

Varieties of South Asian Islam

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Varieties of South Asian Islam¹

Over the past forty years Islamic movements and groups of South Asian origin have come to be established in Britain. They offer different ways, although not always markedly different ways, of being Muslim. Their relationships with each other are often extremely abrasive. Moreover, they can have significantly different attitudes to the state, in particular the non-Muslim state. An understanding of the origins and Islamic orientations of these movements and groups would seem to be of value in trying to make sense of their behaviour in British society. This paper will examine the following movements: the Deobandi, the Bareilvi, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Tablighi Jamaat, the Jamaat-i Islami, the Ahmadiyya, and one which is unlikely to be distinguished in Britain by any particular name, but which represents a very important Islamic orientation, which we shall term the Modernist.² It will also examine the following groups: Shias and Ismailis. In each case we will be concerned to study the historical circumstances in which the movement or group emerged, to set out its beliefs and Islamic orientation, and to suggest both its likely relationships with other movements and groups and its probable attitudes to the state.

The background of the eighteenth century Islamic revival and British Rule

All the movements emerged in South Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The context of their emergence was in part that of a continuing process of Islamic revival and reform, and in part that of the imposition of the colonial state.

From the eighteenth century a great movement of revival and reform swept through the Muslim world as Muslims faced up to the meaning of the decline of Muslim power. In each case this movement had indigenous origins but often received stimuli from movements elsewhere.³ In South Asia the first significant leader of revival and reform was Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) who in his lifetime saw the Mughal empire reduced from the rule of most of India to that of a few square miles around Delhi. He devoted his life to fashioning a form of Islam which could survive political decline: he emphasised the study of the textual sources of the faith, that is the Quran and the Hadiths, as opposed to the study of logic and philosophy which was widespread at the time; he worked to create unity

amongst Muslims and attacked the Shia sect whose power was growing as they came to rule Mughal successor states.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Shah Waliullah's concerns were sustained by his four sons who helped to make Delhi into a major intellectual and spiritual centre to which Muslims would travel from many parts of the eastern Islamic world. By the 1820s the old Mughal capital had become the focus of an activist reform movement led by an associate of Shah Waliullah's descendants, one Saiyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly. Saiyid Ahmad aimed to purify Islam of Hindu influences, to wipe out Shia practices and to abolish sufi customs which suggested that sufi saints could intercede for man with God.⁴ Uniting his followers in his own Tariqa Muhammadiyya he eventually fled Delhi to set up a Muslim community run according to the sharia (holy law) on the Northwest frontier. In 1831 he died in jihad against the Sikhs, but his followers, often known as Wahhabis after the movement of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab in eighteenth century Arabia, were active down to World War One. There were other such movements in South Asia at the time, notably that of Haji Shariatullah in Bengal and the Mappila Muslims in Kerala, but it is Saiyid Ahmad's upon which we focus because several of the movements which concern us had their origins, in part at least, in the Delhi world in which his example was remembered and his spirit still cherished.

The impact of British rule was to destroy most of the bases on which Islamic society had rested. As from the 1820s it came seriously to be felt in Upper India the Muslim elite, as a rentier class, found themselves rivalled in their dominance increasingly by men, mainly Hindus, involved in the new trade and commercial agriculture stimulated by the East India Company. Muslim elites suffered further as the British abolished the revenue-free grants which the Mughals had made to support them as scholars, teachers and administrators. They found Islamic law, which was, of course, revelation reduced to rules for life, steadily replaced by British codes until only the Islamic personal law (known as Anglo-Muhammadden law) remained. In the same way the Muslim law officers were replaced by westerners. Everywhere aspects of life influenced by the Quran were being reduced to just private matters, while western knowledge and values spread in the public sphere and threatened to make inroads into the private one.

Then, a series of events took place which brought home to north Indian Muslims what had happened: the kingdom of Awadh was annexed in 1856 and, following the Mutiny uprising of 1857-58, the Mughal emperor was forced into abdication and Delhi sacked. Gone were the psychological props of significant Muslim rulers still in place; empty was the religious and cultural capital of Indo-Islamic civilisation. The shock of these disasters is recorded in much of the poetry and prose of the time. Members of the Muslim elite considered leaving India; some actually did so. The shock forced those who remained to face up to the problem of how could they be Muslim under British rule. The responses to this questioning form a period of unusual creativity in the Islamic history of South Asia. The movements with which we are concerned are all different answers to the question: how could Islamic society be sustained under colonial rule? This was a question which later came to be reformulated as: how could Islamic society be sustained in the face of the overall dominance of western civilisation?

The Deobandis⁵

The Deoband movement was the first to take shape. Its founders, Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, had been educated in the reform atmosphere of pre-Mutiny Delhi and were determined to make its traditions live in the post-Mutiny world. Education was their answer to enabling Muslims to be Muslims without political power. The focus of the movement was a madrasa (Islamic secondary school) founded at Deoband, a *qasba* (country town occupied by Muslim gentry) in Saharanpur district some ninety miles northeast of Delhi. This madrasa has subsequently grown to the extent that it is now regarded by many as the most important traditional university in the Islamic world after Al-Azhar in Cairo. The movement itself has been spread in large part by the foundation of madrasas associated with Deoband. By 1900 it acknowledged forty attached schools; by its centenary in 1967, 8934.

What Deoband offered was a way of being Muslim with as limited a relationship as possible with the state. As far as beliefs went, it laid emphasis following the reformist tradition on close adherence to the sharia, which was closely associated with an emphasis on the study of the revealed sciences as opposed to the rational ones. It tolerated only a restrained sufi practice which admitted of no hint of intercession. It required avoidance of all forms of behaviour which might suggest the influence of either the Shia, the Hindu or the British world. Overall their's was a scriptural religion; knowledge of God's word was crucial to knowing how to behave properly as a Muslim. At a time when they did not control the state, they must get knowledge for themselves and impose it upon themselves, the promptings of the individual human conscience being the main sanction. Appropriately this has come to be termed a 'protestant' form of Islam. And in its association, for instance, with literacy, the printing press and personal responsibility, bears comparison with the emergence of Christian protestantism in Europe. In the Islamic world there were similar developments in the Muhammadiyya of the Dutch East Indies⁶ and the Salafiyya of French North Africa.⁷

In its organisation and its policies the Deoband movement was geared to sustaining Islamic society outside the colonial state. The madrasas were dependent on public subscription; assistance from government was always refused. The organisation, moreover, unlike earlier Muslim organisations which tended to live little longer than their founders, was bureaucratic; many lessons were learned from the example of mission schools and pre-Mutiny Delhi College. Much effort was devoted to proselytisation; debating was part of the Deobandi training while large numbers of books in Arabic and Persian were translated into the vernacular and spread wide by means of the printing press. A typical Deobandi book is Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi's still popular *Bihishti Zevar*, first published in the 1890s, which offers complete guidance to a woman on how to behave as a Muslim.⁸ While should anyone be in doubt on a point of Islamic law

they had only to write to the Dar ul-Ifta (office of Legal Judgements) at Deoband to receive guidance.

Deoband's Islamic stance was, of course, reflected in its politics. Having created systems to operate outside the state their idea of independence was ultimately the rule of the ulama (learned men), although the feeling was not restricted to Deobandi ulama at the time. This was the point they made to secretary of state Montagu when he visited India to test opinion on political reform in 1917 and 1918; it was a strand which ran through all their thinking about independence from the 1920s on. They could not justify support for Pakistan which they envisaged as an 'Islamic state' which would be ruled by secular Muslims. They saw a preferable future in a secular independent India where somewhat optimistically they hoped that some form of jurisprudential apartheid would be achieved between the Hindus and themselves. At the outcome a minority of Deobandis did declare for Pakistan and under Shabbir Ahmad Usmani played a part in the early stages of the formulation of the Pakistani constitution. From 1919 the main Deobandi voice in Indian politics was the Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Hind which after partition found itself with a Pakistani wing, the Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Islam. As far as the Deobandis have had any politics in India since Independence, they have been support for the Congress.⁹

If the Deobandis in Britain are true to their original purposes, they will form a bastion of conservative Sunni orthodoxy in the Hanafi mould - Burhanuddin Marghinani's *Hidaya*, compiled in the twelfth century AD, will very probably be their guide. They will wish to preserve the sharia as handed down from the Islamic middle ages; they will resist intercessionary practices, hence their frequent and bitter conflicts with the Barelvis; they will be concerned to proselytise by providing education and other systems to fashion the religious personality. They will have no concern to establish an Islamic state, indeed, they are unlikely to be interested in the state except in so far as it prevents them from fulfilling their quite narrowly conceived objectives.

Ahl-i Hadith¹⁰

The Ahl-i Hadith come from the same Delhi world and the same background of revival and reform as the Deobandis. They were, however, more extreme in their religious ideas, more intense in their commitment to them, more elitist in their social background, more consciously sectarian in their behaviour, and less influential. Many came from once great Muslim families which had fallen on hard times, as did their best-known figures in the late nineteenth century, Maulana Nazir Hussain, who was descended from a family of qazis of the Mughal court, and Nawab Siddiq Hasan, who restored his fortunes by marrying the Begum of Bhopal. By the twentieth century the movement had begun to acquire institutionalised forms with its own madrasas, mosques, journals, and from 1912 its own All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference which met annually.

Like the Deobandis the Ahl-i Hadith were committed to purifying Muslim behaviour of all practices not in accordance with the sharia. But in doing so they went further than the Deobandis; they rejected the decisions of the medieval law schools (Hanafi, Maliki etc.) and made direct use of the Quran and the Hadith. They argued that the best way to be a true Muslim was to go back to these textual sources and use the jurisprudential techniques sanctioned by the Hadith (i.e. *qiyas* or argument by analogy and *ijma* or the consensus of the ulama on a point of law) which the founders of the law schools had used themselves. Their approach was one which meant immense individual responsibility for the believer; it was not one which could be shared outside a spiritual elite. Appropriately, therefore, they went further than the Deobandis in their disapproval of sufism, condemning almost all its expressions.

The way of the Ahl-i Hadith was puritanical. They lived in dread of judgement, which gave a notable intensity to their own religious practice and their

attitudes towards those of others. Their interpretations of the law tended to be literal and narrowly conceived. They insisted, as the Deobandis also did, on various reforms in family practice, for instance, simple marriage celebrations, modest dowries and widow re-marriage. They were resolute in fulfilling the requirements of the faith, encouraging performance of haj (the Mecca pilgrimage) and scrupulously rendering the proper zakat (the canonical tithe). In India they saw themselves as part of a strict reforming tradition going back to Shah Waliullah and beyond. In the wider Islamic world they identified with the general orientation of the Arabian Wahhabis.

As we might expect from such a puritanical group, their style was sectarian and 'embattled' as Metcalf puts it.¹¹ They quite clearly set themselves apart from other Muslims, sporting their own cut of beard and insisting on their own form of prayer. This latter practice sharply divided them from Hanafis. It was, in communal prayer, a highly visible and extremely annoying distinction: they said 'amen' aloud, lifted their hands at the time of bowing, folded their hands above the navel and repeated the fatihah (the opening chapter of the Quran which Muslims use as Christians might use the Lord's prayer) aloud along with the Imam. The presence of Ahl-i Hadith often caused disturbances in late nineteenth century India and Hanafis resorted to banning them from their mosques. This led to a series of judicial disputes in which, eventually, the Privy Council ruled that mosques should be open to Ahl-i Hadith as well as Hanafis.

As is not unusual with such intense ideological sects, the Ahl-i Hadith split. Towards the end of the nineteenth century a group emerged under Maulana Abdullah Chakralavi in Lahore which accused them of placing excessive reliance on Hadith, indeed, turning them into a second form of revelation. Chakralavi asserted that only the Quran could be used as compulsory guidance, the Hadith referring merely to the human condition of the Prophet. The group, of course, came to be called the Ahl-i Quran. They were even more exclusive than the Ahl-i Hadith, not bothering to raise the question of whether they could pray with others, but establishing their own prayer ritual with a series of distinctive practices including kneeling only on one knee. They prayed only in their own mosques, eliminated funeral and Id prayers, and prayers and alms offered for the sake of the dead. Their dispute with the Ahl-i Hadith was so bitter that eventually the government had to intervene to protect Chakralavi's life. Up to the middle of this century the Ahl-i Quran were found mainly in the Punjab.

In sum the Ahl-i Hadith in British India were a puritanical sect whose positions by and large were extreme versions of those of the Deobandis. They placed an enormous emphasis on personal responsibility in religion and had a general condemnatory attitude towards those of others. Their attitude to the state has been similar to that of mainline Deobandi thought.

The Barelvis¹²

The origins of the Barelvis can be traced back to early nineteenth century Delhi, although they are to be found not so much in the movement of revival and reform as in the resistance to it. The movement crystallised in the late nineteenth century around the scholar and polymath, Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly (1856-1921). He used his Hanafi legal scholarship to justify Islam as it had been handed down - a custom-laden Islam which was closely tied to the sufi world of the shrines where believers sought the help of saints to intercede from them with God. If the Deobandis wanted to conserve Islam as they found it in the Hanafi law books of the Islamic middle ages, the Barelvis wished to conserve it as they found it in nineteenth century India. In the manner of the time they proselytised their position, regarding themselves as the true Sunnis, 'Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jamaat'. Predictably, given their emphasis on intercession and on the lack of personal responsibility, from the late nineteenth century to the present their relationships with the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis have been ones of polemic and rivalry expressed at times in street rioting.¹³

Ahmad Riza Khan's teaching places, first of all, great emphasis on the pre-eminence of the Prophet. He stressed the sufi concept of the light of Muhammad (Nur-i Muhammadi), which was derived from God's own light and had existed like the Word in Christian theology from the beginning of creation. It had played a part in the very process of creation; it was omnipresent; it meant that the Prophet though human was also more than human. He had, moreover, unique knowledge of the unknown (ilm ul-ghaib) and therefore could be called upon to intercede for man with God. Along similar lines Ahmad Riza Khan asserted that saints could see with the light of God (Nur-i Khuda) and therefore their intercession could be called upon, and not just at their shrines but anywhere.

In harmony with such teachings the Bareilvi leader displayed enormous respect for the Prophet in his religious practice, paying great attention to maulud ceremonies (celebrations of the Prophet's birth), and to the time of qiyam during maulud when it was believed the Prophet was actually present. He also observed the annual death celebrations of many saints (known as Urs or the time when saints had been joined to God), noting in particular the 11th of each month in commemoration of Abdul Qadir Gilani who was the most revered of all sufi saints. And, of course, he justified a wide range of customary practices from bestowing amulets to drawing blood on Saturdays. In his comfortable endorsement of the Islam of the shrine, Ahmad Riza Khan had broad popular support, finding especial favour, at the beginning at least, from the illiterate and the villager as opposed to the educated of the gasba and town. He presented an answer to providing Islamic guidance to a rural Muslim world at a time when Muslims did not control the state.

While Ahmad Riza Khan lived he dominated the movement and there was relatively little institutional development, although by his death several schools had been founded, most notably the Jamiat-Manzir-i Islam in Bareilly and the Dar ul-Ulum Hizb ul-Ahnaf in Lahore. In politics the movement was, if anything, pro-British, supporting them during World War One and actually organizing ulama to resist the Khilafat-non-co-operation movement of 1919-22.14 As Independence approached Bareilvis gave their support to the Pakistan campaign, as did other ulama from non-reforming backgrounds, who saw Independence in terms of the reconnection of Muslims with political power. Over the past forty years the movement has burgeoned both inside and outside South Asia. In Pakistan its organisation is the Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Pakistan and it boasts at least one notable political figure in Maulana Noorani.

As far as Bareilvis in Britain are concerned, we would not expect them, despite their more positive attitude to the state, to have any more difficulty in living under non-Muslim rule than the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith. Flexibility is a feature of their behaviour. However, what they are very likely to be noted for is their continuing polemic against these two movements and their open competition with them for the control of resources.

The Modernists¹⁵

One variety of South Asian Islam, which may not be particularly noticeable amongst the immigrant Muslim communities of Britain's towns, but which is one of great importance in the overall development of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is that known as modernism. Many of its origins, in driving spirit, in methods and in personnel, are to be found in the early nineteenth century Delhi world of revival and reform. The formulator of this Islamic position was Saiyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), the descendant of high-ranking Mughal service families. Before the Mutiny uprising he was extremely devout, a gifted amateur historian and archaeologist and a minor judicial official under the British. After the Mutiny uprising his answer to the problem of how Muslims might survive as Muslims without power was to reconcile them to British rule and western civilisation. His method was to demonstrate that there

was nothing in the achievement of western civilisation that intrinsically undermined Islam. Like the Ahl-i Hadith he circumvented the medieval law schools and went straight to the Quran and Hadith as guidance for Muslims. The basis of his exegetical principles was that the laws of Creation were the Work of God and the Quran was the Word of God and they just could not be contradictory - and if they seemed to be so it was because man failed to understand them correctly. So, for instance, he explained apparently miraculous events in the Quran, as Christian apologists might have done similar events in the Bible, as metaphors. So equally, he explained Islamic practices criticised by the West such as jihad, slavery or polygamy in terms of their historical context of the Quran's revelation in the seventh century AD. In the process he developed the dynamic principle of modernist thought, which was to distinguish between what was central to revelation and what was merely the historical wrapping in which it came. His concern was to translate that central purpose into modern circumstances.

This dynamic principle has been developed in modernist thought down to the present. It is there in Muhammad Iqbal's (1877?-1938) bridging of the gulf between Islamic universalism and the modern national state; it is there too in his bridging of the gulf between the sovereignty of God and that of the people in his transference of the pillar supporting the sharia from the consensus of the ulama to that of the people as a whole. It is most clearly worked out by the leading modernist thinker of today, and one time head of Pakistan's constitutionally established Institute of Islamic Research, Fazlur Rahman, in his explanation of the reasoning behind the most important piece of modernist legislation, Pakistan's Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961.¹⁶

The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh (1877), the All-India Muslim Educational Conference (1886) and the All-India Muslim League (1906) were the institutional forces of the Modernist orientation, although not all associated with them would necessarily have supported it. Once Pakistan was won the modernists certainly hoped that it would be a laboratory in which their thought could be developed. But from the very first debates over the constitution they were opposed, as they had been from the late nineteenth century onwards, by reforming groups such as those we have examined above, and the fundamentalist group which we shall be examining below. Although initially they had the upper hand in the compromises that have been reached, they have had over the years to cede more and more ground to their opponents. In India, on the other hand, the abiding sense of insecurity of Muslims, their capacity to protect the sharia being seen as the touchstone of their capacity to preserve their identity, has left absolutely no room for legal reform along modernist lines, as the recent Shah Bano issue demonstrated.¹⁷

In Britain we would expect to find modernists amongst the highly educated, often from second or even third generation university-educated families. Undoubtedly their approach offers great opportunities for legal flexibility but to make public use of their understanding would be of little value as they do not have broad support in the community. For one thing, their elitism apart, their orientation has come under increasing attack as the Muslim revival has gathered way over the past thirty years; for another, their approach is more likely to succeed in those places where Muslims wield power as opposed to those where they are in a minority and feel threatened by another civilisation.

The Ahmadiyya¹⁸

The Ahmadiyya form the last major movement to spring out of nineteenth century India. Unlike the movements examined above they have no origins in the world of early nineteenth century Delhi; they are very much a product of the post-Mutiny era and the extent of religious competition in northwestern India. Here there was a powerful Christian missionary polemic against Islam and Hinduism. Here too there was a powerful Hindu revivalist response, in the form of the Arya

Samaj, which began by aiming to reconvert Christians to Hinduism, but continued by turning its attention to Muslims.

It was in this context that the Ahmadiyya emerged. The founder was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) who came from an old Mughal service family of Qadian in East Punjab. He began as a champion of Islamic orthodoxy against Christian missionary polemic and Arya Samaj Hinduism, but came to see himself as 'at least' a symbolic representative of Krishna and Jesus as well as an Islamic Mahdi. In 1889 he proclaimed himself to be a minor prophet, with a messianic mission to rejuvenate Islam - the expected 'messenger of the latter days'. Inevitably, bitter polemic followed his denial of the finality of Muhammad's prophecy. Eventually, Ghulam Ahmad and his followers seceded from Sunni Islam and prayed in their own mosques, being called Mirzais or Qadianis.

In fact Ghulam Ahmad differed from Sunni Muslims on only three major points:

(1) In the denial of the finality of Muhammad's prophethood, which he explained by making a distinction between primary and secondary or Mahdistian prophethood. He regarded himself as having the same relationship to Muhammad as Jesus did to Moses; as Jesus brought the period of Mosaic order to an end so he brought that of Muhammad to a close.

(2) In his claim to be the resurrected Jesus, in defiance of both the New Testament and the Quran, Ghulam Ahmad asserted that Jesus did not die on the cross but only swooned, recovering later to travel on a mission to the ten lost tribes of Israel in Afghanistan and Kashmir. He even went to the extent of identifying the grave of Jesus in Khan Yar Street, Srinagar, Kashmir. His discovery of the last resting place of Jesus and his denial of the ascended Christ of the New Testament and the Quran was central to his own claim to be Mahdi/Messiah.

(3) In his pacific theory of jihad in which he argued that, as he was the spiritual prophet for the age, the only appropriate jihad was not war but missionary work. He categorically ruled out any form of jihad against the British.¹⁹

After the death of the first successor to Ghulam Ahmad in 1914, a major schism took place in the community over Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood. A faction led by Khwaja Kamaluddin, sometime Imam of the Woking Mosque, and Maulana Muhammad Ali, noted translator of the Quran, while retaining Ahmad's Christology, recognised him only as a renovator (mujaddid) of Islam and not a prophet (nabi). They became known as the Lahoris (the Lahore Party), as opposed to the Qadianis, or orthodox Ahmadis, who were led by Ghulam Ahmad's son, Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad (d.1965).

Both groups of Ahmadiyya have been extremely vigorous in proselytisation. Under Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad the Qadiani-Ahmadis became a disciplined and highly organised community. To begin with the administrative centre was at Qadian itself, where as many as possible would gather each December; after partition it was relocated in Rabwah (West Pakistan). Two societies were formed to prosecute the work of the community: the Sadr-Anjuman-i Ahmadiyya, which was responsible for administration and education, and whose success is marked by unusually high literacy rates amongst the Ahmadiyya - in Pakistan, for instance, a 100% rate is claimed for men and a 70% rate for women; and the Anjuman-i Taraqqi-i Islam which is responsible for missionary work, and whose success is manifest in the large number of converts gained in the subcontinent and worldwide, notably in Africa. There is a considerable network of missionary centres in Europe and North America.

The Ahmadiyya are hated by Muslims of all complexions from orthodox to modernist to fundamentalist to Shia. In the 1930s they were made a major focus of attack by the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam (The Association of Islamic Freedom Fighters), an experience which greatly developed their sense of community. The assault was

continued after the establishment of Pakistan, which the Ahmadiyya had not supported, and made more urgent by the fact that a leading member of the government was Sir Chaudhuri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, a Qadiani of great gifts. Then, in 1953 their status became the occasion of the first great trial of strength between the orthodox/fundamentalist opposition and the modernist/secular leadership of the state when the former demanded that the Ahmadiyya be declared a non-Muslim sect. There were riots and martial law had to be declared before the government had its way. Two decades later, however, anti-Ahmadiyya pressure was successful and Mr Bhutto was forced to legislate that they were no longer qualified to hold office in Pakistan.

In Britain we would expect the Ahmadiyya, in view of their high levels of education and their traditions of self-help, to fit easily into the social fabric. Moreover, since in recent years their headquarters had been moved to London to escape persecution in Pakistan, they have a special reason that they should do so. In addition some of the sources of friction, which exist between other Muslim groups, should not exist in their case as their mosques and other institutions are completely separate. On the other hand, what they stand for is a continuing source of irritation to all Muslims, many of whom are likely to object if the Ahmadiyya are recognised as Muslims by the authorities. Their vigorous missionary work is almost bound to cause conflict from time to time: Muslims are likely to oppose any headway made; Christians are likely to take offence at their beliefs about Christ and aspersions on his character, for instance, that he was drunken, a coward, consorted with prostitutes etc...

Finally, it might be noted that the Ahmadiyya have interesting similarities with another messianic movement, the Bahai, who emerged in Iran in the mid-nineteenth century. There is also, however, one important difference: the Bahai have left Islam while the Ahmadiyya have not.

The Tablighi Jamaat²⁰

The Tablighi Jamaat of Delhi, along with the Jamaat-i Islami, form the two great Islamic movements generated in twentieth century South Asia. Both of them have many followers and much influence outside the region. Indeed, some would say that the Tabligh is the most popular reform movement in the Islamic world as a whole. As a movement it carries the drives and the orientations of early nineteenth-century Delhi and of Deoband into the later twentieth century, but gives them new edge in its central purpose of mass Islamic education, of the correcting of the Muslim's worship and of the perfecting of his relationship with God.

The founder of the Tablighi Jamaat, which is also known as the Tahrik-i Iman (Faith Movement) and the Dini Dawat (Religious Mission), was Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944). He came from a distinguished family of ulama and sufis from the qasba of Kandhla in Muzaffarnagar district some fifty miles north of Delhi. In 1917, after studying at Deoband and teaching at its Saharanpur offshoot, he took over his father's madrasa in Delhi, which was devoted to instructing the Meos, a people from the large rural area to the southwest of Delhi whose Islam was only superficial. Soon he was dissatisfied with the result of his teaching and in 1925 began active missionary work in the Meo villages. In the process the aims, methods and style of execution of the Tablighi Jamaat were forged.

The aims are summed up in Ilyas' A Call to Muslims-Message to an All-India Conference of Ulama, and the Muslim Political Leaders at Delhi in April 1944, the Year of his Death. He sees Muslims as different from other people in that their success or failure depends on the complete adoption of Islam and strict obedience to Muhammad. For this to happen the following practices must be adopted: (1) inculcating missionary spirit; (2) acquiring and transmitting Islamic knowledge; (3) enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong; (4) working together in mutual love. With regard to the last point Ilyas urged that

religious reform could never be achieved by compulsion, only by persuasion. Alongside these directives Ilyas declared that God had provided a six-point programme in the method of the Prophet: (1) the profession of faith; (2) the ritually prescribed prayers; (3) knowledge and remembrance of God; (4) respect for all Muslims; (5) sincere intentions; (6) the giving of time.²¹

The style of execution is well described thus:

The Tablighi Jama'at asks Muslims, irrespective of their educational or economic background, to come together and spare their time for travelling in groups, from house to house, street to street, village to village, town to town, exhorting the people to live their life according to the principles mentioned. They are to spend these days in living collectively in the spirit of Muslim brotherhood in an atmosphere of harmony and love...

Each party going out for tabligh comprises about ten persons. One of them, with a comparatively better religious knowledge is their mu'allim (instructor) and one with the capability of management their amir (group leader). After gathering in the mosque for supererogatory prayers and prayers of supplication they move out with earnest looks and serious deportment (usually recognisable by their wearing beard, Muslim cap and kurta-payjama, and carrying each one his blanket and travel bag) hymning the Glory and Sanctity of God and not indulging in anything which may be irrelevant to this sacred occasion. When they reach the locality where they are to deliver the 'call' they once again raise their hands in collective supplication (du'a) before God. They then go on their gasht (round) from door to door and collect the people in the mosque where they will exhort them to observe their duty to Allah on the lines of the programme (set out above). Ladies may also be addressed on adherence to ritual prayer and other points. They are also invited to take an active part in the movement.²²

In its early years the Tabligh was dismissed by the ulama as superficial in its impact; here also was the disdain of the qasba ashraf (respectable folk) for the Tabligh's rustic preachers. But this did not prevent the organisation from growing, and ultimately spreading to East and West Asia, Europe and North America - from 1944 to 1965 it was led by Ilyas' son Yusuf, and since then by Maulana Inamul Hasan. Notable features of the movement are: its total focus on the renewal of faith; the forbidding of members to discuss politics while preaching or involve them in anyway in their mission; the forbidding of members to engage in religious controversy; the following of the sharia in its personal law dimension as set out in the medieval law books; and the way in which aspects of its methods are clearly an extension of the sufi tradition.

In Britain we would expect the Tabligh, which has an institutional centre at Dewsbury, to be the Islamic group to be the least involved in controversy of any kind.

The Jamaat-i Islami²³

The Jamaat-i Islami is a leading part of what has come to be called the 'Islamic Movement' in the second half of the twentieth century; it is at the same time a prime example of Muslim fundamentalism, which we define as the concern to return to what Muslims feel is the original form and intent of Islamic doctrine, a concern which is much influenced by twentieth century understandings. As such it shares similarities of concern and approach with the leaders of the Iranian revolution and with the Muslim Brotherhood and its more recent offshoots in Egypt. Indeed, its ideas played a significant role in the second stage in the ideological development of the Brotherhood from the 1950s. As a movement the Jamaat represents a substantial change of concern and approach from the other movements we have examined. These have been conceived as answers to the problem of how to be Muslim under western colonial rule. The Jamaat offers an answer to the larger question of how to be Muslim in the face of the spread of western

civilisation. Power, it argues, is essential to the preservation of Islamic civilisation, and like the modernists it is concerned to unite Islam with that prime form of twentieth century human organisation, the modern state. The Jamaat is an elite party of the righteous which aims to bring about this end.

The origins of the Jamaat lie in the ideas of Saiyid Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979), who was a journalist and a theologian but not a man with the training of a traditional alim (learned man). Coming from a notable family of sufis, his father was a lawyer who had been brought up in Delhi but preferred to live in Hyderabad as the last significant centre of the Mughal tradition. When young Maududi was carefully insulated from western culture and the English language. From age sixteen he supported himself as a journalist, most notably as editor of Al-Jamiat from 1924 to 1927, the organ of the Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Hind. During this decade he came to know many ulama and became thoroughly versed in Arabic; he also learned English, went clean-shaven and wore western dress. From his mid-twenties he began a deep study of Islam. His first concern was to defend it from Hindu accusations that it had been spread by the sword, but in the process he developed a deep and systematic understanding of his faith. By the time he took up the editorship of Tarjuman Al-Quran in 1932, which was to be the main vehicle of his ideas for the rest of his life, he knew, as he wrote looking back in the 1970s, what he had to do:

the plan of action I had in mind was that I should first break the hold which Western culture and ideas had come to acquire over the Muslim intelligentsia, and to instil in them the fact that Islam has a code of life of its own, its own culture, its own political and economic systems and a philosophy and an educational system which

are all superior to anything that Western civilisation could offer. I wanted to rid them of the wrong notion that they needed to borrow from others in the matter of culture and civilisation.¹⁸

The intensity of his feeling runs through all his articles of the 1930s; his fear of the corrupting influence of western civilisation is notably manifest in his articles on *pardah* first published in 1935.

The last decade of British rule in India, with its attendant anxieties over the future of Muslims, brought Maududi to develop the political dimension of his Islamic vision. He told Muslims that they were a separate nation in India but not in the European sense suggested by the All-India Muslim League. They had a message for all humanity. The way to carry this message forward was to establish not a nation state of Muslims but an Islamic state in which every constituent part would reveal Islam in ideal and practice. In August 1941 Maududi founded the *Jamaat-i Islami*, a carefully selected righteous elite, to put this idea into practice.

Maududi's political vision may be expressed thus. Central is the belief that God alone is sovereign; man has gone astray because he has accepted sovereigns other than God, for instance, Kings, nation-states or custom. All the guidance which man needs can be found in the sharia which offers a complete scheme of life where nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking. Political power is essential to put this divinely ordained pattern into effect; the Islamic state has a missionary purpose. Moreover, because God's guidance extends to all human activity, this state must be universal and all-embracing, and because the state's purpose is to establish Islamic ideology it must be run by those who believe in it and comprehend its spirit - those who do not may just live within the confines of the state as non-Muslim citizens (*zimmi*s). Naturally this state recognises that God not man is the source of all law. The state is merely God's vice-regent (*khalifa*) on earth. It is a vice-regency, however, which is shared by all Muslim citizens of the state with whom, in consequence, the ruler must consult in the process of government. So Maududi describes his polity as a 'theo-democracy' in which the whole community of Muslims interpret the law of God within the framework supplied by the sharia. The ruler (*Amir*) is to be elected by whatever means are appropriate providing they ensure the choice of men with the confidence of the people. Legislation itself takes place in four

ways: by interpretation, by analogy, by inference, and, in that area of human affairs about which the sharia is silent, by independent judgement.

The Jamaat itself is a highly organised institution run along lines similar to those Maududi set out for the Islamic state. According to the constitution of 1952, which was amended in 1957, the head of the organisation holds the position of Amir and he is elected by the members - Maududi held this position until 1972. There is a Consultative Council, an Executive Council, a Secretary-general and seven departments. Beneath this central organisation there are provincial and district organisations each with their Amir, Consultative Councils and Secretary-general. The central administration is based at Lahore. Normal membership is restricted; often an applicant is kept under observation for months to see if his moral qualities and manner of life reach the standard required by the Jamaat. Thus in 1971 the organisation had only 2500 members but several hundred thousand sympathisers (muttafiqin) whose training and education is given great attention, often in specially established training camps. Finance comes mainly from donations and from the considerable royalties derived from Maududi's works. There are several front organisations of peasants, workers, students and ulama; there is also an Islamic Research Institute.²⁵

Despite its small numbers the Jamaat has had a considerable impact on the politics of Pakistan. From 1948 to 1956 it played a key role in directing Pakistan away from developing into a secular state towards an Islamic state, so that the first constitution, which was promulgated in 1956, looked towards reconstructing 'Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis and revising all existing laws in the light of the Quran and Sunna'. But the martial law regime of Ayub Khan from 1958 and the leftward-leaning government of Z.A. Bhutto from 1971 meant that no headway was made, indeed, the Jamaat was confronted by the modernist Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. In consequence the Jamaat was in almost continual opposition, going to the extent of taking the apparently unIslamic step of supporting the candidature of Fatima Jinnah against Ayub Khan for President in 1965 and playing a major role in the movement to overthrow Bhutto in 1977. The Jamaat was able, certainly in the early years, to support General Zia ul-Haq and his desire for Islamisation, although soon this came to be seen as largely cosmetic and no material advance towards the Jamaat's goal of establishing an Islamic system. Among the Jamaat's strengths in Pakistani politics have been its disciplined organisation, its comprehensive ideology and its clear goal; among its weaknesses have been its inability to expand its support significantly beyond the confines of the lower-middle class intelligentsia.²⁶

We would expect support for the Jamaat in Britain to be proportionately rather greater than in Pakistan. First because here all Muslims are confronted directly by the challenges of Western civilisation, and to these the Jamaat offers the most complete and systematic answer. And second because Muslims in Britain are favourably placed sociologically. Religious fundamentalism seems to flourish amongst those who are in a state of transition from one type of society to another, so, for instance, it is very much a phenomenon of urbanising societies in the Middle East and South Asia. We would expect it also to flourish amongst those who have and still make yet more transitions, from rural to urban areas, from South Asia to Britain, and in their daily lives from Muslim home to Western school, factory and office.

The question remains: how can we expect an organisation dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state to behave in Britain? If a member of the Jamaat was asked what his ultimate ambition for the organisation was, he would probably admit that he hoped ultimately for the transformation of Britain into an Islamic state. But it is important to remember that the Jamaat is as much a political as a religious organisation and has shown its willingness to operate within the structures provided by the state, though it be at odds with the masters of the moment. We would expect it to be opportunistic in its approach

as it was in supporting Fatima Jinnah in 1965. We would expect it to make the fullest possible use of opportunities provided by the state to establish Islamic enclaves, for instance, in schooling. Overall, given its traditions of welfare provision, funding hospitals, dispensaries and so on, and given its organisations capacities (which are well represented by the achievements of its British arm, the UK Islamic Mission), we would expect it to work with some success towards creating a high level of Islamic organisation within the British state framework, a process which may well be assisted by current government policy of withdrawing from the workings of society.

Shias and Ismailis²⁷

Here we deal with totally different phenomena as these groups did not spring up in order to confront the challenges of British colonialism and Western civilisation over the past one hundred and fifty years but are movements which date back to resistance to Sunni domination and to party strife in the early years of the Muslim community. Shiism began as a movement of political opposition to the early caliphs, which justified itself doctrinally by claiming that the only legitimate successors of Muhammad were the descendants of his cousin and son-in-law Ali. The belief developed that, along with the exoteric interpretation of the Quran, there was a secret interpretation which had been transmitted from Muhammad to Ali and from Ali to his heir; hence the only authoritative source of guidance were those successors of Ali to whom this secret knowledge had been transmitted, and who had thus been designated Imam, or leader of the community. Gradually the Imams were raised to a superhuman status which was expressed in the belief that they were incarnations of Divine Light which had descended to them through the prophets from Adam. It followed that they were infallible and without sin. Most South Asian Shias are Twelvers, the most important Shia sect and that which rules Iran. They recognise twelve Imams, the last being Muhammad Al-Muntazar who disappeared down a well, or so it is said, around the year 873 AD, and whose return is expected. In the meantime he lives in concealment and continues to guide his followers through his mujtahids (very learned ulama competent to use independent judgement).

Most South Asian Twelver Shias are descendants of migrants from Iran who came in the main in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or from Sunnis who converted to Shiism in order better to be able to win positions at the courts of Shia rulers. They operate under a system of personal law which differs notably from Sunni systems in the matters of temporary marriage, divorce and inheritance. Moreover, they have found it necessary to maintain a separate communal existence which extends to worship, places of worship and festivals such as Muharram. In Pakistan, Lahore and Karachi are their main centres; in India, Lucknow, the former capital of the last significant Shia ruler.

Three points seem worthy of note:

(1) For the past three centuries Shia-Sunni relations have been particularly bad in South Asia, frequently resulting in communal riots in which many have been killed. Among the sources of irritation offered by Shias to Sunnis are: their call to prayer; their practice of cursing the first three caliphs and Yazid; and their emotional ceremonies in the month of Muharram, in particular on the 10th, when they recall the martyrdom of Hussain at the hands of the Sunnis. In recent years these sources of tension have been added to by the struggle between Iran and Iraq and her Arab allies, and Shia-Sunni clashes during the Mecca pilgrimage. We see no reason why these endemic tensions should not come to have some reflection in relations between the communities in Britain, should enough Shias come to be gathered in one area.

(2) Through the belief that the Shia mujtahids are instruments of the occultated Imam there is in Twelver Shiism, as classically understood, much greater potential for legal change in response to a changing world than there is in the classical Sunni legal system.

(3) South Asian Shias have always had links with their religious heartland in Iran and Iraq. They have travelled to the shrine cities for pilgrimage and for study, and ideas and moods amongst the Shias of these cities have been reflected amongst South Asian Shias. Certainly the Iranian revolution gave Shias on the subcontinent a fillip and recent years have seen much rioting in Karachi. But for a considered assessment of the impact of the revolution on the Shia communities of Pakistan we must await the work of Professor Nikkie Keddie of UCLA, a leading US historian of Iran, who over the past three years has turned her attention to this group.

The Ismailis number only a few hundred thousand on the subcontinent. They are significant less for their numbers than for their wealth. As a sect they are an offshoot from the main branch of Shias, regarding the sixth Imam's son Ismail as his rightful successor while the Shias followed his brother Musa Kazim. The Ismailis themselves, however, divided over the succession to the Fatimid caliph Mustansir and formed two groups, one represented by the Bohras of Western India and the second by the Khojas of the Punjab, Sind, Gujarat and Bombay.

The Bohras are again divided into two main groups, the Daudis, whose head in the 1950s lived in Surat, and the Sulaimanis, whose head in the 1950s lived in the Yemen. Most Bohras are converts from Hinduism and retain many Hindu customs; their beliefs have been systematically concealed and remain obscure. They have their own mosques, their own cemeteries, pray only three times a day and do not meet on Fridays for congregational prayer. Many Bohras are very wealthy; some have achieved eminence in public life, notably members of the Tyabji family from the very small Sulaimani sect.

The most important group amongst the Khojas are those from Sind, Gujarat and Bombay known as the Aga Khanis. These look to the Aga Khan, who claims descent from the seventh Imam through the leaders of the thirteenth-century Assassins of Syria, as head of their community. The Aga Khan, through the striking fiscal practice of having himself weighed against precious gems and metals each year, receives vast wealth from the community which he redistributes in support for welfare projects; the community itself is highly organised and notable for its cooperative enterprise in finance, education and health.

Many Khojas are converts from Hinduism and this is reflected in their customs. Moreover, Khojas do not go to the mosque for worship, but to a meeting room 'jamaat khana'. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, foremost figure in the founding of Pakistan, is the most notable Khoja of recent times.

Most Ismailis will have come to Britain via East Africa. They are likely to be wealthy and well-educated, often both. It is unlikely that they would behave in such a way as to antagonise other Muslim communities, although it should be noted that in India they do engage in missionary work amongst the lower Hindu castes. Professor Christopher Shackleton of the School of Oriental and African Studies has close contacts with the English community.

Conclusion

It is evident that the past two centuries have been a period of great creativity amongst South Asian Muslims. That this should be so is not surprising as, some Russian Muslim groups apart, their encounter with Western power and the modern state has been longer and deeper than that of any other Muslim group. One consequence has been that within the Islamic world over the past one hundred years South Asia has been much more of an exporter than an importer of new impulses and new ideas. So Deoband has much influence in Southeast Asia, Maududi and Iqbal in the Middle East, the Ahmadiyya in Africa and so on. There is the irony, too, that Islamic ideas, developed by movements which aimed to escape the consequences of British rule and Western civilisation, have since

Independence been carried by these movements to the very heart of Britain and the West.

Amongst the Muslim movements in Britain all, bar the modernists, have a missionary impulse which derives from their overall response to the loss of political power. Now it is the task of individual Muslims to impose Muhammad's message for mankind upon themselves and preach it to others - in some of the more puritanical groups, as we have shown, a task which generates a most acutely felt sense of personal responsibility. Most of the movements are led by ulama, only two by lay folk - the modernists and the Jamaat, and relations between the ulama-led and the lay-led movements are rarely good. All those groups led by ulama, except to some degree the Bareilvis, have developed ways of being Muslim which enable them to operate to a large extent outside the state. The modernists and the Jamaati Islami, on the other hand, actually seek to control the state. As far as the modernists are concerned, this end has been achieved in the foundation of Pakistan. As far as the Jamaati Islami is concerned, their Islamic state still has to be won. All movements, except the modernists, are from a Western point of view, although not necessarily an Islamic point of view, legally conservative - we recognise, of course, that outside the framework of an Islamic state the extent to which the sharia is observed is to a large extent a matter of personal choice. This said, it ought to be noted that some Muslims in Britain, and most notably the followers of the Jamaati Islami, are the first migrants for almost a millenium who, rather than adopting the ways of Britons, fondly hope that they can make Britons like themselves.

Notes

1. The subject of this article and many more issues relating to South Asian Islam will be covered in Francis Robinson, *Islam in Modern South Asia*, which is a volume in G. Johnson, C. Bayly and J. Richards eds., *The New Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

2. This article ignores one way of being Muslim widely followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because it has not been transferred in any significant way to Britain. It is that represented by the Firangi Mahal family of ulama and sufis. For further details see: Francis Robinson, 'Farangi Mahall' in B. Lewis et Al; eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2 ed., supplement, pp.292-4; 'The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and their adab', in B. Metcalf ed., *Moral Conduct and Authority: the Place of Adab in South Asian Islam* (Berkeley, 1984), pp.152-83; 'Problems in the History of the Farangi Mahall Family of

Learned and Holy Men' in N.J. Allen et Al., eds., Oxford University Papers on India, 1, 2, (Delhi, 1987), pp.1-27.

3. For the eighteenth and early nineteenth century Islamic revival see Francis Robinson, Atlas of the Islamic World Since 1500 (Oxford, 1982), pp.118-29.

4. Sufis are Muslim mystics. While the ulama are the representatives of the formal knowledge of Islam contained in the sharia, the sufis are the bearers of particular techniques for developing emotional or intuitive knowledge of God, for coming to know God in the heart. A particular sufi technique or way (tariqat) is handed down within the framework of an order (silsilah). In South Asia there are three main orders: the Chishtiyya, who are divided into two subsections, the Sabiri and the Nizami, the Qadriyya and the Naqshbandiyya. Through time these orders have produced many saints whose shrines form the focus of sufi activity. Today each of these shrines will have a representative of the saint (sajjada), who presides at the annual celebrations of the saint's death (Urs), who passes on the saint's techniques for knowing God to his disciples and successors, and who provides to all who care to seek it both spiritual and more concrete forms of assistance. Many ulama are also sufis, and some sufis have the training of ulama. Over the past two centuries sufi beliefs, most notably those in which saints are thought to be able to intercede for men with God, have been amongst the most important battlefields on which reformers have fought for the salvation, as they see it, of the Muslim community.

5. The classic works on Deoband are: B.D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 1982) and Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Bombay, 1963).

6. See M. Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree (Yogyakarta, 1983).

7. See J.M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1975), pp.366-9.

8. Barbara Metcalf plans a full translation of Bihishti Zewar. In the following articles she has studied the book as a product of reformism: 'The Making of a Muslim Lady: Maulana Thanawi's Bihishti Zewar', in M. Israel and N.K. Wagle eds., Islamic Society and Culture: Essays in Honour of Professor Aziz Ahmad (Delhi, 1984), pp.17-38; 'Islamic Reform and Islamic Women: Maulana Thanawi's Jewelry of Paradise', in B.E. Metcalf ed., Moral Conduct and Authority, pp.184-95; 'Islamische Reformbewegungen', in W. Schluchter ed., Max Webers Sicht des Islams (Frankfurt-am-Main), pp.242-55.

9. For the Political ideas of Deobandis in the last years of British rule see, Peter Hardy, Partners in freedom - and True Muslims: the political thought of some Muslim scholars in British India 1912-1947 (Lund, 1971), pp.31-43.

10. See Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp.264-96; Murray T. Titus, Islam in India and Pakistan Rev. ed., (Serampore, 1959), pp.195-7.

11. Metcalf, Islamic revival, p.281.

12. For the Barelvis see Ibid, pp.296-314.

13. How bad relations between the groups were was indicated in 1903 when Ahmad Riza Khan procured a legal judgement from the Ulama of Mecca and Medina declaring the Deobandis to be Kafirs. See Ibid., pp.309-10.

14. See Francis Robinson Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of United Provinces' Muslims 1860-1923 (Cambridge, 1974), p.422.

15. See Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964* (London, 1967).
16. Fazlur Rahman, 'The Controversy over the Muslim Family Laws', in D.E. Smith ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton, 1966) pp.414-27.
17. Asghar Ali Engineer ed., *The Shah Bano Controversy* (Bombay, 1987).
18. The most recent work on the Ahmadiyya is: Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective* (Delhi, 1974). This has a useful bibliography pp.17-18. The following works should be noticed in particular: H.A. Walter, *The Ahmadiyah Movement* (Calcutta, 1918); H.J. Fisher, *Ahmadiyah: A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast* (Oxford, 1963); Titus, *Islam*, pp.256-71; a substantial new work by J. Friedmann of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is about to appear, published by the University of California Press.
19. Aziz Ahmad and G.E. Von Grunebaum eds., *Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857-1968* (Weisbaden, 1970), pp.8-9.
20. There is very little written about the Tablighi Jamaat. See the following: S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Life and Mission of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas*, trans. from the Urdu by M.A. Kidwai, (Lucknow, 1979); M. Anwarul Haq, *The Faith Movement of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas* (London, 1972); the chapter entitled 'Fundamentalism sans politics' in M.S. Agwani, *Islamic Fundamentalism in India* (Chandigarh, 1986); Christian Troll, 'Five Letters of Maulana Ilyas (1885-1944), the Founder of the Tablighi Jama'at, Translated, Annotate and Introduced' in Christian W. Troll ed., *Islam in India: Studies and Commentaries* (Delhi, 1985), pp.138-76.
21. *Ibid.*, pp.143-6.
22. *Ibid.*, p.146.
23. Much of the material devoted to the Jamaat is drawn from Francis Robinson, 'Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi', in B. Lewis et Al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., forthcoming. There is a good bibliography in Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari eds., *Islamic Perspectives: studies in honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi* (Leicester, 1979), pp.3-14. The most important articles on Mawdudi are by Charles J. Adams 'The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi' in D.E. Smith ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion*, pp.371-97 and 'Mawdudi and the Islamic State', in J.L. Esposito ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York, 1983), pp.99-133.
24. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdoodi, 'Twenty-nine years of the Jamaat-e-Islami', *The Criterion*, Vol. V, 6, p.45.
25. Kalim Bahadur, *The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political action* (New Delhi, 1977), pp.139-58; for the Jama'at's position and activity in post-partition India, see Agwani, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, pp.53-90.
26. For the impact of the Jama'at in Pakistan's politics see B. Metcalf, 'Islamic Arguments in Contemporary Pakistan' in William R. Roff ed., *Islam and the political Economy of Meaning: comparative studies of Muslim Discourse* (London, 1987), pp.132-59.
27. See: J.N. Hollister, *The Shia of India* (London, 1953); Titus, *Islam*, pp.87-115; Asghar Ali Engineer, *The Bohras* (New Delhi, 1980); Azim Nanji, *The Nizari Isma'ili Tradition in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent* (New York, 1978).