

WENTAO FU

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PERSONAL INFORMATION

Address: Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK
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EDUCATION

Ph.D. *Candidate*, Economics, University of Warwick, 2012-2018 (Expected)
Diploma plus Msc, Economics, University of Warwick, Distinction, 2010-2012
B.A., Economics, Shenzhen University, Outstanding Graduate, 2005-2009

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics
Secondary: Industrial Organisation, Financial Economics

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2015-Present Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, University of Warwick
2013-2015 Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Warwick
2014-2015 Research Assistant to Dr. Peter Buisseret

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Teaching Fellowship, University of Warwick, UK	2015-Present
Warwick Postgraduate Fellow in Economics, University of Warwick, UK	2012-2015
Outstanding Graduate, Shenzhen University, China	2009
Top Prize Scholarship, Shenzhen University, China	2006, 2008
Namtai Social Scholarship, Shenzhen University, China	2006, 2008
First Prize Scholarship, Shenzhen University, China	2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Module	Year	Average Evaluation
Economic Analysis: Microeconomics (Msc)	2016-Present	4.4/5
Topics in Financial Economics (Bsc 3rd year)	2017-Present	N.A.
Topics in Economic Theory (Bsc 3rd year)	2016-Present	4.13/5
Mathematical Techniques B (Bsc 1st year)	2015-Present	4.32/5
Economics of Strategy (Bsc 2nd year)	2015, 2017-Present	N.A.
Introductory Maths & Stats (Msc)	2015-2017	N.A.
Mathematical Economics 1A (Bsc 2nd year)	2013-2016	4.42/5
Mathematical Economics 1B (Bsc 2nd year)	2013-2015	4.5/5

PRESENTATIONS AND SUMMER SCHOOLS

<i>Presentations</i>	Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (scheduled), 2017 MTWP seminar, University of Warwick, 2015-2017
<i>Summer</i>	25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory - Matching and Market Design, Institute for Advance Studies, Hebrew University
<i>Schools</i>	Decision-Making under Uncertainty, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick

OTHER SKILLS

Languages: English (Fluent), Mandarin (Native), Cantonese (Conversant), German (Basic), Japanese (Basic)

Computing: Mathematica (Excellent), Matlab (Good), STATA (Good), EViews (Good), R (Basic)

REFERENCES

Prof. Motty Perry (Advisor)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
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Prof. Jacob (Kobi) Glazer (Advisor)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
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Dr. Peter Buisseret
Harris School of Public Policy
University of Chicago
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Prof. Jeremy Smith (Teaching)
Department of Economics
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WORKING PAPERS

Optimal Contract to Reward Private Experimentation (Job Market Paper)

This paper studies how a principal motivates an uninformed agent to learn about, and reveal, his quality through private experiments. The principal commits to a reward scheme and she aims to assign the rewards to correspond as closely as possible to the quality of the agent. To get a high reward, the agent experiments privately and discloses the results selectively. I show that the optimal reward scheme features an increasing step function: the early steps encourage a potential good type agent to continue experiments after early successes; the later steps are designed to deter a bad type agent from over-experimentation after a failure, and the scheme becomes flat when enough successes are reported. If the agent's incentives to deviate from the intended path of experimentation are weak, a one-step function is optimal: the agent receives a bonus if he reports enough successes; otherwise, he only gets a non-negative compensation. I characterise the conditions where the principal achieves the same efficiency level relative to a public information environment.

Motivating Partnership in R&D Projects

This paper discusses a two-period economy with a three-tier hierarchy in which the principal without full commitment decides how and when to motivate a productive intermediary (agent

one) to privately sub-contract and collaborate with another agent (agent two) on a project with uncertain quality. The dynamic moral hazard problem arises due to the agents' hidden effort choice and the opportunity for future work. Besides free riding, the agent one's exclusion and over-investment incentives need to be considered due to his private sub-contract option. Both the dominant incentive constraint in the optimal short term contract and the principal's investment decision depend on the project's value-cost ratio, the level of synergy in the partnership and the amount of patience. In general, the principal under-invests and stops earlier compared to the first-best outcome. However, there exist scenarios in which agent one always over-invests when the individual work is motivated, and the principal might compromise to motivate a higher effort level by over-investing relative to the static game, especially if the synergy is positive but small and the project's value-cost ratio is medium. In a two-tier hierarchy, the principal can be weakly better off, but the inefficiency caused by agent one's private link to the other agent still exists.

Private Experimentation and Persuasion

This paper considers a situation in which an uninformed agent persuades a principal for a high reward through costly private experimentation. Since the experiments and results are private information, the agent selectively discloses the favourable ones. I show the existence of three types of equilibria as well as their conditions: no-experiment equilibrium, separating equilibria with learning and pooling equilibria with learning. The participation threshold determines the upper bound of the entire set of equilibria, and the over-experimentation determines the boundary between the separating and pooling equilibria with learning. As the agent's value-cost ratio or prior belief increases, the set of separating equilibria with learning shrinks but the set of pooling equilibria with learning expands. Moreover, when the agent can pre-commit to report a specific number of successes to prove his quality, he tends to commit to a number that is as small as possible.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Rumours and Information Acquisition

Filial Piety and Altruism - with Jingguo Yang