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<title>Arms control and disarmament</title></titleStmt>

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<idno>sslct020</idno>

<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

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The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

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<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any

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<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>

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<date>14/11/2000</date><equipment><p>audio</p></equipment>

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<item n="module">Modern International Relations</item>

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<u who="nm1163"> if for some reason you <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of get lost or want to know more about arms control which of course i assume that you will <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> Stuart Croft's Strategies of Arms Control is <pause dur="0.2"/> a really good introduction <pause dur="0.9"/> # and i think they have three copies in the library so <pause dur="0.2"/> you should be able to take turns and actually <pause dur="0.7"/> have a look at them <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> it sort of gives you a brief historical background and then goes into <pause dur="0.3"/> Cold War arms control negotiations <pause dur="0.5"/> and examines essentially the utility of arms control and <pause dur="0.2"/> the question of <pause dur="0.6"/> well is arms control <pause dur="0.2"/> a completely futile concept or is it not <pause dur="0.9"/> now the reason why he wrote the book <pause dur="0.4"/> partly was because <pause dur="1.4"/> <gap reason="name" extent="2 words"/> <pause dur="2.5"/> wrote a book called <pause dur="0.5"/> who is <pause dur="0.2"/> a member of the department now <pause dur="0.4"/> wrote a book called # <pause dur="0.8"/> House of Cards <pause dur="0.5"/> in which he argues very strongly against <pause dur="0.7"/> the <trunc>ut</trunc> <trunc>u</trunc> the usefulness of arms control <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> it was out of print for quite a long time but i hope that because he's joined the department <pause dur="0.4"/> i mean for quite a long time a few years <pause dur="0.8"/> i hope that because he's joined the

department it should actually be available at least in the departmental library <pause dur="1.1"/> but i haven't checked i must admit it just <pause dur="0.4"/> occurred to me that i might # <pause dur="0.3"/> that it might actually be available now as well <pause dur="0.8"/> so you have two completely different perspectives Stuart Croft arguing well there is a there is a use there is some use to arms controls <pause dur="0.3"/> and <gap reason="name" extent="2 words"/> going no arms control it's all rubbish <pause dur="0.4"/> it's a completely futile endeavour <pause dur="1.1"/> i'm going to try to introduce you <pause dur="1.3"/><kinesic desc="puts on transparency" iterated="n"/> to concepts of arms control <pause dur="0.7"/> as they emerged <pause dur="1.2"/> now as i said <pause dur="0.3"/> last time <pause dur="0.2"/> arms control and arms races <pause dur="0.9"/> are <pause dur="0.5"/> not <pause dur="0.2"/> a phenomenon <pause dur="0.6"/> that's really only limited to the Cold War <pause dur="1.6"/> the reason why we have concentrated so much on <pause dur="0.3"/> arms control during the Cold War <pause dur="0.4"/> was simply because <pause dur="0.7"/> we were <trunc>d</trunc> we were dealing with nuclear weapons which you know loads about now after attending the lecture last week <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> from a historical perspective arms races <pause dur="0.5"/> existed <pause dur="0.9"/> well since the <pause dur="1.5"/> well since <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> the beginning of time really <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> <pause dur="0.6"/> one of the

first # <pause dur="0.7"/> arms control measures <pause dur="0.6"/> was <pause dur="1.1"/> <trunc>p</trunc> <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> some <trunc>po</trunc> i forgot the name now <vocal desc="laugh" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/> this is very embarrassing <pause dur="0.5"/> # <trunc>outla</trunc> outlawing the longbow <pause dur="1.2"/> simply because there was the idea that # that was an <pause dur="0.3"/> an immoral means of war <pause dur="1.8"/> but then real arms control on a political level <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> on a on a more concerted level <pause dur="0.5"/> you find before the <trunc>worl</trunc> the First World War <pause dur="0.5"/> when <pause dur="0.2"/> Russia and Britain both <pause dur="0.2"/> tried to push through <pause dur="0.6"/> # arms control <pause dur="0.9"/> agendas and and translate them into actual policy <pause dur="0.6"/> because <pause dur="0.2"/> they <trunc>s</trunc> they feared the outbreak of a war <pause dur="0.9"/> so the idea was if we try to cooperate on reducing levels of armament <pause dur="0.4"/> we reduce the security dilemma <pause dur="1.1"/> and therefore <pause dur="0.4"/> # war might actually not break out now there is <pause dur="1.3"/> a false logic <pause dur="0.2"/> to this argument but i get to that later <pause dur="1.3"/> now between the wars <pause dur="0.2"/> you had <pause dur="0.2"/> two <pause dur="1.1"/> broad categories of arms control one <pause dur="0.5"/> the Geneva Conventions <pause dur="0.5"/> which regulated the conduct of war <pause dur="0.3"/> the way in which military equipment was used <pause dur="0.4"/> military operations were conducted <pause dur="0.4"/> how prisoners were to be

treated how <pause dur="0.2"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> # targets were illegitimate targets <pause dur="0.6"/> how <pause dur="0.4"/> submarine warfare for example ought to be conducted or warfare at sea <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> all essentially aimed at regulating <pause dur="0.3"/> the the conduct of <trunc>mili</trunc> the conduct of military operations <pause dur="0.5"/> with a view to saving lives <pause dur="0.3"/> destroying the enemy's <pause dur="0.3"/> capabilities <pause dur="0.5"/> but saving lives and those whose lives have been saved and <trunc>be</trunc> and those who became prisoner <pause dur="0.6"/> were supposed to be treated in <pause dur="0.3"/> a reasonably decent way <pause dur="0.2"/> I-E not tortured et cetera et cetera <pause dur="1.3"/> now <pause dur="0.3"/> as such conventions often go <pause dur="0.3"/> they weren't adhered to in the Second World War <pause dur="1.2"/> # a great deal and <pause dur="0.2"/> obviously you still have violations of these conventions <pause dur="2.0"/> but then the question is might it not be a good <pause dur="0.2"/> idea to just have them for the sake of being able to refer to them <pause dur="1.0"/> the other <pause dur="0.6"/> # major system was the Washington Naval Treaty System <pause dur="0.6"/> in which <pause dur="0.4"/> Britain and the U-S Japan and Germany <pause dur="1.3"/> and France <pause dur="0.3"/> when and other countries but <trunc>th</trunc> those four countries particularly <pause dur="0.7"/> were meant to reduce their <pause dur="0.2"/> i mean Germany

after the First World War had <pause dur="0.4"/> levels of armaments <pause dur="0.2"/> or top levels of armaments imposed on its armed forces at at any rate <pause dur="0.6"/> but they tried to come up with a system which would allow <pause dur="0.6"/> all of them to have some sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> armed forces or naval forces <pause dur="0.6"/> but which would not exceed a specific tonnage <pause dur="0.2"/> # the idea behind that being that <pause dur="0.5"/> if you only have a certain <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of size of ship you can only put <pause dur="0.2"/> a certain amount <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> weapons and and <pause dur="0.2"/> well <pause dur="0.5"/> weapons which which have <trunc>s</trunc> have limited capabilities on these ships <pause dur="1.1"/> now <pause dur="0.6"/> the Washington Treaty System also had a political dimension in that it <pause dur="0.2"/> was meant to force the countries that were members of the Washington Naval Treaties <pause dur="0.6"/> to talking to one another <pause dur="0.6"/> and to try to reduce to try to address each other's security concerns <pause dur="1.5"/> without <pause dur="0.2"/> always only bean counting <pause dur="0.2"/> but actually looking at what the political objectives were for each of these countries <pause dur="0.8"/> as we know <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the Washington <pause dur="0.2"/> Treaty <trunc>sys</trunc> <trunc>wa</trunc> Washington Naval Treaty System <pause dur="0.6"/> did not do its job as <pause dur="0.2"/> intended which

is one of the reasons why <pause dur="0.4"/> arms control <pause dur="0.5"/> or <trunc>i</trunc> which is one example where arms control is sometimes dismissed as completely futile <pause dur="6.2"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="6"/> now what what what are generally the aims <pause dur="0.6"/> of arms control <pause dur="2.1"/> i'll just look at them from the two main <pause dur="0.4"/> perspectives <pause dur="0.4"/> realist or neo-realist perspective and <pause dur="0.2"/> the # <pause dur="0.5"/> liberal or <pause dur="0.2"/> neo-liberal perspective <pause dur="2.0"/> from a realist perspective <pause dur="0.4"/> arms control <pause dur="0.3"/> # is essentially meant to maintain <pause dur="0.4"/> the balance of military power <pause dur="1.8"/> I-E that if you <pause dur="0.3"/> assume that <pause dur="0.2"/> if <trunc>ca</trunc> that capabilities <pause dur="0.2"/> it's particularly military capabilities <pause dur="0.6"/> are what make a state powerful <pause dur="1.3"/> then <pause dur="0.5"/> if there is a balance of military power <pause dur="0.8"/> if <pause dur="0.4"/> none of the states <pause dur="1.1"/> tied into this balance of power <pause dur="0.4"/> is capable <pause dur="0.6"/> of of<pause dur="0.2"/> mustering the military capabilites which would allow it to attack another state <pause dur="0.4"/> with the assumption that it would win the war <pause dur="0.4"/> and that's generally assumed as one of the <pause dur="0.2"/> principal <pause dur="0.4"/> causes of a war <pause dur="0.3"/> that if if there are <pause dur="0.3"/> political <pause dur="1.5"/> conflicts <pause dur="0.6"/> and state A assumes that it could win a war against state B <pause dur="0.8"/> then it is much

more likely to actually go <pause dur="0.2"/> and attack that state <pause dur="0.2"/> than if it <pause dur="0.2"/> has <pause dur="0.4"/> capability reasons <pause dur="0.2"/> to assume it won't win that war <pause dur="1.2"/> so by maintaining the balance of military power <pause dur="1.1"/> the assumption was that this could avoid <pause dur="1.1"/> well would be the <trunc>assum</trunc> # <pause dur="0.2"/> that that this could be <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>s</trunc> that this could avoid war <pause dur="1.6"/> tied into that is obviously <pause dur="0.2"/> managing <pause dur="0.8"/> our old # <pause dur="0.8"/> concept the security dilemma <pause dur="1.8"/> not only with a view to avoiding the outbreak of war <pause dur="0.4"/> # at any given level <pause dur="0.7"/> but also <pause dur="0.3"/> because <pause dur="0.3"/> the security dilemma or or <pause dur="0.2"/> the spiral implied in the concept of security dilemma <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> implies <pause dur="0.2"/> defence expenditure <pause dur="0.3"/> it's an economic burden <pause dur="0.4"/> if <pause dur="0.3"/> two of or more states <pause dur="0.7"/> constantly respond to each other's <pause dur="0.2"/> increasing armament levels <pause dur="0.7"/> they will spend a lot of money on armed forces <pause dur="0.9"/> and arms control measures <pause dur="0.2"/> might be agreed upon <pause dur="0.5"/> if each side considers <pause dur="0.2"/> the defence expenditure far too high <pause dur="0.6"/> for <pause dur="0.4"/> its economic capabilities <pause dur="0.3"/> or chooses to or or would <trunc>desi</trunc> would desire <pause dur="1.1"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> spend <pause dur="0.7"/> public money on <pause dur="0.2"/> things other <pause dur="0.3"/> than defence equipment <pause dur="1.8"/> so from a

systemic perspective you could say <pause dur="0.5"/> if two two or more states <pause dur="0.2"/> seek to balance <pause dur="0.5"/> their cost-benefit equation in terms of military and economic security <pause dur="0.5"/> they might engage <pause dur="0.2"/> # in arms control <pause dur="2.0"/> the problem with that is that if you only <pause dur="0.2"/> reduce capabilities <pause dur="0.7"/> then that doesn't in itself prevent war because obviously the capabilities themselves <pause dur="0.9"/> do not cause war <pause dur="0.4"/> it's the intentions which lie behind the capabilities <pause dur="0.7"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> might <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> lead to war <pause dur="0.8"/> so in a sense <pause dur="0.5"/> and this is what <pause dur="0.5"/> <gap reason="name" extent="2 words"/> for example would argue <pause dur="0.3"/> arms control leads you into a circular argument <pause dur="0.6"/> because <pause dur="1.0"/> since it's not the capabilities which cause war but political friction <pause dur="1.8"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> as i will <pause dur="0.3"/> explain later you need trust in order to establish arms control measures <pause dur="1.2"/> by the time you actually would <pause dur="0.4"/> want to go for arms control measures <pause dur="0.5"/> it's quite likely that the states with whom you want to control your weaponry <pause dur="0.7"/> are not prepared to trust you <pause dur="0.2"/> therefore they are not going to negotiate with you <pause dur="0.3"/> so it doesn't make any sense whatsoever <pause dur="1.4"/> and <pause dur="0.9"/>

if there is the trust and if there is negotiations are negotiations and if there are <pause dur="0.2"/> there is a preparedness in principle <pause dur="0.5"/> to cooperate <pause dur="0.7"/> politically <pause dur="0.9"/> then you don't need to avoid war <pause dur="1.0"/> so you don't need to control arms <pause dur="1.0"/> that would be <pause dur="0.2"/> one of the <pause dur="1.1"/> sort of perspectives on arms control which which <pause dur="0.5"/> basically says arms control <pause dur="0.2"/> doesn't do anything for anyone <pause dur="0.4"/> including for <pause dur="0.4"/> the stability in regions or the international system <pause dur="1.8"/> now from a more liberal perspective <pause dur="0.5"/> the argument would be <pause dur="1.0"/> the central <pause dur="2.3"/> benefit <pause dur="0.3"/> of arms control negotiations <pause dur="0.9"/> is that they can come up with rules <pause dur="0.2"/> and norms of behaviour <pause dur="1.5"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> as you will see later in the context of nuclear <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> weapons <pause dur="0.2"/> and <trunc>prolifera</trunc> # well nuclear weapons regulation <pause dur="1.5"/> that was a particularly <pause dur="0.2"/> prevalent argument <pause dur="2.3"/> partly <pause dur="1.4"/> # a liberal perspective of course is or this this idea that you can generate rules and norms of behaviour <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in the # on the on an international level or on a regional level <pause dur="0.2"/> through arms control <pause dur="0.3"/> that is tied in <pause dur="0.4"/> with the idea that <pause dur="0.4"/>

weapons will only be be used as a last resort <pause dur="0.5"/> only if everything else has failed or if war is about to be pressed upon a state <pause dur="0.9"/> then <pause dur="0.3"/> a liberal state <pause dur="0.3"/> would <pause dur="0.2"/> find it necessary to defend itself <pause dur="0.6"/> but it would not necessarily advocate the use of force <pause dur="0.9"/> in order <pause dur="0.7"/> for for aggressive purposes <pause dur="0.6"/> now whether that still holds <pause dur="0.5"/> in today's environment where the use of force and the conditions for the use of force <pause dur="0.4"/> are changing <pause dur="1.3"/> is a different question <pause dur="2.0"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> a liberal perspective would furthermore <pause dur="0.2"/> emphasize the economic <pause dur="0.2"/> prosperity aspects of security building mechanisms <pause dur="0.7"/> # more than <pause dur="1.4"/> only to a <pause dur="0.2"/> limited degree but more than <pause dur="0.4"/> defence expenditure because <pause dur="0.2"/> there is <pause dur="0.9"/> liberals tend to see more of a trade-off between creating stability and security <pause dur="0.3"/> through economic means <pause dur="0.5"/> and the ability <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> preserve military or security by military means <pause dur="1.3"/> so from that perspective <pause dur="1.5"/> cooperation becomes more of a possibility even if <pause dur="0.5"/> this cooperation is seen <pause dur="0.3"/> essentially also as a means to fend off <pause dur="0.5"/> external threats <pause dur="0.2"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> the

international environment might throw at the state <pause dur="2.9"/> but that then leads <pause dur="0.7"/> in an argumentative line to <pause dur="0.3"/> the idea that economic gains through interdependence are preferable <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.5"/> using military means <pause dur="0.3"/> for the <trunc>condu</trunc> conduct of international politics <pause dur="0.8"/> that peaceful conflict resolution is # is essentially better than using force <pause dur="0.5"/> and that <pause dur="0.4"/> confidence and security building measures that's what this <pause dur="0.3"/> abbreviation means <pause dur="1.0"/> are a means <pause dur="0.3"/> of arms control in the sense that they control the will to use arms <pause dur="0.5"/> rather than <pause dur="0.3"/> on the <trunc>fir</trunc> in the first place <pause dur="0.2"/> the capabilities which the # <pause dur="0.3"/> weapons <pause dur="0.4"/> on each side convey </u><pause dur="0.6"/> <u who="sm1164" trans="pause"> so what does C </u><u who="nm1163" trans="latching"> sorry </u><u who="sm1164" trans="latching"> C-S-B-M stand for </u><u who="nm1163" trans="overlap"> confidence and security building measures <pause dur="3.2"/> sometimes you might find this also as <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="6"/> just C-B-M <pause dur="0.3"/> which is confidence building measures <pause dur="6.6"/> now how is <trunc>arm</trunc> arms control conducted <pause dur="2.5"/> or what are the instruments of arms control <pause dur="2.7"/>

much arms control happens on a state to state level <pause dur="1.5"/> since the end of the <pause dur="1.0"/> Cold War <pause dur="0.9"/> there is quite a lot of arms control <pause dur="0.3"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> needs to happen in <pause dur="0.2"/> in the context of <pause dur="0.8"/> conflict resolution or resolution of conflicts in intra-state wars <pause dur="1.3"/> but that's a slightly separate issue <pause dur="1.7"/> now <pause dur="0.5"/> arms can be controlled nationally <pause dur="0.5"/> simply by a state imposing or a government imposing export controls <pause dur="1.2"/> we'll find that in the <pause dur="0.2"/> nuclear <pause dur="0.4"/> # non-proliferation regime <pause dur="0.8"/> # you find <pause dur="0.2"/> i i briefly touched upon that # in the context of <pause dur="0.2"/> dual use goods <pause dur="0.5"/> you found that although it doesn't always work or very often doesn't work <pause dur="0.5"/> # with regard to <pause dur="0.7"/> <unclear><trunc>nat</trunc></unclear> states <pause dur="0.2"/> that have a strong defence industry but also <pause dur="0.6"/> at least would like to pursue <pause dur="0.5"/> a policy which <pause dur="0.3"/> doesn't <pause dur="0.5"/> send arms into <pause dur="0.2"/> already conflict ridden regions <pause dur="0.3"/> watched through government sanction <pause dur="0.7"/> that they impose export controls <pause dur="0.2"/> temporary export controls <pause dur="1.5"/> and they are then this is then essentially a policy of unilateral restraint <pause dur="1.8"/> unilateral restraint can also be imposed of course on

the development of certain weapon systems <pause dur="0.9"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> some states just decide not to go for <pause dur="0.7"/> a particular weapon system or a particular technology <pause dur="1.2"/> which of course is <pause dur="0.4"/> a measure of arms control <pause dur="4.0"/> once you go on to <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of an international level <pause dur="1.0"/> and if you want to <pause dur="0.7"/> try to <pause dur="0.3"/> enshrine arms control measures <pause dur="0.8"/> on that level <pause dur="0.8"/> you have two options either <pause dur="0.4"/> states <trunc>agra</trunc> agree on a bilateral basis to <pause dur="0.4"/> reduce or control <pause dur="0.8"/> arms <pause dur="0.2"/> or their armaments <pause dur="1.0"/> or they agree <pause dur="0.7"/> on a bilateral level to <pause dur="1.7"/> unilateral measures <pause dur="0.2"/> that <trunc>pro</trunc> prohibit the <trunc>pro</trunc> the proliferation of certain technologies <pause dur="1.7"/> or <pause dur="0.3"/> you pursue a multilateral perspective which is <pause dur="0.6"/> particularly <pause dur="0.5"/> favoured for <pause dur="0.3"/> non-proliferation regimes <pause dur="2.5"/> now the difference between arms the <pause dur="0.6"/> you could say that non-proliferation is a subsection of arms control <pause dur="1.5"/> # just sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> for for conceptual clarification <pause dur="0.7"/> controlling arms essentially means controlling the level of armaments <pause dur="0.8"/> non-proliferation means preventing the spread <pause dur="0.2"/> of weapon systems or weapons

technology <pause dur="0.8"/> so there is <pause dur="0.2"/> there is a slight difference but it's a <pause dur="0.2"/> significant difference between the two concepts <pause dur="2.0"/> bilaterally and multinationally <pause dur="0.4"/> # you have again different types of options you can either go for arms limitation <pause dur="0.5"/> or arms reduction treaties <pause dur="0.7"/> where the two sides agree to actually cut out <pause dur="0.5"/> a whole class of weapons <pause dur="2.9"/> there are arms or technology transfer controls or regimes <pause dur="0.2"/> regimes being <pause dur="0.4"/> multinational agreements which are then nationally implemented <pause dur="0.5"/> and which impose on the the members of the regime a set of rules and norms <pause dur="0.4"/> as to what they may and may not do <pause dur="0.3"/> which in turn is meant <pause dur="0.6"/> to make it more predictable for each of the members <pause dur="1.0"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> know what <pause dur="0.6"/> another member is likely to do <pause dur="0.7"/> there are of course pitfalls to this but this is the <pause dur="0.4"/> the positive <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> the the <pause dur="0.4"/> perceived positive aspect of regime building <pause dur="1.6"/> you can have weapons exclusion zones <pause dur="0.2"/> where <pause dur="0.4"/> for example nuclear weapons are <pause dur="0.6"/> not not permitted or all the states in a particular zone <pause dur="0.5"/> region <pause dur="0.4"/> # agree not to acquire nuclear

weapons <pause dur="1.5"/> moratoria which well particularly <pause dur="0.2"/> linked to nuclear weapons tests <pause dur="0.8"/> or one state would <pause dur="1.4"/> declare a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing <pause dur="0.3"/> which of course puts <pause dur="0.5"/> the other members of the nuclear <pause dur="0.4"/> power community under pressure <pause dur="0.4"/> if they also want to gain the moral high ground <pause dur="0.3"/> that they might also <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> call for a moratorium on their <pause dur="0.2"/> <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.4"/> weapons testing <pause dur="0.9"/> and finally notification schemes which is essentially <pause dur="0.5"/> well it's one core of confidence and security building measures <pause dur="0.5"/> and that is <pause dur="0.7"/> because <pause dur="1.8"/> there is the assumption that capabilities <pause dur="0.7"/> might be <pause dur="0.7"/> might <pause dur="0.2"/> well the the possession of capabilities might trigger <pause dur="0.3"/> a war <pause dur="1.2"/> and there is also from a conventional war perspective <pause dur="0.3"/> still the very strong assumption that surprise attack is always <pause dur="0.2"/> better for the aggressor <pause dur="0.5"/> than <pause dur="1.1"/> sort of giving away too much <pause dur="0.7"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> the reason why exercises and <pause dur="0.2"/> well exercises became an issue of notification schemes for exercises became an issue <pause dur="0.6"/> was that <pause dur="0.2"/> if <pause dur="0.2"/> armies exercise <pause dur="0.2"/> armies the air forces navies <pause dur="2.4"/> a potentially

hostile <pause dur="0.5"/> state <pause dur="0.9"/> in the case of NATO and Warsaw Pact if NATO exercises the Warsaw Pact would look at NATO's exercises and go <pause dur="0.5"/> well what are they planning to do might they actually be tempted to attack us now <pause dur="0.7"/> but if there is early notification of what sort of exercises are going to be conducted <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> not what exactly they are going to <pause dur="0.2"/> exercise but <pause dur="0.4"/> how many soldiers or troops are going to be moved <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>base</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> how long the exercise is going to <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> going to be <pause dur="0.5"/> then the other side has some sort of reasonable <pause dur="0.2"/> way of assessing this exercise is just a pretence for <pause dur="0.3"/> an aggressive act or not <pause dur="0.6"/> now this is actually quite that that this was actually quite important during the Cold War because # <pause dur="0.5"/> NATO <pause dur="0.7"/> in fact did launch <pause dur="1.1"/> a missile as part of its exercise but that missile went astray <pause dur="0.6"/> and the Soviet Union wasn't sure whether that was an attack or not <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> because they had good communications <pause dur="0.6"/> that meant that the that nothing <pause dur="0.3"/> worse than # just a small little blip happened <pause dur="0.9"/> it could have been <pause dur="0.2"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="7"/> otherwise

if there hadn't been <pause dur="0.9"/> a way of notifying each other of this <pause dur="0.7"/> and then for the Soviet Union to actually assure <pause dur="0.4"/> that this was not an aggressive act <pause dur="2.0"/> now how effective can arms control be <pause dur="2.0"/> if you have treaties on a government to government level <pause dur="0.7"/> whether they are <pause dur="0.4"/> multilateral or bilateral <pause dur="1.7"/> they constitute then international law but that means <pause dur="0.4"/> the implementation <pause dur="0.3"/> of the treaty <pause dur="0.4"/> depends on <pause dur="0.3"/> each <pause dur="0.2"/> government <pause dur="2.3"/> which poses a bit of a problem <pause dur="0.7"/> because <pause dur="0.3"/> yes governments agree to control or limit their <pause dur="0.2"/> their military arsenals <pause dur="0.4"/> but how does government A know <pause dur="0.4"/> that governments B C and D <pause dur="0.4"/> are actually complying with the commitment they entered into <pause dur="0.3"/> in the treaty <pause dur="4.3"/> the second issue is <pause dur="0.4"/> therefore <pause dur="0.4"/> that there has to be a degree of transparency <pause dur="0.5"/> in the arms control process <pause dur="0.5"/> now transparency really has two functions <pause dur="0.5"/> when it's talked about in the context of arms control <pause dur="0.5"/> one is <pause dur="0.5"/> that during arms control treaty negotiations <pause dur="0.2"/> each side <pause dur="0.3"/> is tasked with <pause dur="0.4"/> putting <pause dur="0.3"/> its capabilities <pause dur="0.7"/> more or less accurately on

the table <pause dur="0.4"/> they have <pause dur="0.2"/> because they know the other side has been spying on them <pause dur="0.9"/> so they can't be completely off the mark <pause dur="0.9"/> so in a sense during the arms control negotiations they will try to tease out of each other <pause dur="0.4"/> what <pause dur="0.4"/> they have <pause dur="1.6"/> the other <pause dur="0.6"/> aspect of transparency is when it comes to implementing the arms control <pause dur="0.4"/> treaty that they have just agreed on <pause dur="1.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and that is that <pause dur="1.1"/> whatever arms control measures have been agreed upon <pause dur="0.5"/> that should actually be <pause dur="0.5"/> verifiable and be made transparent <pause dur="1.1"/> by <pause dur="0.8"/> a multinational observer group or by <pause dur="0.3"/> # a small group <pause dur="0.5"/> of the opposite state <pause dur="1.3"/> now that doesn't always happen <pause dur="0.4"/> and there are actually a lot of arms control treaties which <pause dur="0.6"/> while still regarded valuable <pause dur="0.6"/> but which don't have either verification or transparency measures <pause dur="0.6"/> in that sense built into them <pause dur="2.1"/> particularly with regard to nuclear biological and chemical weapons the irreversibility <pause dur="0.7"/> of the arms control measures <pause dur="0.2"/> has gained <pause dur="1.0"/> very high priority in <pause dur="0.2"/> any <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of arms control negotiations but of

course <pause dur="0.4"/> particularly with regard to <pause dur="0.4"/> nuclear and biological weapons where we have had most movement <pause dur="2.1"/> so transparency and verification are two essential components of arms control measures <pause dur="0.8"/> because <pause dur="0.2"/> yes <pause dur="0.5"/> you can say we have to trust each other <pause dur="1.2"/> but then <pause dur="0.6"/> checking <pause dur="0.2"/> whether it's worth trusting the other side is of course better <pause dur="0.5"/> than <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> just believing it <pause dur="0.7"/> and if the other side is compliant <pause dur="0.6"/> then that generates more trust which might in turn <pause dur="0.3"/> lead to more <pause dur="0.6"/> arms control measures <pause dur="0.4"/> if everything goes well <pause dur="1.0"/> and it <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="6"/> often doesn't <pause dur="6.3"/> now <pause dur="1.3"/> you may recall that i mentioned on the side <pause dur="1.9"/> some time ago <pause dur="0.9"/> that the Cuban Missile Crisis was <pause dur="1.6"/> an important turning point in the way in which <pause dur="0.4"/> nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the U-S was conducted <pause dur="1.0"/> now why was it so essential <pause dur="0.4"/> it was essential because it showed <pause dur="0.6"/> the two sides that they had no quick means of talking to one another <pause dur="0.9"/> that if anything happened if any nuclear accident happened <pause dur="0.8"/> they couldn't they would have to go through each other's

<trunc>embas</trunc> # so through <pause dur="0.3"/> yeah their embassies <pause dur="0.7"/> and or each other's embassies <pause dur="0.4"/> to then <pause dur="0.2"/> and send <pause dur="1.0"/> letters by diplomatic post <pause dur="0.3"/> which is quicker than if they if it went by normal post but still <pause dur="0.4"/> it takes a little while <pause dur="0.5"/> and when when when we're talking about nuclear weapons and you didn't want to take that long <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> the the need to actually be able to pick up the phone <pause dur="0.2"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> talk to one another became <pause dur="0.4"/> a hugely important aspect <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.4"/> the way arms control negotiations started <pause dur="0.8"/> and it was really the first agreement that was that was implemented in nineteen-<pause dur="0.8"/>sixty-three <pause dur="0.5"/> meant they had a direct line between <pause dur="0.3"/> the Kremlin and the White House <pause dur="1.1"/> following <pause dur="0.9"/> that <pause dur="0.6"/> # we had several different measures which were meant to prevent <pause dur="0.4"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>ha</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> were were were included <pause dur="0.4"/> # notification about nuclear accidents <pause dur="0.4"/> accidents at sea <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> the Limited Test Band treaty <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> from <pause dur="0.2"/> nineteen-sixty-nine onwards <pause dur="0.2"/> the two sides of the U-S and the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.5"/> engaged in what became known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks <pause dur="1.4"/> now <pause dur="1.3"/> i mentioned

SALT as <pause dur="0.2"/> an issue which the Europeans saw <pause dur="0.2"/> with some trepidation <pause dur="0.9"/> because as i said the negotiations went on between the U-S and the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.4"/> and didn't include either the European Warsaw Pact members or the European <pause dur="0.5"/> # NATO members <pause dur="1.0"/> so the worry on the part of the Europeans was <pause dur="0.4"/> that the U-S and the Soviet Union might actually break out to a degree <pause dur="0.7"/> of of <pause dur="0.8"/> their alliance well <trunc>pa</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> particularly for the for the <pause dur="0.2"/> # European NATO members that was the concern <pause dur="1.1"/> and that therefore the U-S might find a settlement which enhanced its own security <pause dur="0.6"/> through <pause dur="0.2"/> nuclear arms control <pause dur="1.4"/> but also made it less likely that <trunc>so</trunc> that the U-S would intervene <pause dur="0.2"/> or would come to the aid of NATO Europe <pause dur="0.4"/> if there was Soviet attack <pause dur="2.9"/> what it did do <pause dur="0.6"/> apart from the U-S then having to reiterate its point that it <pause dur="0.5"/> wouldn't <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> defect <pause dur="1.8"/> what SALT-one did <pause dur="0.7"/> was <pause dur="0.3"/> more a political achievement than an actual military achievement because it started <pause dur="0.3"/> a process of arms control negotiations which lasted through

the entire nineteen-seventies <pause dur="0.6"/> was then interrupted for about <pause dur="0.2"/> five years <pause dur="0.6"/> because the Cold War <pause dur="0.2"/> became colder again <pause dur="0.8"/> and <pause dur="0.6"/> was then taken up <pause dur="0.5"/> really where SALT-two had left it <pause dur="0.5"/> in the start negotiations about which i will tell you <pause dur="0.2"/> briefly <pause dur="0.2"/> in a minute <pause dur="1.8"/> a central treaty <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> linked to SALT-one was the A-B-M Treaty the # Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty <pause dur="1.1"/> that was central <pause dur="1.3"/> because it enshrined <pause dur="2.0"/> the rationale that the <pause dur="0.2"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> the the rationale which the U-S had favoured for <pause dur="1.1"/> a long time <pause dur="0.9"/> that nuclear deterrence should be <trunc>b</trunc> based on authentic capability <pause dur="1.1"/> with the <trunc>A</trunc> with the signing of the A-B-M Treaty which allowed <pause dur="0.4"/> the Soviet Union and the U-S to build <pause dur="0.3"/> anti-ballistic missile defences <pause dur="0.4"/> around <pause dur="0.3"/> first only <pause dur="0.2"/> one site each and then two sites <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> in in the respective country <pause dur="1.3"/> with the Soviet Union signing this treaty they basically said yes <pause dur="0.3"/> defence against nuclear weapons is not possible <pause dur="0.7"/> therefore or it's not affordable either <pause dur="0.4"/> therefore we are going to join you in building our capabilities <pause dur="0.4"/> or

building deterrents on <pause dur="1.1"/> on offensive capabilities <pause dur="1.0"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> this is <pause dur="0.2"/> essentially seen as the principal <pause dur="0.3"/> stability enhancing quality of the A-B-M Treaty <pause dur="0.4"/> now the reason i'm going on about this <pause dur="0.6"/> is that <pause dur="0.2"/> at the moment and <trunc>f</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> during the entire nineteen-nineties <pause dur="0.6"/> the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> has <pause dur="0.8"/> pursued <pause dur="0.3"/> and is <pause dur="0.2"/> seriously thinking <pause dur="0.3"/> about <pause dur="0.4"/> deploying <pause dur="0.3"/> a national ballistic missile defence system <pause dur="1.0"/> and you have the same arguments <pause dur="0.2"/> over again <pause dur="0.5"/> as to what a national ballistic missile defence system will do <pause dur="0.5"/> for international and for European <trunc>se</trunc> security <pause dur="0.9"/> because if the <trunc>sov</trunc> if the U-S can can <pause dur="0.5"/> defend itself <pause dur="0.7"/> is it likely to actually <pause dur="0.4"/> come to the aid of allies <pause dur="1.2"/>

for the allies it means <pause dur="0.2"/> are they going to spend their money on <pause dur="0.3"/> a European ballistic missile defence system <pause dur="0.4"/> which will also give them some degree <pause dur="0.3"/> some limited capability to <trunc>f</trunc> to defend themselves against <pause dur="0.6"/> missiles now no longer coming from well <pause dur="0.4"/> now the assumption is no longer that it that they primarily come from the Soviet <trunc>un</trunc> from <pause dur="0.2"/> well the successors of the Soviet Union <pause dur="1.1"/> but <pause dur="0.7"/> because Iraq Korea <pause dur="0.2"/> and well <pause dur="0.2"/> several <trunc>mid</trunc> Middle Eastern states and several <pause dur="0.9"/> <trunc>asia</trunc> # east Asian states <pause dur="0.5"/> have started <pause dur="0.7"/> building ballistic missiles which have now by now a medium range capability <pause dur="0.6"/> and the assumption is that well we need a ballistic missile defence system because <pause dur="0.5"/> these states are otherwise going to attack us <pause dur="0.6"/> now how serious this threat is <pause dur="0.4"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> a hugely controversial issue <pause dur="1.1"/> they may have these capabilities but they may not want to attack <pause dur="0.3"/> Europe <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> is a ballistic missile defence system not an invitation <pause dur="0.6"/> for <pause dur="0.3"/> one of these states that is

pursuing <pause dur="0.2"/> ballistic missile development <pause dur="1.0"/> to actually try and penetrate <pause dur="0.2"/> this ballistic missile defence system <pause dur="0.7"/> how secure can it be <pause dur="0.2"/> do you need a hundred per cent security or do you need <pause dur="0.2"/> eighty per cent security <pause dur="0.7"/> what if you feel secure <pause dur="0.2"/> under your ballistic missile defence system <pause dur="0.7"/> and have spent loads of money <pause dur="0.2"/> on the <pause dur="0.2"/> on that but you don't have any money for other defensive measures <pause dur="0.8"/> so it's an it's an enormously <pause dur="0.4"/> important issue <pause dur="0.6"/> which you will hear of <pause dur="0.4"/> much more <pause dur="0.4"/> if you read the newspaper <pause dur="0.3"/> and if # George W Bush is becoming president because he has already said that he will definitely deploy <pause dur="0.5"/> Clinton earlier this year <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> took back the earlier decision that <pause dur="0.3"/> the <trunc>uni</trunc> that the the U-S will definitely get a ballistic a national ballistic missile defence system <pause dur="0.8"/> Gore <pause dur="0.2"/> is basically pursuing a Clinton line <pause dur="0.5"/> but Bush has said we're going to go for it <pause dur="0.4"/> what that does for European defence <pause dur="0.6"/> is an issue we really need to think about <pause dur="2.8"/> hence <pause dur="0.2"/> the A-B-M Treaty <pause dur="0.2"/> being a very important <pause dur="1.6"/> historical relic <pause dur="0.5"/>

and Russia i should <pause dur="0.2"/> add that just just for <pause dur="0.3"/> your full <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>information <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.5"/> Russia is seriously against <pause dur="0.5"/> any deployment of ballistic missile defence systems they <pause dur="0.6"/> there there have been talks as to what how they might cooperate on this # or not but Russia clings very much to <pause dur="0.5"/> the idea that the A-B-M Treaty is really unviable <pause dur="0.9"/> # unvialable <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> going back to SALT SALT <trunc>re</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> limited really <pause dur="0.2"/> the deployment <pause dur="0.2"/> the number of deployments <pause dur="0.4"/> of medium range missiles <pause dur="0.5"/> these were missiles which were no longer going to be produced but they just agreed that they <pause dur="0.3"/> that they were essentially it was essentially outdated technology by the time <pause dur="0.6"/> but they agreed that they would no longer <pause dur="0.3"/> # develop them and deploy them <pause dur="0.7"/> it didn't have any verification measures apart from <pause dur="1.1"/> national technical means which is essentially <pause dur="0.2"/> spy planes or spy satellites <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> and there were no observer missions or anything built into this but the idea that they <pause dur="0.2"/> were talking about arms control <pause dur="0.3"/> was already seen as <pause dur="0.6"/> one mean a one one positive step forward <pause dur="0.6"/>

SALT-two went a lot further <pause dur="0.3"/> but was never ratified <pause dur="0.2"/> because the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.3"/> invaded Afghanistan <pause dur="0.5"/> and U-S Congress then <pause dur="0.3"/> refused to ratify the treaty <pause dur="1.2"/> following the invasion of Afghanistan obviously <pause dur="0.3"/> as you all know the Cold War became a lot colder <pause dur="1.7"/> so it took until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev <pause dur="0.7"/> to start <pause dur="1.2"/> some new approach to arms control <pause dur="3.6"/> some people <pause dur="0.4"/> argue that it was really Ronald Reagan's massive build up of nuclear and <pause dur="0.3"/> conventional capabilities <pause dur="0.8"/> of the U-S forces <pause dur="0.8"/> which escalated as you all know in <pause dur="0.3"/> the S-D-I <pause dur="0.6"/> proposal <pause dur="0.5"/> which is essentially the precursor <pause dur="0.4"/> to the ballistic missile defence systems we are talking about now <pause dur="2.4"/> so some people would argue that # <pause dur="1.4"/> Ronald Reagan out<pause dur="0.7"/>procured <pause dur="0.5"/> outarmed <pause dur="0.7"/> the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.8"/> others <pause dur="0.2"/> would say and <pause dur="1.2"/> i think they have a stronger case to make <pause dur="1.2"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> Gorbachev's <pause dur="0.2"/> policy swing towards reasonable sufficiency in <pause dur="0.5"/> Soviet defence <pause dur="0.8"/> planning and Soviet defence spending <pause dur="1.1"/> was a major step forward which enabled <pause dur="0.3"/> nuclear <pause dur="0.5"/> arms reductions <pause dur="1.2"/> reasonable

sufficiency was essentially a policy which went back <pause dur="0.2"/> from <pause dur="0.4"/> we have to have massive forces <pause dur="0.8"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> any conceivable theatre that we might have to fight in <pause dur="0.8"/> to well how much do we actually need <pause dur="0.4"/> given the political situation surrounding us <pause dur="0.7"/> given that we are pursuing a policy <pause dur="0.5"/> that is meant to build friendly relations with all our neighbours <pause dur="0.3"/> and you can see that on the policy level that the Soviet Union went out and <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> started <pause dur="0.8"/> rebuilding trust between <pause dur="0.2"/> itself and its neighbours <pause dur="1.1"/> not least in order to <pause dur="0.9"/> have external stability <pause dur="0.3"/> for <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>dome</trunc> domestic political and economic reform <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and that was <pause dur="0.3"/> these <pause dur="0.3"/> diplomatic <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> <trunc>for</trunc> forays <pause dur="0.8"/> where <pause dur="1.0"/> replicated on the military level <pause dur="0.7"/> by <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> a new design of the defence of defence policy which would use defence spending <pause dur="0.5"/> and went for <pause dur="0.3"/> smaller amount of forces <pause dur="2.5"/> you also have Gorbachev <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>pro</trunc> # <pause dur="0.3"/> suggesting in various fora <pause dur="1.0"/> conventional arms reductions <pause dur="0.7"/> now the West didn't take that too seriously for quite a long time <pause dur="0.4"/> because the arms reductions he proposed <pause dur="0.4"/>

essentially concerned <pause dur="0.7"/> weapons systems which were outdated <pause dur="1.1"/> such as <pause dur="0.2"/> small submarines in the Baltic sea <pause dur="2.7"/> but START-one <pause dur="0.4"/> which the U-S and and then still the Soviet Union <pause dur="0.3"/> signed in nineteen-ninety and was then ratified in nineteen-ninety-two <pause dur="0.7"/> was <pause dur="0.5"/> A an extension of the concept started in <pause dur="0.2"/> the SALT treaties <pause dur="0.5"/> I-E that launcher systems and platforms would be reduced <pause dur="0.3"/> not nuclear warheads <pause dur="0.7"/> that became an issue soon after START-one was signed <pause dur="1.5"/> but it was the first treaty which really significantly reduced <pause dur="0.7"/> nuclear <pause dur="1.1"/> long range or strategic <pause dur="0.3"/> # launch platforms <pause dur="0.9"/> in nineteen-<pause dur="1.6"/>ninety-five you also have the # well they agreed <pause dur="0.3"/> to reduce <pause dur="1.0"/> no nineteen-eighty-seven sorry <pause dur="0.5"/> wrong wrong date <pause dur="0.4"/> they agreed on # <pause dur="0.3"/> a complete reduction <pause dur="0.2"/> or a <trunc>comp</trunc> <trunc>comp</trunc> complete elimination <pause dur="0.4"/> of intermediate nuclear forces <pause dur="0.5"/> which # was the first time ever that a whole class of weapons <pause dur="0.2"/> was going to be abolished <pause dur="1.8"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> START-one <pause dur="0.2"/> as much as it was a positive development soon ran into an enormous problem because what <pause dur="0.2"/> they had of course

not <pause dur="0.5"/> contended with was that the Soviet Union would collapse <pause dur="1.0"/> now i said earlier if you have government to government treaties <pause dur="0.5"/> or any sort of international treaty then it is up <trunc>t</trunc> up to <pause dur="0.5"/> the government <pause dur="0.4"/> which <pause dur="0.2"/> has signed the treaty to implement the treaty <pause dur="1.3"/> now with the collapse of the Soviet Union in nineteen-ninety-two <pause dur="0.4"/> you had all of a sudden <pause dur="0.2"/> Russia <pause dur="0.3"/> Ukraine <pause dur="0.2"/> Khazakhstan <pause dur="0.4"/> and <pause dur="1.4"/> who else <pause dur="0.5"/> Belarus <pause dur="0.6"/> # with nuclear weapons on their territory <pause dur="1.1"/> they then needed to be brought into the fold <pause dur="0.4"/> in a series of other negotiations <pause dur="0.9"/> so that they would actually ship back <pause dur="0.6"/> Soviet built nuclear missiles <pause dur="0.3"/> to Russia <pause dur="0.3"/> where they could then be <pause dur="0.7"/> where they could then be # destroyed <pause dur="1.0"/> START-two <pause dur="0.2"/> foresaw reductions down to three-thousand warheads on each side well two-thousand-five-hundred to three-thousand <pause dur="0.5"/> on each side <pause dur="0.3"/> and was not ratified by Russia for a very long time <pause dur="0.3"/> they dragged their feet until <pause dur="0.7"/> April <trunc>two-thou</trunc> of this year <pause dur="0.5"/> until they finally # decided to <pause dur="0.4"/> to # <pause dur="0.9"/> to ratify the Duma <pause dur="1.8"/> the reasons for

that are hugely complicated very technical and # i'm not going to go into them <pause dur="0.4"/> but <pause dur="0.8"/> only <pause dur="0.8"/> what a few days ago <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> Putin <pause dur="0.3"/> proposed a new round of arms control negotiations <pause dur="0.4"/> which <pause dur="0.3"/> # worked <pause dur="0.2"/> well which are to be aimed at reducing <pause dur="0.3"/> the level of nuclear warheads on each side down to <pause dur="0.4"/> one-thousand <pause dur="0.3"/> # which would be very significant <pause dur="0.4"/> START-three they've talked about two-thousand <pause dur="1.1"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="7"/> so far but <pause dur="0.2"/> if they go for a thousand then that would be a further step forward <pause dur="2.7"/> multinational arms control or international arms control <pause dur="5.5"/> the core <pause dur="0.2"/> of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is obviously the nuclear non-proliferation treaty <pause dur="2.0"/> it is to be <pause dur="1.7"/> over well <pause dur="0.7"/> the I-A-E-A the International Atomic Energy Agency which is <pause dur="0.2"/> associated with the U-N <pause dur="1.4"/> is not a verification agency <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of <pause dur="0.4"/> an agency which could <pause dur="0.5"/> prevent <pause dur="0.6"/> nuclear weapons from <trunc>deve</trunc> from being developed <pause dur="0.6"/> but it is a a verification agency which assesses whether <pause dur="0.6"/> the countries that are members and have agreements which its with its inspectors <pause dur="1.0"/>

whether they are using nuclear material <pause dur="0.3"/> for the purposes that they have committed themselves to <pause dur="0.3"/> I-E <pause dur="0.2"/> not for military purposes <pause dur="0.7"/> the I-A-E-A in essence is an audit organization <pause dur="0.5"/> which checks the books <pause dur="1.0"/> of all in all the <pause dur="0.2"/> # installations for which it has # <pause dur="0.3"/> access rights <pause dur="0.8"/> but it doesn't <trunc>ca</trunc> cannot prevent <pause dur="1.0"/> nuclear weapons development <pause dur="0.5"/> it's been <pause dur="0.2"/> recently earlier in <pause dur="0.2"/> this <pause dur="0.3"/> # in in in the last decade <pause dur="1.1"/> it has been strengthened <pause dur="1.2"/> but it still has only very limited <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> limited access rights <pause dur="1.1"/> the central deal in the N-P-T <pause dur="0.6"/> was that the four <pause dur="1.4"/> five <pause dur="0.9"/> permanent members of the security council <pause dur="0.4"/> all of whom had nuclear weapons by the time <pause dur="0.4"/> the N-P-T <pause dur="0.4"/> was # agreed upon in nineteen-sixty-seven <pause dur="1.8"/> that they would <pause dur="0.4"/> give access <pause dur="0.7"/> to nuclear <pause dur="0.2"/> material and technology for the <trunc>pa</trunc> production of power <pause dur="0.8"/> # electricity <pause dur="0.8"/> and any other peaceful purposes medical use for example <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> or in agriculture <pause dur="0.5"/> they would give access to this information and to this material to all the members <pause dur="0.4"/> of the N-P-T which joined the N-P-T <pause dur="0.9"/> but these

members had to commit themselves to not <pause dur="0.5"/> procuring nuclear weapons <pause dur="1.3"/> I-E the trade-off was we abstain from nuclear weapons <pause dur="0.5"/> if you give us nuclear technology <pause dur="0.6"/> it's significant to remember that at the time nuclear <pause dur="0.2"/> power was seen as <pause dur="0.4"/> one of the major potential motors <pause dur="0.4"/> for <pause dur="0.3"/> development <pause dur="0.4"/> in <pause dur="0.2"/> lesser developed countries <pause dur="0.8"/> because <pause dur="1.2"/> you could produce a lot of power out of very very <pause dur="0.3"/> little material <pause dur="0.4"/> now if the investment <pause dur="0.4"/> in nuclear power has turned out to be <pause dur="0.3"/> enormously expensive <pause dur="0.4"/> in financial terms <pause dur="0.4"/> and of course there are <pause dur="0.2"/> serious risks associated with the use of nuclear power <pause dur="1.5"/> in turn <pause dur="1.1"/> the <pause dur="0.3"/> the P-five <pause dur="0.9"/> so-called nuclear weapons states <pause dur="0.7"/> committed themselves in article six <pause dur="0.2"/> to working towards <pause dur="0.6"/> early <trunc>nuc</trunc> <trunc>com</trunc> early and complete nuclear disarmament at the <pause dur="0.9"/> earliest possible time <pause dur="0.7"/> now their article six commitment <pause dur="0.4"/> has become <pause dur="0.5"/> an even more contentious issue than it was <pause dur="0.4"/> soon after it became apparent that <pause dur="0.3"/> the P-five had no intention to really seriously go towards zero <pause dur="0.9"/> during the Cold War <pause dur="0.6"/> since the end

of the Cold War <pause dur="0.9"/> they have come under a lot more pressure <pause dur="0.4"/> from countries <pause dur="0.4"/> which used to belong to the non-alliant movement <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> trying to force them into <pause dur="0.4"/> actually <pause dur="1.1"/> making serious steps towards <pause dur="0.5"/> complete nuclear disarmament <pause dur="1.5"/> the N-P-T is not the only element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime <pause dur="0.6"/> national measures have also been taken by those countries that had advanced nuclear <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> had access to or developed nuclear technology <pause dur="0.6"/> and they <pause dur="1.2"/> these measures are are sort of can be subsumed under nuclear suppliers regulations <pause dur="0.6"/> the London Club has come up with a list of trigger technologies <pause dur="0.4"/> which are supposed to be subjected to particularly stringent export controls <pause dur="0.6"/> and for which licenses have to be # <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> well obtained before they can be exported <pause dur="0.3"/> and they have committed themselves not to export any <pause dur="0.3"/> weapons related <pause dur="0.2"/> # technologies to non-weapon states <pause dur="0.9"/>

and you have regional <trunc>regul</trunc> # regulations so you have <trunc>s</trunc> # a multitier system <pause dur="0.5"/> in the form of EUROTOM associated with <pause dur="0.3"/> the E-U <pause dur="5.5"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="5"/> finally <pause dur="0.9"/> you have <pause dur="0.4"/> as i already said on the national level <trunc>ex</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> national export controls which are not tied into <pause dur="0.5"/> # a wider system <pause dur="0.4"/> and a so-called fuel takeback policy which has been on and off <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> whatever since it <pause dur="0.3"/> was started <pause dur="0.5"/> by the nuclear weapon states <pause dur="0.9"/> because the idea was that <pause dur="0.5"/> if <pause dur="2.7"/> a country runs <pause dur="0.2"/> nuclear power reactors it can in principle <pause dur="0.3"/> obtain the material for weapons <pause dur="0.5"/> from the fuel rods that have to go into the <trunc>pow</trunc> the reactor <pause dur="0.6"/> but if the state that has produced the fuel <pause dur="0.4"/> takes these these fuel rods <trunc>bage</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> back back <pause dur="0.4"/> and then supplies <pause dur="0.3"/> fresh fuel rods <pause dur="0.4"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> the country that runs just the nuclear power station won't get access to that material <pause dur="2.9"/> the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the <trunc>c</trunc> the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty the Partial Test Ban Treaty is no problem that's been signed

and ratified <pause dur="0.5"/> the C-T-B-T <pause dur="1.1"/> has <pause dur="0.3"/> huge <pause dur="1.4"/> political <pause dur="0.2"/> problems attached to it <pause dur="0.7"/> the reason why the C-T-B-T is seen as a valuable <pause dur="0.9"/> arms control measure <pause dur="0.3"/> is that in order to build up a militarily useful nuclear arsenal <pause dur="0.7"/> it is necessary to test <pause dur="0.2"/> weapons <pause dur="0.8"/> and <pause dur="1.4"/> these tests in most countries still would have to be done physically <pause dur="0.4"/> which means <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> that if you restrict <pause dur="0.2"/> testing <pause dur="0.9"/> then <pause dur="0.6"/> you put a break <pause dur="0.3"/> into the development cycle <pause dur="0.2"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> nuclear <pause dur="0.4"/> # technology <pause dur="0.5"/> weapons technology <pause dur="0.9"/> # however not only the so-called rogue state or <pause dur="0.7"/> rogue states which the U-S called them tends to call rogue states <pause dur="0.5"/> but also the U-S haven't signed <pause dur="0.3"/> the # ratified the C-T-B-T yet <pause dur="0.6"/> remains to be seen whether that will be done <pause dur="1.3"/> and just one example for a nuclear weapons free zone was the Treaty of Tlatelolco <pause dur="1.1"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="17"/> which is always a tongue breaker <pause dur="0.8"/> # signed in <pause dur="0.3"/> which established a nuclear weapons free zone for Latin America <pause dur="0.4"/> in nineteen-sixty-eight <pause dur="6.9"/> now a lot of the problems <pause dur="0.9"/> associated with nuclear <pause dur="0.6"/> nuclear technology <pause dur="4.1"/> is there

a problem </u><pause dur="0.2"/> <u who="sm1165" trans="pause"> could you put the last one back up please </u><pause dur="1.1"/> <u who="nm1163" trans="pause"> <vocal desc="laughter" n="ss" iterated="y" dur="1"/> <kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="4"/> you had so much time <pause dur="1.0"/> can't believe it i've been rambling on for ages <pause dur="12.9"/> hurry up i've got a few more <pause dur="7.5"/> got it <pause dur="2.1"/> right <pause dur="0.7"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="3"/> the problems with # <pause dur="2.2"/> nuclear weapons <pause dur="0.2"/> or nuclear material <pause dur="0.3"/> are essentially the same problems that you encounter with biological and chemical weapons <pause dur="0.3"/> now i've talked about that already <pause dur="0.2"/> briefly so i don't need to <pause dur="0.5"/> # go into that <pause dur="0.7"/> at great length # <pause dur="1.2"/> biological chemical and nuclear <pause dur="0.4"/> weapons <pause dur="0.7"/> share one characteristic which is <pause dur="0.4"/> that the central <pause dur="1.2"/> ingredient the central ingredient which causes the harm <pause dur="1.0"/> is dual use <pause dur="1.7"/> it's used for <pause dur="0.7"/> all sorts of purposes <pause dur="0.2"/> a nuclear reactor can be built in such a way or run in such a way <pause dur="0.3"/> that it just produces energy <pause dur="0.6"/> but it can also be run <pause dur="0.3"/> in such a way that it produces <pause dur="0.3"/> uranium and plutonium <pause dur="0.5"/> # it's particularly the uranium which <pause dur="0.4"/> you would <pause dur="0.2"/> need for building nuclear weapons <pause dur="1.4"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> by <pause dur="0.7"/> making nuclear material accessible <pause dur="0.5"/> and usable <pause dur="0.6"/> you always run the risk that <pause dur="0.4"/> you cannot survey <pause dur="0.2"/> the use of that

material <pause dur="0.8"/> adequately and actually check whether it's not going to be diverted in small amounts <pause dur="3.2"/> biological and chemical weapons you have essentially the same problem <pause dur="0.7"/> anyone who <pause dur="0.8"/> would want to start a lab <pause dur="0.8"/> in which <pause dur="1.4"/> biological weapons are to be produced <pause dur="1.1"/> essentially only needs to contact some farming supplier here <pause dur="1.0"/> and get <pause dur="1.4"/> the bacteria <pause dur="0.5"/> he or she wants <pause dur="0.7"/> and then start a production line <pause dur="0.2"/> for particular toxins <pause dur="0.5"/> for particular <pause dur="0.6"/> microbes <pause dur="1.7"/> things that that are not <pause dur="2.5"/> which are not very difficult to get <pause dur="0.6"/> you can <pause dur="0.4"/> you can buy cheaply and then produce <pause dur="0.5"/> in massive amounts <pause dur="1.2"/> chemical weapons very similar issue a lot of the # <pause dur="0.2"/> chemical or a lot of the elements which go into <pause dur="1.1"/> # chemical weapons <pause dur="0.4"/> are used <pause dur="0.4"/> in agriculture or in all sorts of other industries <pause dur="0.2"/> with civilian application <pause dur="1.0"/> now the real problem arises when <pause dur="0.9"/> we think about how biological chemical or even nuclear weapons are <pause dur="0.6"/> might be distributed <pause dur="0.8"/> and the most attractive means of doing that is <pause dur="0.3"/> by missiles <pause dur="0.7"/> now since the end of the

nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.4"/> ballistic missiles <pause dur="0.2"/> have <pause dur="0.9"/> <trunc>ba</trunc> ballistic missile technology which is also very largely dual use technology <pause dur="0.7"/> has been proliferating <pause dur="1.1"/> quite widely <pause dur="0.7"/> to a number of countries <pause dur="0.5"/> particularly <pause dur="0.2"/> # in west south <pause dur="0.4"/> and east Asia <pause dur="1.7"/> the three main <pause dur="0.2"/> treaties we have at the moment which are trying to sort of contain this <pause dur="0.7"/> are the ones listed here <pause dur="1.6"/> biological weapons convention the main problem as i said is <pause dur="0.2"/> that there is no <pause dur="0.2"/> there are no verification procedures <pause dur="0.8"/> although the U-S and <pause dur="0.3"/> Russia have an agreement <pause dur="0.4"/> by which the U-S <pause dur="0.4"/> is aiding Russia to reduce its <pause dur="0.2"/> biological weapons arsenal <pause dur="0.4"/> and destroy them which of course has the verification component attached to that <pause dur="2.8"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="12"/> most notorious problem is conventional arms control <pause dur="3.1"/> because a lot of them well <pause dur="0.2"/> all the main <pause dur="0.6"/> weapons exporters <pause dur="0.8"/> have an interest <pause dur="0.9"/> for industrial employment but particularly <pause dur="0.5"/> military reasons to maintain a defence industry <pause dur="1.3"/> now because they can't <pause dur="0.2"/> apart from the U-S <pause dur="0.7"/> they can't afford to build <pause dur="1.1"/> the weapons that

would make defence production economical <pause dur="1.0"/> only for their own armed forces <pause dur="0.5"/> they have to export <pause dur="1.2"/> otherwise they have to change their defence policy entirely <pause dur="2.5"/> but of course once you start doing that <pause dur="0.7"/> there are a lot of links in the chain <pause dur="1.3"/> and there are a lot of links <pause dur="0.6"/> which may <pause dur="0.2"/> not be interested in <pause dur="0.4"/> exporting weapons in accordance with international treaties <pause dur="0.6"/> # government regulation and such like <pause dur="1.1"/> plus of course nobody really wants to be too open about what sort of <pause dur="0.4"/> weapon systems they have in their <pause dur="0.5"/> in their arsenal <pause dur="0.7"/> because they don't want to give away too much <pause dur="1.9"/> so <pause dur="1.0"/> all the attempts at reducing <pause dur="0.4"/> conventional weapons <pause dur="0.9"/> which are not in a <pause dur="0.7"/> in a context <pause dur="0.2"/> or which were not conceived in the Cold War context <pause dur="1.0"/> particularly here the Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty # which was signed in nineteen-ninety <pause dur="1.1"/> which reduced <pause dur="0.9"/> the arsenals of <pause dur="0.2"/> both blocks <pause dur="0.4"/> brought both blocks down <pause dur="0.5"/> which then of course entailed a host of different problems <pause dur="0.6"/> as to implementing the treaty when the two blocks

disintegrated or the Warsaw Pact disintegrated <pause dur="1.8"/> all the other agreements <pause dur="0.2"/> are very very vague <pause dur="0.7"/> they are <pause dur="0.3"/> conventions they are aimed at at creating norms <pause dur="0.6"/> at <pause dur="1.0"/> # generating rules and voluntary adherence to rules <pause dur="0.7"/> the Wassenaar Agreement <pause dur="0.7"/> is essentially a follow on to the COCUM Agreement which the West had <trunc>impl</trunc> had instated <pause dur="0.5"/> to limit exports of high <trunc>technol</trunc> high military <pause dur="0.2"/> use technology <pause dur="0.5"/> to the Warsaw Pact <pause dur="1.0"/> # Wassenaar is <pause dur="0.3"/> not very different from that <pause dur="0.9"/> the U-N conventional weapons register <pause dur="0.4"/> problem here <pause dur="0.7"/> returns to the <trunc>v</trunc> register through national governments are voluntary <pause dur="0.7"/> and even if <pause dur="0.2"/> # a government returns only an empty sheet <pause dur="0.6"/> it doesn't <pause dur="0.7"/> it it counted as a return <pause dur="0.3"/> but it doesn't really enhance transparency <pause dur="0.5"/> but <pause dur="0.2"/> nevertheless the conventional weapons register is meant to enhance transparency <pause dur="1.1"/> code of conduct we will probably hear <pause dur="0.2"/> a bit more about <pause dur="1.2"/> in the future again <pause dur="0.6"/> which is essentially also a means of trying to <pause dur="0.5"/> stimulate norms <pause dur="3.7"/><kinesic desc="changes transparency" iterated="y" dur="12"/> just to make the <pause dur="0.6"/> i know i'm overrunning slightly <pause dur="0.5"/> just to

make it complete <pause dur="2.8"/> these are a few examples of <trunc>confi</trunc> confidence and security building measures <pause dur="3.1"/> which as i said before are aimed at initiating a dialogue <pause dur="0.2"/> and <pause dur="0.7"/> building trust through talking to one another <pause dur="1.6"/> how far they are they can be in themselves <pause dur="1.7"/> an <trunc>instabil</trunc> or a stability increasing tool <pause dur="0.4"/> without any other ingredients <pause dur="0.4"/> is highly doubtful <pause dur="0.9"/> there has to be at least the initial will <pause dur="0.6"/> and that is often tied in with incentives as to what <pause dur="0.2"/> will be the actual gain out of <pause dur="0.2"/> negotiations <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> before anything substantive happens <pause dur="3.3"/> but the other examples are essentially the ones that i have mentioned already <pause dur="5.3"/> in other words exchange of observers well <trunc>exe</trunc> exchange of <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>e</trunc> exchange of observers <pause dur="0.5"/> is essentially <pause dur="1.7"/> it's it's tied in with the notification of military exercises # idea <pause dur="0.5"/> and that is if if one <pause dur="1.2"/> for example at the end of the Cold War if the Warsaw Pact exercised or NATO exercised <pause dur="0.8"/> each side NATO would send <pause dur="0.2"/> or would be invited to send observers to some of the exercises <pause dur="0.4"/> in the Warsaw Pact <pause dur="0.3"/>

and the Warsaw Pact was invited to send <pause dur="0.5"/> some observers to NATO exercises <pause dur="0.4"/> only selected ones but <pause dur="0.4"/> at least a beginning <pause dur="2.4"/> now where do we go from here <pause dur="4.4"/> arms control has become a lot more complicated in the contemporary environment because we don't have the blocks any more <pause dur="1.3"/> well i can over overrun <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> another five minutes but i don't think that would be a very good idea <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="3.4"/> the possibly most promising way of approaching arms control issues is really in a multilevel <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> set up <pause dur="1.4"/> that we don't only rely on international <pause dur="0.3"/> arms control measures but also <pause dur="0.4"/> on regional or try to simulate regional arms control <pause dur="0.4"/> and bilateral understanding <pause dur="0.4"/> between <pause dur="0.5"/> states that are at risk of <pause dur="0.8"/> accelerating arms races or <pause dur="0.2"/> running <pause dur="0.8"/> up <pause dur="0.7"/> or <pause dur="0.6"/> well <pause dur="1.2"/> engaging in an arms race in the first place <pause dur="1.8"/> one of the <pause dur="0.2"/> principal advantages of doing that <pause dur="0.3"/> would be that <pause dur="0.2"/> neighbours <pause dur="0.2"/> who need to talk to one another

before <pause dur="0.2"/> any confidence can be built <pause dur="0.8"/> are actually then capable of <pause dur="0.2"/> sitting down together and trying to <pause dur="0.4"/> sort out their differences <pause dur="0.8"/> how much the international community can help in this <pause dur="0.5"/> if we look at south Asia <pause dur="0.6"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> it's not enormously encouraging <pause dur="1.0"/> it may be <pause dur="0.5"/> that in some areas or some regions <pause dur="0.3"/> we <pause dur="0.2"/> will just have to wait <pause dur="0.2"/> until arms control becomes a possibility <pause dur="0.4"/> and that there isn't an awful lot that can be done <pause dur="2.5"/> what within <pause dur="1.0"/> the scholarly community has become <pause dur="0.2"/> a major issue <pause dur="1.1"/> in researching arms control is how <pause dur="0.3"/> norms can be established and particular <pause dur="0.5"/> norms in the international <pause dur="0.2"/> on the on an international level <pause dur="0.4"/> and how norms can be preserved <pause dur="0.7"/> so that <pause dur="0.3"/> what has already been gained for example in the context of nuclear arms control <pause dur="0.4"/> isn't going to be reversed <pause dur="0.2"/> # in the future <pause dur="5.3"/> so much for today <pause dur="0.4"/> thank you very much <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> for your attention <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> i do apologize for the <pause dur="0.4"/> rather accelerated speed at the <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/> end <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" dur="1"/><shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.7"/> shan't happen on Thursday

</u></body>

</text></TEI.2>