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<title>Prenegotiation and second track diplomacy</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

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The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




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<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Politics</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ss</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG2</item>

<item n="module">Modern International Relations</item>





<u who="nf1339"> so there are two sets of handouts today so if you can <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> <pause dur="0.3"/> <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> in both <pause dur="1.3"/> <unclear>and take</unclear> one of each <pause dur="5.6"/> okay so about three lectures back we were talking about changing a <trunc>na</trunc> the changing nature and notions of conflict and security especially since the end of the Cold War <pause dur="0.6"/> # how they expanded from focusing solely on state and interstate # <pause dur="0.2"/> security issues of a predominantly military nature <pause dur="0.5"/> # to look much more at problems in the <trunc>mo</trunc> <trunc>mili</trunc> non-military areas and of a global nature as well <pause dur="0.6"/> # the international community has certainly come to recognize issues like gross human rights violations <pause dur="0.4"/> the treatment of ethnic minorities # mass violence and famine # within countries even environmental issues within countries <pause dur="0.4"/> as being potentially # related to <pause dur="0.3"/> international peace # and stability <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well new types of security threats of course demand new or at least reformed instruments and institutions <pause dur="0.4"/> # conventional # very much state centred <pause dur="0.2"/> # <trunc>inst</trunc> instruments and institutions that we

still have today <pause dur="0.5"/> based on the sanctity of state sovereignty <pause dur="0.4"/> # are not going to be effective most people believe or at least not sufficient they need to be changed <pause dur="0.6"/> # and the need for new approaches certainly include negotiation and conflict resolution <pause dur="0.4"/> # this is a basic point that that so many people are making now over and over again while working # in these fields <pause dur="0.4"/> # Jessica Matthews is one of them <pause dur="0.2"/> a # <pause dur="0.2"/> prominent analyst of international security and negotiation <pause dur="0.5"/> who argues in a recent article that by conventional approaches that we still are so much using today <pause dur="0.4"/> # are too competitive and static <pause dur="0.4"/> new approaches will have to become more flexible more <trunc>crop</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> cooperative <pause dur="0.4"/> and recognize negotiation as a continuous process of managing shared problems and threats <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well there are large number of factors that new approaches to negotiation will have to address in reality and i'm going to speak only about three # today <pause dur="0.5"/> # the importance of the need for prenegotiation that's what it's

called <pause dur="0.3"/> for second track diplomacy and then # problem solving <pause dur="0.6"/> i will look at what these # activities mean and what's new about them # how they differ from conventional approaches <pause dur="0.4"/> and i'll also give some examples of how they're being # used # to this day <pause dur="0.2"/> # to successfully <pause dur="1.3"/> okay so let me <trunc>s</trunc> <trunc>b</trunc> start with second track diplomacy # what it is why it's important and why it's so much spoken about # these days <pause dur="0.5"/> # you will know all what first track diplomacy is # this is something that traditional approaches have focused on <pause dur="0.5"/> # it's something that we # are well <pause dur="0.2"/> quite well # informed about because the vast majority <pause dur="0.3"/> of diplomatic activities and # negotiation encounters that we learn about <pause dur="0.4"/> # through the media are the first track nature <pause dur="0.5"/> # at least when they are still ongoing <pause dur="0.4"/> # first track diplomacy involves diplomatic encounters negotiations <pause dur="0.3"/> between official representatives of the parties to conflict <pause dur="0.4"/> # # formal heads of states international recognized leaders of of national

movements and so on <pause dur="0.3"/> these are official recognized representatives of the parties <pause dur="0.4"/> # # to a conflict or to an international issue <pause dur="0.7"/> they are conducted in official recognized fora permanent fora <pause dur="0.5"/> # such as various fora of the United Nations very very common # <pause dur="0.5"/> the European Union # the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe these are all <pause dur="0.3"/> very frequently used international fora for # diplomatic # <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> meetings and so on <pause dur="0.6"/> they often use <pause dur="0.2"/> well established predetermined rules and procedures especially in large-scale multilateral negotiations that are so <pause dur="0.3"/> complex as a way of simplifying them <pause dur="0.5"/> # when it comes to voting <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> decision making <pause dur="0.4"/> # the use of a single negotiating text these are all <pause dur="0.2"/> mechanisms that that # are decided on on in advance and that are used in these diplomatic encounters <pause dur="0.8"/> # they are typically public or at least partly public # the media is <trunc>a</trunc> almost always there <pause dur="0.5"/> and lets us know what's going on # at least secrecy's not an important feature <pause dur="0.2"/>

of first track diplomacy <pause dur="0.9"/> # and this kind of third party intervention will involve mediation that we spoke about i think it was # two three lectures <trunc>ag</trunc> two lectures ago <pause dur="0.4"/> # the kind that Kissinger practised and not the kind of informal facilitation that i'm going to spoke speak about later on in context with second track diplomacy <pause dur="0.5"/> and finally of course the <pause dur="0.3"/> the overall purpose of first track diplomacy is to come to an official formal agreement that heads of state sign on to <pause dur="0.5"/> that is it <trunc>i</trunc> <trunc>i</trunc> really what everyone is aiming at in the end <pause dur="0.9"/> now second track diplomacy is something very very different # it is much more diffuse and it's much more difficult to observe <pause dur="0.4"/> # not at least because it's # characteristically conducted <trunc>u</trunc> in unofficial in # secret settings away from the media and the public eye <pause dur="0.6"/> # so we don't <trunc>of</trunc> often don't <trunc>us</trunc> # learn about <pause dur="0.7"/> what is going on or what has been achieved <pause dur="0.3"/> until after in fact and sometimes we don't really learn about it at all because it's just

sort of channelled in to first track diplomacy <pause dur="0.4"/> and it it's very hard to distinguish exactly what what went on <pause dur="0.4"/> # secrecy is a is a very very important feature <pause dur="0.2"/> # and indeed to the success of second track diplomacy <pause dur="0.6"/> # second track diplomacy is non-committal and <trunc>explorat</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> exploratory <pause dur="0.5"/> it is not meant at directly # meant to directly negotiate or signing a formal agreement <pause dur="0.5"/> but # rather we're providing the parties with a sort of favourable # setting in which they can explore <pause dur="0.3"/> in a very non low risk way <pause dur="0.3"/> how the other side views the situation what the sense of overlapping interests are <pause dur="0.3"/> what some possible agreements might be <pause dur="0.5"/> what might be possible <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> and any kind of third # party intervention that occurs in this setting # is so-called facilitation rather than mediation <pause dur="0.4"/> it's # it's about facilitating dialogue between the parties <pause dur="0.4"/> # it's not <pause dur="0.2"/> about making the parties make # make particular concessions or produce a formal agreement of a special kind <pause dur="0.4"/> that was the kind of # <pause dur="0.2"/>

third party # activity that Kissinger engaged in it's much kind of <pause dur="0.4"/> it's # <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>lea</trunc> less interventionist softer # less forceful <pause dur="0.3"/> way of bringing the parties together than you <trunc>wi</trunc> you find in first track diplomacy <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> second track diplomacy and this is also very important involves non-official unofficial representatives of the parties <pause dur="0.4"/> like prominent community leaders are very often involved academics # high level informal <trunc>inva</trunc> advisers to government and political leaders <pause dur="0.5"/> who themselves do not hold an important political office <pause dur="0.5"/> the idea here is to involve individuals who are # sufficiently close to the official leaders that they <pause dur="0.2"/> can have an actual input into the official policy making <pause dur="0.3"/> but at the same time who are not themselves holding a political office so they are constrained <pause dur="0.4"/> by holding such an office # <pause dur="0.4"/> # # not to constrain # to to to engage in this kind of unofficial dialogue <pause dur="0.5"/> # they should be free to engage in <trunc>ex</trunc> in exploration experimentation with new possibilities and new

options <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>b</trunc> feel free to to speak # as they wish <pause dur="0.4"/> # and # not # be carrying the <trunc>so</trunc> constraints and and burden of # <trunc>ho</trunc> holding an official office that often means that <pause dur="0.3"/> leaders are not able to <pause dur="0.4"/> to # speak as freely or # explore options as freely as they otherwise would have been able to do <pause dur="1.1"/> so so why is second track diplomacy so much # spoken about today why <trunc>di</trunc> why is it of special interest to us today <pause dur="0.6"/> well it's it's widely recognized as being particularly important in dealing with ethnic sectarian # conflicts that become so prominent and so <pause dur="0.4"/> # # # <pause dur="0.4"/> # yeah and it's such a prominent feature really of of # so post-Cold War # scene <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> increasingly conflicts are as you know are within states and there often have <pause dur="0.4"/> they're not only ethnic sectarian conflicts but they have a often a very strong ethnic sectarian component aspect of them <pause dur="0.5"/> and these are conflicts marked by very long histories of antagonism and hostility <pause dur="0.3"/> with very very low levels of trust between the parties <pause dur="0.4"/> with

very # exclusive series of notions of of conflict and about <trunc>wh</trunc> what what is possible <pause dur="0.5"/> # in most cases the parties don't even recognize each others' right to exist <pause dur="0.2"/> to be where they are <pause dur="0.4"/> even less their their claims # <pause dur="0.5"/> so second track # second track dialogues you will <trunc>se</trunc> # from the features of second track diplomacy that i just laid out you will see that that will <pause dur="0.3"/> # be much more promising in dealing with these sorts of # conflicts than first track diplomacy <pause dur="0.4"/> # is much better suited to deal with these sort of sort of psychological obstacles # that you deal with in in ethnic sectarian conflicts <pause dur="0.4"/> # of # of # # <pause dur="0.4"/> of mistrust # of # of a lack in faith in a possibility of coming to negotiate an agreement and so on <pause dur="0.4"/> it provides a much more low risk non-threatening <pause dur="0.4"/> # environment to break down down these sorts of psychological # obstacles to peace <pause dur="1.2"/> now of course first track diplomacy is not something we can do away with it's it's <trunc>extre</trunc> still extremely important <pause dur="0.5"/> # # in if you take the

transition to democratic government in South Africa for example <pause dur="0.4"/> various <trunc>tr</trunc> second track diplomatic # initiatives were very important and very supportive but in the end it was first track diplomacy that did the job <pause dur="0.5"/> in the end # there must be of course heads of states that come up with a formal agreement # <pause dur="0.2"/> that translate the second track <pause dur="0.3"/> diplomatic initiatives into offical policy <pause dur="0.3"/> and into a formal agreement so second # first track diplomacy's still necessary <pause dur="0.4"/> but increasingly people are arguing that we need to complement this with second track diplomacy that that will buy us a much more <pause dur="0.3"/> promising # setting for <pause dur="0.3"/> overcoming the sorts of # conflicts that we see so much of now in the after the end of the Cold War <pause dur="0.7"/> # probably the most illuminating <trunc>e</trunc> # # <trunc>e</trunc> recent example of the role and success of second track diplomacy <pause dur="0.3"/> that people point to and not just people working on the Middle East <pause dur="0.5"/> # is the secret meetings that took place in Norway in the early nineties between Israel

and the P-L-O <pause dur="0.4"/> # sponsored by by # actually by <trunc>n</trunc> Norwegian # government officials but also by # Norwegian private individuals <pause dur="0.3"/> under the leadership of the then foreign minister # Jürgen Holst # often out in his <pause dur="0.4"/> hidden <trunc>codda</trunc> cottage out in the # Norwegian forests outside Oslo <pause dur="0.4"/> # # they basically brought # representatives of the parties together to engage in dialogue to <trunc>ex</trunc> explore a number of options that they hadn't really dared to entertain previously <pause dur="0.7"/> and eventually this led # as you well know to the formal Israel P-L-O peace treaty the so-called Oslo Accords <pause dur="0.4"/> and the famous handshake between Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and P-L-O leader Yasser Arafat <pause dur="0.4"/> on the lawn outside the # # White House in September nineteen-ninety-three <pause dur="0.5"/> # it's an astonishing achievement that no one had expected and it really has to be explained largely in terms of # the use of a second a second track # <pause dur="0.2"/> diplomatic track in this case <pause dur="0.5"/>

# it's a fascinating story that one now can # read about quite # comprehensibly several <pause dur="0.3"/> of the individuals that took part in this initiative in in Norway <pause dur="0.3"/> have now written their memoirs or or have written about this experience and why it was <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> so successful <pause dur="0.5"/> # and it's it's very very interesting to read about it # <pause dur="0.6"/> of course # this is # <pause dur="0.2"/> # i think # a lot of the success of this case is to be explained by the fact that <pause dur="0.4"/> at the <trunc>l</trunc> at the late stage of of this these <trunc>diplo</trunc> # <pause dur="0.5"/> this # # these meetings in Oslo <pause dur="0.4"/> # the official leaders got involved Yitzhak Rabin the Prime Minister of Israel <pause dur="0.3"/> and Yasser Arafat the P-L-O leader <pause dur="0.3"/> # actually went to Norway at the late stage when it was obvious that these meetings were going to be successful in leading to an agreement <pause dur="0.5"/> so there was a mixing if you like a connection between the

first and the second track <pause dur="0.4"/> # # done in a very successful way <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> often second track <trunc>dip</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>dip</trunc> diplomatic efforts can be successful on their own terms <pause dur="0.3"/> but they don't succeed in making the jump into <trunc>s</trunc> # first-track diplomacy they don't # succeed in making the transition <pause dur="0.4"/> to get the official leaders involved and that's very very important # <pause dur="0.6"/> # the Oslo experience was also very much driven by <pause dur="0.3"/> the failure of the first # first track the Madrid path # <pause dur="0.3"/> the multilateral Middle East multilateral negotiations <trunc>ini</trunc> initiated in Madrid had failed <pause dur="0.5"/> and so there was an urgent need for some kind of alternative <pause dur="0.2"/> # initiative <pause dur="0.2"/> # and that also explains <pause dur="0.4"/> # the <pause dur="0.3"/> # success of it <pause dur="1.6"/> # some analysts <unclear>had also</unclear> begin to speak about the importance of third track diplomacy i don't know if you have heard of this term <pause dur="0.4"/> # that is the involvement of grass roots movements and organizations <pause dur="0.2"/> that may have no direct links at all to official policy makers <pause dur="0.5"/> but are significant ultimately for

representing and ultimately changing individual attitudes and behaviour <pause dur="0.2"/> among common people <pause dur="0.5"/> # in representing civil society the common man in the street if you like <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> # i think it adds # even <trunc>s</trunc> when you look at second track diplomacy it involves very much elites these are not your sort of common folks <pause dur="0.4"/> # they're involved but it's it's community leaders as i said it's prominent academics it's unofficial <trunc>ad</trunc> advisers to government leaders <pause dur="0.3"/> so we're still talking very much about elites that not necessarily have very close <pause dur="0.3"/> connections # to to the people at large <pause dur="0.7"/> # ultimately of course few agreements whether they're coming out of second track diplomacy or first track diplomacy <pause dur="0.4"/> are going to be successful unless the man in the street the woman in the street # accept them <pause dur="0.6"/> # and often those kinds of <pause dur="0.3"/> # # <pause dur="0.3"/> or shall i say popular <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> views popular # perceptions of what is necessary what is acceptable <pause dur="0.4"/> # doesn't change alone they don't change alone with second and and first track

diplomacy <pause dur="0.3"/> and hence this the the <pause dur="0.2"/> all the talk now about the importance of third track diplomacy but <trunc>evel</trunc> involving representatives also <pause dur="0.3"/> of civil society of <trunc>lar</trunc> at large of of the # the common man in the street <pause dur="0.4"/> # and about the importance of change in their their views # <pause dur="0.4"/> there have been a number of examples provided for the importance of this you will know of the the # <pause dur="0.4"/> the growing # # power and activity of Islamic fundamentalist groups for example in the Middle East that have planted <pause dur="0.5"/> # that have engaged in a number of terrorist incidents that derailed the Middle East peace process <pause dur="0.3"/> they are getting more and more support # among the Palestinian population at large because of the frustration with lack of progress in the peace process <pause dur="0.5"/> # and <trunc>i</trunc> it has pointed to the need you know to convert <pause dur="0.4"/> # people on the ground their views as well <pause dur="0.2"/> # and the need to complement first and <trunc>tr</trunc> second track diplomacy with <pause dur="0.2"/> a third track diplomacy <pause dur="1.4"/> now # <pause dur="0.2"/> second track diplomacy can either #

take place once formal negotiations have really <pause dur="0.2"/> gotten underway to break any stalemates that that occur <pause dur="0.6"/> # get away from again from the official negotiating table in a confidential private setting <pause dur="0.6"/> or it can take place before official negotiations have even <trunc>be</trunc> begun to explore the possibilities of of # engaging in dialogue <pause dur="0.5"/> and in this case it it comes very close to the second kind of approach i'm going to speak about # <pause dur="0.3"/> the functions of prenegotiation <pause dur="0.4"/> # which is another # activity that people now # are speaking so much of # as being important to <pause dur="0.5"/> to break stalemates in so many ongoing # conflicts <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> now # as as you noted earlier on and we spoke about negotiation in traditional # models and practices # the significant negotiations the significant talks really don't really begin <pause dur="0.3"/> until the parties sit down at the official negotiating table <pause dur="0.5"/> and they they basically end when they leave it # <pause dur="0.5"/> prenegotiation in some form of course has been practised as long as negotiation itself

has been practised <pause dur="0.5"/> what is new now is the recognition of its importance # <pause dur="0.4"/> that official negotiations that we usually # # observe and and are informed about are really just part of a much larger # process <pause dur="0.3"/> of decision making that begin with an exploratory prenegotiation phase <pause dur="0.4"/> and end much much later <pause dur="0.2"/> with negotiations of ratification and implementation <pause dur="0.4"/> # the <pause dur="0.2"/> relatively brief span of # <trunc>s</trunc> seeing diplomats sitting <trunc>ra</trunc> sitting down at the official negotiating table <pause dur="0.3"/> it's a it's a very short one and relatively important <pause dur="0.3"/> unimportant compared to this larger decision making process that involves many other activities as well <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in many negotiations today really prenegotiations and post-agreemenet negotiations have become # # much more important <pause dur="0.4"/> # and it has partly to do with the growing complexity of multilateral negotiations <pause dur="0.4"/> such <trunc>n</trunc> so <trunc>mu</trunc> so much more now needs to be achieved needs to be done <pause dur="0.2"/> before official talks get underway <pause dur="0.5"/> # if you look at for example at the well known

# Rio Earth Summit in # back in Rio in in June nineteen-ninety-two <pause dur="0.4"/> the the prenegotiations lasted for several years i think it was about ten years or so <pause dur="0.4"/> and both with the encounters in between them very extensive consultations <pause dur="0.5"/> the post-agreement # the post <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> negotiation phase is still ongoing # very very important in the area of climate change biodiversity <pause dur="0.3"/> and so on <pause dur="0.2"/> but the negotiations themselves at Rio <pause dur="0.2"/> lasted only two weeks <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> # very short <pause dur="0.2"/> # and # to a large extent what went on there had been <trunc>be</trunc> determined <trunc>pr</trunc> # previously in the prenegotiation phase <pause dur="0.6"/> so increasingly some extent these the formal negotiations are becoming more of a show if you like # and just # a way of confirming what already has been decided earlier on <pause dur="0.4"/> # in prenegotiations <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> a groundbreaking # piece of work that came <trunc>b</trunc> # out in the <trunc>nine</trunc> # end of the nineteen-eighties # <pause dur="0.2"/> # it talks exactly about the importance of prenegotiation <pause dur="0.5"/> # the book Getting to the Table the Processes of

International Prenegotiation by Janice Gross Stein <pause dur="0.6"/> # it puts forward a notion of prenegotiation <trunc>whi</trunc> which says <pause dur="1.1"/> <reading>prenegotiation begins when one or more parties consider negotiation as a policy option <pause dur="0.3"/> and <trunc>communic</trunc> communicates this intention to the other parties <pause dur="0.4"/> it ends when all the parties agree to formal negotiations <pause dur="0.3"/> or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option</reading> <pause dur="0.4"/> so this is very much a temporal definition of what prenegotiation is <pause dur="0.4"/> and it's useful but it doesn't really tells us about what the functions of <pause dur="0.2"/> prenegotiations are or should be <pause dur="0.5"/> so let me just say a few words # about that <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> prenegotiation is really different it's distinct from formal negotiations in that the that <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> supposed to do two things that # are not as well done in formal negotiations <pause dur="0.4"/> one is to explore whether actually undertaking # a formal # dialogue is is would <trunc>i</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> would it be desirable <pause dur="0.4"/> # at all from a number of

viewpoints from the viewpoint of one's own interests <pause dur="0.4"/> # and whether these are likely to be possible to reconcile <trunc>wi</trunc> # <pause dur="0.3"/> to be compatible with those of the other sides <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> from the likelihood of negotiation actually being likely to succeed in producing an agreement # and the kind of risks involved <pause dur="0.3"/> it's really a a kind of assessment of of the extent to which # formal negotiations are likely to succeed <pause dur="0.7"/> # and the barriers # to overcome here # are usually of two kinds psychological and strategic i'm going to get to that in a moment <pause dur="0.4"/> but then in secondly if the the conclusion is that negotiations are worth undertaking <pause dur="0.4"/> then the second task of prenegotiation is is is # is to prepare for formal negotiations <pause dur="0.4"/> # to to set the agenda we spoke earlier on about the <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>wh</trunc> what the what the # <pause dur="0.2"/> how important this is # how <pause dur="0.2"/> decisive agenda setting can be for what happens later on <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>looki</trunc> looking just at the Middle East <pause dur="0.5"/> # about arranging this so <trunc>logis</trunc> <trunc>lis</trunc> # i i'm taking the

logistical arrangements # for the negotiations <pause dur="0.4"/> # the importance of the neutrality of the sites can be very important # having negotiations in a partisan site <pause dur="0.5"/> can # be greatly at a disadvantage of of the party in whose home country the negotiations are not and so on <pause dur="0.4"/> so basically two tasks of prenegotiation here <pause dur="0.8"/> now there are two usually two barriers to overcome in in terms of making the parties believe that negotiation <pause dur="0.3"/> are worth undertaking <pause dur="0.5"/> # psychological and strategic <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> now psychological barriers are are essentially fears and mistrust the sorts of barriers that we see so much of in # ethnic sectarian # conflicts <pause dur="0.5"/> # <trunc>par</trunc> particularly in ethnic conflicts <trunc>pa</trunc> the parties don't even recognize each others' basic needs <pause dur="0.4"/> # for identities for survival <pause dur="0.3"/> # # they even their basic right to exist <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> so each party basically fears that what it has what it has or what it controls may be lost in the negotiation process <pause dur="0.5"/> that # the other side might exploit any concessions

that will make as a springboard for eliminating its very existence <pause dur="0.6"/> # this was for a very very long time this <trunc>psy</trunc> psychology of the difficulty of getting # negotiations underway <pause dur="0.3"/> # between Israelis and Palestinians in Northern Ireland in many other ethnic sectarian # conflicts <pause dur="0.9"/>

now strategic barriers are a quite a different # nature these are sort of shrewd calculations # self-interest # <trunc>ca</trunc> calculations <pause dur="0.5"/> that a party wouldn't # doesn't <trunc>ha</trunc> really have a need for or doesn't have much to gain from undertaking negotiations <pause dur="0.5"/> either compared to the current situation <pause dur="0.2"/> # if that is viable <pause dur="0.3"/> or some other unilateral option available to it for example the use of force the use of coercion <pause dur="0.3"/> # what have you <pause dur="1.1"/> # they are particularly important # when the disputed resources are very highly valued when they are viewed as being almost impossible to compromise upon <pause dur="0.3"/> as with the situation of of Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where it can't at the moment <pause dur="0.7"/> or when the

relations between parties are there are equal so you have one supposedly more powerful party <pause dur="0.5"/> that it feels that it can impose its solution # <pause dur="0.2"/> impose other alternatives on the on the # weaker party <pause dur="0.4"/> and doesn't really need to negotiate to compromise with the other side in order to get a some kind of <pause dur="0.2"/> # solution <pause dur="0.7"/> both these kinds of barriers psychological and strategic # are very very <pause dur="0.3"/> # <trunc>i</trunc> is a very prominent feature of the sorts of internal violent conflicts that we're seeing now <pause dur="0.4"/> increasingly # within countries # the strong ethnic sectarian <pause dur="0.4"/> # nature and they explain very much the intractability of these conflicts why it's so difficult <pause dur="0.4"/> # to get negotiations underway at the same time of course <pause dur="0.3"/> only negotiation # is going to provide a peaceful solution <pause dur="0.5"/> # so still # <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> often the parties or outside parties try to get negotiations underway although it is so difficult <pause dur="1.6"/> okay <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="3.6"/> now <trunc>prene</trunc> prenegotiation is not explicitly about trying to find or to agree on one particular

solution it's not about a negotiating agreement that can only take place in formal official negotiations <pause dur="0.6"/> but it is about # exploring about identifying about inventing # <pause dur="0.5"/> # possible alternatives for a solution and and finding out how the various parties # <pause dur="0.4"/> # would feel about them how they would # come down on them if they could think that they could live with them <pause dur="0.4"/> so it's about # exploring possible solutions it's about building confidence # <pause dur="0.4"/> in the possibility of reaching an agreement <pause dur="0.4"/> # and in the # the # # work of undertaking negotiations <pause dur="0.6"/> now if the negotiation doesn't succeed if in a way <trunc>th</trunc> # it doesn't take place negotiations formal negotiations will hardly ever succeed <pause dur="0.6"/> but if prenegotiation does take place and does succeed it will have a usually a very important impact on what happens <pause dur="0.2"/> subsequently in formal <pause dur="0.2"/> negotiations <pause dur="0.5"/> # ultimately the success of course of prenegotiation <pause dur="0.3"/> is measured not only about # by getting the parties to the table but also

to getting them eventually to an agreement <pause dur="0.3"/> that actually will be # implemented <pause dur="0.4"/> # and honoured <pause dur="2.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> now the second track diplomacy and prenegotiation i've spoken about very briefly they're very closely related to the third approach i'd like to <pause dur="0.3"/> speak about briefly problem solving or the integrated # approach <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> i don't think we need to remember too much about the distributive approach # that i illustrated in the context of the U-S and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the Kissinger mediation in the Middle East <pause dur="0.5"/> # with <trunc>s</trunc> very sort of competitive serious # features <pause dur="0.5"/> that is not going to be very # helpful in in building # trust and confidence between the parties <pause dur="0.5"/> # in creating <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> a belief in the worth of undertaking negotiation in the sorts of # conflicts that we have so much of now since the end of the Cold War <pause dur="0.6"/> # virtually all analysis now of new needed <trunc>ap</trunc> practices of conflict resolution <pause dur="0.5"/> and negotiation <pause dur="0.5"/> conclude that # new practices new more effective practices need

to include a much stronger <pause dur="0.3"/> problem solving or what what's called also an integrative component than has been # the case so far <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> # then they need to become much less competitive much less <pause dur="0.2"/> adversarial <pause dur="0.4"/> # need to engage the parties in a a sort of common problem solving # process <pause dur="0.3"/> where they look at shared problems much # more together rather than separately <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and # # yes <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> cooperation negotiations are really needed # to tackle so many contemporary issues at the moment <pause dur="0.5"/> and # # the parties # # are viewed as as having to <trunc>e</trunc> engage much more extensively <pause dur="0.3"/> in cooperative integrated problem solving approaches rather than in competitive <pause dur="0.4"/> # ones <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> an academic by the name of Terje Larsen from Norway was the single most important # facilitator in this <pause dur="0.4"/> Oslo # <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>e</trunc> experience that i'd mentioned just a while ago <pause dur="0.4"/> # he # <trunc>a</trunc> in the context of of that conflict and the breakthrough between the Israel and the P-L-O <pause dur="0.4"/> # when he was interviewed on a B-B-C program # a

couple of years ago <pause dur="0.3"/> he pointed out that Netanyahu the then the Israeli prime minister <pause dur="0.4"/> and Arafat are travelling on a tandem bicycle <pause dur="0.2"/> they have to be partners <pause dur="0.4"/> this process is not a win-lose situation it cannot be a win-lose situation <pause dur="0.3"/> where there can be one winner and one loser <pause dur="0.5"/> either there <trunc>ha</trunc> there has to be two winners or two losers if <trunc>m</trunc> <trunc>mest</trunc> Minister Netanyahu goes down he will drag Mr Arafat with him <pause dur="0.4"/> and if Arafat goes down he will drag Netanyahu with him <pause dur="0.5"/> so it's a perception of conflict # <trunc>a</trunc> as with <trunc>i</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> parties are being in the same boat that they're interdependent and they need to use more cooperative <pause dur="0.3"/> more problem solving more creative approaches # to arrive <pause dur="0.3"/> at a satisfactory # stable solution of their conflict <pause dur="0.4"/> # than the distributive conventional approaches have suggested <pause dur="1.6"/> now the origin of the formulation of the integrative approach is is one very widely practised to this day although not sufficiently many would argue but

the origin <pause dur="0.3"/> # of the formulation of this approach <pause dur="0.4"/> should really be attributed to the pioneering work of # somebody by the name of Mary Parker <pause dur="0.2"/> Follett <pause dur="0.6"/> who published already back in in the beginning of last century in nineteen-eighteen a book <pause dur="0.4"/> # well actually three books # entitled The New State Creative Experience and Dynamic Administration <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> # they were not really recognized for their significance until much much later in the nineteen-sixties # especially the works of <pause dur="0.3"/> Walton and McKersie to academics working at Harvard <pause dur="0.4"/> # who produced a book entitled A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations <pause dur="0.4"/> which was a really a much more systematic <pause dur="0.2"/> # # scientific development of the integrative approach <pause dur="0.8"/> # and it hasn't really been until very much more recently in nineteen-seventies or so that people working in this field much more widely have taken this approach # <pause dur="0.2"/> seriously and it's very very recent that people actually started consciously to practise it <pause dur="0.5"/> though

it is still not # # practised # sufficiently many people would argue <pause dur="0.7"/> now Follett herself # back in in # # beginning of the last century wrote based of on her own experiences in a very different context # in business administration and business organization <pause dur="0.6"/> and she noticed that often <trunc>ki</trunc> conflicts in this setting were resolved in ways that were either destructive <pause dur="0.5"/> # or people lost out <pause dur="0.2"/> or they didn't leave there quite as well off as satisfied <pause dur="0.4"/> as # # as <pause dur="0.2"/> would have been possible if they had done it in a different way <pause dur="0.5"/> # many opportunities for for greater joint gains for greater joint benefits were missed <pause dur="1.1"/> # she pointed out there were basically <trunc>w</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> three ways that you can resolve a conflict whether it's at the interpersonal level or with the your employer internationally <pause dur="0.6"/> # domination <pause dur="0.2"/> compromise and integration <pause dur="0.3"/> # integration is another word for <trunc>s</trunc> for problem solving <pause dur="1.1"/> now domination we know what that is that's basically the successful use of coercion or force <pause dur="0.4"/> one side

basically wins everything or most of it and the other loses out one side # imposes its solution on the other side <pause dur="0.7"/> # compromise we also know what that is it means basically that each party has to give up something has to make <pause dur="0.3"/> substantial concessions and compromise # on <trunc>s</trunc> in interest to reach an agreement <pause dur="0.5"/> it's the <trunc>s</trunc> sort of outcome that <pause dur="0.2"/> that normally results from traditional <trunc>dis</trunc> <trunc>dis</trunc> distributive # approaches competitive approaches <pause dur="0.4"/> to conflict resolution <pause dur="0.4"/> that we saw reflected in the NISP # # last week <pause dur="0.2"/> during the Cold War <pause dur="0.4"/> # # you will have some kind of solution but it's a compromise solution meaning that each party will have to give up <pause dur="0.3"/> quite a bit in order to <pause dur="0.2"/> to reach it <pause dur="0.7"/> integration however which of course is the way # is the the method that Follett # # endorses <pause dur="0.5"/> # it's the third way of resolving conflict # that means that basically it's put very simply that a solution is found that meets all the essential interests of the various parties involved <pause dur="0.6"/> each party

gets what it's required <trunc>w</trunc> what is requires without having to give up anything very significant <pause dur="0.4"/> and without having to deprive the other party of what it's needs <pause dur="0.7"/> # this of course sounds very good # and i'm going to give some examples of how it # could operate # <pause dur="0.6"/> # Follett herself # favoured using very simple examples that need the personal context to illustrate # larger more important points <pause dur="0.4"/> and in fact her very simple examples are become <trunc>w</trunc> some of the most widely <pause dur="0.3"/> used even in the international conflicts literature that of course deals with situations that are <pause dur="0.3"/> endlessly and more complex <pause dur="0.5"/> # one of the most # # widely quoted examples that she uses is is the # <pause dur="0.3"/> situation that she found herself <trunc>s</trunc> <trunc>wa</trunc> once in when she was studying at Harvard University she was <pause dur="0.3"/> working in the main # reading room <pause dur="1.1"/> and another woman came in and # # wanted to # open the window where she was sitting # while # she wanted to really have it closed <pause dur="0.7"/> and

as the two kept insisting on their respective positions either open the window or keep it # keep it closed <pause dur="0.4"/> of course they they wouldn't really encounter any good solution # <pause dur="0.2"/> they they could perhaps compromise and and leave the # window open some of the time or close it some of the time <pause dur="0.5"/> but neither would really be very happy <pause dur="0.8"/> but Follett # experiences in conflict resolution came up with a much better # # alternative here <pause dur="0.4"/> she started asking the woman why she really wanted to have the # # window open <pause dur="0.5"/> and found out that it was really for ventilation # and it wasn't so much having it open per se <pause dur="0.5"/> while she herself wanted to avoid a draught so they opened the window in the next room <pause dur="0.2"/> very ingeniously <pause dur="0.6"/> and that way both of them are are very happy with this solution <pause dur="0.2"/> and so she uses this to exemplify that <pause dur="0.3"/> as long as you keep insisting on your positions without exploring the underlying reasons you're not really <trunc>ca</trunc> going

to come up with any good solution <pause dur="0.4"/> it's only if you start exploring the underlying motivations for what what why you're seeking what you're seeking <pause dur="0.4"/> that you're going to be able to come up with a positive some integrative # solution <pause dur="0.4"/> so this is a way of sort of bypassing the position sending away the position and looking at underlying # <pause dur="0.4"/> # reasons # # for coming up with a better # solution <pause dur="0.6"/> Follett's basic message here with this very simple example is that we tend to look at conflict <trunc>se</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> situations <pause dur="0.3"/> in too <unclear>serious #</unclear> terms we tend to look at them in too exclusive too negative ways <pause dur="0.5"/> and that often # we are not exploring underlying motivations <trunc>underb</trunc> lying <pause dur="0.2"/> concerns enough <pause dur="0.4"/> and that if we did we would often come up with much much better solutions that really address the root causes of the conflicts <pause dur="0.5"/> # she says that there are hardly ever any conflict that you cannot <pause dur="0.2"/> cannot be solved <pause dur="0.3"/> it <pause dur="0.2"/> depends basically on the parties' # willingness to engage in problem solving to <trunc>en</trunc> to

engage with this approach <pause dur="0.9"/> # you can <trunc>ha</trunc> get a glimpse of how this approach could apply to much more complex international conflict in the handout where i've made a <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of a table of the the conflict over Jerusalem between the Israelis and the Palestinians <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> # # <pause dur="0.2"/> counted really the most <trunc>intr</trunc> # most intractable issue in the whole <pause dur="0.4"/> # Middle East peace process that # <pause dur="0.2"/> has already caused <pause dur="0.3"/> its collapse at least for the time being maybe it # will permanently <trunc>co</trunc> collapse of this issue <pause dur="0.4"/> nonetheless it's it's the # certainly one of the most intractable international conflicts that we have around <pause dur="0.6"/> and # # <pause dur="0.9"/> it's going to remain very very difficult to to resolve and i've # made this table just to illustrate how the integrative approach that Follett advocates <pause dur="0.4"/> # could apply to this conflict <pause dur="0.5"/> now you have there # a list of the positions the interests and needs in in that conflict over Jerusalem between Israel and the Palestinians <pause dur="0.5"/> # you'll see that as you move up towards the

positions <pause dur="0.4"/> the demands the stakes in the conflict become much more # political and rigid <pause dur="0.4"/> much more less flexible in terms of how they can be met this is the level at which the distributive conventional approaches <pause dur="0.4"/> operate <pause dur="0.4"/> it takes basically the positions of the parties have to give them <pause dur="0.2"/> and try to bargain and negotiate on basis of those # positions <pause dur="0.5"/> # it doesn't # they don't really question the legitimacy or or you know the positions whether they are really necessary or <trunc>w</trunc> how they can be changed <pause dur="0.4"/> the positions are the starting points # for bargaining and negotiation <pause dur="0.6"/> often of course positions are not going to distinguish between what are fundamental concerns and and what is just <trunc>ba</trunc> wishful thinking it's just like a package if you like <pause dur="0.3"/> that doesn't distinguish # <pause dur="0.5"/> basic # # needs from # from <pause dur="0.2"/> just aspirations <pause dur="0.5"/> so Israel Israel is saying as you well know # all of Jerusalem must be the <trunc>exter</trunc> <trunc>ex</trunc> # the eternal indivisible capital of Israel there can be no <pause dur="0.3"/> # role for a

<trunc>po</trunc> a a a political role for the Palestinians in the city <pause dur="0.6"/> # whereas Palestinians are saying there are <gap reason="inaudible" extent="1 sec"/> Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine <pause dur="0.6"/> now # obviously there's not going to be much room for agreement here it's going to be very very difficult if you use this kind of traditional approach based on positions to come to an agreement <pause dur="0.3"/> if you did have an agreement it would be involve a great deal of compromising <pause dur="0.3"/> on the part of both sides and neither side would be very very would be very happy very pleased # with the agreement <pause dur="1.2"/> # that's as you move down in that chart towards # # interests and needs you will see that the concerns of the conflict become much more <pause dur="0.6"/> psychological and abstract and much more flexible <pause dur="0.3"/> in terms of how they can be filled <pause dur="0.4"/> and this is the level at which the integrative approach operates # especially in the context of prenegotiation of second track diplomacy <pause dur="0.5"/> # at this level one doesn't take the decisions # <pause dur="0.2"/> for granted # <trunc>s</trunc> at face value

but look beneath them <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>a</trunc> at the underlying motivating # concerns # as the two women in the Harvard library did <pause dur="0.9"/> # and in fact if you look at most of the Israeli interests in that chart you will see that # to for example <reading>to keep Jerusalem physically undivided <pause dur="0.3"/> to secure effective control over the Jewish areas of the city <pause dur="0.3"/> to gain recognition of Jerusalem # as the Israel's capital from the international community</reading> and so on and so on <pause dur="0.5"/> we'll see that they are not necessarily incompatible at all with most of the Palestinian ones <pause dur="0.4"/> # in fact many of the Israeli concerns interests are not going to be possible <trunc>f</trunc> to fulfil without fulfilling the Palestinian ones <pause dur="0.3"/> and most of them are not mutually exclusive <pause dur="0.4"/> but it's only by looking underneath the positions that we see this and that we can start to think of integrated mutually # <pause dur="0.4"/> # # # acceptable solutions # # <pause dur="0.4"/> in a new way <pause dur="1.3"/> so # # this is just really to give you a snapshot of # how it could be used # to to deal

with an international # conflict <pause dur="0.6"/> so to summarize the integrative approach really use negotiation essentially as a joint problem solving exercise that in where efforts are made to create new options that can reconcile and combine <pause dur="0.3"/> the # the parties most essential interests <pause dur="0.4"/> in a way that avoids the need for painful compromises <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> as opposed to the distributive approach # that is a much more of a competitive <pause dur="0.3"/> # self-centred process where the parties work much more on their own <pause dur="0.4"/> # they're perceived from fixed positions and demands and try to strike a compromise # # basis # of them <pause dur="0.8"/> # of course there are different sorts of tactics negotiation <pause dur="0.3"/> tactics and indeed negotiation skills are associated with each approach <pause dur="0.5"/> # the distributive approach would use very much things like # a sort of competitive manipulative <pause dur="0.3"/> # tactics like the use of threats the use of deadlines <pause dur="0.4"/> # the use of coercion # as the use of warnings <pause dur="0.2"/> # the sorts of # tactics that # <pause dur="0.4"/> # that Kissinger used

so much in the the Middle East that we saw <pause dur="0.4"/> whereas the integrative approach would use very different sorts of things # # <pause dur="0.5"/> # they would use # # <pause dur="0.3"/> i'm going to come to that in a moment # <pause dur="0.3"/> but basically it it # it's a piece of # # # <pause dur="1.0"/> techniques methods that <pause dur="0.4"/> will be based on the parties sharing a great deal of information in between themselves # about their general interests and needs priorities <pause dur="0.6"/> again this will only # be possible to take place in a <trunc>non</trunc> # non-public confidential setting <pause dur="0.5"/> # not in formal official negotiations and that's why secrecy <pause dur="0.3"/> # and a lack of publicity are so important # # with the use of the integrative approach <pause dur="0.5"/> # there's a huge literature now and so much discussion about # problem solving integrative techniques that could be used <pause dur="0.4"/> in a number of different different settings # <pause dur="0.5"/> one for example is it's called resource expansion <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> it's really basically about how you can <trunc>i</trunc> increase the the amount # the usage of the resources that are

disputed <pause dur="0.5"/> # to to provide more mutually satisfactory agreements when it comes to <pause dur="0.5"/> negotiations over Jerusalem now for example there's a lot of talk about how the municipal boundaries of the city <pause dur="0.4"/> could be # enlarged so that Israel and Israel and the Palestinians would each <pause dur="0.2"/> exercise sovereignty <pause dur="0.2"/> or some kind of control <pause dur="0.2"/> over as much territory as that they would have had <pause dur="0.2"/> have done alone within the old # narrow boundaries of Jerusalem <pause dur="0.5"/> so it's it's quite # # <pause dur="0.5"/> quite # # innovative way of sort of # making Jerusalem bigger and then dividing it up if you like <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> there are problems with it as well but i won't go into those details basically it's a way of facilitating <pause dur="0.3"/> conflict resolution by <pause dur="0.3"/> # making what is disputed # # bigger <pause dur="0.9"/> # then there are exchange or trading strategies # like linkage of issues # that means that # <pause dur="0.2"/> you bring in # new issues that <trunc>a</trunc> <trunc>a</trunc> before were not linked to the conflict and have each party concede <pause dur="0.4"/> on issues that it values a little or less in exchange for the

other party doing the same so that each party <pause dur="0.3"/> ends up with what it values the more the exchange of concessions a little differently valued <pause dur="0.2"/> items <pause dur="0.7"/> # of course it assumes that there are issues that are differently valued and sometimes as with Jerusalem both want it equally much it cannot be traded off against anything else and that's a problem <pause dur="0.5"/> but often there are issues that are differently valued and that would help <pause dur="0.3"/> # conflict resolution in a integrative # way <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> # more some of the more recent plans for Jerusalem link for example the promise of a Palestinian state in the West Bank in Gaza <pause dur="0.4"/> to Palestinian acceptance of exclusive Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem <pause dur="0.4"/> # but again # the assumption here is wrong that Jerusalem is differently valued the Palestinians <trunc>have</trunc> haven't accepted this <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of # # <pause dur="0.2"/> compromise if you like # <pause dur="0.4"/> and # it hasn't worked because # the city is equally valued by both <pause dur="1.4"/>

# but nonetheless # a recent experience and i could give <trunc>ma</trunc> give many more examples if there was more time <pause dur="0.4"/> # seems to suggest # that # <pause dur="0.3"/> # international negotiation conflict resolution will <pause dur="0.2"/> result in more effective agreement <pause dur="0.4"/> are more likely to result in agreement in solutions <pause dur="0.3"/> if integrative problem solving methods are used <pause dur="0.4"/> and if also second # second track diplomatic path and prenegotiation # <pause dur="0.4"/> are used # it's probably linked to the fact that obviously in international <pause dur="0.3"/> community today we don't have supernational authority that can <pause dur="0.4"/> formulate and <trunc>enf</trunc> and enforce solutions so solutions if <pause dur="0.3"/> an agreement is the parties are going to implement and live by them and honour them in the long term <pause dur="0.3"/> need to be beneficial they need to see a benefit to be had

from implementing # agreements <pause dur="0.5"/> and # by the use of the integrative # the integrative approach is very much focused on this on on producing # mutual benefits on making it gainful for the parties <pause dur="0.5"/> to implement the solutions and that's # <pause dur="0.4"/> why it's more # likely to succeed <pause dur="0.7"/> so # <pause dur="0.5"/> that is about these three approaches # <pause dur="0.5"/> to complement # what i started out talking about earlier on about negotiation and <trunc>confli</trunc> conflict resolution in the conventional <trunc>mo</trunc> <trunc>ne</trunc> mode <pause dur="0.7"/> and # that's basically it for these series of lectures thank you