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<title>Nozick's Libertarian Critique of Rawls</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

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The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

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<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Politics and International Studies</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ss</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG</item>

<item n="module">Justice and Equality</item>




<u who="nf1167"> i told you last time because i didn't finish the lecture on Rawls and utilitarianism that i was going to finish it today but actually i've decided i'm not going to i know you'll be very disappointed but <pause dur="0.4"/> think you've had enough of that <pause dur="0.2"/> so i'm going straight into <pause dur="0.3"/> # Nozick <pause dur="0.3"/> and his criticisms of Rawls <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> so just a few years after Rawls published his book <pause dur="0.4"/> # another one of the Harvard Philosophy department <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> published <pause dur="0.5"/> # a very sort of radical libertarian tract called Anarchy State and Utopia <pause dur="0.6"/> # this was Robert Nozick it was very provocative and it got lots of attention <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> favourable and unfavourable <pause dur="0.7"/> he started his book this way <pause dur="0.3"/> <reading>individuals have rights and there are things no person or group may do to them without violating their rights <pause dur="0.4"/> so strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what <pause dur="0.3"/> if anything <pause dur="0.2"/> the state and its officials may do</reading> <pause dur="1.3"/> so that's where that's his starting point he doesn't

even argue for that that's where he gets off <pause dur="1.0"/> so he argued that only a minimal state was justified and anything more extensive than that <pause dur="0.4"/> violated people's rights <pause dur="0.3"/> all that this minimal state could do was protect people against force theft fraud <pause dur="0.4"/> and forced contracts and a few things like that but it didn't have any welfare functions <pause dur="1.8"/> he also had a long chapter criticizing Rawls <pause dur="0.8"/> and the whole approach to distributive justice that he regarded Rawls as representative of <pause dur="1.2"/> now his own approach to justice he calls the entitlement theory <pause dur="0.5"/> he avoids the very term distributive justice he doesn't think that justice consists of distributing anything <pause dur="0.8"/> at all <pause dur="0.4"/> he <trunc>d</trunc> he doesn't like that whole approach <pause dur="0.7"/> # as we'll see <pause dur="0.8"/> now # <pause dur="0.5"/> you'll find that Nozick writes in a very sort of loose style it's very readable <pause dur="0.3"/> but a lot of it is a matter of sort of shooting from the hip <pause dur="0.5"/> and he sort of scatters his shots all over the place <pause dur="0.4"/> and a lot of them sort of miss a lot of them it's a lot of

good rhetoric but a lot of his his shots really don't hit their targets <pause dur="0.5"/> <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/> so # <pause dur="1.5"/> i'm not going to have a lot to say about his own positive theory today <pause dur="0.4"/> we're going to focus mostly on his criticisms of # <pause dur="0.2"/> Rawls' theory and related theories <pause dur="0.8"/> well i'll say a <trunc>l</trunc> <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> a little about his theories so you'll have some idea <pause dur="0.4"/> of what his own view is <pause dur="0.5"/> his own entitlement view of justice <pause dur="0.3"/> begins with the proposition <pause dur="0.2"/> that people have inviolable rights of self-ownership <pause dur="0.7"/> so that means in effect that people have rights over themselves that are equivalent <pause dur="0.3"/> to the rights that a slave owner would have over his slave <pause dur="0.4"/> so they're entitled to use their own body <pause dur="0.4"/> and their own products in a way that a slave over # slave owner would be entitled <pause dur="0.2"/> to use <pause dur="0.2"/> his slave's body and <pause dur="0.2"/> the products of the slave's labour <pause dur="1.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.0"/> so as a result of that people are entitled to make certain

choices <pause dur="0.7"/> and as long as the starting point from which they make their choices is just <pause dur="0.4"/> whatever follows <pause dur="0.3"/> by just steps <pause dur="0.4"/> is just <pause dur="0.3"/> you just let the process follow <pause dur="0.8"/> let it lead where it may it doesn't really matter you don't even have to keep track of the distribution <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> that you get to <pause dur="0.6"/> so what he cares about is the history or pedigree <pause dur="0.4"/> of people's holdings <pause dur="0.2"/> he doesn't care about what the overall pattern that they add up to is <pause dur="0.5"/> <vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/> so it's a historical entitlement <pause dur="0.2"/> view <pause dur="1.3"/> no general redistribution is called for <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> he says <pause dur="0.4"/> now he specifies three things <pause dur="0.3"/> that are required <pause dur="0.3"/> for this process to be just <pause dur="0.7"/> first there has to be justice in the original acquisition of holdings <pause dur="0.4"/> second <pause dur="0.2"/> there has to be justice in the transfer of holdings <pause dur="1.0"/> from one person to another <pause dur="0.8"/> and third there has to be rectification of any past injustices that might have occurred <pause dur="0.3"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.8"/> of course <pause dur="0.2"/> # the big question here is what is it for <trunc>ju</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> for

acquisitions to be just in the first place <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> an important <pause dur="0.2"/> point that Nozick makes here <pause dur="0.3"/> is what he calls <pause dur="0.4"/> the Lockean proviso <pause dur="0.5"/> # because <trunc>h</trunc> he's it's closely related to a point that John Locke made <pause dur="0.4"/> this says <pause dur="0.6"/> that there's an important constraint <pause dur="0.2"/> on <pause dur="0.2"/> acquisition <pause dur="0.2"/> in the first place <pause dur="0.4"/> that is <pause dur="0.3"/> that when you appropriate goods you have to leave enough and as good left in common for others <pause dur="0.6"/> enough and as good for others <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well <pause dur="0.7"/> we'll <pause dur="0.2"/> come back in a minute to exactly what that means <pause dur="1.2"/> <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.9"/> Nozick contrasts his historical entitlement approach to justice <pause dur="0.4"/> with <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> any <pause dur="0.2"/> principle that aims either <pause dur="0.4"/> to achieve a certain end state <pause dur="0.5"/> or <pause dur="0.4"/> to achieve a certain pattern of distribution <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> he rejects <pause dur="0.2"/> all principles that end <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>e</trunc> that aim at end states or patterns <pause dur="0.6"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> there are a lot of familiar <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>ad</trunc> examples of such principles we've already come across like <pause dur="0.2"/> maximizing utility <pause dur="0.5"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> maximin primary goods Rawls' principle <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.4"/>

now on the entitlement view things come into the world <pause dur="0.3"/> already attached to people who are entitled to them <pause dur="0.5"/> people's choices to transfer those entitlements <pause dur="0.6"/> simply don't have to conform to any pattern <pause dur="0.4"/> they can do what they like with them <pause dur="0.5"/> so he thinks this whole idea of a of a <pause dur="0.2"/> aiming at a pattern <pause dur="0.3"/> is misguided <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> he <pause dur="0.4"/> he claims that <pause dur="0.6"/> the benefits of the social surplus <pause dur="0.5"/> the the surplus <pause dur="0.5"/> that people get from cooperating with each other <pause dur="0.8"/> are not manna from heaven <pause dur="1.1"/> # that we can distribute freely it's not up to society to distribute this as if it were manna from heaven <pause dur="1.3"/> # <trunc>w</trunc> what does he mean by that exactly well <pause dur="0.5"/> let's think first about what if <pause dur="0.4"/> what if individuals were all like Robinson Crusoe every person had his own island <pause dur="0.4"/> and on that island he worked by himself he or she worked by themselves <pause dur="0.4"/> creating whatever <pause dur="0.5"/> they were creating building their tree houses or <pause dur="0.4"/> fishing <pause dur="0.5"/> well in that case he thinks it's clear <pause dur="0.4"/> that there would be no distribution <pause dur="0.4"/> # redistribution

warranted that each Robinson Crusoe <pause dur="0.3"/> would be entitled <pause dur="0.3"/> to his own product <pause dur="0.5"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> does cooperation change that <pause dur="1.3"/> if these <pause dur="0.2"/> different Robinson Crusoes <pause dur="0.4"/> suddenly get together and start cooperating and producing more than the total that they were producing separately <pause dur="1.1"/> is the surplus available <pause dur="0.2"/> for redistribution <pause dur="0.6"/> well a common answer is <pause dur="0.3"/> yes it is because <pause dur="0.4"/> once cooperation occurs we can no longer disentangle <pause dur="0.8"/> # the contributions that each individual makes <pause dur="0.5"/> to the product <pause dur="0.4"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> Nozick <pause dur="0.3"/> rejects that answer <pause dur="0.2"/> he says <pause dur="0.2"/> yes we can <pause dur="0.2"/> disentangle <pause dur="0.2"/> the product <pause dur="0.5"/> if we can identify the different contributions <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> sorry if <trunc>w</trunc> we <trunc>c</trunc> if we can identify what different individuals need to be given as incentives to produce <pause dur="0.5"/> then <pause dur="0.3"/> we know <pause dur="0.3"/> what they are responsible for producing <pause dur="0.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> the very same question the <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>th</trunc> <trunc>a</trunc> let me put it this way <pause dur="0.3"/> the answer to the question <pause dur="0.3"/> of who needs to be given incentives to contribute in order

to generate extra product <pause dur="1.0"/> also answers the question of who's entitled to that product <pause dur="0.6"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> the two things go together <pause dur="1.8"/> so the surplus arrives in the world already attached to people <pause dur="0.3"/> and it's not available for redistribution <pause dur="0.7"/> in his view <pause dur="1.7"/><vocal desc="cough" iterated="n"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.6"/> all right well that's all <trunc>s</trunc> that all sounds pretty <pause dur="0.3"/> radically unreconstructed sort of anti-welfare state stuff <pause dur="0.6"/> # how radical is it really would it actually wipe out the welfare state <pause dur="1.8"/> well there are two reasons to think it might not be quite as radical as it sounds at first <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> first <pause dur="0.2"/> remember <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> just acquisition of holdings is limited by <pause dur="0.2"/> the Lockean proviso <pause dur="0.5"/> which says that <pause dur="0.2"/> you can only take goods <pause dur="0.2"/> to begin with <pause dur="0.2"/> if you <trunc>n</trunc> leave <sic corr="enough">asnough</sic> and as good for others <pause dur="0.7"/> so acquisitions that make others worse off <pause dur="0.2"/> are unjust <pause dur="0.2"/> and they have to be rectified <pause dur="1.2"/> well worse off compared to what <pause dur="0.3"/> you may ask well that's the critical

point what's the baseline for comparisons <pause dur="1.7"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> everything depends here on how you fix this baseline <pause dur="0.7"/> well he gives a few examples of what he has in mind <pause dur="1.0"/> you can't appropriate the only waterhole in the desert <pause dur="0.2"/> and make people pay you for <trunc>y</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> getting water from it <pause dur="0.5"/> why <pause dur="0.4"/> because that would leave them <pause dur="0.2"/> worse off than they would have been <pause dur="0.4"/> if you hadn't appropriated it <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> but <pause dur="0.3"/> contrast that with a different case <pause dur="0.6"/> if you invent a new medicine <pause dur="0.8"/> and you charge people <pause dur="0.8"/> for supplying them with this medicine <pause dur="1.2"/> then <pause dur="0.7"/> you can <pause dur="0.6"/> you can do that that's that's not unjust that's # compatible <trunc>be</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> you're you're not leaving anyone worse off than they would have been because <pause dur="0.3"/> if you hadn't invented this medicine they wouldn't have had the medicine anyway <pause dur="0.7"/> all right so <pause dur="0.7"/> that's the <trunc>k</trunc> the kind of <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> way he wants this distinction to apply <pause dur="0.6"/> okay so that's one reason we're limited <pause dur="0.6"/> by the Lockean proviso in what we can justly acquire in the first place <pause dur="0.3"/> and secondly <pause dur="0.3"/> his third principle says you have to

rectify past injustices <pause dur="0.7"/> well if we think about it <pause dur="0.2"/> think about the history of <pause dur="0.5"/> # <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>Western civilization <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.3"/> there have been <pause dur="0.2"/> plenty of <pause dur="0.3"/> violations of the Lockean proviso <pause dur="0.3"/> people have been helping themselves to things that left other people worse off <pause dur="0.4"/> for a very long time <pause dur="0.2"/> so we've got an awful lot of accumulated past injustice <pause dur="0.3"/> that strictly speaking ought to be rectified <pause dur="0.4"/> in our societies <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> he admits Nozick admits that actually <pause dur="0.4"/> maybe <pause dur="0.4"/> # a rough rule of thumb which might have the effect of rectifying all this past injustice <pause dur="0.6"/> might be something rather like a maximin principle <pause dur="0.6"/> # you might assume that <pause dur="0.4"/> the people who were the victims of this past injustice <pause dur="0.4"/> # are now among the worst off members of society <pause dur="0.4"/> and a rough and ready way of rectifying it <pause dur="0.2"/> might be <pause dur="0.4"/> to make them as well off as you can <pause dur="1.0"/> so those are two reasons to think <pause dur="0.4"/> maybe it's not quite as <pause dur="0.3"/> anti-welfarist in its <pause dur="0.3"/> # anti-welfare state in its policy <pause dur="0.2"/> implications <pause dur="0.5"/> as <pause dur="0.2"/> it might sound <pause dur="0.9"/> the practical

recommendations might not be that different <pause dur="1.7"/> all right so <pause dur="0.4"/> i want now to move on <pause dur="0.3"/> to discuss <pause dur="0.2"/> the objections that Nozick makes <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> Rawlsian <pause dur="0.9"/> justice in particular and also <pause dur="0.3"/> more generally to the whole idea of a pattern of redistribution which Rawls is one example of <pause dur="1.8"/> first <pause dur="0.8"/> there's <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> the interference objection <pause dur="1.1"/> this is an objection to pattern principles <pause dur="0.3"/> # of justice just <pause dur="0.2"/> principles that aim at some particular pattern of the distribution of goods <pause dur="0.8"/> in general not just <pause dur="0.6"/> to Rawls <pause dur="0.6"/> he illustrates this objection with this famous <pause dur="0.2"/> example of Wilt Chamberlain <pause dur="0.8"/> he supposes that we've got a just starting point <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> everybody's got a just amount of income to begin with <pause dur="1.1"/> and then <pause dur="0.3"/> # from this point we suppose that there's this <pause dur="0.2"/> fabulous basketball player and everybody <pause dur="0.5"/> is very <pause dur="0.3"/> enthusiastic about paying <pause dur="0.4"/> # a pound each or a <pause dur="0.2"/> a dollar each i guess he says <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.5"/> a <pause dur="0.3"/> twenty-five cent seat i can't believe that # have twenty-five anyway <pause dur="0.2"/> to see him play basketball <pause dur="0.5"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> he ends up Wilt Chamberlain ends

up far richer than anyone else <pause dur="1.6"/> and this is all a voluntary <pause dur="0.7"/> transfer <pause dur="0.4"/> from a just starting point <pause dur="0.7"/> now if we're trying to maintain a pattern of <pause dur="0.2"/> justice of <trunc>d</trunc> <trunc>d</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> pattern of distribution <pause dur="0.9"/> we're going to have to interfere continually to maintain that pattern <pause dur="0.4"/> when people make these voluntary transfers we're going to continually have to interfere with the liberty of people <pause dur="0.7"/> to <pause dur="0.6"/> buy things to transfer resources in the way that they choose <pause dur="0.6"/> so maintaining any pattern of distribution will require a constant interference <pause dur="0.2"/> in people's liberty <pause dur="0.3"/> he says <pause dur="0.6"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/> that's the objection <pause dur="2.0"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> you might <pause dur="0.6"/> say <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>wha</trunc> <vocal desc="laugh" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.4"/> why wait a <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>minute why is that an objection i mean <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/>that's just tax taxation i mean <pause dur="0.8"/> we're all familiar with taxation it's <pause dur="0.3"/> you're just wrinkling your nose when you <pause dur="0.3"/> when you say <pause dur="0.4"/> taxation yuck i mean that's not really an objection <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> well <pause dur="0.7"/> let's <pause dur="0.2"/> include a little bit more of the rhetoric here to # sort of <pause dur="0.4"/> illustrate this point <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> he says <pause dur="0.5"/> well

look <pause dur="0.2"/> if the starting point is just <pause dur="0.3"/> then people <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> in that starting point supposedly <pause dur="0.7"/> should be entitled to dispose of their goods as they like <pause dur="0.9"/> well why doesn't that <pause dur="0.6"/> include <pause dur="0.3"/> transferring <pause dur="1.1"/> their money to someone else if they want <pause dur="1.3"/> he says <pause dur="0.3"/> no third party has any claim on your goods in the just starting point <pause dur="0.7"/> well why does that <pause dur="0.2"/> change <pause dur="0.4"/> if you <pause dur="0.3"/> transfer your <pause dur="0.3"/> good to a second party if the third party didn't have a claim to begin with why did they get one just because you transfer <pause dur="0.8"/> some money <pause dur="0.3"/> like you know when i transfer my <pause dur="0.3"/> twenty-five cents to Wilt Chamberlain <pause dur="1.7"/> he says <pause dur="0.4"/> a socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> and <pause dur="1.7"/> so he says <pause dur="0.2"/> people <pause dur="0.5"/> pattern principles let people spend their fair share on themselves <pause dur="0.3"/> but not on other people <pause dur="0.3"/> and that this is <pause dur="0.4"/> a kind of <pause dur="0.2"/> perverse individualism it's individualism with a vengeance he says you're only allowed to spend money on yourself but not on other people <pause dur="1.1"/> # and he also complains that <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> this

kind of a restriction <pause dur="0.8"/> ignores the rights of donors the rights that people have to give gifts <pause dur="1.8"/> all right so there's some good rhetoric there this this remark about forbidding capitalist acts between consenting adults is <pause dur="0.3"/> reproduced in practically every <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>introductory text <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><pause dur="0.3"/> to political <pause dur="0.3"/> philosophy but <pause dur="0.7"/> let's ask is there really a good argument behind this <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well quite a few # different replies have been made <pause dur="0.3"/> # just to consider a few of them <pause dur="0.7"/> # first various critics have pointed out that really this <pause dur="0.2"/> point just begs the question <pause dur="0.8"/> he's simply assuming that an ideal starting point confers <pause dur="0.3"/> unqualified entitlements <pause dur="0.8"/> to transfer your goods <pause dur="1.4"/> but that <pause dur="0.2"/> assumption is <pause dur="0.3"/> precisely what any pattern view is rejecting so he he hasn't really given any independent argument he's just <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of begged the question with this rhetoric <pause dur="2.2"/> a second reply is that <pause dur="0.5"/> for a very important class of goods <pause dur="0.4"/> the rights of donors are irrelevant <pause dur="0.5"/> and these are goods <pause dur="1.2"/> that are your

natural endowments your natural abilities or disabilities your <trunc>t</trunc> natural talents <pause dur="0.3"/> things like what family you're born into <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> these are not things that anyone gives you <pause dur="0.3"/> unless you want to think of them as the gifts of God or something <pause dur="0.9"/> but # <pause dur="0.4"/> barring that <pause dur="0.3"/> the <trunc>r</trunc> there's no donor <pause dur="0.6"/> whose rights are relevant <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> so we'll come back to this point about natural endowments <pause dur="0.2"/> shortly <pause dur="1.6"/> a third reply though focuses on goods for which <pause dur="0.2"/> there are actually donors # so it's # it's not pursuing the donor point <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="1.8"/> it says even if we consider goods <pause dur="0.3"/> which are given <pause dur="0.3"/> by human donors <pause dur="0.4"/> this argument still doesn't work it actually involves a confusion <pause dur="0.9"/> the argument <pause dur="0.3"/> # starts from <pause dur="0.9"/> # the idea <pause dur="0.3"/> about <pause dur="0.7"/> the correct <pause dur="0.9"/> <trunc>fr</trunc> from an idea about what it is for me to spend money on myself <pause dur="0.9"/> as opposed to spending it on other people <pause dur="0.3"/> and then it says well <pause dur="0.3"/> if i could spend it on myself why can't i spend it on other people that's individualism with a vengeance <pause dur="0.6"/> but this whole idea of spending money on myself <pause dur="0.6"/> is <pause dur="0.9"/> suspect <pause dur="0.2"/>

it doesn't hold up <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> you can't <pause dur="1.1"/> you can you can give money to someone without getting anything <trunc>i</trunc> in return but that's not really spending it on yourself <pause dur="0.4"/> spending money on yourself <pause dur="0.3"/> involves <pause dur="0.3"/> transferring the money to someone else in exchange for something <pause dur="0.6"/> that you get from them that's what happens when you buy <pause dur="0.3"/> something <pause dur="0.3"/> for yourself <pause dur="0.6"/> you give your money to someone else who gives you something in exchange <pause dur="0.7"/> # you can't eat your money i mean there's no way of <pause dur="0.3"/> consuming your money <pause dur="0.3"/> without entering into an exchange with someone else <pause dur="1.8"/> okay so transferring money to someone else is part of what it is to spend money on yourself <pause dur="0.8"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.3"/> so <pause dur="0.8"/> the # underlying point here is that exchanges and transfers <pause dur="0.8"/> provide the measure of income <pause dur="0.9"/> # we're not income isn't just <pause dur="0.4"/> bills you know <pause dur="0.2"/> pound notes <pause dur="0.4"/> or pound coins <pause dur="0.4"/> income is <pause dur="1.2"/> how many times those things get circulated in exchanges <pause dur="0.4"/> so to take an example suppose i

earn a hundred pounds <pause dur="0.3"/> doing my job <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> i pay tax on that hundred pounds and i've got my leftover whatever it is sixty pounds <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> i then <pause dur="0.7"/> come home and pay my <pause dur="0.2"/> housekeeper <pause dur="0.3"/> for cleaning my house <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> and i <pause dur="0.2"/> so i give her twenty pounds out of what i have left <pause dur="0.3"/> and she pays tax on that again <pause dur="1.0"/> now because that's the same <pause dur="0.6"/> ten # <trunc>s</trunc> ten <trunc>pou</trunc> # twenty pound note that i've already paid tax on doesn't she can't argue well i don't have to pay tax on that because you've already paid my tax <pause dur="0.7"/> that that would be crazy <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> this # objection really seems to involve a very naive view about what it is <pause dur="0.2"/> what income is <pause dur="2.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.5"/> so every time people <pause dur="1.3"/> money and goods change hands <pause dur="0.5"/> <trunc>in</trunc> more income is generated <pause dur="1.9"/> all right so i don't think the <pause dur="0.2"/> Wilt Chamberlain non-interference objection <pause dur="0.5"/> gets very far <pause dur="1.1"/> let's go on now to consider <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> two more objections Nozick makes <pause dur="0.3"/> these are actually focused more on Rawls in particular <pause dur="2.3"/> and they concern

especially the idea <pause dur="0.2"/> of Rawls that you derive principles of justice from the original position <pause dur="0.2"/> behind a veil of ignorance <pause dur="2.1"/> the second and these are <pause dur="0.3"/> quite closely related so i'll sort of give you a a brief idea of each of them and then i'll <pause dur="0.2"/> come back and look at <pause dur="0.2"/> them <pause dur="0.2"/> in turn a little more closely <pause dur="0.6"/> the second objection <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> Nozick makes is that <pause dur="0.3"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.5"/> the idea of deriving principles of justice from <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> a position of choice behind a veil of ignorance <pause dur="0.7"/> could never <pause dur="0.3"/> produce <pause dur="0.4"/> the kind of principles <pause dur="0.3"/> that he Nozick likes they could never produce historical entitlement principles <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> they'd have to produce some kind of an end state or pattern principle <pause dur="1.9"/> so he objects to this # <pause dur="0.6"/> choosing principles in the original position behind the veil idea <pause dur="0.3"/> because he thinks <pause dur="0.3"/> it's totally biased against <pause dur="0.5"/> the whole idea of an entitlement principle and <trunc>a</trunc> leads you necessarily toward <pause dur="0.2"/> the kind of principle

he rejects <pause dur="1.0"/> the third <pause dur="0.3"/> # objection he makes is that <pause dur="0.8"/> if that's true that puts Rawls in an inconsistent <pause dur="0.3"/> position <pause dur="1.3"/> Nozick says look <pause dur="0.7"/> Rawls' argument depends essentially on a certain procedure <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> whatever <pause dur="0.4"/> principles would be agreed to <pause dur="0.5"/> in this position <pause dur="0.2"/> behind a veil of ignorance <pause dur="0.6"/> count as just <pause dur="0.8"/> so <pause dur="0.5"/> the procedure that <pause dur="0.3"/> people go through of choosing behind a veil of ignorance is what <pause dur="1.2"/> justifies these principles <pause dur="0.2"/> as just <pause dur="0.9"/> but he says well look <pause dur="0.4"/> if a procedure is good enough to justify these principles <pause dur="0.4"/> why aren't procedural principles good enough to start with <pause dur="1.0"/> like my entitlement principles <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> that he thinks there's a sort of inconsistency <pause dur="0.6"/> in having a procedure <pause dur="0.3"/> that can only justify <pause dur="0.2"/> non-procedural principles <pause dur="1.4"/> all right <pause dur="0.6"/> like pattern or end state principles which are not just a matter of what procedure you've historically gone through <pause dur="1.0"/> like his are <pause dur="1.1"/> all right <pause dur="0.7"/> that's just briefly to give you an idea of these two objections let's go back <pause dur="0.3"/> over them a little more

slowly now <pause dur="0.4"/> let's look at this second objection <pause dur="0.3"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in a nutshell <pause dur="0.2"/> this objection is <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> the original position is set up in a way that's biased against ever <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> yielding <pause dur="0.4"/> procedural principles of justice and <trunc>ty</trunc> historical entitlement type principles <pause dur="1.6"/> okay we can call that the bias objection <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="1.7"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.6"/> well <pause dur="0.6"/> why does Nozick think <pause dur="0.2"/> that people behind a veil of ignorance would never go for procedural principles would always go for some kind of pattern or end state principle <pause dur="0.7"/> to explain why <pause dur="0.4"/> he gives an example <pause dur="0.4"/> he asks us to imagine a group of students <pause dur="0.6"/> and these students are trying to decide <pause dur="0.4"/> on a marking scheme <pause dur="0.7"/> how they want their <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> their work <pause dur="0.6"/> to be marked <pause dur="0.5"/> and they're trying to do this from behind a veil of ignorance that is to say they don't know how good their work is they don't know what marks they're likely to get <pause dur="1.0"/> and he argues that <pause dur="0.4"/> in that position

students would never agree <pause dur="0.4"/> to be marked on the merits <pause dur="1.4"/> # to have their work just really fairly <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>at</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> assessed on the merits they would rather <pause dur="0.5"/> agree to some marking scheme that gave them <pause dur="0.3"/> as good a chance as possible <pause dur="0.4"/> of <pause dur="0.3"/> getting <pause dur="0.4"/> a good mark or which <pause dur="0.3"/> guaranteed that they wouldn't fall below a certain level <pause dur="0.4"/> or <pause dur="0.2"/> something like that some kind of pattern or end state <pause dur="0.2"/> they would go for <pause dur="0.5"/> but not just <pause dur="0.8"/> to be marked on the merits <pause dur="0.8"/> # according to their entitlements <pause dur="2.8"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> well <pause dur="0.8"/> let's think about that # <pause dur="1.3"/> how many students would actually <pause dur="1.2"/> choose to be marked on the merits if they were <pause dur="0.2"/> making this kind of a choice <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in fact <pause dur="0.3"/> # in America i don't i i guess it's the case here for some courses <pause dur="0.5"/> there are a lot of <pause dur="0.2"/> a lot of places offer the option <pause dur="0.2"/> of <pause dur="0.5"/> # taking courses pass fail instead of getting marks in them <pause dur="0.5"/> and it's very unpopular hardly anyone does it <pause dur="0.2"/> they're <trunc>per</trunc> <trunc>per</trunc> perfectly free to do it but people don't do it <pause dur="0.7"/> well you might say that's not really relevant for several reasons one <pause dur="0.4"/>

they're not behind a veil of ignorance <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> and <trunc>t</trunc> two # <pause dur="0.9"/> you know the <trunc>j</trunc> the job market is such that you know that employers are going to wonder why you took things pass fail most students don't do it so if you do it it's going to look bad <pause dur="0.4"/> right so it's not exactly <pause dur="0.5"/> relevant but <pause dur="0.4"/> maybe it's suggestive anyway because there may be more to it than this i mean <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> let's make a thought experiment that <pause dur="0.2"/> makes it a little bit more relevant here <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> if you were starting out at university so you didn't really know what to expect <pause dur="0.4"/> say you'd got into a really good university <pause dur="0.4"/> much better than <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> most of the people who are in your secondary school did <pause dur="0.3"/> so you were there with a lot of really high powered people and you really had no idea how you were going to <pause dur="0.7"/> # come out in that competition <pause dur="0.9"/> and also let's suppose # <pause dur="0.5"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> this is the only university in your country you're in a small country it has one university <pause dur="0.3"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> # <trunc>y</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>the</trunc> there aren't a lot of other universities doing

something different <pause dur="0.3"/> and the student body now is voting on a marking scheme <pause dur="0.6"/> now we get a little bit closer to <pause dur="0.5"/> # the situation <pause dur="0.4"/> well <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> what would you what would you do let me just ask you <pause dur="0.4"/> how many of you in that situation would actually vote <pause dur="0.3"/> to be marked on the merits <pause dur="5.8"/><kinesic desc="put hands up" iterated="n" n="ss"/> how many of you would vote for something other than being marked on the merits <pause dur="1.5"/> well all right i think that i think this is </u><pause dur="1.8"/> <u who="sf1168" trans="overlap"> # sorry but can you explain what <pause dur="0.2"/> on the merits means </u><u who="nf1167" trans="overlap"> on the merits it just means somebody marks you according to how good they think your work is <pause dur="1.7"/> on the merits of your work </u><pause dur="2.4"/> <u who="su1169" trans="pause"> <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" n="ss" dur="1"/><gap reason="inaudible" extent="2 sec"/> </u><u who="nf1167" trans="latching"> sorry did you not understand that do you want to <trunc>tr</trunc> do it again </u><u who="sf1170" trans="latching"> yes </u><u who="nf1167" trans="latching"> how many would you how how many would want to be marked according to how good <pause dur="0.2"/> they think the work is <pause dur="1.5"/><kinesic desc="put hands up" iterated="n" n="ss"/> as opposed to just you know some kind of <pause dur="0.2"/> pass fail scheme or something <pause dur="0.5"/> like that if you if you pass the minimum amount then <pause dur="0.2"/> okay how many people would like to

be marked on something other than on the merits <pause dur="1.9"/><kinesic desc="put hands up" iterated="n" n="sm1171"/> <vocal desc="laughter" iterated="y" n="ss" dur="3"/><shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>one brave soul <pause dur="0.5"/> good <pause dur="0.3"/> <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> well anyway look <pause dur="0.4"/> i think there's something <pause dur="0.2"/> # revealing here i mean i don't know what your reasons are and i i'll maybe we can pursue this in the seminar and find out <pause dur="0.4"/> but <pause dur="0.5"/> at least i think some of you might be motivated in the following way <pause dur="0.2"/> you might think to yourselves <pause dur="0.5"/> well look it's a bit like engaging in a sport i'm going to put a lot of effort and a lot of time into this <pause dur="0.3"/> and i want to achieve as much as i can achieve <pause dur="0.3"/> and frankly i need the incentive i need the discipline to develop my own capacities to do as well <pause dur="0.3"/> as i can do <pause dur="0.3"/> i don't know what my capacities are <pause dur="0.4"/> but whatever they are <pause dur="0.4"/> i know that i want to develop them as much as i can <pause dur="0.6"/> and the incentive and discipline that being marked on the merits will provide <pause dur="0.3"/> will help me to do that <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> that suggests that people enjoy developing their abilities they enjoy achieving

whatever excellence they're capable of <pause dur="0.9"/> and i think that's actually quite an important and <trunc>univ</trunc> fairly universal motivation # <pause dur="0.3"/> it also suggests a reply to Nozick here <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> these students may well choose to be marked on the merits # <pause dur="0.7"/> even if they're behind a veil <pause dur="0.2"/> for this kind of reason <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> but it's interesting that Rawls actually says you know <pause dur="0.4"/> behind the veil you don't know anything about yourself personally but you do know some general psychological facts about human beings <pause dur="0.4"/> one of the things he allows <pause dur="0.4"/> is that <pause dur="0.3"/> what he calls the Aristotelian principle <pause dur="0.5"/> the Aristotelian principle says <pause dur="0.3"/> people enjoy exercising their abilities and they enjoy doing <pause dur="0.2"/> well what they can do <pause dur="1.4"/> so # <pause dur="0.5"/> you might <pause dur="0.2"/> wonder actually <pause dur="0.3"/> whether people behind Rawls' veil of ignorance might reasonably choose principles that give them some incentives to develop their capacities <pause dur="0.7"/> # might even <pause dur="0.2"/> choose principles that involve penalties <pause dur="0.4"/> along the way for failing to reach certain goals <pause dur="1.7"/> now you might say well <pause dur="0.2"/>

<vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> wait a minute you wouldn't choose that if you didn't know whether you were handicapped <pause dur="0.5"/> whether you were disabled in some way <pause dur="2.1"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> well <pause dur="0.7"/> this is <pause dur="0.5"/> a delicate matter i mean we have to <trunc>y</trunc> there there are lots of points that have to be <pause dur="0.4"/> # made and respected about disabilities but <pause dur="1.1"/> we certainly don't want to be in a position of arguing that <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> disabled people are any different from other people in respect of enjoying exercising their abilities and doing what they can do well i mean from <pause dur="0.3"/> you know Stephen Hawking to wheelchair sports <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> you've got lots of counter-examples to that so <pause dur="1.3"/> almost everyone has <pause dur="0.2"/> a capacity to do something well <pause dur="0.5"/> # it doesn't have to be something earth shaking <pause dur="0.8"/> # it can be just arranging <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>flowers <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/>or <pause dur="0.4"/> you know # <pause dur="0.3"/> whatever but <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> people nevertheless enjoy <pause dur="0.7"/> developing <pause dur="0.4"/> their capacities whatever they are at whatever level they fall <pause dur="0.6"/> okay <pause dur="0.2"/> so that's in effect <pause dur="0.2"/> # a reply to this <pause dur="0.5"/> # second objection of Nozick <pause dur="1.3"/> that <pause dur="0.7"/> # the

bias objection isn't really true <pause dur="1.4"/><vocal desc="cough" iterated="n"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/> the original position in the veil aren't really biased totally against entitlement <trunc>princi</trunc> principles <pause dur="0.3"/> they may even <pause dur="0.3"/> be more conducive to entitlement principles than Rawls himself seems to think <pause dur="2.2"/> okay let's now go on to Nozick's third objection <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> for this objection we have to suppose for the sake of argument that the bias objection is correct <pause dur="0.8"/> because <pause dur="0.2"/> it <pause dur="0.3"/> makes a sort of dilemma or inconsistency based on that <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="1.5"/> okay so we're supposing that the choice procedure behind the veil <pause dur="0.4"/> cannot yield procedural <pause dur="0.4"/> principles of justice <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> he says Nozick says well that would be it was <pause dur="0.2"/> it's inconsistent to appeal to a procedural choice <pause dur="0.5"/> # to justify principles if this procedure rules out procedural principles <pause dur="1.6"/> # so he says if procedures are so great that they can justify the principles they lead to then Rawls' theory is defective because it can't lead to procedural principles <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> and if procedural principles

aren't good enough <pause dur="0.2"/> then Rawls' theory isn't justified anyway <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> so if <pause dur="0.6"/> procedures are good enough to base the choice of principles on they should be good enough to count as principles of justice he says <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.0"/><vocal desc="cough" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.8"/> excuse me <pause dur="0.9"/> okay so how much is there in this # <pause dur="0.2"/> objection <pause dur="0.4"/> is there really any dilemma or inconsistency here <pause dur="0.8"/> after all <pause dur="0.4"/> for Rawls it's not <pause dur="0.2"/> just the fact <pause dur="0.3"/> that you've made a choice that you've gone through certain procedure <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> not any old procedure would do not any old choice <pause dur="0.3"/> not any old contract that people might make <pause dur="0.5"/> would have this special kind of justification attached to it <pause dur="0.8"/> what's very important <pause dur="0.2"/> for Rawls is the idea that people <pause dur="0.3"/> have chosen something behind a veil of ignorance <pause dur="0.6"/> and that's <pause dur="0.4"/> essential to the justification <pause dur="0.2"/> provided for what they choose <pause dur="0.4"/> it's essential to it because <pause dur="0.4"/> the whole idea is that there are <pause dur="0.3"/> morally arbitrary factors factors for which people aren't responsible <pause dur="0.6"/> that could influence <pause dur="0.7"/> # ordinary contracts and

ordinary procedures <pause dur="0.3"/> so normally when people <pause dur="0.2"/> enter into contracts all sorts of morally arbitrary factors are influential <pause dur="1.4"/> # and <pause dur="0.2"/> that's why <pause dur="0.5"/> those <pause dur="0.3"/> contracts those procedures don't yield the special kind of justification <pause dur="0.5"/> that you get <pause dur="0.3"/> when you impose <pause dur="0.3"/> the veil of ignorance <pause dur="0.2"/> which excludes the influence of these morally arbitrary factors <pause dur="1.0"/> so <pause dur="0.4"/> it isn't just any old procedure it's a very special procedure <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.4"/> that Rawls appeals to <pause dur="0.4"/> so i don't actually think there's any <pause dur="0.3"/> dilemma or inconsistency here this <pause dur="0.3"/> argument doesn't work either <pause dur="1.8"/><vocal desc="cough" iterated="y" dur="1"/><pause dur="2.9"/> so let's now move on to <pause dur="0.2"/> the fourth objection that Nozick <pause dur="0.2"/> makes <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> this is <pause dur="0.7"/> the forced labour objection he says taxation is equivalent <pause dur="0.6"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> forced labour <pause dur="0.5"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.5"/> taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour <pause dur="2.2"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> seizing <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> the results of someone's labour is equivalent <pause dur="0.2"/> to seizing <pause dur="0.7"/> hours from them forcing them <pause dur="0.4"/> to work <pause dur="1.6"/> how does

he # <pause dur="0.4"/> develop this idea <pause dur="0.2"/> well he compares two people <pause dur="0.3"/> # i'm <pause dur="0.2"/> i'm making up some names here i've got <pause dur="0.6"/> Amy and Zach the # <pause dur="0.3"/> intended A and Z <trunc>in</trunc> intended to <pause dur="0.3"/> suggest that this is <pause dur="0.2"/> a spectrum in between these two extremes <pause dur="0.7"/> Amy prefers overtime plus more money to leisure <pause dur="0.8"/> all right she's a <pause dur="0.3"/> a workaholic <pause dur="0.9"/> Zach prefers leisure to overtime <pause dur="0.9"/> they have the same <pause dur="0.2"/> abilities but they have different preferences <pause dur="1.5"/> so Amy likes to buy things with the extra money she <trunc>work</trunc> she gets by working overtime <pause dur="0.6"/> she's a sort of workaholic consumer type <pause dur="0.5"/> Zach is a surfer <pause dur="0.6"/> he works # you know the minimal working day and he spends the rest of his time surfing he'd rather surf than anything he could <pause dur="0.3"/> buy with the money he'd earn if he <pause dur="0.2"/> wasn't surfing <pause dur="1.5"/> so because Amy works overtime some of the extra money she earns goes to tax <pause dur="0.5"/> # it <trunc>h</trunc> goes to help the needy <pause dur="0.9"/> but when Zach goes surfing <pause dur="0.3"/> he's not taxed <pause dur="0.4"/> no extra cash is taken from him <pause dur="2.0"/> if his leisure spent surfing was taxed <pause dur="0.4"/> he would actually <trunc>h</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> have to work <pause dur="0.3"/>

extra <pause dur="0.5"/> to get the cash to pay the tax on that extra <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="2.3"/> so he would be in effect forced <pause dur="0.3"/> to work more than he wants to forced to work overtime in order to <pause dur="0.2"/> pay tax <pause dur="1.0"/> well Nozick assumes that that would be wrong that that would be forced <pause dur="0.2"/> labour <pause dur="0.6"/> that Zach <pause dur="0.2"/> would be entitled not to work overtime if he chose this without being liable to tax <pause dur="0.5"/> on what he would have earned if he had worked overtime <pause dur="1.2"/> he says <pause dur="0.6"/> well look if <pause dur="0.9"/> # if Zach's not required <pause dur="0.3"/> to <pause dur="0.2"/> pay tax to <pause dur="0.2"/> he's not forced to work <pause dur="0.3"/> in order to pay tax on his leisure <pause dur="0.4"/> why should Amy be forced to work just because she prefers to work overtime <pause dur="0.5"/> why should only Amy be required to help the needy and not Zach <pause dur="0.8"/> # just because they have different tastes that seems unfair to workaholics <pause dur="2.1"/> and he # <pause dur="0.2"/> goes on with <pause dur="0.2"/> a whole lot of rhetorical questions <pause dur="1.2"/> he says some people's happiness depends on goods and services <pause dur="0.3"/> and they'd need money to buy them <pause dur="0.4"/> but other people's doesn't <pause dur="0.3"/> why do we treat them differently <pause dur="0.5"/> some people like to <pause dur="0.2"/> watch films so they

need money to buy tickets to get into the cinema <pause dur="0.4"/> other people prefer to watch sunsets <pause dur="0.6"/> why should they <pause dur="0.3"/> why force <pause dur="0.2"/> the movie goer to help the needy <pause dur="0.2"/> and not help the sunset lover <pause dur="0.2"/> the nature lover to help the needy <pause dur="2.5"/> what justifies treating them differently <pause dur="0.3"/> okay well <pause dur="0.7"/> these are good questions actually they're serious questions in <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.5"/> tax <trunc>tr</trunc> about the tax treatment of leisure <pause dur="0.3"/> and they raise # serious issues about tax policy <pause dur="0.6"/> # how to value <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> leisure <pause dur="0.6"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.7"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.0"/> so i think in order to understand what's going on here we make <pause dur="0.2"/> need to make a little bit of a digression <pause dur="0.5"/> # and think about what's in the background of some of these issues here <pause dur="1.1"/> our existing tax systems by and large <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> don't tax someone like Zach <pause dur="0.7"/> who chooses to <trunc>con</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> to consume his own leisure of course he'd be taxed on whatever he did earn <pause dur="0.6"/> for the hours he worked <pause dur="0.4"/> but he wouldn't be taxed on what he could earn if he worked more <pause dur="1.1"/> they <trunc>n</trunc> existing tax

systems don't tax leisure <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> someone like Zach is treated in effect more favourably than someone like Amy <pause dur="2.2"/> # well why <pause dur="0.2"/> what's the explanation of this is it because we have an aversion <pause dur="0.4"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> forced labour <pause dur="0.8"/> or is it for some other reason <pause dur="1.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> well let's <pause dur="0.2"/> let's think a bit more about this now <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> i said Zach and Amy have the same abilities but different preferences <pause dur="1.4"/> Amy # chooses to exercise her earning ability <pause dur="0.6"/> <trunc>t</trunc> <trunc>mo</trunc> more fully than Zach does <pause dur="1.1"/> well why doesn't Zach <pause dur="0.8"/> want to exercise it <pause dur="0.5"/> so <pause dur="0.5"/> one possibility is Zach may genuinely prefer to surf <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.5"/> but another possibility is this <pause dur="0.3"/> he may think <pause dur="0.4"/> well look consumption of my own leisure time is not subject to tax <pause dur="0.5"/> while if i work and buy something else it is subject to tax <pause dur="0.4"/> so <pause dur="0.3"/> actually it's a better deal to consume my own leisure time 'cause it's tax free <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.4"/> and since his leisure time is tax free <pause dur="0.5"/> he may decide he wants to consume more

leisure than he would <pause dur="0.4"/> otherwise <pause dur="1.1"/> that's a bit like buying more whisky than you might want <pause dur="0.5"/> otherwise because you're in duty free <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.5"/> if <pause dur="0.2"/> Zach were influenced by this kind of reasoning <pause dur="0.3"/> he might well <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> decide <pause dur="0.4"/> to take more leisure <pause dur="0.2"/> spend more time surfing than he would otherwise <pause dur="0.6"/> in that case the tax system would be distorting <pause dur="0.5"/> his decisions about how much to work <pause dur="0.2"/> inducing him to work less <pause dur="0.7"/> and that's widely regarded <pause dur="0.2"/> as a bad thing for a tax system to induce that kind of distortion in the labour supply <pause dur="0.8"/> now how could that be avoided <pause dur="0.3"/> how could a tax system avoid that <pause dur="1.6"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> there's a way <pause dur="0.2"/> that's widely <pause dur="0.4"/> # known and discussed it's completely impractical <pause dur="0.4"/> but it would <pause dur="0.3"/> it would theoretically <pause dur="0.2"/> do the trick <pause dur="0.2"/> and that is <pause dur="0.4"/> you tax people's leisure as well as their <pause dur="0.2"/> income <pause dur="0.5"/> that is to say you tax their earning ability <pause dur="0.2"/> not what they actually earn <pause dur="0.4"/> but the ability to earn <pause dur="0.2"/> that they have <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> what they <trunc>c</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> you tax them on what they

could earn <pause dur="0.2"/> if they were to exercise their earning ability <pause dur="0.2"/> fully <pause dur="1.7"/> now that in effect <pause dur="0.3"/> treats people <pause dur="0.2"/> as if they're having to buy their own leisure time back <pause dur="0.4"/> out of <pause dur="0.3"/> their full <pause dur="0.5"/> # earning ability <pause dur="1.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> that kind of tax is called a lump sum tax you owe a fixed amount based on your earning ability <pause dur="0.2"/> and you can't change it by how much you choose to work <pause dur="1.1"/> you can't <pause dur="0.4"/> reduce it by choosing to work less you owe it whether you work or not <pause dur="1.0"/> and because of that <pause dur="0.2"/> you actually have to work <pause dur="0.3"/> because you can't pay it out of leisure you have to work enough at least <pause dur="0.4"/> to get the money to pay the tax <pause dur="1.3"/> so that in a sense does force you <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.3"/> work <pause dur="2.3"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="2.0"/> okay so this is a scheme that says if you have the ability to earn a certain income you owe tax on <pause dur="0.4"/> that amount of income whether you choose to exercise that ability or not <pause dur="0.2"/> is down to you we don't care <pause dur="1.7"/> let's notice three things about this idea of lump sung <pause dur="0.2"/> sum taxation <pause dur="1.3"/> well first <pause dur="0.5"/> it avoids this distortion <pause dur="0.4"/>

# people no longer have incentive to work less than they would <pause dur="0.4"/> you can't reduce the amount of tax you owe <pause dur="0.3"/> by <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> working less <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> second <pause dur="1.1"/> as i said it does in a sense force people to work <pause dur="0.4"/> in order to pay this inflexible tax you have to work <pause dur="0.6"/> at least enough to get the money for the tax <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> so that <pause dur="0.2"/> may be regarded as a distortion of their choices as well <pause dur="1.6"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/><pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> it's not subsidizing leisure but it's # <pause dur="0.5"/> doing something else maybe it's even worse <pause dur="0.5"/> does it <pause dur="0.2"/> violate their rights of self-ownership <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> Nozick at any rate thinks that this is such a bad idea that he doesn't really even take it seriously <pause dur="0.7"/> # he thinks if he can persuade us that taxing say a movie goer is just as bad as taxing a sunset lover <pause dur="0.4"/> then we won't tax either of them he doesn't think <pause dur="0.3"/> # well he doesn't even take seriously the possibility we might tax both of them <pause dur="1.4"/> but we should ask <pause dur="0.2"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> is it really that bad <pause dur="0.3"/> is does it really violate <trunc>s</trunc> rights of self-ownership to do this <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="2.4"/> or are <trunc>d</trunc> are

people do <trunc>r</trunc> people really have rights of self-ownership that would <pause dur="0.2"/> rule this kind of thing out <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> well <pause dur="0.2"/> the third point <pause dur="0.4"/> about lump sum taxes undercuts these <pause dur="0.3"/> first two points really <pause dur="0.3"/> and that's the point that it's just completely impractical <pause dur="0.5"/> why <pause dur="0.7"/> # because it provides an incentive to people to hide their true abilities <pause dur="0.6"/> talented productive people <pause dur="0.4"/> will have an incentive to pretend to be <pause dur="0.2"/> less talented less productive to reduce their tax <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> by behaving <pause dur="0.6"/> as if they were less talented and less productive because after all the government <pause dur="0.2"/> doesn't know <pause dur="0.3"/> what your true earning ability is all it can <pause dur="0.5"/> observe is how you behave <pause dur="0.9"/> so very productive people may have an incentive to behave as if they were less productive <pause dur="1.1"/> and that's a bad distortion <pause dur="0.2"/> on the labour supply that's probably worse than the other one <pause dur="0.5"/> # <vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.8"/> okay so <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> there's no reliable way to get the information you'd need <pause dur="0.4"/> to avoid this <pause dur="0.4"/> bad incentive effect <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> one way of doing it might be

to pretend everyone had the same abilities and tax everyone <pause dur="0.2"/> exactly the same regardless of their abilities <pause dur="0.5"/> but that's really <pause dur="0.2"/> going to be very hard on people who actually are disabled <pause dur="1.0"/> who actually do have <pause dur="0.9"/> very reduced abilities <pause dur="0.3"/> so that doesn't <pause dur="0.3"/> really work either <pause dur="0.8"/> okay so it's a very impractical idea the lump sum tax idea <pause dur="1.0"/> this is <pause dur="0.3"/> a very <pause dur="0.2"/> brief breezy summary of some very complicated and deep issues about tax policy <pause dur="0.6"/> but i <trunc>th</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> the point i'm trying to make here is <pause dur="0.5"/> look we've got another explanation of why we don't tax Zach on his leisure <pause dur="1.0"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> in theory <pause dur="0.3"/> if we <trunc>c</trunc> really could measure people's earning abilities maybe we would <pause dur="0.9"/> maybe we wouldn't be worried about the forced labour idea <pause dur="0.4"/> the reason we don't do it isn't that <pause dur="0.5"/> it's that it's just completely impractical <pause dur="0.4"/> that's why we don't do it <pause dur="0.5"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.9"/> all right <pause dur="0.2"/> so # <pause dur="2.8"/> i don't think that the forced labour objection <pause dur="0.7"/> gets very far either <pause dur="0.7"/> this is another one <pause dur="0.6"/> that # <pause dur="0.2"/>

counts as <pause dur="1.2"/> shooting from the hip <pause dur="1.1"/> but now i think we're getting closer to the area where <pause dur="0.2"/> the really # important <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> objections lie which i think do <pause dur="0.2"/> actually <pause dur="0.4"/> hit their targets <pause dur="0.5"/> and these are the objections that have to do with the idea of moral arbitrariness <pause dur="2.2"/> # <pause dur="3.0"/> i think <pause dur="0.3"/> his ideas about moral arbitrariness are central to why Rawls rejects anything like Nozick's <pause dur="0.3"/> position <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.8"/> Nozick disagrees with him here <pause dur="0.2"/> at the heart of his theory <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> Rawls thinks that <pause dur="0.2"/> talents and abilities disabilities that people are born with <pause dur="0.3"/> the family situations they're born into <pause dur="0.5"/> the upbringings they receive <pause dur="0.3"/> are morally arbitrary <pause dur="0.2"/> but what does that mean it means they're not responsible for them <pause dur="0.2"/> they don't deserve them in any sense <pause dur="0.8"/> at times he even seems to think that the effort they make <pause dur="0.3"/> the degree of effort <pause dur="0.3"/> they exert is morally arbitrary that that's almost like another talent they have <pause dur="2.8"/> okay <pause dur="0.3"/> so <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/> these morally arbitrary factors are not

chosen by the person they're not responsible for them <pause dur="0.6"/> and the idea here is that morality and justice should not depend <pause dur="0.5"/> on factors <pause dur="0.3"/> that are arbitrary from a moral point of view <pause dur="0.2"/> factors that are merely matters of luck <pause dur="1.1"/> that expresses <pause dur="0.3"/> a Kantian view which is at the heart of Rawls' <pause dur="0.2"/> Theory of Justice <pause dur="0.7"/> Kant thought that the demands of morality and justice could not depend on merely empirical factors <pause dur="0.4"/> on merely contingent differences between people <pause dur="1.2"/> between their different personalities and desires <pause dur="1.0"/> they had to be the demands of justice had to be <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> an expression of pure reason abstracted from all the contingencies of the empirical world <pause dur="0.7"/> # and an aspect of each person in Kant's view <pause dur="0.3"/> is that each person has a capacity <pause dur="0.5"/> to respond to pure reason <pause dur="0.3"/> to form intentions on the basis of pure reason <pause dur="0.5"/> this capacity is an aspect of what Kant <pause dur="0.7"/> regarded as the purely rational self or the the noumenal self <pause dur="0.2"/> to use his technical term <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> so <pause dur="1.1"/> people had this

capacity of the in their <pause dur="0.3"/> # that resided in their noumenal aspect with their noumenal selves <pause dur="0.5"/> to act on the basis of pure reason apart from all these morally arbitrary <pause dur="0.3"/> factors <pause dur="0.4"/> and in that respect <pause dur="0.2"/> Kant regarded people as fundamentally free and equal <pause dur="1.4"/> well <pause dur="0.4"/> Rawls <pause dur="0.4"/> says at one point in A Theory of Justice <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> his original position can be thought of <pause dur="0.5"/> as the point of view from which noumenal selves see the world <pause dur="1.4"/> so it's because differences in <pause dur="0.4"/> your abilities your natural abilities your upbringing and so on <pause dur="0.5"/> are a matter of rock are morally arbitrary <pause dur="0.3"/> that Rawls wants to exclude them from influencing <pause dur="0.6"/> what goes on in the original position <pause dur="1.1"/> he does that through the veil of ignorance <pause dur="0.7"/> so the veil of ignorance sort of strips people down <pause dur="0.5"/> of all these <pause dur="0.2"/> arbitrary differences <pause dur="0.7"/> # in their own conception <pause dur="0.6"/> the way they can see themselves behind the veil <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> all that's left is a sort of <pause dur="0.7"/> our morally equal abstract selves <pause dur="0.4"/> that are <pause dur="0.4"/> supposed to carry out <pause dur="0.2"/> a search for <pause dur="0.2"/> reasons <pause dur="0.7"/> that are prior

to <pause dur="0.2"/> all these different <pause dur="0.8"/> arbitrary factors that differentiate people <pause dur="1.4"/> prior to good and bad luck <pause dur="1.8"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> it's those ideas i've just sketched a sort of cluster of Kantian ideas at the heart of Rawls' theory <pause dur="0.3"/> it's those ideas <pause dur="0.2"/> that Nozick <pause dur="0.4"/> launches his most telling attack <pause dur="0.3"/> at <pause dur="1.2"/> # and there are at least three different strands of this attack that we can differentiate <pause dur="0.4"/> first <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> he says the moral arbitrariness line of thought is dangerous it proves too much <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> it's supposed to stop us from <pause dur="0.4"/> # giving moral significance <pause dur="0.4"/> to <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the results of certain you know free market transactions and so on <pause dur="0.5"/> but it can only do that <pause dur="0.6"/> by doing a lot more than that by attributing in effect everything noteworthy about a person <pause dur="0.3"/> to morally arbitrary factors <pause dur="0.6"/> 'cause after all <pause dur="0.2"/> if we go back far enough to before someone's birth <pause dur="0.4"/> he's not responsible for any of the factors that lead to his own birth <pause dur="0.4"/> or to his genetic make-up <pause dur="0.3"/> the environment in which he grows up <pause dur="0.5"/> and so on <pause dur="0.6"/> so we end up <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> calling his

responsibility for anything into question <pause dur="0.4"/> this leads to an unexalted view of people <pause dur="0.5"/> as <pause dur="0.2"/> not responsible for anything at all <pause dur="0.9"/> and he says Nozick says <pause dur="0.2"/> well that's a very risky line to take for someone like Rawls <pause dur="0.3"/> because Rawls wants to defend <pause dur="0.4"/> the dignity and self-respect of autonomous human beings <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> so before we go down the route that this moral arbitrariness idea forces on us <pause dur="0.4"/> we'd better <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>stop <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/> and think whether we really want to end up <pause dur="0.2"/> where it takes us <pause dur="0.4"/> maybe Kant was actually wrong <pause dur="2.5"/> second <pause dur="0.2"/> Nozick says <pause dur="1.0"/> look <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the view that differences between people need to be justified just begs the question <pause dur="0.4"/> it simply presupposes <pause dur="0.3"/> equality is a default position <pause dur="0.2"/> why do differences <pause dur="0.3"/> particularly need to be justified <pause dur="0.7"/> people just are different <pause dur="0.4"/> that doesn't need justification <pause dur="1.2"/> now here he actually flings back at Rawls <pause dur="0.2"/> something very close to the criticism Rawls <unclear>that</unclear> makes of utilitarianism <pause dur="0.8"/> remember <pause dur="0.2"/> Rawls criticizes utilitarianism <pause dur="0.3"/> for conflating the different desires of

different people <pause dur="1.4"/> and treating them <pause dur="0.5"/> as if they were all <pause dur="0.3"/> the desires of one big person <pause dur="0.9"/> he <pause dur="0.3"/> trades the pleasures and pains of different people off against one another <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> Rawls says that doing this <pause dur="0.3"/> fails to take seriously <pause dur="0.6"/> the separateness of persons <pause dur="1.3"/> well Nozick <pause dur="0.3"/> says <pause dur="0.5"/> # by assuming the differences between people need to be justified <pause dur="0.3"/> Rawls is failing to take seriously the distinctions the differences between people <pause dur="0.6"/> at an even deeper level <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> he says <pause dur="0.5"/> all these morally arbitrary supposedly morally arbitrary features of people <pause dur="0.3"/> that we're supposed to sort of <pause dur="0.4"/> abstract from <pause dur="0.4"/> if we <pause dur="0.7"/> press too hard on this distinction between people and these morally arbitrary factors <pause dur="0.5"/> we're not left with any coherent conception of a person <pause dur="0.3"/> there's nothing left <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> people just are these bundles <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>of morally arbitrary factors <pause dur="0.4"/><shift feature="voice" new="normal"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/> so we deprive people of their very identity if we <pause dur="0.3"/> push this line <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="1.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.0"/> and that's quite

similar actually to the objection that Rawls himself makes against the sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> bare person idea <pause dur="0.4"/> remember we <pause dur="0.3"/> discussed that last time <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="3.2"/> all right <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> so <pause dur="1.7"/> the idea then is <pause dur="0.3"/> we <pause dur="0.3"/> should be just as <pause dur="0.7"/> unhappy about this Kantian version <pause dur="0.4"/> of the noumenal self <pause dur="0.9"/> bare person <pause dur="0.3"/> as we were about the utilitarian version of the remember the bare person who had an equal chance of being anyone <pause dur="0.6"/> then one's no better than the other <pause dur="0.6"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> # people <pause dur="0.2"/> aren't bare selves of that kind and justice doesn't need them <pause dur="0.4"/> that's the sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> line <pause dur="1.7"/> okay so that's the <pause dur="0.4"/> the second point the third <pause dur="0.3"/> # strand of this sort of attack on the Kantian <pause dur="0.7"/> heart of Rawls' theory <pause dur="0.6"/> is that actually <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> there's a kind of inconsistency here because <pause dur="0.5"/> Rawls' theory does allow <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/> morally arbitrary differences to have an influence <pause dur="0.3"/> on people's just shares <pause dur="0.4"/> remember after all the maximin principle <pause dur="0.5"/> allows incentive in equalities <pause dur="0.4"/> it says <pause dur="0.2"/><vocal desc="sniff" iterated="n"/> if by allowing for inequalities you can

give the more productive people <pause dur="0.2"/> incentives <pause dur="0.3"/> that <pause dur="0.7"/> make them produce more <pause dur="0.5"/> in a way that <pause dur="0.2"/> makes everybody better off including the worst off <pause dur="0.5"/> that's okay <pause dur="0.7"/> but people actually don't deserve to be more productive <pause dur="0.7"/> so why should they <pause dur="0.4"/> benefit from those morally arbitrary factors <pause dur="1.2"/> # <pause dur="1.8"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> in fact <pause dur="0.3"/> Jerry Cohen <pause dur="0.2"/> coming in from the left <pause dur="0.7"/> # the opposite direction from Nozick <pause dur="0.7"/> presses that very question <pause dur="0.4"/> against Rawls <pause dur="0.2"/> he says <pause dur="0.4"/> he doesn't he rejects Rawls' reasoning for this sort of maximin idea <pause dur="0.5"/> # well <trunc>h</trunc> he rejects aspects of of <pause dur="0.3"/> the reasoning <pause dur="0.6"/> because he says <pause dur="0.3"/> just that <pause dur="0.7"/> the more productive aren't responsible for being more productive and they jolly well could do the extra work without getting <pause dur="0.3"/> the extra product <pause dur="0.4"/> so why should they get the extra product <pause dur="0.9"/> okay so Rawls seems to be sort of <pause dur="0.5"/> cut <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> in he seems to be caught in between <pause dur="0.5"/> the right wing attack from Nozick and the left wing attack from <pause dur="0.4"/> Cohen <pause dur="0.6"/> he's <pause dur="0.5"/> he's trying to allow a little bit of incentive and

equality <pause dur="0.4"/> but <pause dur="0.9"/> allowing a little bit sort of is to have <trunc>neith</trunc> neither one thing nor the other <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.6"/> all right i think some of these points here really do hit their target <pause dur="0.3"/> the underlying point <pause dur="0.8"/> is expressed by Nozick when he says <pause dur="0.2"/> that the foundations underlying desert <pause dur="0.3"/> don't themselves need to be <pause dur="0.3"/> deserved all the way down <pause dur="0.5"/> people may be entitled to what flows from their natural assets <pause dur="0.4"/> even if their natural assets are morally arbitrary <pause dur="1.2"/> well let's just <pause dur="0.2"/> focus <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> on what's at issue here <pause dur="0.4"/><vocal desc="clears throat" iterated="n"/><pause dur="1.4"/> it may seem that rights of self-ownership <pause dur="0.4"/> are at issue <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> i don't actually think however <pause dur="0.3"/> that whether people have these strong rights <pause dur="0.3"/> is the critical point <pause dur="0.7"/> # i don't think we have to believe in rights of self-ownership <pause dur="0.3"/> in order <pause dur="0.4"/> to <pause dur="0.7"/> think that there's something to what Nozick is saying <pause dur="0.5"/> i think the real issue is <pause dur="0.5"/> about a certain principle which i'm going to call the responsibility for causes principle <pause dur="0.6"/> and this principle says <pause dur="0.2"/> this <pause dur="0.2"/> it

says that to be responsible <trunc>s</trunc> for something <pause dur="0.4"/> you have to be responsible for its causes <pause dur="1.6"/> to be responsible for something you have to be responsible for its causes <pause dur="0.9"/> Rawls seems to assume that <pause dur="0.4"/> he says <pause dur="0.3"/> different earning levels are caused by different natural endowments <pause dur="0.3"/> you don't <pause dur="0.2"/> deserve your natural endowments <pause dur="0.2"/> so you don't deserve <pause dur="0.7"/> your earnings level <pause dur="0.9"/> Nozick seems to reject that <pause dur="0.3"/> principle <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="2.1"/> well <pause dur="0.4"/> should we actually accept this principle <pause dur="0.5"/> notice <pause dur="0.6"/> how if you accept the principle that you have to be responsible for causes <pause dur="0.3"/> you can apply it again and again <pause dur="0.4"/> not just do i have to be responsible for the causes <pause dur="0.2"/> of any choice i make <pause dur="0.3"/> but for the causes of those causes and the causes of those causes and so on <pause dur="0.7"/> all the way back <pause dur="1.3"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> but <pause dur="0.6"/> pretty soon we're going to get back to a point <pause dur="0.2"/> before i was even <pause dur="0.4"/> alive <pause dur="1.4"/> i couldn't possibly be responsible for those causes all the way back <pause dur="0.8"/> the result is <pause dur="0.3"/> if you accept this principle it looks as if nobody's ever responsible for anything <pause dur="1.5"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/>

responsibility seems to be impossible if we accept this principle <pause dur="1.4"/> well <pause dur="1.5"/> we have to think very hard then about whether we actually do <trunc>ac</trunc> accept it <pause dur="0.6"/> we don't usually think that nobody's responsible for anything <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> so our normal <pause dur="0.2"/> # practices of attributing responsibility people are inconsistent with this principle <pause dur="1.3"/> # so we could deny that this principle was true <pause dur="0.2"/> there's no incoherence in denying it <pause dur="0.6"/> # we need to think very hard about <pause dur="0.5"/> whether to accept it <pause dur="0.5"/> one thing i want to say <pause dur="0.3"/> # though is that <pause dur="0.2"/> we shouldn't think that a reason to accept this principle <pause dur="0.3"/> is that if we do it will support egalitarianism <pause dur="0.9"/> that would not only be wishful thinking but it would be an illusion because <pause dur="0.3"/> if no one's responsible for anything if no one ever deserves anything <pause dur="0.3"/> it does not follow <pause dur="0.3"/> that everyone does deserve <pause dur="0.2"/> the same thing <pause dur="0.8"/> that's just a fallacy <pause dur="1.4"/> # <pause dur="1.3"/> so making responsibility impossible does not provide any independent grounds <pause dur="0.2"/> for being an egalitarian <pause dur="2.1"/> all right <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="1.2"/> there we go then for today # <pause dur="0.9"/> next time <pause dur="0.2"/> communitarianism