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Sonia Bhalotra
Damian Clarke
Hanna Mühlrad
Mårten Palme

Health and Labor Market Impacts of Twin Birth: Evidence from a Swedish IVF Policy Mandate

Sonia Bhalotra,* Damian Clarke,† Hanna Mühlrad,‡ and Mårten Palme§

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Abstract

IVF allows women to delay birth and pursue careers, but IVF massively increases the risk of twin birth. There is limited evidence of how having twins influences women's post-birth careers. We investigate this, leveraging a single embryo transfer (SET) mandate implemented in Sweden in 2003, following which the share of twin births showed a precipitous drop of 70%. Linking birth registers to hospitalization and earnings registers, we identify substantial improvements in maternal and child health and women's earnings following IVF birth, alongside an increase in subsequent fertility. We provide the first comprehensive evaluation of SET, relevant given the secular rise in IVF births and growing concerns over twin birth risk. We contribute new estimates of the child penalty imposed by twin as opposed to singleton birth, relevant to the secular rise in the global twin birth rate.

Keywords: twins, IVF, single embryo transfer, career costs of children, child penalty, gender wage gap, fertility, maternal health, neonatal health, gender

JEL Codes: J13, I11, I12, I38, J24.

*Department of Economics, University of Warwick, CEPR, IEA, IZA, CAGE

†Department of Economics, University of Chile and IZA

‡Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU)

§Department of Economics, Stockholm University

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1 Introduction

About 1.6 million twins are born each year worldwide, with one in every 42 children born a twin. Records from more than a hundred countries indicate that the global twin birth rate has risen by a third over the past 40 years (Monden et al., 2021). There are two widely recognized drivers of this trend. One is the postponement of parenthood. Although the chances of conception fall with age, the probability of having twins increases because older women have higher levels of follicle stimulating hormone (Beemsterboer et al., 2006; Pison and D’Addato, 2006).¹ The other is the steadily increasing use of fertility treatments, some of which reflects delayed parenthood but some of which reflects a rise in infertility.² The common practice in IVF is to implant two embryos to increase the chances of success and, as a result, the risk of twin birth with IVF is 10 to 20 times the risk without (Karlström and Bergh, 2007; Kalra and Barnhart, 2011). A third potential driver of the trend in twin birth, albeit one that is less widely recognized, is trend improvements in maternal health— conditional upon conception, healthy women are more likely to successfully take a twin pregnancy to term (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019).³ Overall, the rising trend in twin birth reflects both women’s reproductive health and their decision to delay birth, often in favour of career opportunities.

In this paper we consider the consequences of twin birth for women’s reproductive health outcomes and careers. To do this, we leverage a policy change implemented in Sweden in January 2003 which mandated that the default procedure for IVF births should involve a single embryo transfer (henceforth, SET). The SET mandate was exogenously driven by scientific research showing that pregnancy success rates could be maintained with single rather than double embryo transfers (DET) (Lukassen et al., 2005; Karlström and Bergh, 2007; Lundin and Bergh, 2007; Criniti et al., 2005; Kutlu et al., 2011). Its abrupt introduction disrupted reproductive outcomes for women

¹In a 2015 publication, the German Federal Institute for Population Research reported that the percentage of women giving birth at age 35 or older had risen from 7.6% in 1981 to 25.9% in 2015. OECD figures indicate that the average age at first birth has risen by about 7 years since the 1970s, and 3.4 years since 2000 (OECD, 2021).

²It is thought that hormone altering chemicals play a role— these are found in water bottles, food packaging, electronic devices, personal-care products and cleaning supplies (Scientific American, 2021). A meta-analysis of studies of sperm counts of men (unselected on fertility) in western countries concludes that it has halved in the last 40 years (Levine et al., 2017). Couple-level infertility, defined as failure to achieve pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse, is currently estimated at between 7% and 15% of all couples (Geyter, 2021; Ekechi, 2021). *Children of Men* and *The Handmaid’s Tale* are examples of unsettling narratives around growing infertility. The growth in fertility treatments possibly also reflects their increasing success in line with improvements in IVF technology; falling costs as governments expand subsidies for IVF; and growing information and acceptability. A third of US adults say they have used fertility treatments or know someone who has (Pew Research Center, 2021).

³Bhalotra and Clarke (2019) analyse close to 17 million births in 72 countries, of which 2.73% are twins. They show that mothers of twins are selectively healthy. This is the case in richer and poorer countries, and it holds for sixteen different markers of maternal health, including health stocks and health conditions prior to pregnancy (height, obesity, diabetes, hypertension, asthma, kidney disease, smoking), exposure to unexpected stress in pregnancy, and measures of the availability of medical professionals and prenatal care. The effects are sizable, with a 1 standard deviation improvement in the indicator increasing the likelihood of twinning by 6% to 12%. The authors provide evidence of selective miscarriage being the key mechanism, using U.S. Vital Statistics data for 14 to 16 million births.

using IVF. Following the SET mandate, the twin birth rate fell sharply from about 30% pre-SET to 5% soon after. By 2018, it had fallen to 2.54%, which is one of the world's lowest twin birth rates among IVF users. The twin birth rate among IVF users continues to be 25%–30% in many countries (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2020), and the share of women using IVF shows a steady rise.⁴ Both of these facts underline the relevance of our analysis.

Our results contribute new evidence for women considering delaying birth and accessing IVF, and for countries considering mandating or encouraging SET for IVF, showing that mandating SET significantly improves not only maternal and child health outcomes under IVF but also women's earnings after birth. Our results are also relevant to understanding impacts of twin birth in the wider population of women with unassisted births. We delineate our contributions to the literature more precisely in the next section.

We merge the Swedish medical birth register with administrative data on hospitalization, death and earnings, and link children to mothers and fathers using the multi-generation register. We analyse birth cohorts 1998-2007, a window around the SET reform in 2003, and track outcomes for up to nine years after birth. The estimation sample, including all women (those who do and do not use IVF) contains individual longitudinal data for approximately 895,000 births and 908,000 children. Identification relies upon the introduction of SET creating experimental variation in the risk of twin birth among IVF-users.⁵ We estimate event study models, controlling flexibly for the age and education of the mother and father and, in order to control for aggregate trends, we adopt a double difference approach incorporating non-IVF births.⁶ We investigate the two main threats to identification, which are that the outcomes of IVF vs non-IVF users could have evolved differently in the absence of the SET reform, and endogenous (SET-driven) selection into IVF treatment.⁷

We find no evidence of differential pre-trends but we nevertheless provide bounds on the estimates obtained by relaxing the parallel trends assumption, following Rambachan and Roth (2020). We investigate and allay the concern that there were substantive changes in the composition of mothers adopting IVF in response to SET. We nevertheless show estimates with and without con-

⁴The share of all births owing to IVF now exceeds 3% in many industrialized countries (de Mouzon et al., 2010) and it is estimated to be growing at about 7% per annum.

⁵The share of twin births among unassisted births is stable, which confirms that the post-SET drop in twin birth among IVF-assisted births is not the result of global factors such as improvements in maternal health which impact both IVF and non-IVF births.

⁶Incorporating non-IVF births acts to provide a natural benchmark for analysis of effect sizes. Since twin birth is the main reason that the fertility and health outcomes of IVF-users and non-users diverge, we express all improvements in these outcomes for IVF births in terms of the fraction of the pre-reform gap between IVF and non-IVF births that was closed by mandating SET.

⁷The difference in difference approach does not require that the treated (IVF) and untreated (non-IVF, or mothers with natural births) exhibit balance in levels, only in trends. In other words, identification does not require that there is no selection into IVF, but rather that this selection does not systematically change when the SET reform is put in place. In fact women undertaking IVF tend to be older and exhibit healthier pregnancy behaviours, and both of these factors predict twinning irrespective of SET vs DET procedures Bhalotra and Clarke (2019). By leveraging the SET mandate we are able to isolate policy-driven variation in twinning from the variation predicted by characteristics.

trols for mother and father characteristics, and provide results of an additional specification that controls for trends in characteristics. We also show, for an appropriately matched sample, that the estimates hold conditional upon mother fixed effects.⁸ We consistently report p -values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing.

Our main findings are that mandating SET for IVF-users led to a sharp drop in twin births, significant improvements in maternal and newborn health, an increase in the probability of a subsequent birth driven by mothers at first parity, and a decrease in the career costs of children. The SET reform led to the health and fertility outcomes of women using IVF converging toward those of women with unassisted births. In the case of earnings, women using IVF have a baseline advantage and SET enhanced this advantage. Overall, SET significantly resolves the trade-offs that women face in choosing to delay birth to establish careers with the fallback of seeking IVF treatment, but then possibly suffering perinatal complications, unwanted births, and post-birth earnings penalties.

Our estimates show that the benefits accruing from reduced hospital costs, increased earnings of women and increased potential earnings of children vastly overwhelm the costs associated with the SET reform. We extend the analysis to examine dynamic impacts of twin vs singleton birth on mother's earnings using the estimator of Kleven et al. (2019b). This reveals that twins impose an excess child penalty in the short run but that this vanishes after two years. Indeed the child penalty on earnings among mothers who start out with twins is smaller in the long run, consistent with scale economies, and the fact that mothers who start with singletons often have an additional child and hence incur two distinct career disruptions. We highlight that, in countries with weaker family-friendly policies, twin births may impose a more persistent excess penalty on women's earnings.

The identified impacts are fairly pervasive across population sub-groups and, for continuous outcomes, across the distribution of the outcome. We examined heterogeneity in impacts of SET by parity, age, education and body mass index (BMI) of the mother. Twin birth rates not only decline significantly in each subgroup, the magnitude of the decline is similar across all subgroups subject to the mandate, a pattern consistent with it resulting from the mandate rather than from selection or an omitted factor. This pervasive pattern is mirrored in indicators such as child birth weight and gestational age that directly reflect twinning. There is some variation across subgroups in the impact of SET on the mother's health and earnings but, in general, we see significant declines in the high-frequency subgroups, which confirms that most IVF-users experienced the noted improvements.⁹

⁸If women with more favourable characteristics were more likely to undertake IVF following the SET mandate then this would lead to higher twinning alongside better health and earnings (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019), while the SET reform led to lower twinning alongside better health and earnings. Also, the proportion of women seeking IVF does not show a discontinuous change at the date of the SET reform. If it did, this might signal that women at the margin are different and hence that there is a compositional shift. These facts contribute to mitigating selection concerns, over and above the tests we provide.

⁹Most outcomes show similar magnitudes across education and BMI categories, but some outcomes

We now elaborate our findings. Neonatal outcomes for children born of IVF show a dramatic improvement across a range of indicators after the SET mandate, the baseline gap relative to non-IVF births narrowing by 50 to 75 percent.¹⁰ We identify increases in gestational age, birth weight and APGAR score, and declines in hospitalization and an index of 17 neonatal morbidities. Improvements are evident across the distribution of continuous measures. The probability of low birth weight at the commonly used medical thresholds of 1500 and 2500 grams fell by 1.2 and 7.8 percentage points (pp) respectively. Maternal morbidities, maternal hospitalization and C-section rates also fall after SET. The effects are again large, for example, the number of nights mothers spend in hospital after birth falls by 0.63, closing 63% of the baseline excess over non-IVF births, and receipt of sickness benefits declines by 8.2%, eliminating 40% of the excess relative to non-IVF births.

We find that women using IVF are 7.2 pp more likely to have another birth after SET, driven by women at first parity, for whom the increase is 10 pp. In Sweden, on average about half of all women have a second child. Before the SET reform women using IVF were less likely than other women to proceed to a subsequent birth— 46% compared with 53% of women and this is likely, at least in part, because a larger share of IVF users had twins. The SET reform, by virtue of reducing twin birth risk among IVF-users, closes more than two-thirds of this gap. The increase translates to 0.11 additional births among IVF women which occur within 3 years of the index birth.

Averaged over the nine years after birth, the earnings of women giving birth with IVF assistance are 5.6% higher after SET than before SET. We investigated the extensive vs intensive margins of both earnings and fertility. We find significant increases in mother's earnings at both the extensive (employment) and intensive margin of earnings (earnings conditional on employment). The overall increase is dominated by the intensive margin, as women's labour force participation rate in Sweden is high and it is uncommon that women drop out after birth. The increase in women's earnings is statistically significant for women having their first birth (extensive margin of fertility) as well as for women at higher parity (intensive margin). The increase in earnings is larger for women using IVF for their second or higher order births, consistent with women at higher parity being less likely to want an additional birth.¹¹ The increase in women's earnings is evident through most of the distribution of earnings.

We find no discernible impact of SET on father's earnings. It follows that SET produces an increase in the long run earnings of mothers relative to fathers, a measure of the child penalty that

show no significant impact for women at parity 3 or higher, or among women under the age of 25, both of which are low-frequency categories in the treated (IVF) sample.

¹⁰We do not expect full convergence. Only 70% of IVF births were conceived with SET after the reform because the mandate allowed exceptions, for example, for older women (see section 2).

¹¹More than half of all women who have a singleton at first birth have a subsequent birth and, as a result, the impact of motherhood on their earnings at the 5 or the 9 year mark is not dissimilar to that for women who have twins at first birth. However women who have a singleton at second birth are a lot less likely to move on to have another child, and women who have twins at second birth are left with three children, which is above target for a majority of women. This is why SET— which reduced twin birth rates— had a larger earnings-improving impact on women using IVF at higher parity.

Kleven et al. (2019b) argue is an increasingly important explanation of the gender earnings gap. This differential has also been used as a marker of women's bargaining power in the household that impacts their consumption, autonomy, and risk of domestic violence victimization (McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg et al., 1997; Aizer, 2010).

To investigate the child penalty result further, we estimated the dynamic impacts of birth on earnings for mothers and fathers of twins vs singletons, using the estimator of Kleven et al. (2019b). In the main analysis, the event is the passage of the SET mandate in 2003. In this auxiliary analysis, it is a mother-specific event of birth. We find that women's labour market earnings in the two years following birth are about 10 percentage points lower when they have twins as opposed to singletons but that, in the long run, mothers starting out with twins tend to suffer a slightly smaller long run child penalty than mothers starting out with singletons, diverging by around 1.5 percentage points. We show that the exact same pattern holds for women not using IVF: the twin vs singleton penalty evolves similarly. However, women using IVF, in the long run suffer a smaller child penalty than women having unassisted births, consistent with IVF-users having established their careers before birth (see, for example, Adda et al. (2017)).¹²

Most research on the child penalty estimates "reduced form" impacts of entry to parenthood (first birth), allowing that subsequent births may exacerbate the long run penalty on women's earnings, without explicitly modelling or even accounting for subsequent birth. In a paper that takes a more structural approach, Adda et al. (2017) argue that the cost of a second child is increasing in birth spacing, as this prolongs the time that the mother spends off work. There is however no previous evidence of whether this carries through to the case of twin birth, when birth spacing approaches zero.

Our finding that mothers giving birth with IVF suffer a smaller child penalty in earnings after SET is consistent with a direct impact of lower rates of twin birth, and an indirect impact that derives from improved maternal and newborn health. In our Swedish data, both the excess child penalty from twin birth, and its adverse health impacts (on mothers and children) are most clearly evident in the two years following birth. The dynamics of employment profiles disrupted by the event of birth look broadly similar to the dynamics of the earnings profiles, in line with women in Sweden taking time out of the labour market in the years just after birth but with most women returning to work after. In Sweden, women's careers are relatively protected by the generosity of parental leave, sickness benefits and postnatal hospital care, and this no doubt helps them tide over the twin-driven dip in the years following birth. However in countries where these protections are weaker, the short run challenge imposed by twin birth may have a persistent impact on women's earnings. In particular, the depth of the short run dip in earnings after twin birth may propel layoff, dropout or occupational mobility, leading to the excess child penalty of twins persisting into the long run. Ours are the first estimates distinguishing the child penalty for twin vs singleton birth,

¹²We also provide estimates of father's earnings and employment trajectories after twin vs singleton birth, separating the IVF and non IVF samples. The twin vs singleton pattern is similar to that seen for mothers albeit muted. What is notable is that we estimate a child premium on father's earnings. We discuss this in the results section.

but estimates for other countries that investigate this are merited.

1.1 Existing literature and contributions

This section contextualizes this paper with respect to related research delineating its contributions to three strands of research: on IVF, twin birth, and on the child penalty.

Similar to the introduction of the pill, the legalization of abortion and the availability of long-acting reversible contraceptives (Bailey, 2006; Goldin and Katz, 2002; Abramowitz, 2014), IVF has contributed to the economic liberation of women by allowing them to delay marriage and childbirth to pursue higher education and a career. However, previous research has recognized that IVF imposes substantial costs on families and the health system. The cost of IVF procedures in the US ranges between \$12,000 and \$18,000 per cycle (Bitler, 2008). The higher risk of twin birth exacerbates the postnatal costs of IVF births: it is estimated that the average cost of a singleton birth in the US in 2012 was \$27,000, against \$115,000 and \$435,000 for twin and triplet births respectively (Lemos et al., 2013).

The reason is that twin births are associated with adverse pregnancy and birth outcomes (Sazonova et al., 2013). Women conceiving through IVF treatment are more likely to suffer from complications including hypertension, haemorrhage and emergency C-section and twin birth plays a large role in this. Twin births are much more likely to be preterm, about 58% of twins being delivered before 37 weeks, compared with about 11% of singletons (Morrison, 2005). Twins are more likely to be low birth weight, and to suffer neonatal morbidities. There are additional long run costs of twin birth because markers of poor infant health are associated with neurological development issues, weaker cognitive performance and lower educational attainment, life expectancy and income (Gelbaya et al., 2010; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Black et al., 2007; Oreopoulos et al., 2008; Bharadwaj et al., 2013; Bhalotra et al., 2017; Almond et al., 2018).

Our first contribution is that we comprehensively document impacts of the SET-led shift away from twin birth among IVF-users on an unusually rich set of indicators of neonatal and maternal health. In doing this we augment the related biomedical evidence (Sazonova et al., 2011; Kalra and Barnhart, 2011; Saldeen and Sundström, 2005; Bergh et al., 1999; Hall, 2003) by virtue of identifying causal effects, using the entire population of births and analysing future fertility and earnings in addition to child and maternal health.

In a related paper, using variation in access to infertility treatments induced by state-level insurance mandates, Bitler (2008) shows that *expanding access to IVF* leads to an increase in twin birth and hence an increase in the healthcare costs of birth. In contrast, we estimate impacts of regulating the number of embryos transferred *conditional upon IVF use*, which results in a decrease in twin births and a decrease in healthcare costs of birth. The distinction is important because our estimates not only document impacts of twin birth but show how a switch to SET can largely

mitigate these impacts.¹³

Our second contribution is that we model impacts of the SET reform on fertility continuation. This provides (ITT) estimates of how the occurrence of twins vs singletons at first birth modifies the demand for a subsequent child. Our finding that mandating SET (and thus reducing the chances of a twin birth) led to higher subsequent fertility among IVF users is consistent with some women wanting two children. For these women, SET results not in a change in fertility but instead in birth spacing (while for women who do not proceed to have another birth, there is also a change in fertility).

There is relatively little evidence of the impacts of birth spacing vs additional births on women's labour market outcomes. Using miscarriage as a source of exogenous variation in birth spacing, Karimi (2014) finds that longer intervals allow women in Sweden to re-enter the labor market between births, but the structural model of Adda et al. (2017) predicts that shorter birth spacing diminishes the long run child penalty (for women who have at least two births) by shortening the total time that women are off work. It seems plausible that the relationship is non-linear, but we are unaware of any previous evidence of how the motherhood penalty reacts to birth spacing approaching zero, as is the case with twin birth. As twins are an increasing share of births, disproportionately occurring among women with strong career attachments, it is important to find out.

We provide the first estimates of the excess motherhood penalty exerted by twins in comparison with singleton births, using a policy experiment that is uniquely positioned to identify this object. In doing this, we make a new contribution to a growing literature on the career costs of children (Adda et al., 2017; Kleven et al., 2019b; Berniell et al., 2021). Our findings also have methodological relevance. In the twin instrument literature (references below), it is common to interpret the estimates as reflecting impacts of having an additional child, largely ignoring direct impacts of twin birth arising from their closer (close to zero) birth spacing and their weaker birth endowments. Although some studies have recognized that twins may have direct impacts on the outcome (Cáceres-Delpiano, 2006; Conley and Glauber, 2005; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Qian, 2017), there are no estimates of the direct impact of twins on earnings.¹⁴

We contribute to a wider literature seeking to identify impacts of fertility on women's earnings. Most of the literature has been unable to identify impacts of having a first (singleton) birth i.e. extensive margin fertility by virtue of the instruments used for fertility which are typically either twin birth¹⁵ or, following (Angrist and Evans, 1998), an indicator for the first two births being of

¹³An additional distinction of our work is that we investigate not only child health but also maternal health, and we use a richer set of indicators of child health, also tracking child hospitalizations through to nine years after birth.

¹⁴The validity of the same sex instrument has also been subject to scrutiny. For instance, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) show evidence of scale economies in child sex, and point to evidence that the sex composition of births affects marital stability (Ananat and Michaels, 2008; Dahl and Moretti, 2008). This is not directly relevant here, other than that it highlights the challenges to identifying impacts of fertility on earnings.

¹⁵Amongst others, see for example Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980); Bronars and Grogger (1994); Angrist and Evans (1998); Cáceres-Delpiano (2012); Jacobsen et al. (1999).

the same sex. In an innovative approach to estimating impacts of first birth, Lundborg et al. (2017) use IVF-success within a sample of IVF-users in Denmark as a new instrument, on the grounds that the chances of conceiving with IVF treatment are idiosyncratic. Using the exogenous variation in twinning created by SET, we provide an alternative approach to identifying earnings impacts for women at first birth.¹⁶

Overall, we substantially extend the evidence of impacts of twin birth on maternal and child health, and provide new evidence of impacts of twin birth on future fertility and earnings.¹⁷ Although it is widely acknowledged that availability of IVF and other assisted reproductive technologies has significantly enhanced women's choice set, slackening the career-family tradeoff by allowing women to invest in their careers and delay birth (Gershoni and Low, 2021a,b), there is surprisingly limited evidence of whether the substantial increase in the risk of twinning associated with IVF compromises the careers of women *after* birth. Our results illuminate the trade-offs that arise in postponing birth and undertaking IVF, while also demonstrating the potential for recent advances in IVF technology to mitigate these trade-offs. As discussed, the trade-offs are most likely smaller in Sweden than in most other countries because Sweden provides universal health care to a high standard, and unusually generous parental leave. Thus, although the excess motherhood penalty from twin birth is short-lived in Sweden, it might exhibit persistence in countries with a weaker welfare state.¹⁸

Our final contribution is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of mandating SET for IVF treatments, along with a crude benefit-cost assessment.¹⁹ Our assessment includes short run benefits (dominated by health gains) and longer run benefits (dominated by earnings gains for both the mothers and the children), and we account for the marginal cost of public funds. While this is only a back of the envelope calculation and the division of costs between the public and the private purse is different across countries, it does serve to make salient the range of dynamic benefits flowing from the SET mandate.²⁰ Our findings are relevant to countries considering mandating

¹⁶In Lundborg et al. (2017), IVF-success switches the number of children from 0 to 1 for about 75% of Danish IVF-users, and from 0 to 2 for the other 25%, because a quarter of the births in their IVF sample are twin births. Their estimates of the child penalty are thus a weighted average over women who have singleton and twin births. The increment in fertility is, on average, 1.25. This potentially limits the extent to which their estimates generalize to unassisted births. Our estimates capture a unit change in fertility.

¹⁷In fact we provide reduced form estimates of impacts of mandating SET. These need to be scaled by impacts of SET on twinning to deliver estimates for twinning.

¹⁸Other factors that may result in twins having a larger long run impact on women's earnings than singleton births include cases where gender norms result in women having weaker labour force attachment, or where women desire one rather than two children. We mention these cases parenthetically because they are correlated with family-friendly policies.

¹⁹Biomedical studies showing that the SET mandate was associated with a sharp drop in twin births include Karlström and Bergh (2007); Lundin and Bergh (2007); Saldeen and Sundström (2005); Sazonova et al. (2011); Thurin et al. (2004). Lukassen et al. (2005); Thurin et al. (2004) show that mandating SET lowered costs of neonatal care. We are unaware of any analysis of impacts of SET on fertility or earnings, or of an attempt at quantifying its benefits.

²⁰In countries like the US with relatively restrictive public coverage for IVF (Bitler and Schmidt, 2012), it is likely to be harder to mandate SET (Karlström and Bergh, 2007; Pinckney-Clark et al., 2016) because when families privately bear a large share of the costs of IVF, they may elect DET even when they do not

SET for IVF. Following the lead of Sweden, other countries including Belgium and Turkey have mandated SET. The advantages of SET are increasingly recognized, and many countries actively encourage elective uptake of SET.²¹ Nevertheless, multiple (typically double) embryo transfers are still prevalent in many countries.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes IVF and the SET reform in Sweden. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the reform impacts on fertility, child and maternal health and 6 present results related to parental earnings and the career costs of children. Section 7.1 then documents robustness to alternative methods, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Background: IVF eligibility and technological advances

The global uptake of IVF has increased steadily over time, no doubt encouraged by improvements in availability of contraception and by both demand and supply forces encouraging women's labour force participation. In 2018, about 8 million children had been born as a result of IVF (European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology, 2018). In Sweden, in our sample years of 1998-2007, 2.15% of all births occur with IVF assistance.

IVF treatments in Sweden- access and eligibility. All permanent residents in Sweden have access to heavily subsidized health care offered by both private and public providers. For most medical services, there is a small fee, capped at 1100 SEK (approximately 125 USD) per annum and there are typically no additional costs. Health care is mainly funded by tax revenues, and only 2% of residents have private health insurance (Anell, 2008). IVF treatments are heavily subsidised. Eligibility criteria are as follows. The couple should be in a stable union, either legally married or co-habiting for at least two years, although since 2016 single women are also allowed to access publicly funded IVF treatment and, lesbian couples have been allowed access since 2005. The woman should have no previous children, either biological or adopted. IVF is available for second and higher order births but this is not publicly funded.²² Finally, a medical assessment of the woman is conducted to confirm that her body mass index (BMI) is within the normal range, that there is no evidence of risky behavior such as smoking and use of alcohol and other drugs/narcotics. Other mental and physical illness and disability are also considered before offering treatment. The suggested maternal age for starting the first treatment is below 40 and the guidelines suggest that any remaining embryos/egg cells should be transferred before age 45. The age of the man should lie between 25 and 56 years. BMI thresholds and age restrictions are county-specific, for example, the maximum age of the mother in Örebro county is 43 while in Norrbotten county it is 37 (Alm, 2010). A couple is allowed three rounds of treatment (follicle aspiration), and any remaining embryos and

have a preference for twins because DET is less expensive than two cycles with SET (Hamilton et al., 2018).

²¹The UK, US and Switzerland are among countries actively encouraging elective SET, see <https://www.hfea.gov.uk/about-us/our-campaign-to-reduce-multiple-births/>; <https://www.cdc.gov/art/patientresources/transfer.html>; and Geyter (2021).

²²The cost of a private IVF treatment in 2021 is around 80,000 SEK (about 9,153 US\$).

eggs of good quality are frozen.

Technological advances and the SET mandate. IVF treatments have typically involved multiple embryo transfers in order to raise the odds of a successful pregnancy. In 1993, most IVF clinics in Sweden implemented a voluntary reduction in the number of embryos routinely transferred, from three to two. This resulted in the virtual elimination of the conception of triplets by IVF, while the pregnancy rate and the live-birth rate remained essentially unaffected at 35 and 25 percent per transfer, respectively (Thurin et al., 2004). Following this, observational studies set in clinics in Finland and Belgium respectively, involving approximately 1000 patients each, demonstrated that pregnancy success rates were not significantly lower even when the number of embryos transferred was reduced from two to one (Vilksa et al., 1999; Gerris et al., 2001). Clearer evidence of this was provided by a major randomised control trial involving 661 participants in clinics spread across Sweden, Norway and Denmark (Thurin et al., 2004). This study showed that the success rate of IVF was maintained with SET for women under 36 years of age with at least two embryos of good-quality. For such women the cumulative rate of live births was not significantly different between elective SET (38.8%) and DET (42.9%), this being the probability of at least one live birth following transfer of one fresh embryo (under SET), and if needed, a subsequent transfer of a frozen embryo. Subsequent evidence emerging from trials and observational studies reinforced the broad conclusions of small and insignificant differences in pregnancy success for a broader class of women (Lukassen et al., 2005; Karlström and Bergh, 2007; Lundin and Bergh, 2007; Criniti et al., 2005; Kutlu et al., 2011).

On January 1 2003, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare mandated SET as the default IVF procedure, allowing exceptions for women with a low perceived risk of twinning.²³ In particular, women with low embryo quality, those aged above 38 years and/or those women with more than three previously failed IVF cycles were still allowed DET, provided that they were informed about the potential risks for the mother and child (Saldeen and Sundström, 2005). At the time that SET was implemented, there were no other changes in the IVF treatment procedure with respect to medication, technique or equipment (Saldeen and Sundström, 2005).²⁴

²³This date precedes the full publication of the results from the multi-centre RCT of Thurin et al. (2004). However, it was strongly guided by available scientific evidence and emerging results. For example, Bergh et al. (2005) (in Swedish) discussing reform adoption, point to the studies conducted by Bergh et al. (1999); Strömberg et al. (2002); Ericson and Källén (2001) in collaboration with the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, as key to the decision.

²⁴There is one exception. In January 2003, coincident with the SET reform, there was a change in regulation (*Socialstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd om assisterad befruktning* SOSFS 2002:13) that allowed donated eggs or sperm to be used in IVF treatments, although subject to an extensive assessment of the couple's medical, psychological and socio-economic characteristics, similar to those in an adoption process (Socialstyrelsen, 2016). The amendment allowing donated gametes was restricted to publicly funded university hospitals. In 2002, only 19 IVF cycles using donated egg cells were attempted resulting in 6 live births (Socialstyrelsen, 2006). While the number of IVF cases with donated eggs cells has increased (from 19 cycles in 2003 to 401 cycles in 2010, resulting in 86 live births), the share of IVF births using donated eggs cells is only 2% of all IVF births (Socialstyrelsen, 2013).

3 Data and descriptive statistics

3.1 Data

Data sources We use the the Swedish Medical Birth Registry, provided by the National Board of Health and Welfare, which covers approximately 99% of all births in Sweden. This contains information on pregnancy, delivery and post-partum outcomes. It also contains information on maternal characteristics including age, parity, body mass index (BMI), chronic diseases, tobacco consumption and prenatal conditions and treatments. Information on the father is not in the birth register but we obtain the father's age, education and whether he was born in Sweden from LISA, another register, discussed below. We can identify fathers even if they no longer live with the mother or child. We do not observe unsuccessful fertility treatments. We observe IVF births in the register if the treatment results in a successful pregnancy delivered after week 22, and the register flags assisted births including standard IVF, intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), surgical procedures and ovarian stimulation. Our indicator for IVF includes standard IVF and IVF with ICSI.

We supplement the birth register with data from other registers, retrieving the link between each mother, father, and child from the multi-generation Register, provided by Statistics Sweden. For children, we obtain additional medical information on hospitalizations during childhood from the Swedish National Patient Registry (SNPR) and information on child mortality from the Cause of Death Registry, both provided by the National Board of Health and Welfare. For parents, we obtain administrative data on income and educational attainment from the Longitudinal Integration Database for Health Insurance and Labor Market Studies (LISA) provided by Statistics Sweden. For fathers, we further obtain information on age and whether he was born in Sweden from the total population registry.

Sample The sample consist of all births in Sweden conceived during 1998-2007. The data on post-birth outcomes including hospitalization, mortality and income are available until 2016. As the last cohort in the birth sample (babies born in 2007) can be followed for at most 9 years after birth, we measure post-birth outcomes over a window of 9 years so that we have a balanced panel. So, for example, for a birth that occurs in the year 2000, we track hospitalization and parent earnings up until 2009. We remove triplet and higher order births (532 births). We also remove a small number of observations with missing or conflicting information on birth date or gestational age (1071 births), parental age (367 births), region of birth (374 births), and birth order (16 births). The data include 22,183 IVF births and 932,822 non-IVF births conceived during this period . While the unit of observation for child health is births, the unit of observation for maternal outcomes is pregnancy. Because women older than 38 were exempt from the SET mandate, we primarily focus on women younger than 39 for the main analysis (19,563 IVF births and 888,675 non-IVF births: 16,097 unique IVF mothers and 588,308 unique non-IVF mothers). The share of IVF births in this sample is 2.15%.

Outcome variables *Fertility*: The outcome variables are an indicator for twin as opposed to singleton birth, the number of subsequent birth over the 9 years following the index birth and the extensive margin indicator of this, defined as the probability of having no further births. A birth is an event, so an additional birth event is coded as one subsequent birth, irrespective of whether it results in a singleton or twins.

Maternal health: We also examine maternal morbidity, length of hospital stay during delivery (number of nights hospitalized), and whether the birth was delivered by emergency Caesarean section. Following Wennerholm et al. (2019), we construct a composite index for severe maternal morbidity, which is set to 1 if there was at least one case of morbidity, and zero otherwise, See Table A1.²⁵

Neonatal health: We investigate birth weight, gestational age, nights hospitalized during the first nine years of life, the probability that the APGAR score is below 7, severe neonatal morbidity, infant mortality, and under-5 mortality.²⁶ For some variables we create more than one indicator outcome, for example, we study low birth weight and preterm delivery in line with medically relevant cutoffs. For birth weight and gestational age, we also plot effects across the distribution. We construct a composite index for severe neonatal morbidity using registered medical diagnoses and surgical procedures defined according to the International Classification of Diseases – 10th Revision (ICD-10) and the classification of care measure (Swedish KVÅ-codes), using the criteria laid out in Wennerholm et al. (2019). See Table A2. The index is a binary variable set to 1 if there was at least one case of severe morbidity, and zero otherwise.²⁷ Summary measures of morbidities by the IVF status of the birth are presented in Tables A3 for maternal morbidity, and A4 for child morbidity.

Parental earnings: We study wage earnings and income from sick pay benefits. Parental wage earnings represent taxed annual earnings from gainful employment. The public sick pay insurance program replaces 80 percent of forgone earnings below a social security ceiling after two weeks in a work absence spell due to temporary health deficiencies. The first two weeks in a spell are financed by the employer. A certificate from a physician confirming the health deficiency is needed after 10 days in a spell. Both income variables are expressed in annual amounts in Swedish kroner (SEK)

²⁵The variables included in this composite index are postpartum hemorrhage >1000 ml, hysterectomy, other major surgical intervention (uterine compression sutures such as B-Lynch, uterine artery ligation or embolization, internal iliac artery ligation, or intrauterine balloon tamponade), venous thromboembolism, maternal sepsis, maternal death, 3rd or 4th degree perineal laceration, anesthesia complications, other obstetric injuries, post-partum depression, placenta complications, complications due to multiple birth, uterine rupture, eclampsia, preeclampsia, gestational diabetes mellitus, cervical lacerations, chorioamnionitis, wound infection, endometritis, and urinary tract infection.

²⁶APGAR, measured 5 minutes after birth, stands for “appearance, pulse, grimace, activity, respiration” and is a five-criterion evaluation method, indicating the general health condition of the newborn baby.

²⁷The indicators of severe morbidity are: APGAR score below 4, pneumonia, sepsis, birth trauma (fractures, neurologic injury, retinal haemorrhage or facial nerve palsy), hypoglycemia, plexus injury, stillbirth, birth weight <1500 g, preterm birth before 32 weeks, umbilical artery pH <7.0, hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy, intracranial hemorrhage, neonatal convulsions, meconium aspiration syndrome, mechanical ventilation, cardio-respiratory resuscitation and therapeutic hypothermia.

using the 2018 consumer price index. We study incomes averaged over a period of 9 years after birth, and provide estimates of the impact of SET across the earnings distribution. Only 8% of all women have zero earnings within 3 years of giving birth, a marker of the high rate of labour force attachment of Swedish women. We present estimates for earnings including the zeroes but we also provide separate estimates excluding them and modelling the probability of shifting from zero to nonzero earnings after SET. Additionally, we examine the impact of SET on women's earnings relative to the earnings of their partners.

Covariates We control for age fixed effects (FE), FE for educational attainment, and whether born outside Sweden for both mother and father, the mother's pregnancy order FE, child gender, region of birth and conception year-month FE. In order to control for maternal health predictors of twinning (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019) we also control for whether the mother smoked in early pregnancy and her pre-pregnancy BMI.²⁸ We document that the results are, in general, not sensitive to these controls, and additionally are robust to allowing for trends in maternal and paternal characteristics.

3.2 Descriptive statistics

Summary statistics are provided in Appendix Tables A5 and A6 for parents and children respectively, stratifying by IVF status. Table A7 additionally stratifies by whether the birth is a twin or a singleton.

Refer to Table A5, which summarizes outcomes (Panel A) and characteristics (Panel B) for IVF vs non-IVF users, averaging the data for the baseline (pre-SET) period of 1998-2002. Recall that we only have information on IVF parents who succeed in having a birth. The baseline rate of twin birth in the IVF sample is 19%, compared with less than 1% in the non-IVF sample. In the IVF sample, 74% of all women are first-time mothers, compared with 44% in the non-IVF sample. Women using IVF are older, taller, heavier and less likely to have smoked during and before pregnancy.²⁹ They have higher education and earnings, consistent with more educated women being more likely to delay birth so as to fulfil career ambitions, also see Table A8, which shows rates of IVF births by age. Despite this, but in line with being older and having higher rates of twin births they exhibit significantly higher maternal morbidity and birth-related complications, see Tables A3 and A4. Table A6 reveals the significant extent to which, pre-SET, multiple indicators of in utero and neonatal health are all worse for children born of IVF.

Is this entirely accounted for by IVF-children being more likely to be twin births? To assess this we summarize baseline indicators of child health separately for twins and singletons, providing tests of the difference in means between IVF and non-IVF births, see Table A7. For 6 of 8

²⁸We control for the highest level of education, a categorical measure from level 1-7. Level 1 is primary education less than 9 years, level 2 is primary education of 9 years, level 3 is 2 or fewer years of secondary education, level 4 is 3 years of secondary education, level 5 is fewer than 3 years of tertiary education, level 6 is 3 or more years of tertiary education and level 7 is graduate-level studies.

²⁹The age distributions in the two samples is plotted in Appendix Figure B1.

indicators, IVF-twins are not significantly different from non-IVF twins.³⁰ However, for 6 of 8 indicators, IVF singletons have significantly worse health than non-IVF singletons. This may reflect, *inter alia*, that singletons born after an IVF procedure were conceived as twins, with only one surviving to birth. It is important here because it tells us that we should not expect complete convergence of IVF outcomes towards non-IVF outcomes after the SET reform.³¹

We note that the fact that women using IVF are older and have healthier pregnancy behaviours predisposes them toward twin birth. In other words, even under SET, IVF users will have a higher twin birth rate than non-IVF users. We adjust for this by controlling for individual characteristics including age and pregnancy health indicators. But, importantly, the SET reform isolates variation in twinning that is driven by the reform, as long as the reform does not generate selection into IVF, a concern that we are able to allay.

3.3 Trends in IVF and twinning

Share of all births assisted by IVF The proportion of all live births for which the mother used IVF is shown in Figure 1a. The share is flat around the date of the reform and then appears to follow the same trend as pre-reform. The share of IVF births will be a function not only of the rate at which women select into IVF, but also of the IVF-success rate. As discussed in the preceding section, the pregnancy success rate among IVF users was maintained at about one-quarter following the SET mandate (Karlström and Bergh, 2007). Also see Figure A1a, which suggests no significant change in deliveries per cycle and per embryo transfer, and Figure A1b, which shows that the number of IVF treatments performed is smooth around the cut-off. Trends in the share of births achieved with each type of ART procedure are presented in Figure B2, which shows that IVF is the only ART procedure exhibiting a trend. This limits concern about endogenous shifts in the composition of mothers using IVF after SET, but we nevertheless investigate selection on mother-level observables in Section 7.1. Identification does not require no selection into IVF, but rather that this selection does not systematically change when the SET reform is put in place.

Share of IVF births conceived with SET This is a measure of compliance with the SET reform. The trend in the proportion of IVF births achieved using SET rather than DET is in Figure 1b, showing a sharp increase coincident with the SET reform.³² This share is stable at about 10% for the decade to the year 2000, increasing to 30% in 2002, following which there is a significant jump to 60% in 2003. It continues to rise to 70% in 2005, after which it stabilizes. The share does not rise to 100% because of the exemptions we outlined in Section 2, that allowed some IVF procedures to proceed with DET.

³⁰One explanation of this is that non-IVF twins are more likely than IVF twins to be positively selected on maternal health and education (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019).

³¹The singleton sample is much larger than the twin sample and this will contribute to more precise estimation of differences in the singleton sample. However we note that the medical literature (Pinborg et al., 2013; Sazonova et al., 2011) has also noted that IVF singletons have worse birth indicators.

³²The birth registers do not identify SET vs DET within IVF births, but the share of SET births is available in aggregate data published by the National Board of Health.

The elective increase in the year before the reform can be explained by the fact that the medical profession was informed of the results of scientific research showing that DET no longer had an advantage over SET from 2001. It is plausible that they advocated SET to their patients in advance of the mandate.³³ We also note that the region of Skåne went alone, introducing the reform in 2001. Dropping the region is not informative because we do not have the information to adjust for people migrating there for treatment. In the spirit of a donut design, we repeat the analysis dropping 2001-2002. As one may expect looking at Figure 1b, the results are robust to this, see Section 7.1.

Share of IVF births that are twin vs singleton Figure 1c shows a sharp drop in the share of twin births among IVF conceptions from 30% to about 10% coincident with the SET mandate, with a further decline to 5% from 2004, after which it stabilizes. At 5% this is still well above the share of twins among unassisted births (also displayed in the Figure) of about 1.62%, consistent with close to 30% of post-reform IVF births proceeding with DET and with the biological tendency for twin births to increase with parental age and socio-economic status (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2020). The fact that the share of twins among non-IVF births is stable indicates that the post-SET drop in twins is not the result of global factors such as improvements in maternal health which impact both IVF and non-IVF births (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019).

Trend breaks in outcomes following the SET reform As a prelude to the analysis, we show unconditional outcome data plots in Appendix Figures B3, B4, B5 and B6. Most of our outcome indicators for child and maternal health and for maternal income show a sharp improvement after the 2003 reform. We do not dwell upon the single difference shown in these plots but instead study the double differenced event study plots. We now describe the strategy for generating these.

4 Empirical strategy

We apply a panel event-study design to draw causal inference over how the 2003 IVF-SET reform, which created quasi-experimental variation in the risk of twin birth, impacted fertility, child and maternal health (and sickness benefits), and mother’s and father’s earnings. The reform occurs nationwide, and a single difference is vulnerable to capturing the influence of omitted trends that change in or after 2003. In order to control for aggregate trends, we difference the outcomes of women using IVF with respect to the outcomes of women not using IVF. The estimated equation is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k \in \ell} \gamma_k (IVF_i \times \mathbb{I}\{Year_t = SET + k\}) + \beta IVF_i + \mathbf{X}_{it} \delta + \alpha_c + \pi_t + \nu_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable Y_{it} refers to an outcome for birth i in year t , and IVF_i refers to the IVF status of each birth (1 if IVF was used, and 0 otherwise). We interact the IVF indicator with

³³Indeed, policymakers often introduce laws and mandates once the relevant constituents are ready to receive them (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005).

four leads and lags on either side of the reform, $\ell = \{-4, -3, -2, 0, \dots, 4\}$. The year before the reform, 2002, is omitted as a base category. The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the SET reform, outcomes associated with IVF and non-IVF births would have followed similar trends over time. This is investigated by testing the equality of the lead (pre-SET) coefficients. The lagged (post-SET) coefficients capture the dynamic effects of the reform.³⁴

Year \times month of conception fixed effects π_t control flexibly for all relevant time varying unobservables. County of birth fixed effects α_c capture time-invariant geographical variation in the outcomes. The control variables \mathbf{X} are fixed effects for the following characteristics of both mothers and fathers: age at birth, education level, whether native (defined as born in Sweden); the pregnancy order (birth order) of the mother; and the gender of the child. To account for their potential impact on twin birth (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019), we also control for whether the mother smoked in the first trimester of pregnancy and her BMI before pregnancy. Standard errors are clustered by mother.

We also report estimates of the single coefficient two way fixed effects equation:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1(PostSET \times IVF)_{it} + \beta_2IVF_i + \mathbf{X}_{it}\delta + \alpha_c + \pi_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where all variables are defined as in equation 1, but we now cumulate all of the lag coefficients into a single indicator variable, *PostSET* defined as 1 for all births conceived after January 1 2003, and 0 for those conceived before. The parameter of interest is β_1 , capturing the average change in outcomes for IVF births relative to non-IVF births after 1 January 2003. We will report the extent to which SET led to a convergence of IVF birth outcomes towards non-IVF birth outcomes, defined as (β_1/β_2) . As there was a single adoption date which holds nationwide, we need not be concerned about problems in weighting in two-way fixed effect models with heterogeneous treatment effects that have been shown to potentially create bias in staggered adoption designs (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020; Sun and Abraham, 2020). Heterogeneous effects will be reduced to mean pre-SET versus post-SET changes between IVF and non-IVF mothers in equation 2.

Counterfactual trends. We plot event study estimates of equation 1 with confidence intervals to allow the reader to assess if outcomes for women who did and did not use IVF exhibit differential pre-trends. Even if we cannot reject parallel pre-trends, this may be because we are under-powered to do so (Roth, 2021). To allow for flexible violations of parallel trends, we implement recent partial identification methods that estimate upper and lower bounds on the estimates after relaxing the assumption of parallel pre-trends (Rambachan and Roth, 2020). To do this, we require prior assumptions on the degree of violation of parallel trends allowed. We estimate pre-trends between years -4 to -2 (omitting year -1) and project these forward as post-trends, allowing them to vary

³⁴In this specification, year refers to conception year. The post-SET coefficients describe the change in the outcome for children conceived in 2003, 2004, ..., 2007. For each conception year, earnings are defined as an average over the nine years after birth. We similarly take an average over nine years for child hospitalization.

by some amount M between each subsequent period. We plot a series of estimated bounds corresponding to a range of values of M .³⁵

We know that there is selection into IVF, for example, women using IVF are older and more educated than other women. The DiD estimator only requires trends, not levels to be parallel, but level differences may lead one to worry that the control group (women not using IVF to conceive) does not provide a good counterfactual for the treated group (women using IVF). In the baseline specification we control for relevant parental characteristics using flexible specifications. We estimate an additional model that controls for parental characteristics interacted with a linear trend. This accounts for differences in outcome trends that derive from compositional differences, for example, it allows that fertility or earnings evolve differently for more vs less educated women.

The SET reform as a policy experiment Equations 1 and 2 are reduced form representations of a system in which the SET mandate instruments the twin birth rate, with the drop in twinning driving the other outcomes. We provide estimates of the first stage, which demonstrate instrument relevance (power). The exclusion restriction that the SET reform impacts the outcomes only through twinning is plausible given that SET involved a switch from two to one embryo with no concurrent changes in IVF treatment procedures with respect to medication, technique or equipment (Saldeen and Sundström, 2005). As explained earlier, the SET mandate permitted exceptions, allowing women with lower chances of pregnancy success, including women over the age of 38, to elect DET. The birth register has an individual tag for IVF but it does not reveal which IVF-users used SET rather than DET. As a result, our estimates are intent to treat (ITT) estimates.

That the SET mandate was exogenously driven by scientific research (on pregnancy success rates in trials comparing SET with DET) and that its abrupt introduction disrupted reproductive health outcomes is clear. However, unconditional plots of trends in the outcomes we analyse (Figures B3-B6) reveal that many outcomes began to move in the direction stimulated by SET from 2001. This is consistent with the fact that medical professionals had the evidence before the mandate and that, under their guidance, there was an elective increase in SET in the two years preceding the mandate. Ignoring this in the baseline specification makes our results conservative (as the jump at the date of the reform is smaller). However, we show that our results are robust to dropping the two years of gradual increase so that identification comes from a sharper discontinuity in the share of twin births to IVF users. This specification check also takes care of the fact that the region of Skåne implemented SET in 2001, ahead of the rest of the country. Allowing this window around the SET reform also addresses measurement error in the date of conception, which is used to assign births to the post-SET (treated) vs the pre-SET (control) cohorts.

³⁵These methods at baseline allow for any prevailing differential trends between IVF and non-IVF outcomes. The values M then allow for *additional* movements beyond those implied in any prevailing trends. Values of M are naturally outcome dependent, for example they are allowed to be up to 1% in the case of twinning, 10 grams in the case of birth weight, 1000 SEK in the case of income, and so forth. The presentation of bounds over a range of values of M allows varying priors related to these values to be considered, and as such, we present a series of bounds gridding over M .

Endogenous changes in sample composition Even if one is satisfied that the SET mandate provides a valid policy experiment, a causal interpretation of our estimates requires that we examine endogenous changes in sample composition. In particular, we need to investigate whether implementation of SET resulted in a shift in the sorts of women seeking IVF. First, if women with more favourable maternal characteristics were more likely to select into IVF after the SET mandate then this would lead to higher twinning alongside better health and earnings (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019), while the SET reform led to lower twinning alongside better health and earnings. Second, we consider whether the share of women seeking IVF changed discontinuously at the date of the SET reform. If it did, it is plausible that women at the margin are different and hence that there is a compositional shift. Figure A1b shows no structural break in the trend in women using IVF coincident with SET. Third, we investigate endogenous changes in composition by regressing each characteristic of women (and their partners) on IVF and $\text{PostSET} \times \text{IVF}$ in what is effectively a test of balance. A statistically significant coefficient on $\text{PostSET} \times \text{IVF}$ is indicative of selection, and we will see that there is little evidence of this.

In any case, as discussed, we also account for any differences by controlling flexibly for characteristics of the mother and father in the model, for trends in these characteristics, and by investigating a model with mother fixed effects (described below). If there were endogenous selection into the IVF sample on characteristics then the controls for characteristics would be potentially endogenous. We therefore show results without these controls, and the results are broadly similar.

In a further specification check we allow for unobserved mother-level unobserved heterogeneity by including mother fixed effects. As mother fixed effects in a model with a binary interaction (of IVF with SET) can result in undesired comparisons, we create an explicitly matched sample that allows us to compare mothers exposed vs unexposed to the SET reform, so that we isolate impacts of the SET reform on *within* mother variation. A discussion of the issues that arise in the standard model, and of our matched sample and results is in Appendix C.

Multiple hypothesis testing We have many indicators of the outcomes. We are thus faced with a problem of multiple-inference and risk over-rejecting null hypotheses (i.e. an inflated rate of Type I errors). We address this issue using two different approaches. First, we adjust all p -values by controlling for the family-wise error rate (the proportion of Type I errors committed among *any* of the outcome variables considered) among all variables examined in the paper using Holm’s step-down procedure.³⁶ This method has the advantage of greater power compared to single step approaches such as Bonferroni. It is more demanding than false-discovery rate corrections which set the error rate based on the proportion of Type I errors in all significant findings. Second, we create summary indices for child health and maternal health which aggregate multiple measures of

³⁶This is a ‘step-down’ procedure in that the most significant p -value is multiplied by K , the second most significant p -value is multiplied by $K - 1$, the third most significant by $K - 2$, and so forth, where K is the total number of hypotheses to be tested. This procedure could be further refined using step-down methods which additionally consider correlation between outcomes of interest, for example methods of Romano and Wolf (2005). Here we use Holm’s method given its ease of application across various data sources, but our corrections should thus be viewed as conservative.

morbidity, thus decreasing the number of hypotheses tested. The impacts on individual components of morbidity indexes are displayed in Tables A9 (children) and A10 (mothers), while the indexes, considered in aggregate in main specifications, take the value of 1 if at least one morbidity occurred.

Outcome distribution and heterogeneity by characteristics For key continuous outcomes we estimate and display impacts of the SET reform across the outcome distribution. To do this we estimate equation 2 several times, defining the outcome as a binary variable indicating that the outcome exceeds a range of specific points along the distribution of outcomes, following Rossin-Slater (2013). We also investigate heterogeneity in impacts of the reform by mother characteristics including parity, education, age and body mass index (BMI). Levels of each of these categories, as well as rates of IVF birth in each group, are documented in Table A8.

5 Results: Twin birth, fertility, child and maternal health

Event study estimates of the impact of the SET reform on IVF outcomes are in Figures 2-5, and the corresponding single coefficient estimates are in Tables 1 to 4. Estimate showing how the outcome distribution is shifted with SET, for key continuous outcomes, are in Figure 6, and Figure 7 describes birth spacing, or dynamic fertility impacts. For parsimony, we provide additional results for selected key outcomes in the main text, and for all other outcomes in the Appendix. Rambachan and Roth (2020) bounds on the dynamic effects are in Figures 8 and Appendix Figures A2-A3. A sequence of additional robustness checks is displayed in Figure 9 and Appendix Figures A4-A5. Heterogeneity in treatment effects is displayed in Figures 10 and Appendix Figures A6-A7.

In all results tables, the coefficient in the first row displays the impact of the SET reform, identified from a double difference that engages pre- vs post-SET variation in IVF relative to non-IVF birth outcomes. The coefficient in the second row provides the main effect of IVF on the outcome. For fertility and health outcomes, we consistently provide the ratio of these coefficients as the scaled impact of the SET reform, or the extent to which the passage of SET narrowed the baseline gap between IVF and non-IVF births in the outcome. For brevity, we will sometimes refer to this as “the gap”. For earnings, because the earnings of women using IVF are higher than of other women before the reform, we scale these estimates, as is standard, by their pre-reform mean (i.e by the baseline IVF mean). Every table reports the p -value attached to the double difference coefficient unadjusted as well as adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (henceforth MHT). Most coefficients that are significant unadjusted remain significant after the MHT correction. We only explicitly discuss the MHT correction in cases where the adjustment results in significance being lost.

5.1 Twin birth rate

See Table 1. IVF pregnancies in the pre-reform period were 17.5 percentage points (pp) more likely to be a twin pregnancy. The SET reform leads to a decline in the risk of twin birth of 12.3

pp. Thus the SET reform narrowed the gap in twinning between IVF and non-IVF births by about 70%.

The data do not identify at the individual level which women used SET and which were exempt and allowed to use DET, though we know from aggregated figures provided by the government that about 70% of post-reform IVF births used SET, versus 10% of pre-reform births. That twinning fell by 70% while rates of SET increased by only 60% is consistent with the fact that in the post-reform period, DET procedures were targeted at women with a low probability of twinning.

The event study plot is in Figure 2a. The dynamic impacts of the reform reveal that all of the decline occurred within a year after reform, after which it stabilized, consistent with the reform being a mandate. Now consider the pre-reform coefficients. The difference in the share of twin births between IVF and non-IVF women fluctuates in the pre-reform period, showing no trend until it declines steadily from 2002 (-1 in event time) to 2004 (+1 in event time). As discussed earlier, this is consistent with medical professionals having learnt of the potential for single embryo transfers to preserve pregnancy success rates before the National Board of Health mandated SET. Specification checks discussed in the next section establish that our results are robust to dropping the transition years.³⁷

5.2 Fertility

There are two reasons that women may want to avert a twin birth. First, they may desire one child rather than two children. Second, they may desire two (or more) but prefer them spaced out. In the latter case, women using IVF are more likely to proceed to have another birth event after SET relative to before. Understanding the relative weight of these preferences among IVF users is relevant to understanding the welfare impacts of mandating SET. We model the number of births and the probability of at least one further birth (modelled as the inverse, which is no further birth), see Table 1, columns 2 and 3.

Prior to the SET reform, women conceiving with IVF were 10 percentage points more likely to cease fertility (row 2, column 3), perhaps principally because they were more likely to have had twins. After SET, there is a 7.2 pp increase in the chances of IVF users continuing fertility (row 1). Thus, after SET is mandated, a higher share of IVF births is followed by a subsequent birth. Thus SET closes about 70% of the pre-reform gap.³⁸ Column 2 shows that, before SET, IVF users had 0.11 fewer births in the nine years following the index birth than women who do

³⁷We also observe in Figure 2a that the pre-2002 coefficients, while more or less flat, do not lie on the zero line but, instead, are shifted up. This is mechanically because of the slight rollout of SET pre-reform, which acts to push the second and earlier leads above the first lead, which is the omitted base. It is for the same reason that the pre-reform coefficients in Figures 2b (discussed next) are shifted to lie below the zero line, and our remarks here apply to all event studies discussed. Dropping the transition years of 2001-2002 would result in the pre-coefficients resting on the zero line. In any case, note that the level of the pre-reform coefficients does not challenge the pretrends assumption.

³⁸The unconditional baseline means displayed in the Table show that, averaging over parity, before passage of SET, 46% of IVF users and 53% of women having a natural birth continue to have another child.

not use IVF (row 2). After SET, this gap narrows as IVF users have 0.07 more births than before. The event study plots in Figures 2b-2c show significant and persistent post-reform changes and the pre-reform differences show no trend.

Clearly women at first parity are more likely to continue fertility than women who already have children. We therefore repeated this exercise distinguishing women having their first birth from the rest, see Figure 10, panel (b), as well as Appendix Figure A7. As shown in Table A5, 74% of all IVF births are first births, while 44% of all non-IVF births are first births. The post-SET increase in the chances of a second birth is entirely driven by women for whom the index IVF birth is a first birth: in this sample SET results in an increase in the number of births by 0.11, and a decrease in the chances of no future birth by 10 pp. Among women whose index birth was second or higher, both of these coefficients are essentially zero.

Figure 7 considers the timing of these additional births. We estimate specification 2, but rather than modelling total future fertility, we estimate a series of separate regressions where the outcome is an indicator for a woman having a birth $k \in \{1, \dots, 7\}$ years post-birth, and the independent variable of interest is the same $PostSET \times IVF$ terms. We observe that additional marginal births following SET generally occur two or three years after the index birth.

5.3 Child health outcomes

See Table 2. Neonatal outcomes for children born of IVF show a dramatic improvement across a range of indicators after the SET mandate. IVF newborns are 194.7 grams heavier at birth, which corresponds to 61% of the baseline IVF deficit relative to unassisted births. They are less likely to be born prematurely, having 0.61 weeks longer gestation, which is 56% of the baseline gap. The probability of a low APGAR (less than 7 in a range of 0-10) is lower after SET, narrowing the gap by as much as 75%. The APGAR is a test done 1 and 5 minutes after birth that checks a baby's heart rate, muscle tone, and other signs to see if extra medical care or emergency care is needed. We investigated numerous other indicators of health at birth including birth length, head circumference and breech presentation, SET-led improvements in which narrowed the IVF–non-IVF differential by close to 50%, these results are available in Bhalotra et al. (2019), where we also report no discernible change in the probability that the IVF birth is male and the probability of fetal malformation.

There is a decline of 3.1 pp in the probability that IVF births suffer at least one severe neonatal morbidity outcome, closing the gap by 56%. The 17 morbidities included in the index are detailed in Table A2 and Table A9 shows morbidity-specific results. After using the MHT adjustment across the 17 outcomes, five show a significant reduction. These are extremely low birth weight, extremely preterm birth, hypoglycemia, hypothermia and meconium aspiration. In line with reduced morbidities at birth, post-SET IVF births spend 1.8 fewer nights in hospital after birth, narrowing the gap by 62%. They are also less likely to return to hospital later on, between the ages of 1 and 8 – although this coefficient is not statistically significant, we note that there is

a significant gap (i.e. IVF births spend significantly more nights in hospital after the infant period) and that SET narrows this by 38%. Child mortality rates in Sweden are low and there are no statistically discernible impacts of SET on infant or under-5 mortality, but, again, there is a significant baseline gap and, after the SET mandate, while imprecise, there is a sizeable reduction in these gaps of 42 and 76 percent respectively. On account of imperfect compliance (generated by allowed exceptions to SET), together with the fact that IVF singletons have worse health than singletons born following an unassisted conception (shown in preceding section), we do not expect absolute convergence of IVF to non-IVF outcomes.

The event study plots in Figure 3 provide a vivid depiction of the results, additionally demonstrating persistence of the post-reform effects and showing no significant differences in pretrends between IVF and non-IVF births. The impacts of SET tend to be larger among first births, but the differences are often not significant, see Figures 10 and A6. The significance of the improvement in the APGAR score is not robust to MHT, but the other results are.

Distribution of effects For three of the most commonly used indicators of birth outcomes, birth weight, gestational age and the APGAR score, we estimate distributional impacts, see Figure 6. We observe significant impacts of SET across most of the distribution for these outcomes. For birth weight, the largest marginal impact is in the middle at around 3,000 grams, while for gestational age and APGAR the largest impacts are in the upper regions, around 37 weeks and for scores above 6 respectively. We also studied marginal effects at thresholds that are often used in the targeting of medical resources (Almond et al., 2010; Bharadwaj et al., 2013), which are presented at specific distributional points in Figure 6a. We estimate that, following the SET reform, the likelihood of IVF babies being born with a weight below 1,500 grams (very low birth weight) fell by 1.2 pp, and the likelihood of being born with a weight below 2500 grams (low birth weight) by 7.8 pp. Scaling by pre-reform differences between IVF and non-IVF babies, the proportional impacts are both about 60% (full calculations are documented in Bhalotra et al. (2019)). The probability of preterm delivery before weeks 28, 32 and 37 decreased by 0.5 (63%), 1.3 (52%) and 8.3 (53%) pp. respectively. Very similar results are found for first-time mothers.³⁹

5.4 Maternal health outcomes

See Table 3. Using an index of maternal morbidities around childbirth (defined in Table A1), we estimate that SET results in 1.1 pp decrease in the chances that mothers suffer at least one of a set of morbidities, corresponding to a 20% narrowing of the gap between IVF and non-IVF mothers. The baseline gap is large and the fact that 80% of the excess morbidity women incur under IVF remains after SET flags risks to women associated with IVF over and above the risk of having a multiple birth.

³⁹When we say that SET makes it around 8% more likely that a birth exceeds 2,500 grams this can be because it shifted births from 2,450 to 2,500, or from 1,000 to 2,500. We can only say that the distribution moves to the right without saying from what baseline.

The 18 morbidities included in the index are detailed in Table A1 and Table A10 shows morbidity-specific results. Pre-eclampsia and an indicator for multiple birth complications show a decline after SET, but these do not survive adjustment for testing 18 hypotheses. The number of nights mothers with an IVF birth spend in hospital following childbirth declined by 0.63 on a base of 5.2, constituting a narrowing of the gap by a considerable 63%. The probability that the birth is an emergency C-section declined by 1.5 pp, narrowing the gap by 35%. These outcomes are not independent, as women who have a C-section birth are more likely to spend longer time in hospital, and more likely to suffer maternal morbidities. The result for morbidities and C-sections is not robust to MHT, the result for hospital nights is. In all cases, results are larger for first time mothers than mothers having a higher order birth (Figure A7).

Another indicator of impacts of SET on maternal health that captures any morbidities that limit attendance at work is sickness benefit, defined in the Data section. We find a significant reduction of 665 SEK in receipt of sickness benefits after SET among women using IVF, which narrows the baseline gap by 40%, see columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The result for fathers is in the same direction but imprecise. Significance of the decrease in women's sickness payment receipts is robust to MHT. Figure 4 provides event study plots for the outcomes in Table 3 and Figure 5 for sickness benefits. They highlight that this set of results is estimated with relatively low precision. Among mothers having their first birth, the impact of SET on maternal morbidity and emergency C-sections is larger and, also, tends to be estimated with precision (Figure A7), but the impact on sickness pay is similar for first and second births (and null for higher order births above birth 2, see Figure 10).

6 Results: Parental earnings and the child penalty

In this section we describe impacts of the SET reform on the earnings of mothers and fathers. We then profile birth dynamics that describe the child penalty for mothers and fathers, distinguishing twin from singleton birth in each of the IVF and non-IVF samples.

6.1 Mother's earnings after birth

See Table 4. While child and maternal health at baseline (pre-SET) are consistently worse for IVF births, mother's earnings are higher among women who have IVF-assisted births. This is a reflection of the stylized fact that there is positive selection of women on socioeconomic status and age into IVF treatments. For each post-SET birth cohort, earnings are defined as an average over the 9 years after birth. Averaging over the four post-SET cohorts, we identify an increase of about 5.6% following the SET mandate. Thus SET widens the baseline gap in favour of IVF-using women (column 1).⁴⁰ The event study plot (Figure 5a) shows that the increase in women's

⁴⁰The 5.6% is calculated as the SET driven increase of 10,872 SEK in row 1 divided by the baseline IVF mean of 192,983 in row 5. The scaled impact, for consistency with the other tables, is the ratio of the coefficients in rows 1 and 2 but since, in this case, the baseline gap favours IVF users, the scaled impact is a less meaningful statistic.

earnings persists through the four cohorts born after the SET reform. Significance of the increase in women's earnings is robust to MHT.

Our finding that mothers giving birth with IVF suffer a smaller child penalty in earnings after SET is consistent with an indirect impact that derives from improved maternal and newborn health, and a direct impact of lower rates of twin birth. We have already documented that adverse health impacts (on mothers and children) are most clearly evident in the year of birth. In the next section we investigate earnings dynamics following twin vs singleton birth and identify an excess child penalty from twin birth which, similarly, is evident only for a short period (two years) after birth, after which there is convergence of the birth penalty from twins towards that from singletons, with the long run penalty tending to slightly favour women who start out with twins.

Distribution Figure 6d shows that the SET reform acted to shift earnings towards the middle of the distribution. The likelihood of having a salary of about 250,000 SEK increases by nearly 4 pp. We estimate smaller, insignificant increases in the lower half of the distribution, though the point estimates suggest consistent positive shifts in the likelihood of having a mean salary exceeding all distributional mass points considered.⁴¹

Extensive vs intensive margin changes The results discussed so far include cases where earnings are zero. We separated these cases to illuminate impacts on women's employment as distinct from impacts on their earnings (Appendix Table A11). The SET mandate led to a significant increase in women's earnings at both the extensive and intensive margins. The increase at the extensive margin is small, at 0.5 pp, consistent with the baseline share of women with a non-zero wage being 97%. The intensive margin increase is therefore very similar to the total increase shown in Table 4.

First vs higher order births Estimates for women having their first vs higher order birth are in Figure 10. In contrast to the results for maternal health, SET has a larger impact on earnings for women for whom the index IVF birth is second or higher order – in fact the coefficient is twice as large, roughly 20,000 SEK rather than 10,000 SEK, though confidence intervals overlap in each case.

6.2 Father's earnings after birth

Sweden pioneered parental leave policies starting in 1975. Parents in Sweden are now entitled to 480 days of paid parental leave, with 180 extra days for twin births.⁴² In 2019, fathers took, on average, 30 per cent of all paid parental leave. Thus, in principle, fathers' earnings could suffer from having a child. On the other hand, fathers may catch up after paternity leave, working harder,

⁴¹Since earnings are in SEK and not in logarithms, equal proportional increases will show as larger absolute increases.

⁴²Although the parental leave program is individual, allowing 240 days for each parent, all days above 90 can be transferred to the other parent. The number of non-transferable days increased from 30 in 1995 to 60 in 2002 and to 90 in 2016.

as suggested by Lundberg and Rose (2002) for example. We find no impact of SET on the earnings of men who father children born with IVF (column 2). Observe that the baseline gap for men, as for women, favours IVF-users (rows 5 and 6). Event studies for mother and father earnings are in Figure 5, showing a clear upward shift for women’s earnings post-SET, and a flat profile pre- and post-reform for fathers.

Relative income of women Since SET resulted in an increase in women’s and not men’s earnings in the IVF sample, it follows that it was associated with an increase in the relative earnings of women in the aggregate. Motivated by the common assumption that women’s bargaining power within the family is a function of her income relative to that of her partner, we used individual linked data in the register to create the relative female wage at the household level. We find that, on average within IVF couples with an IVF birth, there is a 6.2% increase in the relative earnings of women after SET (Appendix Table A11). However significance of the extensive margin earnings coefficient for women, and the relative female income coefficient does not survive the MHT adjustment, though we note that multiple hypothesis adjustment here is quite demanding, being based on a FWER correction which conserves size at the cost of power.

6.3 The child penalty from twin vs singleton birth

We identified an increase in post-birth earnings of IVF-using women (averaged over the nine years after birth) after the SET reform, i.e. for women giving birth after 2003. Since the SET reform essentially delivered a sharp drop in the twin birth rate of IVF-users, we investigated this further by estimating dynamic impacts of birth on women’s earnings distinguishing women who have twins vs singletons, using the estimator of Kleven et al. (2019b). Earlier the event was passage of SET in 2003, while now the event is a mother-specific date for first birth.

Estimation strategy The estimated equation is:

$$wage_{ist} = \sum_{j \neq -1} \alpha_j \cdot \mathbb{1}[j = t] + \sum_k \beta_k \cdot \mathbb{1}[k = \text{age}_{is}] + \sum_y \gamma_y \cdot \mathbb{1}[y = s] + \nu_{ist}, \quad (3)$$

where i indexes individuals, s indexes year, and t indexes event time relative to birth. The coefficients α capture earnings dynamics surrounding birth, while controlling flexibly for age and year fixed effects. Each coefficient and its 95% confidence interval are converted to proportional changes following Kleven et al. (2019b), as $P_t \equiv \hat{\alpha}_t / E[\widehat{wage}_{ist|t}]$, where $\widehat{wage}_{ist|t}$ is the predicted outcome omitting the event-time dummies. We additionally estimate specifications where instead of modelling earnings, we model labour market participation, defined as 1 if an individual’s earnings in the year exceed a minimum value, defined following the Social Security’s definition of 1.5 basic amounts.⁴³

⁴³This is a standard measure defined by the Social Security System, and is updated following CPI closely over time. See e.g.: <https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/priser-och-konsumtion/konsumentprisindex/konsumentprisindex-kpi/pong/tabell-och-diagram/prisbasbelopp/prisbasbelopp/>.

Estimates of the child penalty for twins vs singletons The estimates are in Figure 11. They reveal that twins impose a significantly higher child penalty than singletons in the first two years after birth. One year after birth, the child penalty for twin mothers is about 78% compared with about 61% for mothers of singletons. Averaging across the 24 months after birth, twin mothers face about a 10 pp larger decline in earnings than singleton mothers. However, this vanishes by year 2 and, by year 9, the earnings of mothers of twins are slightly ahead of the earnings of mothers of singletons. This pattern is similar irrespective of whether the birth was assisted by IVF or not. Thus, having twins does not exert an excess child penalty in the long run. This implies that our estimates for the impact of SET reflect a decline in the short run child penalty.⁴⁴

Since the population shares of both IVF-users and twins are relatively small (each less than 3%), our estimates for non-IVF families with singleton children are close to representative of the population. Figure 11 indicates a long run child penalty of about 20% for this group, which is similar to the full population estimate of 26% for Sweden provided in Kleven et al. (2019a).⁴⁵

Interpretation and discussion Our results provide several new insights of general interest. First, consider the interpretation of the short vs long run impacts of twin vs singleton births on women's labour market outcomes. It is not surprising that twins have a larger impact in the first two years following birth, as managing two newborns at once clearly makes it difficult to do much else. What does merit interpretation is the fact that the child penalty for twin mothers quickly converges towards that among singleton mothers, eventually being smaller. We propose that this reflect scale economies or, equivalently, that women whose first birth is a singleton are significantly more likely to go on to have a subsequent birth (irrespective of their IVF status, but more clear among women having a first birth, who dominate the IVF sample). This is visible in Figure 11, where the earnings of singleton mothers exhibit a second dip three years after the first birth, which is when a large fraction of second births occur (see Figure 7).

It seems that the (infinitesimally) short birth spacing of twins results in scale economies relative to having two births spaced by two to three years, and that these scale economies are large enough to dominate the average earnings profiles of twin vs singleton mothers even though only about half of all women in our sample proceed to a second birth. The same pattern is evident on the extensive margin of earnings: the dynamics of employment profiles disrupted by the event of birth look broadly similar to the dynamics of the earnings profiles, consistent with women in Sweden taking time out of the labour market in the years just after birth but with most women returning to work after, see Panel B of Figure 11.

Most research on the child penalty estimates “reduced form” impacts of entry to parenthood (first birth), allowing that subsequent births may exacerbate the long run penalty on women's earn-

⁴⁴These results are for first birth. The pattern of results for higher order births is broadly similar, though after an initial larger reduction for twins, twin and singleton mothers largely converge, given fewer future births following second births, see Appendix Figure A8.

⁴⁵They use the universe of births in 1997- 2011 while we use the universe of births in 1998-2007. In both their study and ours, earnings exclude mandated state-provided benefits.

ings, without explicitly modelling or even accounting for subsequent birth. In a paper that takes a more structural approach, Adda et al. (2017) predict that shorter birth spacing will diminish the long run child penalty among women who have at least two children by shortening the time that women are off work. We provide what appears to be the first evidence that this carries through to the case of twin birth, when birth spacing approaches zero.

Second, for all births, fathers earnings show a small short term child penalty but after two years, this switches sign and nine years after their first birth fathers earn about 20% more than they did before birth, a child premium. This contrasts with Kleven et al. (2019a) who, for Sweden, similar to other European countries, find no long run impact of fatherhood on earnings. However it is in line with early results for the US in (Lundberg and Rose, 2002). Distinguishing twin from singleton birth reveals an *excess* child penalty from twin birth, similar to the dip seen for mothers, albeit much smaller at less than 5%. In the IVF population, fathers of twins (similar to mothers of twins) exhibit a smaller twin penalty. In the non-IVF population, fathers of singletons and twins lie on the same trajectory.

A third finding is that the long run child penalty is smaller among women using IVF than in the rest of the population. This is consistent with the fact that women using IVF are older and more educated and thus more invested in their careers before they give birth. They are likely to be in jobs with better employment conditions, and they are also likely to make choices that favour their careers. However, it could have gone the other way, making this a relevant empirical result. Women undertaking IVF may have stronger preferences for having children, indicated by the fact that IVF is a very clear fertility-seeking choice which imposes considerable psychic if not financial costs. If this is the case then women using IVF could in principle choose to compromise their established careers, for instance by moving to more flexible jobs, at a greater rate than women with natural births. The evidence suggests that the former of these two forces dominates in Sweden.

7 Additional Results

In this section we first provide robustness tests on our analysis of impacts of SET, and then discuss heterogeneity in impacts by characteristics of the mothers, and provide a sketch of our approach to a cost-benefit analysis of the SET reform.

7.1 Robustness checks

In the empirical strategy laid out in Section 4 we set out the identifying assumptions, noted challenges to identification and explained how we address these. In this section we provide the results of specification checks and extensions, referring the reader to Section 4 for the motivating principles.

Endogenous selection into IVF The share of IVF births in all births has increased secularly since the 1990s, tracking changes in technology, costs, and availability of IVF, and there is no evidence

that SET prompted either a higher or lower share of women to opt for IVF, see Figure 1a which shows no break in trend in 2003. Nevertheless if SET prompted a change in the composition of IVF-mothers this would modify the extent to which we can attach a causal interpretation to our estimates.

We investigate this directly by regressing each of a host of available mother and father characteristics on the treatment term, in the spirit of a test of balance, see Table A12. Of the twelve characteristics, only one has a MHT adjusted p -value that indicates imbalance: after SET, IVF women are 1.9% more likely than before SET to have a native-born partner.⁴⁶ In any case, these differences are small, and we condition flexibly upon all available characteristics. We assess sensitivity of the estimates to this by producing estimates in which we drop all controls for parental characteristics. The coefficients hardly move, see Figure 9 for key outcomes, Appendix Figures A4-A5 for the rest.

Finding limited selection on a range of observables may lead us to expect limited selection on unobservables (as in formal decomposition methods proposed by Altonji et al. (2005)). We nevertheless investigate selection on unobservables by estimating a specification with mother fixed effects. In practice, when the independent variable of interest is an interaction term the standard approach does not provide meaningful estimates, essentially because the identifying variation includes comparisons that are not sensible. This is explained in Appendix C, where we identify the subset of comparisons that is sensible. Pooling these, we estimate the mother fixed effects specification on a sample restricted to women with at least two pregnancies (about 50% of all IVF mothers). Table C1 shows that the SET mandate leads to significant increases in fertility, birth weight, infant survival and earnings in this selected subsample, in line with the benchmark estimates.⁴⁷ The sequence of tests of selection on mother-level observables and unobservables together indicates that our estimates are not contaminated by selection into SET.

Differential trends for IVF vs non-IVF outcomes Table A5 reveals clear selection into IVF on parental characteristics, but the difference-in-difference estimator does not require that the treated and control groups are matched in levels, only in trends. The event study plots discussed in the previous section, in general, show no evidence of differential pre-trends. However, fluctuations in the pre-reform coefficients are consistent with outcome trends changing a year before the reform. This is in line with new scientific evidence being disseminated in advance of the mandate, leading medical professionals to advocate elective SET from 2001. To address this we re-estimate SET

⁴⁶The *unadjusted* p -values additionally point to an increase of about 4% in the share of both mothers and fathers with tertiary education, which may reflect an underlying trend in education together with the fact that IVF-users are consistently more educated than other women.

⁴⁷We find no significant impacts on the other outcomes. In principle this could be because the other outcomes are driven by endogenous selection of women into IVF (unlikely given the balance tests and robustness to adding vs dropping controls for characteristics, as well as the trend tests discussed next), or by the sample being selected by construction (unlikely given similarity of the estimates for the outcomes for which significance persists with mother fixed effects), or because we are underpowered to detect effects. The last seems most likely—the mother FE estimates in Table C1 are estimated on barely 5,000 observations, while the benchmark sample contains about 900,000 observations.

impacts dropping the years 2001-2002, and the coefficient of interest is close to identical, see Figures 9, A4 and A5. This specification checks also confirms that our estimates are not sensitive to measurement error in the date of conception, which we estimate using information on birth date.⁴⁸

We nevertheless investigate sensitivity to adjusting for trends. First, we control for every parent characteristic interacted with a linear trend. This allows that the outcomes (e.g. birth weight, or women's earnings) evolved differently over time for women with different characteristics (e.g. education or age). If they did, and if IVF-users had different characteristics, then this could manifest as a violation of the pre-trends assumption. Estimates conditional on trends in characteristics are not significantly different from the baseline estimates, as documented in the plots labelled "Trends in Parent" in Figures 9, A4 and A5.

The same Figures display estimates of a more demanding specification that additionally allows the trends in parental characteristics to break in 2003, the date of the SET reform. This adjusts more flexibly for selection into IVF, and also adjusts for selection into SET. The magnitude of the treatment effect now moves a bit but, in general, the baseline results continue to hold.⁴⁹ The stability of the results to these specification checks is consistent with our finding, reported in the previous section, that impacts of the SET reform on the analysed outcomes are, in general, evident across parents with different age, education and health characteristics.

To allow that the event studies are underpowered to detect pre-trends, and additionally to allow for a more flexible class of parallel trend assumptions where counterfactual trends can *further* diverge from linearity between subsequent periods, we estimate bounds on the dynamic post-SET coefficients using the honest DiD estimator of Rambachan and Roth (2020). See Figure 8 for key outcomes and A2-A3 for all other outcomes. The baseline estimates largely stand up to this specification check.⁵⁰

Consider for example rates of twinning, documented in Figure 8a. Pre-event lead coefficients from -5 to -2 suggest a very moderate downward trend if a line is traced through point estimates in these periods (including a baseline 0 in year -2, as evident also in Figure B3a). We can trace

⁴⁸The estimates are also robust to removing the region of Skåne which mandated SET in 2001. These results are not shown because, in principle, people could migrate to Skåne for the procedure and give birth in their home county, they are however available in an earlier working paper version of the paper, (Bhalotra et al., 2019). We also note there that in 2005 Sweden started to offer same-sex couples publicly funded access to fertility treatments including IVF. Same-sex couples tend to have higher socioeconomic status (Ahmed et al., 2011b,a) but their children tend to have worse birth outcomes, at least as observed in lower birth weight (Aldén et al., 2017). To account for this legislative change we restricted the sample to conceptions occurring during 1998-2004. The estimates are similar but for parsimony, are not displayed as the number of children born to lesbian parents during 1995-2010 is only 750.

⁴⁹Inclusion of trends that are allowed to break in the year of SET tends to reduce the impact of SET, except for infant mortality and sickness benefits when it increases it but, in general, the new estimates are not significantly different from the benchmark.

⁵⁰Among notable changes are that the APGAR score no longer shows a significant improvement, but infant mortality shows a significant decline now having been insignificant earlier. These are two of several outcomes.

this forward as the counterfactual trend in place of a parallel trend strictly at the zero line, which suggests that rates of twinning may have slightly decreased among IVF women compared to their non-IVF counterparts, even in the absence of SET. Considering this slight decline as the counterfactual trend thus shifts confidence intervals in the direction of the zero line, though they are still located significantly below 0. Additionally, we allow further divergence from linearity by the values indicated as M . For example, in the most demanding case, we allow rates of twinning to further diverge by as much as 1 percentage point per year when considering counterfactual trends, generating bounds based on most the extreme lower and upper confidence intervals encountered. In each of lags 0, 1, 2 and 3, the bounds are still informative under these quite demanding assumptions, becoming insignificant only at lag 4 given the accumulation of uncertainty over time. Similar such interpretations can be made for all outcomes and bounds plotted in Figures 8, A2 and A3.

If one is concerned about omitted trends biasing estimates, it is often useful to be able to identify a placebo experiment. Since we investigate impacts of a mandate and there were documented exceptions to the mandate, we are able to leverage this. We estimate impacts for women over the age of 38 as they were exempt from the mandate. See Figure 10 and Appendix Figures A6-A7 which show that, consistent with this, in general, we see either muted effects or no effects of SET in this group. This is not the ideal placebo because older women needed to electively opt-out of SET (and indeed, we observe a small reduction of twinning even in this group), and because older women may have different outcomes for biological reasons.

We conclude with a discussion of possible misclassification. Comparing the Medical Birth Registry with national IVF data, it seems that it correctly identifies between 70 and 90 percent of all IVF births. Thus 10 to 30 percent of IVF births may be incorrectly recorded as non-IVF births. This is a second order concern for two reasons. First it will contaminate the control group and lead to under-estimation of the impacts of SET. Second, the size of the treated group (IVF users) is so much smaller than the size of the control group (mothers who do not use IVF) that, even if the impact of the reform is very large, it is unlikely that the 30% of mis-classified IVF births will impact averages in the control group in any substantive way. To see this, consider that the number of observed IVF births in the Medical Birth Registry is 22,183, and the number of non-IVF births is 932,822. Inflating the number of IVF births from 70 to 100% implies that 9,507 IVF births are incorrectly classified as non-IVF births. This is only slightly more than 1% of non-IVF births. We provide additional discussion, as well as a calculation of the (small) magnitude of any expected attenuation for the worst case of 30% mis-classified in Appendix F.

7.2 Heterogeneity in impacts of the SET reform

We investigated heterogeneity by categories of mother's parity (birth order), age at birth, education and BMI. The shares of women in each of these groups who use IVF are provided in Table A8. For selected outcomes the estimates are in Figure 10, all other estimates being in Appendix Figures A6 (for child outcomes) and A7 (for parent-level outcomes). The headline result is that the impacts

of SET are fairly pervasive by markers of the demographics, health and education of women. The results are detailed in Appendix D.

7.3 A back-of-the envelope cost-benefit analysis of the SET mandate

Given the benefits documented over a range of outcomes, and costs implicit in conducting SET rather than DET procedures, we seek to obtain a global idea of the reform's implications by conducting a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis. Full details of these calculations are provided in Appendix E, which we summarise here.

The financial costs of SET are equal to the costs of DET, as shown in the reimbursement register maintained by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions. However, we adjust the costs of SET (vs DET) upward to account for a 15 pp difference in the probability of a live birth between DET and SET, which is 42% vs 27%. We estimate short run benefits to include the costs of hospital nights and emergency C-sections averted, and increased post-birth earnings. We estimate long run benefits by using estimates available in the literature that allow us to project the reduced probability of low birth weight onto future lifetime earnings for affected children.

Taken together over the lifetime of the mother and child the benefits from mandating SET overwhelm its costs by a factor of 116. If we considered only short run benefits (that include mother's earnings in the 9 years following birth but exclude the earnings of children once they grow up) this ratio is smaller but still exceeds costs by a factor of 62. We under-estimate the short run benefits by virtue of ignoring the medical care costs averted on account of reduced morbidities among women and children that are not captured by hospital nights. We under-estimate the long run benefits to the extent that we (a) project forward only the economic gains to birth weight improvements and not, for instance, improvements in birth length or head circumference and (b) we summarize economic gains in earnings, rather than also accounting for the impacts of early life health improvements on other dimensions including cognitive attainment, employment and life expectancy which may have impacts beyond earnings on next generation productivity or on health care costs.⁵¹

8 Conclusion

Linking administrative data from several sources at the individual level to create longitudinal data for all births in Sweden during 1998-2007, we provide a comprehensive examination of causal effects of a 2003 reform that mandated single embryo transfer (SET) in IVF fertility treatment, displacing the default of double embryo transfers (DET). We find that, after SET, women using

⁵¹Using Swedish data, Bhalotra et al. (2017) demonstrate large impacts of an early child health intervention on later life chronic disease and life expectancy. Bhalotra et al. (2021) demonstrate impacts on cognitive attainment and employment in addition to earnings, also for Sweden and estimates for other countries are surveyed in Almond et al. (2018). A number of studies show that parental human capital has causal impacts on next generation human capital.

IVF experience a sharply lower probability of twin birth, better child and maternal health and higher earnings in the nine years following birth. We estimate that the benefits flowing from SET vastly outweigh its costs. Our findings are important as IVF is now a key feature of the reproductive landscape and likely to continue to increase, especially as it becomes more readily accessible to women in poorer countries. Our results are more broadly relevant to the rising share of twin births among women not using IVF, driven by both delayed parenthood and improvements in maternal health.

The other significant contribution of this paper is to a growing literature on the child penalty. We provide the first estimates of the child penalty for twin births as compared with singleton births. Consistent with lay priors, we find that women's earnings and employment take a larger hit in the two years following birth if their first birth results in twins. However, after this they completely catch up with mothers of singletons and, nine years after birth, mothers who started out with twins show a slightly smaller child penalty than mothers who started out with singletons. This appears to be because about half of all women with singleton first births have a subsequent birth and thus suffer two distinct career interruptions. While having two children at once conflicts with careers for a short time, in the long run it appears to deliver scale economies.

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Figures and Tables

Table 1: The Impact of SET on Fertility

| | Twin Birth | # Births within 9 years | No future births |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| SET reform | -0.123*** [0.005] | 0.074*** [0.010] | -0.072*** [0.007] |
| IVF | 0.175*** [0.005] | -0.106*** [0.008] | 0.101*** [0.006] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -0.703 | -0.694 | -0.707 |
| Observations | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.190 | 0.579 | 0.536 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.016 | 0.686 | 0.472 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Corrected p-value (SET) | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | < 0.001 |

Notes to Table 1: Each column presents a separate two-way fixed effect regression estimating the impact of the SET reform on fertility outcomes. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. The scaled impact of SET refers to the proportional impact of the SET reform compared to the difference between IVF and non-IVF mothers. This is the ratio of the coefficient in row 1 to the coefficient in row 2. Corrected p -values are calculated using Holm's Family Wise Error Rate correction across all models estimated in Tables 1-4. Standard errors are clustered by mother. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: The Impact of SET on Child Health

| Panel A | Birth weight | Gestational age (weeks) | Hospital nights (age 0) | Hospital nights (aged 1-8) |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| SET reform | 194.673*** [12.043] | 0.611*** [0.048] | -1.787*** [0.251] | -0.126 [0.123] |
| IVF | -319.311*** [9.782] | -1.090*** [0.040] | 2.868*** [0.213] | 0.334*** [0.097] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -0.610 | -0.560 | -0.623 | -0.378 |
| Observations | 905,473 | 908,232 | 903,605 | 908,232 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 3182.140 | 38.269 | 4.724 | 1.335 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 3539.100 | 39.315 | 1.708 | 1.064 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.303 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | 1.00 |

| Panel B | APGAR < 7 | Severe neonatal morbidity | Infant mortality | Under 5 mortality |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| SET reform | -0.004** [0.002] | -0.031*** [0.005] | -0.001 [0.001] | -0.001 [0.001] |
| IVF | 0.006*** [0.002] | 0.055*** [0.004] | 0.003*** [0.001] | 0.001** [0.001] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -0.751 | -0.556 | -0.416 | -0.760 |
| Observations | 900,261 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.021 | 0.148 | 0.009 | 0.002 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.012 | 0.075 | 0.006 | 0.001 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.354 | 0.118 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.280 | < 0.001 | 1.00 | 0.826 |

Notes to Table 2: Each column presents a separate two-way FE regression estimating the impact of the SET reform on neonatal and child health outcomes. All data are obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry and the Swedish National Patient Registry covering all births for the time period 1998-2007. In the case of longer-term health outcomes (under 5 mortality and all hospitalization between ages 1-8), these are observed in the Swedish National Patient Registry following children up until (a maximum of) 2016. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. The scaled impact of SET refers to the proportional impact of the SET reform compared to the difference between IVF and non-IVF mothers. This is the ratio of the coefficient in row 1 to the coefficient in row 2. Corrected *p*-values are calculated using Holm's Family Wise Error Rate correction across all models estimated in Tables 1-4. Standard errors are clustered by mother. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: The Impact of SET on Maternal Health

| | Maternal morbidity | Hospital nights childbirth | Emergency C-section |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| SET reform | -0.011* [0.006] | -0.633*** [0.113] | -0.015** [0.006] |
| IVF | 0.055*** [0.005] | 0.997*** [0.099] | 0.042*** [0.004] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -0.200 | -0.635 | -0.346 |
| Observations | 895,336 | 874,814 | 895,336 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.228 | 5.214 | 0.171 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.132 | 3.603 | 0.086 |
| Uncorrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.086 | 0.000 | 0.011 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.688 | < 0.001 | 0.149 |


Notes to Table 3: Each column presents a separate two-way fixed effect regression estimating the impact of the SET reform on maternal health or hospitalization measures. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. The scaled impact of SET refers to the proportional impact of the SET reform compared to the difference between IVF and non-IVF mothers. This is the ratio of the coefficient in row 1 to the coefficient in row 2. Corrected *p*-values are calculated using Holm's Family Wise Error Rate correction across all models estimated in Tables 1-A11. Standard errors are clustered by mother. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: The Impact of SET on Labour Market Outcomes

| | Mothers | | Fathers | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Wage Earnings | Sickness Benefits | Wage Earnings | Sickness Benefits |
| SET reform | 10872*** (2061) | -665*** (207) | -2192 (5046) | -166 (205) |
| IVF | -1409 (1526) | 1656*** (173) | 22728*** (4151) | 438** (178) |
| Scaled Impact of SET (vs. baseline) | 0.056 | -0.082 | -0.005 | -0.037 |
| Observations | 893,747 | 893,747 | 893,793 | 893,793 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 192983 | 8127 | 400782 | 4481 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 162822 | 6845 | 338141 | 4413 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.664 | 0.418 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | < 0.001 | 0.017 | 1.00 | 1.00 |

Notes to Table 4: Each column presents a separate two-way FE estimate of the impact of the SET reform on maternal or paternal labour market outcomes. Wage earning and sickness benefits refer to averages over the 9 years following each mother or father's birth, and are generated by following parents up to (a maximum of) 2016 in the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA) register. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. The scaled impact of SET (vs. baseline) refers to the proportional impact of the estimate of the SET reform (row 1), compared to the mean of the dependent variable among IVF users at baseline. Corrected *p*-values are calculated using Holm's Family Wise Error Rate correction across all models estimated in Tables 1-4. Standard errors are clustered by mother. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Figure 1: Trends in SET and proportion of IVF births



45


Notes: Annual trends in the proportion of IVF and the proportion of SET births are based on aggregate data collected from annual reports by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare. Rates of twin births are based on micro-level data from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry recording all pregnancies over at least 22 weeks of gestation. Proportions in panel (a) refer to the proportion among all births. Proportions in panel (b) refer to the proportion among all IVF birth and proportions in panel (c) refer to the proportion among IVF (solid line) or non-IVF (dashed line) births. The red vertical line indicates the year of the SET reform.

Figure 2: Event studies: The Impact of SET on Fertility




Notes: Event studies are analogous to single coefficient regressions presented in Table 1, however here estimate full leads and lags to the exposure to the SET reform interacted with a mother’s IVF status, as per specification 1. Leads and lags refer to cohorts of mothers giving birth up to 5 years pre and 4 years post-SET reform. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform, and year -1 is the omitted reference period. Standard errors are clustered by mother.

Figure 3: Event studies: The Impact of SET on Neonatal and Child Health




Notes: Event studies are analogous to single coefficient regressions presented in Table 2, however here estimate full leads and lags to the exposure to the SET reform interacted with each child's mother's IVF status, as per specification 1. Leads and lags refer to cohorts of children born up to 5 years pre and 4 years post-SET reform. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform, and year -1 is the omitted reference period. Standard errors are clustered by mother.

Figure 4: Event studies: The Impact of SET on Maternal Health




Notes: Event studies are analogous to single coefficient regressions presented in Table 3, however here estimate full leads and lags to the exposure to the SET reform interacted with a mother’s IVF status, as per specification 1. Leads and lags refer to cohorts of mothers giving birth up to 5 years pre and 4 years post-SET reform. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform, and year -1 is the omitted reference period. Standard errors are clustered by mother.

Figure 5: Event studies: The Impact of SET on Labor Market Outcomes



Notes: Event studies are analogous to single coefficient regressions presented in Table 4, however here estimate full leads and lags to the exposure to the SET reform interacted with each mother’s IVF status, as per specification 1. Leads and lags refer to cohorts of mothers or fathers of children born up to 5 years pre- and 4 years post-SET reform. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform, and year -1 is the omitted reference period. Standard errors are clustered by mother or father.


Figure 6: Distributional Impacts of the SET Reform



Notes: Distributional impacts of the SET reform are considered over child outcomes (panels (a)-(c)) and mother's labour market outcomes (panel (d)). In each case, each point estimate and 95% CI refers to the estimated impact of SET from a difference-in-differences regression where the outcome is whether the birth exceeds the particular threshold where the outcome is whether the birth exceeds the particular threshold indicated on the horizontal axis (panels (a)-(c)) or whether the mother's average earnings exceed the particular average earnings threshold indicated on the horizontal axis of panel (d). Specifically, each point and CI refers to $\hat{\beta}_1^k$ from the following specification:


$$Pr(Y_{it} > k) = \alpha^k + \beta_1^k (PostSET \times IVF)_{it} + \beta_2^k IVF_i + \mathbf{X}_{it}^k \delta + \alpha_c^k + \pi_t^k + \varepsilon_{it}^k$$
estimated using a linear probability model for each cut-point k documented on each plot, and is thus interpreted as the marginal change in the likelihood of exceeding particular distributional points of interest among IVF mother's post SET, compared with IVF mother's pre-SET in a double-difference framework with non-IVF mothers. All other details follow those in regressions estimated in Tables 2-4. Standard errors are clustered by mother.

Figure 7: Impact of SET on future fertility and birth spacing




Notes: Each coefficient and standard error are obtained from a difference-in-differences regression of having been exposed to the SET reform on the probability of having an additional birth in the years following all births observed in our data (the “index births”). Each index birth is obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry for the time period 1998-2007, with following births occurring up to 9 years post-index births, (therefore followed up until a maximum of 2016). Standard errors are clustered by mother, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are plotted.

Figure 8: Honest DiD Bounds – Partial Identification Relaxing Parallel Trend Assumptions




Notes: “Honest Difference-in-Differences” models are estimated following Rambachan and Roth (2020). Here rather than assuming parallel trends between IVF and non-IVF mothers in the post-SET period, the counterfactual is assumed to follow trends between IVF and non-IVF mothers observed in the pre-SET period. These trends are additionally allowed to diverge by up to M units in each period, where M is indicated in each shaded confidence interval plotted. In each case, solid shaded areas present 95% confidence bounds. Black points represent original event study estimates, and black error bars prior to period 0 refer to original (event study) estimates used to model pre-trends. Given some roll-out in year -1, pre-trends are estimated from years -5 to -2, with year -2 being the omitted baseline year.

Figure 9: Estimates Based on Alternative Models and Samples




Notes: Each plot estimates alternative specifications for outcomes examined in Table 1 of the paper. “Main Estimate” reproduces the estimate from Table 1 for comparability. “Removing 2001-2002” implements a Donut DD model where the pre-treatment years of 2001 and 2002 are removed. “Trends in Parent” refer to models including trends in all parental characteristics indicated in the Data section of the paper, while “Split Trends” refers to models including these trends separately for IVF and non-IVF parents. “No Controls” is a baseline model without any controls. Black circles present point estimates and error bars present 95% confidence intervals. All estimates and CIs are generated from DD models, with standard errors clustered by mother.

Figure 10: Reform Heterogeneity



Notes: Each plot documents heterogeneity in reform impacts by birth order, maternal age, education and BMI. Each point estimate (solid circle) and 95% confidence interval (error bars) plots the estimate of the impact of the SET reform estimated from DD models where the estimation sample consists only of individuals meeting the criteria indicated in the vertical axes. All other details follow those from equation 2 of the text.

Figure 11: Labour Market Dynamics of Twin and Singleton Births (IVF and non-IVF births)



Notes: Each figure plots child penalties estimated following Kleven et al. (2019b) for mothers and fathers of twins (black lines and points), versus singletons (grey lines and points). Plots for IVF births are presented in panels (a) for mothers and (c) for fathers, while analogous plots for non-IVF births are provided in panels (b) and (d) respectively (for wages) while similar plots are presented for labour market participation in the panel below. Each point estimate and confidence interval refers to proportional impacts compared to outcomes one year prior to birth. All specifications are based on all first births in our sample of years 1998-2007, with all details following model 3 of the text.

Online Appendices for:

Health and Labor Market Impacts of Twin Birth: Evidence from a Swedish IVF Policy Mandate

Sonia Bhalotra & Damian Clarke & Hanna Mühlrad & Mårten Palme

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A Appendix Figures and Tables

Table A1: Classification of Maternal Morbidity Events

| Classification | ICD-10 and KVÅ Codes | MBR Variable Name |
|--|--|-------------------|
| Maternal Morbidity | | |
| Maternal deaths | O959 O960 O961 O969 O970 O971 O979 | |
| Non-planned hysterectomy | O822, MCA33, MCA30, LCD00, LCD96+ZXD00 | |
| Blood transfusion + blood loss >1000 ml or haemorrhage with coagulopathy | (DR029, DR033, DR036, DR038, V9209 + O678, O720, O721A, O721B, O721X) or O723 or O670 | |
| Other surgical interventions such as uterine or vaginal tamponade, uterine compression su- tures, embolization, re-operation due to com- plications | MBB10 DP015 MCW96 KCH00 MWA00 MWB00 MWC00 MWC01 MWD00 MWE00 MWE01 MWE02 MWF00 MWF01 MWW96 MWW97 MWW98 | |
| Maternal venous thromboembolism | O871 O873 O878 O880 O881 O882 O883 O888 | |
| Maternal sepsis | O859 R572 A410 A411 A412 A413 A414 A415 A418 A419 | |
| Third degree perineal injury with over 50% of the external anal sphincter torn | O702 O702C 0702D 0702E 0702F 0702X + MBR-variable | SFINKTER |
| Fourth degree perineal injury (including the rectal mucosa) | 0703 + MBR-variable | REKTUM |
| Injuries during delivery and surgery: Uterine rupture, bladder or urethra | O711 O715 S355 S357 S358 S359 S364 S365 S368 S371 S372 | |
| Arteria iliaca interna, intestines, urinary blad- der and urethra | | |
| Anaesthesia complications | O890 O891 O892 O896 O903 O740 O741 O742 O743 O747 O751 O754 | |
| Eclampsia | O15 O150 O151 O152 O159 | |
| Post-partum depression | F32 F320 F321 F322 F323 F32A F323W F328 F329 F53 F530 F531 F538 F539 | |
| Placenta complications | O430 O430A O430B O430W O430X O431 O432 O432A O432 O432X O438 O43 | |
| Complications associated with multiple births | O310 O311 O312 O312A O312B O312X O318 | |
| Wound rupture | O900 O901 O902 | |
| Intensive care | ZV049 | |
| Cervical lacerations | O713 MBC00 | |
| Preeclampsia/gestational hypertension | O139 O14 O140 O141 O141A O141B O141X O142 O149 | |
| Gestational Diabetes Mellitus | O244 O244A O244B | |
| Chorioamnionitis | O411 R572 | |
| Wound infection | O860 | |
| UTI | O862 O863 | |
| Endometritis | O859 | |

Notes: Maternal morbidity events are documented in the Swedish Medical Birth Register (MFR) and defined using medical diagnoses classified according to the International Classification of Diseases 10 (ICD-10) and procedures (using KVÅ-codes) during pregnancy and delivery. The morbidity events listed in this table are defined by the ICD-10 and KVÅ codes presented in column 2 and/or by the MFR-variables presented in column 3.

Table A2: Classification of Severe Neonatal Morbidity Events

| Classification | ICD-10 Code | MBR Name | Variable |
|---|---|-----------------------|----------|
| Severe Neonatal Morbidity | | | |
| Stillbirth (ante- and intrapartum) | | DODFOD | |
| Asphyxia at delivery, pH<7 | P201 P209 P210 P211 P211B P219 | | |
| Hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy grade 2-3 | P910 P911 P912 P913 P914 P915 P916 P916B P916C P916X | | |
| Intracranial haemorrhage | P100 P101 P102 P103 P104 P108 P109 P520 P521 P523 P524 P525 P526 P528 P529 | | |
| Neonatal convulsions | P909 P909A P909B P909C | | |
| Respiratory distress and meconium aspiration syndrome | P240 P241 P242 P248 P249 P220 P228 P229 | | |
| Invasive mechanical ventilation | DG021 DG022 DG002 DG026 | | |
| Cardiorespiratory resuscitation (intubation, ventilation, heart compressions) | DG017 DG018 DM004 DG010 DF017 DF012 DF028 + MBR-variables | ACIDOS, INTUB, HJMASS | |
| Therapeutic hypothermia | DV034 | | |
| Extremely low birthweight. <1500 grams | | BVIKT | |
| Extremely preterm, <32 weeks of gestation | | GRVBS | |
| APGAR score <4 at five minutes | | APGAR5 | |
| Congenital pneumonia | P230 P231 P232 P233 P234 P235 P236 P238 P239 | | |
| Congenital sepsis | P360 P361 P362 P363 P364 P365 P368 P369 | | |
| Birth trauma (fractures, neurological injury, retinal hemorrhage or facial nerve palsy, pulmonary hemorrhage, pneumothorax) | P110 P111 P112 P113 P114 P115 P119 P130 P131 P132 P133 P134 P138 P139 P150 P151 P152 P153 P154 P155 P156 P158 P159 P260 P261 P268 P269 P251 P252 P253 | | |
| Obstetric brachial plexus injury | P140 P141 P142 P143 P148 P149 | | |
| Hypoglycemia <2.2 mmol/l | P704A P704B | | |
| Notes: Neonatal morbidity events are documented in the Swedish Medical Birth Register (MFR) and defined using medical diagnoses classified according to the International Classification of Diseases 10 (ICD-10) and procedures (using KVÅ-codes) during pregnancy and delivery. The morbidity events listed in this table are defined by the ICD-10 and KVÅ codes presented in column 2 and/or by the MFR-variables presented in column 3. | | | |

Table A3: Summary Statistics by IVF Status – Adverse Maternal Outcomes

| | IVF | | Non-IVF | | Difference (p-values) |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|---------|-----------|--------------------------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | |
| Hemorrhage 1000ml | 8.585 | 27.897 | 4.899 | 21.575 | 0.000 |
| Hysterectomy | 0.034 | 1.693 | 0.022 | 1.474 | 0.352 |
| Post-birth surgery | 0.304 | 5.479 | 0.089 | 2.975 | 0.057 |
| Thromboembolism | 0.046 | 2.142 | 0.029 | 1.699 | 0.221 |
| Sepsis | 0.568 | 7.456 | 0.310 | 5.559 | 0.000 |
| Maternal deaths | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004 | 0.660 | 0.565 |
| Perineal lacerations 3-4 | 3.131 | 17.417 | 2.018 | 14.063 | 0.000 |
| Anesthesia complications | 0.011 | 1.071 | 0.023 | 1.501 | 0.737 |
| Injury | 0.126 | 3.550 | 0.086 | 2.925 | 0.573 |
| Depression | 0.034 | 1.855 | 0.046 | 2.136 | 0.000 |
| Placenta complications | 0.826 | 9.018 | 0.196 | 4.416 | 0.000 |
| Multiple birth comp. | 0.270 | 5.101 | 0.026 | 1.607 | 0.000 |
| Ruptures | 0.281 | 5.212 | 0.114 | 3.366 | 0.000 |
| Eclampsia | 0.103 | 3.211 | 0.056 | 2.364 | 0.016 |
| Preeclampsia | 7.145 | 25.704 | 3.580 | 18.574 | 0.000 |
| Diabetes | 0.981 | 9.811 | 0.794 | 8.875 | 0.588 |
| Cervical Lacerations | 0.528 | 7.245 | 0.289 | 5.366 | 0.000 |
| Choriomenoitis | 0.573 | 7.551 | 0.182 | 4.265 | 0.000 |
| Wound infection | 0.281 | 5.267 | 0.150 | 3.864 | 0.000 |
| Endometriosis | 0.568 | 7.456 | 0.309 | 5.551 | 0.000 |
| Urinary Tract Infection | 0.757 | 8.635 | 0.372 | 6.082 | 0.000 |

Notes: Summary statistics for specific maternal morbidity measures used to construct the maternal morbidity index are displayed separately by a mother's IVF status. Each measure is a binary indicator of whether the mother suffered a particular event, multiplied by 100 for ease of visualisation. *p*-values of tests for equality of means by group are reported in the final column.

Table A4: Summary Statistics by IVF Status – Adverse Child Outcomes

| | IVF | | Non-IVF | | Difference (p-values) |
|---------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------------------------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev | |
| Umbilical chord pH<7 | 967.511 | 9789.098 | 588.402 | 7648.145 | 0.000 |
| Hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy | 59.723 | 2443.243 | 36.377 | 1906.918 | 0.653 |
| Intracranial hematoma | 167.224 | 4086.128 | 94.484 | 3072.384 | 0.174 |
| Neonatal convulsions | 226.947 | 4758.770 | 161.096 | 4010.447 | 0.372 |
| Meconium aspiration | 4753.942 | 21280.233 | 1841.502 | 13444.684 | 0.000 |
| Mechanical ventilation | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.028 |
| Cardiorespiratory resuscitation | 692.785 | 8294.987 | 376.521 | 6124.572 | 0.001 |
| Therapeutic hypothermia | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.720 |
| APGAR < 4 | 474.337 | 6871.278 | 262.887 | 5120.514 | 0.002 |
| Pneumonia | 358.337 | 5975.750 | 321.247 | 5658.763 | 0.180 |
| Sepsis | 1457.238 | 11984.050 | 821.306 | 9025.313 | 0.000 |
| Birth trauma | 1015.289 | 10025.473 | 961.616 | 9758.949 | 0.329 |
| Hypoglycemia | 6473.961 | 24608.052 | 2757.293 | 16374.592 | 0.000 |
| Plexus injury | 95.557 | 3089.931 | 252.510 | 5018.692 | 0.014 |
| Still birth | 334.448 | 5773.815 | 327.861 | 5716.528 | 0.813 |
| Extremely low birth weight | 2962.255 | 16955.380 | 712.885 | 8413.114 | 0.000 |
| Extremely Preterm | 1158.624 | 10702.040 | 250.856 | 5002.275 | 0.000 |

Notes: Summary statistics for specific infant morbidity measures used to construct the neonatal morbidity index are displayed separately by their mother's IVF status. Each measure is a binary indicator of whether the child suffered a particular event, multiplied by 100,000 for ease of presentation. *p*-values of tests for equality of means by group are reported in the final column.

Table A5: Summary Statistics by IVF Status – Parental Characteristics

| | IVF | | Non-IVF | | Difference (p-values) |
|--|--------|-----------|---------|-----------|--------------------------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | |
| Panel A: Principal Outcome Measures (Parents) | | | | | |
| Twin birth | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0.000 |
| N Births within 9 yrs | 0.58 | 0.71 | 0.69 | 0.77 | 0.000 |
| No future births | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.000 |
| Maternal morbidity | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.000 |
| Hospital nights, childbirth | 5.21 | 8.20 | 3.58 | 6.29 | 0.000 |
| Emergency C-section | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0.08 | 0.28 | 0.000 |
| Wage earnings, mother | 192983 | 138751 | 162310 | 119960 | 0.000 |
| Sickness benefits, mother | 8126.6 | 14067.7 | 6823.3 | 12997.1 | 0.000 |
| Wage earnings, father | 400782 | 361257 | 337078 | 262925 | 0.000 |
| Sickness benefits, father | 4481.3 | 14636.1 | 4412.1 | 13724.5 | 0.000 |
| Panel B: Covariates | | | | | |
| Age, mother | 32.37 | 3.60 | 29.24 | 4.57 | 0.000 |
| BMI, mother | 24.53 | 4.11 | 24.38 | 4.31 | 0.346 |
| Born in Sweden, mother | 0.87 | 0.34 | 0.83 | 0.38 | 0.000 |
| First time mother | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.000 |
| Smoking, mother | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.000 |
| Elementary, mother | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.000 |
| High school, mother | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.020 |
| University, mother | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0.000 |
| Age, father | 35.58 | 5.23 | 32.66 | 5.73 | 0.000 |
| Born in Sweden, father | 0.87 | 0.34 | 0.82 | 0.39 | 0.000 |
| Elementary, father | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0.000 |
| High school, father | 0.35 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.000 |
| University, father | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.000 |
| Total Observations | 17,565 | | 877,775 | | |

Notes: Characteristics and outcomes of IVF and non-IVF parents from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry and LISA Registry are displayed, along with p -values testing for equality across groups. Total observations indicated at the foot of the table refer to the total number of mothers aged under 39, and hence used in principal models. In a number of robustness checks, we include additionally women over the age of 39, resulting in a sample of 19,964 IVF mothers and 921,287 non-IVF mothers.

Table A6: Summary Statistics by IVF Status – Child Outcomes

| | IVF | | Non-IVF | | Difference (p-values) |
|--|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------------------------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | |
| Principal Outcome Measures (Children) | | | | | |
| Birth weight | 3182.382 | 760.151 | 3546.027 | 591.518 | 0.000 |
| Gestational age (weeks) | 38.269 | 2.923 | 39.335 | 1.968 | 0.000 |
| Hospital nights, age 0 | 4.729 | 16.392 | 1.650 | 9.080 | 0.000 |
| Hospital nights, ages 1-8 | 1.338 | 8.781 | 1.057 | 7.718 | 0.000 |
| AAR score < 7 | 0.021 | 0.143 | 0.011 | 0.107 | 0.000 |
| Severe neonatal morbidity | 0.148 | 0.355 | 0.074 | 0.262 | 0.000 |
| Infant mortality | 0.009 | 0.094 | 0.006 | 0.075 | 0.000 |
| Under 5 mortality | 0.002 | 0.046 | 0.001 | 0.033 | 0.000 |
| Total Observations | 19,563 | | 888,675 | | |

Notes: Characteristics of children born as a result of IVF procedures and non-IVF procedures are displayed. All measures are generated from microdata in the Swedish Medical Birth Registry, and *p*-values testing for equality across groups are reported. Total observations indicated at the foot of the table refer to the total number of children born to mothers aged under 39 (which is larger than the total number of mothers, given multiple births). In a number of robustness checks, we extend to include additionally women over the age of 39, resulting in a sample of 22,183 IVF births and 932,822 non-IVF births.

Table A7: Summary Statistics of Singleton and Twin Births by IVF status

| | Twins | | | Singletons | | |
|--|----------|--------------|------------------|------------|--------------|------------------|
| | IVF mean | Non-IVF mean | <i>p</i> -values | IVF mean | Non-IVF mean | <i>p</i> -values |
| Principal Outcome Measures (Children) | | | | | | |
| Birth weight | 2559.1 | 2569.4 | 0.342 | 3470.5 | 3557.6 | 0.000 |
| Gestational age (weeks) | 36.1 | 36.1 | 0.757 | 39.2 | 39.4 | 0.000 |
| Hospital nights, age 0 | 9.13 | 8.47 | 0.067 | 2.19 | 1.41 | 0.000 |
| Hospital nights, ages 1-8 | 1.55 | 1.32 | 0.183 | 1.11 | 0.992 | 0.054 |
| APGAR score < 7 | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.804 | 0.015 | 0.011 | 0.000 |
| Severe neonatal morbidity | 0.248 | 0.226 | 0.002 | 0.094 | 0.067 | 0.000 |
| Infant mortality | 0.015 | 0.016 | 0.458 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.159 |
| Under 5 mortality | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.994 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.116 |

Notes: Mean values of indicators of health at birth are presented for twins (left-hand panel) and singleton births (right-hand panel). Identical measures as those used in principal models of the paper are displayed. Tests of equality are presented between IVF and non-IVF births within each group of singletons or twins (*p*-values corresponding to these tests are reported).

Table A8: Proportion of IVF births by group

| Age | | Birth Order | | Education | | BMI | |
|-----------|-------|---------------------------|-------|-------------|-------|---------------|-------|
| Group | Prop. | Group | Prop. | Group | Prop. | Group | Prop. |
| Age <25 | 0.002 | 1 st pregnancy | 0.032 | Elementary | 0.010 | Normal weight | 0.020 |
| Age 25-29 | 0.010 | 2 nd pregnancy | 0.012 | High school | 0.019 | Overweight | 0.022 |
| Age 30-34 | 0.025 | 3 rd or higher | 0.004 | University | 0.025 | Obese | 0.021 |
| Age 35-38 | 0.044 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Age >38 | 0.052 | – | – | – | – | – | – |

Notes: Each panel displays the proportion of all IVF births among mothers who meet specific age, birth order, education or BMI criteria noted in the right hand panel. All proportions refer to all live births registered in the Medical Birth Registry over the period under study (1998-2016).

Table A9: The Impact of SET on Neonatal Morbidity

| Panel A | APGAR < 4 | Pneumonia | Sepsis | Birth Trauma | Hypogly- cemia | Plexus Injury |
|---------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| SET reform | -0.001 [0.001] | 0.001 [0.001] | -0.001 [0.002] | 0.000 [0.001] | -0.019*** [0.004] | 0.001** [0.000] |
| IVF | 0.002* [0.001] | -0.000 [0.001] | 0.004*** [0.001] | -0.001 [0.001] | 0.029*** [0.003] | -0.002*** [0.000] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -0.335 | -1.116 | -0.231 | -0.336 | -0.646 | -0.684 |
| Observations | 900,261 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.015 | 0.010 | 0.065 | 0.001 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.010 | 0.028 | 0.002 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.615 | 0.553 | 0.637 | 0.904 | 0.000 | 0.032 |
| Corrected p-value (SET) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | < 0.01 | 0.378 |
| Panel B | Still- birth | Extremely Low BW | Extremely Preterm | pH < 7 | Hypo. Isch. Encephalop. | Intra. Haem. |
| SET reform | 0.002* [0.001] | -0.013*** [0.003] | -0.005*** [0.002] | -0.002* [0.001] | -0.000 [0.000] | 0.001 [0.001] |
| IVF | -0.000 [0.001] | 0.021*** [0.002] | 0.009*** [0.002] | 0.001 [0.001] | 0.000 [0.000] | 0.000 [0.000] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -7.356 | -0.631 | -0.631 | -1.634 | -7.491 | 2.944 |
| Observations | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.003 | 0.030 | 0.012 | 0.010 | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.064 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.086 | 0.878 | 0.153 |
| Corrected p-value (SET) | 0.701 | < 0.01 | 0.023 | 0.856 | 1 | 1 |
| Panel C | Neo. Convul. | Meconium Aspiration | Mechanical Ventilation | Cardioresp. | Ther Hypothermia | |
| SET reform | -0.001 [0.001] | -0.010*** [0.003] | 0.000 [0.000] | -0.002 [0.001] | -0.000*** [0.000] | |
| IVF | 0.000 [0.001] | 0.024*** [0.003] | -0.000 [0.000] | 0.002 [0.001] | -0.000* [0.000] | |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -7.170 | -0.407 | -9.032 | -1.049 | 2.339 | |
| Observations | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | 908,232 | |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.002 | 0.048 | 0.000 | 0.007 | 0.000 | |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.002 | 0.019 | 0.000 | 0.004 | 0.000 | |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.274 | 0.004 | 0.267 | 0.188 | 0.001 | |
| Corrected p-value (SET) | 1 | 0.046 | 1 | 1 | 0.019 | |

Notes: Each column presents a separate two-way FE estimate of the impact of the SET reform on neonatal health and morbidity measures following specification 2. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by mother. The corrected p-value refers to p-values based on Holm's FWER correction considering all 17 outcomes in this Table. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A10: The Impact of SET on Maternal Morbidity

| Panel A | Hameorrhage | Hysterectomy | Post-birth surgery | Thromboembolism | Sepsis | Maternal Death | Perineal Laceration |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| SET reform | 0.034 [0.456] | 0.052 [0.036] | 0.040 [0.098] | -0.018 [0.028] | -0.090 [0.113] | 0.009 [0.010] | -0.052 [0.290] |
| IVF | 2.808*** [0.349] | 0.008 [0.022] | 0.209*** [0.073] | 0.008 [0.025] | 0.183** [0.092] | -0.007*** [0.002] | -0.171 [0.228] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | 0.012 | 6.808 | 0.194 | -2.187 | -0.490 | -1.362 | 0.306 |
| Observations | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 9.394 | 0.036 | 0.370 | 0.043 | 0.605 | 0.000 | 3.743 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 5.342 | 0.025 | 0.118 | 0.032 | 0.323 | 0.004 | 2.640 |
| Uncorrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.941 | 0.145 | 0.678 | 0.529 | 0.427 | 0.342 | 0.856 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Panel B | Anasthesia complications | Injury | Depression | Placenta complications | Mult. Birth Comp. | Ruptures | Eclampsia |
| SET reform | -0.005 [0.015] | -0.057 [0.055] | -0.041 [0.042] | 0.165 [0.134] | -0.160** [0.074] | -0.056 [0.081] | -0.020 [0.054] |
| IVF | -0.020 [0.015] | 0.042 [0.046] | -0.029 [0.025] | 0.453*** [0.099] | 0.268*** [0.065] | 0.125* [0.065] | 0.036 [0.043] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | 0.243 | -1.342 | 1.406 | 0.364 | -0.596 | -0.451 | -0.557 |
| Observations | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.014 | 0.142 | 0.043 | 0.690 | 0.306 | 0.306 | 0.128 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.026 | 0.093 | 0.053 | 0.212 | 0.033 | 0.128 | 0.063 |
| Uncorrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.749 | 0.307 | 0.323 | 0.218 | 0.032 | 0.485 | 0.711 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.664 | 1 | 1 |
| Panel C | Pre-Eclampsia | Diabetes | Cervical Lacerat. | Choriomnionitis | Wound Infection | Endometri | UTI |
| SET reform | -0.787** [0.384] | 0.153 [0.170] | -0.047 [0.113] | -0.058 [0.116] | 0.001 [0.078] | -0.089 [0.113] | -0.160 [0.132] |
| IVF | 2.011*** [0.308] | 0.024 [0.127] | 0.189** [0.089] | 0.308*** [0.092] | 0.028 [0.063] | 0.185** [0.092] | 0.291*** [0.109] |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -0.391 | 6.376 | -0.248 | -0.188 | 0.023 | -0.479 | -0.551 |
| Observations | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 | 895,336 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 7.180 | 1.110 | 0.555 | 0.598 | 0.278 | 0.605 | 0.840 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 3.742 | 0.852 | 0.298 | 0.205 | 0.170 | 0.323 | 0.414 |
| Uncorrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.040 | 0.367 | 0.678 | 0.616 | 0.993 | 0.432 | 0.225 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.804 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Notes: Each column presents a separate two-way FE estimate of the impact of the SET reform on maternal morbidity outcomes following specification 2. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by mother. The corrected *p*-value refers to *p*-values based on Holm's FWER correction considering all 21 outcomes in this Table. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: The impact of SET on extensive vs intensive margin earnings

| | Mothers | | Fathers | | Relative Female Wage |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Non-zero wage | Wage income (intensive margin) | Non-zero wage | Wage income (intensive margin) | |
| SET reform | 0.005** (0.002) | 10097.019*** (2066.624) | 0.002 (0.003) | -2822.879 (5103.602) | 12889.284** (5311.522) |
| IVF | -0.004* (0.002) | -1494.855 (1535.096) | -0.001 (0.002) | 23378.530*** (4212.426) | -24163.280*** (4339.532) |
| Scaled Impact of SET | -1.363 | -6.755 | -2.590 | -0.121 | -0.533 |
| Observations | 893,747 | 855,717 | 893,793 | 863,761 | 892,718 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 0.970 | 198851.041 | 0.970 | 413089.735 | -207676.944 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 0.958 | 169996.115 | 0.966 | 349960.027 | -175243.521 |
| Uncorrected p-value (SET) | 0.038 | 0.000 | 0.530 | 0.580 | 0.015 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.342 | < 0.001 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.165 |


Notes: Each column presents a separate two-way FE estimate of the impact of the SET reform on maternal or paternal labour market participation (measured as reporting at least some wage income in the years following birth), and wage income at the extensive margin (wage among all individuals reporting non-zero wages). The final column estimates the impact of the SET reform on the relative female wage to the male wage within all households. Wage earning refer to averages over the 9 years following each mother or father's birth, and are generated by following parents up to (a maximum of) 2016 in the LISA register. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. The scaled impact of SET refers to the proportional impact of the SET reform compared to the difference between IVF and non-IVF mothers. This is the ratio of the coefficient in row 1 to the coefficient in row 2. Corrected *p*-values are calculated using Holm's Family Wise Error Rate correction across all models estimated in Tables 1-4. Standard errors are clustered by mother. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12: The SET reform and maternal and paternal characteristics

| | Age (1) | Primary (2) | Secondary (3) | Tertiary (4) | Native (5) | BMI (6) | Smoke (7) |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Panel A: Mothers | | | | | | | |
| SET reform | 0.029 [0.056] | -0.008** [0.004] | -0.010 [0.008] | 0.018** [0.008] | 0.000 [0.005] | -0.090 [0.068] | 0.005 [0.003] |
| IVF | 3.124*** [0.044] | -0.055*** [0.003] | -0.016*** [0.006] | 0.071*** [0.006] | 0.044*** [0.004] | 0.148*** [0.054] | -0.053*** [0.003] |
| Proportional Change | 0.001 | -0.105 | -0.021 | 0.042 | 0.000 | -0.004 | 0.074 |
| Observations | 895,340 | 860,550 | 860,550 | 860,550 | 894,999 | 783,673 | 841,292 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 32.366 | 0.077 | 0.489 | 0.434 | 0.869 | 24.534 | 0.061 |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 29.287 | 0.131 | 0.506 | 0.363 | 0.828 | 24.384 | 0.112 |
| Uncorrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.609 | 0.040 | 0.193 | 0.020 | 0.942 | 0.190 | 0.192 |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 1.00 | 0.399 | 1.00 | 0.220 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Panel B: Fathers | | | | | | | |
| SET reform | 0.059 [0.082] | -0.009* [0.005] | 0.013* [0.007] | -0.005 [0.008] | 0.017*** [0.005] | – | – |
| IVF | 2.921*** [0.064] | -0.038*** [0.004] | 0.015** [0.006] | 0.023*** [0.006] | 0.053*** [0.004] | – | – |
| Proportional Change | 0.002 | -0.086 | 0.038 | -0.009 | 0.019 | – | – |
| Observations | 895,340 | 876,923 | 876,923 | 876,923 | 895,340 | – | – |
| Mean of Dep. Var. IVF | 35.577 | 0.099 | 0.351 | 0.550 | 0.869 | – | – |
| Mean of Dep. Var. Full | 32.706 | 0.137 | 0.339 | 0.524 | 0.819 | – | – |
| Uncorrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 0.474 | 0.060 | 0.065 | 0.534 | 0.002 | – | – |
| Corrected <i>p</i> -value (SET) | 1.00 | 0.539 | 0.539 | 1.00 | 0.024 | – | – |

Notes: Each column presents a separate two-way FE regression where parental characteristics are regressed on the SET reform and IVF indicator following specification 2. Models replicate those from Table 1, however replacing outcome variables with observable parental characteristics (control variables included in all baseline models in the paper). Maternal characteristics are presented in Panel A, with similar paternal characteristics in Panel B. In the case of BMI and a woman’s smoking status during pregnancy, these are only observed for mothers. Estimated date of conception fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Proportional Change” in panel footers refers to the parameter estimated on SET reform divided by the baseline dependent variable mean for IVF users. Standard errors are clustered by mother. Corrected *p*-value refers to *p*-values from Holm’s multiple hypothesis correction based on the hypotheses tested in this Table. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Figure A1: Trends in delivery rates and IVF treatments




Notes: Annual trends in deliveries per transfer/cycle and the number of IVF treatments are based on aggregate data collected from annual reports by the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare and presented in Figures A1a and A1b. Started cycles refer to all IVF procedures initiated, whether or not an embryo was eventually transferred, while embryo transfers refers only to those procedures in which an embryo was transferred to the woman. The red vertical line indicates the year of the SET reform.

Figure A2: Honest DiD Bounds – Alternative Child Health Measures


(a) Gestational Age (weeks)




(b) Hospital nights, ages 1-8




(c) APGAR score < 7




(d) Severe Neonatal Morbidity



(e) Infant mortality




(f) Under 5 mortality




Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 8. Identical “Honest Difference-in-Differences” procedures are implemented, here focusing on child health measures not presented in Figure 8.

Figure A3: Honest DiD Bounds – Alternative Parental Outcomes


(a) Number of future births within 9 years




(b) Maternal Morbidity Index




(c) Hospital nights




(d) Emergency C-section



(e) Wage earnings, father




(f) Income from sickness leave, father




Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 8. Identical “Honest Difference-in-Differences” procedures are implemented, here focusing on additional parental outcomes (fertility, health, and labour market measures) not presented in Figure 8.

Figure A4: Alternative Models and Samples – Additional Child Health Measures


(a) Gestational Age (weeks)




(b) Hospital nights, ages 1-8




(c) APGAR score < 7




(d) Severe Neonatal Morbidity



(e) Infant Mortality




(f) Under 5 mortality



Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 9. Identical robustness plots are displayed, here focusing on additional child health measures not presented in Figure 9.


Figure A5: Alternative Models and Samples – Additional Parental Outcomes




Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 9. Identical robustness plots are displayed, here focusing on additional parental outcomes (fertility, health, and labour market measures) not presented in Figure 9.

Figure A6: Reform Heterogeneity – Additional Child Health Measures


(a) Gestational Age (weeks)




(b) Hospital nights, ages 1–8




(c) APGAR score < 7




(d) Severe Neonatal Morbidity



(e) Infant Mortality




(f) Under 5 mortality




Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 10. Identical group-specific estimates are plotted for the groups indicated on vertical plot axes, however for alternative measures of child health not documented in Figure 10.

Figure A7: Reform Heterogeneity – Additional Parental Outcomes



Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 10. Identical group-specific estimates are plotted for the groups indicated on vertical plot axes, however for alternative measures of child health not documented in Figure 10.

Figure A8: Labour Market Dynamics of Twin and Singleton Births at Higher-order Births (IVF and non-IVF births)




A21

Notes: Refer to notes to Figure 11. Identical plots are displayed, however here instead of estimating impacts of first births (as per main specifications of Kleven et al. (2019b)), only second or higher-order births are considered. All other details follow those noted in Figure 11.


B Descriptive Plots and Trends in Principal Outcome Measures by IVF Status

Figure B1: Maternal Age




Notes: Annual trends in twin pregnancies are presented for conceptions with and without IVF treatment. Data are obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry (microdata records). The vertical line indicates the year of the SET reform.

Figure B2: ART treatments




Notes: Data are obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry, presenting trends in different classes of recorder ART treatments. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform.

Figure B3: Trends in fertility outcomes




A23

Notes: Summary plots are based on microdata obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry covering the principal estimation sample from the paper, documenting raw averages in fertility outcomes by IVF status over time. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform.

Figure B4: Trends neonatal and child health outcomes


Notes: Summary plots are based on microdata obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry covering the principal estimation sample from the paper, documenting raw averages in outcomes by a child's conception status (IVF or non-IVF) over time. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform.

Figure B5: Trends in maternal health measures



Notes: Summary plots are based on microdata obtained from the Swedish Medical Birth Registry and the Swedish National Patient Registry covering the principal estimation sample of the paper, documenting raw averages in outcomes by IVF status over time. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform.

Figure B6: Trends in labour market outcomes



Notes: Summary plots are based on microdata obtained from the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labor market studies covering the principal estimation sample of the paper, documenting raw averages in outcomes by parental IVF status over time. The red-vertical line represents the year of the SET reform. Wage earnings and sickness benefits refer to averages in the 9 years following birth for all parents who give birth in a given year.

C Within Mother Variation and Identification

To observe why a standard mother fixed effect model does not have good properties when we are interested in estimating the parameter on a binary interaction term, consider the simplified model laid out below. We present this analysis in terms of first differences rather than mother fixed effects as it simplifies the underlying variation (all variation is binary), however these results hold in the case of mother fixed effects, as the identical underlying variation just needs to be considered in terms of deviations from the mean in each of the dependent variables, and scaled accordingly. The first differences model can be written:

$$(y_i - y_j) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(IVF_i - IVF_j) + \beta_2(IVF \cdot SET_i - IVF \cdot SET_j) + \mathbf{X}'\gamma + (\varepsilon_i - \varepsilon_j),$$

where y_i and y_j refer to outcomes following a mother's child i and j respectively, IVF_i and IVF_j refer to the mother's IVF status on each birth (1 if IVF, 0 if not), and $IVF \cdot SET$ refers to the binary IVF variable interacted with SET, a measure taking 1 if the birth is in the post-SET period, and 0 if it is in the pre-SET period. The vector \mathbf{X} includes controls including year of birth fixed effects. To fix ideas below we will consider a mother with 2 births, and will consider y as her outcome in the years following the birth.

The parameter β_1 has a standard panel interpretation, which we discuss before passing on to the problematic parameter β_2 . Formally, $\beta_1 \equiv \frac{\partial(y_i - y_j)}{\partial(IVF_i - IVF_j)}$, which in the case of binary variables can be simplified to⁵²:

$$\beta_1 \equiv E[(y_i - y_j)|(IVF_i - IVF_j) = 1] - E[(y_i - y_j)|(IVF_i - IVF_j) = 0], \quad (4)$$

which is precisely what we wish to capture in the mother panel regression. In words, if y refers to the mother's salary, this is the salary change for mothers who have one IVF birth and one non-IVF birth (and hence for whom $IVF_i - IVF_j = 1$), compared to those who had two births of the same type (IVF or non-IVF), and hence for whom $(IVF_i - IVF_j) = 0$.

However, now consider the parameter β_2 . This will similarly capture the mean differences in outcomes for mothers who have within birth variation in the dependent variable ($IVF \cdot SET_i - IVF \cdot SET_j$), compared to mothers who do not have variation in this variable. To see that this is problematic as it includes a number of undesired comparisons, we lay out all the potential birth combinations based on IVF and SET below. Combinations in red are combinations for which $(IVF \cdot SET_i - IVF \cdot SET_j)$ equals zero, while combinations in green are those for which

⁵²Strictly speaking, the below assumes that $IVF_i - IVF_j$ can only take the values of 0 or 1. In practice, it can also take the value of -1 (when $IVF_i = 0$ and $IVF_j = 1$). However, the model can always be re-written such that the IVF birth is listed first on both sides, in which case the restriction to values of 0 and 1 for the first difference just simplifies exposition without losing generality.

$(IVF \cdot SET_i - IVF \cdot SET_j)$ equals 1.⁵³

| | Birth 1 | Birth 2 |
|-----|------------------|------------------|
| 1. | IVF = 0, SET = 0 | IVF = 0, SET = 0 |
| 2. | IVF = 0, SET = 0 | IVF = 1, SET = 0 |
| 3. | IVF = 0, SET = 0 | IVF = 0, SET = 1 |
| 4. | IVF = 0, SET = 0 | IVF = 1, SET = 1 |
| 5. | IVF = 1, SET = 0 | IVF = 0, SET = 0 |
| 6. | IVF = 1, SET = 0 | IVF = 0, SET = 1 |
| 7. | IVF = 1, SET = 0 | IVF = 1, SET = 0 |
| 8. | IVF = 1, SET = 0 | IVF = 1, SET = 1 |
| 9. | IVF = 0, SET = 1 | IVF = 0, SET = 1 |
| 10. | IVF = 0, SET = 1 | IVF = 1, SET = 1 |
| 11. | IVF = 1, SET = 1 | IVF = 0, SET = 1 |
| 12. | IVF = 1, SET = 1 | IVF = 1, SET = 1 |

Certain combinations are ruled out, for instance, if Birth 1 occurs in the post SET period, the following birth (Birth 2) must also occur in the post SET period. The estimate for β_2 will capture a weighted average of the difference in salary changes of individuals who meet one of the combinations highlighted in green (those for whom $IVF \cdot SET$ “switches” between births), and the salary changes of individuals in the categories in red (those for whom $IVF \cdot SET$ remains constant across births).

The insight for our purposes is that mechanically adding mother fixed effects to the model as is often done will not generate meaningful estimates because certain combinations do not make sense if we wish to identify the impact of the SET reform. Consider birth schedule 11 which describes a mother who has one IVF birth post SET (and hence is subject to the SET reform), and follows this birth with a non-IVF birth (also post-SET). However, as birth 2 occurs without IVF, $IVF \cdot SET$ takes the value of 0 for this second birth, generating within-birth variation. Now if the SET reform has had a positive impact on salaries of women who have an IVF birth, we would expect the salary gain associated with birth one to persist following her second birth. Indeed, it may even be magnified following the second birth, given that her exposure to SET led to her first birth being less likely to be a twin birth and to her being less likely to have suffered complications. However, the mother fixed effect model considers the first birth ‘exposed’ to the SET reform and the second birth ‘unexposed’. Thus, if we mechanically estimate that standard mother fixed effects model in equation 4, any permanent impacts on salary observed in the second birth will actually be subtracted from the impact of the reform, rather than seen as an impact of the reform.

⁵³The same point holds as in the previous footnote. What we are concerned about here are the units with variation within $IVF \cdot SET_i$ and $IVF \cdot SET_j$ which can always be re-written such that the value of 1 is prior to the value of 0.

At a minimum, this group of individuals (an IVF followed by a non IVF birth, both post SET) should be removed from the sample in mother fixed effect models. However, even if this group is removed from the sample, the baseline group for which $IVF \cdot SET$ is constant across the two births is very heterogeneous, with 8 different birth profiles (indicated in red above). This includes mothers who have two IVF births post SET (group 12), and as such no variation in $IVF \cdot SET$, and who hence are mechanically (in the fixed effect model) unexposed to the reform, but in practice having been exposed twice to the reform.

A more thoughtful design is to compare treated women with matched controls defined as women with similar birth profiles, but different exposures to the reform. The following matched groups consider identical birth profiles but differential exposure to SET (numbers refer to profiles in the table above):

- 10 (variation in exposure) vs. 2 (no variation in exposure). This compares salary changes of mothers who have a first non IVF birth followed by a second IVF birth. The exposed mothers give birth to both after the SET reform, while the unexposed mothers give birth to both before the SET reform.
- 8 (variation in exposure) vs. 7 (no variation in exposure). This compares salary changes of mothers who have two IVF births. The exposed mothers gives birth to one IVF birth pre SET and one IVF birth post SET, while the unexposed mother gives birth to both IVF births pre-SET.
- 4 (variation in exposure) vs. 2 (no variation in exposure). This compares salary changes of mothers who have a first non IVF birth followed by a second IVF birth. The exposed mother gives birth to the first birth pre SET and the second birth post SET, while the unexposed mother gives birth to both in the pre-SET period.

In Table C1 we estimate the mother fixed effect model, pooling only the three exposure variation groups laid out above. This allows us to capture all fixed characteristics of mothers, and compare within-mother changes in outcomes based on exposure to SET. The results broadly support the benchmark results. Post-SET, IVF using women experience significant increases in fertility, birth weight, infant survival and earnings. We no longer see statistically significant impacts for the other outcomes. However it is hard to discern whether this is because the benchmark results for these estimates are driven by selection on unobservables, or because the mother-FE estimates are estimated on a smaller, selected sample in which there simply isn't enough variation to identify all of the benchmark model effects. The former is unlikely given the other tests we present in Section 7.1. The latter seems likely given that the number of observations for this test falls from about 900,000 in the benchmark to barely 5,000.

Table C1: Within-Mother Variation in Exposure to SET

| | Matched Mother FE Sample | | | Original Estimates | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|
| | Point Estimate | Standard Error | Observations | Point Estimate | Standard Error | Observations |
| Panel A: Mother Outcomes | | | | | | |
| Mother's Earnings | 16,737*** | (3052) | 4,016 | 10,872*** | (2,061) | 893,747 |
| Mother's Sickness Benefits | -277 | (489) | 4,016 | -665*** | (207) | 893,747 |
| Father's Earnings | 3456 | (7706) | 4,014 | -2192 | (5046) | 893,793 |
| Father's Sickness Benefits | -55.68 | (371.15) | 4,020 | -166 | (205) | 893,793 |
| Twin Birth | -0.057 | (0.039) | 4,004 | -0.123*** | 0.005 | 895,336 |
| Births within 9 Years | 0.081* | (0.043) | 4,004 | 0.074*** | (0.010) | 895,336 |
| No Future Births | -0.073* | (0.038) | 4,004 | -0.072*** | (0.007) | 895,336 |
| Maternal Morbidity | -0.022 | (0.061) | 4,020 | -0.011* | (0.006) | 895,336 |
| Hospital Nights (birth) | 0.828 | (0.884) | 3,838 | -0.633*** | (0.113) | 874,814 |
| Emergency C-Section | 0.050 | (0.046) | 4,020 | -0.015** | (0.006) | 895,336 |
| Panel B: Child Outcomes | | | | | | |
| Birth weight | 114.395*** | 40.430 | 5,550 | 194.673*** | (12.043) | 905,473 |
| Gestational age | 0.151 | (0.152) | 5,624 | 0.611*** | (0.048) | 908,232 |
| Hospital Nights (0 years) | -0.168 | (0.728) | 5,528 | -1.787*** | (0.251) | 903,605 |
| Hospital Nights (1-10 yrs.) | 0.343 | (0.407) | 5,624 | -0.126 | (0.123) | 908,232 |
| APGAR <7 | -0.006 | (0.012) | 5,460 | -0.004** | (0.002) | 900,261 |
| Severe Morbidity | -0.034 | (0.024) | 5,624 | -0.031*** | (0.005) | 908,232 |
| Infant Mortality | -0.023*** | (0.008) | 5,624 | -0.001 | (0.001) | 908,232 |
| Under 5 Mortality | 0.002 | (0.004) | 5,624 | -0.001 | (0.001) | 908,232 |

Notes: Columns 1-3 report point estimates, standard errors and observation numbers for mother fixed effect models laid out in Appendix C. This consists only of matched samples with variation in exposure to SET and IVF, and consists exclusively of mother's with two births. Mother's fixed effects capture all fixed characteristics of the mother. Mother's age fixed effects and birth date controls are also included to capture age and birth spacing respectively. Standard errors are clustered by mothers. Columns 4-6 present baseline (no mother FE) models reported in the body of the paper in Tables 1-4. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

D Heterogeneity in impacts of the SET reform

See Figure 10 for key outcomes, and see Appendix Figures A6 (for child outcomes) and A7 (for parent-level outcomes) for the rest. The headline result is that the impacts of SET are fairly pervasive by markers of the demographics, health and education of women. In this section we discuss the findings.

Consistent with SET being mandated, we see a significant decline in twin births among IVF-users across the board. Consistent with women over the age of 38 being allowed exemption, the decline is smaller in this group and this age gradient also reflects in smaller declines for women at parity 3 or higher (as these women are on average older). There are no significant differences in the decline across the other ages, or across education or BMI groups. If anything other than SET were driving the decline in twin births, it seems unlikely that it would drive a similar decline across these categories. The post-SET increase in subsequent fertility among IVF-users is entirely driven by women at first parity. It is otherwise similar across groups with the exception of women with primary education, who display no change.⁵⁴

The increase in birth weight and gestational age and the fall in the number of nights the child spends in hospital in the first year are across the board and of broadly similar magnitude, consistent with these indicators directly reflecting twinning. The absolute increase tends to be largest for women with tertiary education, consistent with baseline twin birth rates being higher among more educated women (Bhalotra and Clarke, 2019).⁵⁵ The overall improvement in the APGAR score is significant only for women age 25-29, with primary education and BMI at or below normal. The reduction in severe neonatal morbidity is driven by women at parity one and women age 25-34 but is pervasive across education and BMI groups. The average treatment effects were small and insignificant for child nights in hospital between the ages of 1 and 8 years, infant mortality and under-5 mortality. Breaking this down, we see no significant decline in hospital nights in any subgroup but we do see a decline in infant mortality among women with BMI at or below the normal threshold, and a decline in under-5 mortality for women at second parity and for women classified as obese.

Turning to maternal health, there is an across-the-board reduction in the number of nights women spend in hospital after birth, with the exception of the low-frequency groups of higher parity women and young (under 25) women. The largest drop is for less educated women, possibly reflecting that their baseline health is less robust. Emergency C-section rates and maternal morbid-

⁵⁴This is not in line with the commonly observed negative association of fertility with education. Noting this sort of difference is potentially relevant for future research but, without further analysis, we can only speculate that it may reflect that women with primary education are less likely to be in stable partnerships and hence less likely to be in a position to continue fertility. They are a small fraction of the treated (IVF) group.

⁵⁵Birth weight increases in every group while gestational age and hospital nights do not improve for women at high parity (order 3 or higher) and women under 25.

ity are correlated with hospital nights, but they exhibit more variation.⁵⁶ Sickness benefits paid to the mother decline across the board but are not statistically significant at high parity, among obese women, or among women at the two ends of the age distribution. Changes in sickness benefits paid to the father are also examined by mother characteristics (following consistent heterogeneity classifications across all outcomes). There was no average impact but, breaking this down, we see a decrease for partners of overweight women and women with secondary education, and an increase for the very small fraction of IVF-women at high parity.

The increase in women's wage earnings is pervasive across education and BMI group and evident at birth orders 1 and 2 (which cover the majority of IVF users) but only statistically significant for women age 35-38 (who are 30% of all IVF women), while being positive, but with CIs overlapping 0 at other ages. Wage earnings for fathers show no significant change in any subgroup, consistent with the averaged results discussed earlier.

⁵⁶In considering this variation we note that heterogeneity will imply that the maternal morbidity index is a noisy sum over several component indicators, and that these three indicators of maternal health are all potentially influenced by hospital capacity and hospital policy. For all of these reasons we do not expect impacts as uniform as for indicators like fertility and birth weight. These are the patterns we see: The decline in C-section rates is most notable among women at first parity, age 25-34, low-BMI and with primary education. The decline in maternal morbidity is driven by women at first parity, age 30-34, with tertiary education— Table 1a shows that these are the modal IVF women in the case of both parity and educational level, so the decline impacts the majority of IVF users.

E Social costs and benefits of the SET reform

In this section we provide a crude estimate of the social costs and benefits of the SET reform to gain a broad sense of the relative magnitudes. This is no more than a simple back-of-the-envelope-analysis. We focus on hospital and labour market costs and benefits. We assess costs of SET vs DET. We then assess benefits in terms of cost savings to the health care budget stemming from reduced hospital nights after birth and fewer emergency C-sections, and labor market gains arising from the improved health of IVF using mothers and their children. We ignore the utility gain from improved health among both mothers and children and we ignore any general equilibrium effects associated with the labour market gains.

1. Costs to the health care sector.

a. There is a potential for an increase in the number of IVF treatments a woman undertakes after SET, since there is a higher probability that the treatment is successful in one cycle when using a double embryo transfer (DET). While the studies we quote in Section 2 find no significant difference in success rates of SET vs DET, this allows for an additional cycle with SET that involves the implantation of an additional frozen embryo. Large RCTs suggest the likelihood of live birth following SET is 27% compared to 42% in DET, but this value rises to 38% if a second transfer is then conducted (Thurin et al., 2004).⁵⁷ The public purse funds up to 3 cycles of IVF. A rough estimate of the increase in embryo transfers due to second round SETs is 42 minus 27% which gives 15%.⁵⁸ The internal cost of a SET IVF treatment is according to the Swedish health care authorities 30,100 SEK (about 3,209 US\$). Since the number of IVF transfers completed following the reform was 71,687, around 70% of which were SET, this suggests a rough differential in future embryo transfers of $71,687 \cdot 0.7 \cdot 0.15 = 7,527$. Based on the reference price for a SET procedure, this suggests that a cost increase of $30,100 \cdot 7,527 = 226$ million SEK (24 million US\$).

Since the Swedish health care sector is financed by taxes, we also have to consider the social costs of raising the taxes to finance these additional costs – the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF). According to Kleven and Kreiner (2003), these costs are 1.73 for Sweden. This means that the cost increase on 226 million SEK should be multiplied by 1.73, i.e., 391 million SEK (41.5 million US\$).

b. Our results suggest several health improvements for mothers and children that may result in cost savings to the health care sector as a result of the SET reform. We find that the SET reform led to IVF mothers spending 0.633 fewer nights in hospital after birth. Since the cost of a hospital night in Sweden is on average 5,200 SEK (554 US\$) this implies a cost reduction on 3,292 SEK per IVF mother.

⁵⁷The success rates of 38% and 42% are not statistically significantly different.

⁵⁸This assumes that individuals who initiated a DET cycle but did not conceive are also likely to undergo additional IVF cycles, such that the marginal change owes to the differential efficiency of SET versus SET in the first fresh embryo transfer.

Our results also suggest a 1.5 pp reduction in the probability of emergency C-sections. Since the cost difference between a vaginal delivery and an emergency C-section is 33,874 SEK (3,611 US\$) there is a 508 SEK cost reduction per IVF delivery as a result of the reform.

The number of IVF deliveries after the reform for the period under study was 11,739, there is thus an overall cost reduction of 44.6 million SEK. Again considering the Marginal costs of public funds, this means that the true social cost of the additional care is 77.2 million SEK (8.2 million US\$).

c. We find significant effects of the SET reform on child health, including measures of birth weight, hospital nights and severe neonatal morbidity. The only measure that is easily transferable to costs for the health care sector is hospital nights. Recognizing that we under-estimate the short term cost-savings arising from child health benefits, we compute the savings associated with fewer hospital nights. The point estimate is an average reduction of 1.787 per IVF birth implying a cost of 9,292 SEK ($1.787 \times 5,200$ SEK, or 991 US\$) per born child, or an aggregate cost on 123.3 million SEK ($9,292 \times 13,265$ SEK, or 13.1 million US\$). This implies a social cost on 213,3 million SEK (22.7 million US\$).

2. Mother's labor supply after birth.

We estimate a significant increase in labor earnings of IVF mothers giving birth after the SET reform. The point estimate suggests an average annual increase of 10,872 SEK (1,159 US\$) for the nine years following giving birth. This estimate suggests an increase of 86,976 SEK (9,272 US\$) per woman having an IVF birth during the period under study, or an aggregate effect on 1,154 million SEK (123 million US\$). The event study plot shows that the SET-led earnings increase among IVF-women is persistent.

The social costs of SET include the cost of raising tax revenues to finance income support programs for women undertaking IVF. Again, we use the marginal cost of public funds obtained from Kleven and Kreiner (2003) of 1.787. Our estimates indicate that IVF women claim lower sickness insurance benefits by an average of 665 SEK per year. We multiply this through the 9 years for which we observe women after birth. The total savings per women amount to 5,320 SEK, implying an aggregate saving of 62,6 million SEK (6,7 million US\$). To get the additional social cost, and avoiding double counting, this number is multiplied by 0.73, to give 45.7 million SEK (4,9 million US\$).

3. Long-term labor market effects from improved child health.

There is a large literature linking adverse health at birth to future labor market outcomes of the children. Using data on twins, Black et al. (2007) estimate a causal effect of birth weight on future earnings of the child. Their point estimate suggests that a 10 percent increase in birth weight increases average earnings by 1 percent. Our estimate is that SET results in a 6.1 percent increase in birth weight. Since the average annual earnings in Sweden are 433,200 SEK, this suggest an annual

increase in earnings of 2,642 SEK (282 US\$). Assuming a 40 year career and, as an approximation, assuming that wage growth and the discount rate cancel one another out exactly, we estimate an effect on individual life time earnings amounting to 105,701 SEK and an aggregate effect of 1,402 million SEK (149 million US\$).

Taken together, according to our estimates, the SET reform implied a short-term fiscal cost on 58.1 million SEK (6.6 million US\$) for the health care sector. Considering the Marginal cost of public funds (MCF), this corresponds to a cost to the society on 100.5 million SEK (11.7 US\$). However, our calculation shows a medium and long-term 25 times as large *surplus* on 2,501 million SEK (290.8 US\$), when also considering increases in women's earnings and averted benefit payments in the medium run and from child labor market returns in the long run.

F Measurement of IVF usage

A number of methodologies exist to consider mis-reporting of treatment variables (Horowitz and Manski, 1995), or selection into treatment (Lee, 2009; Alderman et al., 2011). The case we are concerned with is relatively simple, as we are concerned only with a mis-classification of treated units to be included as part of the control group. Given our application, in general, we are likely to under-estimate the effect size by a small amount. To see why, we provide some simple algebra considering the difference between a DiD estimator where all treated units are correctly classified: $\hat{\beta}_1$, and an estimator where some portion of treated units are mis-classified as controls $\hat{\tilde{\beta}}_1$. These estimators can, respectively, be written as:

$$\hat{\beta}_1 = (\bar{Y}_{T1} - \bar{Y}_{C1}) - (\bar{Y}_{T0} - \bar{Y}_{C0}),$$

where \bar{Y}_{T1} refers to average outcomes among treated following treatment, \bar{Y}_{C1} refers to average outcomes among controls following treatment, and \bar{Y}_{T0} and \bar{Y}_{C0} are the same values prior to treatment. The biased estimator, on the other hand, is:

$$\hat{\tilde{\beta}}_1 = (\bar{Y}_{T1} - \bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C1}) - (\bar{Y}_{T0} - \bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C0}),$$

where now $\bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C1}$ includes a small portion of the incorrectly classified treated units, and similarly for $\bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C0}$. In particular,

$$\bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C1} = \frac{T_{C1}}{T_{C1} + T_{mc^1}} \bar{Y}_{C1} + \frac{T_{mc^1}}{T_{C1} + T_{mc^1}} \bar{Y}_{T1}.$$

Here T_{C1} refers to the total number of control units in period 1, and T_{mc^1} refers to the total number of mis-classified treated units included as controls following treatments. A similar value is defined for $\bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C0}$. It is worth noting here that $\bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C1}$ will equal the true value \bar{Y}_{C1} in two circumstances: either if T_{mc^1} is zero (and there is no mis-classification), or if $\bar{Y}_{C1} = \bar{Y}_{T1}$ and so mis-classification does not matter. Now, we can calculate the bias in the diff-in-diff estimate as the difference between the true value $\hat{\beta}_1$ and the observed value with misclassification $\hat{\tilde{\beta}}_1$. This is calculated as:

$$\begin{aligned} Bias(\hat{\beta}_1) &= \hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\tilde{\beta}}_1 = (\bar{Y}_{C1} - \bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C1}) - (\bar{Y}_{C0} - \bar{\tilde{Y}}_{C0}) \\ &= \left(\frac{T_{C1}}{T_{C1} + T_{mc^1}} \bar{Y}_{C1} + \frac{T_{mc^1}}{T_{C1} + T_{mc^1}} \bar{Y}_{T1} - \bar{Y}_{C1} \right) - \\ &\quad \left(\frac{T_{C0}}{T_{C0} + T_{mc^0}} \bar{Y}_{C0} + \frac{T_{mc^0}}{T_{C0} + T_{mc^0}} \bar{Y}_{T0} - \bar{Y}_{C0} \right) \\ &= \left(\frac{T_{mc^1}}{T_{C1} + T_{mc^1}} \bar{Y}_{T1} - \frac{T_{mc^1}}{T_{C1} + T_{mc^1}} \bar{Y}_{C1} \right) - \\ &\quad \left(\frac{T_{mc^0}}{T_{C0} + T_{mc^0}} \bar{Y}_{T0} - \frac{T_{mc^0}}{T_{C0} + T_{mc^0}} \bar{Y}_{C0} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

If we are further willing to assume that the misclassification of treatment units is constant over time (in our setting, that IVF births are constantly under-reported by 30%), this can be further simplified to:

$$Bias(\hat{\beta}_1) = \frac{T_{mc}}{T_C + T_{mc}} [(\bar{Y}_{T1} - \bar{Y}_{C1}) - (\bar{Y}_{T0} - \bar{Y}_{C0})]. \quad (6)$$

This simple bias formula thus suggests that mis-classification will bias the estimate by the true diff-in-diff estimate, scaled by a parameter capturing the degree of mis-classification of the control group. In our case, given that this proportion $\frac{T_{mc}}{T_C + T_{mc}}$ is small, biases in estimates will also be small. And indeed, we can provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of this bias using the observed values in the data. Assuming that the proportion of mis-classified IVF births is constant over time, we have that $\frac{T_{mc}}{T_C + T_{mc}} = \frac{9,507}{932,822} = 0.0102$. Now, for the case of birth weight, we can approximate the bias using values from the data as:

$$\begin{aligned} Bias(\hat{\beta}_1^{BW}) &= \frac{T_{mc}}{T_C + T_{mc}} [(\bar{Y}_{T1} - \bar{Y}_{C1}) - (\bar{Y}_{T0} - \bar{Y}_{C0})] \\ &= 0.0102 \times [(3200 - 3550) - (3400 - 3530)] = -2.244 \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

In this case, we estimate that the bias in the estimate of SET is likely to be around 2 or 3 grams. When compared to the original estimate from Table 2 of 194.6 grams, we see that this suggests a (relatively) quite small attenuation of estimated effects.