

POST ENTRY CONTROL OF POLITICALLY  
ACTIVE REFUGEES IN THE UK

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## Introduction

As has been argued elsewhere, little distinction has been made between exiles and refugees who leave behind them all involvement in the politics of their home country, and those who, to varying degrees, remain politically active. The processes and influences in relation to policy and practice of admission to the UK of politically active refugees have been discussed elsewhere. It has been shown how, with declining UK hegemony, the influence of foreign policy considerations has become increasingly important in determining policy in this respect. However, the question of the nature of the political activities of particular persons or groups admitted to the UK raises issues of national security and domestic tranquility and this will also be discussed and set in context alongside the foreign policy implications.

While there are considerable difficulties in investigating influences on admission policy, given that much of this policy remains covert and implicit, the fact that the act of admission or exclusion is usually publicly observable allows the tracing of the political motives of decision making which can, in turn, be related to prevailing influences in the domestic and foreign policy arenas. The study of post entry control of politically active refugees (PARS) - the subject of the current article - presents even more methodological problems, in that, not only are the policies usually covert, but also the act of surveillance is itself rarely made public. However, although there is relatively little primary documentary evidence of such practices, and, while the evidence of secondary sources and personal interviews is inevitably patchy, it is possible to trace patterns in this accumulated material along with evidence of such events which have become public. However, more publicly traceable, are patterns of practice in deportation.

In the first section of this paper the organisations involved in post entry controls and surveillance, and the ways in which they set about these tasks in relation to politically active refugees will be described. The main instruments of power which these agencies can use will be considered, recognising that in many situations the administrative discretion of governmental agencies are much greater than the wording of laws and regulations. In addition there is always - particularly in this area - the fall-back position of the use of the prerogative powers of the Crown. In the second main section the various domestic and foreign policy influences on decisions by the UK authorities, as to whether or not the activities of particular individuals and groups should be monitored will be examined, as will the activities of foreign intelligence operations in the UK. In conclusion the comparative weight of different influences on post entry controls, and the differential patterns of influence in relation to the characteristics of the organisations involved in these various aspects of policing will be considered.

## The Organisation and Forms of Post-Entry Control and Surveillance

### UK agencies involved in post-entry controls

There are a number of governmental departments, intelligence agencies and police forces which have an interest in the monitoring of politically active refugees. Firstly there is the Home Office, within whose structure is located the Immigration and Nationality Department (IND), and the various departments which deal with the police and security agencies, particularly Special Branch (SB) and the Security Service, better known as MIS. The regional and functional departments of the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO), act quite often as a source of raw intelligence to be fed into assessments of intelligence issues. In addition The FCO have a close working relationship with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) usually known as M16 and the Government Communications

Headquarters (GCHQ). Finally, the law officers of the government ie. the Attorney General and the Lord Chancellor are consulted as to the implications of various judicial processes in the activities of post entry control. This will be considered more fully in the next section. It should be noted that most of the various governmental departments meet regularly and are usually represented at interdepartmental meetings and sub-cabinet groups such as the Ministerial Steering Committee on Intelligence and Security (MIS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), at which assessments are made of potential difficulties, or dangers to UK interests, either within the UK or abroad.

However, the bulk of post entry control and surveillance of PARS falls upon the shoulders of the Special Branch (SB), and MI5. In relation to post entry controls and surveillance, the Special Branch acts as the public face for intelligence gathering usually on behalf of MI5. As the guidelines of the Home Office to the Special Branch (first made public only in 1984) demonstrate, its role is gathering information about 'threats to public order and helping MI5 to defend the realm against threats of sabotage and espionage, or from the actions of persons and organisations, whether detected from within or without the country which may be judged to be subversive to the state.

In practice, the Special Branch, not MI5, took the lead against Irish terrorism and also threats from the Middle East which were likely to cause terrorist acts. A section keeps permanent watch on those Middle Eastern exiles, eg. Iranians, Libyans, Palestinians, and Iraqis most likely to be either perpetrators or, - in many instances - victims of attacks. Working closely with MI5, they monitor the embassies of target countries and political exiles in the UK. The Special Branch, it is estimated, has altogether between 1800 to 2,000 officers of which about 450 are in the Metropolitan Police, by far the largest force. While the size of the SB is sometimes in dispute, a number of functions which may have previously been dealt with by them have been devolved to more specialised units eg. Drugs Intelligence Unit, Diplomatic Protection Group and the Illegal Immigration Unit.

Hard evidence of Special Branch surveillance is difficult to substantiate, and prone to exaggeration, as the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee found in its attempts to investigate the Special Branch in 1984. Nevertheless, from the published material from this report, and from reports and investigations of organisations of similar type, which have been modelled on, and, in some cases, staffed with personnel from the UK Special Branch, i.e. those operating in Australia and Canada, it is evident that the Special Branch operate a 'fire brigade' approach. Those individuals or exile groups who do not operate by violent means in the UK irrespective of their activities against their home governments in their home territory - eg. the Eritreans, are usually given a lower priority, as are those groups who are not too markedly affecting the UK government relations with 'friendly' countries. However, even in this latter category, it is not unknown for Special Branch officers to make 'friendly' visits to certain refugees and exile groups, ostensibly to check their papers, but also incidentally to suggest that, during an impending (usually) state visit of their home regimes enemy, they should keep their protests within bounds. In addition, those refugees and exiles about whom there is information of possible danger of attack are usually given protective warnings.

Towards other groups, who are perceived to offer greater threats, the Special Branch may take a much more pro-active role. In these cases, the classic techniques of infiltration, use of informers, telephone tapping and, if necessary, 'black bagging' ie. illegal entry, are used. The SB guidelines openly acknowledge the close links between themselves and MIS. 'A special branch', the guidelines state, 'assists the security service in carrying out its task of defending the realm against attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from the actions of persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged subversive to the state.

A large part of this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism, including the activities of international terrorists and terrorists organisations'. Many of the names on MI5's central files were originally provided by local SB forces.

MI5 was set up in 1909 to combat espionage, but since the 1970s has given a higher priority to domestic targets considered subversive. MI5 is organised into six directorates. However the two divisions which most impinge on refugees and exiles are, F division covering domestic subversion, and K which covers counter-espionage. K division, (which up to the late 1960s was known as D) in combination with MI6, used to recruit from the East European and Baltic emigre communities. However, Soviet penetration of these movements caused severe embarrassment, particularly to MI6, and, partly as a result of these fiascos, MI5 changed direction and concentrated more on domestic subversion. In the UK, which MI5 has divided into nine regions, it maintains a network of regional liaison staff, normally retired police assistant commissioners, who are responsible for collaborating with local police forces. Sometimes persuasion will come from higher levels when the local chief constable is reluctant to provide the information and surveillance facilities requested by MI5. At times MI5 and SB share the workload and it is quite normal practice for MI5 to bypass the local chief constable dealing directly with the local SB.

The public knowledge of MI5 is even more shrouded in mystery than is that of the Special Branch, - despite recent government legislation - but the best estimates are that there are approximately 2,000 employed - a high proportion of which are employed on the Registry - at an annual budget of over £300 million. The Registry is one of the key features of MI5 and from the earliest days of Captain Kell (the first head of MI5), was seen as the heart of the operation. By the mid 1950s, it was estimated that there were nearly a million personal files. However, the whole system was based on a highly complex manual filing system, which resisted computerisation until well into the 1970s.

It is clear that historically both Special Branch and MI5 were for a very long period, obsessively anti-communist. However in more recent times, the SB shifted its focus towards terrorism, and has been at the forefront of the fight against terrorism, both in UK mainland and Ireland. MI5 has been slow to shift its attention and resources to anti-terrorism, preferring until recently to concentrate on its traditional task of countering communist bloc activities in Britain, and on domestic subversion.

MI6 is still not even officially acknowledged to exist at least in peacetime. While MI5 operates at home and in the remaining 'colonies', MI6 normally operates abroad. However, their London office looks after UK based operations which includes work related to surveillance of politically active refugees. Like MI5, MI6's main focus of attention for most of the post war period has been towards communist targets and in pursuit of this set up a number of operations involving East European and Baltic emigres, with somewhat disastrous results.

GCHQ's origins goes back almost to the beginning of the UK telecommunications industry, its primary function being to intercept diplomatic, military commercial and private communications. However its rapid post war development and growth in importance followed the UK/USA intelligence agreement in 1947, and GCHQ - of all the UK intelligence agencies - has had the closest possible relations with its US counterpart - the National Security Agency (NSA). In fact, GCHQ is partly funded by US contributions, and is by far the largest intelligence agency in terms of staff and money. It is evident from both Peter Wright's accounts and other evidence, that the surveillance of foreign embassies by signals intelligence (SIGINT) and the employment of native speakers, mainly refugees and exiles, by those agencies, has been a central part of the work of the security services. But recently SIGINT has not contributed significantly to intelligence about Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union or

the Middle East. This has enabled MI6 to argue that it should be given a new priority.

In tracing the approach taken by the UK government to politically active refugees, it has to be noted that inconsistency in approach has often been evident due to the fact that, rivalries between the various agencies have been a major feature in this area. Firstly, there have always been different perspectives between the various government departments, very much reflecting the classic bureaucratic politics model, and this can be clearly illustrated by the differing views of the Home office and the Foreign Office over a long period. Secondly, there are the different outlooks of the government departments from that of some of the intelligence agencies, a good example of which, are the tensions between the views of MI5 and Home secretaries particularly in times of crisis and war. Finally there are the rivalries between the different intelligence agencies which have been a noticeable feature since their establishment.

Because of the recent changes in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the need for closer co-operation within the EC and also because of the apparent inability to prevent IRA activities in the UK and abroad, there have been renewed demands for the reorganisation of the British intelligence operations, reflecting regional interests rather than an outdated global perspective.

The formal instruments of control

Although it is recognised that the UK system of governmental operations works within a very wide range of administrative discretion, there is also a battery of formal instruments of power that the authorities can use with regard to non-UK citizens. These are acts of parliament, formal treaties, delegated legislation, and, if necessary, the use of prerogative powers. All these methods have been used at various times in the UK to deal with PARS, exiles and unfriendly aliens. It is recognised in international law that a state has the right to expel foreigners from its territory as it deems fit. How and when it chooses to do is a matter for national law. Thus one of the most obvious methods in dealing with PARS has been the use of the 1971 Immigration Act, under which a non British subject can be compulsorily removed from the UK, and prevented from returning unless the deportation order is revoked. Although the UK during the 19th century did not expel a single alien, this liberal attitude towards aliens did not last long into the 20th century. As Tony Kushner has suggested, 'Mid 19th century good will to refugees depended on two factors - the lack of a severe threat to the well being of society and the support of Public opinion... At the turn of the century with a loss of this confidence and an increasing hostile public, asylum came under threat'.

While the 1905 Aliens act did contain a clause on deportation 'it was extremely limited in its use. It was not until the passage of the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914 that the use of the phrase 'not conducive to the public good' was first mentioned. Its subsequent re-enactment in the 1919 Aliens Order Act, gave the Home secretary extremely wide ranging powers over the removal of aliens in the UK. This was itself re-enacted in the Aliens Order regulations in 1953 and finally incorporated into the 1971 Immigration Act, which is the current legislative base. The act provides that a person will not be entitled to appeal against a decision to deport on the grounds that their remaining is 'not conducive to the public good', in the interests of national security, relations between the UK and any other country or for others of a political nature. However, the immigration rules provide that while there is no right of appeal where a deportation order was made for the above reasons, such cases are subject to a 'non-statutory advisory procedure'.

The cases that have arisen since the introduction of the advisory appeals panel sometimes known as the 'three wise men'- and the very limited representations

that can be made on behalf of the deportees, have given rise to considerable disquiet, not only among lawyers and human rights groups, but also among a number of senior judges. These cases are perhaps one of the few public opportunities to see some of the influences that will be examined in more detail in the next section namely danger to public order, and foreign relations with other countries - which are used to justify both the limited procedures and the actual deportations.

Other powers to control the movement of aliens, first introduced within the Aliens Restriction Act 1914, related to the compulsory registration of aliens within the UK. These powers were maintained in subsequent Aliens acts and orders, and are now incorporated in the current Immigration rules. Thus at present all non-Commonwealth citizens over the age of 16 who have permission to remain in the UK for longer than six months are required to register with the police. A non-Commonwealth citizen who is permitted to remain as the result of a claim for refugee status/asylum will also have to register if this has not already been done.

In times of war, the UK authorities have made considerable use of delegated legislation, and, in both world wars, the vast law making powers of parliament were delegated to the executive. Indicative of this were the Defence of the Realm Acts (DORA) 1914-15 and Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts of 1939-40, which, among other things, gave Home Secretaries wide ranging powers including the right to intern any persons (not just aliens) without trial for the duration of the war. 'These enormous powers'. as one well known constitutional text pointed out, 'were not always exercised reasonably'.

Additionally, as part of the fight against terrorism, particularly in response to the Northern Ireland 'troubles' the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was first passed in 1974 and has been renewed regularly ever since. Within the powers of the PTA, there are not only extended powers of arrest and detention, but also powers of exclusion. However, although the act was originally designed specifically to deal with terrorism only within the Northern Ireland context, in 1983 the government, acting on the Jellicoe Report, which examined the operations of the act, argued that the powers should be extended to cover international terrorism, because 'London could become a battleground for warring middle east terrorist factions'. In the bill, the definition of terrorism was described as 'the use of violence for political ends', and the bill allowed the police to detain someone without charge for two days and a further five days, with the Home secretary consent. Many organisations, including the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), the British Refugee Council, and the Anti-Apartheid movement immediately pointed out that this definition could cover most PARS and exiles and included nearly all liberation movements. When this was pointed out to the Home Secretary, as the bill was going through its passage in parliament, although he acknowledged this possible interpretation, in an attempt to pacify the growing opposition, he promised that he would advise Chief Constables not to use the new powers in this way.

Despite active lobbying by a number of human rights and refugee organisations, which led to an attempt to amend the clause when it came up in committee in the Commons, the government stood firm in public, while privately assuring the various groups that the position with regard to liberation movements would remain exactly as it is was before the new bill was proposed. The BRC was particularly concerned about its possible effects on refugees, and made further efforts to try to amend the clause in the House of Lords. However the bill was passed with the 'offending' clause in place in March 1984.

The powers of administrative discretion which are always available, can also be used in addition to those powers contained within the Immigration rules. An example of the breadth of such administrative discretion was the case of Jonathan Bloch who was granted refugee status in 1978 and thereafter received

yearly extensions. It was the practice of the Home office (although not incorporated in the immigration rules) that a refugee was granted permanent residence (indefinite leave to remain) after four years. In July 1982 the Home office extended Bloch's visa for a further year but did not grant him permanent residence. When he applied for permanent residence he was refused on the grounds that he was joint author of a book entitled British Intelligence and Covert Action. The Home office letter claimed that: 'Such an action is .... bound to place servants of the crown at greater risk .... than had the publication not occurred'. The secretary of state then 'concluded that as a matter of public policy, (Bloch's) conduct was such that he ought not to be granted indefinite leave to remain'. He was given a further period of extension but was in effect told to leave. Despite protests by lawyers and parliamentarians, Bloch had to leave the UK in 1984.

The other legal powers of which the British government occasionally makes use, and also has to respond to, are the powers of extradition. While the UK government has been highly critical at times of the Irish government's reluctance and occasionally irritated by the USA, and even more recently by some of its EC partners e.g. Belgium, over extradition of IRA suspects, there has been, conversely, a curious reluctance on the part of the British authorities and courts to put into practice the European Convention of extradition, and some reluctance to actually extradite a number of persons accused of terrorism in political offences under existing bilateral extradition treaties. While there are two European conventions on extradition (1957) and on suppression of terrorism (1977), and although the British government was among the first to pass the Suppression Of Terrorism Act and put it into operation in its own domestic legislation, the UK government finally ratified the extradition treaty only in April 1991. Irritation with the British attitude towards extradition and towards the European convention - which was first opened for signature in 1957 - was, as the Home Affairs Committee noted, obvious during their visits abroad. While Home Office witnesses conceded that the surprisingly low number of extraditions from the UK to other EC states (excluding the Republic or Ireland) reflected a view abroad that the British practice was too cumbersome, there was one aspect of the European convention which was found by the UK to be less than satisfactory. This was, that the convention enshrined in the principle of *aut dedere aut iudicare*, that is signatory states have a choice of either giving up their nationals to the jurisdiction of the state asking for extradition, (as the UK does,) or trying them itself. A number of EC countries will not extradite their own nationals and this has concerned the UK government. It was recommended by the Home Affairs Committee that the UK should use diplomatic measures to encourage the other EC countries to abandon their restrictions.

In agreeing to the European Conventions On The Suppression Of Terrorism, the object of governments was to deprive alleged terrorists of their immunity on the grounds that their offence was political. However in law the definition of a political offence varies from country to country and in the case of Father Patrick Ryan whose extradition from Belgium to the UK was refused on what appeared to be political grounds, it appears that there is no common agreement as yet of what constitutes grounds for extradition, within the meaning of the act. Thus, as the Home Affairs Committee suggested, there must be a 'strong political will to tackle these difficult problems'.

In examples where clearly the demands for extradition fell within the bilateral arrangements between countries, the British authorities have been reluctant and extremely slow in pursuing these cases. The hearings in the case of Astrid Proll in 1978/9 were complicated and long, and also involved disputes over nationality. Eventually, however, she was extradited to West Germany. On the other hand, when in 1982 the Italian government attempted to extradite a number of suspected Fascist terrorists, this was rejected by the Bow street magistrates. According to a report in the Sunday Times 'the Italians were furious and when in

1985 the Italian justice minister met the Home Secretary he pressed for a revision of the extradition treaty between the two governments.

The whole history of extradition involving the UK has been fraught with difficulties, and the UK position has varied over time and also with whom it was trying to maintain good diplomatic relations. In addition to the recent problems within the EC, attempts by Commonwealth and the US at extradition have also sometimes resulted in political embarrassment. The Soblen case of 1962 illustrated the flexibility that the UK authorities have in moving between deportation and extradition. Soblen, an American citizen convicted in the US of espionage, fled while on bail to Israel, whence he was deported at the request of the US. In transit by air to the UK he inflicted wounds on himself and had to be detained in hospital in the UK. The Home secretary made a deportation order which was challenged by Soblen. The principal ground was that the deportation order was in substance an extradition and the offence of which he had been convicted in the US was not extraditable. Although in this case the court upheld the Home Secretary's decision, many legal experts believed that the Home Secretary decision was a flawed one.

Similarly the Enahoro case in 1962 illustrated both a legal loophole and the embarrassment of the government in using another flawed legal device. The Fugitive Offenders Act of 1870 which governed extradition to foreign government was not in operation with regard to fugitive offenders within the commonwealth. This was highlighted by this case when the Nigerian government requested the surrender of Chief Enahoro under the then existing Fugitive Offenders Act which did not have a political offences exclusion, and, as such, rendered the British government liable to carry out this request. The embarrassment following from this case and the growth of independent Commonwealth countries led to the replacement of the 1881 act with a new Fugitive Offences Act, 1967 which basically fell into line with the rules governing other demands for extradition from non-commonwealth countries.

#### Determinants of Post-Entry Controls

Some influences on decisions on admission and exclusion of politically active refugees have been discussed elsewhere. It has been shown how in recent years, foreign policy influences have become more important in comparison with earlier years in which threats to public order and the protection of the UK against alien forces were the main considerations. In examining post entry controls, a slightly different balance of influences is however evident, than operates in relation to admissions.

#### Perceived threat to UK and to public order

The tolerance by the UK authorities towards political activism during the mid 19th century underwent a major change with the challenge of the Irish question, and specifically the Fenian attacks in the 1870s. These 'outrages' eventually led to the establishment of a Special Branch in 1883, which although set up initially to combat Irish terrorism soon extended its coverage to foreign revolutionaries and exiles. Surveillance was fairly extensive, and clubs and cafes were closely watched, as were the homes of prominent exiles. The use of informers and 'agents provocateurs' were among the techniques utilised by the police authorities. Another factor which indicated a growing sense of uncertainty, was the increasing belief in the danger of a German military threat and in threats from the German espionage service. This led to the establishment of a sub committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider the question of alien controls in Britain. Its recommendations led to draft proposals for alien controls in the eventuality of war. Thus, when the First world war broke out, the wider powers already in draft form were swiftly put into legislation.

As David Cesarani commented: 'Some of the consequences of the jingoism and xenophobia that accompanied the First World War', which had direct effects on refugees and exile, were to continue into the post-war period. Thus the Aliens Act of 1914 was retained in essence and renamed the Alien Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919. The new Act, together with the older 1914 legislation, was renewed annually until 1953, when it was made permanent. Learning from the First World War experiences, the UK attitude towards enemy aliens was, at the outbreak of the Second World War, much more selective. While enemy aliens were categorised by tribunals according to the degree of danger they posed, until May 1940 the policies implemented by the authorities remained fairly relaxed, and most aliens were left relatively unscathed. However the fall of Dunkirk and the heightening fears of potential invasion together with the use of Fifth Columnists, led to a policy of indiscriminate internment. Many Jewish refugees were placed in camps along with German Nazi supporters. It became apparent that the Home and Foreign Office perceptions of the dangers posed by refugees and aliens were at variance with those of the intelligence community and the War Office. Richard Latham of the refugee section of the Foreign Office denounced the policy. In a memorandum dated June 27th 1940 he wrote: 'Under the stress of recent events in public opinion and under the influence of high authority in the War Office, (M15) has adopted the rule of thumb that any person of foreign nationality is to be presumed to be hostile'. However, the easing of the invasion crisis, led to a broad liberalisation of internment.

The perceptions of the potential dangers particularly after the Second world war and the beginning of the cold war period, shaped responses by the British authorities towards alleged communist infiltration, usually with an implicit foreign connection. However a series of spying incidents involving nuclear scientists from the UK - some of which were refugees was eventually to lead to a programme of vetting senior civil servants and others working in so called 'sensitive' areas in the public and defence industries. These events and the heightening of the cold war did, however, lead to a change in vetting procedures from an essentially negative approach towards positive vetting. Nevertheless, one writer, Tony Bunyan viewed the UK loyalty programme in more drastic terms and argued that 'one of the consequences of the anti-communist purges in the civil service and government contract firms .... was that Chief Constables throughout the country were given instructions to compile lists of the Communist party and its front organisations. Copies of these lists were collated nationally by the Special Branch, who also forwarded copies to MI5'. More interesting from the perspective of this article was that according to Bunyan, the listing of aliens was carefully monitored, particularly in regard to trade unions. Such activities could lead to recommendation for deportation or refusal of naturalisation.

From the late 1960s, two new developments began to have a growing impact on perceived threats to security and dangers from outside the UK. These were the rise of international terrorism arising from the Palestinian question and general Middle East conflict; and the beginnings of the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland and the rise of the provisional IRA. The latter factor, in particular hastened both legislative changes e.g. the Prevention of Terrorism Act and technical developments in surveillance and monitoring technology, leading to similar methods being employed against other groups, including against politically active refugees.

However, in general, those individuals or exile groups who did not appear to operate by violent means in the UK, irrespective of their activities against governments in their home territory, were either ignored or treated relatively mildly. Although as already mentioned occasional 'warnings' prior to visits by leaders of their home regimes occurred, and some individuals are given warnings of potential dangers to themselves from agents of home governments. Thus the murder in London of Gerard Hoarau in 1985, the exiled Seychelles leader, was revealing in that it indicated the type of warnings issued by the intelligence

community and at the same time the relative lack of protection that it provides.

Even if the UK relations with the home regime were less than good, and the UK authorities were in sympathy with the exiles cause, this did not preclude them from taking necessary preventive action. For example it is quite clear that the East European emigre communities have been carefully monitored over a long period. So much so, that when the visit of the Soviet leaders took place in 1956 it was claimed that virtually similar lists of individuals and groups to be monitored during the state visit had been drawn up by the British and Soviet security. The attitude of the UK authorities towards politically active Iranian exiles during the Khomeini period became increasingly concerned with the dangers of the potential hostilities breaking out in the UK not only between anti and pro Khomeini opponents, but also among factions within the various exile groups. Similarly the activities of anti-Gaddafi groups in the UK and the subsequent murder of a number of them both in the UK and in Western Europe, made the UK authorities cautious over the admission of Libyan 'students'. It also led to the movements of these students being monitored fairly extensively, as well as those Libyans working under diplomatic cover at the embassy.

However, the more recent events in the arrest and deportation programme in connection with Iraqi and Palestinian suspects during the Gulf War in 1991, illustrated the consistently different attitudes of the Home Office compared to that of the FCO towards refugees, exiles and aliens in general and the relative weight attached to considerations of public order as opposed to foreign policy; with the Foreign Office reported as being: 'Furious at the Home Office round up and deportation of Arabs'. However the same source reported that the Home Office (would) disregard the Foreign Office objections, because the Foreign Office is always being accused of consisting of 'a bunch of Arab lovers anyway'. It was clear that Home office policy was very much based on M15 guidance, and that the list of people to be detained was not drawn up on the basis 'either of surveillance or hard evidence of current terrorist connections'. It also led a senior Foreign Office official to state that in the light of the detentions, Britain 'was in danger of winning the war but losing the peace'.

Following the end of the Gulf war and the general criticism levelled at the poor performance of MI5 with regard to its information on Middle Eastern detainees, an internal inquiry was set up by the Home Secretary which reported in December 1991, although it did not recommend any disciplining of MI5 officers, it has proposed new procedures on the detention of people on national security grounds.

The gulf war detention debacle also gave the opportunity for the other intelligence agencies not only to criticise the performance of MI5 but coupled with rapid changes following on from the ending of the cold war, to make claims for themselves as the premier intelligence agency in the post cold war period. However it seems much more likely that the new agenda will demand a much greater degree of co-operation than has hitherto taken place within the British intelligence community.

## Foreign Policy considerations

The international status of the UK with regard its declining position in the international hierarchy has been reflected in its approach towards and its tolerance of PAR activity, and secondly the degree to which this activity became a more significant factor in its inter-state relations. Thus it could be argued, that from the 'high' point of Pax Britannica, moving through being still a significant actor in a multi polar international arena, to the more contemporary situation of being a middle ranking power, but with a tradition of greater political involvement in world affairs: this changing status is reflected in the UK's handling of PARS and exiles. Thus, even during the mid 19th century at the height of British hegemony and its Victorian liberalism towards refugees, some regard was paid to the requests and complaints of foreign governments who had refugees and exiles in the UK, although on the whole this was not a major factor on post-entry controls. However by the end of the century it was becoming clear that although the government may have shunned publicly closer co-operation with other governments to deal with the 'anarchists' threat, there was evidence of some collaboration between the British authorities and police agencies abroad. Nevertheless, enough of the general tolerance towards exile political activity remained to cause a public furore over the abduction, of Sun Yat Sen, the Chinese nationalist leader in London in 1896 by Chinese embassy Officials, and held hostage at the Imperial Chinese legation. He was eventually released after Foreign office pressure.

However, an increasing nervousness about the 'anarchist' threat and a growing spy mania, were among the factors that led to the end of the UK's 'splendid isolation', and the recognition of the need for better relations with the outside world. This in turn led to a re-evaluation of the UK's approach towards politically active refugees and exiles. It also reflected a feeling of greater vulnerability than hitherto. Thus following the Russian revolution and the ending of the First World War although the UK itself was openly anti-Bolshevik, it offered little comfort to the many thousands of anti-Bolshevik refugees who had left Russia. The tight controls erected during the first world war were kept in place afterwards, thus enabling the UK to monitor the number of persons entering and their likely nuisance value, as well as deporting thousands of both 'enemy aliens and Russians. As David Cesarani neatly summed up the attitudes of the time: 'Since the press, particularly the Times and the Morning Post were making increasingly popular the notion that Jews were synonymous with Bolsheviks and that the Bolsheviks were financed by the Germans, anti-alienism conveniently subsumed all three'.

Similarly, although, as we have noted, German refugees were somewhat reluctantly admitted in the 1930s and also interned in the early days of the Second World War, the UK's attitude towards German political exiles was evidence of a confused set of signals. While they encouraged anti-Nazi groups to organise and collaborate, they did not relish the somewhat independent stance, that the main exile group, the SPD adopted. For example during the middle of the Second World War, when their Soviet allies and the German exiled Communist party were urging a united German front, the SPD absolutely refused to have any dealings with such a body. As a result it lost support not only from the British government but also its British Labour party allies.

Post-war shifts in foreign policy gradually began to reflect both the declining great power status of the UK, and its increasing interdependence with the rest of the international system. However, at first these underlying shifts were not significant factors in the decision making process with regard to PARS and exiles, and UK policy continued, for a time, to reflect the older more laissez faire approach: that, providing refugees and exiles satisfied the other factors, the nature of their activity did not seem to concern the UK authorities. However, although the refugee and exile once admitted could carry on their political activities, the UK government had responsibilities, in international

and national law, for example, to suppress armed hostile expeditions and attempted crimes against life and property. Nevertheless, a Nelsonian blindness has occasionally afflicted the British government in relation to such activities.

The UK attitude towards the admissions of East Europeans and Balts was affected by the changed atmosphere after the second world war, and at the beginning of the Cold War. The change of regimes in Eastern Europe and the resultant mushrooming of embassies, created extra pressure on MI5 and the Special Branch, but also possible recruitment opportunities for MI6. However, the residence of many thousands of East European refugees, particularly Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians and Balts, added to the problems of surveillance. While there may have been some excuse for East European officials trying to create cultural organisations to maintain links with the emigre population, this was often used as an opportunity to put pressure on them either to return home or to act as agents. A memorandum from Polish community leaders to the Foreign Office in 1949 warned of the activities of embassy officials in enticing Polish emigres to work for them, and noted that already one Polish military attache had been arrested, and a number of resident Poles had been quietly deported. Two years later, in another memo in response to a parliamentary question asked by Lord Vansittart about abuses of diplomatic privileges by embassies in relation to refugees, a Foreign Office official stated: 'We know from secret sources and from emigres that the Polish embassy at least has attempted to expand its espionage network ... by recruiting agents among the emigres. Other satellite missions have less possibilities of this, (however) the Czechoslovakian embassy have been ... trying the same thing'.

Yet, whilst, at one level, the UK government had shown its hostility towards the new Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, this did not preclude them from placing restraints upon the exile governments, to keep their activities within the bounds and conventions of acceptable diplomatic behaviour. Thus when Czech emigres sought to establish a Czech cultural centre in London, this was refused. One of the reasons used to justify this refusal being that this could be construed as a hostile act towards a recognised government in Prague.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Office and MI6 were also keen to make use of emigres, and numbers of them were recruited to work for a new Foreign Office department known as the Information Research Department (IRD), engaged in a type of propaganda programme reminiscent of the black propaganda carried out by German refugees and exiles during the Second World War. In addition, a number of exiles were recruited to carry out missions on behalf of the MI6 in both Albania and the then former Baltic States.

The growth of third world refugees created new problems for the government, as new nations saw the harbouring of exiles by the UK government as a potentially hostile act. The UK relations with both the Shah's regime and the Khomeini regime in Iran reflected these sensitivities. Thus, it has been alleged that the UK authorities turned a blind eye to the activities of the Iranian surveillance operations by SAVAK, as long as it did not manifest itself in outright violence. Further, Anglo-Iranian relations, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, were considered of much greater significance than some minor harassment of Iranian students. However, when UK diplomatic relations with the Khomeini regime turned to the worst, soon after their Revolution, and the methods used against Anti-Khomeini dissidents outside Iran turned to more violent ways, the UK authorities took a more negative view of the new Iranian regime, and the monitoring of the Iranian community became a higher priority.

In addition to the growing decline of UK hegemony and growing awareness of the potential or actual problems from refugees and exiles, the need to nurture more carefully new Commonwealth countries sensitivities, has led to more obvious intervention with regard to the behaviour and activities of refugees and exiles

particularly since 1945. The most significant foreign influences on UK policy are however in relation to its allies, the USA, the Commonwealth and its Western European partners.

Anglo-American relations precluded not only the admissions of groups and individuals who were clearly hostile towards the United States, it also inhibited even American citizens who were opposed to U.S foreign policy in general. In addition, this close relationship - particularly among the respective intelligence agencies - was a significant factor, for example in the deportation of Philip Agee a former CIA officer who had published in the UK a book exposing the activities of the CIA.

Nevertheless, the case of the Chilean refugees, also during the 1970s, indicated that UK/USA perceptions toward politically active refugees were sometimes different. Although the Chileans were admitted on a government programme, because of their high degree of political activity and their involvement particularly within the Labour party and sympathetic trade unions, their activities were monitored by the intelligence services. Further, it has been alleged by members of the Chilean exile community that, when in the early 1980s some banned individuals returned secretly to Chile to go underground, and, were subsequently captured by the Chilean authorities, this led to their friends and associates in London being visited by Special branch.

Relations between the UK and members of the Commonwealth reflected similar concerns. As has already been noted, in relation to the Enahoro case, until 1967, when the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1870 was amended with a new act, citizens from a commonwealth country had less protection from extradition than citizens from other foreign countries. Similarly it was not until 1979 that formal political asylum was granted to citizens of Commonwealth countries. The changes that masked these shifts in policy related particularly to the newer members of the Commonwealth. Examples of these changes were UK relations with both Nigeria and India. During the Nigerian civil war, the UK government supported the central government, to the extent that it tried to prevent humanitarian aid reaching the breakaway province of Biafra, and it refused to give political asylum to Biafrans living in the UK. Again in the 1970s and 1980s, Anglo-Nigerian relations suffered because of the issue of the UK's harbouring of Nigerian political refugees and exiles, refusing, for example to extradite the deposed General Gowon leading to the British high Commissioner being declared persona non grata. The attempted abduction in 1984 of Umaru Dikko, out of the UK in a 'packing case', similarly soured relations.

A similar degree of sensitivity regarding exile politics is also evident in Anglo-Indian relations, further complicated by the fact that many of those engaged in exile politics, in this case, the cause of Sikh independence, are technically British citizens and therefore cannot be either prevented from entering or quietly deported. Although, since 1980, the UK authorities have refused entry to any Sikh nationalists, not UK citizens, and have successfully prosecuted a group of Sikhs for an attempted assassination of the Indian Prime Minister on a visit to the UK in 1985, the Indian authorities still believed that not enough was being done. As Rajiv Gandhi complained at the time: 'the British could be a little tougher on the extremists' and went on to specify 'in curtailing their actions, and in letting us know more information about their movements'.

This policy appears now to be fully operational as witnessed by the attempt of the Home Secretary Kenneth Baker in August 1990 to deport a Sikh militant, Maramjit Singh Chahal to India under the same national security powers which were invoked during the Gulf War. However although the court later ruled against the Home Secretary's handling of the asylum side of the case, it did not pass comment of whether an asylum claim could take priority over national security expulsion.

With European and American efforts to control the spread of international terrorism from the late 1960s and with increasing UK involvement in Europe in general the European dimension began to play a more significant role from the early 70s. Following the Munich massacre, of 1972, and increasing attacks by Palestinians on groups of Israeli and pro-Israeli targets in Europe a need for greater co-operation to combat international terrorism was perceived, and thus the inter-governmental group, TREVI was set up in 1976 to co-ordinate policy. Through the activities of TREVI, INTERPOL, and bilateral relations between the intelligence community in Western Europe, there has grown a highly sophisticated monitoring and surveillance system notwithstanding traditional differences of approach in admissions and post entry controls. This growing co-operation between the UK, the EC and other West European countries will be explored more fully in another article.

#### Reactions to foreign intelligence operations

Much of the control and surveillance of politically active refugees is carried out, not by UK authorities, but by the intelligence agencies of the refugees home country operating on UK soil. The reactions of the UK authorities to this foreign intelligence activity provide a further insight into the forces operating in this area. It is clear that the balance of forces in this case is in favour of the defence of public order, even at the expense of foreign policy considerations, although a degree of strain is sometimes evident.

This pattern has been evident from the 1930s, when some Nazi party officials were found by MI5 to be involved in surveillance and in making threats to anti-Nazi German nationals in the UK, and were eventually deported.

In relation to a campaign of intimidation including violence waged between the Khomeini regime and its exiled opponents, it was clear that MI5, special branch and the anti terrorist squad were operating extensively in this area, although they were unable to prevent attacks on Iranian exiles e.g. a bomb attack in an Iranian shop in London in 1986, and in the shooting of two known monarchists supporters in 1988.

Although this is less usual, there have, however been some cases where there appears to have been some co-operation with, or at least a turning of a blind eye to the activities of foreign intelligence agencies eg, again in relation to Iran during the Shah's regime in the 1960s when SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence agency were operating against Iranian students in London. Even in this case, however, it could also be argued that in this case the UK authorities maintained a studied neutrality to the Iranian students, leading the Shah to express (his) 'deep concern about the activities of Iranian students' and complained that 'it is in London and Manchester that revolutionaries are formed'.

## Conclusion

While the UK has traditionally dealt with immigration issues almost entirely on the basis of domestic considerations, its attitude towards refugee policy and particularly PARS, has had to take into serious consideration the interests and sensitivities of other countries. Thus UK policy towards refugees and PARS is governed by a two way set of interests, these being: domestic considerations, including that of public order, and foreign policy in terms of both the UK relationship with the refugees' home government, and of wider considerations of international relations. These factors inter-relate in a complex and shifting manner, with each factor having more or less influence at any one time, creating at times the impression of confusing inconsistency in relation to specific groups and causes. It has been this interrelationship that has been the focus of this article.

Thus the UK government has, at times, used its policy towards PARS, as an instrument to achieve certain foreign policy ends in relation to the refugees' home government. At other times it has sacrificed foreign policy ends in response to domestic pressure related to security and public order. This has been particularly evident in its reactions to foreign intelligence operations in the UK. As UK refugee policy is formed in an increasingly global arena, the need to take into account factors outside the immediate ones of domestic considerations and relationships with specific foreign governments, also grows, and there is the pressure to consider the UK allies' perception of the way in which particular groups of PARS are treated, in the light of the allies' own foreign policy relationships.

The other main factor which gives further complexity to the overall analysis, is the inconsistency between government policy and individual departmental practices, especially those within the intelligence community. Government policies in these areas are still overwhelmingly kept secret. When, however, they are forced to go public, they are presented under the guise of unity of purpose, homogeneity of thought and efficient execution. However, as we have seen, in practice, many of the organisations involved, are as much at odds with one another as they are with what they perceive as the hostile forces in the outside world. The fact that much of the decision making in this area has been kept secret, and not open to any serious public debate, even among political and administrative elites, leads to a style of decision making increasingly at odds with that prevalent in other areas of British government, with its emphasis on consensual pragmatic incrementalism.

There is growing pressure to open up this whole area to some public scrutiny, if not debate, and it is becoming increasingly likely that the processes will have to become more explicit - if only because of the increasing pressures from the ending of the Cold War and the need for the EC to co-ordinate common policing policies in response to '1992' especially since the Maastricht summit of December 1991, not because of any motive of more open government (for which calls have largely gone unheeded), but as a means of defending policies and practices against attacks - by an increasing number of observers - on the idiosyncratic, and often unco-ordinated ways in which the UK government has handled post entry controls.

## Notes

1. See R. Kaye and R. Charlton, *United Kingdom Refugee Admission Policy and the Politically Active Refugee*, (Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, Warwick, Research Papers in Ethnic Relations No 13 1990)
2. *ibid*
3. For example F.H. Hinsley and C Simkins, *British Intelligence In The Second World War Vol 4 'Security And Counter Intelligence'*, (London HMSO 1990)
4. Although most of the collected evidence points to the major roles of the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It is quite obvious that other departments may also be involved in monitoring specific groups. Robin Oakley records that in 1936 the Colonial office appointed a Liaison office for Cypriots in London. As his footnote states: 'the Liaison officer's brief was clearly intended to include political surveillance as well as welfare work. See R. Oakley, 'The Control Of Cypriot Migration To Britain Between The War', *Immigrants and Minorities Vol 6 No 1 March 1987*
5. See T. Smith, 'Counter-Terrorism : Administrative Response In The United Kingdom', *Public Policy and Administration Vol 2 No 1, 1987*
6. Home Affairs Committee, 'Home Office Guidelines On Work Of A Special Branch', session 1984-5. Special Branch, House of Commons April 1985
7. This account of the SB is mainly based on the following sources, Hinsley and Simkins, *Op cit*, R. Norton Taylor, *In defence of the Realm*, (Civil Liberties Trust, London 1990), P. Wright, *Spycatcher*, (Dell, New York, 1988) and D. Campbell and S. Connor, (*On the Record*, London 1986)
8. Home Office guidelines *op cit*
9. Interview with Mary Dines, Rights and Justice, London, May 1987
10. During the state visit of President Caetano of Portugal in 1973 the Portuguese community had pressure put on them 'not to do anything'. See T. Bunyan, *The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain*, (Quartet, London 1977) p.148 See also an article in *Time Out* which mentions that not only were the demonstrators against the President of Brazil filmed by the SB, but, as the article added, a Brazilian 'was interviewed just before the visit. Their questions covered his political activities and his connection with Chilean exile groups'. 'Spotters Spotted' *Time Out* May 19/20 1976
11. See 'Home Office Guidelines On Work Of Special Branch' *op cit*, pp. x-xiii
12. A Special Branch central index has the names and areas of interest of an estimated 2 million individuals stored on Scotland Yard's C Department computer. See Norton-Taylor *op cit* p.46
13. See T. Bower, 'Red Web', *Sunday Times*, August 6, 1989 and 'The Web Breaks', August 13 1989, *Ibid*
14. See Norton-Taylor p.48

15.        ibid
16.        The Security Services Act 1989, for the first time publicly acknowledged the existence of the MI5. A summary of the main provisions of the act are to be found in Norton-Taylor pp.139-42, see footnote 8 for main sources of information on MI5
17.        It is estimated that the computer system has a capacity of 20 million separate files. Actual files on individuals number about one million. The central terminal is linked to a national network of smaller computers and access terminals set up by MI5. Ibid p.45
18.        See for example H. Trevor Roper, *The Philby Affair*, (London 1968), p.28 and P. Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession*, (Pan, London 1986) chs 3 and 12
19.        On information on MI6 see footnote 7, Bunyan, op cit and J. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, (Ballinger, Cambridge Mass, 1988) pp.22-8
20.        Bower op cit
21.        See N. West, *GCHQ*, (Widenfeld and Nicolson, London 1986)
22.        See Richelson op cit pp.15-22
23.        Ibid. Richelson estimated that even in 1987 GCHQ employed between 5 to 8000 and had a budget of \$700 million a year
24.        Ibid
25.        See G. Allison, *The Essence Of Decision*, (Boston, Little Brown, 1971)
26.        See for example memorandum, from Foreign Office Grant Purves to Home Office PRO FO 371/86179 (N1591/1) January 27 1950 about differences over post war East European escapees. For more recent examples during the Gulf War see A. Savill, 'FO Fury at Detention of Arabs', *Independent* February 6 1991
27.        See P. and L. Gillman, *Collar The Lot*, (Quartet Books London 1980) pp.112-4 on the issue of internment with regard to refugees in 1940. Similar examples of discord were reported during Gulf war. See 'MI5 Blamed For Errors In Roundup', *Independent* February 13 1991 also Campbell D 'MI5 Error Over Palestinians Arrest Ends In Kuwait Killing of Namesake' *Guardian*, January 21 1992
28.        For documented evidence of rivalry see for example Hinsley and Smikins op cit Ch 8. For more recent examples during and after the Gulf war see *Independent* and *Guardian* op cit fn 28
29.        See R. Norton-Taylor 'Stumbles In The Shadow Of Terror'. *Guardian* July 4 1990. see also I.D. Walker, *Wanted A Spy In The Nineties*, *Observer Magazine*, November 1990, D. Campbell and R. Norton-Taylor, *A Question Of Intelligence*, *Guardian*, February 11 1992
30.        T. Kushner, *The persistence of prejudice*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1989) p.141

31. S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Sixth Edition, (Penguin, London 1989) p.335
32. Quoted in 'Government Concedes New Arrest Powers Will Cover Liberation Movements' NCCL News release, November 25 1983.
33. Ibid
34. See J. Wood 'Political Exiles Who Now Have To Walk On the Wild Side Of The Law', Guardian October 24 1983
35. Letter from Home Secretary to Robert Hughes MP and chairman of Anti Apartheid Movement 22 Nov 1983. Document located in JCWI files
36. See NCCL News release op cit. See also correspondence between Home Secretary to Nigel Hartley a member of the BRC Executive Council February 12 1984. Letter to be found in BRC archives
37. See 'Prevention Of Terrorism Bill - Its Possible Effects On Refugees' briefing letter from BRC by Martin Barber, director of BRC February 21, 1984 addressed to the Lords. Letter to be found in BRC archives
38. From Home Office statement sent to Bloch's solicitors, Copy found in JCWI files
39. From the early 1980s, Home Office forms granting either ELR, (exceptional leave to remain) refugees status, or LLR (indefinite leave to remain), all contained a clause which stated 'that if during your stay in the UK you take part in activities involving the support of encouragement of violence or conspiracy to cause violence either in the UK or abroad so as to endanger national security or public order the secretary of state may curtail your stay or deport you'. Quoted from then Home Office forms, copies of which are to be found in BRC archives
40. However it should be noted that the US itself has with regard to extradition has been both influenced by domestic political considerations and foreign policy factors. Thus the United States senate found itself in somewhat obvious difficulties over IRA suspects when in 1985 a new extradition treaty between the US and the UK was being formulated. See M. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, (London Mansell, 1987) p.102-3
41. Home Affairs Committee, seventh report session 1989-90 'Practical Police Co-operation in The European Community' Vol 1 July 20 1990 see pages xxxi-xxxii
42. Ibid
43. Ibid
44. See I.D. Pallister, 'Breaking the Connection', Guardian October 20 1978
45. George Jones et al, 'Britain To Ease Extradition', Sunday Times December 8 1985. More recently when in May 1989 the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, announced that the government would be taking no action to deport the wanted Italian terrorist Roberto Fiore', the journal, Searchlight's explanation was 'that one of the reasons for Fiore's apparent immunity from action by the British authorities may be that he has provided the British Secret Service with information'. 'Fascist

Fugitive worked for MI6'. no author Searchlight no 168 June 1989. See also Searchlight no 172 October 1972

46. See C. Thornberry, 'Dr Soblen and the alien law of the United Kingdom', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol 12 Part 2 April 1963, pp.414-474
47. See S. de Smith op cit p.430 fn 130. See also D. Watt, 'Brooke's Last Stand', *Spectator*, May 3, 1963 and A. Howard, 'The end of the affair', *New Statesman*, May 31 1963
48. See R. Kaye and R. Charlton op cit
49. B. Porter, 'The British Government And Political Refugees 1880-1914', in *Immigrants and Minorities* Vol 2 no 3 November 1983, pp.34-7.
50. See I.D. Saunders, 'Aliens In Britain And The Empire During The First World War', p.100-2 in *Loyalties in Conflict : Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War* ed. F. Swyripa and J.H. Thomson, (1983 Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton)
51. See. D. Cesarani, ' Anti-Alienism in England after the First World War', *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol 6 No 1 March 1987 p.5
52. See P. and L. Gillman, op cit
53. Quoted in *Ibid* p.217
54. See M. Hollingsworth and R. Norton-Taylor, *Blacklist : The inside story of political vetting*, (London Hogarth Press 1988)
55. See Bunyan, op cit. pp.124-5
56. *Ibid*
57. See p.5 and fn 11
58. See J. Pugh, 'Duel For The Hand Of Paradise', *Times* December 20, 1985. See also 'Seychelles : Exile's Leader Killed', *Amnesty*, February 1986
59. In an interview with a UKOSA official, he stated that many students from the third world were often only given grants by their governments providing they acted as agents in monitoring the activities of fellow students. Interview with United Kingdom Council For Overseas Student Affairs (UKCOSA) official, September 1990
60. See Payne, D. Dobson *War without end*, (Harrap, London 1986) p.189
  - a. Savill, 'FO Fury At Detention Of Arabs', *Independent* February 6 1991
61. See 'MI5 Blamed For Errors In Roundup', *Independent* February 13 1991
62. See I.D. Campbell op cit fn 28 *Guardian*
63. See Porter op cit
64. See R. Jensen, 'The International Anti-Anarchists Conference Of 1898 And The Origins Of Interpol', *Journal Of Contemporary History*, 1981
65. See Cesarani op cit p.7

66. See F. Carsten, ' German Refugees In Great Britain, 1933-45' in G. Hirschfield ed 'Exile in Great Britain : Refugees from Hitlers Germany (Berg Publishers/Humanities Press, London 1984)
67. See A. Gleees 'The German Political Exile In London 1939-45' in Hirschfield. See also Ibid
68. Tom Bower op cit. See also A. Grey, 'Boat People Plot In Britain For A Counter-Revolution', Sunday Times December 5 1982
69. See FO 371 -NP 1016/21
70. See PRO FO 351/94714 Memo dated 14th July 1951 from Northern Department. In response to parliamentary question asked by Lord Vansittart. See also Marquess of Reading parliamentary question, House of Lords Oct 29, 1952, and PRO FO 371100910 'about alleged harassment by Soviet diplomats from the Baltic states, the Ukraine and Poland' .... Quoted in P Shipley, Hostile Action, (Pinter, London 1989) p.131
71. See 'Political asylum only after screening', Times February 20 1962
72. See J. Bloch and P. Fitzgerald British Intelligence and Covert Action (Brandon/Junction, London/Dublin 1983)
73. See N. West The Friends, Britains post war intelligence operations, (London Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1988) p.6. See also Tom Bower Op cit
74. As one account put it: 'Documents obtained from SAVAK records showed that it was spying not only on Iranian students but on foreign nations, including British Members of Parliament'. Quoted in A. Matin-Asgari, 'The Iranian Movement Abroad : The Confederation of Iranian Students National Union' p.69 in Iranian Refugees and Exiles Since Khomeini, (ed) A Fathi (Costa Mesa, USA, Mazda Publishers 1991)
75. See pp.67-9 Matin-Asgari op cit, for further evidence of the activities of SAVAK in the UK
76. During the 1960s and early 70s, Anti-Vietnam dissidents, especially those who were liable for military conscription were not allowed to stay after entry as military conscription was and has remained not an excuse for political asylum in the UK. See B. Frelick, 'Conscientious Objectors as Refugees', in United States Refugee Year Book 1986, United State Committee for Refugees, Washington DC. Further, UK legislation allows for the extradition of 'deserters' between friendly nations under the Visiting Forces Act 1952. See I. MacDonald, Immigration Law and Practice, 2nd Edition, (London Butterworths, 1987) pp.371-3.
77. For Agee's account of this episode see P. Agee, On the Run, Bloomsbury Press, London 1987. Chs 7 and 8. Mark Hozenball, an American journalist was also deported at the same time. His offence was an article he co-authored with Duncan Campbell on GCHQ which was published in the New Statesman
78. Kaye and Charlton op cit p14. for details of co-operation between CIA and UK intelligence services over the admission of Chilean refugees
79. See Fn 11
80. Interview with a leading Member of Chile Democratica, London, 1986

81. See A.G. Edgell, Ch 5, 'Nigeria/Biafra' pp 55-6 in Civil Wars And The Politics Of International Relief, (ed) M. Davis, (New York, Praeger 1975)
82. See C. Legum, 'Why Dikko Won't Go Away', New African, September 1984
83. See H. Pick, 'Howe fails to soothe Indian anger over Sikhs', Guardian, April 2 1986. See also Dobson and Payne op cit, pp.205-7.
84. See J Carvel and N Knewstud, ' Second Judicial Reprimanded For Baker', Guardian, December 3 1991
85. See 'Practical Police Co-Operation In The European Community', Home Affairs Committee 7th Report 1989/90. July 20 1990
86. See I D Hirst, 'Bunker Of The Exiles' Guardian, June 30 1987
87. See (Documents On Pahlavi Reign Of Terror Vol 1121), Quoted in A Matin Asgari op cit p.63.
88. See M. Mates, The Secret Services : Is There A Case For Greater Openness, in Europe in Turmoil (ed) G Frost, (Adamantine Press, London 1991) especially pp.145-150