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<title>The theory of realism</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>

<idno>sslct018</idno>

<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any

way</p>

<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>

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<date>24/10/2000</date><equipment><p>audio</p></equipment>

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<person id="nm1160" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm1160, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

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<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Politics</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ss</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG2</item>

<item n="module">Modern International Relations</item>

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<u who="nm1160"> good afternoon ladies and gentlemen perhaps we could make a start <pause dur="3.8"/> thank you very much # <pause dur="1.3"/> a couple of quick announcements <pause dur="0.5"/> before we start # <pause dur="0.6"/> would the <pause dur="0.2"/> group of students who are due to meet <pause dur="0.7"/> <gap reason="name" extent="2 words"/> that's not the one that's already <pause dur="0.4"/> had the first class but the other group <pause dur="0.6"/> he's asked me if you could meet him at three o'clock on Friday <pause dur="0.5"/> this week <pause dur="0.5"/> in room two-five-seven <pause dur="1.2"/> so if you could <pause dur="1.9"/> meet him in room two-five-seven at three o'clock <pause dur="0.7"/> this Friday afternoon <pause dur="2.9"/> the second is to announce that the last four lectures which are <pause dur="0.4"/> on your # sheet as to be announced <pause dur="0.5"/> will be given by # <gap reason="name" extent="2 words"/> <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.9"/> # she's asked me also to point out that she intends to <pause dur="0.5"/> # reinstate the human rights lecture <pause dur="0.4"/> and we're going to delete the one on <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> domestic sources of foreign policy <pause dur="2.9"/> today i'm going to <pause dur="0.3"/> turn my attention to probably one of the <pause dur="0.5"/> longest lasting theories of international <pause dur="0.5"/> relations <pause dur="1.3"/> # and that is the theory of realism <pause dur="1.2"/> in international relations <pause dur="2.5"/> for many years <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="1.1"/> key textbook on

international politics <pause dur="0.5"/> was a book by a man called Hans J Morgenthau <pause dur="0.7"/> an American academic <pause dur="0.3"/> who wrote <pause dur="0.3"/> various editions <pause dur="0.3"/> of his <pause dur="0.7"/> major work <pause dur="0.2"/> Politics Among Nations <pause dur="1.8"/> in this book <pause dur="0.5"/> Morgenthau outlines the theory of realism as it applies <pause dur="0.4"/> to international politics <pause dur="0.7"/> and he begins with a very <pause dur="0.2"/> famous <pause dur="0.6"/> # sentence in his book <pause dur="0.6"/> <reading>international politics</reading> he says <pause dur="0.4"/> <reading>like all politics <pause dur="0.3"/> is the struggle for power</reading> <pause dur="2.3"/> he then <pause dur="0.2"/> proceeds to define <pause dur="1.0"/> international relations <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of power <pause dur="0.4"/> and how states acquire retain <pause dur="0.7"/> and # <pause dur="0.3"/> sustain <pause dur="0.2"/> themselves <pause dur="0.8"/> as power # in power <pause dur="2.9"/> for the realist <pause dur="0.6"/> power is the <pause dur="0.2"/> currency of international politics <pause dur="0.3"/> it's the way in which you get on <pause dur="0.2"/> it's the way in which you <pause dur="0.3"/> achieve your objectives <pause dur="1.6"/> power is therefore <pause dur="0.4"/> crucial <pause dur="0.5"/> if you are <pause dur="0.2"/> to be <pause dur="0.2"/> successful <pause dur="3.3"/> there is no other criteria <pause dur="2.1"/> you don't act <pause dur="1.0"/> in a way which is right <pause dur="1.0"/> morally or <pause dur="0.4"/> in any other way <pause dur="0.8"/> you simply <pause dur="0.2"/> do what is necessary <pause dur="2.6"/> morality plays no part <pause dur="1.7"/> power is everything <pause dur="1.2"/> and the world according to

the realist analysis is divided into two <pause dur="0.5"/> broad <pause dur="0.2"/> groups <pause dur="0.2"/> of states <pause dur="0.8"/> those who are satisfied <pause dur="0.7"/> with the status quo and therefore will <pause dur="0.3"/> seek to sustain it <pause dur="0.8"/> and those who are dissatisfied <pause dur="0.4"/> with the status quo who have <pause dur="0.3"/> one of two choices they can either change the status quo <pause dur="0.6"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> they have to accept it <pause dur="1.3"/> so you have dissatisfied powers or revolutionary powers <pause dur="0.4"/> at one end <pause dur="0.3"/> and satisifed <pause dur="0.2"/> status quo powers <pause dur="0.6"/> at the other <pause dur="1.1"/> the world is seen as a hierarchy <pause dur="1.5"/> with the most satisfied and powerful states at the top <pause dur="0.6"/> and the least satisfied <pause dur="0.3"/> and least powerful states <pause dur="0.3"/> at the bottom <pause dur="1.2"/> realists therefore <pause dur="0.7"/> define international politics as the struggle for power <pause dur="1.3"/> the struggle for <pause dur="0.8"/> supremacy <pause dur="1.6"/> they are in many respects rather like Hobbes' <pause dur="0.8"/> analysis of man and the state of nature <pause dur="1.5"/> they see human nature <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> the nature of states as being <pause dur="0.4"/> much the same <pause dur="1.0"/> states are <pause dur="0.5"/> like Hobbes' man <pause dur="1.0"/> motivated by greed and fear <pause dur="1.6"/> according to Morgenthau no state will <pause dur="0.2"/> willingly lose power or give up power <pause dur="0.5"/> or indeed threaten <pause dur="0.9"/> itself or its position <pause dur="0.4"/> by

taking actions which it # cannot achieve <pause dur="1.9"/> so for the realist <pause dur="1.0"/> the analysis is very simple <pause dur="2.2"/> but it becomes a circular argument <pause dur="2.6"/> power is defined in terms of the national interest <pause dur="0.4"/> all states pursue <pause dur="0.3"/> the national interest <pause dur="1.2"/> but in a sense <pause dur="0.3"/> that creates a real problem because <pause dur="1.5"/> it <pause dur="0.2"/> follows that everything that states do is always in the national interest <pause dur="0.4"/> and what <pause dur="0.7"/> the national interest is in is <pause dur="0.3"/> is always what states do in other words you can't <pause dur="0.3"/> get below that # level of analysis <pause dur="0.7"/> because no state will act <pause dur="1.0"/> out of the <pause dur="0.2"/> interests <pause dur="0.5"/> of its national <pause dur="0.4"/> concerns <pause dur="4.2"/> now <pause dur="0.8"/> Morgenthau may have some <pause dur="0.8"/> relevance because of course he was arguing against the ideas <pause dur="0.4"/> of the nineteen-twenties and the nineteeen-thirties <pause dur="0.4"/> which had seen <pause dur="0.3"/> a view that international politics should be more cooperative <pause dur="0.9"/> as initially it had seen the idea of internationalism <pause dur="0.7"/> as being crucial and essential <pause dur="0.8"/> if progress was to be made <pause dur="1.9"/> the future of the world as seen after the end of the First World War <pause dur="0.3"/> as lain <pause dur="0.2"/> with international cooperation <pause dur="1.6"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/>

establishing new forms of international morality <pause dur="0.8"/> in establishing <pause dur="0.3"/> some forms of cooperative behaviour <pause dur="0.3"/> between states <pause dur="0.5"/> a collective agreement as to what was right <pause dur="0.4"/> and what was wrong <pause dur="1.9"/> Morgenthau argues strongly against this <pause dur="2.6"/> his view <pause dur="0.3"/> was such a <pause dur="0.3"/> # the the liberal <pause dur="0.7"/> idealist view of the world <pause dur="0.7"/> that in fact you could create a <pause dur="0.4"/> a a <pause dur="0.3"/> cooperative world was simply <pause dur="0.9"/> not <pause dur="0.5"/> related <pause dur="0.3"/> to the realities of politics <pause dur="0.7"/> but what in fact happened then was that you simply threatened <pause dur="0.2"/> your own existence <pause dur="1.1"/> by being nice to people <pause dur="0.2"/> you ended up <pause dur="0.2"/> in more trouble <pause dur="0.2"/> than being nasty to them <pause dur="1.1"/> states who didn't <pause dur="0.2"/> seek to defend <pause dur="0.4"/> their power position <pause dur="0.3"/> simply <pause dur="0.2"/> would <pause dur="0.2"/> not <pause dur="0.4"/> be able <pause dur="0.7"/> to survive <pause dur="1.2"/> so that was the problem <pause dur="1.0"/> the problem as far as Morgenthau was concerned was if you acted morally <pause dur="0.3"/> you put at risk <pause dur="0.7"/> the interests of your state <pause dur="3.3"/> and therefore <pause dur="0.2"/> states should simply ignore morality <pause dur="0.7"/> he wrote a famous article called The Twilight of International Morality <pause dur="0.6"/> in which he argued very strongly that the purpose of morality <pause dur="0.4"/>

purpose of ideology as well <pause dur="0.4"/> was simply <pause dur="0.2"/> to provide a gloss <pause dur="0.2"/> for what you would do <pause dur="0.2"/> anyway <pause dur="2.1"/> in other words nobody goes out and says <pause dur="0.2"/> i'm going to war against this country because it's smaller <pause dur="0.3"/> and i can beat the hell out of it <pause dur="0.5"/> you go to war because of <pause dur="0.2"/> international principles <pause dur="0.6"/> but the reality is <pause dur="0.2"/> that you choose war <pause dur="0.2"/> because you think you can win it <pause dur="1.4"/> and then you find some reason <pause dur="0.3"/> for doing <pause dur="0.4"/> for for taking <pause dur="0.2"/> # the military <pause dur="0.2"/> action <pause dur="0.4"/> you don't <pause dur="0.3"/> in other words <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> make moral judgements <pause dur="0.2"/> about <pause dur="0.2"/> the use of force <pause dur="3.4"/> so Morgenthau presents a very <trunc>s</trunc> extreme view of realism <pause dur="1.1"/> that the only thing that matters is power <pause dur="0.4"/> that the only way in which states will <pause dur="0.5"/> will respond to each other <pause dur="0.3"/> is <pause dur="0.3"/> in their perception <pause dur="0.3"/> of other states' power <pause dur="1.3"/> and that <pause dur="0.5"/> essentially <pause dur="0.4"/> international politics is an anarchic system <pause dur="0.4"/> in which only the powerful will succeed <pause dur="3.7"/> the problem however <pause dur="0.3"/> with Morgenthau's analysis and with the realist analysis <pause dur="0.6"/> lies in the number of directions <pause dur="1.5"/> the first is <pause dur="0.9"/> that <pause dur="1.9"/> they're not united in what <pause dur="0.4"/> they

believe <pause dur="0.7"/> should be <pause dur="0.4"/> the role of states <pause dur="0.2"/> even Morgenthau <pause dur="0.5"/> who in his book <pause dur="0.2"/> claims that <pause dur="0.5"/> his analysis of international politics <pause dur="0.2"/> simply reflects <pause dur="0.2"/> what actually happens <pause dur="0.5"/> complains <pause dur="0.4"/> # halfway through the book that America isn't actually <pause dur="0.4"/> conforming <pause dur="0.2"/> to the rules which he's actually laid down <pause dur="0.6"/> and has asserted that all states <pause dur="0.2"/> always follow <pause dur="0.4"/> so in other words he's actually saying <pause dur="0.4"/> here's the theory <pause dur="0.2"/> but in fact unfortunately <pause dur="0.4"/> # states <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>don't <vocal desc="laugh" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.3"/> abide <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/>by my theory <pause dur="0.4"/> which of course <pause dur="0.2"/> is nevertheless <pause dur="0.2"/> an accurate description <pause dur="0.3"/> of how states always behave <pause dur="2.9"/> so <pause dur="0.8"/> in reality states don't always act as the realists <pause dur="0.4"/> would wish <pause dur="0.9"/> nevertheless the realists did have a genuine point <pause dur="0.5"/> in the sense that they were arguing against those <pause dur="0.4"/> who believed that <pause dur="0.4"/> policy should be motivated by <pause dur="0.4"/> idealistic <pause dur="0.3"/> and <trunc>morali</trunc> # moralistic <pause dur="0.3"/> views <pause dur="0.7"/> to take one example <pause dur="1.0"/> in the post-nineteen-forty-five period <pause dur="0.5"/> there were those in the United States who sincerely believed <pause dur="0.5"/> that because democracy <pause dur="0.3"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>ec</trunc> and the market economy <pause dur="0.2"/> was so

morally superior <pause dur="0.4"/> it was the duty of the United States <pause dur="0.4"/> to roll back the frontiers of communism <pause dur="0.3"/> to liberate Eastern Europe <pause dur="0.4"/> by military means <pause dur="0.2"/> if necessary <pause dur="1.5"/> whilst the realists might agree <pause dur="0.2"/> that that would be a laudable objective <pause dur="0.5"/> they equally firmly argued <pause dur="0.2"/> that that was not <pause dur="0.3"/> a real <pause dur="0.4"/> possibility <pause dur="0.5"/> that you could not roll back frontiers of communism <pause dur="0.3"/> because such <pause dur="0.6"/> to try to do so <pause dur="0.2"/> would simply put at risk <pause dur="0.3"/> all <pause dur="0.2"/> that the United States stood for <pause dur="2.0"/>

and <pause dur="0.2"/> particularly in the age of nuclear weapons and once <pause dur="0.4"/> the Soviet Union could respond in nuclear kind <pause dur="0.3"/> it was the there was little point <pause dur="0.6"/> in doing so <pause dur="0.9"/> there was no point in being right <pause dur="0.4"/> but very <pause dur="0.2"/> very <pause dur="0.2"/> dead <pause dur="1.5"/> so for the realists the argument is very much a practical one <pause dur="0.3"/> as well <pause dur="0.4"/> as a theoretical one <pause dur="1.1"/> now that doesn't mean to say that realists and idealists don't always agree <pause dur="0.8"/> indeed in Korea <pause dur="0.9"/> during the Korean War <pause dur="0.4"/> or perhaps more recently during the Gulf War <pause dur="0.6"/> you could get both realists and idealists agreeing <pause dur="0.5"/> on the outcome even though they actually <pause dur="0.2"/>

came to it <pause dur="0.2"/> from two entirely different viewpoints <pause dur="0.6"/> on the one side the realists <pause dur="0.2"/> would argue <pause dur="0.3"/> the key issue in the Gulf is oil <pause dur="0.2"/> and therefore it's in <pause dur="0.3"/> the United States' interests <pause dur="0.4"/> to secure <trunc>oi</trunc> oil supplies <pause dur="0.2"/> prevent <pause dur="0.4"/> Saddam Hussein from controlling a large <pause dur="0.6"/> # section of the world's oil supplies <pause dur="1.8"/> so the United States should take military action <pause dur="0.3"/> and on the other side there would be the idealists who said this was poor little country <pause dur="0.3"/> invaded by a rather larger country <pause dur="0.2"/> it was the duty of the international community <pause dur="0.3"/> to defend <pause dur="0.4"/> the right of Kuwait <pause dur="0.4"/> to sovereign <pause dur="0.3"/> independence <pause dur="0.3"/> and existence <pause dur="1.4"/> so both agree <pause dur="0.2"/> on military action <pause dur="0.3"/> but from entirely different perspective <pause dur="0.3"/> one saying it's our moral duty <pause dur="0.3"/> the other saying it's the interests <pause dur="0.2"/> of the state <pause dur="0.8"/> which is important <pause dur="4.9"/> there however <pause dur="0.2"/> remain significant problems <pause dur="0.2"/> with the analysis which # <pause dur="0.3"/> Morgenthau and others <pause dur="0.5"/> bring forward <pause dur="0.8"/> first of all in defining what is the national interest <pause dur="1.2"/> whose interests <pause dur="0.4"/> are to be defined as the national interest <pause dur="1.5"/> here we

have the same sort of problem as you get in <pause dur="0.3"/> political philosophy in relation to Rousseau <pause dur="2.9"/> in relation to the will of all <pause dur="0.5"/> and the general will <pause dur="3.7"/> Morgenthau's answer to that is that in the sense the national interest <pause dur="0.3"/> is so self-evident <pause dur="0.6"/> that in fact you don't need to define it <pause dur="2.1"/> but that's a bit of a cop out really because you do need to actually know <pause dur="0.3"/> what the national interest is <pause dur="0.4"/> if you're going to pursue it <pause dur="0.6"/> and simply to assert <pause dur="0.3"/> that to retain your power is in the national interest <pause dur="0.3"/> seems to me to be <pause dur="0.2"/> an inadequate explanation <pause dur="0.8"/> it's also very much related to time constraints <pause dur="1.7"/> how much time has to expire before you know whether something is in the national interest <pause dur="1.2"/> let's take the case of Germany <pause dur="1.4"/> Germany between nineteen-thirty-six and <pause dur="0.4"/> nineteen-forty-two or thereabouts <pause dur="0.3"/> could be said to have <pause dur="0.5"/> gained as a result of the Nazi <pause dur="0.3"/> government they had expanded <pause dur="0.3"/> Germany they had occupied most of Europe <pause dur="0.5"/> they were being highly <trunc>su</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> successful <pause dur="1.0"/> in military terms <pause dur="0.8"/> between nineteen-forty-three

and nineteen-forty-five <pause dur="0.6"/> Germany lost everything so perhaps the Second World War wasn't quite so <pause dur="0.3"/> in America # sorry in in Germany's <pause dur="0.3"/> # national interest <pause dur="0.9"/> but view that from the year two-thousand you could certainly argue that <pause dur="0.5"/> not only was it in the national interests of Germany to fight the Second World War <pause dur="0.3"/> it was in the national interests of Germany to lose the Second World War <pause dur="0.3"/> because Germany has become by far and away the strongest state <pause dur="0.5"/> in Europe <pause dur="1.4"/> so in a sense <pause dur="1.1"/> it depends on how you define <pause dur="0.2"/> success <pause dur="0.4"/> and what kind of time scale <pause dur="0.4"/> you're looking at as to whether or not <pause dur="0.3"/> a particular policy or a particular approach <pause dur="0.6"/> is <pause dur="0.3"/> in the national interest <pause dur="2.7"/> the third problem is the problem of power <pause dur="0.5"/> what constitutes power <pause dur="2.2"/> now we all have a fairly <pause dur="0.8"/> broad view <pause dur="0.3"/> of what we mean by power <pause dur="0.8"/> but really the realists are only concerned <pause dur="1.0"/> in their analysis with military power <pause dur="1.7"/> military power is the tangible power that you can see <pause dur="0.8"/> that states <pause dur="0.2"/> actually have <pause dur="1.1"/> but power is much more significant than that <pause dur="1.2"/> power <pause dur="1.3"/>

may be the currency of international relations but some of it is not easily measurable <pause dur="1.6"/> the bits that are <pause dur="0.5"/> we can look at and compare <pause dur="1.1"/> so for example <pause dur="1.2"/> we can <pause dur="0.4"/> look at the size of a country's <pause dur="0.2"/> military capabilities <pause dur="3.4"/> tells us very little how about the quality <pause dur="0.4"/> of those <pause dur="0.2"/> capabilities <pause dur="0.4"/> and there are some states who genuinely believe <pause dur="0.3"/> that quantity <pause dur="0.2"/> will always overcome quality <pause dur="1.0"/> but nevertheless it is an important factor <pause dur="0.2"/> which needs to be considered <pause dur="1.9"/> how good <pause dur="0.3"/> are the weapons <pause dur="1.8"/> how accurate are they <pause dur="0.2"/> how effective <pause dur="3.8"/> what about the size of the population <pause dur="1.0"/> that again gives you some clue <pause dur="0.3"/> as to <pause dur="0.4"/> how <pause dur="0.2"/> large an army <pause dur="0.2"/> a country <pause dur="0.2"/> might be able <pause dur="0.5"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> # deploy <pause dur="0.5"/> in times of emergency <pause dur="1.2"/> what is the strength of the economy <pause dur="0.9"/> is it a modern economy is it <pause dur="0.3"/> is it <pause dur="0.3"/> # is there a well educated population <pause dur="0.6"/> we can measure most of these factors <pause dur="0.5"/> in terms of almost every state and every year <pause dur="0.3"/> for example the International Institute <pause dur="0.2"/> for Strategic Studies <pause dur="0.3"/> produces a list <pause dur="0.3"/> of the military capability <pause dur="0.3"/> of almost every state <pause dur="1.6"/> so anybody

who wants to look up how strong a particular country is <pause dur="0.4"/> you can look up <pause dur="0.3"/> and find out <pause dur="1.1"/> but that doesn't really tell you <pause dur="0.4"/> very much <pause dur="1.8"/> there are also immeasurable elements <pause dur="0.6"/> of power <pause dur="1.3"/> power is relative <pause dur="0.5"/> and it is psychological <pause dur="1.4"/> power is relative in the sense <pause dur="0.4"/> that whilst we may have a general hierarchy <pause dur="0.2"/> of states <pause dur="0.5"/> you can still have regional great powers <pause dur="0.4"/> who may not <pause dur="0.2"/> necessarily meet <pause dur="0.2"/> the reach the top ten <pause dur="0.3"/> internationally <pause dur="0.4"/> but who are still great powers <pause dur="0.4"/> in their locality <pause dur="0.2"/> and who can influence <pause dur="0.2"/> and effectively <pause dur="0.3"/> manipulate <pause dur="0.3"/> states <pause dur="0.2"/> around them <pause dur="3.6"/> secondly people may perceive one state as being more powerful than it actually is or less powerful <pause dur="1.4"/> Britain is a very good example of a state <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> after nineteen-forty-five <pause dur="0.5"/> proclaimed itself to be a great power <pause dur="0.4"/> and possibly for about a decade after the end of the Second World War <pause dur="0.3"/> was regarded by almost everybody <pause dur="0.3"/> as a great power <pause dur="1.1"/> so in order to be <pause dur="0.5"/> to have your power acknowledged <pause dur="0.3"/> is a very important factor in terms <pause dur="0.3"/> of <pause dur="0.6"/> public assessment <pause dur="0.4"/> of your power

capabilities <pause dur="1.2"/> states simply can't assert that they are powerful <pause dur="0.5"/> other people have to recognize it as such <pause dur="4.4"/> states may <pause dur="0.7"/> not be powerful if they are divided amongst themselves <pause dur="1.3"/> however much <pause dur="0.2"/> your military capability <pause dur="0.3"/> may be it may be ineffectual <pause dur="0.4"/> if in fact <pause dur="0.3"/> you are <pause dur="0.3"/> have a weak government <pause dur="0.7"/> a divided country <pause dur="1.3"/> a country which is simply <pause dur="0.4"/> unable <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> get its act <pause dur="0.2"/> together <pause dur="0.7"/> to use one example <pause dur="0.4"/> the example of Laos <pause dur="0.3"/> or Cambodia during the <pause dur="0.3"/> nineteen-fifties and sixties <pause dur="0.2"/> had a neutralist government <pause dur="1.0"/> to the north <pause dur="0.4"/> # of the sort of # in northern <pause dur="0.4"/> Laos and northern Cambodia you had communists <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> dominance to the south you had western <pause dur="0.2"/> capitalist dominance <pause dur="0.3"/> and so you had compromised on a government <pause dur="0.2"/> that was a neutral government neither capitalist nor communist <pause dur="0.4"/> but virtually incapable of doing anything <pause dur="4.8"/> or France in nineteen-forty which collapsed <pause dur="1.7"/> as a result of <trunc>inter</trunc> in part at least as a result of internal divisions <pause dur="0.3"/> within France <pause dur="0.8"/> and the effectiveness <pause dur="0.4"/> of German propaganda <pause dur="1.1"/> we cannot measure <pause dur="0.4"/> people's

determination to fight <pause dur="1.4"/> and a classic example <pause dur="0.5"/> of this <pause dur="0.6"/> # would be <pause dur="0.4"/> Israel in the modern <pause dur="0.3"/> day <pause dur="0.2"/> we can take Israel today <pause dur="0.7"/> Israel <pause dur="0.6"/> is <pause dur="0.9"/> a very small country with a <trunc>ve</trunc> relatively small <pause dur="0.3"/> population and certainly <pause dur="0.5"/> if you simply add up the population <pause dur="0.4"/> significantly weaker <pause dur="0.3"/> than its Arab neighbours <pause dur="1.0"/> and yet Israel has fought <pause dur="0.3"/> a number of wars <pause dur="0.2"/> in the past <pause dur="0.5"/> and survived and been successful <pause dur="0.9"/> why <pause dur="0.6"/> because it is more determined to do so <pause dur="0.9"/> it is more determined <pause dur="0.9"/> because for Israel <pause dur="0.7"/> one loss is one loss <pause dur="0.2"/> too many <pause dur="1.1"/> it simply would not survive <pause dur="1.4"/> and therefore <pause dur="0.4"/> however small you are you may be very determined <pause dur="0.5"/> to be successful <pause dur="0.3"/> and to survive <pause dur="0.5"/> i'm not arguing that this will always be <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> <vocal desc="laugh" iterated="n"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> mean that you can <pause dur="0.5"/> be successful <pause dur="0.7"/> but the motivation is a very powerful element <pause dur="0.4"/> in getting people <pause dur="0.3"/> to fight <pause dur="0.6"/> and to sustain their position <pause dur="4.7"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> when we look at power <pause dur="0.9"/> we can't always <pause dur="0.2"/> add up <pause dur="0.5"/> the numbers <pause dur="1.0"/> and be certain <pause dur="0.3"/> that one state is more powerful <pause dur="0.4"/> than another <pause dur="2.7"/> in the last analysis <pause dur="0.7"/> power exists at three

different levels <pause dur="1.0"/> it exists at the level of influence how people <pause dur="0.2"/> influence other states <pause dur="0.7"/> well you can do that <pause dur="0.3"/> physically by sending a gunboat <pause dur="0.5"/> harassing people threatening people <pause dur="2.1"/> but occasionally and quite often <pause dur="0.4"/> influence can far exceed <pause dur="0.7"/> your physical capacity <pause dur="0.4"/> # to force an action <pause dur="0.6"/> that is to say <pause dur="1.1"/> organizations like <pause dur="0.3"/> the Vatican <pause dur="0.3"/> have enormous influence around the world <pause dur="0.5"/> but have very little power <pause dur="1.4"/> a country like Britain has got enormous influence <pause dur="0.5"/> but <pause dur="0.2"/> comparatively <pause dur="0.3"/> declining power <pause dur="4.7"/> you can also have <pause dur="1.1"/> mobilized power <pause dur="0.4"/> let's say <pause dur="0.5"/> how much power you actually have available to you <pause dur="0.2"/> at any given moment <pause dur="0.8"/> mobilized power <pause dur="0.2"/> is the amount of power <pause dur="0.2"/> which you can normally deploy <pause dur="0.3"/> in <pause dur="0.6"/> peacetime <pause dur="0.4"/> conditions <pause dur="1.0"/> and then you've got total power <pause dur="0.3"/> which is what you can achieve <pause dur="0.3"/> when you mobilize fully and completely <pause dur="0.3"/> onto a war footing <pause dur="1.3"/> and how quickly you can do that <pause dur="0.3"/> how effectively you can do that <pause dur="0.4"/> is a further factor <pause dur="0.5"/> in determining how powerful <pause dur="0.3"/> you may be <pause dur="0.9"/> many states <pause dur="0.3"/> have often been frightened <pause dur="0.4"/> of a

surprise attack <pause dur="1.1"/> and however powerful you may be <pause dur="0.3"/> you can sometimes be the victim <pause dur="0.3"/> of such attacks <pause dur="1.1"/> furthermore <pause dur="1.8"/> it's become increasingly clear in the modern world <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.9"/> the kind of military capability that states have <pause dur="0.3"/> may not always be <pause dur="0.4"/> relevant <pause dur="0.2"/> to the particular operations <pause dur="0.4"/> which they wish to undertake <pause dur="1.4"/> nobody would suggest that because the United States failed in Vietnam <pause dur="0.5"/> Vietnam was more in powerful <pause dur="0.4"/> than the United States <pause dur="0.6"/> all one can say <pause dur="0.4"/> is that the <trunc>f</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> power that was available to the United States <pause dur="0.2"/> was inappropriate for use <pause dur="0.3"/> in Vietnam <pause dur="1.0"/> and therefore <pause dur="0.7"/> no state <pause dur="0.4"/> in a sense has absolute power <pause dur="0.4"/> in the international <pause dur="0.3"/> community <pause dur="2.5"/> a second and perhaps more interesting point is that economic power <pause dur="0.9"/> is <pause dur="0.7"/> equally significant <pause dur="1.1"/> and something which in a sense the realists <pause dur="0.3"/> have paid very little attention to <pause dur="2.9"/> economic power <pause dur="0.9"/> may be <pause dur="0.2"/> differently distributed <pause dur="0.5"/> from <pause dur="1.6"/> military power <pause dur="1.0"/> indeed if you go <pause dur="1.6"/> back in history <pause dur="1.2"/> when you look back to the nineteenth century and the eighteenth century <pause dur="0.9"/> most of the

knowledge great powers of that era <pause dur="1.4"/> were in fact also the economic giants <pause dur="1.2"/> but in the twentieth century <pause dur="0.7"/> we find that that has not always been the case <pause dur="1.0"/> if we look at the <pause dur="0.3"/> period after nineteen-forty-five for example <pause dur="0.3"/> nobody would really argue that the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.3"/> was ever <pause dur="0.2"/> an economic great power <pause dur="1.0"/> but militarily <pause dur="0.3"/> it was second <pause dur="0.8"/> in the world to the United States in terms of its military capability <pause dur="2.3"/> so <pause dur="1.0"/> there has become a growing mismatch between economic power <pause dur="0.4"/> and military power <pause dur="0.9"/> and some states have used economic power <pause dur="0.5"/> very sucessfully <pause dur="0.2"/> to achieve their objectives <pause dur="0.3"/> in the international community <pause dur="1.6"/> so that economic power has become a new reality <pause dur="0.8"/> which in a sense the realists <pause dur="0.2"/> have failed to take into account <pause dur="0.5"/> neo-realists <pause dur="0.4"/> people like Kenneth Waltz and others <pause dur="0.3"/> in more recent times <pause dur="0.3"/> have however <pause dur="0.3"/> taken that <pause dur="0.5"/> into account in their analysis <pause dur="0.5"/> of international politics <pause dur="4.1"/> is it true <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>howe</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> also that in fact states do not behave according to some <pause dur="0.6"/> basic <pause dur="0.2"/> feelings <pause dur="0.2"/> of morality <pause dur="0.8"/> i think here again

the realist analysis <pause dur="0.3"/> is simply inaccurate <pause dur="1.5"/> of course it's true that states will not <pause dur="0.4"/> act simply out of <pause dur="0.6"/> # a feeling that <pause dur="0.2"/> what they should ought to do <pause dur="0.5"/> should be moral <pause dur="1.0"/> and states will of course choose to do <pause dur="0.2"/> a series of immoral <pause dur="0.5"/> actions <pause dur="1.7"/> but as <pause dur="0.2"/> Arnold Wolfers one of the early realists argued <pause dur="0.8"/> in a famous # article <pause dur="0.2"/> called Statesmanship and Moral Choice <pause dur="0.8"/> states do make choices <pause dur="0.8"/> and they do make them on the basis of some moral values <pause dur="1.6"/> given the fact that you may have objective which can be achieved by more than one means <pause dur="0.7"/> then you can choose the least immoral <pause dur="0.4"/> of a range of immoral actions <pause dur="0.9"/> that's not saying you're going to act morally <pause dur="0.3"/> but there is a degree of moral choice <pause dur="0.3"/> between sort of bombing somebody <pause dur="0.2"/> and maybe <pause dur="0.2"/> using less intrusive means <pause dur="4.0"/> now the analysis which the realists have offered <pause dur="2.0"/> adds <pause dur="0.2"/> one further <pause dur="0.6"/> element and <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>rather interestingly <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.3"/> it becomes a moral imparity <pause dur="1.7"/> the realist analysis <pause dur="2.4"/> is that order <pause dur="0.4"/> is more important than justice <pause dur="0.3"/> in the international community <pause dur="2.6"/> to the realist <pause dur="0.5"/>

what is important <pause dur="0.8"/> is that peace is preserved <pause dur="3.3"/> not because it is <pause dur="0.2"/> morally good <pause dur="0.6"/> but because it benefits <pause dur="0.4"/> those that are at the top of the international <pause dur="0.6"/> system <pause dur="2.4"/> when you're at the top <pause dur="0.5"/> you don't want to risk anything <pause dur="0.4"/> you become more conservative with a small C <pause dur="0.7"/> you want to have <pause dur="0.2"/> a conservative view <pause dur="0.3"/> you don't risk anything <pause dur="0.4"/> you don't put your head above the parapet <pause dur="0.3"/> you want order <pause dur="0.2"/> in order that your trade will continue <pause dur="0.2"/> that your economic prosperity will continue <pause dur="0.3"/> that your interests will be safeguarded <pause dur="0.5"/> and you don't risk anything <pause dur="1.1"/> of course <pause dur="0.5"/> if anybody threatens you <pause dur="0.2"/> you will fight them <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> presuming you're <pause dur="0.6"/> as powerful as you think you are <pause dur="0.5"/> you will defeat them <pause dur="1.1"/> but the reality is <pause dur="0.5"/> you want order <pause dur="0.6"/> order is by far and away the most important value <pause dur="0.3"/> as far as the realist is concerned <pause dur="5.8"/> other people would argue that justice is more important <pause dur="3.0"/> that you cannot have <pause dur="0.2"/> a real <pause dur="0.6"/> just <pause dur="0.2"/> world <pause dur="0.6"/> a peaceful world <pause dur="0.2"/> unless there is proper justice <pause dur="1.1"/> people will always be dissatisfied <pause dur="0.6"/> if they cannot see <pause dur="0.3"/> that their legitimate complaints <pause dur="0.3"/> will be dealt with <pause dur="0.4"/> and if at all possible remedied <pause dur="2.1"/>

the reality is that for those who are dissatisfied <pause dur="0.3"/> with the status quo <pause dur="0.9"/> which is essentially what the realists support <pause dur="1.9"/> have <pause dur="0.5"/> to change that status quo <pause dur="0.4"/> by military means <pause dur="0.9"/> the only way <pause dur="0.6"/> in which a <pause dur="0.6"/> status quo can be changed <pause dur="0.5"/> is by <pause dur="0.5"/> replacing those at the top <pause dur="0.5"/> with a new <pause dur="0.3"/> international order <pause dur="2.3"/> and the general belief is that that can only be achieved by military means <pause dur="3.2"/> now in reality of course <pause dur="1.1"/> that may not be true <pause dur="1.3"/> some states can achieve objectives using economic means <pause dur="1.4"/> and provide tremendous impact on <pause dur="0.5"/> the international economy <pause dur="0.5"/> such as raising the price of oil <pause dur="2.0"/> but in <pause dur="0.2"/> but in the realists' analysis <pause dur="0.6"/> you are faced with a very stark choice <pause dur="0.5"/> there is order <pause dur="0.8"/> in which <pause dur="0.2"/> states <pause dur="0.2"/> at the top <pause dur="0.4"/> dispense <pause dur="0.9"/> what they regard as justice <pause dur="1.7"/> # or there is anarchy <pause dur="2.7"/> others on the other hand would <pause dur="0.2"/> would argue that in <pause dur="0.2"/> it is an anarchy because there is no justice <pause dur="1.5"/> why is it that two-thirds of the world <pause dur="0.2"/> consume <pause dur="0.5"/> less than a third of the world's resources <pause dur="1.3"/> is this not an unfair <pause dur="0.4"/> and unreasonable distribution <pause dur="0.6"/> both of <pause dur="0.3"/>

the resources of the world <pause dur="0.2"/> and of power <pause dur="1.7"/> that more equal division of power <pause dur="0.4"/> will lead to more peaceful <pause dur="1.8"/> relations <pause dur="1.1"/> particularly <pause dur="0.4"/> given the fact that more people will be satisfied <pause dur="0.6"/> than dissatisfied <pause dur="4.3"/> now <pause dur="0.7"/> one way in which states can increase their power <pause dur="0.3"/> is through alliances <pause dur="0.9"/> they can achieve <pause dur="1.2"/> what they cannot achieve alone <pause dur="0.8"/> by joining with others <pause dur="1.4"/> and alliances can be created <pause dur="0.6"/> in the short term <pause dur="0.3"/> for short term gains <pause dur="0.4"/> they can be economic alliances they can be diplomatic alliances <pause dur="0.4"/> they can be military alliances <pause dur="0.7"/> alliances enable you <pause dur="0.2"/> to change the power relationship <pause dur="2.6"/> and to achieve far more collectively <pause dur="0.7"/> than individually <pause dur="2.4"/> but the difference between that kind of collectivism <pause dur="0.5"/> which realists would approve of <pause dur="0.8"/> and the collectivism <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> the idealists <pause dur="1.0"/> is that <pause dur="0.9"/> under alliances <pause dur="0.3"/> you choose your partners <pause dur="0.5"/> and you choose the purposes <pause dur="0.4"/> for which <pause dur="0.3"/> you form <pause dur="0.2"/> an alliance <pause dur="5.4"/> the <pause dur="0.6"/> realists would argue that <pause dur="0.7"/> it is only makes sense <pause dur="0.3"/> if you have common objectives <pause dur="0.3"/> to join together <pause dur="0.2"/> to achieve them <pause dur="1.3"/> as happened

during the Second World War <pause dur="0.2"/> it doesn't require ideological <pause dur="0.5"/> considerations <pause dur="0.5"/> if you have a common enemy <pause dur="0.3"/> you'll join together <pause dur="0.2"/> to fight <pause dur="0.2"/> against that common enemy <pause dur="0.9"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> that's as really as we'd have predicted all that as quickly <pause dur="0.4"/> as you came together <pause dur="0.3"/> you disintegrated because you always fall out <pause dur="0.3"/> over who's going to get <pause dur="0.3"/> the biggest spoils <pause dur="0.2"/> at the end <pause dur="0.2"/> of that conflict <pause dur="1.5"/> but alliances <pause dur="0.3"/> are ways of increasing power <pause dur="0.2"/> in the short term <pause dur="1.3"/> very few alliances <pause dur="0.4"/> last longer <pause dur="0.4"/> than the existence <pause dur="0.3"/> of the threat <pause dur="0.3"/> that created them <pause dur="6.3"/> so that realists have a view of the world which is very simple <pause dur="3.1"/> the world is divided to some extent into good guys and bad guys <pause dur="1.4"/> the good guys are the people you agree with the bad guys are the people who are trying to upset you <pause dur="1.4"/> they have a simplistic view <pause dur="0.6"/> of how states interreact <pause dur="0.7"/> they see it in terms of power <pause dur="1.5"/> the only thing that matters <pause dur="0.3"/> is whether i am more powerful <pause dur="0.4"/> than another state <pause dur="0.3"/> or that state is more powerful <pause dur="0.3"/> than i am <pause dur="1.9"/> and it's a very simplistic <pause dur="0.2"/>

analysis of power because it simply <pause dur="0.3"/> seeks to identify <pause dur="0.2"/> military power <pause dur="0.5"/> of the main means by which states <pause dur="0.5"/> interreact <pause dur="2.5"/> it excludes morality <pause dur="0.3"/> there's no moral <pause dur="0.5"/> considerations at all <pause dur="1.5"/> except in so far as you might choose <pause dur="0.7"/> not so bad <pause dur="0.8"/> a means <pause dur="0.4"/> of achieving your objective <pause dur="1.1"/> and the example which Wolfers uses <pause dur="0.3"/> is the example <pause dur="0.2"/> of the Cuban missile crisis <pause dur="1.7"/> where he says look <pause dur="1.9"/> let's consider what the options of the United States were <pause dur="1.0"/> they could have written a nice letter to Mr Gorbachev <pause dur="0.2"/> sorry to Mr <trunc>gru</trunc> Khrushchev <pause dur="0.4"/> and say <pause dur="0.2"/> # please take your missiles away <pause dur="0.5"/> doesn't seem very likely that would be happen <pause dur="1.2"/> they could ignore it they can simply say it's none of our business <pause dur="1.8"/> they could bomb the missile sites <pause dur="1.5"/> they could invade <pause dur="1.0"/> or they could <pause dur="1.0"/> set up <pause dur="0.2"/> some kind of quarantine <pause dur="0.4"/> to stop the military <pause dur="0.5"/> capability <pause dur="0.2"/> getting through <pause dur="2.2"/> Wolfers' argument is that Kennedy chose <pause dur="0.4"/> the least worst of those options that were available to him <pause dur="0.2"/> he dismissed the idea of writing to Khrushchev <pause dur="0.6"/> or ignoring it completely <pause dur="2.2"/>

and that was to set up a quarantine <pause dur="1.1"/> because that was the least worst option because it threatened nobody <pause dur="0.5"/> except those who wished to either <pause dur="0.3"/> run <pause dur="0.2"/> the quarantine <pause dur="0.6"/> or attempt <pause dur="0.2"/> to # <pause dur="0.3"/> # force their way through it <pause dur="2.6"/> it threatened no Cubans it threatened no Russians <pause dur="0.9"/> but it demonstrated America's commitment <pause dur="0.3"/> to do something <pause dur="0.2"/> positive <pause dur="0.2"/> about getting rid <pause dur="0.5"/> of the missiles it achieved its objectives <pause dur="3.8"/> so there is an element of morality but it's not very <pause dur="0.2"/> strong <pause dur="1.6"/> where i think there <pause dur="0.2"/> there is a weakness however <pause dur="0.2"/> is that most states seek to defend their actions in moral terms <pause dur="0.5"/> very few states <pause dur="0.3"/> seek to actually <pause dur="0.6"/> announce that they're doing something <pause dur="0.4"/> just because they can do it <pause dur="0.9"/> they always find some reason <pause dur="0.8"/> ideological <pause dur="2.1"/> or moral <pause dur="0.7"/> to justify the actions <pause dur="0.3"/> which they have taken <pause dur="3.0"/> and you have to ask yourself why <pause dur="0.9"/> why do states do this if in fact <pause dur="0.4"/> everybody knows that states are simply out for themselves <pause dur="0.5"/> if everybody knows that the only thing that really matters <pause dur="0.3"/> is power <pause dur="0.8"/> why do you feel the

necessity to defend yourself <pause dur="1.0"/> against <pause dur="0.3"/> world opinion <pause dur="1.6"/> and i suppose the answer to that is <pause dur="0.4"/> that in fact states like to be liked <pause dur="2.0"/> they don't like to be seen <pause dur="0.2"/> as bullies <pause dur="0.6"/> they don't like to be seen <pause dur="0.4"/> as people who ignore the rights of others <pause dur="2.4"/> and so states do feel a certain degree of obligation <pause dur="0.8"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> justify their actions <pause dur="1.7"/> furthermore i think <pause dur="1.2"/> realism <pause dur="0.2"/> excludes the possibility <pause dur="1.5"/> and it's a growing one <pause dur="0.9"/> that <pause dur="2.0"/> states can simply <pause dur="0.3"/> isolate themselves <pause dur="0.5"/> from the ouside world <pause dur="1.2"/> the growth of television the growth of <pause dur="0.2"/> mass communications <pause dur="0.5"/> have meant it's virtually impossible <pause dur="0.6"/> for states to ignore <pause dur="0.4"/> what is going on <pause dur="0.2"/> around them <pause dur="1.3"/> and public opinion <pause dur="0.4"/> has become more important in some respects within states <pause dur="0.8"/> forcing states to do things which they might not otherwise <pause dur="0.6"/> do <pause dur="2.5"/> so the strict application of power <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of <pause dur="0.5"/> maintaining the hierarchy <pause dur="0.8"/> of ignoring the interests of others is simply <pause dur="0.3"/> being slowly <pause dur="0.5"/> withered <pause dur="0.2"/> away <pause dur="1.0"/> i'm not suggesting that there's <pause dur="0.4"/> a tremendous amount of <pause dur="0.4"/> international compassion <pause dur="0.3"/> and so forth <pause dur="0.3"/>

but there is certainly a view <pause dur="0.4"/> that today's states cannot get away <pause dur="0.5"/> as often <pause dur="0.4"/> as they did <pause dur="0.4"/> with simply <pause dur="0.2"/> doing things because it's in their interests <pause dur="0.4"/> to do so <pause dur="3.8"/> furthermore <pause dur="1.1"/> there has been a second line of <pause dur="0.4"/> criticism of <trunc>rea</trunc> of realism <pause dur="0.8"/> not this time from the idealists <pause dur="1.0"/> who simply <pause dur="0.2"/> throw up their hands in despair at the idea <pause dur="0.2"/> that states should simply behave <pause dur="0.3"/> in such a a <pause dur="0.2"/> cavalier way <pause dur="0.9"/> but from those <pause dur="0.2"/> who wish to see <pause dur="0.4"/> a more clearer analysis <pause dur="0.5"/> of international relations <pause dur="0.5"/> based on a more scientific <pause dur="1.0"/> method <pause dur="0.5"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> # study <pause dur="2.5"/> into the <pause dur="0.6"/> debate if that is the right way of <pause dur="0.3"/> putting it <pause dur="0.7"/> came a group of <pause dur="0.7"/> scientists mainly <pause dur="0.9"/> who sought <pause dur="0.5"/> to criticize <pause dur="0.4"/> Morgenthau's view <pause dur="0.5"/> that what he had put forward was a scientific <pause dur="0.3"/> theory <pause dur="0.3"/> of international relations <pause dur="0.5"/> by pointing out first of all <pause dur="0.2"/> that Morgenthau did not set out any <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>preconc</trunc> # <pause dur="0.6"/> did not set out any propositions <pause dur="0.3"/> that he sought to test <pause dur="0.4"/> but merely <pause dur="0.2"/> asserting <pause dur="0.3"/> that the behaviour of states was as he described it <pause dur="0.5"/> and therefore <pause dur="0.6"/> was able to fit everything into his theory <pause dur="2.0"/> but he

also failed to <pause dur="1.6"/> discard <pause dur="0.4"/> his own ideological views <pause dur="2.7"/> and that what was needed was a more scientific <pause dur="0.5"/> and rigorous approach to the study of international politics <pause dur="1.3"/> that yes states behaved <pause dur="0.8"/> in certain ways but they could be seen as behaving <pause dur="0.2"/> in certain ways <pause dur="0.3"/> because of certain <pause dur="0.2"/> variables <pause dur="0.2"/> which operated <pause dur="0.3"/> across all states <pause dur="0.4"/> and in the same way <pause dur="0.3"/> across all states <pause dur="1.1"/> so the scientific analysis of international politics <pause dur="0.8"/> would analyse <pause dur="0.5"/> the ways in which states behave <pause dur="0.7"/> not by <pause dur="0.3"/> asserting beforehand <pause dur="0.4"/> what they would do <pause dur="0.5"/> but by looking at what they did <pause dur="0.3"/> and then trying to understand <pause dur="0.3"/> why it was they behave <pause dur="0.4"/> in the way in which they did <pause dur="2.0"/> Morton Kaplan in his <pause dur="0.4"/> book System and Process in International Politics <pause dur="0.3"/> introduced this new <pause dur="0.7"/> idea of systems analysis <pause dur="1.0"/> that there was such a thing as an international system <pause dur="0.3"/> and the international system <pause dur="0.3"/> simply had to be analysed <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of the way in which <pause dur="0.2"/> it was structured <pause dur="0.2"/> and how <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> subsystems within that system <pause dur="0.5"/> interreacted <pause dur="3.9"/> traditionalists like Morgenthau and others <pause dur="0.7"/>

simply found this <pause dur="0.9"/> beyond comprehension <pause dur="0.8"/> they argued strongly <pause dur="0.3"/> that you couldn't have a scientific study <pause dur="0.3"/> in that sense <pause dur="1.8"/> you couldn't have <pause dur="0.4"/> a study of politics <pause dur="0.6"/> which discounted the human <pause dur="0.2"/> element <pause dur="0.5"/> within it <pause dur="2.9"/> they argued that their analysis of international politics the realist analysis of international politics <pause dur="0.5"/> reflected <pause dur="0.3"/> a broad philosophical <pause dur="0.6"/> tradition <pause dur="0.2"/> about <pause dur="0.3"/> the nature <pause dur="0.3"/> of human beings <pause dur="1.5"/> human beings <pause dur="0.6"/> behaved <pause dur="2.4"/> selfishly <pause dur="1.5"/> that the nature <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> individuals <pause dur="0.5"/> was such <pause dur="0.4"/> that they <pause dur="0.2"/> behaved in the way in which <pause dur="0.6"/> to Morgenthau and others states behaved <pause dur="0.8"/> why <pause dur="0.3"/> because states were made up of human beings <pause dur="1.2"/> the people who made decisions for states <pause dur="1.5"/> translated their individual <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> methods of working <pause dur="0.5"/> to the state level <pause dur="1.8"/> it was individuals who made decisions on behalf of states <pause dur="1.0"/> states <pause dur="0.2"/> themselves couldn't make any decisions at all <pause dur="1.9"/> so that the <pause dur="1.2"/> debate which went on was between those who thought you could understand the international system <pause dur="0.6"/> by looking at <pause dur="1.2"/> issues <pause dur="0.2"/> in a scientific way <pause dur="0.6"/> and those who asserted that it was simply impossible <pause dur="0.5"/> to do so <pause dur="3.3"/>

at a later stage in this debate which to some extent became rather sterile with each side <pause dur="0.7"/> shouting at the other and not really communicating <pause dur="1.0"/> there developed <pause dur="1.1"/> a new version of realism <pause dur="1.0"/> or neo-realism as it became <pause dur="2.7"/> the leading # figure in this # analysis <pause dur="0.4"/> was a man called Kenneth Waltz <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> now Kenneth Waltz's analysis <pause dur="0.4"/> of international relations <pause dur="1.3"/> was very much <pause dur="1.5"/> to attempt <pause dur="0.2"/> the broad principles of realism <pause dur="1.7"/> but to argue <pause dur="0.3"/> that in a sense it needed to be modernized <pause dur="0.3"/> and brought in up to date <pause dur="0.4"/> and to accept a wider range of factors <pause dur="0.4"/> than people like Morgenthau <pause dur="0.5"/> and the early realists <pause dur="0.3"/> had suggested <pause dur="1.9"/> the Waltz book <pause dur="1.1"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> series of books <pause dur="1.0"/> he made his name for example by <pause dur="0.3"/> an analysis of war entitled Man the State and War <pause dur="0.5"/> in which he tried to analyse the different levels <pause dur="0.5"/> of which war <pause dur="0.4"/> might be seen to have been the cause <pause dur="1.8"/> he then went on to look at the balance of power <pause dur="0.4"/> as a theory <pause dur="1.1"/> because as you'll see next time <pause dur="0.4"/> in which i'm sure you'll be pleased to know will be my last appearance #<pause dur="0.7"/> in this

lecture <trunc>thea</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> # series <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> we # <pause dur="0.4"/> # he identified the balance of power as being one of the most crucial elements <pause dur="0.6"/> # for <pause dur="0.2"/> the realists and indeed for the maintenance of order <pause dur="0.5"/> within international <pause dur="0.5"/> relations <pause dur="2.9"/> but he also saw it in terms of the nuclear balance of power <pause dur="1.7"/> but what you had to do was you had to see the balance of power <pause dur="0.4"/> within the nuclear <pause dur="0.3"/> context <pause dur="1.1"/> and rather interestingly <pause dur="2.2"/> he and others have argued very strongly <pause dur="1.2"/> that deterrence is best achieved through the acquisition <pause dur="0.3"/> of nuclear weapons <pause dur="1.3"/> but Waltz went further <pause dur="0.7"/> he actually argued that as many states as possible <pause dur="0.5"/> should have nuclear weapons <pause dur="0.9"/> because that way <pause dur="0.4"/> every state would <pause dur="0.2"/> deter <pause dur="0.5"/> every other <pause dur="1.3"/> and that war <pause dur="0.2"/> would simply be abolished <pause dur="0.2"/> through deterrence <pause dur="1.3"/> he wrote a famous article called <pause dur="0.4"/> Nuclear Weapons More Would Be Better <pause dur="3.3"/> and that <pause dur="1.3"/> what he's trying to argue it seems to me <pause dur="0.6"/> is that you can create some kind of stability and order <pause dur="0.8"/> within

the international <pause dur="0.5"/> community <pause dur="1.2"/> the search for order <pause dur="0.6"/> while as it is primarily <trunc>concer</trunc> the concern of the realist <pause dur="0.6"/> who assert that it is far more important than justice <pause dur="0.4"/> remains a key factor in international <pause dur="0.4"/> relations <pause dur="1.6"/> in the next few lectures that we shall be # <pause dur="0.4"/> having <pause dur="1.3"/> # and giving <pause dur="1.7"/> it is answering the questions of how we avoid war <pause dur="0.7"/> that will be central <pause dur="0.4"/> # to the discussions <pause dur="0.9"/> now half the reason for that <pause dur="0.5"/> is that even if you believe in international justice <pause dur="0.8"/> there is a general feeling <pause dur="0.4"/> that wars are destructive <pause dur="0.7"/> and should be avoided if at all possible <pause dur="1.1"/> the fact that war does exist and continues to exist <pause dur="0.5"/> is a key factor <pause dur="0.3"/> in understanding international politics <pause dur="0.9"/> how you avoid it <pause dur="0.6"/> and the answers to what the best means of achieving <pause dur="0.4"/> the avoidance of war <pause dur="0.4"/> is a matter <pause dur="0.3"/> which varies <pause dur="0.3"/> for individual approach <pause dur="0.3"/> to individual approach <pause dur="0.5"/> but next week <pause dur="0.3"/> i shall be looking at in detail <pause dur="0.3"/> at the balance of power <pause dur="0.3"/> as a concept <pause dur="0.5"/> for managing international relations

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