

# Understanding the Power of Majority-Party Leaders and Their Parties\*

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## Abstract

Foundational theories of legislative organization disagree about whether majority-party leaders are powerful or not, but the difficulty of measuring power has prevented empirical work from addressing this debate effectively. We argue that we can detect the power of leaders by examining the way that strategic donors respond to changes in the identity of the majority-party leader. We offer a new dataset which covers leadership positions in all U.S. state legislatures over the past 20 years, and we use it to understand whether, and under what conditions, majority-party leaders are powerful. We find that, on average, majority-party leaders wield considerable power. Contrary to typical theoretical predictions, however, we show that leaders are *less* powerful—not more—when polarization is higher. We argue that this is because leaders are most valuable in times when they can forge consensus where it does not already exist naturally. The paper thus offers new data that facilitates empirical tests for theories of legislative organization and also proposes new arguments about the institutional sources of partisan legislative power.

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# 1 Introduction

In all U.S. legislatures, as well as many others across the world, members of the majority party delegate some amount of *de jure* authority to a single member: a leader. A variety of theories discuss the way leaders and their parties might or might not influence legislative activity, and if so, under what conditions they do so. To understand the role legislative leaders play—and thus to understand how our legislatures operate, what power parties do or do not possess, and how both go about the task of representing constituents—we must answer the question: are leaders powerful? This is the key issue we study in this paper.

The broad literature on political leadership and legislative organization offers reasons to expect legislative leaders to wield considerable power (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007), and also reasons to expect them to wield no power at all (e.g., Krehbiel 1993, 1998). On the one hand, majority-party leaders—think in particular of the Speaker of the House—seem to possess vast powers with which to control the legislative agenda, to influence committee assignments, and to direct the majority party’s goals in the legislature. It is not difficult to imagine how these powers, if vested, can aid members of the majority power seeking political goals. On the other hand, leaders can only serve as agents at the whims of their principals, the members of the legislature and of the majority party. Can a legislative body organized under the principle of majority rule ever allocate meaningful power to a single member, or is the leader only a figurehead in a process that must at all turns satisfy the median legislator? Put another way, can a majoritarian legislature ever “tie its own hands” by ceding power to a single, non-median legislator?

We contribute to this debate by bringing to bear new data and empirical approaches that allow us to measure the power of political leaders, and thus the power of their parties. Measuring these concepts in data is obviously difficult. First, we must observe variation in leadership and in the institutional context in which leaders arise. This is not possible at the federal level, where we have only two units (the House and the Senate) with which to perform inference. We solve this problem by constructing a new dataset containing the identities of all state legislators who serve as Majority-Party Leader, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, or any similar position in the legislatures of all fifty U.S. states, 1990–2010.

In addition to obtaining variation in leadership and in institutional design, we must also define what we mean by “power.” First, we offer a clear definition of what we call policy power, defined in the spirit of Krehbiel (1993). Policy power, in our view, is defined as the ability for a member to influence the actions of the legislature, i.e., to produce legislative outputs that are different from those that would have been produced in a leaderless chamber guided by the preferences of the median legislator.

It is impossible to measure this kind of power directly. For example, although we have learned much by studying the formally delineated powers of partisan leaders across legislatures, this fails to capture *de facto* rather than *de jure* authority. Surveying legislators, too, has shed light on the workings of legislatures, but will not identify what we are thinking of as power. Not only are survey takers notoriously difficult subjects, but much of the power to influence legislative activity may occur behind the scenes, in ways survey takers may or may not observe themselves. We circumvent these problems by applying to our question a longstanding tradition of measuring power *indirectly*, using a revealed-preferences argument (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1998; Apollonio and La Raja 2006; Hall 2014; Snyder 1992). We use campaign contributions from donors imbued with the incentives to seek out those with power in order to determine how powerful members are. Strategic donors contribute for access (e.g., Kalla and Broockman 2014; Fourinaies and Hall 2014; Grimmer and Powell 2014; Snyder 1992), and in so doing they reveal the identities of those in the legislature they believe have the power to offer the most value to them.

Finally, we must also solve a typical issue of causal inference. Even if we find an association between leadership status and power, can we conclude that leadership conveys power? Or, alternatively, do the powerful rise to become leaders? We address this issue by employing a difference-in-differences design, comparing the change in the amount of contributions that candidates receive after they become leaders to the same change over the same time period among members that do not become leaders. We take pains to validate this approach, to show why the key identifying assumption of “parallel trends” is plausible, and to show how the results are robust to alternate empirical strategies.

Using this approach, we show that legislative leaders are indeed powerful. Strategic groups react to changes in leadership by reallocating large amounts of campaign contributions to new leadership. Though we consider alternate interpretations, the evidence clearly implies that, since

leaders appear powerful, and since leaders only gain power from their co-partisans in the majority party, the majority party, too, must be powerful. By offering a new approach for measuring the power of party leaders we therefore also shed light on the power of parties in American legislatures. Because this approach does not rely on the use of data generated endogenously from within the legislature—such as roll-call votes, procedural decisions, or committee assignments—we believe it is among the strongest evidence for the power of political parties in American legislatures.

Going further, we also show how the power of these leaders, and thus of their parties, is shaped in important ways by the institutional context in which they serve. Major theories of partisan legislatures predict that majority parties should centralize power—i.e., that they should augment the powers of their leaders—in times of polarization. But we show that, instead, leaders *lose* power when polarization increases. These findings force important revisions of legislative theories, and we offer a simple argument in this direction. Times when members agree on policy goals, we argue, are precisely the times when leadership is least important; times of preference heterogeneity, on the other hand, are the times during which ceding power to a leader, who can direct bargaining and forge consensus where one does not exist naturally, is most important.

Finally, we also distinguish between policy power—at the core of most theories of the legislature—and a separate concept we call *symbolic* power. The latter encapsulates the ability for leaders to capture the “hearts and minds” of ideologically motivated voters and donors. Symbolic power is just that—symbolic. It has no impact on policy outcomes but is of value to ideological voters and donors whose preferences expand beyond the policy process itself. We offer evidence that leaders in general possess both kinds of power, and we demonstrate that policy power is conditional on the institutional design of the legislature while symbolic power is not.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we motivate our study within the theoretical literature on the power of parties and party leaders. Next, we explain our approach to measuring the power of majority-party leaders, the dataset we have constructed for this purpose, and the empirical design we employ to isolate the causal effects of party leadership. Following that, we present empirical results documenting the power of majority-party leaders. Subsequently, we examine how the power of majority-party leaders varies with polarization. In the final empirical section, we look at how this power varies with term limits. Finally, we conclude.

## 2 Theoretical Perspectives: Partisan Political Power and the Role of Leaders

A central question in the study of Congress, and of legislatures more generally, is whether and to what extent parties are powerful.<sup>1</sup> Although what precisely “power” means is not always defined, scholars are typically concerned with the idea that parties pass “laws that are different from those that would be passed in the absence of parties” (Krehbiel 1993: 235). Writing in the 1940s, Schattschneider (1942: 1) declared that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.” Soon thereafter, the APSA committee report famously argued that the personalized nature of American politics had led to weak parties that offered little in the way of cohesive platforms and did nothing to coerce their members in the legislature (APSA 1950). Mayhew (1974) offered an explanation for this “weak party” view. If legislators are motivated by the desire for reelection, and if voters reward legislators for the personal positions they take on legislation (Downs 1957), then why would legislators alter their behavior to serve the needs of a party? In this view, “the best service a party can supply to its congressmen is a negative one; it can leave them alone” (Mayhew 1974: 99-100).

### 2.1 Partisan Theories of Legislative Organization

More recently, scholars have put forward a variety of theories to explain how parties might resolve commitment and coordination problems faced by legislators. In different ways, these theories focus on the ways parties might organize the legislature to benefit members of the majority party when they run for reelection. Though they differ in many details, all of these theories agree that “centralization,” the act of granting enhanced powers to a majority-party leader such as the Speaker of the House, is a crucial mechanism by which parties organize their power (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich

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<sup>1</sup>While we focus in this paper on the role parties play in U.S. legislatures, a closely related literature studies the policy consequences of party control. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) studies U.S. mayors and finds little evidence that Democratic and Republican mayors represent cities differently, all else equal. In the comparative context, Fiva, Folke and Sørensen (2014) offer evidence that Norwegian parties affect fiscal policy at the local level. In a similar vein, Folke (N.d.) offers evidence for the policy effects of parties in Swedish municipalities. In a British context, Fourniaies and Mutlu-Eren (2014) shows how the Prime Minister’s party allocate more resources to councils controlled by co-partisans. Another literature studies how party elites and activists influence political activities by affecting who runs for office (Broockman N.d.; Broockman et al. 2014; Bawn et al. 2012). Finally, in the historical context, Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011) explores how parties have used patronage as an alternate source of power.

and Rohde 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007; Jenkins and Stewart 2012; Van Houweling 2007, 2012).

While not necessarily disagreeing that parties *could* possess some degree of power, Krehbiel (1993) and Krehbiel (1998), among others, argue that these powers may be vastly overstated. At the root of this counterargument is the distinction between parties and individual preferences. Suppose that a set of legislators share similar preferences. As a result, we observe them voting and taking other actions together. It is tempting to conclude, erroneously in this example, that party is “important.” In fact party is irrelevant—members’ behaviors are coordinated purely because of their shared views and not because of any power of their party. Building off of this logic, Krehbiel (1993) and Krehbiel (1998) offer compelling evidence that a theory that omits party does a good job of explaining much of observed legislative behavior.<sup>2</sup> Combined with the clear difficulties parties face in coercing their members, we therefore have good reasons to doubt that parties are truly powerful. Much of the apparent importance of parties—e.g., the well-documented rise in legislative polarization (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006)—may instead simply be the result of changes in the underlying preferences of legislators and voters, rather than evidence for the power of parties themselves. The “Krehbiel objection” is an important one, then, not only because it provides an alternative theory of the legislature that does not depend on parties, but also because it makes clear why much of the evidence in the political parties literature is insufficient to conclude that parties are powerful. Observing the correlated activities of copartisans has no bearing on determining whether parties and their leaders are important or not.

We contribute to this literature by evaluating empirically whether parties and their leaders are powerful. We depart from the previous work by placing empirical scrutiny not on the inner workings of the legislature but instead on the behavior of interest groups interacting with legislators. The reason for this departure is simple. Decisions over legislative procedure, committee assignments, and roll-call voting occur in a complex environment in which distinguishing individual from partisan power is largely impossible. As Krehbiel (1993: 238) explains:

The crucial question has to do with individual legislators’ policy preferences. In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with fellow party members *in spite of their disagreement* about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow

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<sup>2</sup>In uniting non-partisan and partisan theories of legislative organization, Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) also provide conditions under which partisan influence is unnecessary to explain partisan legislative outcomes.

party members *because of their agreement* about the policy in question? [emphasis original]

Thus, to evaluate the power of parties for a range of activities, we need to understand the but-for actions of legislators in a world without parties. This is of course not possible, directly.

We can, however, evaluate the power of majority-party leaders. In the next section, we describe the specific way in which we measure the power of leaders. Given this measure, we take advantage of the fact that, unlike the presence of parties, which are constant and enduring, the identity of these leaders changes frequently thanks to election results. Majority-party status fluctuates, bringing in new leaders and casting out old ones. Leaders retire or even, in some cases, lose their own re-election bids. This gives us an opportunity to evaluate the power of leadership. Not only that, but because leaders' power comes from their role in the majority party, if we find that leaders are powerful we can likely conclude that parties, too, are powerful.<sup>3</sup>

## 2.2 Theoretical Predictions Concerning Polarization and Partisan Power

Prominent legislative theories also differ in their predictions over *when* parties will be most apt to centralize power, i.e., to grant additional powers to their leaders in order to enhance legislative efficiency and accomplish more of their policy goals. The Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory of Aldrich and Rohde (2001) is especially explicit on this point, predicting that “strong party behavior is more likely if the two parties are polarized” (Aldrich and Battista 2002: 165). The logic of this prediction is straightforward. Members of the majority party must elect to cede power to their leader. If they do so, they can achieve more policy goals, but at the cost of allowing the leader to influence the form eventual policy takes. Thus, members of the majority party will be more willing to cede this power and produce a strong leader, the argument goes, when they agree more on policy and are thus less concerned with the actions the leader will take once her powers are burnished. One condition that makes members “agree more” on policy is polarization, which widens the gap between the views of the majority and minority parties.

But the act of centralizing requires the party to tie its own hands. Moderate members of the majority party may see policy move farther from their preferred position if they allow their party

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<sup>3</sup>Of course, leaders may also secure power from non-partisan sources (e.g., Palmer 2014), but in U.S. legislatures where the leader is elected by members of the majority party, it seems reasonable to suspect that the power of majority-party leadership points to the power of the majority party.

to centralize rather than if they simply let policy go to the median legislator’s preferred position. Because the median legislator is the pivotal actor in all decisions, both those concerning policy and those concerning procedural matters, it is not clear that she should ever allow power to flow to a leader who seeks to implement non-median policies. Theories like that in Krehbiel (1998) therefore predict no effect of polarization on the power of the majority-party leader, who should have no power regardless of conditions.

Testing this prediction is especially important given recent trends in U.S. legislatures. Federal and state legislatures are near all-time high levels of polarization (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Shor and McCarty 2011), and the organizational power of legislative parties could be one potential factor exacerbating the apparent gridlock in our legislatures. On the other hand, if parties and their leaders possess little coercive power over their members, then how the legislature is organized—and how this depends on polarization in the electorate and in the legislature—may have little to do with changes in policy outcomes. By examining how polarization interacts with the power of majority-party leaders, we not only test the main prediction of seminal theories of legislation, but we also speak to the current condition of U.S. legislatures in this era of polarization.

### 3 Empirical Approach

Many studies have sought to investigate the power of state legislative officers for a variety of purposes.<sup>4</sup> This literature typically uses one of two approaches to measuring some kind of “power.” First, some papers study *de jure* power, investigating variation across states in the formal delineation of leadership powers (e.g., Clucas 2001; Richman 2010). This approach sheds light on how and why different legislatures are structured, formally speaking, and on the consequences these formal rules have for legislative behavior. It is not well suited for our particular question, however. Though the *de jure* power of majority-party leaders may correlate with their *de facto* powers, the two are unlikely to be the same. To understand the sort of power we wish to study—that which influences legislative outcomes and is thus valuable to access-oriented interest groups—we must instead tap directly into the *de facto* powers of leaders.

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<sup>4</sup>For a recent review, see Battista (2011).

The second approach involves asking legislators who they think is powerful (e.g., Clucas 2007).<sup>5</sup> Surveys of legislators on issues of power have proved useful for studying a variety of questions about the workings of state legislatures. Again, however, this technique does not fit with our research question. Understanding the thinking of legislators is a vital question in American Politics, but it reveals *perceptions* of power rather than *de facto* power. Perceptions of power may matter for many reasons, but the coercive power to influence legislative activity may not be easy to observe, or may offer bad incentives to legislators answering survey questions.

### 3.1 Interest-Group Campaign Contributions as a Signal of Power

Instead, we use interest-group campaign contributions as a “revealed preference” measure of power. As Ansolabehere and Snyder (1998: 1674) write: “interest groups’ campaign donations should reflect the political power embedded in the differing offices sought by competing politicians.” A significant body of literature supports this notion.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence that access-oriented interest groups allocate their contributions strategically.

Snyder (1992) demonstrates several ways in which interest groups, but not individuals, allocate money strategically.<sup>7</sup> Fourinaies and Hall (2014) measures the “financial incumbency advantage,” i.e., the extra contributions incumbents receive purely by virtue of holding office. This large financial advantage comes largely from interest groups, who are far more sensitive to incumbency status in their contribution behavior than are individuals. Finally, Grimmer and Powell (2014) documents a similar dynamic in the U.S. House. When legislators are randomly “exiled” from important committees, interest groups, especially those whose economic interests align with the policy jurisdiction of the committees in question, dramatically scale back their donations.

Taken together, these and other papers make it clear how sensitive interest groups are to legislative power in their donation behavior. Our insight is not that this pattern exists—which has

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<sup>5</sup>Though our discussion focuses on these two approaches, which are the most common, many other papers investigate alternative forms of “power” for other purposes. Gamm and Kousser (2013), for example, investigates whether big-city delegations are able to secure policy goals, measuring power based on the attainment of these goals. Unfortunately for our setting, we cannot observe the specific policy goals of leaders in a credible manner.

<sup>6</sup>For theoretical papers supporting this idea, too, see: Hall and Wayman (1990) and Kroszner and Stratmann (1998).

<sup>7</sup>In particular, these groups are shown to prefer younger candidates, all else equal, because of the higher future value of their expected influence. In addition, groups are shown to donate to senators in equal amounts regardless of state size, reflecting their equal power in the legislature.

long been established—but rather that we can apply it to majority-party leaders to understand whether they and their parties are indeed powerful.

### 3.2 New Dataset on State Legislative Leadership Positions

We collected a dataset on the identities of all Speakers, Presidents, majority and minority party leaders, whips and various other leadership positions in both parties across all 99 state legislative chambers during the period 1990-2012. Primary information on these positions comes from volumes of the quarterly-published *State Yellow Book* from 1990-2014 (Leadership Directories 2014). Our secondary sources are the publicly available legislative minutes and proceedings from various state legislatures.

The organization of state legislatures differs in many ways across states and chambers, and so do leadership designations. For example, some states do not use the term “majority leader” but refer to the “Democratic Leader” or “Republican Leader,” and in other states the same position is referred to as the “leader of the floor majority.” Similarly, some states use the same designation to refer to very different positions. For example, the “President of the Senate” is essentially an empty title given to the Lieutenant Governor in some states, whereas it is a powerful member appointed by the majority of the Senate in others. To ensure that leaders are comparable across states, we carefully construct four variables referring to leader positions that are procedurally similar across state legislatures (Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate and House, respectively). Based on the full name, party affiliation, legislative district and year, we manually matched the leadership information to the unique legislator identifier in the most commonly used dataset on state legislative elections (Klarner et al. 2013). This allows us—and future researchers—to merge accurate information on party leaders and electoral outcomes for all state legislatures.

Finally, we merge in data on campaign contributions from the National Institute On Money In State Politics. This dataset provides information on total campaign receipts by candidate, 1990–2012. It also breaks the contributions down by the economic sector of the contributor, based on state-level disclosure requirements. In addition, we are able to separate contributions made by individuals from those made directly by groups based on formatting regularities in the dataset.

### 3.3 Isolating the Effect of Leadership: A Difference-in-Differences Design

We consider a legislator a member of the majority-party leadership if she is either Speaker of the House/Assembly, President Pro Tempore of the Senate or Majority Leader or Majority Floor Leader (in cases with no Majority Leader) in either the House or Senate.<sup>8</sup> Based on this information, we construct the main treatment variable:

$$Leader_{it} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if inc. in district } i \text{ is a member of the Majority Leadership at time } t \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Given this treatment variable, we estimate equations of the form

$$\text{Log Money}_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Leader_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\text{Log Money}_{i,t+1}$  measures the log of total contributions to the incumbent’s party in district  $i$  at time  $t + 1$ .<sup>9</sup> ;  $Leader_{it}$  is the variable defined in Equation 1;  $\alpha_i$  represents district fixed effects;  $\delta_t$  represents year fixed effects; and, finally,  $\varepsilon_{i,t+1}$  is the error term.

With the inclusion of both district and year fixed effects, the analysis is a difference-in-differences design in which changes in campaign receipts for districts whose representatives become leaders (or stop being leaders) are compared to changes over the same time period in “control” districts whose representatives are not majority-party leaders. This isolates the causal effect of leadership under the assumption that the control districts are a good counterfactual prediction for how contributions in a “treated” district would have changed had the district’s representative not become leader at time  $t$ .<sup>10</sup>

This “parallel trends” assumption is relatively plausible in our case, since becoming leader depends on many factors outside the district’s control. The most common reason for a district’s representative to become leader is a switch in majority-party status in the legislature, well beyond

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<sup>8</sup>To be clear, in any case where there is a “Majority Leader” we use this title. In cases where there is no Majority Leader we next look for a “Majority Floor Leader.” To ensure that our results are not driven by the exact choice of offices, we replicate results in the Appendix using a variety of stricter or looser definitions of “leadership.”

<sup>9</sup>We use  $\log(\text{total contributions} + 1)$  to deal with cases in which a party does not receive any contributions. The results are not depend on whether we use 1, 10, 100 or exclude the observations.

<sup>10</sup>This assumption is much more plausible than assuming, for example, that districts whose representatives are majority-party leaders are just like other districts, as would be assumed in a typical “naive” comparison across districts. It is also weaker than the assumption employed in a simple district fixed-effects framework, which makes within-district comparisons without adjusting for unobserved changes over time.

the control of the district itself. Another common reason is the retirement of the previous majority-party leader, also a decision “exogenous” in many ways from the district itself. While it is obvious that districts whose representatives become leaders will be those whose incumbents are likely senior—since we might suspect leaders to be drawn from among the most senior of legislators—the difference-in-differences design accounts for this directly by making *within*-legislator comparisons.

In addition to these reasons to believe in the design’s validity, we also validate it empirically in several ways. First, we show that our results do not depend on whether or not we control for pre-treatment covariates. In particular, in the Appendix we show that the overall results are the same when we control for legislator experience. We also re-implement the analysis using state-year fixed effects instead of simple year fixed effects. Finally, we also include state-specific linear time trends. In all three cases, estimates remain highly stable, suggesting that the design is valid.

## 4 Results: Legislative Leaders Are Powerful


### 4.1 Main Results

Before presenting formal results, we first investigate the effect of majority-party graphically. Figure 1 presents average total interest-group contributions over time to two sets of incumbents: those that become majority-party leader, and those that never do. In the spirit of the difference-in-differences design, we rescale each observation’s year to indicate how many years are remaining (or have passed) until the incumbent in question becomes leader, and we construct the control group using the set of incumbents who never become leader but who serve over the same time period as each “treated” incumbent.

The results clearly suggest a large effect of majority-party leadership on interest-group contributions. Before treatment, the two groups of incumbents look relatively similar in the level of contributions they receive. After the “treated” group become leaders, however, we see a large jump up in interest-group contributions—and we see no such change in the control group over the same time period. This effect persists for 8 years past treatment until, eventually, contributions revert to baseline levels (probably because most leaders do not remain leaders for this long).

The graph shows some evidence that “treated” districts are trending upwards in their contributions pre-treatment more so than control districts. This is a potential violation of the diff-in-diff

**Figure 1 – The Effect of Majority-Party Leadership on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions.** The figure compares trends over time in interest group contributions to incumbents who become majority-party leader vs. incumbents who never become leader. Leaders see a large increase in interest-group contributions that non-leaders do not. Since interest-group donors are known to seek out those with power, the increase implies that the majority-party leadership position conveys power to those who hold it.



assumption of parallel trends, although the large and discontinuous jump in contributions immediately after treatment suggests the presence of a meaningful effect. In the Appendix, we present a battery of evidence to suggest that the possibility of a differential slope does not drive the positive effects that we find in our analysis. The positive slope for treated districts likely indicates, at least in part, anticipatory behavior on the part of strategic donors. Many majority-party leaders are “next in line” for quite some time before becoming leader, giving groups ample time to foster a relationship via contributions in advance of the official change in leadership status. This anticipatory behavior will in fact bias us *against* finding a positive effect. In this respect our estimates may actually be closer to a lower bound on the effect of leadership.

Turning now to formal estimates, Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the difference-in-differences design from equation 2 using three outcome variables: the log of total contributions from interest-group donors, the log of total contributions from all sources, and the log of total contributions from individual donors. In all three columns, we see evidence for the significant power that legislative leaders possess.

Consider the results in the first column. Here we see that becoming the majority-party leader is estimated to cause a 0.61 log-point increase in total contributions from interest groups, on average across all states and chambers. This corresponds to roughly an 84% increase in contributions ( $\exp(0.61) - 1 \approx 0.84$ ). Overall, leadership conveys a massive increase in campaign donations.<sup>11</sup> This estimate captures the policy power of majority-party leaders. Becoming the majority-party leader triggers a huge burst of contributions by donors that we know from other work to be highly strategic in whom they donate to. The results thus show that leaders, on average, possess considerable power in state legislatures.

In the final two columns, we look at the effects on total contributions from all sources, and total contributions from individual donors. As the second column shows, leadership causes a large on-average increase in contributions from all sources. Comparing the first and third columns, we see that party leadership causes equally large increases in both individual and group donations. The increase in individual contributions suggests the symbolic power of leaders. Individuals, unlike interest groups, are consumption-oriented in their donation behavior (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder 2003). The increase in contributions that candidates receive for being the majority-party leader thus indicates the increased ideological utility that individuals receive for supporting the leader, the public face of the party.

## 4.2 Effects by Sector

We can further our understanding of the power of leadership by looking at how different sectors of the economy contribute in response to changes in leadership. In Figure 2, we plot point estimates for  $\beta_1$  from equation 2 using sector-level outcome variables. For each sector  $k$ , we create the outcome variable  $\text{Log Money}_{ikt}$  which measures the log of all contributions made by donors in sector  $k$  that flow to the incumbent party in district  $i$  in the election at time  $t$ .

As Figure 2 shows, the effect of leadership is large and positive across all donor sectors. The first four points indicate estimates for aggregated groups of donors: all individual donors, all interest-group donors, all ideological group donors, and all donors (corresponding to the first column in Table

<sup>11</sup>We find the same result using levels instead of the log of contributions. When not represented by a majority-party leader, a typical district is estimated to receive, on average, roughly \$60,000 in contributions to the Democratic party. When the district is represented by the majority-party leader, it receives on average more than \$100,000 in contributions. This represents approximately a 70% increase in donations, similar to that estimated in the log analysis.

**Table 1 – Effect of Attaining Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions.** Leadership causes a large increase in contributions, including from strategic interest-group donors whose behavior reveals the power of party leaders.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.61 (0.09)	0.52 (0.07)	0.61 (0.12)
Intercept	8.47 (0.47)	9.52 (0.51)	4.77 (0.49)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.


1. Individuals, interest groups, and ideological groups *all* target new leaders with a tremendous increase in contributions. This points to the *dual* power of leaders; they hold sway over policy, which leads interest groups to target them, but they are also the symbolic leader of their party, encouraging ideological groups and individuals to target them, too.

The second group of points represent estimates on specific donor sectors. As we see, the effect of leadership is robust across all donor sectors, but it is especially large among those we know to be most strategic and least ideological in their donation behavior (Fourinaies and Hall 2014). The overall effect on interest group donations is therefore not driven by a single sector or donor group, but rather is a consistent effect across all groups.

### 4.3 Summary

Strategic, access-oriented interest groups seek access from those in the legislature vested with power. Their contributions therefore reveal who, among legislators, possesses power. Using a difference-in-differences design to isolate the causal effect of majority-party leadership in state legislatures, we have shown in this section that majority-party leaders are indeed powerful. If majority-party leaders could not influence policy, we would not observe these large effects on interest-group contributions.

**Figure 2 – Effect of Leadership on Contributions Across Donor Types.** Access-oriented donor groups are especially sensitive to changes in party leadership status, indicating the power of majority-party leaders in state legislatures. Ideological groups also support leaders, suggesting their dual role as both powerful legislative actors capable of influencing policy and also as ideological leaders of their parties.



*Note:* The figure plots sector-specific estimates for  $\beta_1$  from equation 2. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors clustered by state.

## 5 Polarization Reduces the Power of Majority-Party Leaders

A major goal of the theoretical literature on parties is to explain when and why they ought to be powerful and when and why they ought to be weak. As we reviewed in the “Theoretical Perspectives” section, the main prediction in the literature on U.S. legislatures is that parties should centralize power in times of high polarization.

## 5.1 Measuring Polarization

We can leverage our empirical approach to study this prediction directly. To do so, however, we require a measure of polarization. Though we could use a measure based on roll-call voting in state legislatures (Shor and McCarty 2011)—and indeed, the results below are robust to the use this measure—we worry that this measure is *post-treatment* for our analysis. If leaders are powerful, and the evidence in the previous section shows that they are, then they can affect what bills are voted on, and thus influence estimated ideal points of legislators. As a result we cannot then examine how the effect of attaining leadership varies with this measure of polarization, since it is not a pre-treatment covariate.

To circumvent this problem, we instead use a measure of ideology based on campaign contributions (Bonica 2013, 2014). This measure does not depend on the agenda in the legislature, and is in fact entirely external to the legislature, thus avoiding the post-treatment problem described above. In addition, by using this measure we can avoid selecting on winning election, too, since the measure exists for both winning and losing candidates (as long as they raise sufficient funds during the election). We thus measure polarization as the difference in the median ideological position of each party’s entire candidate pool in a given state and year.


## 5.2 Polarization and the Power of Majority-Party Leaders

First, we examine graphical evidence. Figure 3 plots the logged difference between average interest-group contributions to leaders and non-leaders across levels of polarization for each state-chamber year observation in the dataset. To the left of the plot, we see that leaders receive far more interest-group contributions than other members of the legislatures when polarization is low. As we look to the right in the plot—as polarization is increasing—we see the the gap in interest-group contributions between leaders and non-leaders shrinks. Correlationally speaking, leaders appear to command a smaller premium from strategic donors when polarization is high.

To test this more formally, we estimate equations of the form

$$Money_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Leader_{it} + \beta_2 Polarization_{it} \times Leader_{it} + \beta_3 Polarization_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (3)$$

**Figure 3 – The Majority-Party Leader’s Edge in Interest-Group Contributions Across Levels of Polarization.** The figure plots the logged difference in mean interest-group contributions to majority-party leaders and non-leaders across levels of polarization. When polarization is higher, the premium to being leader decreases markedly.



*Note: Grey points are state-year averages; interest-group contributions are residualized by state and year. Black line is simple line of best fit from OLS; dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.*

where  $Polarization_{it}$  is the contribution-based estimate of polarization at time  $t$  for the state in which district  $i$  is located. Since polarization is at the state level, the  $\alpha_i$  now represent state, rather than district, fixed effects. The analysis thus compares the difference in average contributions to leaders and non-leaders, within states, in times when polarization in the state increases relative to its own mean and relative to trends in other states over the same time period. Clearly, polarization is not “randomly” assigned. However, by investigating within-state changes in polarization—and how these changes interact with the differential campaign receipts of leaders—and benchmarking these changes to changes in other states, we are able to obtain what we think is plausibly exogenous variation in polarization.

The quantity of interest is again  $\beta_2$ , which now measures the differential effect of leadership across levels of polarization. To aid in interpretation, we standardize the polarization measure to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The coefficient  $\beta_2$  thus captures the difference in the

**Table 2 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Levels of Polarization.** Polarization reduces the power of majority-party leaders.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.90 (0.11)	0.71 (0.08)	0.93 (0.13)
Leader $\times$ Polarization	-0.17 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.37 (0.10)
Polarization	-0.37 (0.12)	-0.34 (0.12)	-0.42 (0.20)
Intercept	8.46 (0.27)	9.47 (0.19)	5.05 (0.40)
N	13,210	13,210	13,210
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

effect of attaining leadership for a one standard-deviation increase in polarization. Table 2 presents the estimated results. The first row captures the effect of leadership on campaign contributions in a legislature with average polarization (since the polarization measure is standardized to have mean 0). Echoing Table 1, we see large effects of leadership in these legislatures. The second row presents our new quantity of interest. As we see, the interaction term is consistently negative (and statistically significant). When polarization is one standard deviation higher than average, the effect of leadership is considerably smaller (though still large).

Contrary to the predictions of CPG and other similar theories, polarization *decreases* rather than increases the power of majority-party leaders. Why might this be the case? A full theoretical account of the links between polarization and legislative organization will require a far more in depth treatment, but we suspect that the explanation involves the opportunities that leaders have to legislate and to strike deals when polarization is high vs. when it is low. Times of high polarization, when majority-party members' preferences are aligned, may indeed be times when the majority party is able to accomplish its goals more effectively, as in CPG theory. But this is true *regardless* of whether the majority party has an effective leader or not. That is to say, *high polarization is precisely the condition under which strong leadership is unnecessary.*

When, on the other hand, majority-party members' preferences are heterogeneous, there is more room—and more need—for bargaining. Members cannot trust their naturally aligned preferences to carry policy forward; a leader must coordinate their activities and forge a consensus where one does not exist by default. Thus, while the majority party may be able to achieve more when polarization is high, majority-party leaders are more valuable, and parties have an opportunity to wield power in a meaningful way, when polarization is low.

The fact that leaders *can* achieve more when polarization is low does not guarantee, of course, that members of the majority party will cede the necessary power to them under these conditions. We think it is clear that a tradeoff exists; times when members do not want to imbue their leaders with power because they disagree on policy goals are precisely the times when centralizing power has the chance to achieve policy goals that are otherwise unattainable. While there is much work to be done understanding in theory how this tradeoff works, our empirical results strongly suggest that members resolve these conflicts through delegation. As a result, leaders end up, in equilibrium, being more powerful when polarization is low.

### **5.3 Polarization and the Dual Powers of Leaders**

The final column of Table 2 shows that individual contributions, too, decrease when polarization is high. Thus, at the same time as leaders lose policy power in times of polarization, they seem to lose symbolic power, too. When members of the majority party are more similar, ideologically, it may be that voters have less reason to look to the party's leader as its symbolic head. Though here we see a correlation between symbolic and policy power, in the next section we explore a situation in which the opposite occurs; symbolic power remains steady while policy power erodes.

### **5.4 Summary**

On average across U.S. state legislatures, majority-party leaders possess considerable powers. However, as we have shown in this section, these powers are reduced when polarization increases. This forces us to revise our theories of legislative organization, which typically predict the opposite. Having explored this pattern, we now investigate the dual powers of majority-party leaders in more depth.

## 6 Term Limits Reduce the Power of Legislative Leaders

We now investigate the dual powers of majority-party leaders another way, by focusing on the implementation of state legislative term limits. We might suspect that term limits dramatically reduce the policy power of majority-party leaders because they remove many of the incentives leaders can offer to members in exchange for loyalty (e.g., Carey, Niemi and Powell 2000; Kousser 2005). When members are only in the legislature for a few terms—and most term limit laws prevent legislators from serving more than two terms—the promise of future committee assignments or leadership positions no longer has the same appeal.

In order to evaluate how the power of majority-party leaders varies with term limits, we estimate equations of the form

$$Money_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Leader_{it} + \beta_2 Limit_{it} \times Leader_{it} + \beta_3 Limit_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (4)$$

where  $Limit_{it}$  takes the value 1 if district  $i$  is in a state with legislative term limits in place at time  $t$ . The quantity of interest is now  $\beta_2$ , which measures the difference in the power of leadership in term-limited states, relative to states without term limits ( $\beta_1$ ).

Table 3 presents the results, in the same format as Table 1. In the first column, we see that majority-party leadership is estimated to cause a 1.24 log-point increase in interest-group contributions in non-term-limited legislatures (first row), but this effect is a full 0.39 log-points *lower* when term limits are in place (second row). Term limits deprive leaders of the ability to promise future benefits to members in exchange for loyalty and, perhaps as a result of this, they reduce the value of leaders to strategic interest groups. This may indicate the reduced power of leaders, who no longer possess the same institutional power over their copartisans, but of course it also reflects the fact that interest groups can no longer invest in an individual leader over a long time horizon, since the leader will be termed out along with any other long-serving legislators. Either way, it is clear that term limits deprive leaders of some of their power.

In contrast, in the third column, we see that the effect of majority-party leadership on individual contributions is estimated to be no different when term limits are in place vs. when they are not. To

**Table 3 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Term-Limited and Non Term-Limited States.** Term limits are shown to reduce the power of majority-party leaders.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	1.24 (0.14)	0.97 (0.10)	1.12 (0.18)
Leader $\times$ Limit	-0.39 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.23)
Limit	-0.51 (0.20)	-0.38 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.27)
Intercept	8.91 (0.41)	10.00 (0.36)	5.43 (0.26)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

the extent that individual contributions measure symbolic power, then, term limits do not appear to affect the symbolic power of leaders at all.

Overall, we have seen in previous sections that majority-party leaders wield considerable policy power, as evidence by the fact that, on average, strategic interest groups target them with their contributions. *How* do majority-party leaders wield such power, though? The analysis in this section offers some clues. When leaders and their copartisans are expected to be around for longer, and when leaders can therefore exert more control over renegade members, interest groups value leaders more. When term limits take these powers away, interest groups scale back their contributions to leaders.

## 7 Conclusion

How much influence does the majority party and its leaders have on the legislative process? This question has animated much of the scholarly discussion on Congress, legislative politics, and elections over the past century. Despite a rich theoretical literature offering explanations for and against

the power of the majority party, there is little empirical evidence available for this debate. This gap in the empirical literature is the result, in our view, of two major obstacles.

First, defining and measuring “power” is difficult, and many previous ways of conceptualizing it, though useful for some purposes, do not allow researchers to test effectively whether majority-party leaders can influence legislation. Surveying legislators and asking them who is powerful will not systematically reveal majority-party power, as we have argued. Likewise, measuring the *de jure* of majority-party leaders will not necessarily identify *de facto* power, since those with *de facto* power may have little *de jure* power, and those with *de jure* power may have little *de facto* power. Finally, studying the majority party by observing strategic outputs of the legislative process is inherently difficult.

We have offered a separate approach. We apply a longstanding technique from elsewhere in the American Politics literature, using interest-group campaign contributions to track power. This approach is justified by the clear evidence that access-oriented groups seek out those in the legislature who can accomplish the political goals they desire. By circumventing the issues of the approaches mentioned above, our indirect measure of power reflects when and where the majority party and its leaders can exert their influence to “get things done,” and where they are not able to do so.

Second, to understand whether majority parties are powerful, we need useful variation in who holds power. This is simply not possible at the federal level, where there are only two cases to study. We overcome this issue by collecting a new dataset on leadership positions in state legislatures. This dataset, which we hope will prove fruitful for a variety of future projects on political parties and their leaders, has allowed us to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the identities of majority-party leaders. Using a difference-in-differences design to address concerns of candidate quality and other unobserved characteristics that lead some members of the legislature to become party leaders and others not to, we are able to isolate the effect of majority-party leadership on campaign contributions from interest groups.

Overall, we find that strategic interest groups allocate a large amount of funds based purely on leadership status. When a representative becomes the majority-party leader in a state legislature, her campaign receipts from interest groups increase sharply. These groups have every incentive to seek out those with power. The fact that majority-party leadership status causes them to contribute so much more money thus indicates the overall power of majority-party leaders. And

since leaders' powers are largely partisan, the paper therefore points to the power of parties, too. Because this evidence does not rely on observing strategic dynamics within the legislature, self-reported perceptions of power, or the *de jure* powers of leaders, we believe it is among the strongest evidence available for the power of parties in American politics.

By investigating the specific sources of the effect of party leadership on campaign contributions, we also contribute to the literature on *how* majority-party leaders are powerful. We find that leaders play a dual role in the legislature. They provide consistent value to access groups, which shows that they have the power to offer policy concessions and other activities that these groups find valuable, but they also gain significant contributions from ideological groups. This suggests that leaders have the power to produce both ideological and non-ideological goods. They are both the principal actor in effecting policy and the symbolic head of their party.

We also apply our empirical design to measure how the power of leaders and their parties differs across institutional contexts, thereby shedding light on *why* they are powerful. Majority-party leaders are far less powerful in term-limited legislatures, suggesting the importance of the career incentives that the majority party can offer to its members when legislative institutions offer long time horizons to legislators. At the same time, term limits have no effect on ideological contributions to majority-party leaders, underscoring the fact that symbolic power, unlike policy power, does not depend on the structure of the legislature.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we have established that majority-party leaders are far *less* powerful when polarization is higher—contrary to theories of partisan organization that posit increased centralization under these conditions. We have argued that the pattern of evidence is consistent with an alternate story of leadership power. In this account, eras of high polarization—eras when members naturally agree on what needs to be done—are precisely the circumstance in which leaders are unimportant. We have argued that the primary role of leaders is to forge consensus where it does not exist naturally, and thus that leaders are most important when their copartisans' preferences are heterogeneous, not homogeneous. Necessarily we have left the full details of this argument for future development, but the empirical evidence we have put forward in this paper on the variation in the power of leadership across levels of polarization represents an important step in revising theories of the legislature that make predictions about polarization.

The literature on political parties has struggled to resolve a fundamental tension. On the one hand, parties *seem* powerful. On the other, it is difficult to see how a set of strategic individuals can form an effective coalition that requires them to act contrary to their individual interests. As Cox and McCubbins (2007: 7) write: “Neither parties as floor coalitions nor parties as procedural coalitions seem theoretically justified without a theory of how individual legislators can be welded together into a meaningful and stable collectivity.” We provide evidence that underscores just how important the development and improvement of such theories is and will be in the future. Despite the difficulties parties face in inducing individual members to cooperate in this manner, the new evidence presented in this paper suggests that our existing theories are correct in positing that majority-party leaders have significant power in the legislature, but that they are incorrect in supposing that this power varies positively with the degree of polarization in the legislature. Majority-party leaders are indeed a force to be reckoned with, but they are most powerful in times when they can use their authority to forge a consensus that does not already exist, naturally, among members of their party.

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## Appendix

### Validating the Parallel Trends Assumption

The causal inferences in the paper rely on the so-called “parallel trends” assumption of the difference-in-differences design. Rather than make a naive comparison of the campaign receipts of leaders and non-leaders, we instead compare the *change* in contributions a candidate receives before and after she becomes the leader to the change in contributions over the same time period among candidates who do not become leaders. This addresses any common, unobserved time factors that would bias a simple within-comparison of contributions over time. However, it relies on the assumption that the change over time in the “control” units provides an accurate counterfactual for the change over time that would have occurred for a given candidate had she not become the majority-party leader.

In this section, we offer evidence that this assumption is plausible by showing how our results are robust to a variety of techniques for relaxing the parallel trends assumption. First, in Table A.1, we added state-specific linear time trends to see if the results might be driven by differences in how states are trending over time. As the table shows, we continue to find a large, significant effect of leadership on campaign contributions.

**Table A.1 – State-Specific Trends.**

	Log Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)	Log Group Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.52 (0.06)	0.60 (0.11)	0.62 (0.09)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Time Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Next, in Table A.2, we alter the comparison groups in a different way. Rather than use overall year fixed effects, which account for common temporal shocks at the national level, we include a separate set of year fixed effects for each state, i.e., state-year fixed effects. In essence this performs a difference-in-differences design separately for each state, comparing changes in contributions for leaders and non-leaders, and then weights these together to produce one overall estimate. As the results show, we again find similar, large effects for majority-party leadership.

Finally, in Table A.3, we address the parallel trends assumption a different way by directly controlling for a variable that might violate the assumption. Specifically, we include a control variable that measures the number of years of seniority of the incumbent in district  $i$  at time  $t$ . This address a potential issue in which districts that have more experienced incumbents—districts from which, we might suspect, future leaders are more likely to arise—trend differently from other districts. As the table shows, we once again find little change in the estimated effects.

**Table A.2 – State-Year Fixed Effects.**

	Log Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)	Log Group Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.51 (0.06)	0.58 (0.11)	0.60 (0.09)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

**Table A.3 – Controlling for Seniority.**

	Log Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)	Log Group Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.53 (0.07)	0.63 (0.13)	0.65 (0.09)
Seniority	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

## Leadership positions

### Results Not Driven by Professionalization

One important factor that varies across U.S. state legislatures is the degree to which they are “professionalized.” Although professionalization has been shown to be an important variable in many analyses, it appears to be unrelated to the power of leaders.

Table A.5 interacts the leadership variable with the state’s ranking in terms of professionalization, using the most up-to-date professionalization data from Squire (2012). Note that the main effect for this professionalization variable is omitted because it is absorbed by the district fixed effects (the rank is calculated as the average across all years and thus does not vary within a district over time). As the table shows, we find a precisely estimated zero coefficient on the interaction: the power of leadership does not appear to vary along with state legislative professionalization.

### Redefining the Leadership Variable

In the paper we define leadership to include the following positions: Speaker of the House/Assembly, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Majority Leader (Senate or House), and Majority Floor Leader (Senate or House).

Here we offer estimates with three alternative definitions in order to probe the robustness of the findings and to see which offices appear to drive the results. For brevity’s sake we only present results using logged interest-group contributions, our main outcome of interest.

In the first column of Table A.6, we remove Majority Leader from the list of offices included above. In the second column, we remove President Pro Tempore from the list of offices. In the final column, we include all of the offices from the original definition and we also add in Speaker Pro Tempore. In all three cases, effects continue to be large and positive. The effect appears to grow a bit when President Pro Tempore is removed, probably because this office is somewhat less important, but in all cases effects are quite large.

**Table A.4** – Overview of Leadership Positions by State and Year

	Majority Leader	Speaker of the House	President Pro Tem
AL	02 06 98	02 06 90 94 98	02 06 90 94 98
AK	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	
AZ	02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98		92 94 96 98
AR	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96	02 04 92 96 98
CA	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	00 04 94 96
CO	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 06 08 90 94 98
CT	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
DE	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 08 90 92 96
FL	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 08 92 96 98
GA	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98
HI	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	
ID	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
IL	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 90 92 94 96 98	08
IN	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 08 90 94 98
IA	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 08 90 92 96
KS	00 02 04 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98	
KY	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 92 96
LA		07 91 95	03 07 91 95 99
ME	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00
MD	02 06 90 94 98	90 94 98	02 06 90 94 98
MA	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 06
MI	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 06 90 94 98
MN	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	06
MS	07	03 07 91 95 99	03 07 91 95 99
MO	00 02 04 06 08 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 92 94 96
MT	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 90 92
NE			
NV	00 02 04 06 90 92 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 06 08 90
NH	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 90 92 94	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98
NJ	01 03 07 91 93 97		01 03 07 91 93 97
NM	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 92 96
NY	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
NC	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
ND	00 04 08 90 92 96		00 04 90 92 96 98
OH	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 90 96
OK	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	04 06 90 94
OR	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 90 94 98
PA	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 08 90 94 98
RI	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 96 98
SC	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 92 96
SD	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98		00 02 04 06 90 92 94 98
TN	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 92 94 96 98	
TX		00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 90 94 98
UT	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	
VT	00 94 96	00 02	94
VA	01 03 05 07 91 93 95 97 99	01 03 05 07 91 93 95 97 99	03 07 91 95 99
WA	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 92 94 96 98
WV			
WI	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 94 96
WY	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	

**Table A.5 – Effect Across Squire Professionalization Rank.**

	Log Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)	Log Group Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.52 (0.12)	0.65 (0.28)	0.54 (0.18)
Professionalization × Leader	0.01 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.43)	0.15 (0.27)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

**Table A.6 – Effect of Attaining Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions: Using Different Leadership Codings.**

	No Majority Leader Log Group Contributions (\$)	No President Pro Tem Log Group Contributions (\$)	Adding Speaker Pro Tem Log Group Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.58 (0.09)	0.68 (0.11)	0.57 (0.08)
Intercept	8.46 (0.47)	8.47 (0.47)	8.47 (0.47)
N	40,132	40,132	40,132
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.