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<title>The pluralisation of forms of production</title></titleStmt>

<publicationStmt><distributor>BASE and Oxford Text Archive</distributor>


<availability><p>The British Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading, under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Centre for English Language Teacher Education, Warwick) and Paul Thompson

(Department of Applied Linguistics, Reading), with funding from BALEAP,

EURALEX, the British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. The

original recordings are held at the Universities of Warwick and Reading, and

at the Oxford Text Archive and may be consulted by bona fide researchers

upon written application to any of the holding bodies.

The BASE corpus is freely available to researchers who agree to the

following conditions:</p>

<p>1. The recordings and transcriptions should not be modified in any


<p>2. The recordings and transcriptions should be used for research purposes

only; they should not be reproduced in teaching materials</p>

<p>3. The recordings and transcriptions should not be reproduced in full for

a wider audience/readership, although researchers are free to quote short

passages of text (up to 200 running words from any given speech event)</p>

<p>4. The corpus developers should be informed of all presentations or

publications arising from analysis of the corpus</p><p>

Researchers should acknowledge their use of the corpus using the following

form of words:

The recordings and transcriptions used in this study come from the British

Academic Spoken English (BASE) corpus, which was developed at the

Universities of Warwick and Reading under the directorship of Hilary Nesi

(Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus development was assisted by

funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP, EURALEX, the

British Academy and the Arts and Humanities Research Board. </p></availability>




<recording dur="00:48:29" n="6965">


<respStmt><name>BASE team</name>



<langUsage><language id="en">English</language>



<person id="nm1222" role="main speaker" n="n" sex="m"><p>nm1222, main speaker, non-student, male</p></person>

<personGrp id="ss" role="audience" size="m"><p>ss, audience, medium group </p></personGrp>

<personGrp id="sl" role="all" size="m"><p>sl, all, medium group</p></personGrp>

<personGrp role="speakers" size="3"><p>number of speakers: 3</p></personGrp>





<item n="speechevent">Lecture</item>

<item n="acaddept">Sociology</item>

<item n="acaddiv">ss</item>

<item n="partlevel">UG</item>

<item n="module">unknown</item>




<u who="nm1222"> maybe i said it at the very beginning # <pause dur="0.2"/> but maybe i didn't <pause dur="0.3"/> so <trunc>f</trunc> # while i talk feel free sort of to interrupt me if you have any questions directly as i'm going on <pause dur="0.3"/> because as you will have noticed # <pause dur="0.5"/> # i and i guess <gap reason="name" extent="1 word"/> as well we have a tendency just just just to talk to the very end of the lecture <pause dur="0.2"/> so there is not really any time <pause dur="0.4"/> to ask questions directly at the end only then in the seminar <pause dur="0.3"/> but if you want to raise points directly related to <pause dur="0.2"/> what we are doing <pause dur="0.4"/> # just feel free to do so <pause dur="0.2"/> then we <pause dur="0.3"/> we can interrupt and and answer questions or give more detail <pause dur="2.3"/> # otherwise <pause dur="0.3"/> # we will with this with this lecture now move to # the <pause dur="0.2"/> the whole set of lecture really the <pause dur="0.2"/> the core or the middle part of this course <pause dur="0.4"/> where the # we will talk about <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> tendencies of change in <pause dur="0.3"/> contemporary Western societies <pause dur="0.6"/> over <pause dur="0.2"/> well roughly <pause dur="0.2"/> the past three decades or the post-World War Two period <pause dur="0.6"/> so the main <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> time span at which we'll be looking will always be a comparison between <pause dur="0.2"/> well roughly the

nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties on the one hand <pause dur="0.5"/> and the nineteen-nineties on the other <pause dur="0.6"/> and the guiding question will always be <pause dur="0.3"/> whether there <pause dur="0.2"/> is an important social transformation going on <pause dur="0.4"/> # in the various fields of of social action <pause dur="0.4"/> in society <pause dur="1.0"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> # we'll start with really with <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of more economic topics so the theme of this lecture is in <pause dur="0.2"/> well economic sociology if you want to call it like that <pause dur="0.5"/> or also some elements of <pause dur="0.3"/> the sociology of labour and sociology of the welfare state <pause dur="2.0"/> and # <pause dur="0.3"/> you may remember from <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> a couple weeks ago <pause dur="0.4"/> # that # i already gave an outline of the major areas we'll be looking at of the dimensions of social change <pause dur="0.6"/> # so i will <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in the first few minutes come back to that <pause dur="0.4"/> # talk about <pause dur="0.2"/> how we can discuss the major economic changes <pause dur="0.4"/> and then go into <pause dur="0.2"/> much more detail than i did in the short summary <pause dur="0.5"/> which i did a couple weeks ago <pause dur="2.9"/> now <pause dur="0.2"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> question which i already posed a couple of weeks ago was <pause dur="0.3"/> well why at all look at the post-war

period <pause dur="0.4"/> if <pause dur="0.4"/> # one could say that i mean for <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> most Western countries <pause dur="0.3"/> there wasn't really any major institutional change <pause dur="0.4"/> i mean most Western countries <pause dur="0.2"/> at least from after the Second World War onwards from the <trunc>ni</trunc> late nineteen-forties <pause dur="0.6"/> # were <pause dur="0.2"/> basically <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> democratically organized in political terms <pause dur="0.4"/> they were capitalist market societies in economic terms <pause dur="0.4"/> they were # societies <pause dur="0.2"/> broadly committed to a plural understanding of # <pause dur="0.2"/> social lives <pause dur="0.4"/> so nothing really happened in all those sort of most fundamental terms one could say <pause dur="1.1"/> nevertheless <pause dur="0.3"/> we will try to make an argument that there was a major change <pause dur="0.4"/> # so that must have been then on a slightly <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> more <pause dur="0.4"/> # more detailed levels of a more differentiated level <pause dur="1.0"/> # and that is what we will try to do so we have to describe <pause dur="1.0"/> in this lecture economic but then also political and social changes <pause dur="0.4"/> in a bit more detail at a <pause dur="0.2"/> at a lower level of differentiation so to say <pause dur="1.9"/> once we do that <pause dur="0.3"/> then <pause dur="0.3"/> # we can see that indeed there were some <pause dur="0.3"/>

some important changes <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> and so what i will do now is i will try to describe <pause dur="0.5"/> # or give an idea as to how one could describe <pause dur="0.2"/> as indeed how sociology has described <pause dur="0.5"/> # over a <pause dur="0.6"/> a couple of decades within the framework of industrial society theory <pause dur="0.6"/> has described the societies of the nineteen-fifties nineteen-sixties <pause dur="0.8"/> # and then i will sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> # try to show <pause dur="0.4"/> how these descriptions have changed and how we should really <pause dur="0.3"/> # see <pause dur="0.3"/> Western societies in a slightly different light nowadays <pause dur="1.8"/> in economic terms <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> i say this <pause dur="0.3"/> briefly as a summary at the beginning <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> theory of industrial society <pause dur="0.4"/> # was really based on the idea <pause dur="0.3"/> that # <pause dur="0.4"/> the dominant model of industrial production <pause dur="0.4"/> is # standardized mass production <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> large production runs of a rather limited number of goods <pause dur="0.4"/> # in large-scale factories # large-scale organizations <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> and those <pause dur="0.2"/> the goods produced <pause dur="0.3"/> the under those conditions of mass production <pause dur="0.3"/> being consumed in a similarly standardized way so that's <pause dur="0.3"/>

standardized mass <trunc>cos</trunc> mass consumption as some people have said <pause dur="1.6"/> this <pause dur="0.4"/> model of economic organization then went with <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of say a model of economic policy making <pause dur="0.7"/> # which seemed adapted and adequate to this model of economic organization <pause dur="0.5"/> namely <pause dur="0.3"/> on the one hand <pause dur="0.4"/> large-scale organization of both employers and workers sort of in unions and of employers' associations <pause dur="0.6"/> # direct negotiation between <pause dur="0.2"/> the top <pause dur="0.2"/> level of these large-scale organizations <pause dur="0.5"/> with very often <pause dur="0.3"/> the involvement of the state as a moderator and mediator <pause dur="0.4"/> between sort of the two <pause dur="0.4"/> conflicting organizations <pause dur="1.1"/> the state in addition <pause dur="0.4"/> intervening into the economy <pause dur="0.4"/> # by means of <pause dur="0.3"/> what was technically known as demand management <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> economic policy based on the Keynesian idea <pause dur="0.4"/> that # by increasing or diminishing government spending <pause dur="0.3"/> # you could indeed <pause dur="0.3"/> keep the economy on a basically stable growth path <pause dur="1.5"/> that then in consequence it's a third element <pause dur="0.3"/> the so it's the the economy policy

objective we can call it <pause dur="0.4"/> or also a link between <pause dur="0.3"/> economic policy and social policy really <pause dur="0.6"/> namely that once you think that you can't keep the economy on a stable growth path <pause dur="0.5"/> then you can also <pause dur="0.2"/> argue that <pause dur="0.4"/> full employment is <pause dur="0.4"/> an objective of government action <pause dur="0.4"/> which can indeed be achieved <pause dur="0.4"/> there is no major problem in achieving it because on the basis of Keynesianism <pause dur="0.5"/> # you know how you're going to do it <pause dur="0.3"/> namely <pause dur="0.4"/> should employment fall below a certain level <pause dur="0.4"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> you # have to increase government spending <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the production will increase and employment will increase <pause dur="0.2"/> and accordingly sort of the move back to the growth path <pause dur="0.4"/> has been achieved <pause dur="1.5"/> so that is <pause dur="0.3"/> basically # we can call that a sort of full employment convention as it has been called recently <pause dur="0.3"/> and the basic agreement # <pause dur="0.5"/> even sort of among the major parties sort of the more conservative Christian parties on the one hand <pause dur="0.4"/> the Tories in Britain <pause dur="0.4"/> and the the more <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of left wing Social Democratic or Labour parties on the

other hand <pause dur="0.5"/> during the fifties and sixties <pause dur="0.2"/> they basically agreed that that is the <pause dur="0.3"/> the way to do it <pause dur="0.2"/> # and that <pause dur="0.2"/> one indeed could achieve that <pause dur="1.8"/> so this is <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>i</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> in summary really something which i said already earlier a couple of weeks ago <pause dur="0.6"/> is # <pause dur="0.2"/> the idea that there is a typical <pause dur="0.5"/> # sort of organization of production <pause dur="0.5"/> linked to <pause dur="0.6"/> a typical economic policy mechanism <pause dur="0.3"/> # and economic policy objectives <pause dur="0.5"/> which in sum really describe what <pause dur="0.5"/> # the economy of <trunc>in</trunc> advanced industrial society is about <pause dur="1.3"/> that's the image of the <pause dur="0.2"/> nineteen-sixties so to say <pause dur="0.9"/> and now we'll i'll run through that <pause dur="0.4"/> and # we'll try to discuss <pause dur="0.3"/> if that has changed and how that has changed over the more recent period <pause dur="0.7"/> let me for that purpose also <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> draw sort of a <pause dur="0.8"/> a a kind of picture which you will <pause dur="0.2"/> # be used to already by now <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of this distinction between the sixties and the nineties <pause dur="0.4"/> long <pause dur="0.2"/> well always slightly schematic terms but i think useful terms <pause dur="0.4"/> to # <pause dur="0.3"/> carve out the main elements of those pictures <pause dur="0.6"/> so we'll <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="6"/><pause dur="2.4"/>

compare the nineteen-sixties <pause dur="2.5"/> to the nineteen-nineties <pause dur="0.6"/> along those # three dimensions which i <pause dur="0.2"/> i outlined just now <pause dur="0.5"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="10"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the one we can call <pause dur="0.9"/> something like the <pause dur="0.6"/> organization of production <pause dur="5.7"/> this is <pause dur="0.6"/> standardized mass production <pause dur="9.9"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="10"/> and associated with that the large-scale organization <pause dur="10.5"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="7"/> combined and linked to # <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> what i call here now the economic policy <pause dur="0.6"/> arrangement or mechanism <pause dur="12.3"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="9"/> this is # <pause dur="0.4"/> Keynesianism <pause dur="0.3"/> on the one hand <pause dur="6.4"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="4"/> and very often <pause dur="0.4"/> indeed to varying degrees but i will come back to that <pause dur="0.5"/> linked to what one can call corporatism <pause dur="0.5"/> corporatism in the sense namely that <pause dur="0.2"/> both employers and workers <pause dur="0.4"/> get organized also in large-scale organizations that's where there is some <pause dur="0.2"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> mapping here to the form of production <pause dur="0.6"/> # and that they <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> talk about # the development of the economy <pause dur="0.3"/> often <pause dur="0.2"/> # together with the state governments of the economic ministry or <pause dur="0.3"/> whatever the exact title is in various countries <pause dur="1.8"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="2"/> this is indeed a term with which you may be less familiar <pause dur="0.4"/> it's more

typical really of continental European arrangements than of <pause dur="0.6"/> English or British arrangements <pause dur="0.2"/> but we come back to that <pause dur="5.8"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="3"/> and finally we have an economic policy objective as i just <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="8"/> said <pause dur="9.0"/> and that is # the full employment convention <pause dur="13.2"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="10"/> now if we look at that <pause dur="0.6"/> you can almost immediately say that <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> this <pause dur="0.2"/> is no longer <pause dur="0.5"/> sort of really in the strong sense valid <pause dur="0.5"/> # in the sense namely that <pause dur="0.3"/> # <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this is the the one dominant or typical model <pause dur="0.2"/> of economic organization and economic policy <pause dur="0.8"/> but on the other hand you could also argue <pause dur="0.4"/> well <pause dur="0.3"/> we still have elements of all that <pause dur="0.4"/> and certainly there is standardized mass production still <pause dur="0.6"/> # there may not be exactly Keynesianism but # there are government interventions into the economy <pause dur="0.6"/> and there are these large-scale organizations and at least in some cases also <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> ideas of communication coordination of <pause dur="0.2"/> economic policy <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in <pause dur="0.5"/> in <trunc>wi</trunc> # between these organizations <pause dur="0.5"/> and there is at least <pause dur="0.2"/> a lot of <pause dur="0.3"/> talk about full employment and how one gets back to

full employment <pause dur="0.8"/> # so there is sort of <pause dur="0.3"/> a bit a mixed picture <pause dur="0.2"/> # the on the one hand <pause dur="0.3"/> these elements are still there <pause dur="0.5"/> on the other <trunc>eleme</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> hand <pause dur="0.5"/> we can also say that <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> # many of these things have changed we <pause dur="0.2"/> haven't had full employment for <pause dur="0.5"/> # more than fifteen or twenty years depending on the country <pause dur="0.6"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> governments may keep talking about it but <pause dur="0.2"/> we may have doubts about their commitment to it really <pause dur="0.8"/> # coordination between the economic policy actors <pause dur="0.4"/> has in has in many instances broken down it has been difficult to re-establish it <pause dur="0.5"/> various countries one talks about the need to re-establish it but it doesn't <pause dur="0.2"/> work <pause dur="0.5"/> any longer as effectively as it once did <pause dur="0.9"/> and there <pause dur="0.3"/> is a lot of talk about small and medium-sized entreprise that innovation in the economy comes really from them and rather <pause dur="0.3"/> not from the large-scale companies <pause dur="0.4"/> so you see there <pause dur="0.2"/> this kind of mixed picture <pause dur="0.2"/> which # <pause dur="0.4"/> really has <pause dur="0.4"/> has these elements still but also has lots of complications <pause dur="0.8"/> now # <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> i will try it from

that basis then <pause dur="0.4"/> try to say something about <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="1.1"/> rather analytical possibilities as we can try to describe <pause dur="0.5"/> what the current situation is i mean if we try to <pause dur="1.3"/> go beyond at least # <pause dur="0.3"/> one or two steps beyond just saying <pause dur="0.4"/> well we have it but we also have new elements <pause dur="0.4"/> # try to # <pause dur="0.2"/> to analytically describe what the <pause dur="0.4"/> the possibilities of sociological analysis of the economy <pause dur="0.3"/> # are nowadays <pause dur="1.5"/> and in that context i will then refer to the various <pause dur="0.5"/> # texts which are in the course outline and <pause dur="0.3"/> well <pause dur="0.4"/> the particular one you <pause dur="0.2"/> you read for <pause dur="0.8"/> the seminar later on <pause dur="1.7"/> now you will have seen in the reading for today <pause dur="0.4"/> that # some people argue <pause dur="0.3"/> that standardized mass production is really <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> or went through # a major crisis of that <pause dur="0.4"/> # there was a massive decline if not a collapse of the <pause dur="0.4"/> model of standardized mass production <pause dur="0.7"/> the key text for that <pause dur="0.5"/> is # the one which we also listed under the additional readings <pause dur="0.4"/> the book by <pause dur="0.2"/> Charles Sable and Michael Piore <pause dur="0.6"/> # on the second industrial divide <pause dur="0.7"/> where they

argue that indeed standardized mass production was a historical phenomenon <pause dur="0.5"/> which # slowly <pause dur="0.4"/> which is not at all related to the industrial revolution <pause dur="0.2"/> but that was really rather small-scale production <pause dur="0.7"/> but is a phenomenon of the late nineteenth century <pause dur="0.5"/> # when gradually <pause dur="0.4"/> # these longer production runs <pause dur="0.4"/> # Taylorist organization of work you know the <pause dur="0.6"/> # which i briefly mentioned earlier <pause dur="0.5"/> the <trunc>m</trunc> <pause dur="0.4"/> the minute and detailed <pause dur="0.4"/> # cutting up of the elements this <trunc>i</trunc> the the work process <pause dur="0.4"/> # to control and steer <pause dur="0.3"/> the labour power more effectively <pause dur="0.5"/> # in the factory <pause dur="0.5"/> and in the next step then the conveyor belt <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> and this # <pause dur="0.2"/> model together <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of <pause dur="0.4"/> Taylorist <pause dur="0.4"/> Taylorist scientific organization <trunc>a</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> of work as <pause dur="0.4"/> Taylor called it in the U-S at the beginning of this century <pause dur="0.7"/> and <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.4"/> conveyor belt driven <pause dur="0.6"/> # production of standardized good <pause dur="0.4"/> has really become known as the <pause dur="0.2"/> Fordist model of production <pause dur="1.0"/> on the basis of <pause dur="0.6"/> # works of some French economists in the <pause dur="0.7"/> # late nineteen-sixties early

nineteen-seventies <pause dur="0.4"/> that has become known # this <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model here as <pause dur="0.3"/> as Fordism <pause dur="0.5"/> but as a historical model of <pause dur="0.4"/> # the organization of the capitalist economy <pause dur="0.6"/> but it's not really typical for <pause dur="0.2"/> capitalism as such <pause dur="0.5"/> but rather typical for <pause dur="1.1"/> a historical development within capitalism <pause dur="0.6"/> so that means <pause dur="0.2"/> # it may as well change and may as well <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of decay and be transformed <pause dur="0.6"/> and that then is really <pause dur="0.4"/> the argument which Piore and Sable have come up with <pause dur="0.4"/> namely that <pause dur="0.2"/> if there was one industrial divide <pause dur="0.5"/> in the nineteenth century late in the nineteenth century <pause dur="0.5"/> towards <pause dur="0.3"/> standardized mass production and towards Fordism <pause dur="0.8"/> we may now be they wrote that in the early nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.6"/> undergoing or going through a second industrial divide <pause dur="0.7"/> away from standardized mass production <pause dur="0.4"/> towards what they called flexible specialization <pause dur="0.6"/> that's the term which you found in the in the reading <pause dur="9.9"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="8"/> flexible specialization means <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> due to new production technologies <pause dur="0.4"/> basically related to # <pause dur="0.3"/> electronics

and information technology <pause dur="0.7"/> # you can indeed <pause dur="0.2"/> what you couldn't do <pause dur="0.4"/> under Taylorism and Fordism <pause dur="0.5"/> # change the production runs rather quickly <pause dur="0.6"/> # so that you <pause dur="0.2"/> were not dependent any longer on <pause dur="1.0"/> mass production of goods and mass consumption of these <pause dur="0.4"/> identical goods <pause dur="0.5"/> but that you could <pause dur="0.8"/> take the example of the car industry could change models <trunc>rath</trunc> rather quickly <pause dur="0.4"/> or take <trunc>con</trunc> consumer electronics <pause dur="0.6"/> # that you could have short production runs and then just change the computer <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> assisted <pause dur="0.2"/> design and production <pause dur="0.4"/> # and produce something else <pause dur="0.3"/> rather flexibly <pause dur="0.2"/> but you can specialize <pause dur="0.5"/> # at short notice and <pause dur="0.2"/> during <pause dur="0.4"/> over short time periods <pause dur="0.5"/> # and that indeed <pause dur="0.5"/> where <pause dur="0.6"/> Taylorists and Fordists thought thought <pause dur="0.4"/> that the # <pause dur="0.6"/> # big organization hierarchically organized centrally planned so to say within the <trunc>govern</trunc> within the company <pause dur="0.6"/> that this <pause dur="0.5"/> necessarily has to be the most efficient model of production <pause dur="0.8"/> theorists of specialization argue instead that <pause dur="0.5"/> at least and in <pause dur="0.6"/> with the help

of current technology <pause dur="0.6"/> # you can indeed organize much more flexibly and that that is the <pause dur="0.6"/> # the efficient way also of reacting to <pause dur="0.3"/> changing demand <pause dur="0.5"/> changing demand patterns <pause dur="0.3"/> # and to <pause dur="0.2"/> # changing market developments <pause dur="0.3"/> on <pause dur="0.2"/> that's part of this obviously <pause dur="0.5"/> on an increasingly global market <pause dur="1.8"/> and we'll just say here and point to <pause dur="0.4"/> a later lecture and discussion <pause dur="0.5"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> here this is also connected to # <pause dur="0.6"/> a broader social change namely what we will discuss under the heading of lifestyles and identities <pause dur="0.6"/> that indeed <pause dur="0.3"/> from roughly the nineteen-seventies onwards <pause dur="0.4"/> # demand patterns also changed <pause dur="0.4"/> because <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> partly because of affluence also <pause dur="0.3"/> 'cause people # were less interested in buying sort of always the same kind of car which may have a major change with the season <pause dur="0.3"/> # minor change with the season <pause dur="0.4"/> but a rather <pause dur="0.4"/> # limited diversity <pause dur="0.2"/> # of products on offer <pause dur="0.7"/> the same for all kinds of more durable products <pause dur="0.7"/> # so that <pause dur="0.2"/> with a differentiation of life lifestyles # more emphasis given to <pause dur="0.5"/> a variety

of <trunc>id</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> identities and social life <pause dur="0.4"/> that indeed <pause dur="0.3"/> # there was a demand for a greater variety and diversity of products <pause dur="0.6"/> so that flexible specialization is also a response to this kind of social change or social and cultural change <pause dur="0.4"/> namely <pause dur="0.4"/> different demand patterns towards greater <pause dur="0.2"/> variety and diversity <pause dur="2.6"/> now Piore and Sable also argue that <pause dur="0.2"/> once you do that <pause dur="0.4"/> # once you # # try to develop a <pause dur="0.3"/> production organization <pause dur="0.3"/> # in direction of flexible specialization <pause dur="0.5"/> then you also need a different kind of of company <pause dur="0.6"/> that the large-scale centralized hierarchical company <pause dur="0.2"/> like <pause dur="0.3"/> General Motors or Ford or so <pause dur="0.7"/> is no longer the most efficient model <pause dur="0.5"/> and they looked indeed <pause dur="0.3"/> at research done # on <pause dur="0.2"/> # central Italy <pause dur="0.5"/> and on south-west Germany <pause dur="0.5"/> # where <pause dur="0.5"/> sort of highly <pause dur="0.2"/> and sort of the <pause dur="0.4"/> highly affluent regions # with # world market competitive production <pause dur="0.5"/> but rather on the basis of many small companies <pause dur="0.4"/> rather than a few big ones <pause dur="0.7"/> this has become known as the theory of industrial districts <pause dur="0.6"/> but you don't have <pause dur="0.8"/>

if you take the <trunc>ex</trunc> Italian example <pause dur="0.3"/> but you don't have like with # Fiat in Turin <pause dur="0.6"/> # one big company which really dominates the economy of a city <pause dur="0.7"/> they have a city of a million inhabitants or more <pause dur="0.5"/> where virtually everything is dependent from the well-being of the Fiat company was <pause dur="0.2"/> it is no longer the case <pause dur="0.8"/> but when you look at central Italy <pause dur="0.4"/> # then you have <pause dur="0.6"/> no big company at all but a region which was not only at least as affluent <pause dur="0.3"/> or maybe more affluent and more <pause dur="0.2"/> prosperous than northern Italy <pause dur="0.6"/> with the more <pause dur="0.5"/> sort of industrial <pause dur="0.7"/> mass production kind of economy <pause dur="0.7"/> # but even an economy <pause dur="0.3"/> which watered the crisis of the nineteen-seventies <pause dur="0.3"/> the world recession <pause dur="0.2"/> recession in seventy-four seventy-five <pause dur="0.5"/> # and demand changes <pause dur="0.3"/> # much better at <pause dur="0.2"/> than the <pause dur="0.4"/> # standardized production economy did <pause dur="0.7"/> so Piore and Sable and other <pause dur="0.2"/> economic sociologists really concluded from that <pause dur="0.6"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> there is <pause dur="0.4"/> a <pause dur="0.5"/> # a more efficient a <trunc>f</trunc> more flexible model of industrial organization <pause dur="0.3"/> also on the

level of of company organization <pause dur="2.3"/> and that is # <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="7"/> as i said <pause dur="1.1"/> really a model of industrial districts <pause dur="4.0"/> nowadays also sometimes discussed as a sort of network organization <pause dur="0.4"/> # not <pause dur="0.3"/> one big company <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="3"/> but <pause dur="2.6"/> a network of smaller companies <pause dur="0.8"/> about which it is also important to say that the idea there is <pause dur="0.5"/> # not just <pause dur="0.7"/> # the idea of <pause dur="0.5"/> the innovative capacity of small and medium-sized entreprises as # <pause dur="0.4"/> to here in economics <pause dur="0.5"/> but also the idea that these companies are not really in full competition <pause dur="0.8"/> but that they so say share common resources like <pause dur="0.5"/> # certain kinds of education and training in a region # historical <pause dur="0.4"/> # backgrounds of # <trunc>produc</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> production specialisms <pause dur="0.4"/> # that they also have <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> cooperative relations rather with # <pause dur="0.3"/> local or regional Chambers of Commerce <pause dur="0.3"/> with local or regional banks to finance their arrangements <pause dur="0.7"/> so indeed there's not just a question of <trunc>t</trunc> of size <pause dur="0.4"/> it's also the idea <pause dur="0.2"/> that there is not <pause dur="0.5"/> sort of full market competition <pause dur="0.3"/> as economists

would like to tell us <pause dur="0.5"/> but rather a kind of <pause dur="0.3"/> social economic arrangement <pause dur="0.3"/> based on <pause dur="0.4"/> a mixture of cooperation and competition <pause dur="0.5"/> # where companies also work together while they're may at the same time be compete in several respects <pause dur="2.6"/> now <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="1.6"/> this is sort of one argument <pause dur="0.2"/> and if you looked at Piore and Sable <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> The Second Industrial Divide you will have seen that that they make that argument sort of very strongly <pause dur="0.5"/> that there is a <pause dur="0.2"/> a big change <pause dur="0.3"/> from <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this kind of organization <pause dur="0.5"/> to <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this kind of organization <pause dur="2.5"/> now as i said earlier <pause dur="0.3"/> # we may <pause dur="0.7"/> see that something like that happens that also maybe that we <pause dur="0.5"/> # sociologists and economists didn't pay enough attention <pause dur="0.4"/> to these other kinds of production <pause dur="0.4"/> # which # were <pause dur="0.4"/> more sort of in the shadow so to say of <pause dur="0.4"/> # the dominant mass production mentioned earlier because they existed and these industrial <trunc>ic</trunc> <pause dur="0.3"/> districts existed in the fifties and sixties <pause dur="0.5"/> they're not really new <pause dur="0.5"/> # but not much attention was

paid to them <pause dur="1.2"/> but we may also argue <pause dur="0.6"/> standardized mass production also persists <pause dur="0.4"/> so that we cannot <pause dur="0.5"/> that Piore and Sable really overdraw their argument by saying that <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> the whole economy <pause dur="0.4"/> moves from one model <pause dur="0.3"/> standardized mass production <pause dur="0.5"/> to a different model flexible specialization <pause dur="1.1"/> any empirical study will show that that is not really true <pause dur="0.2"/> # that there there may be <pause dur="0.9"/> some change into that direction but there may as well be just a shift in attention on the part of observers # also journalistic observers <pause dur="1.1"/> now <pause dur="0.5"/> that is where i come to the <pause dur="0.2"/> diagram which is the i will not <pause dur="0.2"/> say much in detail about that <pause dur="0.5"/> because of lack of time <pause dur="0.5"/> there have then been # been some economists and sociologists <pause dur="0.4"/> # who have tried to go a step further <pause dur="0.7"/> and the <pause dur="0.2"/> main idea of this diagram is quite simple <pause dur="0.3"/> mainly to say that <pause dur="0.2"/><event desc="looks through notes" iterated="y" dur="3"/> there is not any overall shift <pause dur="0.5"/> just look at it myself <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> but we really have to <pause dur="0.4"/> recognize that what exists <pause dur="0.8"/> is <pause dur="0.5"/> something like a plurality of worlds of production <pause dur="0.3"/> as # Salais and Storper call that <pause dur="0.4"/> this is the <pause dur="0.3"/> text <pause dur="0.5"/> # which is also on the course outline <pause dur="0.5"/> # The Four

Worlds of Contemporary Industry <pause dur="0.7"/> # from the Cambridge Journal of Economics but you have the full details in the outline this diagram is taken from that text <pause dur="1.6"/> where you see <pause dur="0.2"/> if you just take a brief look <pause dur="0.4"/> in the <pause dur="0.3"/> the the main idea here is <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.4"/> we really have <pause dur="0.3"/> a variety of different basic production models <pause dur="0.7"/> # and they argue that sort of systemically speaking there are four <pause dur="0.7"/> # and # <pause dur="0.7"/> there could be more obviously one can always sort of make this argument more sophisticated <pause dur="0.4"/> there isn't any <pause dur="0.8"/> any need why there should be just four <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> below you have in the lower right corner <pause dur="0.2"/> what they call the industrial world <pause dur="0.4"/> that is really <pause dur="0.3"/> this model <pause dur="1.2"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> that's the lower right corner of their diagram <pause dur="1.3"/> now <pause dur="0.8"/> what # <pause dur="0.4"/> Piore and Sable tend to argue <pause dur="0.6"/> is that # <pause dur="0.3"/> due to the changes that i have been talking about <pause dur="0.5"/> there is a shift towards <pause dur="0.4"/> what one <pause dur="0.2"/> may want to call a network market world <pause dur="0.3"/> and that's the <pause dur="0.5"/> # top right <pause dur="0.9"/> # corner of this diagram <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> this is <pause dur="0.2"/> # roughly more or less it's not exactly

the same <pause dur="0.4"/> it's what Piore and Sable say <pause dur="0.6"/> # is roughly # the idea that the whole economy shifts from the lower right to the upper right <pause dur="0.7"/> not least because if you look at the <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the right order of that <pause dur="0.4"/> because the market conditions change from predictability to uncertainty <pause dur="0.9"/> and that is why you have to be <pause dur="0.4"/> # more flexible <pause dur="0.3"/> that is why you cannot <pause dur="0.5"/> # rely on long production runs of the same products over long periods <pause dur="0.5"/> # you have to be <pause dur="0.4"/> # you have to react flexibly <pause dur="0.3"/> # sort of as a producer <pause dur="0.5"/> # to the changing market environments <pause dur="1.3"/> # Salais and Storper say that this is <pause dur="0.2"/> not entirely wrong <pause dur="0.5"/> but it's only a part of the picture <pause dur="0.5"/> so <pause dur="0.2"/> that one should what one should really do is <pause dur="0.3"/> one should # look at <pause dur="0.7"/> economic organization <pause dur="0.4"/> in broader and more systematic terms <pause dur="0.4"/> that market changes <pause dur="0.5"/> the right <pause dur="0.3"/> axis <pause dur="0.2"/> the axis on the right <pause dur="0.5"/> is only one part of the change <pause dur="0.3"/> or of the conditions of production having said that first of all <pause dur="0.6"/> there is another element which is the technology and the production process <pause dur="0.6"/>

which obviously was also part of <pause dur="0.5"/> # Piore's and Sable's argument but again they assume that there is <pause dur="0.3"/> a major shift into one direction only <pause dur="1.6"/> and if you take <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> Salais and Storper argue if you take <pause dur="0.5"/> market conditions and <pause dur="0.2"/> technological conditions into account <pause dur="0.6"/> then <pause dur="0.2"/> you # <pause dur="0.3"/> # have this variety or diversity of <pause dur="0.4"/> of worlds of production <pause dur="1.3"/> # different kinds of economic organization <pause dur="0.6"/> at the same time not really a shift over time sort of one <pause dur="0.3"/> historical transformation <pause dur="0.6"/> as <pause dur="0.7"/> the argument for <trunc>s</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> flexible specialization wanted it <pause dur="0.6"/> but <pause dur="0.3"/> # you have to look really at the national or local conditions <pause dur="0.4"/> to see <pause dur="0.5"/> what kinds of markets are there <pause dur="0.3"/> what kinds of technologies are used to produce goods <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> in certain areas or <trunc>sin</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> or in a national economy like <pause dur="0.2"/> say the British <pause dur="0.7"/> # and then you can say <pause dur="0.3"/> # where <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.5"/> # a major part of such an economy falls into this fourfold scheme <pause dur="2.5"/> i <pause dur="0.2"/> # we don't really have time to

go into much detail <pause dur="0.4"/> but # let me just say something about the <pause dur="0.4"/> the other two worlds <pause dur="0.7"/> # the world of innovation <pause dur="0.2"/> that is really the that's the lower <pause dur="0.6"/> left <pause dur="0.3"/> corner <pause dur="0.6"/> that is <pause dur="0.2"/> not this Silicon Valley <pause dur="0.3"/> kind of business where you have <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of high-tech <pause dur="0.2"/> # production <pause dur="0.4"/> of the <pause dur="0.3"/> the cutting edge of # <pause dur="0.3"/> industrial technology <pause dur="0.4"/> # that's why <pause dur="0.2"/> it's on a different level of <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> on the technology scale the <pause dur="0.4"/> axis on the bottom <pause dur="1.2"/> but you may sort of like <pause dur="0.3"/> computer chips or basic computer equipment <pause dur="0.4"/> also do <pause dur="0.4"/> # fairly <trunc>gen</trunc> generic products <pause dur="0.4"/> # catering for a fairly stable and developing market <pause dur="0.6"/> so that is why this world of innovation <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> is <pause dur="0.2"/> changing <pause dur="0.2"/> rapidly in terms of the technology they use because they <pause dur="0.4"/> they use <pause dur="0.3"/> a high scientific input <pause dur="0.6"/> but they produce # for fairly predictable <pause dur="0.2"/> markets <pause dur="1.2"/> whereas the Marshallian market world <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> using the name of Alfred Marshall sort of the <pause dur="0.3"/> British economist from the <pause dur="0.2"/> late nineteenth century <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> is <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> a market world which also works with # high technology but has to

adapt to rather unpredictable <pause dur="0.3"/> # market conditions <pause dur="1.0"/> then you see what they put # <pause dur="0.3"/> into these boxes <pause dur="0.6"/> is # <pause dur="0.5"/> quite different criteria <pause dur="0.4"/> # as to which these economic sectors or segments <pause dur="0.4"/> worlds as they call that <pause dur="0.4"/> # how they are organized <pause dur="0.3"/> there is really only the industrial world <pause dur="0.4"/> competes by price <pause dur="0.7"/> # where <pause dur="0.4"/> if you produce more effectively <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> can offer at lower prices you will be the leading competitor in the field <pause dur="0.9"/> in all other cases <pause dur="0.4"/> there is there are other <pause dur="0.2"/> criteria of competition <pause dur="0.5"/> # it can be <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of the ability to take in recent technology that's what they call learning <pause dur="0.6"/> it can be quite simply the quality of products <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> you may know for instance that when i <trunc>men</trunc> was mentioning <pause dur="0.2"/> south-western Germany <pause dur="0.6"/> # where they produce not least # tool making <pause dur="0.5"/> # technology sort of # factory equipment and things like that <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> these producers often sell at much higher prices than their competitors <pause dur="0.6"/> but there is the general view that these products are of higher quality than <pause dur="0.4"/> competitors from <pause dur="0.2"/> # from

other countries <pause dur="0.4"/> so <shift feature="voice" new="laugh"/>they don't <shift feature="voice" new="normal"/>really compete on the world market <pause dur="0.7"/> by price <pause dur="0.2"/> but they compete by quality <pause dur="0.5"/> and that's a quite different kind of economic arrangement <pause dur="0.2"/> than <pause dur="0.2"/> a competition by price <pause dur="0.2"/> i'll come back to that # in a minute <pause dur="1.3"/> whereas # <pause dur="0.3"/> then the network market world <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> that they say that price plays a role but quality comes in so that's a mixed criterion <pause dur="0.7"/> according to their view <pause dur="0.4"/> one can have <pause dur="0.2"/> and as i say i will say a bit more in a minute <pause dur="0.4"/> can have long <pause dur="0.2"/> discussions one can try what they have tried to do really <pause dur="0.4"/> look at <pause dur="0.5"/> in their case the French Italian and American economy <pause dur="0.6"/> is say <pause dur="0.6"/> what the dominant fields are where these economies specialize <pause dur="0.5"/> # so then for instance you find that the American economy is rather in the two bottom <pause dur="0.3"/> segments # it's still strong on in standardized mass production <pause dur="0.3"/> but it's also strong in the innovative world <pause dur="0.7"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> whereas <pause dur="0.5"/> other economies have different specializations <pause dur="1.3"/> so that you have a you have a choice really <pause dur="0.4"/> there is not one change from <pause dur="0.3"/>

<kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model to <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model <pause dur="0.5"/> but <pause dur="0.3"/> there is <pause dur="0.3"/> what they call <pause dur="1.7"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="6"/> worlds in plural <pause dur="0.5"/> of production <pause dur="3.9"/> so this is <pause dur="0.5"/> # and this is the important <unclear>to say the</unclear> <pause dur="0.4"/> important conceptual conclusion <pause dur="0.4"/> from these observations <pause dur="0.5"/> there is <pause dur="1.6"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/> not <pause dur="0.4"/> a clear line to be drawn from <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> one dominant model to <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> another <pause dur="0.7"/> but we have <pause dur="0.5"/> it's more complicated but we have an alternative tool to understand these developments <pause dur="0.4"/> by <pause dur="0.6"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/> looking at <pause dur="0.6"/> this diversity or plurality <pause dur="0.2"/> of production <pause dur="1.3"/> not a a simple historical change from one model to the other <pause dur="0.6"/> but <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> a more complex change <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> including # <pause dur="0.2"/> a diversity of different arrangements <pause dur="0.4"/> in the in the present <pause dur="2.4"/> now <pause dur="0.6"/> really <pause dur="0.5"/> on the <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> other two major points i'll be discussing <pause dur="0.7"/> i will basically show that <pause dur="0.3"/> # that is essentially the same <pause dur="0.3"/> # that again <pause dur="0.3"/> we have # <pause dur="1.1"/> among <pause dur="0.2"/> well social scientists sociologists and certainly among journalists <pause dur="0.4"/> often <pause dur="0.3"/> a view that things have changed in one

direction <pause dur="0.4"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model <pause dur="0.8"/> just didn't hold any longer <pause dur="0.2"/> so that a new model had to be developed <pause dur="1.0"/> whereas <pause dur="0.2"/> in each case one can make an argument that <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> it's not as simple as <unclear>that</unclear> <pause dur="0.4"/> # basic conditions have changed but that means <pause dur="0.3"/> that we are in a situation where <pause dur="0.3"/> as i say <pause dur="0.2"/> new models or indeed <pause dur="0.4"/> models based on some diversity of conditions <pause dur="0.3"/> are still in need of development <pause dur="1.3"/> if we do that here <pause dur="0.3"/> for # <pause dur="0.8"/> # the economic policy mechanism <pause dur="0.9"/> then it is quite clear <pause dur="0.3"/> that <pause dur="0.5"/> as many people have it <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the argument is that Keynesianism and corporatism <pause dur="0.4"/> don't work any longer because of globalization <pause dur="0.8"/> that indeed both rely on <pause dur="0.4"/> a nationally organized economy <pause dur="0.2"/> a nationally contained economy <pause dur="0.9"/> Keynesanism does it <pause dur="0.3"/> because you have a government role <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> the government determination of # <pause dur="0.5"/> expenditure and and thus <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of the level of economic <trunc>aki</trunc> activity the steering of that level <pause dur="0.5"/> on the basis of <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> of government spending <pause dur="1.1"/> where that only works is if the government can really

control the economy <pause dur="0.7"/> these are things which really happened <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> for instance in <pause dur="0.4"/> France in the early nineteen-eighties <pause dur="0.5"/> # when <pause dur="0.2"/> the <pause dur="0.7"/> well that was the first time that France had a socialist government <pause dur="0.5"/> in the post-World War <pause dur="0.3"/> Two period <pause dur="0.6"/> and that government <pause dur="0.2"/> # the first government under <pause dur="0.2"/> President Mitterand <pause dur="0.6"/> had a commitment to Keynesianism <pause dur="0.5"/> and there was high unemployment <pause dur="0.3"/> so well what they wanted to do <pause dur="0.2"/> according to old Keynesian recipes <pause dur="0.5"/> they wanted to increase government spending <pause dur="0.2"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> push the economy <pause dur="0.3"/> to higher employment levels <pause dur="0.4"/> well they did that they spent a lot of money <pause dur="0.8"/> and # the economy went upwards <pause dur="0.2"/> to some extent <pause dur="0.8"/> but as it happened at that point of time the French economy was already <pause dur="0.4"/> # tightly linked to other European economies and <pause dur="0.6"/> globally linked to <pause dur="0.2"/> other economies across the world <pause dur="0.7"/> so the fact that the French government pumped money into <pause dur="0.3"/> the economy <pause dur="0.5"/> meant that many French consumers but also producers companies <pause dur="0.4"/> bought products abroad imported

products <pause dur="0.6"/> so that <pause dur="0.3"/> a lot of the <pause dur="0.3"/> pump priming as it's technically called a lot of the deficit spending <pause dur="0.6"/> didn't really went into the French didn't really go into the French economy <pause dur="0.5"/> but went into economies other European economies and abroad <pause dur="0.5"/> so they increased their deficit <pause dur="0.4"/> without much effect on the French economy <pause dur="0.9"/> and this was abandoned after <pause dur="0.3"/> # a little more than a year <pause dur="0.4"/> they recognized that <pause dur="0.4"/> Keynesianism really depends on a national economy which you can control <pause dur="0.6"/> and if you cannot control it any longer <pause dur="0.4"/> because of <pause dur="0.4"/> global linkages <pause dur="0.5"/> # you just cannot do it <pause dur="0.7"/> you don't have the effects any longer which <pause dur="0.2"/> you would like to have <pause dur="2.3"/> the same is true <pause dur="1.0"/> about corporatism <pause dur="0.8"/> because corporatism relies on the fact <pause dur="0.4"/> that there are national organizations of the employers like <pause dur="0.5"/> C-B-I <pause dur="0.2"/> in England the Confederation of <pause dur="0.2"/> British Industry <pause dur="0.6"/> or like a national Trade Union Council <pause dur="0.6"/> and that they get together and # determine sort of <pause dur="0.2"/> wage levels # employment conditions and the like <pause dur="1.2"/> now

again <pause dur="0.4"/> if you come to the conviction that <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> indeed <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>i</trunc> if you try to do that <pause dur="0.3"/> you may just # arrive at conclusions # which the economy cannot sustain <pause dur="0.4"/> # because it competes on the global level <pause dur="0.8"/> then what will happen is that <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="1.0"/> people will defect from these national organizations you have that that <pause dur="0.6"/> employers indeed say <pause dur="0.4"/> # said sort of in the nineteen-seventies <pause dur="0.6"/> well if you're going to <pause dur="0.2"/> agree sort of the national organization on that level of wages <pause dur="0.5"/> then i just # exit from the organization <pause dur="0.4"/> # i cannot pay those wages so # <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> the <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> # i will pay different wages so the the model of bargaining breaks down <pause dur="0.7"/> the same actually also <pause dur="0.2"/> not to put the blame one-sidedly on the employers <pause dur="0.4"/> also for workers sort of with the <pause dur="0.6"/> # not least sort of <trunc>s</trunc> the so-called knowledge based upper middle classes <pause dur="0.4"/> # were <pause dur="0.2"/> # increasingly then <pause dur="0.2"/> also employees <pause dur="0.4"/> # hoped to get a better bargain by individually negotiating with their employers rather than agreeing to wage conventions <pause dur="0.6"/> # then the model also

breaks down from the <pause dur="0.4"/> employees' or workers' <pause dur="0.3"/> # point of view <pause dur="1.0"/> this was the crisis of the <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.8"/> # of the wage bargaining the centralized wage bargaining model <pause dur="0.4"/> which indeed happened from the <pause dur="0.2"/> well mid-nineteen-seventies onwards <pause dur="0.5"/> and which in many <trunc>crea</trunc> countries led to major changes of this <pause dur="0.2"/> this model <pause dur="0.5"/> not a drastic one <pause dur="0.2"/> but # in in some countries but <pause dur="0.5"/> in many <pause dur="0.4"/> in many cases indeed <pause dur="0.4"/> yes <pause dur="0.7"/> so the the idea here is <pause dur="0.8"/> if that were entirely true <pause dur="0.5"/> would be that <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/> this nationally organized model what's the key characteristics here <kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="5"/> <pause dur="0.5"/> that it's nation based <pause dur="5.4"/> gives way to something like a global neoliberalism <pause dur="13.4"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="6"/> now this is a case like the case with flexible specialization <pause dur="0.2"/> in <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> the first category <pause dur="0.4"/> global <trunc>neolib</trunc> liberalism that's what i said <pause dur="0.9"/> is namely that <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> where there is a tendency into that direction <pause dur="0.3"/> there was a crisis of the <pause dur="0.2"/> Keynesian corporatist model of <pause dur="0.5"/> economic policy <pause dur="1.1"/> it is on the other hand not true <pause dur="0.5"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> say our European economies <pause dur="0.4"/> have just gone neoliberal

have just opened to <pause dur="0.4"/> # the world market <pause dur="0.8"/> # we can still see on the one hand <pause dur="0.6"/> that there is what <pause dur="0.3"/> David Soskice calls varieties of capitalism <pause dur="0.6"/> this is the paper which we also mention on the course outline <pause dur="0.5"/> which is # unpublished # but is in the <pause dur="0.3"/> the copy of it or several copies are in the <pause dur="0.3"/> S-R-C collections <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> where he argues that <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> indeed <pause dur="0.3"/> # there are <pause dur="0.4"/> different ways of coordinating economies <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.5"/> and <pause dur="0.2"/> they indeed persist # the level of coordination does not go away <pause dur="0.6"/> # that may <pause dur="0.2"/> change that may adapt to new conditions <pause dur="0.4"/> # but there are sort of traditions of institutional arrangements <pause dur="0.4"/> which indeed <pause dur="0.2"/> are quite persistent of those changes <pause dur="1.0"/> he makes there a major distinction between what he calls <pause dur="0.3"/> coordinated market economies and <pause dur="0.4"/> uncoordinated market economies <pause dur="0.8"/> # the uncoordinated ones or rather <pause dur="0.4"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> British and the American one <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> that is why the term corporatism is less well known in this country <pause dur="0.4"/> because there is a much lower degree of coordination <pause dur="0.5"/> than for instance in <pause dur="0.5"/> #

Germany or Japan <pause dur="0.3"/> these are his counter-examples his examples for <pause dur="0.4"/> coordinated economies <pause dur="0.9"/> now this was written before the Japanese crisis <pause dur="0.4"/> but # <pause dur="0.3"/> <trunc>i</trunc> it still holds <pause dur="0.3"/> that <pause dur="0.5"/> the the argument namely that <pause dur="0.3"/> there are <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of quite entrenched <pause dur="0.3"/> institutional arrangements <pause dur="0.4"/> which don't just disappear because of deregulation and neoliberalism <pause dur="0.4"/> # but which adapt to new situations <pause dur="0.9"/> the <pause dur="0.2"/> point there is that these are indeed complex institutional arrangements <pause dur="0.4"/> where <pause dur="0.3"/> # the organization of <pause dur="0.3"/> # training and education is involved <pause dur="0.3"/> as you may know <pause dur="0.5"/> that there is # <pause dur="0.2"/> a much more organized <pause dur="0.2"/> professional training system <pause dur="0.5"/> # a company based one or a or a mixed system between <pause dur="0.6"/> a dual system between companies and public institutions in Germany <pause dur="0.5"/> where apprentices are <pause dur="0.2"/> are trained <pause dur="0.4"/> a much more formalized system than in this country <pause dur="0.8"/> there is # a relation between companies and banks <pause dur="0.4"/> which is much tighter <pause dur="0.3"/> in both Germany and Japan <pause dur="0.6"/> # where <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> there is the higher degree of coordination Soskice talks about <pause dur="0.6"/>

where banks don't just let <pause dur="0.4"/> companies drop because they <pause dur="0.2"/> the profits decline or <pause dur="0.2"/> <trunc>b</trunc> <pause dur="0.2"/> because they go into deficit <pause dur="0.4"/> but they try to organize restructurings <pause dur="0.5"/> # so really coordination between banks and <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> and companies and producers <pause dur="0.9"/> thirdly there is in some cases <pause dur="0.4"/> # coordinated <pause dur="0.2"/> work <pause dur="0.3"/> across <pause dur="0.3"/> # companies in the same sector <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> that is <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> are things which are now <pause dur="0.3"/> sort of discussed under the level of sort of competition policy <pause dur="0.6"/> where it's often argued that competition needs to be increased that the German or Japanese economy <pause dur="0.4"/> don't really know the necessary <pause dur="0.2"/> levels of competition <pause dur="0.8"/> but it can also be taken to be an advantage of coordination <pause dur="1.1"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> as Soskice argues <pause dur="0.7"/> and finally there may be a kind of <pause dur="0.4"/> company organization that's more the Japanese model <pause dur="0.5"/> where you have large-scale <trunc>con</trunc> conglomerates <pause dur="0.3"/> which don't <pause dur="0.6"/> # dominate one sector <pause dur="0.2"/> but # <pause dur="0.6"/> # operate in various sectors so that they sustain themselves <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> through <pause dur="0.5"/> boom and bust because they never occul in all occur in all sectors at the

same time <pause dur="1.6"/> to <pause dur="0.4"/> say that briefly <pause dur="0.4"/> the argument here is <pause dur="0.3"/> there is not just <pause dur="0.5"/> global <trunc>neoriler</trunc> neoliberalism <pause dur="0.2"/> but there are <pause dur="0.3"/> varieties of capitalism <pause dur="0.2"/> that's indeed the title of his paper <pause dur="11.5"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="9"/> and you recognize the same structure of argument <pause dur="0.3"/> is not a change to one new model <pause dur="0.4"/> but there is <pause dur="0.4"/> a transformation towards <pause dur="0.4"/> # a more complex institutional <pause dur="0.2"/> situation overall <pause dur="3.1"/> then # <pause dur="0.5"/> finally <pause dur="0.6"/> let's say something about <pause dur="0.4"/> the economic policy objective <pause dur="0.8"/> where there was an agreement <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.2"/> it should be sort of growth and full employment and full employment through growth <pause dur="0.7"/> that is the <pause dur="0.4"/> the Keynesian full employment convention as some people call it <pause dur="0.7"/> # and the idea that it was reachable <pause dur="0.6"/> # that it was indeed achievable with some standard tools <pause dur="0.8"/> now as i said earlier <pause dur="0.2"/> there is an agreement that these tools don't work in the same way than they used to work <pause dur="0.9"/> but if we conclude from what i said earlier <pause dur="0.5"/> there's also probably not necessarily <pause dur="0.2"/> the idea that one has to abandon that entirely <pause dur="1.3"/> now

some people argue that and # <pause dur="0.4"/> that's again one of those fashionable terms of the time <pause dur="0.5"/> where some people say we have to <pause dur="0.2"/> get away from any such commitment of full employment <pause dur="0.5"/> what we have to do is to change the <pause dur="0.3"/> supply situation on the labour market <pause dur="0.3"/> people have to be flexible <pause dur="0.5"/> we have to deregulate the labour market <pause dur="0.4"/> we have to <pause dur="0.4"/> allow hiring <pause dur="0.2"/> hiring and firing on more easy conditions we have to allow <pause dur="0.5"/> variety of work situations <pause dur="0.4"/> # sort of temporary contracts part-time contracts <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.7"/> temping in general <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> no minimum wage <pause dur="0.5"/> all that only <pause dur="0.2"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> hampers the development of the economy and the creation of jobs <pause dur="0.4"/> # what one has to have is a maximum flexibility <pause dur="0.6"/> that's the one idea <pause dur="7.0"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="5"/> now <pause dur="0.3"/> this idea obviously goes along well with an idea of global <trunc>neol</trunc> neoliberalism <pause dur="0.2"/> that you should have markets and competition wherever you can get them <pause dur="1.2"/> what it does not do though <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.3"/> is it does not have a link between economic policy and social policy any longer <pause dur="0.4"/> in the same way <pause dur="0.4"/> in which the full

employment convention had it <pause dur="1.2"/> there <pause dur="0.3"/> this <pause dur="0.2"/> full employment convention really meant <pause dur="0.3"/> that within a society within a nation <pause dur="0.5"/> there was an understanding that <pause dur="0.4"/> there is something like a common responsibility <pause dur="0.6"/> to get <pause dur="0.5"/> everybody employed <pause dur="0.4"/> and those who temporarily could not be employed <pause dur="0.4"/> # should get unemployment benefits on such a level that # <pause dur="0.2"/> they could lead a decent life <pause dur="1.1"/> # that is what i call a linkage between economic policy and social policy <pause dur="0.8"/> so that there is well the government could even say a societal commitment and consensus along that <pause dur="1.2"/> what the idea of flexibility means really is giving that idea up <pause dur="0.3"/> it basically shifts responsibility from the society to the individual <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> the overall conditions are changed in such a way that <pause dur="0.5"/> there are really almost no impediments or barriers to get a job <pause dur="0.8"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> no union involvement <pause dur="0.2"/> no restrictions <pause dur="0.3"/> nothing like that <pause dur="0.6"/> but that that also means that <pause dur="0.5"/> everybody should see how <pause dur="0.2"/> he or she could <pause dur="0.4"/> sell <pause dur="0.5"/> her or his labour power <pause dur="0.4"/> #

under whatever conditions are possible <pause dur="0.9"/> now the <pause dur="0.4"/> here there is not really <pause dur="0.2"/> a new <pause dur="0.9"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/> model <pause dur="0.6"/> but it is also clear that at least in European societies <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> the flexibility regime is not just accepted <pause dur="0.8"/> i mean there are some people who talk about <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.9"/> offensive <pause dur="0.2"/> flexibility or constructive flexibility <pause dur="0.4"/> where they see a role for the unions <trunc>n</trunc> new role for the unions a new role for the regions <pause dur="0.4"/> # to develop the regime <pause dur="0.3"/> which # <pause dur="0.3"/> keeps up this linkage of <pause dur="0.4"/> as i will call it <pause dur="0.4"/> of economic and social policy <pause dur="1.9"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="1"/> i put that into <pause dur="0.2"/> brackets because there isn't really yet a model <pause dur="2.9"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="13"/> but the idea is that some such linkage needs to be maintained <pause dur="9.0"/> and that there is indeed no reason to assume <pause dur="0.5"/> it may have become more difficult than it was in the nineteen-sixties <pause dur="0.5"/> when <pause dur="0.2"/> this could be organized around a national society <pause dur="0.6"/> the national government committed to that <pause dur="0.5"/> that may no longer be possible <pause dur="0.8"/> however <pause dur="0.5"/> # this does not entail that there are no <pause dur="0.3"/> means and

resources and actors <pause dur="0.4"/> to try to develop such a new model <pause dur="0.5"/> there are unions there are <pause dur="0.3"/> regional or <pause dur="0.2"/> city governments who could <pause dur="0.3"/> have a stronger role <pause dur="0.6"/> again partly because historically they had a role <pause dur="0.6"/> there is now not least # a stronger role of the European Union <pause dur="0.5"/> so if Keynesianism doesn't work any longer on the national level <pause dur="0.2"/> maybe it still works on the European level <pause dur="0.6"/> because Europe is less overall less import dependent <pause dur="0.3"/> than each individual member state of the European Union <pause dur="0.8"/> so there are discussions around <pause dur="0.5"/> how to design really this <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model <pause dur="0.6"/> which are open sort of which are <pause dur="0.5"/> open-ended there is no solution for it yet <pause dur="0.2"/> but <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.2"/> there is also the view <pause dur="0.2"/> that <pause dur="0.3"/> there is no need to <pause dur="0.2"/> embark fully on a model of flexibility <pause dur="3.2"/> to conclude <pause dur="0.5"/> # what you have seen and the way in which i <pause dur="0.2"/> introduced <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model at the very beginning <pause dur="0.6"/> # <pause dur="0.6"/> and that is one of the important questions here <pause dur="0.2"/> in <kinesic desc="indicates point on board" iterated="n"/> this model there is a linkage between <pause dur="0.4"/> organization of production <pause dur="0.3"/> economic policy mechanism <pause dur="0.5"/> and economic

policy objective <pause dur="0.4"/> one follows from the other <pause dur="0.7"/> if you have standardized mass production you have standardized work situations <pause dur="0.4"/> you have # <pause dur="0.6"/> a likelihood of the common workers' consciousness and <pause dur="0.2"/> trade union development <pause dur="0.7"/> # who can operate in large-scale organizations who can get organized and <pause dur="0.4"/> <trunc>o</trunc> are organizable because they <pause dur="0.2"/> are in these large-scale organizations <pause dur="0.7"/> you have <pause dur="0.4"/> # a national government <pause dur="0.3"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> or in a national level <pause dur="0.3"/> towards they relate <pause dur="0.2"/> both the unions and the employers <pause dur="0.8"/> and <pause dur="0.3"/> thus you can construct <pause dur="0.4"/> sort of a socially responsible community <pause dur="0.3"/> # to arrive at <pause dur="1.1"/> a linkage of economic and social policy <pause dur="0.6"/> so this <pause dur="0.4"/><kinesic desc="writes on board" iterated="y" dur="2"/> this works the one relates to the other <pause dur="0.2"/> or rather it worked <pause dur="0.5"/> it was the model of the fifties and sixties <pause dur="0.7"/> it doesn't work any longer in the same way <pause dur="0.3"/> and one possibility here is <pause dur="0.7"/> to argue <pause dur="1.5"/> in favour of a model which combines <pause dur="0.4"/> flexible specialization and global <trunc>neoliber</trunc> neoliberalism and flexibility <pause dur="0.8"/> which does away with all the institutions and

boundaries which there were <pause dur="0.4"/> and just hopes that <pause dur="0.8"/> by flexibilizing <pause dur="0.2"/> this you can <pause dur="0.5"/> create a new kind of viable <pause dur="0.2"/> economic regime <pause dur="1.3"/> now as i've tried to say briefly there are reasons <pause dur="0.4"/> to assume that that <pause dur="0.3"/> while it is a coherent model <pause dur="0.6"/> but that it just wouldn't <pause dur="0.7"/> # be socially viable <pause dur="0.2"/> that it would <pause dur="0.5"/> # create # high inequalities <pause dur="0.4"/> # <pause dur="0.5"/> of a level in kind which one tried to abolish over much of the <pause dur="0.6"/> social and economic <pause dur="0.2"/> policy developments of the <pause dur="0.4"/> earlier Second World War period <pause dur="0.7"/> so that is why one has to search for <pause dur="0.6"/> a model to relate the variety of worlds of production <pause dur="0.7"/> in the different <pause dur="0.7"/> sort of historically developed settings which have varieties of coordination between economies varieties

of capitalism <pause dur="0.9"/> to develop that into a new linkage of economic and social policy <pause dur="0.8"/> but this is obviously <pause dur="0.7"/> less clear-cut <pause dur="0.2"/> # we can less take it for granted <pause dur="0.4"/> than the old model <pause dur="0.3"/> the old model was quite stable <pause dur="0.4"/> it was <pause dur="0.3"/> conventionalized indeed it developed over a <pause dur="0.5"/> a long time sort of from the eighteen-eighties eighteen-nineties to the nineteen-sixties <pause dur="0.3"/> and through many struggles obviously workers' struggles not least <pause dur="0.9"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> we don't have that now there is not such a stability <pause dur="0.4"/> there are not these conventions which <pause dur="0.6"/> hold each other <pause dur="0.5"/> # <pause dur="0.4"/> but there <pause dur="0.2"/> that does not mean that <pause dur="0.2"/> they couldn't be developed in principle <pause dur="0.8"/> and that is what many <pause dur="0.2"/> sort of <pause dur="0.5"/> social and economic actors are really working on <pause dur="0.6"/> at this point <pause dur="2.1"/> okay <pause dur="0.3"/> thank you