

**The Geography of Vietnamese Secondary
Migration in the UK**

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The Context

Britain played only a limited role in the early years of the exodus from Vietnam. In 1975, the withdrawal of American troops from Saigon stimulated a mass exodus of those associated with the defeated capitalist regime. 9500 of these refugees were accepted by the French government for resettlement, whilst the US administration admitted 133,000 Vietnamese in a period of only fourteen days during April and May. In the same year Britain allowed only 32 new Vietnamese into the country whilst granting a further 300 the right to remain here. In 1976, only three new Vietnamese refugees entered the United Kingdom. Britain, then, was peripheral to the first exodus of Vietnamese.

Later in the decade, a second and fundamentally different wave of emigration developed from Vietnam. It was stimulated by the persecution of those ethnic Chinese who lived in what had been North Vietnam. This group found their position increasingly untenable as relations deteriorated between Vietnam and China. They had restrictions placed upon their movement, their ownership of businesses and their right to meet in public. From September 1978 onwards, they sought to leave Vietnam in growing numbers, often by sea in makeshift and overcrowded vessels. Over 150,000 died at sea either of disease, drowning, or at the hands of pirates. Those that did survive were placed in camps in Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia. Others were rescued by passing merchant vessels such as the British-registered Wellpark which picked up 350 'Boat people' late in 1978. These, along with a further 260 people, were airlifted to the UK for resettlement, thereby bringing the annual total of acceptances to 610.

By the beginning of 1979 the South East Asian neighbours of Vietnam were facing economic and social difficulties arising from their unwanted role as hosts to Vietnamese refugees. In Hong Kong, for example, the 'open' camps were coming to be permanent additions to the urban landscape, and the very success of the 'open' regime - which allowed camp residents to work in Hong Kong and oversee many facets of their own daily existence - was thought, by some, to be actively encouraging others to leave Vietnam. As a result both the United Nations and the Hong Kong government appealed for countries to accept quotas of refugees for resettlement. Britain took 1500, initially, and a further 1400 who had been rescued at sea. By July of 1979 it had become clear that initial offers of resettlement were insufficient and, as a result, a conference was convened in Geneva to discuss the plight of those countries bordering the South China Sea. Mrs Thatcher attended the meeting and pledged Britain to accept a further quota of 10,000 Vietnamese. Most of these quota refugees had arrived by June 1981 although smaller numbers have been granted admission each year since then, usually as part of a policy of family reunion. In 1987, for example, 467 Vietnamese were allowed to enter Britain. It is important, however, to note

that whilst the Vietnamese refugee issue was essentially associated with the period 1979-81 for mainland Britain, Vietnamese are still continuing to arrive in Hong Kong where they are now housed in 'closed' camps which are run under considerably less humanitarian regimes. 17,000 new arrivals were recorded in the first nine months of 1988 and the Vietnamese refugee issue is still very much alive in Hong Kong, albeit largely ignored by Westminster.

The migrants

Key factors shaping policy towards any refugee group are its demographic profile, the skills and potential which individuals bring with them, and the values and attitudes that have been instilled in the sending society. Three main sources of demographic data exist: a 1981 Home Office survey of some 6,500 Vietnamese refugees in the UK (Jones, 1981); a much smaller survey of Vietnamese households drawn from Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire. This was funded by Ockenden Venture and authored by Somerset (1983); and a data-base compiled by ourselves, containing some 11,289 individuals. Basic demographic variables were extracted for these individuals from reception camp records during our field-work. Together, these sources provide a profile of the Vietnamese in Britain which can be summarised as follows:

- 1) the community is divided approximately evenly between the sexes (53% males, 47% female)
- 2) they are a very youthful group, with a majority less than twenty-five years of age on arrival (59% having been born since 1955)
- 3) half had previously been living in extended families in Vietnam (Jones, 1982)
- 4) most were members of large families (49% were from families with between three and five children according to Jones)
- 5) three-quarters had ceased full-time education before reaching secondary level (Jones)
- 6) only 18% had been white-collar workers in Vietnam
- 7) most had fled from Vietnam without significant pre-planning and therefore had few belongings
- 8) almost three-quarters are ethnic Chinese. Only 16% are ethnic Vietnamese
- 9) 62% originated from North Vietnam
- 10) most had spent 8-18 months in transit camps in Hong Kong, where many had secured employment and had become economically independent
- 11) all respondents had left Hong Kong because they had to. For most, Britain was not their first-choice destination.

Britain's Vietnamese population therefore differed significantly from those in other receiving countries. Whilst Britain had been willing to make up its resettlement quota by

accepting any deserving individual, other countries had been far more selective and had imposed stringent criteria which debarred many applicants who were subsequently taken by Britain.

According to the Home Affairs Select Committee Report on the Vietnamese, those responsible for designing policy were faced with seven key difficulties arising from the timing of the migration, the government's lack of selectivity, and the characteristics of the resulting migrants:

- 1) the Vietnamese had few transferable or immediately marketable skills
- 2) most Vietnamese were poorly educated even in their own languages
- 3) those from North Vietnam had had very little contact with western civilisation
- 4) Britain was not the first-choice destination for many
- 5) there was no pre-existing Vietnamese community in the UK to which the new arrivals could turn for support
- 6) the Vietnamese arrived in Britain at a time of recession and high unemployment
- 7) the Vietnamese in the UK are themselves divided by religion, language and geographical origins.

The final element which contributed to the formulation of policy was the government's political ideology. The Conservative government of the day was committed to minimising state intervention wherever possible, reducing government expenditure, and encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their own welfare and destiny.

Government Policy

The reception and resettlement policies eventually introduced by the government reflected the various considerations outlined above. It chose a strategy which minimised its own direct involvement and passed most of the day-to-day activities onto charities which were in receipt of funding specifically for that purpose.

The Home Office retained overall control of policy and was the department responsible for overseeing government expenditure. The newly constituted Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam (JCRV) was given responsibility for the implementation of policy and its national coordination. And the three charities - Ockenden Venture, Save the Children, Fund, and the British Council for Aid to Refugees - were asked to undertake the detailed work of reception and resettlement.

The extent and type of government intervention was determined by four general principles:

- 1) refugees were to be prevented from becoming dependent upon external assistance and were therefore encouraged to enter into mainstream British life as quickly as possible
- 2) the Vietnamese were to be readied for work as quickly as possible so that families could regain their independence
- 3) once placed in the community, refugees were not to be the beneficiaries of welfare programmes designed specifically for them. They were, instead, to gain assistance through those welfare mechanisms already in place, and available to all other members of society
- 4) refugees were not to be allowed to cluster in large numbers in particular localities. Dispersal was to be a central component of the resettlement process.

Government policy and funding was therefore directed towards the reception phase of the programme. Camps were established throughout Britain to receive the Vietnamese. Their primary aim was to act as holding centres prior to the speedy resettlement of individuals into the community. Three months was established as the maximum desirable time that any individual should spend in the camps, and during that time they were to be given tuition in the English language and general guidance on the way of life in Britain and the country's culture. It was hoped that the skills and knowledge acquired in the camps would make the Vietnamese ready for employment shortly after resettlement. The camps accounted for £21 million out of the £23 million spent on the Vietnamese programme.

In practice, the reception phase failed to meet all of the targets laid down by government although there were some successes. They did provide a supportive environment during the

traumatic first few weeks after arrival (Somerset, 1983), and refugees received considerable tuition and assistance, although some still considered this inadequate. The Vietnamese forged new friendships and contacts, many of which were maintained after resettlement. Set against these achievements were significant failings. The camps have been criticised for encouraging dependence and institutionalisation, for discouraging contact with British people (other than camp staff), for fostering a rather unrealistic view of life in Britain, and for failing to make the Vietnamese ready for immediate employment on resettlement. This last criticism is without doubt the most significant since the government had committed the bulk of its support and finance to reception, whilst assuming that resettlement would either take care of itself or be managed through existing and non-specialised policy instruments. Some commentators feel that the camps could never have successfully made the Vietnamese 'job-ready' with the resources at their disposal and with the government's decision not to impose language or skill qualifications during the selection procedure. Others point to the extended periods which many Vietnamese spent in the camps (7% remained in the camps for over a year) and question whether this time was used to good effect. Having committed the majority of its resources to the reception phase of the programme the government relied heavily upon voluntary assistance during the resettlement stage. Local authorities were asked to volunteer vacant council properties, housing associations were asked to put aside accommodation for the Vietnamese, the charities were required to handle the actual mechanics of resettlement, and local volunteers were given the day-to-day task of ensuring that new families were comfortable. Volunteers were also expected to liaise with local authorities, Job Centres, and the DHSS to ensure that families received their welfare entitlements and were given information about suitable employment opportunities. The costs of resettlement were consequently transferred from central government on the one hand to local authorities and individual volunteers on the other. In some cases, this worked well, especially where local volunteers were both numerous and committed. In others, the policy was less successful, since the volunteer support groups suffered 'compassion fatigue' and the responsibility fell on a few individuals who felt themselves overtaxed and used.

During the subsequent resettlement phase the desire to disperse the Vietnamese widely throughout the United Kingdom was central to the government's intentions. The reasons for this are somewhat unclear. Some of the individuals who were involved in the very early stages of resettlement - before an official programme or policy existed - insist that the decision to disperse simply grew out of existing informal practice. Individuals had mobilised their own networks of contacts to find accommodation for the earliest arrivals and these contacts naturally tended to be geographically diverse. Moreover requests for help were more likely to be received sympathetically if they involved only one or two refugee families. These same individuals argue that once the Home Office became

involved, such ad hoc arrangements were codified into a formal policy of dispersal. In contrast, other commentators suggest that the policy was more deliberate and considered. They suggest that the decision to rely upon voluntary and unrewarded offers of housing from local authorities and housing associations necessitated dispersal, since no one authority or association could be expected to bear the costs of resettling large numbers of Vietnamese. In addition, authorities were aware of the fact that they would receive no funding to cover the subsequent needs of those Vietnamese resettled in their locality. Dispersing the Vietnamese also spread the social costs of resettlement since groups such as the National Front - which had attracted some 192,000 votes in the 1979 General Election - would have difficulty mobilising local opposition to the resettlement of a handful of families. Dispersal had the further benefits that it prevented the ghettoisation of the Vietnamese and was therefore thought to speed their assimilation, and that it avoided overstretching any local volunteer support groups.

Resettlement patterns

Although the Home Office recommended that the Vietnamese be resettled in scattered clusters of between 4 and 10 families, the eventual pattern of settlement was determined by the availability of offers of housing. Initially the housing associations provided most of the offers of accommodation. With the advent of quota migrants it became clear that such offers would be insufficient, and the local authorities were approached for their cooperation. The early response was good - no doubt helped by the sympathetic portrayal of the Vietnamese by the British media - but as the programme developed, offers waned and the charities again turned to the housing associations. Despite this, the availability of housing remained the key problem for those involved in resettlement. In effect, offers of accommodation were so scarce and of such variable quality that the charities were unable to refuse them simply because they were in areas of existing ethnic concentration or because the 'quota' of 4-10 families had already been resettled in the locality.

Data provided by Jones (1982) and subsequently analysed by Robinson (1985) suggest that the dispersal policy was a failure on both of the major criteria by which it could be judged. If the aim of policy really was to disperse the Vietnamese widely, then it must be judged unsuccessful. Table 1 illustrates the resettlement patterns of the 6,500 Vietnamese in Jones' (1982) Home Office sample. At least on a regional level, it is clear that the Vietnamese were not widely dispersed but, rather, became concentrated in particular parts of the country. The South East, the North West and the West Midlands all attracted significant numbers of refugees whilst other areas such as East Anglia, West Wales and Cumbria hosted relatively few. As columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 indicate, the South East, the North West and the West Midlands are also areas of considerable existing ethnic settlement. It is

paradoxical that the government's decision not to control directly the availability of housing for refugees should undermine its own stated aim of avoiding accentuating existing ethnic concentrations. As Table 1 also demonstrates, government non-intervention in the resettlement process had implications beyond simple spatial patterning: a significant proportion of Jones' Vietnamese were ultimately resettled in areas of above-average unemployment. Economic deprivation was thus added to social deprivation.

The regional level of analysis is, however, particularly coarse, and may well obscure more detailed patterns at finer levels of spatial resolution. Jones' (1982) data were also disaggregated by urban centres, although he listed only those with more than 50 Vietnamese inhabitants. Even so, the data showed that 53% of all Vietnamese in Jones' sample were resettled in clusters which exceeded the Home Office's maximum recommended size. Again, therefore, when judged against the stated aim of dispersal, the real achievement was limited. Less than half the Vietnamese were actually dispersed. Table 2 concentrates upon those Vietnamese who found themselves part of a larger community, located in many cases within a major conurbation. Columns 2 and 3 of that table make it clear that many of these conurbations already contained sizeable populations of New Commonwealth and Pakistani origin. In fact, particular reference to column 3 shows that 61% of all those Vietnamese contained in Table 2 were eventually resettled in London, Birmingham, Greater Manchester and Wolverhampton, and that these four centres already possessed, respectively, the largest, second largest, sixth largest and fifth largest New Commonwealth populations in the whole of the UK (Robinson, 1986). It again seems that the government's unwillingness to intervene directly in the provision of accommodation for the refugees prejudiced the success of the programme and coincidentally concentrated the social costs of resettlement on those cities which could least afford them. This conclusion receives corroboration from column 4 of the table, which indicates the unemployment rate in each of the fourteen listed towns and cities. Of these centres, only London and Derby recorded unemployment rates below the contemporary national average of 9 per cent. The government's decision to delegate the cost and responsibility of the resettlement programme therefore not only undermined the achievement of stated policy objectives, but it also consigned a significant number of refugees to resettlement in areas of existing ethnic concentration and above-average unemployment.

The fact that less than half Jones' sample of Vietnamese families was actually dispersed indicates the failure of policy. Paradoxically, however, in the longer term this failure may prove to be an unintended success, for when judged against an alternative criterion - namely whether dispersal itself was a good idea - government policy seems equally deficient. Barely three years after dispersal had been introduced as a policy objective, those involved

in the programme were questioning the wisdom of the decision. The Report of the Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam (1982) explained the value of dispersal:

This policy had its merits. Since no government aid was to be provided to local authorities to meet the needs of the refugees in settlement it sought to spread the load by limiting the demands on each area and in this way it certainly ensured that our efforts to obtain housing got quickly off the ground. It recognised also the important part played by members of voluntary support groups in settling the refugees within the community and therefore sought not to overtax the groups (p.10).

Equally they began to express doubts about dispersal. In relation to training, the Committee suggested:

The policy of dispersed settlement has also meant that even where the particular needs of the refugees are recognised there are insufficient numbers for the MSC to feel justified in organising special provision (p.15).

When discussing 'refugee trauma' and the need for support, they opined:

The Vietnamese ought to be able to look to their own community for support. However, the dispersal policy has meant that, with the exception of a few urban areas, the numbers settled together are not large enough to provide that support (p.17).

And lastly, in relation to the statutory services provided by departments of central and local government:

Dispersal has meant that no local authority has taken enough Vietnamese to warrant making special provision to assist them. Even in London, where the density of Vietnamese is probably greatest, there are no more than 300 Vietnamese to any one borough (p.19).

Although the impact of dispersal had not been researched in depth in the intervening period, opinions had clearly hardened further by the time the Home Affairs Select Committee reported in 1985. The Committee again rehearsed the reasons for dispersal but were more forthright in their criticism.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the policy of dispersal is now almost universally regarded as mistaken, despite its initial attraction... It has left many Vietnamese isolated from compatriots to whom they can relate and from whom they can draw support, it has made it considerably harder and more expensive to assist the Vietnamese through English language classes, training courses and other services... It is hard to think of any problem facing the Vietnamese which would not have been less severe or difficult to resolve if the disastrous policy of dispersal had not been adopted. In the long term it might well have been cheaper for the government to subsidise housing so that the Vietnamese were housed in larger groups than to try to deal with the problems of scattered populations (p.xxii).

Clearly then, judged by either of the two main criteria, the resettlement phase of the Vietnamese programme was a failure. The government set out to disperse the Vietnamese

in small clusters but only succeeded in half of the cases. And the central concept of dispersal is now, itself, regarded as misguided.

Secondary migration

Most commentators take for granted that the response to the problems exacerbated by planned dispersal has been the voluntary movement of Vietnamese from outlying/dispersed localities into nascent concentrations. As yet, however, this conventional wisdom remains untested in any rigorous or systematic way in the field. Rather, writers adopt a rhetoric which assumes the existence of secondary migration without proving it. This, in part, reflects the relatively superficial and journalistic treatment of the topic to date. Fielding (1987), for example, quotes the case of one family who moved from Manchester to Lewisham, and supports this by referring to key centres of growth (London, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester), although no data are cited to confirm these impressions. Caudrey (1986), too, writes of an exodus from Scotland, of migration from Skipton and Halifax to Leeds, and of a large influx to London, Birmingham and to a lesser extent Leeds. Data are again sketchy. Britton (1987) concentrates upon South Wales, and writes of the lure of Soho and the failure of a mother and daughter from Merthyr to gain the accommodation in London that would allow them to move there. However, in each of these contributions to the literature, limited, colloquial or second hand evidence was presented to prove the existence of what is implied to be a widespread and numerically important drift of Vietnamese people to specific centres.

The Home Affairs Select Committee Report (1985) was rather more measured and thorough in its treatment of the topic. The Committee suggested that secondary migration might occur for a variety of reasons including racial harassment, the desire to be near kin or as part of the search for employment. The mechanisms of mobility might also be varied. Individuals might make use of the Tenants Exchange Scheme to swap council properties in different areas. Others might use the National Mobility Scheme whilst yet others might leave existing accommodation and simply squat, lodge or move in with relatives at their destination. Regardless, Leeds, Manchester and Bradford had all gained population through secondary migration, as had London and the West Midlands. London had seen its Vietnamese population rise from 3683 in 1982 to 5420 in 1984 whilst, over the same period, the West Midlands had experienced growth from 1155 to 1604 people. For the Home Affairs Committee, the real issue was not whether secondary migration would continue, but rather what would be the consequences of this movement and what policies might be introduced to ameliorate its undesirable concomitants. The Committee specifically mentioned the problems of homelessness and overcrowding but balanced this by arguing that:

the concentration of the Vietnamese into fewer areas, where they can more easily assist each other, is desirable (p.xxviii).

As for policy recommendations, the Committee wished to see more done for those Vietnamese who remained in dispersed areas where they were becoming increasingly isolated and vulnerable. They suggested residential training and language courses, for example, as a means of overcoming the problems of service provision. They also considered whether the Vietnamese could be assisted in their mobility by changes in the council housing transfer rules or by relocation grants. And finally, the Committee seemed particularly enthusiastic about the concept of countermagnets which might act as intervening opportunities for those Vietnamese considering moving direct from marginal areas to London. Alternative destinations might be made more attractive by the planned and funded provision of a range of community facilities in cities other than London and Birmingham.

As with other publications, though, the Select Committee report provided no rigorous data concerning the scale, timing or direction of secondary migration. These were taken as known, and the Committee instead addressed the consequences of the as-yet unquantified migration. More recently, the British Refugee Council (1987) has proffered proposals for a British policy on refugees. Central to this was a plea for basic research into British refugee issues which might yield base-line data. They comment:

voluntary and statutory organisations concerned with refugees have undertaken hardly any systematic research into the situation of refugees in Britain. Research would not only underpin public information work, but - most important - would enable an appropriate and comprehensive programme for long-term settlement to be developed... BRC believes it is now time to remedy this deficiency. Firstly, we need to know much more about Britain's refugee population: from what ethnic and national groups they originate, where they live, whether they are employed, unemployed or self-employed, what kind of accommodation they live in (p.21).

Going beyond this, it is also worth noting that basic data on settlement patterns and secondary migration are essential to the efficient and adequate provision of services to refugee clients. At present, decisions might be made on the basis of incomplete or even non-existent data, and this might unnecessarily exacerbate the gap between need and provision.

Acquiring a data set

Data concerning the settlement patterns of the Vietnamese at varied points in time do exist within the UK. The two main charities which continued to be responsible for the Vietnamese up until 1988 - Ockenden Venture and Refugee Action - both held records which could be used to study the issue of secondary migration. The records, however,

differed significantly in their detail, their form and their accessibility. Moreover they were in different locations and neither charity had the resources either to analyse their own records or undertake the collation of both sets of records into a unified data set.

The research reported here therefore sought to collect, collate and consolidate the records possessed by both charities into a single national data set. This could then be used to answer preliminary questions about Vietnamese secondary migration as a prelude to the second, and independent, stage which would consider the causes of secondary migration and its social and economic concomitants. This second stage will be a separately funded project spanning the period 1989 to 1990.

60,000 bits of information were transcribed from charity records over a period of four months. Usually these were known addresses of individuals at known points in time. A proportion of the data were duplicate since it merely confirmed that an individual was at a particular address at a particular point in time. Once confirmed, these duplicate records were withdrawn. The remaining data set was then further reduced by extracting only household heads, who were felt to be the only group likely to make independent relocation decisions. Our final data set therefore contains some 3101 households made up of over 12,500 individuals. We therefore have records for 100% of the quota Vietnamese in Britain and approximately 57% of all Vietnamese in this country. For each of these households we have a series of chained addresses ranging from first resettlement address in 1979 to last known address in 1988.

Each of these 8426 addresses was coded using a framework of spatial units developed by the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies in Newcastle. These regions are designed to reflect patterns of daily interaction, particularly the journey to work. Champion et al (1987) divide England, Wales and Scotland into 280 Local Labour Market Areas (LLMAs) shown in Figure 1. A higher level of spatial units can also be formed by aggregating the LLMAs into 135 Functional Regions (FRs). This largely involves the consolidation of suburban rings into their respective urban centres, and the agglomeration of some remote rural areas. The national network of FRs is shown in Figure 2. All addresses of Vietnamese households were coded by LLMA, although in later stages of the analysis they were recoded to FRs. These address codes form the basis of the computerised data set now assembled in Swansea.

Analysis

Since the data set consists only of sequentially linked addresses, there is a limit to the analysis that can be undertaken. Included amongst the issues that could not be considered in this first phase were whether secondary migration has been demographically or socially

selective, the motives that individuals felt prompted them to move, and the social consequences of secondary migration (e.g. homelessness, overcrowding and long-term unemployment).

The data have allowed seven basic research questions to be addressed. Each will be taken in turn.

1. To what extent have the Vietnamese participated in secondary migration?

It is important to stress at the outset that the form of the data could easily lead to potentially erroneous conclusions. Although the entire data set covers the period 1978 to 1988, very few households have a complete record of addresses for each of the ten years. As Table 3 indicates, the peak years for admission were 1979 and 1980, and individuals will only start to appear in the records of the charities after these dates. Indeed the respondent who arrived in 1988 would have been present for only four months of the decade that is being scrutinised. In addition, the incompleteness of charity records means that even after arrival, a full sequence of linked addresses is very unusual. Most households appear in the data on two or three occasions during the decade. As a result, it is vital to remember that any one household might be contributing data only for the period 1979-81 or 1981-4, for example, and that conclusions about their mobility therefore only relate to a two or three year period, not the entire decade. If data relating to two or three years are unthinkingly averaged over nine (late 1979 to early 1988), the results would be highly misleading. Table 4 provides a clear example of this potential pitfall. It purports to show the grossed migration of all 3101 households over the nine years 1979-88. It indicates a very static population in which three-quarters of households have not engaged in secondary migration. This finding would be contrary to the anecdotal evidence available either in other published accounts or from community/charity workers. If, however, more selective and careful use is made of the data, the conclusions are somewhat different. Taking only those households for which we have long-term data, (i.e. for a period of 5 years or more), it is apparent that over half (51%) of all Vietnamese households *have* changed their address since resettlement. This suggests a relatively high degree of dissatisfaction with the accommodation allotted during resettlement. Even here though, it is important that data are seen in context, and that Vietnamese mobility rates are compared with those of other ethnic groups in Britain. Comparable data on the latter are sparse. Brown's (1984) PSI study gives some information on levels of mobility during the period 1977-82. Ethnic mobility rates for that five year period are shown in Table 5. They are compared with a Vietnamese rate calculated for any five years prior to the last known address. The Table indicates that whilst Vietnamese mobility was one-third greater than that of the white population, it was by no means exceptional by the contemporary standards of other ethnic groups. Indeed, Pakistani

mobility was significantly higher, and Bangladeshi mobility was of a different magnitude altogether.

2. How frequently do Vietnamese households move?

The previous section took no account of the modifying influence of multiple mobility. Again, data in Table 4 might unthinkingly be used to conclude that relatively few Vietnamese households (6.5%) have engaged in multiple mobility during the nine year study period. However, as Table 6 reveals, the recorded frequency of mobility depends upon the number of years that a household appears in the data set. Over half those who might superficially be classified as non-movers, for example, appear in the data set only fleetingly (i.e. for twelve months or less). We cannot be sure, therefore, whether these households are in fact non-movers or whether, if we had more complete data, they would prove to be movers or multiple movers. Table 6 also shows that for those households for which we have long-term data, mobility has been the norm and multiple mobility is by no means unusual. Indeed for those 456 households for whom we have relatively complete mobility histories (i.e. 5 years or more), 16% have moved more than once, and four households have moved as many as five times during a period of 5 to 8 years.

When the data are compared with those for the white population and for other ethnic groups (derived from Brown), the Vietnamese are seen to be heavily over-represented in the category of two moves in five years, but not grossly over-represented in the category of greater than two moves.

In order to discover whether conclusions were being biased by concentrating only upon the small number (456) of households for which we have extended mobility histories, an alternative methodology was employed. This involved the Markov Chain enhancement of incomplete histories so that a total of 2169 complete records was created. The conclusions from this enhanced data did not differ markedly from those derived only from the smaller sub-set. If anything, mobility and multiple mobility rates were higher (e.g. 60% of households would have moved over the nine year study period rather than 51%).

Annual turnover rates have also been calculated and these can be found in Table 7. Clearly the greater multiple mobility of the Vietnamese increases their averaged annual turnover rate and they become one of the more mobile groups. Even so, their rates are not very different to those of other ethnic groups and are still comfortably exceeded by those of the Bangladeshis.

What all this suggests is that the Vietnamese have not been as mobile as the journalistic stereotype suggests. Their mobility and multiple mobility are well in excess of those for the

white population but are not exceptional by the standards of other ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups which are recent arrivals and are currently undergoing a transitional phase (e.g. the Bangladeshis) record mobility and multiple mobility rates which are considerably in excess of those of the Vietnamese. This suggests that the Vietnamese should not be categorised as an inherently mobile group (in the same way that the literature has tried to categorise Pakistanis: see for example Werbner, 1979), but can more accurately be considered to be a group engaged in a one-off adjustment of its circumstances. The other ethnic groups under discussion have also undergone transitional phases of this nature in which they adjusted their locations and housing to new needs. The movement from lodging houses into single-family dwellings (Robinson, 1981) would be one such phase; the shift from owner occupation to renting of council properties would be another (Robinson, 1980; Peach and Shah, 1980). During such transitional phases, mobility levels rose for these populations, too, but in their case they were motivated by internal and self-generated pressures, not by the prior external intervention that characterises the case of the Vietnamese.

3. Which calendar years recorded peak Vietnamese mobility?

Table 8 provides data for all households regardless of the completeness of their migration records. It therefore provides a picture of gross mobility per calendar year. It reveals that 1984 was the peak year, both for number of households migrating and for number of moves. Almost one-third of all moves recorded during the period late 1979-early 1988 took place in 1984. 1982 and 1983 were the next most important years. Column 5 of the table considers the issue from a different perspective, namely what proportion of households for which we have records in a given year actually moved in that year. Using this measure, it is clear that the proportion of households that are moving has increased in each successive year. Whereas only 4 per cent of households moved in 1979, by 1987 this had risen to 54 per cent. This may reflect two factors. First, that the longer the Vietnamese have been in Britain, the more information they possess about opportunities in other parts of the country. Or second, that those households which appear in the later years of the charity records are an unrepresentative sample of all Vietnamese and have an in-built bias towards those who have moved. The last column of the table provides data on multiple movers by year. It demonstrates that multiple mobility was relatively more frequent in the early and late years of the study period and relatively infrequent around 1983. This might suggest that some households made numerous short distance movements in the area of resettlement immediately after arrival, followed by one or two movements over longer distances into a different area, after which families would again move frequently. Multiple mobility in this third phase could be seen as a response to inadequate or insecure accommodation or progressive adjustment to new information about opportunities.

4. How soon after resettlement did Vietnamese families move?

The degree to which the Vietnamese found their resettlement accommodation satisfactory can be assessed through studying the speed with which they subsequently left it. Table 9 provides relevant data for those households known to have moved. It reveals that about one-third of movers had changed their address within twelve months of resettlement and that more than one-half had made their first move within two years. Only 6% remained at their resettlement address for five or more years. Indeed, the average household known to have moved did so for the first time only 2 years and 8 months after resettlement. This is a clear indication that dispersal did not provide the Vietnamese with satisfactory accommodation.

5. Which regions have gained and which have lost Vietnamese through secondary migration?

It is essential to set the migration of the Vietnamese in a national context. Two major trends have underlined the migration of the British population in the period since 1979. These are counter-urbanisation and the drift to the growth centres of the south (see Champion, 1989 for a discussion of these issues). Counter-urbanisation has caused sharp population loss from the major conurbations, and particularly their cores. This has reflected the technological obsolescence of much Victorian housing, the deteriorating physical environment in many of the country's major cities, and the decentralisation of employment opportunities to suburban and exurban locations. The corollary of counter-urbanisation is that as people have left the conurbations they have moved either to small free-standing, and often rural, towns or to previously remote rural areas. Overlaid on this trend of counter-urbanisation has been a differential pattern of regional population growth. Areas north of a line between the Severn and the Wash have fared less well. Thus conurbations in the North have suffered more than those in the South, and the market towns of the latter have grown more rapidly than those of the former. These trends have worked against many of Britain's ethnic minorities (see Robinson, 1989 for a discussion of this point), although there has been insufficient research to know whether they, too, have participated in the major streams of migration.

The issue of spatial redistribution through secondary migration needs to be investigated at a variety of spatial scales in order that no significant trends are missed. The coarsest scale is that of Economic Regions already discussed in relation to the Home Office data of Jones (1982) and its re-analysis by Robinson (1985). Although these units are too large to indicate much detail, they are of value when set within a discussion of the 'drift to the South East' and the 'North-South divide'. Table 10 shows the changing regional distribution of the Vietnamese at five points in time. Since the sample size varies from 2209 households in

one case to 187 in another, the data have been converted into percentages of the total sample for that year. The table illustrates clearly how secondary migration has denuded the periphery, to the numerical benefit of the South East, West Midlands and North West. The South West, Yorkshire, the North, Wales and Scotland have all experienced a fall in their share of the national total. If the smaller post-1984 sample is reliable, it suggests that the process of concentration has accelerated considerably over the last four years. The second feature shown by the table is that Jones' (1982) earlier sample (of perhaps 1500 households) produced misleading results. In particular, the validity of Jones' conclusions about spatial dispersal appear to have been heavily dependent upon the organisation providing data. The net effect, if our larger and more broadly-based sample is preferred, is that Jones provided a seriously distorted picture of resettlement. He significantly understated settlement in the Save the Children Fund areas of Yorkshire, the East Midlands and East Anglia but overstated settlement in Ockenden's zone of operation, in regions such as the West Midlands, North West, and North. Perhaps these discrepancies should encourage the search for alternative data on other characteristics of the Vietnamese for which Jones' publication is still regarded as the definitive work. Our own research, for example, includes use of alternative and more accurate demographic data derived from other sources. And the last feature of note in Table 10 is that secondary migration has actually increased the spatial polarisation between the Vietnamese and British populations. Changes in the relative distribution of Vietnamese over the period Resettlement-1988 have made their settlement patterns less like those of the indigenous population, not more.

The next tier in the hierarchy of geographical units is the FRs. There are 135 of these in Britain, of which 20 are 'Metropolitan Regions' and 115 are 'Freestanding'. They are largely defined by their employment structures and their commuting flows, such that an FR is highly self-contained in terms of journey-to-work patterns. They do, however, have the disadvantage that most detail relating to the major conurbation is lost. The London FR thus stretches from Newbury in the west to Sittingbourne in the east. Figures 3 to 7 map the location of known addresses in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986/7/8 as well as the initial resettlement address. Again, variations in sample size make direct comparison difficult, but when the maps are seen alongside tabulated data, a number of conclusions are revealed. Table 11 shows the number of FRs in England, Wales and Scotland that have varying proportions of the national total of Vietnamese. Table 12 charts the change in proportion of the national total contained within those same FRs. These data suggest:

a) the Vietnamese have become progressively more concentrated over time. Households were recorded in 88% of Britain's FRs at the time of resettlement. By 1982 this had fallen to 67%, by 1984 it had fallen further to 66%, and last recorded addresses (in 1986/7/8) are now only found in 20% of FRs.

b) this process of concentration has been partly caused by the withdrawal of households from those FRs in which the Vietnamese were not very numerous. Table 11 shows that the number of FRs which each contained less than 1% of the nation's Vietnamese declined from 64 at the time of resettlement to 44 in 1984 and subsequently to zero (albeit in a small sample). Table 12 underscores this conclusion by demonstrating that a large number of FRs experienced small losses in the proportion of Vietnamese that they contained. Regions which had each contained 0.2% of the national total, for instance, were experiencing a loss of population which was reducing their share either to 0.1% or 0%.

c) if those families who were leaving areas of sparse Vietnamese settlement had simply moved to other areas of dispersed settlement, then the overall degree of concentration might not have changed significantly. In practice, however, families were moving centripetally to areas of existing Vietnamese concentration. As Table 12 indicates, some FRs were gaining an extra one, two or even more per cent of the national total in each two year period. Indeed one FR increased its share of the national total of Vietnamese from 32% in 1982 to 54% in 1986/7/8.

d) Figures 3 to 7 reveal that those FRs losing population were not only numerically marginal, but also geographically marginal. Northern Ireland saw the number of households (in our sample) fall from 21 at the time of resettlement to 14 in 1980, 5 in 1982, 2 in 1984 and zero in 1986/7/8. Glasgow experienced a reduction from 42 in the first year to 23 in 1982, 11 in 1984 and 1 in 1986/7/8. Vietnamese households ceased (in our sample) to live in peripheral areas such as Barnstaple, and on the Cumbrian coast.

e) the converse of this withdrawal is a relative and absolute growth in more central regions, defined in economic as well as in geographical terms. The London FR appears to have been the area which has gained most. At the time of resettlement it contained 36% of all Vietnamese households (in our sample) in Britain. By 1982 this had risen to 45%, and within two years it had climbed further to 49%. By 1986/7/8 over half (54%) of our sample lived within the London FR. Birmingham, too, experienced relative growth from 6.4% of the national total, through 8.1% (1982) to 11.8% (1986/7/8). Leeds' share doubled (2.1% to 4.4%), and it also gained in absolute terms. And the Manchester FR saw its share rise from 3.7% to 11.8%. Clearly then, losses on the periphery were being balanced by gains in the central economic heartland of Britain.

The third tier in the hierarchy of geographical units is LLMAs. This scale more than doubles the number of units to 280. In addition, it was decided to treat each London Borough as a separate unit, thereby raising the total number of areas to 312. Because this could be regarded as being too fine a spatial net for the available sample size, little attempt has been made to analyse the data for 1986/7/8. Data for the earlier period, however,

confirm and strengthen the conclusions derived at FR level. Table 13 shows that the Vietnamese were originally distributed across 81% of all LLMA's (and London Boroughs) but by 1982 this had fallen back to 63%, and two years later it was further reduced to 56%. Two-thirds of all the LLMA's from which the Vietnamese (in our sample) withdrew, had originally only contained the smallest proportion of the households (0-0.25% of the national total). Conversely the number of LLMA's with greater than 2% of all Vietnamese households actually rose from 8, through 12 in 1982, to 12 such LLMA's in 1986/7/8. And finally, Figures 4 to 8 have been drawn such that households are located within the correct LLMA even though the boundaries of these regions have been suppressed. The figures indicate the growing importance of Birmingham LLMA, and the rise of Greenwich, Lambeth, Southwark and Tower Hamlets within London. Table 14 lists the 15 most important LLMA's within Britain at each point in time. Again this emphasises the enduring importance of both Birmingham, which never fell below fourth in the ranking, and Manchester which appeared in the hierarchy on every occasion. Other centres clearly became less important as secondary migration increased in volume: Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow all slipped down the ranking and then disappeared from it. And yet other centres made single appearances in particular years (Aldershot, Newport and Edinburgh in 1980 and Northampton in 1984). What is of greatest significance, though, is the importance of the London Boroughs: Southwark and Lambeth retained placings in the top five throughout; Bexley, Greenwich and Tower Hamlets remained in the top 10; Hackney moved up the hierarchy on most of the occasions when it appeared; and Lewisham remained on the fringe of the leading ten areas. The net effect of these individual movements by the London Boroughs is such that the number of Boroughs in the top fifteen rose from 5 in 1980, through 9 in 1982, to 8 in 1984. Indeed in 1985-8, there were that many Boroughs in the top ten.

The synchronic analysis of spatial patterns from resettlement through to 1984 (and occasionally 1988) suggests several conclusions. First, the South East has gained Vietnamese at the expense of other regions. This parallels trends within the wider population. Second, remote or peripheral areas have lost their Vietnamese population. This trend differs from that within the indigenous population who are, increasingly, moving to such areas. Third, the Vietnamese population are becoming more concentrated into the major conurbations (London, Birmingham and Manchester) at a time when the wider population are leaving these places. And fourth, the Vietnamese are becoming more concentrated into particular Boroughs in London, and these tend to be the more deprived inner areas from which the indigenous population are decentralising. These trends suggest that the Vietnamese are becoming more polarised in their spatial distribution, and that a greater proportion now reside in areas that are materially deprived.

6. What has been the pattern of secondary migration which produced regional losses and gains?

Section 5 concentrated upon spatial pattern, not the processes producing those patterns. This section therefore considers the individual migrations which have taken place, their origins, orientations and destinations.

At first sight the detailed pattern of household moves between the resettlement address and the last known (post 1986) address is confused and difficult to summarise. As a result, no attempt has been made to map all such moves in one Figure. Rather the movements have been disaggregated into different types and each of these is shown in a separate Figure. Figure 8 therefore shows the 'cross-country' moves and demonstrates withdrawal from peripheral areas into the smaller of the localised nuclei, such as Leeds, Southampton and Bristol. Figure 9 shows the larger flows that have occurred into the growing second-tier conurbations of Manchester and Birmingham, both from their immediate hinterlands and from more outlying districts. Figure 10 shows the overwhelming and universal attraction of Greater London, and the way that this has drawn people direct from isolated areas as well as up the hierarchy of settlement from lesser centres. Finally, Figure 11 indicates how the flow into London has impacted upon specific Boroughs. It is clear that Lambeth, Southwark and Tower Hamlets have been key destinations for in-migrants.

7. What types of regions are gaining or losing Vietnamese households?

The analysis presented in previous sections has been essentially geographical, in that it was concerned with the absolute location of areas within Britain. This section takes a different approach, and considers the *structural* location of regions and places. It uses a typology of places (LLMAs) designed by Champion et al (1987). They used five criteria to define nineteen different types of places to which all 280 LLMAs were allocated. These varied from Dominant Conurbations (e.g. Manchester), through Conurbation Subdominant Cities (e.g. Motherwell) to Northern Rural areas (e.g. Penrith).

All of the 8426 dated addresses were recorded by type of LLMA, and yearly profiles were then produced of the distribution of the Vietnamese across these types. These profiles are contained in Table 15 and are graphically represented in Figure 12. It should be noted that the profile for the period since 1984 is based on a much smaller sample than those of years prior to that date. Trends are discernible within the data and are perhaps best discussed for each group of categories in turn. Group 1 contains Dominant Metropolises (categories 1-4). Not unexpectedly, London increased its share of the national total of Vietnamese households throughout the period. Amongst the other Dominant Metropolises, Provincial and Subregional Dominants held their relative positions until 1984, but have since seen

their share of the Vietnamese decline sharply. If the post-1984 figures are to be entirely believed, Conurbation Dominants experienced almost the opposite trends. Prior to 1984 they had seen their share of the national total halved, but since 1984 they have experienced renewed relative growth. This no doubt reflects the early losses from Newcastle, Glasgow and Liverpool followed by the more recent gains of Birmingham and Manchester. Moving on to the next group (categories 5 to 9), which are all towns or cities that are subordinate to a larger metropolis, it is clear that the Vietnamese have never really been present here in any significant numbers. Time has not altered the original omission made during resettlement. Thus centres like Southend, Maidenhead, Motherwell, Northwich and Rugby (to provide an example for each category) have never hosted significant Vietnamese communities. The third group (categories 10 to 14) are all Southern LLMA's varying from cities, through various types of towns, to rural areas. The most important single category is free-standing Cities (number 10). These experienced relative growth between 1981 and 1984, but more recent data suggest a sharp decline in importance. This probably reflects losses to nearby London. Categories 12 and 14 (Rural areas and Commercial towns) both held their station until 1984 after which they experienced precipitous decline. Category 13 (Manufacturing Towns) even increased up until 1984, before a sharp fall. Category 11 (Service towns), in contrast, suffered declining importance throughout the period. The fourth group (categories 15 to 19) directly parallels group 3 in structure but here all LLMA's are located north of the Severn-Wash axis. All categories experienced persistent loss of relative importance but, again, this was more accentuated after 1984.

It would therefore appear that prior to 1984, the pattern of growth and decline in numbers of Vietnamese had a strongly economic character, since it reflected the varying economic fortunes of different types of places. Those parts of the country most affected by recession and restructuring lost their relative proportion of the Vietnamese (e.g. Conurbation Dominants and all Northern types of LLMA). Those least affected by recession gained Vietnamese (e.g. Southern Freestanding Cities, Southern Manufacturing Towns and London). The small Dominants and Southern LLMA's less influenced by economic boom both held their own. In the period since 1984, when economic conditions have improved, the pattern of Vietnamese gain and loss seems not to reflect the pursuit of material well-being but rather the search for social well-being. Indeed those types of places which have recorded relative growth in their Vietnamese populations (i.e. London and the Conurbation dominants) seem to have done so largely because of the powerful attraction of their existing Vietnamese 'communities' not because of their intrinsic character.

Finally in this section it is worth commenting upon the early and late distributions of the Vietnamese vis a vis the parallel distribution of the British population (at the time of the 1981 census). Upon resettlement it is clear that Vietnamese households were grossly

under-represented in two entire groups: Subdominant Urban areas and all Northern categories. Conversely, they were grossly over-represented in Dominant Urban areas and shared similar representation in Southern categories to the British population as a whole. Because of secondary migration, these discrepancies had been accentuated by 1984, and have become even more so in the period since then. Mobility has thus not only increased spatial concentration of the Vietnamese but has also led to increasing polarisation between the types of places inhabited by that group and the population as a whole.

Conclusions and the Future

The current research represents an attempt to map only the broad outlines of Vietnamese secondary migration in the UK. It is very much a first step rather than a definitive study. In addition, although the data set that has been compiled for this purpose is a considerable advance on what was previously available, it is still flawed. In particular, four weaknesses should be mentioned:

- 1) although the data set contains 100% of all quota refugees and over 60% of all Vietnamese households in the UK, there is a conscious bias towards the inclusion of families and the exclusion of individuals. Data on lodgers and single people were extracted from charity records, but resources did not allow their inclusion in this phase of the research. It is likely that the present research understates mobility because of this.
- 2) we have no way of knowing whether the 40% of Vietnamese for which we do not have data, differ in any significant respect from those for which we do.
- 3) the use of charity records (albeit of different types) as a data source might have introduced bias of one form or another. For example they may understate mobility since the more mobile families would be the first to lose contact with these bodies. Alternatively, mobility might be overstated since movers might have contacted the charities for assistance in finding alternative accommodation or employment.
- 4) few families contacted the charities regularly throughout the nine year study period and we therefore have few complete migration histories.

Despite these acknowledged weaknesses in our data, few other social science research projects have samples which exceed 60% of the entire population and which number 3100 households.

The analysis has indicated a number of conclusions. First, whilst the Vietnamese are considerably more mobile than the white population, they have not recorded mobility rates hugely in excess of those of other ethnic groups in Britain. Even when their greater propensity towards multiple mobility is included in the analysis, there are still other ethnic groups (e.g. the Bangladeshis) who have experienced greater mobility over the same period. Second, almost half our sample households have not moved during an extended period of

residence in the UK. These findings are important, since they act as correctives to the growing journalistic stereotype which sees almost all Vietnamese households as transients. Third, two forms of analysis showed the multiple mobility of Vietnamese to be essentially a product of households moving twice rather than repeatedly. Again this might indicate that the Vietnamese are undergoing a finite period of adjustment rather than that they are an inherently mobile group. Fourth, in crude numerical terms, the years 1982 to 1984 were the peak period for Vietnamese mobility, movement taking place for the first time after an average residence of just over 2½ years. Fifth, secondary migration has led to the increasing spatial polarisation of Vietnamese families in Britain. Since 1984 they have become progressively more concentrated in the major conurbations (especially inner London) at a time when the indigenous population is abandoning these in growing numbers. Conversely, the Vietnamese are withdrawing from the rural areas and small market towns that the counter-urbanising indigenous population find so attractive. The net effect is that the spatial distribution of the Vietnamese has come to resemble that of many other ethnic groups.

The experience of the Vietnamese over the last decade suggests that any future policy for the resettlement of refugees needs to be more carefully considered and more actively funded by central government. It is clear that many Vietnamese people have found dispersal in small groups unsatisfactory. Over half all households have responded by voluntarily moving into areas of nascent concentration, usually after less than five years residence in dispersed areas. If dispersal is considered to be beneficial to refugees (as opposed to expedient for policy makers and policy funders), then any future programme would have to address the issues of social isolation, absence of community facilities, and provision of services *in advance*, and it would have to be recognised that dispersal inherently requires greater financial resources and greater central government involvement. Moreover, such a programme would need to be grounded more fully in basic research. The pertinent characteristics of refugees would need to be collected more quickly and more fully, preferably during the selection procedure. The guidelines for dispersal would need to be based upon research into notions of 'critical mass' of ethnic settlement. And the pattern of resettlement should be planned within the context of the contemporary opportunity structure of the country, influenced as that is by recession/boom, restructuring and the movement of the indigenous population.

Lastly there is a strong temptation to think that all is well because the Vietnamese have not sat passively by, but have actively redrawn their own pattern of settlement. This is patently not the case, and there are sound reasons to suggest that central government should renew its involvement in, and resourcing of, the Vietnamese programme to meet the new problems which have undoubtedly arisen as a result of secondary migration. However, basic to any

new commitment would be the need to undertake research into the exact nature of these problems, their scale and indeed their spatial concentration. This is the next phase of our own research programme.

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Figure Captions

- Figure 1 The Local Labour Market Areas of Britain (after Champion, 1987)
- Figure 2 The Functional Regions of Britain (after Champion, 1987)
- Figure 3 The national distribution of Vietnamese households at resettlement
- Figure 4 The national distribution of Vietnamese households in 1980
- Figure 5 The national distribution of Vietnamese households in 1982
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- Figure 7 The last known addresses of Vietnamese households after 1986
- Figure 8 Cross-country migration of households from first to last known address
- Figure 9 Migration from first address to last address in Birmingham or Manchester
- Figure 10 Migration from first address to last address in London
- Figure 11 Migration into and between London Boroughs
- Figure 12 The changing profile of Vietnamese settlement in different types of LLMA

Table 1: The distribution of Vietnamese by economic region, 1982

Percent of Vietnamese ^a	Percent of Vietnamese Total Population ^b	Percent		NC of New Commonwealth ^d	Percent LQ ^e	Unemployment
		L.Q. ^c	Commonwealth ^d			
36.2	30.9	1.2	56.2	1.8	10.0	
21.3	11.9	1.8	7.3	0.6	16.4	
13.5	9.5	1.4	12.8	1.3	16.1	
7.8	5.7	1.4	1.4	0.2	17.7	
7.7	9.4	0.8	2.6	0.3	15.9	
4.9	5.1	0.9	1.3	0.2	16.9	
2.9	7.9	0.4	3.7	0.5	11.9	
2.3	7.1	0.3	6.5	0.9	12.3	
1.1	3.4	0.3	1.6	0.5	11.0	
0.5	8.9	0.06	6.5	0.7	14.5	
n=6079	n=53.5m	n=1.5m				

Source: a calculated from Home Office survey results

b,d calculated from 1981 Census

f 1981 average for males

c Vietnamese Location Quotients

d New Commonwealth and Pakistani populations

e New Commonwealth and Pakistani Location Quotients

The distribution of Vietnamese by urban centre, 1982

Urban areas	Number of	Number of	Rank in UK	Total
	Vietnamese ^a	New Commonwealth residents ^b	Ethnic hierarchy ^c	Unemployment ^d
1. London	1,330	630,859	1	5.9
2. Birmingham	335	87,171	2	11.1
3. Merseyside	315	5,593	30	14.9
4. Newcastle	227	4,639	35	13.0
5. Greater Manchester	197	20,537	6	10.1
6. Glasgow	128	10,059	18	13.1
7. Telford	122	2,274	66	15.0
8. Derby	115	10,377	16	6.4
9. Cardiff	88	6,352	27	10.9
10. Wolverhampton	66	20,791	5	12.0
11. Middlesbrough	65	2,962	53	15.3
12. Preston	59	6,441	26	9.1
13. St. Helens	57	764	-	13.1
14. Runcorn	53	532	-	13.8
	n=3,157			

Sources:

- a Jones, 1982
- b 1981 Census, County Reports for England and Wales, Regional Report for Scotland
- c Robinson, 1986
- d Department of Employment Gazette, 1981

Notes:

- b New Commonwealth and Pakistani population
- c within leading 70 centres only
- d total unemployment in December 1980 (excluding school-leavers)

Table 3: peak years during which Vietnamese were admitted to UK

Year	No. of Households	% of Households
1978	47	1.8
1979	732	27.4
1980	1061	39.8
1981	581	21.8
1982	210	7.9
1983	32	1.2
1984	2	0.1
1985	0	0
1986	0	0
1987	1	-
1988	1	-

Source: original research using our own sample

Table 4: number of changes of address made by Vietnamese households, 1978-88

No. of moves ^a	No. of		% of Vietnamese
	Vietnamese	Vietnamese	
0	2308	74	
1	598	19)	
2	148	5)	
3	30	1)	26
4	10	.3)	
5	5	.2)	

n=3101 households
a other than relocation camp to resettlement address

Table 5: Percentage of households changing address over a five year period (1977-82 or during the 1980s)

Ethnic Group	Percentage moving
Vietnamese	43
Whites	32
East African Asians	33
Indians	43
West Indians	44
Pakistanis	49
Bangladeshis	77

Table 6: Number of households making specified number of moves within specified number of years

Number of moves in that period	Length of time for which continuous data available								
	<12 mths	1 yr	2 yrs	3 yrs	4 yrs	5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs
No move	517	292	71	143	202	174	28	19	3
1 move	28	74	106	83	91	92	38	24	6
2 moves	1	5	19	25	39	27	21	4	-
3 moves	-	2	-	2	9	7	5	1	-
4 moves	-	-	-	1	3	3	2	-	-
5 moves	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	1

n = 2171

Table 7: Annual residential turnover rates calculated for a five year period

Group	% turnover	sample size
Vietnamese	12.5	305
White	9.2	2694
West Indian	12.2	1834
Indian	11.0	1150
Pakistani	11.8	751
Bangladeshi	20.6	277

Note: period in question = 1979-88 for Vietnamese, 1977-82 for other groups

Table 8: Mobility of total sample by calendar year

Calendar Year	No. of households	No. of movers	No. of moves	% of all moves	% of house-holds moving	% that multiple moves form of all moves
1979	266	10	12	1.1	3.8	25.0
1980	840	58	64	6.1	6.9	15.6
1981	1088	123	128	12.2	11.3	7.0
1982	1069	188	193	18.4	17.6	5.2
1983	948	157	161	15.3	16.6	4.3
1984	1020	304	315	30.0	29.8	7.0
1985	212	73	76	7.2	34.4	7.9
1986	146	61	62	5.9	41.7	3.2
1987	68	37	40	3.8	54.4	15.0
Total	3101	1011	1051	100%		

Table 9: Household mobility of movers after resettlement

No. of years after resettlement	% of movers making first move	cumulative % of movers making first move
<1 year	31.0	31.0
1-2 years	22.9	53.9
2-3 years	16.2	70.1
3-4 years	11.9	82.0
4-5 years	11.5	93.5
5-6 years	3.6	97.1
6-7 years	2.4	99.5
7-8 years	0.4	100.0

n = 736

Table 10: Percentage of Vietnamese households in Economic Regions: Resettlement to 1988

	Jones ^a	Resettle-	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985-	British ^b
		ment						1988	population
South East	36	45	45	49	53	55	57	53	31
East Anglia	1	3	2	2	3	3	5	2	3
South West	3	8	10	7	7	7	6	3	8
West Midlands	13	9	7	8	10	10	6	18	9
East Midlands	2	4	3	3	3	3	5	4	7
Yorkshire	1	6	5	7	6	6	10	2	9
North West	21	9	10	7	7	5	4	14	12
North	8	4	4	3	2	1	0	1	6
Wales	5	6	6	6	5	5	4	0	5
Scotland	8	5	5	5	4	3	2	3	9
n =	6079	2209	1068	1249	1155	976	1116	456	53.5m

Notes: a Jones' 1982 Home Office data for individuals not households

b 1981 British Census

Table 11: The number of Functional Regions with different proportions of the Vietnamese population: Resettlement to 1986/7/8

% of respective years national total of Vietnamese households	No. of Functional Regions			
	Resettlement	1982	1984	1986/7/8
0-0.25	64	36	44	0
0.25-0.50	21	29	22	13
0.50-0.75	8	3	2	0
0.75-1.00	12	10	5	0
1.00-1.25	2	2	6	8
1.25-1.50	3	3	2	0
1.50-2.0	2	2	3	2
2.0-2.50	2	1	0	0
2.5-3.0	0	1	1	1
3.0-3.5	1	1	1	0
3.5-4.0	1	1	0	0
4.0-5.0	1	0	3	0
5.0+	2	2	0	3
Max %	36.0	32.4	45.0	54.0

Number of FRs with
Vietnamese households 119 91 89 27

Sample size 2209 1155 1116 187

Table 12: The number of Functional Regions with differing rates of change in their proportion of Vietnamese

Change in percentage of National Total	Resettlement to 1982		1982-4		1984-86/7/8	
	loss	gain	loss	gain	loss	gain
No change	21		28		2	
0-0.2	55	22	29	11	37	3
0.2-0.4	6	4	7	9	14	4
0.4-0.6	3	2	2	2	3	2
0.6-0.8	2	0	1	2	1	1
0.8-1.0	0	0	1	1	2	2
1.0-2.0	1	1	3	1	6	2
>2.0	0	1	1	1	2	3
Total	67 + 21 + 30 = 118		33 + 28 + 27 = 99		65 + 2 + 17 = 84	

Table 12: The number of Functional Regions with differing rates of change in their proportion of Vietnamese

Change in percentage of National Total	Resettlement to 1982		1982-4		1984-86/7/8	
	loss	gain	loss	gain	loss	gain
No change	21		28		2	
0-0.2	55	22	29	11	37	3
0.2-0.4	6	4	7	9	14	4

Table 13: The number of LLMAs with different proportions of the Vietnamese population: Resettlement to 1984

% of respective years national total of Vietnamese households	No. of Local Labour Market Areas		
	Resettlement 1982	1982	1984
0-0.25	141	100	89
0.25-0.5	55	54	49
0.5-0.75	14	8	5
0.75-1.00	21	11	10
1.00-1.25	4	3	1
1.25-1.50	4	5	8
1.5-2.0	5	3	3
2.0-1.5	4	5	2
2.5-3.0	2	3	1
3.0-3.5	1	0	1
3.5-4.0	0	2	0
4.0-5.0	1	1	5
5.0+	0	1	0
Total	252	196	174
Max %	4.2	6.8	5.0

Table 14: The fifteen LLMAs containing the largest number of Vietnamese households: Resettlement to 1988

	Resettlement	1980	1982	1984	1985-8 ^a
1.	Birmingham	Bexley	Birmingham	Southwark	Birmingham
2.	Southwark	Birmingham	Lambeth	Tower Hamlets	Manchester
3.	Tower Hamlets	Bristol	Tower Hamlets	Lambeth	Southwark
4.	Lambeth	Lambeth	Southwark	Birmingham	Lambeth
5.	Bexley }	Southwark	Greenwich	Leeds	Greenwich
6.	Bristol }	Greenwich	Hackney	Greenwich	Bexley
7.	Greenwich	Basilton }	Bristol	Hackney	Tower Hamlets
8.	Manchester	Manchester }	Manchester	Manchester	Islington }
9.	Liverpool }	Lewisham }	Bexley }	Bexley }	Lewisham }
10.	Lewisham }	Aldershot	Leeds }	Bristol	Waltham Forest
11.	Leeds }	Leeds	Camden	Wandsworth }	
12.	Hackney	Liverpool	Lewisham	Basilton }	
13.	Newcastle	Newport	Wandsworth	Bradford	
14.	Basilton	Edinburgh	Basilton	Northampton	
15.	Glasgow	Glasgow	Glasgow	Lewisham	

a 1985-8 truncated at ten because of small sample size

Table 15: The distribution of Vietnamese households across different types of Local Labour Market Areas, resettlement to 1988

Type of LLMA ^a	% of UK population		Resettlement	Percentage of Vietnamese households during				
	1981	1981		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985-88
1. London	14.4	27.7	33.1	36.9	39.8	40.8	46.3	
2. Conurbation dominants	10.5	11.3	10.6	13.4	11.9	7.9	26.4	
3. Provincial dominants	6.4	6.6	6.7	6.8	7.2	9.1	4.3	
4. Sub-regional dominants	5.3	5.8	4.9	4.0	4.1	3.6	0	
5. London sub-dominant cities	3.2	2.5	2.7	2.5	3.2	2.4	0.6	
6. London sub-dominant towns	5.2	5.8	6.2	5.6	5.3	6.2	3.0	
7. Conurbation Sub-dominant cities	6.1	2.9	2.1	1.6	1.6	0.8	1.7	
8. Conurbation Sub-dominant towns	4.4	4.3	3.8	2.4	1.7	0.9	2.8	
9. Smaller, Northern Sub-dominants	5.3	3.0	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.4	
10. Southern freestanding cities	7.6	7.3	6.3	5.9	6.0	6.9	4.1	
11. Northern freestanding cities	4.6	4.3	4.6	4.2	3.4	4.7	2.6	
12. Southern service towns	3.4	3.6	3.0	3.8	3.3	3.5	0.4	
13. Southern commercial towns	2.2	3.0	2.3	2.8	3.2	3.6	1.7	
14. Southern manufacturing towns	2.0	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.8	1.1	
15. Northern service towns	7.2	1.7	1.6	1.0	0.7	0.9	0.2	
16. Northern commercial towns	2.1	1.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.4	0.9	
17. Northern manufacturing towns	3.8	2.3	2.0	1.2	0.9	1.0	0	
18. Southern rural areas	3.1	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.3	0.6	
19. Northern rural areas	3.2	1.3	1.5	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.6	

Note: a typology derived by Champion et al 1987

