

The Rise, Demise, and Transformation of IR:
The last 30 years and the next 30.

*Political Science, Political Economy, Formal Political Theory:
The Last 50 Years, the Next 50*

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Glass (greater than) Half Full – (I)

The previous 30 = 50 – 20 years:

- Game theory in the Michigan Economics Department 30 years ago (1985-86).
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's decision-theoretic *War Trap* (1983).
- Uncertainty and credibility issues formalized with asymmetric information and PBEs in work on nuclear deterrence (Nalebuff 1986, Powell 1987)
- The inefficiency puzzle, informational and commitment problems (Fearon 1995).
- Acemoglu and Robinson point a way to framing very big problems in tractable frameworks (2000, 2001).

Glass (greater than) Half Full – (II)

Studying weakly institutionalized polities:

- The canonical bargaining problem of dividing a pie becomes one of dividing a flow of pies with no or limited commitment power over the division future pies.
- Initial models of bargaining were in many ways a relabeling of existing models, e.g., Rubinstein bargaining with outside options.
- The study of commitment problems – often in the shadow of shifting power – illustrate a shift to new strategic questions.

Glass (greater than) Half Full – (III)

The next 30 years?

- I have no idea...
- More of what we are already seeing – an integration of theory and data (though I do worry about identification).