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<title>Collective defence and military alliances</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:51:55" n="6398">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>



<person id="nf1161" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="f"><p>nf1161, main speaker, non-student, female</p></person>

<person id="sf1162" role="participant" n="s" sex="f"><p>sf1162, participant, student, female</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="l"><p>ss, audience, large group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="l"><p>sl, all, large group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="4"><p>number of speakers: 4</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Politics</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ss</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG2</item>

<item n="module">Modern International Relations</item>




<u who="nf1161"> # <pause dur="1.4"/> could you postpone your conversations until after the lecture <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>please <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> thank you <pause dur="0.6"/> # i believe someone wanted to announce something about political clubbing <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> are the people here or </u><u who="sf1162" trans="overlap"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="0.2"/> yes sorry </u><u who="nf1161" trans="latching"> yes <pause dur="0.2"/> come forward please we'll do it now because otherwise <pause dur="0.5"/> at the end everyone wants to rush out </u><u who="sf1162" trans="latching"> sorry i <gap reason="inaudible" extent="2 secs"/></u><u who="nf1161" trans="latching"> sorry </u><pause dur="0.4"/> <u who="sf1162" trans="pause"> i could do it tomorrow 'cause it's not <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><pause dur="0.5"/> <u who="nf1161" trans="pause"> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/></u><u who="sf1162" trans="latching"> # <pause dur="0.5"/> hi everyone my name's <gap reason="name" extent="1 word"/> # i've just set up a political society this year <pause dur="0.5"/> # and it's just a quick announcement we're having # next Monday we're having <pause dur="0.3"/> a debate on the fuel crisis <pause dur="0.3"/> # it's in Mondial it's at seventy-thirty <pause dur="0.3"/> anyone wants to come join in <pause dur="0.3"/> or just watch # <pause dur="0.2"/> then you're free to join <pause dur="0.2"/> okay </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="nf1161" trans="pause"> where is it </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="sf1162" trans="pause"> # Mondial </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="nf1161" trans="pause"> Mondial </u><u who="sf1162" trans="overlap"> Mondial </u><pause dur="1.3"/> <u who="nf1161" trans="pause"> did everyone get that <pause dur="0.9"/> good <pause dur="0.7"/> turn up in large numbers <pause dur="4.5"/> now first of all apologies # <pause dur="0.2"/> my car <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> broke down last week <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.4"/> # i got to the petrol station and then it didn't want to start any more again <pause dur="0.9"/> so <pause dur="1.6"/> i hope that there won't be any <pause dur="0.3"/>

involuntary <pause dur="0.2"/> spare times anymore i mean <pause dur="0.2"/> without warning <pause dur="0.6"/> # the the # upshot of that is that we'll do alliances today <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>ne</trunc> # on Thursday <pause dur="0.2"/> deterrents and arms races <pause dur="0.5"/> on next Tuesday <pause dur="0.6"/> # arms control and disarmament and on the <trunc>thurs</trunc> # on Thursday week <pause dur="0.3"/> neutrality <pause dur="0.4"/> and so everything gets pushed down a little bit but # <pause dur="0.3"/> you will have the full complement of lectures <pause dur="1.5"/> unless <pause dur="0.6"/> the weather decides again to <pause dur="0.3"/> be completely awful and horrible <pause dur="1.8"/> right collective defence and military alliances <pause dur="3.0"/><kinesic desc="puts on transparency" iterated="n"/> the <pause dur="3.0"/> collective defence <pause dur="1.1"/> but even more so military alliances are generally associated <pause dur="0.4"/> with <pause dur="0.6"/> realist assumptions about how international relations work <pause dur="2.2"/> these are basically as you all know but just to <pause dur="0.2"/> to recall them that armed force is the most <trunc>effe</trunc> most effective foreign policy tool <pause dur="0.3"/> because in the end if you can't <pause dur="0.3"/> coerce <pause dur="0.3"/> a potential adversary into <pause dur="0.3"/> complying with your wishes <pause dur="0.4"/> then you can <trunc>alway</trunc> if by other means like political diplomatic or economic means <pause dur="0.5"/> the # the use of armed force if you have superior

armed force <pause dur="0.4"/> might actually <trunc>achie</trunc> achieve that objective <pause dur="1.2"/> this is seen to be very important <pause dur="0.3"/> by neo-realists and also realists # because <pause dur="0.2"/> they assume that the international system <pause dur="0.3"/> is a monarchic system <pause dur="0.5"/> and essentially all <trunc>s</trunc> all states <pause dur="0.2"/> rely on self-help <pause dur="0.3"/> because there is no <pause dur="0.4"/> government or no form of governance <pause dur="0.4"/> above <pause dur="0.2"/> the state level <pause dur="1.9"/> now that entails <pause dur="0.2"/> in itself this conception for states <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> entails several problems <pause dur="0.2"/> because <pause dur="1.3"/> what if one state <pause dur="0.8"/> arms itself or begins to arm itself more <pause dur="0.5"/> than it has done previously <pause dur="1.0"/> its neighbours <pause dur="0.2"/> may start wondering <pause dur="1.4"/> what the intent is <pause dur="0.3"/> of that state <pause dur="1.0"/> it increases its capabilities and as you know <pause dur="0.3"/> realists see <pause dur="0.3"/> military or economic <pause dur="0.2"/> capabilities <pause dur="0.4"/> as a central defining element of state power <pause dur="1.3"/> now what does it want to do with these <pause dur="0.3"/> capabilities <pause dur="1.3"/> may it want to <pause dur="0.5"/> establish a superiority in armament levels so that it can use force <pause dur="0.5"/> in any sort of conflict with its neighbours <pause dur="0.2"/> or a state <pause dur="0.2"/> somewhat further afield if its military <pause dur="0.5"/> # machinery can reach it <pause dur="1.9"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> in

order to <pause dur="0.2"/> not let this escalate <pause dur="0.2"/> as you know from a previous lecture <pause dur="0.4"/> diplomats and politicians <pause dur="0.4"/> before the Second World War and before the First World War attempted <pause dur="0.4"/> to <trunc>estab</trunc> or to maintain <pause dur="0.4"/> what was known as a balance of power <pause dur="0.4"/> so that no state <pause dur="0.3"/> could really <pause dur="0.5"/> go beyond the point <pause dur="0.5"/> of arming itself and then using <pause dur="0.3"/> its armed force <pause dur="0.4"/> in a political conflict to settle that conflict militarily <pause dur="1.9"/> however <pause dur="0.4"/> if states felt that they were <pause dur="0.9"/> left <pause dur="0.4"/> alone <pause dur="0.7"/> or they couldn't possibly come up with the military <pause dur="0.3"/> # with the economic and resources in order to build up their military <pause dur="0.8"/> they would consider <pause dur="0.3"/> aligning themselves <pause dur="0.2"/> with other states <pause dur="1.1"/> in order to compensate for one state which might be <pause dur="0.5"/> superior in its military potential <pause dur="3.6"/> so the idea of alliance building <pause dur="2.0"/> was <pause dur="0.8"/> that they should alliances should enhance national security <pause dur="1.6"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> seen from an economic perspective <pause dur="0.8"/> by forming alliances and joining forces <pause dur="0.6"/> you might be able you I-E a state might be able <pause dur="0.3"/> to maximize the cost-benefit equation <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> national

defence spending <pause dur="0.2"/> I-E <pause dur="0.3"/> everyone spends <pause dur="0.2"/> as much as they possibly can <pause dur="0.3"/> but because they joined forces <pause dur="0.4"/> their economies aren't going to be <pause dur="0.3"/> burdened too much by military expenditure with in <pause dur="0.2"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> with its <pause dur="0.5"/> essentially unproductive use of capital <pause dur="1.5"/> however because there is also there was also the risk or in short term alliances there was also the risk that <pause dur="1.2"/> a state which on one in one hand wants to be allied with you <pause dur="0.3"/> but then if its fortunes change <pause dur="0.6"/> it might decide no longer to want to be allied with you <pause dur="1.0"/> and in fact might become your enemy <pause dur="0.4"/> there was a preference for short term alliances another reason <pause dur="0.5"/> to to prefer short term alliances was of course <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.6"/> the idea that you wanted to protect your national security and <pause dur="0.2"/> and the secrets surrounding your national security policy <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> was was seen as rather paramount <pause dur="1.5"/> now the <pause dur="1.8"/> the related to these reasons <pause dur="0.8"/> # alliance formation could take place because <pause dur="0.4"/> a <pause dur="0.4"/> a threat should be <pause dur="0.2"/> deterred <pause dur="0.6"/> not necessarily to go to war but because <pause dur="0.6"/> a a threat should be

deterred now i'm going to talk about deterrence at much greater length on Thursday <pause dur="0.4"/> so i'm just going to go over that very quickly <pause dur="0.8"/> either deterrence of a perceived military threat I-E a state as i explained earlier <pause dur="0.2"/> # or <trunc>hy</trunc> hypothesized earlier <pause dur="0.2"/> a state which starts increasing its military capabilities <pause dur="0.8"/> or <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="1.8"/> the <trunc>possibi</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>beca</trunc> well <pause dur="0.6"/> either because it justs increases its # its # <pause dur="0.4"/> capabilities but hasn't really declared an aggressive intent <pause dur="0.4"/> or because there is actually <pause dur="0.3"/> an aggressive intent by a distinct adversary <pause dur="4.7"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="9"/> now another characteristic of pre-forty-five alliances <pause dur="1.2"/> or some of them <pause dur="0.4"/> was that they would be formed <pause dur="0.8"/> for wars of aggression <pause dur="3.0"/> in that case they would also be <pause dur="0.6"/> or that those alliances would be particularly short-lived because there was a political objective which was to be achieved militarily <pause dur="0.7"/> and for that purpose the alliance would be formed <pause dur="0.3"/> once those <trunc>obj</trunc> objectives were <trunc>f</trunc> were # <pause dur="0.2"/> achieved <pause dur="0.9"/> the alliance would disintegrate <pause dur="1.8"/> the problem is <pause dur="0.2"/> that of course

<trunc>inh</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> built into such short term alliances is a high degree of instability <pause dur="0.5"/> because at the time the alliance is formed <pause dur="0.6"/> the state which joined into the <trunc>allia</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> joined in the alliance <pause dur="0.5"/> might have <pause dur="0.2"/> shared objectives <pause dur="0.6"/> but what if the war <pause dur="0.2"/> doesn't go as they intended or as they have <pause dur="0.2"/> had anticipated <pause dur="0.5"/> if the war <pause dur="0.8"/> doesn't go in favour of <pause dur="0.2"/> some of the <trunc>al</trunc> allies objectives <pause dur="0.6"/> the alliance might might fall apart <pause dur="2.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> finally <pause dur="0.7"/> defence <pause dur="0.5"/> if one <pause dur="0.2"/> state is under serious threat it might look <pause dur="0.2"/> round for allies <pause dur="0.5"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> increase its national security in a short term because it can't possibly build up its military potential <pause dur="0.4"/> and produce <pause dur="0.2"/> the weapons it might need <pause dur="0.4"/> in order to defend itself <pause dur="1.3"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> in order to re-establish the balance of power <pause dur="3.8"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="10"/> now problems of alliances <pause dur="4.6"/> are manyfold <pause dur="1.6"/> firstly <pause dur="1.7"/> for states that intend to join into an alliance <pause dur="0.8"/> it is necessary that they reconcile different expectations <pause dur="1.1"/> how do they define national security <pause dur="1.3"/> it depends on where you sit as a state <pause dur="0.2"/> where you are geographically located who your

neighbours are <pause dur="0.3"/> what your <trunc>s</trunc> resources are <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> what your natural resources are <pause dur="0.9"/> that those those <pause dur="0.7"/> factors influence how you define national security <pause dur="0.9"/> what also defines your national <pause dur="0.2"/> security policy <pause dur="0.4"/> is what your outlook is do you want to be <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> just a state that exists and trades and and doesn't really have a very <pause dur="0.5"/> active international policy <pause dur="0.2"/> or foreign policy <pause dur="1.1"/> or do you want to be a state which wants to <pause dur="0.2"/> have further reach <pause dur="1.1"/> # including your neighbours or <pause dur="0.6"/> regional reach or maybe even global reach <pause dur="0.9"/> depending on what the outlook is of different alliance members <pause dur="0.7"/> that's going to <pause dur="0.2"/> define how they define their national security and therefore the utility <pause dur="0.6"/> of an alliance <pause dur="0.3"/> is likely to differ <pause dur="0.8"/> depending on <pause dur="0.4"/> how they define their national security objectives <pause dur="1.2"/> and that

is also going to define as a consequence of course the defence requirements <pause dur="0.6"/> the amount of spending that <pause dur="0.2"/> that the state is prepared to put into <pause dur="0.2"/> procuring <pause dur="0.5"/> # armed forces <pause dur="0.5"/> and the kinds of capabilities the state might want to have <pause dur="0.8"/> if you take <pause dur="0.3"/> today <pause dur="0.6"/> if you compare the U-S <pause dur="0.3"/> with any European country <pause dur="0.6"/> the U-S military machinery is much much more <pause dur="0.4"/> wide-reaching much more capable <pause dur="0.4"/> much more differentiated <pause dur="0.5"/> than any of the European <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> militaries or <pause dur="0.2"/> armed forces are <pause dur="1.4"/> and so <pause dur="0.4"/> these different <pause dur="0.6"/> preconditions of course shape how an alliance is likely to <pause dur="0.5"/> develop <pause dur="1.3"/> a further issue in alliance formation even if its a <trunc>sh</trunc> a relatively short-lived alliance <pause dur="0.2"/> is <pause dur="0.5"/> the question of trust and reliability <pause dur="1.4"/> if you join forces with allies <pause dur="0.7"/> there are a few things which you want to <pause dur="0.4"/> avoid <pause dur="1.2"/> one is <pause dur="0.8"/> the states that are in the alliance want to avoid that some of them <pause dur="0.7"/> spend enormous amounts of military on military capability <pause dur="0.6"/> whereas others don't <pause dur="0.4"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> those who don't spend <pause dur="0.4"/> # an equivalent <pause dur="0.6"/> proportion of their national <pause dur="0.4"/> budget <pause dur="0.7"/> on armed forces <pause dur="0.4"/> can

use <pause dur="0.2"/> might use <pause dur="0.9"/> these <pause dur="1.0"/> this proportion of the budget <pause dur="0.4"/> for <pause dur="0.6"/> building up trade building up their economic infrastructure <pause dur="1.1"/> now some of the allies would then finance <pause dur="0.2"/> the military security <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> these allies that spend less <pause dur="0.8"/> so the question is how do you make sure <pause dur="0.3"/> within an alliance that everyone chips in <pause dur="0.8"/> evenly <pause dur="0.2"/> and that there aren't some <pause dur="0.4"/> who live at the expense of an ally <pause dur="0.4"/> this is called if that happens this is called <trunc>s</trunc> the free-rider syndrome <pause dur="1.1"/> what you also want to avoid in an alliance is the risk of entrapment <pause dur="0.5"/> entrapment means <pause dur="0.8"/> that one ally <pause dur="1.1"/> doesn't <pause dur="0.3"/> either doesn't necessarily say in advance when it approaches <pause dur="0.2"/> a future ally <pause dur="0.6"/> that there isn't a quarrel it has with another state or it develops a quarrel with another state <pause dur="0.4"/> and then drags the other alliance members <pause dur="0.4"/> into <pause dur="0.4"/> that conflict which is really only a conflict which is nationally motivated <pause dur="1.1"/> the allies may not have any interest in being involved in this conflict <pause dur="0.5"/> or they may actually see that as a huge problem because they have very

good relations with that state which has a quibble with one of the allies <pause dur="0.9"/> so entrapment is another risk which alliance members have to <pause dur="0.3"/> be able to deal with <pause dur="1.1"/> the opposite of that is the risk of abandonment <pause dur="2.1"/> which is <pause dur="0.9"/> similar to defection but slightly less harsh <pause dur="0.2"/> # abandonment would <pause dur="0.4"/> happen if a state <pause dur="0.4"/> declares that it will assist <pause dur="0.4"/> in the defence <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> an alliance <pause dur="0.3"/> territory or interest <pause dur="0.8"/> and then doesn't come through <pause dur="0.3"/> with that commitment <pause dur="0.5"/> it abandons its allies <pause dur="0.2"/> # in their <pause dur="0.2"/> attempt of <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> fulfilling the <trunc>al</trunc> alliance objectives <pause dur="0.5"/> defection is if the ally leaves the alliance entirely <pause dur="0.7"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> entails <pause dur="1.0"/> an added risk and that is that the ally which has defected <pause dur="0.3"/> might join <pause dur="0.4"/> a hostile alliance which may have formed <pause dur="0.3"/> in response to your own alliance formation <pause dur="0.7"/> which is of course also something that allies would want to <pause dur="0.2"/> avoid <pause dur="6.7"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="6"/> from a systemic perspective <pause dur="2.1"/> if alliances form <pause dur="0.7"/> in response to inbalances in the balance of power <pause dur="2.0"/> then <pause dur="0.6"/> states which are outside the alliance <pause dur="0.2"/> might feel it

necessary to form alliances themselves <pause dur="1.0"/> now that might <pause dur="0.5"/> recreate the security dilemma on a higher level <pause dur="0.7"/> now very briefly <pause dur="0.3"/> the to <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>rec</trunc> recall what the security dilemma is <pause dur="0.4"/> security dilemma is essentially if one state <pause dur="0.6"/> starts building up its arms the neighbouring state doesn't necessarily know what it intends to do but thinks it wise <pause dur="0.4"/> to build up its own arms <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> oh arsenal as well its its its armed forces <pause dur="0.8"/> then both start building up <pause dur="0.4"/> their armed forces <pause dur="0.4"/> in response to each other <pause dur="0.4"/> which means they spend <pause dur="0.2"/> quite a lot of money <pause dur="0.5"/> on <pause dur="0.7"/> procuring military equipment and maybe <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> getting getting more <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> people to join the armed forces <pause dur="0.9"/> and in the end will be no <pause dur="0.3"/> safer than they were before <pause dur="0.3"/> because they both <pause dur="0.3"/> have just pushed <pause dur="0.2"/> the balance of power <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>o</trunc> up to a higher level <pause dur="0.3"/> with the added risk <pause dur="0.5"/> that one of the states might say <pause dur="0.5"/> well if this continues <pause dur="0.5"/> then we may <pause dur="0.2"/> in the end be <pause dur="0.6"/> outarmed by the other side <pause dur="0.4"/> but at the moment we still have a possibility we we still might have <pause dur="0.5"/> # some chance

in winning a war if we do it <pause dur="0.3"/> right <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> they might start <pause dur="0.2"/> they might actually <pause dur="0.3"/> state A might actually attack <pause dur="0.3"/> instead of <pause dur="1.4"/> waiting what happens with with <pause dur="0.2"/> the # <pause dur="0.2"/> with balance of <pause dur="0.2"/> military power <pause dur="1.0"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> in essence the security dilemma might lead <pause dur="0.3"/> to a much more unstable situation <pause dur="0.5"/> than where the two sides started from and <pause dur="0.4"/> if you have <pause dur="0.5"/> you can have that between states but you can also have that between alliances <pause dur="2.6"/> now <pause dur="0.7"/> in case of a crisis or a war <pause dur="0.3"/> it's of course <pause dur="0.9"/> of utmost importance for the allies to <pause dur="1.0"/> know <pause dur="0.2"/> that they <pause dur="0.2"/> can rely on each other and that each side <pause dur="0.5"/> that has joined the alliance will implement a mutual defence agreement <pause dur="1.9"/> but here of course you have again <pause dur="0.2"/> possible problems <pause dur="0.6"/> in that <pause dur="0.3"/> they don't necessarily agree on the strategic and operational parameters <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> one example for that would be <pause dur="0.3"/> Britain and the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> # in the early stages of the Second World War <pause dur="1.7"/> you again run into the problem of abandonment and entrapment <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.9"/> the question is how <pause dur="0.2"/> how can <pause dur="0.7"/> the alliance the allies then <pause dur="0.2"/> deal with

this situation in such a way that <pause dur="0.2"/> the survival of all of them <pause dur="0.5"/> is actually going to be guaranteed <pause dur="0.4"/> and the stronger member of an alliance <pause dur="0.2"/> doesn't go <pause dur="0.4"/> well <pause dur="0.4"/> this smaller state is dispensible in some way <pause dur="0.8"/> # it may <pause dur="0.3"/> it may be better for us all if we sacrifice one of the alliance members <pause dur="5.9"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> before World War Two <pause dur="0.2"/> as i mentioned before <pause dur="1.5"/> there was a stong belief in the offence <pause dur="0.5"/> because the idea that if you launch a surprise attack at a potential enemy <pause dur="1.6"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> you have <pause dur="0.2"/> at least in that first initial # in that initial phase <pause dur="0.3"/> the upper hand <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> so you would get tight alliances <pause dur="0.5"/> which <pause dur="0.7"/> because they wanted to <pause dur="0.2"/> go for a surprise attack <pause dur="0.5"/> would have very high arms procurement <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.7"/> launch <pause dur="0.2"/> a massive attack as quickly as possible <pause dur="1.8"/> needless to say this was of course <pause dur="0.4"/> quite an unstable way <pause dur="0.3"/> of relating <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> to one <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> another <pause dur="0.6"/> in the interwar period <pause dur="0.7"/> the whole <pause dur="2.0"/> the whole <pause dur="0.3"/> philosophy sort of changed the other way round at least amongst <pause dur="0.3"/> those countries that had <pause dur="0.6"/> won the <trunc>seco</trunc> the First World War <pause dur="1.0"/> in

particular France and the U-S # and and the U-K <pause dur="1.4"/> because they <pause dur="0.2"/> felt it was necessary to spend <pause dur="0.4"/> more time attention and resources <pause dur="0.4"/> on their domestic policies and on the economy <pause dur="0.5"/> and military issues were <pause dur="1.3"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> kept <pause dur="0.3"/> as low on the agenda as possible <pause dur="1.7"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> that led to <pause dur="0.3"/> a defensive strategy <pause dur="0.2"/> especially on the part of of Britain <pause dur="0.9"/> and <pause dur="0.9"/> led of course as you all know <pause dur="0.2"/> to a <trunc>s</trunc> highly a very strong <pause dur="0.6"/> very offensive Germany which launched the Second World War <event desc="takes off transparency" iterated="n"/></u><pause dur="2.3"/> <u who="ss" trans="pause"> <gap reason="inaudible, multiple speakers" extent="5 secs"/> </u><u who="nf1161" trans="overlap"> <kinesic desc="puts on transparency" iterated="n"/> excuse me <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <pause dur="1.3"/> grumble grumble <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <pause dur="1.4"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/> i'll <trunc>w</trunc> wait for your signal <pause dur="1.0"/> am i standing in anyone's way </u><pause dur="0.3"/> <u who="ss" trans="pause"> yes <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/></u><u who="nf1161" trans="overlap"> oh right <vocal desc="laughter" n="sl" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <event desc="moves away" iterated="n"/> <pause dur="0.7"/> tell me when i can come in again <pause dur="17.8"/> ready <event desc="returns to position" iterated="n"/></u><pause dur="0.6"/> <u who="ss" trans="pause"> mm </u><pause dur="0.4"/> <u who="nf1161" trans="pause"> mm <pause dur="1.1"/> we have a lot to do today that's why i'm rushing a bit <pause dur="6.7"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="11"/> done <pause dur="5.7"/> now <pause dur="0.8"/> after the Second World War <pause dur="0.6"/> partly <pause dur="2.7"/> if if at the end of the session you find that <pause dur="0.3"/> you have missed that fifty per cent of what i have said <pause dur="0.6"/> i'll try to make a few copies of this and then <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> they will be very

small <pause dur="0.3"/> because there is quite a lot here <pause dur="0.4"/> but # i can hand them out <pause dur="0.3"/> some time either <pause dur="0.5"/> on Thursday or next week <pause dur="0.2"/> so you won't have missed out <pause dur="1.8"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> where were we <pause dur="0.3"/> alliances <pause dur="0.2"/> collective defence after the Second World War <pause dur="0.6"/> in the general <pause dur="0.4"/> atmosphere of needing to <pause dur="0.2"/> stabilize the international system as i talked about <pause dur="0.5"/> now a week ago <pause dur="1.7"/> but at the same time <pause dur="0.2"/> having to sort of deal with the issue of armed <pause dur="0.2"/> aggression <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> in the international system as well <pause dur="1.4"/> what developed was <pause dur="1.4"/> something called collective defence now <pause dur="0.2"/> we've <pause dur="0.2"/> i've talked about collective security last time <pause dur="0.9"/> collective defence <pause dur="0.5"/> is much more focused on <pause dur="0.2"/> the military aspects <pause dur="0.5"/> of collective security <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> of course it has political dimensions <pause dur="0.9"/> but <pause dur="0.2"/> it is essentially a further development of <pause dur="0.3"/> alliance building <pause dur="3.7"/> now <pause dur="0.5"/> central to a system of collective defence <pause dur="0.4"/> is the mutual commitment that attack # an attack <pause dur="0.3"/> against one is seen as an attack against all <pause dur="2.2"/> but that also means that <pause dur="0.3"/> within <pause dur="0.3"/> the framework <pause dur="0.3"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> the treaty which establishes the the collective

security system <pause dur="0.6"/> there was a need to define active aggression <pause dur="1.0"/> i'll tell you later or i will show you later that NATO <pause dur="0.3"/> as the one <pause dur="0.7"/> almost prominent example of a <pause dur="0.2"/> collective defence system <pause dur="0.6"/> has <pause dur="0.2"/> has done that in the Washington Treaty <pause dur="2.5"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> collective defence systems tend to be <pause dur="0.4"/> established with a longer term view not like alliances <pause dur="0.5"/> # of the pre-World War Two period <pause dur="1.7"/> now <pause dur="0.7"/> that means <pause dur="0.2"/> that if you have a more integrated and <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> a sort of longer lasting system <pause dur="1.6"/> that has ramifications of how the allies cooperate <pause dur="0.8"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> little is as sensitive as <pause dur="0.2"/> the issues of national security when it comes to <pause dur="0.9"/> military national security <pause dur="0.6"/> 'cause all the allies of course want to keep each other out <pause dur="0.5"/> at the same time <pause dur="0.3"/> in a collective defence system there is a need to share some of <pause dur="0.7"/> what it would otherwise would be considered secret <pause dur="1.4"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> in <pause dur="0.3"/> an organization which is meant to establish a collective defence system <pause dur="1.5"/> the way in which the institution is set up has to strike a balance between <pause dur="0.3"/> respecting the sovereignty

of all the # of all the members of the collective security system <pause dur="0.8"/> and at the same time <pause dur="0.3"/> tending to the need <pause dur="0.3"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> to the needs of this collective security system for it to work I-E <pause dur="0.4"/> a degree of openness <pause dur="1.8"/>

now again <pause dur="0.3"/> of course you have the same alliance problems they <pause dur="0.2"/> they are <pause dur="0.3"/> played out in a different way <pause dur="0.5"/> # which i mentioned before <pause dur="0.5"/> the question of <pause dur="0.5"/> defection abandonment and and as well as entrapment <pause dur="0.3"/> and NATO if you look at the <pause dur="0.5"/> history of NATO has had a fair share of discussions about this <pause dur="0.7"/> you ready <pause dur="1.4"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="6"/> don't want to incur your wrath again <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="4.3"/> but <pause dur="0.4"/> overall <pause dur="0.6"/> what <pause dur="0.5"/> Britain France <pause dur="1.0"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> saw <pause dur="0.2"/> paramount in establishing NATO <pause dur="0.5"/> was <pause dur="0.3"/> were the benefits <pause dur="1.2"/> # and these benefits were an enhanced deterrence capability <pause dur="0.4"/> not least because <pause dur="0.4"/> and this was of special interest for Britain and France <pause dur="0.6"/> # and the Benelux countries <pause dur="1.1"/> <trunc>beca</trunc> # to tie the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> militarily <pause dur="0.8"/> into a <trunc>europ</trunc> European security system <pause dur="0.2"/> a or collective defence system <pause dur="1.7"/> A because of the experiences of World War One and Two <pause dur="0.2"/> and the

failure of the balance of power system and Britain's inability <pause dur="0.5"/> to guarantee <pause dur="0.4"/> or to to be <pause dur="0.5"/> a stabilizer in the balance of power <pause dur="0.2"/> on the European continent <pause dur="0.7"/> Britain was economically and militarily <pause dur="0.3"/> after the Second World War no longer capable of of playing this role <pause dur="0.5"/> so the U-S <pause dur="1.1"/> one of the paramount <pause dur="0.6"/> policy objectives for Britain was to tie the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> into <pause dur="0.3"/> a European collective defence system <pause dur="2.6"/> now <pause dur="0.3"/> doing this <pause dur="0.2"/> in with a long <trunc>ter</trunc> longer term perspective <pause dur="0.4"/> meant <pause dur="0.6"/> ultimately <pause dur="0.4"/> that the military processes <pause dur="0.3"/> which were <pause dur="0.4"/> separate nationally <pause dur="0.6"/> had to harmonized in some way <pause dur="1.0"/> because <pause dur="0.6"/> on a on a completely <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of practical operational level <pause dur="0.4"/> the armed forces of <pause dur="0.4"/> now <pause dur="0.6"/> <trunc>sixte</trunc> nineteen different countries but during the Cold War sixteen different countries <pause dur="0.5"/> had to work together <pause dur="0.8"/> they had to be able to talk to one another <pause dur="0.6"/> and if they don't have the radio equipment to do so then then they can't talk to one another <pause dur="0.3"/> they have to have <pause dur="0.2"/> a common

language <pause dur="0.7"/> they have to have planning procedures <pause dur="0.4"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> traces and and just operational procedures which are <pause dur="0.3"/> comparable <pause dur="1.0"/> and they need to be able needed to be able to <pause dur="0.7"/> share <pause dur="0.3"/> to a to a degree <pause dur="0.5"/> # their equipment <pause dur="0.3"/> especially equipment <pause dur="0.2"/> where <pause dur="0.6"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> the <trunc>arm</trunc> the national armed forces tried to <pause dur="0.3"/> work together <pause dur="0.8"/> and that meant that on an on an institutional level <pause dur="1.1"/> other than alliances of the pre-World War Two kind <pause dur="0.9"/> a separate identity <pause dur="0.6"/> emerged <pause dur="0.5"/> where NATO became gradually over over decades not from the very beginning <pause dur="0.5"/> but over the <pause dur="0.2"/> over the over its history <pause dur="0.4"/> became <pause dur="0.3"/> a separate <pause dur="0.2"/> entity <pause dur="0.4"/> which had a separate <pause dur="0.5"/> language a separate way of <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.2"/> operation <pause dur="0.5"/> # the <trunc>wa</trunc> it had different <pause dur="0.2"/> standard operating procedures it had its own <pause dur="0.4"/> planning <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> procedures <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> these would then be handed down to the national <pause dur="0.6"/> military and political planners <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> which were or who were then tasked with implementing what NATO desired <pause dur="0.4"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> there are many studies <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>ex</trunc> # exploring exactly that linkage between NATO level planning <pause dur="0.3"/> and

national level planning <pause dur="0.3"/> because national level planning <pause dur="0.4"/> always massively undercut what NATO thought it might need <pause dur="2.2"/> another <pause dur="0.5"/> aspect <pause dur="0.2"/> which and NATO is really the reference point for collective defence systems because it's the only <pause dur="0.5"/> # long lasting <pause dur="0.6"/> example that we have for a collective defence system <pause dur="2.0"/> another aspect of it is political cooperation <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> confidence building <pause dur="0.2"/> on the one hand because if <pause dur="0.3"/> former enemies especially after <pause dur="0.2"/> Germany # joined NATO as well <pause dur="0.8"/> if former enemies or potentially <pause dur="1.0"/> not hostile <pause dur="0.4"/> neighbours but <pause dur="0.3"/> but neighbours who are not entirely confident or comfortable with one another <pause dur="0.5"/> if they start talking to one another on a political as well as on a military level <pause dur="0.3"/> it's because NATO has a a <pause dur="0.4"/> a political organization which is based in Brussels <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> ever since France left NATO <pause dur="0.4"/> in nineteen-sixty-six <pause dur="0.4"/> and it has a military organization which is # <pause dur="0.4"/> which is based in <pause dur="0.2"/> # Mons near Casteau <pause dur="0.3"/> which <pause dur="0.4"/> is about <pause dur="0.3"/> i don't know <pause dur="0.2"/> an hours drive outside Brussels <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> if on the political and on

the military level <pause dur="1.5"/> the member nations or representatives of the member nations <pause dur="0.2"/> meet <pause dur="0.5"/> regularly <pause dur="0.8"/> there is a very different <pause dur="0.3"/> over time a very different understanding of each other <pause dur="0.7"/> emerges <pause dur="0.3"/> which <pause dur="0.5"/> again contributes to <pause dur="1.7"/> some degree of <pause dur="0.3"/> separate identity of NATO as an organization <pause dur="0.2"/> and that can then <pause dur="0.4"/> be translated down into <pause dur="0.5"/> national decision making levels as well <pause dur="2.1"/> if you talk to people within NATO they would even go so far that <pause dur="0.3"/> conflict resolution within <pause dur="0.3"/> these structures <pause dur="0.5"/> can be possible without this ever <pause dur="0.2"/> becoming an issue <pause dur="0.5"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> really hits the headlines <pause dur="2.1"/> one problem <pause dur="0.4"/> that NATO has had all the time is this issue with free-riding <pause dur="1.0"/> # it's commonly called within <trunc>na</trunc> within the NATO <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> scholarly literature <pause dur="0.5"/> the burden sharing debate <pause dur="0.6"/> it emerged <pause dur="0.2"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> the nineteen-sixties in the nineteen-seventies in the nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.4"/> and it's going to come up again <pause dur="0.4"/> if <pause dur="0.8"/> well depending on who wins the # U-S elections today <pause dur="0.8"/> but with <pause dur="0.5"/> president if if it was to be President Bush i'm pretty sure <pause dur="0.6"/> i would hazard

the guess that the issue will come up again <pause dur="1.5"/> the U-S <pause dur="0.6"/> especially the more <pause dur="1.2"/> the more conservative and the more <pause dur="0.4"/> western orientated <pause dur="0.5"/> proportion of the U-S Congress <pause dur="0.8"/> has <pause dur="0.4"/> especially since the nineteen-seventies very strongly lobbied <pause dur="0.3"/> against a permanent commitment <pause dur="0.4"/> of U-S troops in Europe <pause dur="0.9"/> because they argued that <pause dur="0.3"/> # Europe <pause dur="0.2"/> is <pause dur="0.5"/> from the seventies onwards Europe was doing economically well enough <pause dur="0.4"/> to defend itself <pause dur="0.4"/> and the U-S would still maintain its nuclear umbrella <pause dur="0.3"/> but there was no need <pause dur="0.3"/> for <pause dur="0.3"/> U-S troops to be based <pause dur="0.2"/> in Europe <pause dur="1.9"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and if they were <pause dur="0.7"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> remain in Europe <pause dur="0.3"/> then the Europeans should spend a lot more <pause dur="0.4"/> on their own defence <pause dur="0.5"/> now there was a lot of number crunching that can go on <pause dur="1.0"/> # over the issue of <pause dur="0.4"/> burden sharing because it depends on how you calculated defence expenditure <pause dur="0.5"/> # if you want to make the argument that <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> no Americans and the Europeans are contributing <trunc>e</trunc> equally <pause dur="3.5"/>

i'll get back to the problem of different perceptions <pause dur="0.3"/> U-S and Europe of NATO <pause dur="0.2"/> # in a minute <pause dur="1.9"/> problems with collective defence <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> one i have just mentioned <pause dur="0.4"/> because there is a long term perspective <pause dur="0.5"/> there is an enhanced risk of free-riding <pause dur="1.0"/> the long term perspective also requires that the alliance itself adapts <pause dur="1.2"/> because <pause dur="0.5"/> for for many different reasons <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> A <pause dur="0.8"/> the alliance's rationale under which the alliance may have been founded in the first place <pause dur="0.5"/> may no longer be there if the international system changes <pause dur="0.4"/> or if <pause dur="0.3"/> the relationship between <pause dur="0.4"/> those <pause dur="0.2"/> whom the alliance was meant to deter <pause dur="0.6"/> and the alliance itself <pause dur="0.6"/> improves <pause dur="2.4"/> if it does not improve <pause dur="0.2"/> or if there is no concensus that the # the relationship has improved <pause dur="0.2"/> the question is how high should the defensive <trunc>cap</trunc> <pause dur="0.9"/> of what nature should these defensive capabilities be <pause dur="1.8"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> how committed <pause dur="0.2"/> are the allies <pause dur="0.3"/> depending on how much they contribute to the

defensive capabilities <pause dur="0.3"/> and how they stand <pause dur="0.2"/> politically <pause dur="0.7"/> when France left NATO in nineteen-sixty-six that was seen as a major crisis <pause dur="0.6"/> because it was <pause dur="0.2"/> seen as entailing <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>ha</trunc> have you finished <pause dur="0.8"/> oh i'm asking now <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/><pause dur="1.7"/> <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> # <pause dur="2.2"/> it was seen as entailing the possibility that the Soviet Union might see <pause dur="0.8"/> NATO as falling apart <pause dur="2.5"/> other changes that might happen <pause dur="0.3"/> are <pause dur="0.4"/> changes in the domestic environment of alliance members <pause dur="1.2"/> better or worse economic performance <pause dur="0.5"/> now the external threat <pause dur="0.2"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> NATO as <pause dur="0.4"/> on the NATO level agreed on <pause dur="0.7"/> may have required <pause dur="0.3"/> very high defence expenditure from the perspective of NATO planners <pause dur="0.9"/> but in the early nineteen-seventies <pause dur="0.5"/> neither the U-S <pause dur="0.5"/> nor Britain <pause dur="0.4"/> nor any of the other European countries were really in the position to spend an awful lot of money on defence <pause dur="0.5"/> they still did <pause dur="0.6"/> but they were under serious eeconomic pressures <pause dur="0.4"/> A because of <pause dur="0.2"/> the oil prices <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> the U-S <pause dur="0.2"/> because it had exhausted itself in the in the Vietnam War <pause dur="0.2"/> and had then <pause dur="0.4"/> deferred some of the costs it paid

in the Vietnam War <pause dur="0.6"/> over to the Europeans through its economic policies <pause dur="0.2"/> and financial policies <pause dur="2.4"/> another possibility of change is that <pause dur="1.3"/> the alliance itself might change its role in the international system <pause dur="1.6"/> maybe some alliance members are interested <pause dur="0.2"/> or might be interested in <pause dur="0.4"/> increasing <pause dur="0.5"/> the operational area of the alliance <pause dur="0.4"/> some may not <pause dur="0.6"/> that's a debate you had in NATO in the early nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.6"/> when the U-S and <pause dur="0.6"/> Britain to a <unclear>degree</unclear> <pause dur="0.4"/> argued that NATO should take on a lot more <pause dur="0.3"/> what was then called out of area responsibilities <pause dur="0.5"/> I-E that NATO should no longer just be responsible for <pause dur="0.4"/> the defence of western Europe <pause dur="0.9"/> but <pause dur="0.4"/> also take on <pause dur="0.5"/> the Soviet threat as it was perceived <pause dur="0.5"/> in other areas such as Africa <pause dur="0.2"/> the Middle East <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> south Asia <pause dur="1.1"/> or central Asia <pause dur="2.5"/> now all this can become rather aggravating because of course in an alliance you have <pause dur="0.4"/> in in a collective defence system such as NATO <pause dur="0.8"/> you have <pause dur="0.3"/> collective decision making <pause dur="0.9"/> now the policy formulation should <pause dur="0.5"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> the

spirit of collective decision making <pause dur="0.7"/> take place <pause dur="0.4"/> by mutual agreement <pause dur="0.5"/> but of course <pause dur="0.2"/> some states as what i've said <pause dur="0.3"/> before <pause dur="0.2"/> some states are more equal than others <pause dur="0.4"/> and if the alliance is very much dependent on some <pause dur="0.2"/> of the states or <pause dur="0.2"/> maybe one of the state <pause dur="0.5"/> states then <pause dur="0.4"/> # they this particularly state <trunc>mi</trunc> have may might have a lot more leverage in pushing through its own policy objectives <pause dur="1.0"/> # and then you risk the <trunc>dom</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> the the alliance risks being dominated by larger allies <pause dur="3.4"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> further problems <pause dur="0.3"/> and we've come back to <pause dur="0.4"/> the security dilemma <pause dur="1.6"/> are outside perceptions <pause dur="1.4"/> now NATO was founded <pause dur="1.5"/> with defensive intent <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.7"/> nobody <pause dur="0.2"/> amongst those <pause dur="0.3"/> leading figures who helped NATO into being <pause dur="1.8"/> could <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> well <pause dur="0.9"/> saw <pause dur="0.2"/> NATO as an aggressive alliance <pause dur="1.1"/> there are people on record saying well <pause dur="0.4"/> nobody <pause dur="0.2"/> who has <pause dur="0.4"/> in any way a clean conscience in other words doesn't <pause dur="0.2"/> doesn't want to # <pause dur="1.9"/> attack NATO <pause dur="0.4"/> can see NATO as <pause dur="0.3"/> an aggressive <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well international organization or # or alliance <pause dur="1.4"/> however the Soviet Union saw it very

differently <pause dur="0.6"/> the Soviet Union was convinced <pause dur="0.2"/> until the <trunc>la</trunc> second half of the nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.3"/> that NATO <pause dur="0.3"/> had aggressive intent okay in the nineteen-seventies détente <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> saw this <pause dur="0.4"/> slightly well the the the <pause dur="0.2"/> general mood between East and West <pause dur="0.4"/> eased up a bit <pause dur="0.6"/> but there was always the fear <pause dur="1.0"/> that NATO might attack <pause dur="0.9"/> the Warsaw Pact <pause dur="0.9"/> and <pause dur="0.6"/> with the foundation of or with the founding of the of the Warsaw Pact in response to NATO <pause dur="0.4"/> you have the same <pause dur="0.3"/> you have what i've mentioned earlier that <pause dur="0.4"/> that the <pause dur="0.2"/> an instance where <pause dur="0.5"/> the formation of one alliance triggers the formation of another alliance in response <pause dur="4.3"/> the other issue i've i've already <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> hinted at as well very briefly that intra-alliance arguments may be interpreted as a lack of cohesion <pause dur="0.9"/> one of these the red lines going through NATO debating itself <pause dur="0.9"/> or scholars debating NATO during the Cold War was always <pause dur="0.5"/> if we do not <pause dur="0.5"/> portray an image of a cohesive a politically cohesive life <pause dur="0.5"/> if we show that there are so too many disagreements <pause dur="0.2"/>

between the Europeans and the Americans <pause dur="0.4"/> or amongst the Europeans <pause dur="1.7"/> then NATO is going to be perceived as a weak alliance <pause dur="0.3"/> because then <pause dur="0.2"/> the Soviet Union is likely to <pause dur="0.4"/> exploit <pause dur="1.3"/> this this <pause dur="0.3"/> or and and the Soviet Union is likely to exploit this weakness <pause dur="0.3"/> that it sees in <pause dur="0.2"/> NATO cohesion <pause dur="2.9"/> finally from <pause dur="0.7"/> again a systemic perspective <pause dur="1.5"/> if a collective defence system persists <pause dur="0.6"/> the question is <pause dur="0.4"/> does this persistence <pause dur="0.7"/> maintain the status quo ante <pause dur="0.4"/> I-E before <pause dur="0.3"/> the system changed <pause dur="0.3"/> and the threat disappeared <pause dur="0.5"/> such as NATO post end of Cold War <pause dur="1.2"/> or might it need two new alliances <pause dur="0.5"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> as NATO did <pause dur="0.4"/> might it <pause dur="0.5"/> survive find new roles <pause dur="0.4"/> and transform itself but then does that perception <pause dur="0.6"/> of NATO in its Cold War identity <pause dur="0.2"/> automatically go away <pause dur="1.6"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="10"/> very very <pause dur="0.2"/> weighty questions which we still haven't solved entirely yet <pause dur="5.8"/> now <pause dur="1.5"/> NATO <pause dur="1.2"/> as i said before <pause dur="0.2"/> combines a political and a military mission <pause dur="2.1"/> in its <pause dur="0.5"/> founding treaty so the Washington Treaty you can <pause dur="0.3"/> see all these documents on the NATO website which is just W-W-W-dot-NATO-dot-org <pause dur="0.5"/>

or in the library in the in the Politics department library <pause dur="0.3"/> there is a NATO handbook which has <pause dur="0.2"/> all the basic information from a NATO perspective obviously <pause dur="0.5"/> but it's a good start into <pause dur="0.2"/> the official <pause dur="0.3"/> presentation of NATO as an organization <pause dur="0.8"/> and that includes also the Washington Treaty <pause dur="2.4"/> the declared purpose <pause dur="0.3"/> of NATO was <pause dur="0.4"/> defensive <pause dur="0.7"/> and it subjected itself to the principle <pause dur="0.4"/> principles of the U-N <pause dur="0.4"/> it was as i said before <pause dur="0.7"/> a defensive <pause dur="0.9"/> a a collective defence system <pause dur="0.4"/> which saw itself as <pause dur="0.4"/> a subsystem to <pause dur="0.3"/> the collective security system <pause dur="0.3"/> established <pause dur="0.6"/> under or with the U-N <pause dur="2.4"/> it declares that it was <pause dur="1.2"/> the <pause dur="0.7"/> the founders declared that they <pause dur="0.2"/> founded NATO <pause dur="0.3"/> <reading>to safeguard the freedom the common heritage <pause dur="0.2"/> and civilization of their peoples <pause dur="0.5"/> founded on the principles of democracy individual liberty and the rule of law</reading> <pause dur="1.0"/> now if you look at <pause dur="0.4"/> NATO from that perspective <pause dur="1.1"/> you get <pause dur="0.6"/> immediately a host of areas which you can investigate <pause dur="0.4"/> in order to <pause dur="0.6"/> critically assess <pause dur="0.2"/> the functions of NATO <pause dur="0.9"/> to ask

questions well what is the purpose of <pause dur="0.2"/> this alliance <pause dur="2.1"/> how far is this alliance compatible <pause dur="0.4"/> with <pause dur="0.6"/> the way in which <pause dur="0.7"/> international relations work now <pause dur="0.8"/> has it adapted itself <pause dur="0.8"/> if it is tied to the ideas that <pause dur="0.4"/> on which liberal democracies are are based <pause dur="0.7"/> is it justified for NATO <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> protect Albanians in Kosovo against Serb aggression <pause dur="0.5"/> or maybe it's not <pause dur="2.3"/> but <pause dur="0.6"/> although <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>al</trunc> military alliances are mostly not <pause dur="0.2"/> investigated from that perspective <pause dur="0.9"/> it is rather a rewarding <pause dur="0.4"/> idea to <pause dur="0.5"/> at least question the political and the <pause dur="0.2"/> ideological underpinnings <pause dur="0.5"/> of military alliances <pause dur="0.3"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> because in the end <pause dur="0.5"/> armed force is used for political purposes <pause dur="1.8"/> now NATO also <pause dur="0.3"/> fulfilled the other requirement that it needed to defend # to define <pause dur="1.4"/> what an armed what what aggression is what is an incident of aggression <pause dur="1.2"/> now article five of the Washington Treaty does that <pause dur="2.2"/> A that <pause dur="0.2"/> an armed attack against one shall be considered <pause dur="0.3"/> # an armed attack against all <pause dur="1.0"/> but <pause dur="2.8"/> in response <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> such an act of aggression <pause dur="0.2"/> each of the parties in <reading>in

exercise of their right to individual or collective self-defence recognized by article fifty-one of the U-N charter <pause dur="0.6"/> will assist those attacked by taking individually or in concert with the other parties such action as it deems necessary</reading> <pause dur="0.3"/> now this is an essential point <pause dur="0.7"/> such action as it deems necessary <pause dur="1.0"/> this is this is <pause dur="0.3"/> NATO founders bowing to <pause dur="0.7"/> sovereignty <pause dur="1.0"/> they do not say we predetermine how we are going to defend NATO territory <pause dur="0.3"/> or territory of an ally <pause dur="0.8"/> # against an act of aggression <pause dur="0.2"/> armed aggression <pause dur="1.0"/> they say <pause dur="0.4"/> in the event <pause dur="0.2"/> of an attack <pause dur="0.4"/> each of the NATO members <pause dur="0.5"/> can decide <pause dur="0.2"/> how much <pause dur="0.4"/> and in what way <pause dur="0.5"/> it wants them to contribute to <pause dur="0.5"/> a defensive act or to to defensive action <pause dur="2.8"/> of course in NATO planning especially in NATO planning <pause dur="0.3"/> # for a contingency in an <pause dur="0.2"/> in in <pause dur="0.2"/> well in a confrontation with the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.8"/>

was based on <pause dur="0.2"/> on the assumption that all NATO members would <pause dur="0.2"/> throw in <pause dur="0.3"/> all they had in order to defend themselves <pause dur="0.9"/> but this is an issue which is now <pause dur="0.2"/> becoming much more relevant <pause dur="0.8"/> plus if it had been <pause dur="0.3"/> not the Soviet Union but someone else attacking a NATO member <pause dur="0.4"/> then the situation would have probably been rather different <pause dur="2.3"/> and they undertook the obligation to report an attack and countermeasures to the U-N Security Council <pause dur="1.8"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="14"/> they did not say <pause dur="0.4"/> we are going to ask for permission by the <sic corr="U-N">U-S</sic> Security Council I-E a mandate <pause dur="0.9"/> for <pause dur="0.2"/> any <pause dur="2.0"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> action <pause dur="5.0"/> you don't have to write down these things look them up in in i mean <pause dur="0.4"/> the the # <pause dur="0.9"/> the article bits which i had <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of quoted on this on this slide <pause dur="0.6"/> don't write them down just look them up on the web or <pause dur="0.2"/> in in the handbook it's much easier <pause dur="1.2"/> and it's not so salient unless <pause dur="0.4"/> unless you are interested in looking at NATO and and investigating something <pause dur="0.5"/> pertaining to NATO questions <pause dur="0.6"/> # then you go <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>co</trunc> go to <pause dur="0.2"/> # the NATO handbook or or its website but you don't <pause dur="0.5"/> it's not

essential <pause dur="0.2"/> nobody's going to ask you that in your exams <pause dur="0.4"/> can you quote article five of the # of the Washington Treaty <pause dur="1.8"/> # <pause dur="2.3"/> during the Cold War <pause dur="0.4"/> as i said NATO's <pause dur="0.2"/> principle objective <pause dur="0.2"/> was to deter the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.8"/> everything <pause dur="0.2"/> that NATO did <pause dur="0.5"/> was subordinate to that and of course it had to do this <pause dur="0.3"/> A <pause dur="0.4"/> through <pause dur="0.2"/> nuclear deterrents well it didn't of course have to do this <pause dur="0.6"/> did eventually have to do it when the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.4"/> acquired nuclear weapons in nineteen-forty-nine <pause dur="0.3"/> and built up a nuclear arsenal <pause dur="2.1"/> that also meant it was utterly dependent on the U-S <pause dur="0.2"/> because nuclear deterrents only worked with U-S involvement <pause dur="0.8"/> and this is where i come back to why the Europeans were so keen on having <pause dur="0.5"/> U-S military personnel based in Europe <pause dur="1.8"/> the U-S soldiers based in Europe <pause dur="0.4"/> and pilots and <pause dur="0.5"/> sailors <pause dur="0.6"/> were essentially <pause dur="0.8"/> hostages <pause dur="0.4"/> in <pause dur="0.5"/> the game of nuclear deterrents <pause dur="1.1"/> because by having U-S <pause dur="0.2"/> military personnel based in Europe <pause dur="0.5"/> that military personnel could become <pause dur="0.3"/> a target <pause dur="0.6"/> for Soviet aggression <pause dur="0.9"/> which

meant from a European perspective <pause dur="0.4"/> the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> would have extended national security interests in Europe <pause dur="0.4"/> in the shape of soldiers <pause dur="0.3"/> based <pause dur="0.3"/> on European soil <pause dur="1.1"/> which meant again from a European perspective <pause dur="0.3"/> that the likelihood that the U-S <pause dur="0.3"/> would use nuclear weapons in response to an attack a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.9"/> was much higher <pause dur="0.9"/> than <pause dur="0.5"/> if <pause dur="0.2"/> no U-S personnel had been based <pause dur="0.4"/> on the European continent <pause dur="2.0"/> burden sharing debate and this issue <pause dur="0.2"/> were often <pause dur="0.2"/> very closely linked <pause dur="4.8"/> at the same time <trunc>milita</trunc> # <pause dur="2.4"/> NATO tried to <pause dur="1.2"/> underline its defensive <pause dur="0.3"/> attitude <pause dur="0.8"/> by declaring that military action was dependent on <trunc>unan</trunc> unanimous decisions <pause dur="0.4"/> if the smallest member of NATO did not want to <pause dur="0.9"/> take action <pause dur="0.5"/> NATO wouldn't have taken action <pause dur="0.5"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> unless this member was had <pause dur="0.5"/> # its arms twisted massively by all the other members <pause dur="8.4"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="10"/> on the issue of cohesion <pause dur="1.8"/> not only the burden sharing <pause dur="0.2"/> debate was an issue but also <pause dur="0.7"/> arms control <pause dur="0.8"/> and i'll talk about arms control <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> next in a week's time <pause dur="0.8"/> so just to sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> give you a

pointer <pause dur="0.7"/> # the SALT negotiations in the late nineteen-sixties early nineteen-seventies from a European perspective <pause dur="0.5"/> were seen as <pause dur="0.6"/> entailing at least a risk <pause dur="0.6"/> of the Soviet Union and the U-S coming to <pause dur="1.0"/> a separate agreement <pause dur="0.6"/> which suited their national security interests <pause dur="0.3"/> but not necessarily <pause dur="0.5"/> the Europeans' national security interests <pause dur="0.5"/> which meant <pause dur="0.3"/> that they perceived the risk of being abandoned <pause dur="0.3"/> by <pause dur="0.2"/> the U-S <pause dur="0.6"/> as it turned out <pause dur="0.4"/> the U-S reiterated its commitment to European security and to NATO <pause dur="1.0"/> but <pause dur="0.3"/> in that period in the late sixties early seventies <pause dur="0.2"/> there was <pause dur="0.2"/> quite a lot of <pause dur="0.4"/> concern about <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="10"/> the issue of abandonment <pause dur="4.0"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> to finish very swiftly <pause dur="2.1"/> NATO in the post Cold War environment <pause dur="1.6"/> NATO <pause dur="0.2"/> didn't want to abolish itself as you all know <pause dur="2.2"/> NATO was also seen as still being a child of the Cold War and harbouring aggressive <trunc>aten</trunc> intent against Russia and the successive states of the Soviet <trunc>u</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> the other successive states of the Soviet Union <pause dur="2.3"/> so NATO spent <pause dur="0.2"/> the nineteen-nineties <pause dur="0.5"/> reinventing

itself <pause dur="0.4"/> A <pause dur="0.8"/> as <pause dur="0.6"/> one <pause dur="0.9"/> little wheel <pause dur="0.2"/> well actually quite a dominant wheel <pause dur="0.7"/> in the European <pause dur="0.3"/> framework <pause dur="0.7"/> of institutions which <pause dur="0.3"/> were responsible or which which have remit <pause dur="0.5"/> for political economic and military security and development in Europe <pause dur="1.2"/> NATO enlargement was <pause dur="0.2"/> one <pause dur="0.6"/> major aspect of this <pause dur="1.0"/> which NATO <pause dur="0.7"/> couldn't <pause dur="0.4"/> which is <pause dur="0.2"/> it would be unjustified to see as <pause dur="0.4"/> just something that NATO pursued in order to find a new <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> rationale for itself <pause dur="0.7"/> those countries which had been previously Warsaw Pact members <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> were very keen on <pause dur="0.2"/> establishing their links with western Europe <pause dur="0.7"/> were very keen also on becoming members of NATO not least because it became clear very soon <pause dur="0.3"/> that the E-U <pause dur="0.4"/> would <pause dur="0.4"/> drag its feet a lot longer <pause dur="0.2"/> in <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> admitting new members <pause dur="0.3"/> whereas NATO <pause dur="1.0"/> both from a NATO perspective and from from a U-S perspective was much more prepared <pause dur="0.5"/> to contemplate <pause dur="0.2"/> letting in new members <pause dur="0.5"/> so last year Hungary Poland and the Czech Republic became new members of NATO <pause dur="1.7"/> NATO also # established itself as one organization <pause dur="0.3"/> which had <pause dur="1.0"/> a cooperative role <pause dur="0.4"/> within <pause dur="0.7"/> the European <pause dur="0.4"/> the E-U system of <pause dur="0.6"/> # designing <pause dur="0.3"/> a

common foreign and security policy <pause dur="1.0"/> but of course <pause dur="0.3"/> again there you have <pause dur="1.3"/> <trunc>p</trunc> potentially huge problems <pause dur="0.5"/> of transatlantic relations the different orientations of <pause dur="0.3"/> the European <pause dur="0.3"/> the E-U members <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> towards <pause dur="0.2"/> the the their different attitudes towards the U-S conflicting <pause dur="0.3"/> with the European idea <pause dur="1.1"/> finally <pause dur="0.4"/> NATO became <pause dur="1.0"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> one could say a subcontractor at least for a while <pause dur="0.3"/> to the U-N and the O-S-C it offered <pause dur="0.7"/> it <pause dur="0.2"/> it made itself available <pause dur="0.2"/> as a military tool <pause dur="0.4"/> # for <pause dur="0.2"/> U-N authorized or O-S-C-E <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>os</trunc> # authorized <pause dur="1.2"/> # operations <pause dur="1.1"/> this meant also that NATO does no longer only have to <pause dur="0.8"/> respond under article five it <pause dur="0.3"/> can <pause dur="0.7"/> it has <pause dur="0.5"/> inscribed in in into its new strategic doctrine <pause dur="0.4"/> the possibility of legitimate action <pause dur="0.3"/> in peace enforcement and peace keeping operations <pause dur="0.5"/> so its mission its self-imposed mission <pause dur="0.3"/> has changed <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> quite a significant degree <pause dur="1.7"/> that was an extremely fast <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> rundown # <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>betw</trunc> from alliances of collective security to NATO <pause dur="0.7"/> i hope you remember some of it <pause dur="1.1"/> and i'll see you on Thursday <pause dur="0.7"/> for <pause dur="0.3"/> deterrence <pause dur="1.1"/> thank you