CAGE

Working Paper

809/2026
June 2026

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ISSN: 2978-0276
Grant number: ES/7504701/1

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

UKRI Economic and Social Research Council

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05/06/2026

Abstract

Democracies can sustain disagreement over outcomes, but they are harder to sustain when citizens also perceive the governing norms of political contestation as settled along partisan lines. We study this problem in the context of Brexit and experimentally vary truthful information about how much Leave and Remain supporters agree with, and how uncertain they are about, the appropriateness of a second referendum. We find that uncertainty matters more than agreement: respondents become more willing to donate to and tweet for campaigns on either side of the referendum question when they learn that others, especially members of their own political camp, are more uncertain about the norm. The pattern is strongest for support for the norm position that is less popular within one's own political camp, while private beliefs about the norm and about Brexit itself barely move. These findings are more consistent with reduced conformity pressure and higher perceived returns to political expression than with private-belief updating, and they suggest that information about uncertainty can generate a meaningful form of depolarization in democratic engagement even when underlying outcome preferences remain largely unchanged.

JEL Classification: D81, D83 P11
Keywords: Uncertainty, Norms, Social Image, Political Participation

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1 Introduction

Democracies can absorb disagreement over outcomes, but they are more fragile when citizens also believe that their political camp is unified on the norms governing contestation. In many settings, people may privately hold cross-cutting views on democratic norms while remaining reluctant to express them publicly if they perceive their own side as settled and certain. Polls usually report support levels, but rarely the uncertainty people attach to those views. That omission matters if social pressure operates through perceived certainty rather than through majority support alone (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2016; Bursztyn and Yang, 2022; Bursztyn et al., 2023a).

This paper studies whether information about uncertainty over a contested democratic norm changes political expression. We focus on Brexit because the setting sharply separates outcome preferences from norm views. A respondent could prefer that the United Kingdom leave the European Union while still believing that a second referendum was appropriate, or prefer to remain while believing that another referendum would violate democratic norms. Our question is therefore narrow and concrete: does information about how uncertain others are over the appropriateness of a second referendum make respondents more willing to express cross-cutting norm views? We also ask whether such information matters especially when it concerns members of respondents' own political camp rather than the opposing camp. Throughout, we use the term depolarization in this narrow sense: reduced camp-line polarization in political expression around a contested democratic norm.

We answer these questions with an online experiment fielded in November 2019, just before the general election that settled the immediate political fate of Brexit. We recruit 4,295 respondents broadly representative of the UK population and elicit beliefs about the share of Leave and Remain supporters who agree with, and are uncertain about, the appropriateness of a second referendum. We then randomize truthful information on these quantities using values generated in a pilot survey with 644 respondents. The treatment varies both agreement and uncertainty, and it does so separately for respondents' own political camp and the opposing camp. After the information treatment, we measure willingness to donate to and tweet for campaigns on either side of the referendum question, vote intentions, private beliefs about the norm, and a set of post-treatment mechanism outcomes.

Three findings stand out. First, uncertainty matters more than agreement. Respondents become more willing to campaign when they learn that others are uncertain about the norm, while information about agreement with the norm has little effect on political expression. Second, own-camp uncertainty matters most. The main behavioral effects are strongest when respondents learn that members of their own political camp are uncertain. Third, the behavioral response takes a specific form: Leave supporters become more willing to support the pro-referendum side

when other Leavers appear uncertain, while Remain supporters become more willing to support the anti-referendum side when other Remainers appear uncertain. In other words, uncertainty increases support for the norm position that is less popular within one's own political camp.

Private beliefs move much less than expressive behavior. Respondents update their beliefs about what others think, but we find little change in their own assessments of whether a second referendum is appropriate, in their own support for another referendum, or in their beliefs about the consequences of Brexit. By contrast, respondents report lower perceived reputational costs of deviating from their camp's apparent line and higher perceived effectiveness of public campaigning. The evidence is therefore more consistent with reduced conformity pressure and strategic expression than with private-belief updating. In that sense, the paper speaks to depolarization in democratic engagement more than to depolarization in private beliefs.

These results speak to three literatures. Relative to work on social norms and political behavior (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Krupka and Weber, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2016; Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017, 2015; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2017; Bénabou et al., 2018; Bénabou and Tirole, 2026; Karing, 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2020a,b; Ali and Bénabou, 2020; Andreoni et al., 2021; Bursztyn and Yang, 2022; Bursztyn et al., 2022, 2023a; Hager et al., 2025), we show that uncertainty over a norm can matter independently of support levels. Relative to work on political participation and peer effects (DellaVigna et al., 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2018; Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017; Perez-Truglia, 2018; Cantoni et al., 2019; Enikolopov et al., 2020; Manacorda and Tesei, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2021; Hager et al., 2022a,b, 2023), we show that beliefs about uncertainty within one's own political camp are especially behaviorally important. Relative to work on media and information interventions (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Bursztyn et al., 2019; Barrera et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2020; Chopra et al., 2022; Galasso et al., 2022; Bursztyn et al., 2023b), we show that truthful information about uncertainty can shift expression even when private convictions barely move.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the Brexit setting, the pilot-based treatment construction, and the empirical design. Section 3 shows that uncertainty, rather than agreement, drives the main behavioral effects and that these effects are strongest for uncertainty within respondents' own political camp. Section 4 assesses whether the evidence is more consistent with private-belief updating, social-image channels, or changing perceived returns to political action. Section 5 discusses scope conditions and limitations, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Empirical Design

2.1 Institutional Context

Brexit provides a setting in which outcome preferences and norm views were tightly linked, but not identical. After the June 23, 2016 referendum delivered a narrow majority for Leave, public debate quickly split along two distinct questions: whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union, and whether it would be democratically appropriate to hold another referendum once the terms of withdrawal were known. These are analytically different questions. A citizen could favor Leave while believing that another vote was appropriate, or favor Remain while believing that the 2016 result should stand.

The setting also sits inside a broader empirical literature on the social bases and consequences of the Brexit vote. Prior work shows that Leave support was strongly associated with socioeconomic distress and austerity exposure, and that the economic costs of the vote were unevenly distributed across UK regions (Alabrese et al., 2019; Fetzer, 2019; Fetzer and Wang, 2020). That broader context matters here because it helps explain why Brexit combined durable outcome cleavages with continuing disagreement over the democratic procedure that ought to govern the issue.

Both sides framed their position in the language of democratic principle. Supporters of a new referendum argued that the electorate had voted without full information about the eventual withdrawal agreement and that democratic legitimacy required another vote on the final terms. Opponents argued that reopening the question would itself violate democratic norms by disregarding the result of a legitimate popular vote. The disagreement was therefore not only over Brexit as an outcome, but also over the democratic procedure that should govern the issue.

By late 2019 this norm question had become politically salient and institutionally unresolved. Theresa May's withdrawal agreement had failed repeatedly in Parliament, Boris Johnson had called a general election for December 12, 2019, and the major parties adopted clearly differentiated positions. Conservatives and the Brexit Party opposed another referendum, Labour backed a renegotiation followed by a referendum, and the Liberal Democrats backed Remain without another vote. Campaigns such as "People's Vote" and "Better Off Out" made the norm question highly visible in public debate.

What makes this setting especially useful for our purposes is that both disagreement and uncertainty were plausible. The referendum result was narrow, the subsequent political process was prolonged and conflictual, and both sides appealed to democratic principle. At the time of our experiment, respondents therefore faced a norm that was publicly contested, politically salient, and not obviously settled within either camp. This setting allows us to study views on a democratic norm separately from preferred political outcomes, in a context where both were salient and publicly contested.

2.2 Experimental Design

We field the experiment in November 2019, before the general election that resolved the immediate question of whether another referendum would occur. We run two surveys with Luc.id (now part of Cint) using samples targeted to be representative of the UK population in age, gender, region, and income. The pilot survey contains 644 respondents and generates the truthful values used in the information treatment. The main survey contains 4,295 respondents and measures how those information treatments affect political expression, private beliefs, and related perceptions.[1] The key feature of the design is simple: respondents receive truthful information, but the truthful values differ because the pilot elicited the same underlying norm views using different response scales.

Figure 1 Survey Design Schematic

Pilot survey	→	**Two elicitation scales**	→	**Truthful high/low values**	→	**Main survey**
644 respondents report whether a second referendum is appropriate and how uncertain they are about that view.		Respondents are randomly assigned to a coarse 2-point scale or a detailed 5-point Likert scale.		The two scales generate different truthful shares for agreement and uncertainty among Leave and Remain supporters.		Respondents state priors, receive randomized truthful information, and then report campaigning, vote intentions, private beliefs, and mechanism outcomes.

Pilot survey. The pilot establishes the informational objects used in the experiment. After basic demographics and political background questions, we ask respondents whether "having a second referendum on Brexit is appropriate" and how uncertain they are about that view. Half of the pilot sample answers on a detailed 5-point Likert scale and half on a coarse 2-point scale. This scale variation matters because it generates different truthful shares of respondents who count as agreeing with the norm and as being very uncertain about it. In the detailed-scale arm, 3%

[1] The questionnaires for both surveys are available at https://hannahzille.github.io/hannahzillessen.com/Pre_survey.pdf and https://hannahzille.github.io/hannahzillessen.com/Brexit_main.pdf.

Table 1 Treatment Overview

	Leavers		Remainers	
	Agreement	Uncertainty	Agreement	Uncertainty
High Level	15%	41%	91%	25%
Low Level	3%	14%	50%	3%

of Leavers agree with the appropriateness of a second referendum and 14% report being very uncertain; among Remainers, the corresponding figures are 50% and 3%. In the coarse-scale arm, the corresponding shares are 15% and 41% for Leavers, and 91% and 25% for Remainers. These are all truthful descriptions of pilot responses. One notable descriptive feature is that reported uncertainty is higher among Leavers than among Remainers in both elicitation arms. Our treatment variation therefore exploits truthful differences in reported shares generated by alternative elicitation scales in the pilot survey.

Main survey. The main survey has three stages. First, we collect demographics and political background, including respondents' 2016 referendum vote, current Brexit stance, party proximity, political attention, and the share of their reference group they believe supports Leave. Second, we elicit priors about norm views: respondents estimate the share of Leave supporters and the share of Remain supporters who think a second referendum is appropriate, and the share in each camp who are very uncertain about that view. We randomize whether questions about Leave or Remain supporters are asked first.

Third, respondents receive the information treatment. Every respondent sees two treatment screens, one about Leave supporters and one about Remain supporters, each reminding them of their prior and then revealing the corresponding truthful pilot-survey values. Respondents do not all see the same numbers. For each camp, agreement and uncertainty can each take a high or low truthful value drawn from the pilot survey. We therefore cross-randomize four pieces of information: agreement among Leave supporters, uncertainty among Leave supporters, agreement among Remain supporters, and uncertainty among Remain supporters. Figure 2 in the Appendix shows an example treatment screen.

In the final stage, we measure outcomes. We first ask about support for a second referendum and certainty about that support, which lets us distinguish private outcome preferences from views about the appropriateness of the norm. We then introduce the "People's Vote" and "Better Off Out" campaigns and ask whether respondents would like us to donate one pound to either campaign on their behalf, with one in three choices implemented. We also measure willingness to publicly express a position by asking whether respondents want to tweet in support of or opposition to a second referendum and by recording whether they click the corresponding sharing link. These donation and Twitter measures capture expressed political activity in the survey

context. We additionally collect vote intentions for the upcoming general election and for a hypothetical second referendum. Finally, we elicit manipulation checks and mechanism outcomes covering perceived support for Brexit, beliefs about the consequences of Brexit, perceived social reactions to public campaigning, and perceived effectiveness of political action.

2.3 Data

Sample. Table 2 displays summary statistics for the main survey sample. Our sample is demographically in line with the overall UK population. 45% of respondents are in full-time employment and 5% are students. However, there are slightly more Remain supporters in our data set compared to the general population in December 2019. 55% of respondents support remaining in the European Union while only 45% voted to remain in the 2016 referendum. Table 3 shows that pre-determined characteristics are balanced between treatment arms, suggesting that the randomisation worked as intended.

Treatment Variables. The treatment indicators map directly into the four randomized informational objects. "High Level Remain" and "High Level Leave" equal one when respondents see the higher truthful agreement share for Remain or Leave supporters. "High Uncertainty Remain" and "High Uncertainty Leave" are defined analogously for uncertainty. From these four indicators we form three complementary sets of treatments. First, "High Level Pooled" and "High Uncertainty Pooled" capture whether respondents see the high value for both political camps. Second, "High Level Own" and "High Uncertainty Own" capture whether respondents see the high value for members of their own political camp. Third, "High Level Other" and "High Uncertainty Other" capture whether respondents see the high value for the opposing political camp. This own-camp versus opposing-camp distinction is central to the paper because it lets us test whether conformity pressure is more sensitive to beliefs about politically aligned others than to beliefs about political opponents.

Table 2 Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
Pre-determined variables						
Female	0.49	0.50	0.00	0	1	4295
Age	3.40	1.57	3.00	1	6	4295
Some Tertiary Education	0.42	0.49	0.00	0	1	4295
Employed FT	0.45	0.50	0.00	0	1	4295
Student	0.05	0.22	0.00	0	1	4295
Voted Remain in 2016	0.45	0.50	0.00	0	1	4275
Voted Leave in 2016	0.39	0.49	0.00	0	1	4275
Support Remain Now	0.55	0.50	1.00	0	1	4255
Prior: Remain, Level	65.64	24.31	70.00	0	100	4179
Prior: Remain, Uncert	37.55	25.15	35.00	0	100	4179
Prior: Leave, Level	28.91	25.17	20.00	0	100	4182
Prior: Leave, Uncert	35.15	26.01	30.00	0	100	4182
Outcomes						
Donate Pro Ref	0.36	0.48	0.00	0	1	4116
Donate Anti Ref	0.30	0.46	0.00	0	1	4118
Tweet Pro Ref	0.05	0.22	0.00	0	1	1977
Tweet Anti Ref	0.03	0.18	0.00	0	1	1977
Private Support	0.53	0.50	1.00	0	1	4139
Private Uncert	1.96	1.24	1.00	1	6	4139

Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for the full sample of the main survey. The sampling is described in section 2.2. The first panel shows the pre-determined variables, while the second panel shows the outcomes. Column one shows the mean of each variable, column two its standard deviation, column three the median, columns four and five the minimum and maximum value the variable can take, and column six the number of observations available for each.

Outcome Variables. Our primary outcomes capture political expression rather than deep preference change. We focus on willingness to donate to the "People's Vote" or "Better Off Out" campaigns and willingness to tweet in support of or opposition to a second referendum.[2][3] These outcomes are followed by vote intentions and by a set of belief-based mechanism measures discussed in Section 4. Throughout the paper, we distinguish carefully between support for Brexit

[2]We focus on participants' willingness to donate at all, i.e. publicly or privately in the main body of the paper. Our research design allows us to distinguish between public and private donations, but the results do not appear to be driven by either dimension specifically.

[3]We focus on respondents actually clicking the share link rather than only stating that they would be willing to do so. Both measures yield qualitatively similar results.

as an outcome, support for a second referendum as an outcome, and beliefs about whether a second referendum is appropriate as a democratic norm.

Table 3 Balance Between Treatment Arms

	Mean Outcomes				P-Value
	High Level Remain	High Uncert Remain	High Level Leave	High Uncert Leave	
Pre-determined variables					
Female	0.488	0.499	0.490	0.488	0.721
Age	3.407	3.416	3.403	3.382	0.882
Tertiary Education	0.418	0.423	0.421	0.419	0.990
Employed FT	0.456	0.454	0.446	0.448	0.806
Student	0.052	0.046	0.055	0.055	0.300
Voted Remain in 2016	0.440	0.451	0.437	0.445	0.183
Voted Leave in 2016	0.402	0.393	0.405	0.390	0.335
Support Remain Now	0.533	0.551	0.539	0.545	0.216
Prior: Remain, Level	64.887	65.035	65.709	65.456	0.149
Prior: Remain, Uncert	38.190	37.462	38.015	38.080	0.175
Prior: Leave, Level	28.339	29.595	29.488	28.985	0.112
Prior: Leave, Uncert	35.070	35.592	36.248	35.374	0.060

Notes: This table displays balance statistics for the full sample of the main survey. The sampling is described in section 2.2. Columns one to four show the mean of each pre-determined variable for each of the four treatments. Column five shows the p-value based on a test of joint insignificance of the four treatment dummies used in specification 3.

2.4 Empirical Strategy

Reduced Form Regressions. We use three pre-specified reduced-form specifications to study whether information about agreement with, and uncertainty over, the appropriateness of a second referendum affects political expression and related beliefs.[4] The specifications are designed to answer three separate questions: does uncertainty matter more than agreement on average, does own-camp information matter more than opposing-camp information, and which side of the norm conflict becomes more likely to be expressed?

First, we estimate whether high agreement and high uncertainty, when shown for both political camps, change outcomes on average:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{HighLev}_{pooled,i} + \beta_2 \text{HighUnc}_{pooled,i} + \phi X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_i denotes the outcome of interest and X_i is a vector of controls. We control for gender, age, employment status, education, frequency of consuming news and talking about politics, vote in the 2016 referendum, current Brexit stance and associated uncertainty, region of residence, and the share of respondents' reference group supporting Brexit. Because treatment is

[4]The full pre-analysis plan can be found in the AEA RCT Registry under https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5132-1.0.

randomized, these controls are not needed for identification and serve only to improve precision. $\text{HighLev}_{pooled,i}$ indicates that respondents saw the high agreement value for both camps, and $\text{HighUnc}_{pooled,i}$ indicates that they saw the high uncertainty value for both camps. The omitted category is the set of respondents who saw the lower value on both dimensions for both groups. This specification therefore asks whether uncertainty, rather than agreement, shifts outcomes on average.

Second, we estimate whether respondents react differently to information about their own political camp and the opposing political camp:

$$Y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{HighLev}_{own,i} + \gamma_2 \text{HighUnc}_{own,i} + \gamma_3 \text{HighLev}_{other,i} + \gamma_4 \text{HighUnc}_{other,i} + \phi X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $\text{HighLev}_{own,i}$ and $\text{HighUnc}_{own,i}$ indicate that respondents saw the high agreement or uncertainty value for members of their own political camp, while $\text{HighLev}_{other,i}$ and $\text{HighUnc}_{other,i}$ capture the same for the opposing camp. This specification is useful because it maps directly into a conformity account: if respondents care primarily about deviating from politically aligned others, own-camp uncertainty should matter more than opposing-camp uncertainty.

Third, we estimate which specific campaign positions become more likely to be expressed:

$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{HighLev}_{leave,i} + \delta_2 \text{HighUnc}_{leave,i} + \delta_3 \text{HighLev}_{remain,i} + \delta_4 \text{HighUnc}_{remain,i} + \phi X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where the treatment indicators now refer directly to whether respondents saw the high agreement or uncertainty value for Leave supporters or Remain supporters, irrespective of the respondents' own stance. We estimate this specification separately for Leave and Remain supporters for the main behavioral outcomes. It lets us test the paper's most important asymmetry: whether respondents become more willing to support the norm position that is less popular within their own political camp.

Instrumental Variable Regressions. The reduced-form estimates identify the effect of seeing the high rather than the low truthful value. A natural refinement is to ask whether effects are concentrated among respondents whose priors are actually surpassed. Seeing that 41% of Leave supporters are uncertain may be more consequential for someone who previously guessed 10% than for someone who previously guessed 60%. To capture this idea, we define indicators for whether treatment information exceeds respondents' priors and instrument those indicators with the randomized assignment to the high-value treatment arm. This avoids the endogeneity that would arise from directly conditioning on whether respondents were surprised by the information. Specifically, we estimate the following first stage:

$$T_{higher,i} = \beta_0 + \eta T_{high,i} + \phi X_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{4}$$

where $T_{higher,i}$ indicates that the information shown exceeds the respondent's prior and $T_{high,i}$ denotes assignment to the high-value treatment in that arm. The second-stage regressions mirror specifications 1, 2, and 3, replacing the treatment indicators with the corresponding fitted values. We interpret these estimates as sharpening the reduced-form evidence by focusing on respondents whose priors are actually revised by the treatment.

3 Impact on Political Participation

This section is organized around four contrasts that recur throughout the paper: uncertainty versus agreement, own political camp versus opposing political camp, expression versus private belief, and cross-cutting norm views versus camp-consistent ones. The central question is whether respondents become more willing to express support for the norm position that is less popular within their own political camp when they learn that others are uncertain. If the main channel were persuasion about the merits of the norm itself, agreement information should matter most and private beliefs should move in parallel. If instead uncertainty relaxes conformity pressure or raises the expected return to speaking out, uncertainty should matter more than agreement and the effects should show up primarily in political expression.

3.1 Impact on Political Campaigning

Result 1. *Uncertainty, rather than agreement, drives the main behavioral effects.*

Table 4 asks the broadest question: do respondents react to agreement information or to uncertainty information when both are shown for both political camps? The answer is clear. Agreement information has little effect on donations or tweets, while uncertainty information increases willingness to donate to both campaigns by 2.8 percentage points. Relative to a baseline willingness to donate of roughly 33%, this is an increase of about 10%.

This first table is informative precisely because it does *not* show a directional shift toward one side of the referendum question. Instead, it shows more willingness to engage on either side once uncertainty is made salient. That pattern is difficult to reconcile with a simple persuasion story in which respondents infer that one norm position is correct. It is more naturally read as evidence that uncertainty changes the conditions under which political expression takes place and can produce depolarization in the sense defined above.

Table 4 Campaigning, Pooled

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
High Level	0.010	0.005	0.002	-0.007
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.009)
High Uncert	0.028*	0.028*	-0.003	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Observations	4116	4118	1977	1977
Control Mean	.3554422	.3016027	.0490642	.0343955

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of both Leavers and Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on participants' willingness to campaign. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

Result 2. *These effects are strongest when the uncertainty concerns members of respondents' own political camp.*

Table 5 separates information about respondents' own political camp from information about the opposing camp. This distinction matters because own-camp beliefs are the natural place where conformity pressure should operate. That is exactly what the data suggest. High uncertainty in respondents' own political camp raises willingness to donate to both campaigns by 2.3 percentage points and raises willingness to tweet for the "People's Vote" by 1.8 percentage points, a 36.7% increase relative to the low-information baseline of 4.9%.

Two negative findings are equally important. First, agreement information remains largely inert. Second, uncertainty in the opposing political camp is much less important for the core campaigning outcomes. Table 5 therefore does not show generalized activation. It shows a specific relaxation of within-camp discipline, which is precisely the channel through which depolarization in political expression can emerge.

Table 5 Campaigning, Own/Other

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
High Level Own	0.001	0.006	-0.000	-0.006
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.008)
High Uncert Own	0.023*	0.023*	0.018*	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.008)
High Level Other	0.006	-0.003	-0.001	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.008)
High Uncert Other	0.019	0.007	-0.013	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Observations	4116	4118	1977	1977
Control Mean	.3554422	.3016027	.0490642	.0343955

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of people in one's own as well as the opposed political camp agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on participants' willingness to campaign. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Result 3. *Uncertainty increases support for the norm position that is less popular within one's own political camp.*

Table 6 Campaigning, Leavers

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
High Level Remain	0.002	-0.017	0.012	0.022
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.020)
High Uncert Remain	0.008	-0.021	0.002	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.020)
High Level Leave	0.013	0.011	0.005	-0.019
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.020)
High Uncert Leave	0.032**	0.021	0.023**	0.000
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.020)
Observations	1857	1860	758	758
Control Mean	.1513193	.5204301	.0171504	.0870712

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on willingness to campaign of Leave supporters. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

Tables 6 and 7 show the sharpest version of the result. Table 6 shows that Leave supporters who learn that other Leavers are uncertain become more willing to donate to the "People's Vote" and to tweet in favor of another referendum. The donation effect is 3.2 percentage points, a 21.2% increase relative to the 15.1% baseline; the Twitter effect is 2.3 percentage points, which is large relative to the 1.71% baseline. Remain supporters show the mirror image on donations (Table 7): when other Remainers appear uncertain, they become 3 percentage points more likely to donate to "Better Off Out", a 24.7% increase relative to the 12.1% baseline. Remain supporters also respond to uncertainty among Leavers, though less cleanly, by becoming 2.9 percentage points more likely to donate to "Better Off Out".

This asymmetry is the paper's most substantive result. Leave supporters become more willing to support the pro-referendum side when other Leavers seem uncertain. Remain supporters become more willing to support the anti-referendum side when other Remainers seem uncertain. The common pattern is not that respondents switch camps on Brexit. It is that uncertainty

makes them more willing to express support for the norm position that is less popular within their own political camp. This is the paper's central form of depolarization: weaker camp-line sorting in political expression around a contested norm. At the same time, the treatment values are not symmetric across camps: in absolute terms, the truthful uncertainty shares are higher among Leavers than among Remainers. Cross-camp comparisons should therefore be interpreted cautiously. The design identifies the effect of moving from each camp's low truthful value to its high truthful value, not the effect of imposing the same absolute uncertainty level on both camps. Donations and tweets should therefore be interpreted as changes in expressed political activity within the survey, not as evidence of deep preference transformation.

Table 7 Campaigning, Remainers

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
High Level Remain	-0.007	0.001	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.002)
High Uncert Remain	0.010	0.030**	0.012	0.000
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.002)
High Level Leave	0.007	0.007	-0.013	0.000
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.003)
High Uncert Leave	0.029	0.029**	-0.022	-0.000
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.002)
Observations	2259	2258	1219	1219
Control Mean	.5232404	.1213463	.0689089	.0016407

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on willingness to campaign of Remain supporters. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

3.2 Impact on Voting Intentions

Result 4. *Vote-intention effects point in the same direction but are secondary to the campaigning results.*

Vote intentions are a complementary outcome rather than the paper's central contribution. They matter because party platforms bundled outcome preferences and positions on the referendum norm, but they are noisier and less direct measures of cross-cutting norm expression than the campaign outcomes.

Table 8 Plans to Vote

	Conservatives	Liberal Dem	Labour Party	Brexit Party	Abstaining
High Level	-0.012	-0.012	-0.002	-0.002	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)
High Uncert	-0.002	-0.015	-0.001	-0.016**	0.012
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Observations	4255	4255	4255	4255	4255
Control Mean	.2610012	.1180442	.3201397	.0551804	.0572759

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of both Leavers and Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on participants' voting intentions. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

Table 8 shows that high uncertainty for both camps reduces stated support for the Brexit Party by 1.6 percentage points, or 29% relative to the low-information baseline. Table 9 suggests that this effect is driven more by information about the opposing political camp than by own-camp information. The same table also shows that agreement and uncertainty information from the opposing camp reduce intended support for the Liberal Democrats by 2.4 and 1.6 percentage points respectively.

These patterns are consistent with weaker attachment to the parties most tightly associated with one side of the Brexit cleavage, but they should be read cautiously. Vote intentions aggregate many considerations besides views on the appropriateness of a second referendum. We therefore interpret them as supportive evidence of movement away from strict camp-line expression, not as the main proof of a broader change in political preferences.

Table 9 Plans to Vote, Own/Other

	Conservatives	Liberal Dem	Labour Party	Brexit Party	Abstaining
High Level Own	-0.000	0.010	-0.013	-0.009	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
High Uncert Own	-0.002	0.000	-0.008	-0.006	0.006
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
High Level Other	0.002	-0.024**	0.001	0.009	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
High Uncert Other	0.002	-0.016*	0.008	-0.017**	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	4255	4255	4255	4255	4255
Control Mean	.2610012	.1180442	.3201397	.0551804	.0572759

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of people in one's own as well as the opposed political camp agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on participants' voting intentions. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Taken together, the voting results point in the same qualitative direction as the campaigning results, but through a less direct channel. Campaigning reacts primarily to own-camp uncertainty. Vote intentions react more to uncertainty in the opposing camp. What unifies the two sets of findings is not generalized depolarization, but a weakening of strict camp discipline around the norm question.

3.3 LATE Estimates

The IV results sharpen rather than overturn the reduced-form interpretation. They ask whether the same patterns become larger when the treatment actually moves respondents above their prior beliefs. That is what we find. Across the campaigning and vote-intention outcomes, the estimates keep the same sign and broad interpretation as in the reduced form, but the magnitudes are larger.

One example illustrates the point. In the reduced form, high uncertainty for both camps

raises willingness to donate to either campaign by 2.8 percentage points. In the IV specification, seeing uncertainty that is higher than expected raises willingness to donate by 11 percentage points. The IV estimates therefore suggest that the reduced-form effects are concentrated among respondents whose priors are actually revised by the treatment. Because the IV results do not change the qualitative narrative, we treat them as corroborating evidence rather than as a separate empirical story.

4 Mechanisms

This section assesses which mechanism the evidence is most consistent with. We distinguish between three channels: private-belief updating about the norm or about Brexit, changing social-image or reputational costs of expressing a position, and changing perceived returns to political action. The goal is not to identify a full structural mechanism. Rather, it is to ask which interpretation is most compatible with the joint pattern of behavioral and post-treatment belief outcomes. Because all mechanism measures are elicited after treatment, they should be read as supportive rather than dispositive evidence.

4.1 Social Learning

Result 5. *Respondents update beliefs about what others think, but we find little evidence that they revise their own private views on the norm or on Brexit itself.*

The most basic test for a private-belief updating account is whether respondents absorb the treatment information and then revise their own assessments of the norm. The first part of that test is passed. The second is not.

Beliefs about the appropriateness of a second referendum. We begin by verifying that respondents understand and internalize the treatment information.

We proceed as follows: after seeing the treatment, participants are asked to what extent, on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Agree" (1) to "Disagree" (5), they agree with the following statements: "A large share of Remain supporters think that having a second referendum is appropriate.", "Some Leave supporters think that having a second referendum is appropriate.", "A large share of Leave supporters think that having a second referendum is appropriate.", 'A large share of Remain supporters are very uncertain about their view on the appropriateness of having a second referendum.", "Some Leave supporters are very uncertain about their view on the appropriateness of having a second referendum.", and "A large share of Leave supporters are very uncertain about their view on the appropriateness of having a second referendum.".[5]

[5]For Leavers, we include both a statement mirroring the statement for the Remainers (mentioning "a large share"),

Table 10 Manipulation Checks: Appropriateness of Repeat Referendum

	Remain Level High	Remain Uncert High	Leave Level Medium	Leave Level High	Leave Uncert Medium	Leave Uncert High
High Level Remain	-0.363***	0.224***	0.062	0.092**	0.060	0.055
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.037)
High Uncert Remain	0.069**	-0.285***	-0.078*	-0.019	-0.176***	-0.091**
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.037)
High Level Leave	-0.002	-0.010	-0.175***	-0.207***	-0.071*	-0.102***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.037)
High Uncert Leave	0.024	-0.185***	-0.038	-0.082**	-0.231***	-0.466***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Observations	4072	4072	3270	4072	3270	4072
Control Mean	1.96832	3.289047	2.799694	3.889489	2.874006	3.360756

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on beliefs about shares of the population that agree with the appropriateness and are uncertain. Columns one & two show the impact on participants' agreement with the notion that a large share of Remainers agrees with the appropriateness and is very uncertain. Columns three and four show the same for Leavers. Columns five and six repeat the exercise for Leavers, but now asking about agreement with the statement that "some" Leavers agree with the appropriateness, are very uncertain. The outcomes are categorical variables each coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Agree" (1) to "Disagree" (5). All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 10 shows that the manipulation works mechanically. Respondents who see higher agreement or higher uncertainty for Leave or Remain supporters subsequently report beliefs in the expected direction. This is important because it establishes that the treatment changes perceptions of others' views rather than merely providing ignored information.

Table 11 then asks the more relevant question for mechanism: do these changed beliefs about others translate into changed private beliefs about the norm itself? They largely do not. We see little movement in whether respondents say that a second referendum would conform with UK laws, conform with UK customs, or be appropriate. We also see little movement in respondents' own uncertainty about that assessment. This is the first reason why a pure private-belief updating account looks weak.

as well as a statement mentioning "some" of them agreeing and being uncertain. This is because even in the "high" level treatment arm, it is not a *large* share of Leavers that believes a second referendum would be appropriate (15%).

Table 11 Manipulation Checks: Private Assessment of Appropriateness

	Conform With Law	Conform With Custom	Appropriateness	Uncertainty Appr
High Level Remain	-0.044	-0.055	-0.023	-0.010
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
High Uncert Remain	-0.041	-0.053	-0.003	0.051
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
High Level Leave	-0.028	-0.030	-0.025	0.016
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
High Uncert Leave	-0.001	0.004	-0.017	0.049
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Observations	4039	4039	4071	4071
Control Mean	2.819262	3.11488	2.917711	2.086957

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on private beliefs about the appropriateness of another referendum. Columns one to three show the impact on participants' agreement with the notion that another referendum would "conform with UK laws", "conform with UK customs" and "be appropriate". The outcomes are categorical variables each coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Agree" (1) to "Disagree" (5). Column four shows how uncertain they are about their stance on appropriateness, coded on a Likert scale ranging from "Very certain" (1) to "Very uncertain" (6). All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Beliefs about support for a second referendum. Next, we explore whether information on others' agreement with the appropriateness of a second referendum as well as the uncertainty they attach to this view changes participants' beliefs about their *support* for it. Note that individuals' judgement of the appropriateness of a second referendum can be distinct from their support of it. While the former captures the democratic norm, i.e. whether someone believes a second referendum should happen in a democratic system, the latter captures whether they themselves would like it to happen.

Table 12 Manipulation Checks: Support for Repeat Referendum

	Leave Supp	Leave Unc	Remain Supp	Remain Unc	RefGr Supp	RefGr Unc	Own Supp	Own Unc
High Level Remain	-0.842	-0.006	13.226***	-0.231**	1.355*	0.025	-0.002	-0.016
	(0.671)	(0.085)	(0.733)	(0.090)	(0.761)	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.033)
High Uncert Remain	1.957***	-0.029	-1.608**	0.167*	0.162	0.039	0.002	0.019
	(0.672)	(0.085)	(0.732)	(0.090)	(0.763)	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.033)
High Level Leave	4.925***	0.029	0.361	-0.085	1.202	0.082	0.015	0.029
	(0.671)	(0.085)	(0.732)	(0.090)	(0.763)	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.033)
High Uncert Leave	2.125***	-0.032	1.056	0.014	-0.771	0.094	0.005	0.058*
	(0.672)	(0.085)	(0.729)	(0.090)	(0.763)	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.033)
Observations	4064	4064	4066	4066	4059	4059	4139	4139
Control Mean	25.05463	4.033219	61.45303	4.205607	42.01552	3.918206	.5320126	1.961343

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on beliefs about support for another referendum. Columns one, three & five show the impact on participants' beliefs about the share of Leavers, Remainers and their reference group supporting another referendum. Columns two, four & six show how uncertain they believe each group is, coded on a Likert scale ranging from "Very certain" (1) to "Very uncertain" (6). Columns seven and eight show the impact on participants' private support, coded as a binary variable, and uncertainty, coded as before. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

Table 12 shows a similar pattern for beliefs about support for another referendum as an outcome. Respondents revise beliefs about what Leavers, Remainers, and the wider population support, especially when shown high agreement values. This confirms that respondents use norm information to infer something about broader support patterns.

What Table 12 does *not* show is equally important: respondents' own support for a second referendum barely changes. At most, there is a small increase in uncertainty about private support in one treatment arm. Overall, the table shows movement in beliefs about others far more than movement in respondents' own private outcome preferences.

Beliefs about Brexit. Finally, it could be that participants update their beliefs about the outcome and merits of a second referendum, i.e. the likelihood and consequences of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. To get at this, we first ask participants about the share of the UK population they believe supported remaining in the European Union at the point of the survey as well the probability that the Remain campaign would win a second referendum. We also ask them what they think the consequences of Brexit would be for the UK economy, society as well

as them personally on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "Very positive" (1) to "Very negative" (7).

Table 13 extends this logic to beliefs about Brexit itself. Respondents do update some expectations about the share of the population supporting Remain and about the likelihood that Remain would win another referendum. But changes in beliefs about the consequences of Brexit for the economy, society, or respondents personally are limited and inconsistent. We therefore find little evidence that the treatment caused systematic re-evaluation of Brexit as a substantive policy outcome.

Table 13 Beliefs about Brexit

	Share Pro Remain	Prob Remain Win	Personal Cons	Economic Cons	Societal Cons	Soc Cons, Uncert
High Level Remain	1.277***	0.941*	0.043	0.031	0.069*	-0.020
	(0.421)	(0.560)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)
High Uncert Remain	0.320	-0.250	-0.055	0.005	-0.013	0.032
	(0.422)	(0.558)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)
High Level Leave	0.693	0.952*	0.062	0.014	0.052	0.019
	(0.422)	(0.559)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)
High Uncert Leave	0.332	0.799	-0.053	0.004	0.002	0.107***
	(0.420)	(0.558)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Observations	4068	4039	4037	4037	4037	4037
Control Mean	50.11013	51.09854	4.465445	4.597969	4.443399	2.747833

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on beliefs about another referendum as well as Brexit. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' beliefs about the share of the population currently supporting Remain and likelihood of Remain winning a repeat referendum. Columns three to four show their assessment of the consequences of Brexit for the UK economy, them personally as well as society coded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "Very positive" (1) to "Very negative" (7). Column six shows how uncertain they are about their stance, coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Very Uncertain" (1) to "Very Certain" (5). All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

On a related note, participants might update their own intentions to vote in a hypothetical second referendum if the treatments changed their beliefs about the consequences of Brexit. Table 14 depicts the impact of the four treatment variables on participants stating that they would vote to remain or leave the European Union in another referendum on Brexit as well as abstain from such a vote. It also shows the impact on them stating that they would accept the results of a second vote. We see that intentions are not drastically changed, but that participants become

1.8pp more likely to plan to vote Leave if they learn that a relatively high share of Remainers are uncertain about the appropriateness of a second referendum. At the same time, they become 1.7pp less likely to want to vote Leave if they see relatively high levels of agreement among Leavers with the appropriateness of the referendum. Tables 23 and 24 in the Appendix show that the first result is driven by Leavers while the second is driven by Remainers – in line with expectations.

Table 14 Plans for a Potential Repeat Referendum

	Vote Remain	Vote Leave	Abstain	Accept Result
High Level Remain	-0.010	0.010	-0.001	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)
High Uncert Remain	-0.009	0.018**	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)
High Level Leave	0.007	-0.017**	0.010	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)
High Uncert Leave	0.005	-0.001	-0.004	-0.017
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Observations	4039	4039	4039	4039
Control Mean	.5337955	.3946521	.0715524	.7172567

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on intentions for a potential repeat referendum. Columns one and two show the impact on intention to vote Remain or Leave in such a referendum respectively. Column three shows intention to abstain, and column four shows likelihood to accept the result. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

Taken together, the social-learning evidence has a clear hierarchy. The treatment moves beliefs about what others think. It does not generate comparable movement in respondents' own private views on the appropriateness of a second referendum, their own support for another referendum, or their assessment of Brexit's consequences. This makes a pure private-belief updating account less likely.

4.2 Signalling

Result 6. *The evidence is more consistent with lower perceived reputational costs of expressing cross-cutting norm views.*

The next channel concerns social image. If respondents perceive their own political camp as less settled than they had thought, then expressing a cross-cutting norm view may appear less socially costly (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2016; Bursztyn et al., 2023a). Table 15 provides evidence consistent with that interpretation.

Table 15 Beliefs about Perception of Supporters & Opponents of a Referendum

	Public Support				Public Opposition			
	Population	Ref Group	Remainers	Leavers	Population	Ref Group	Remainers	Leavers
High Level Remain	0.060*	0.048	0.181***	-0.067*	-0.029	-0.087***	-0.142***	0.124***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.037)
High Uncert Remain	0.046	0.051*	-0.073**	0.043	0.030	0.012	0.067*	-0.004
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.038)
High Level Leave	0.044	0.038	0.010	0.096***	0.011	0.005	0.026	-0.050
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.037)
High Uncert Leave	0.038	-0.015	-0.043	0.068**	-0.037	-0.017	0.033	-0.124***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Observations	4047	4047	4047	4047	4047	4047	4047	4047
Control Mean	2.968125	3.136644	3.800593	2.26044	3.115394	3.081295	2.529528	3.550284

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on beliefs about the perception of public support for/ opposition to it. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' beliefs on how the general population, their reference group, Remainers and Leavers view supporters of another referendum. Columns five to eight do the same for opponents of another referendum. The outcome is a categorical variable indicating whether participants think a specific group views opposition "Negatively" (1) or "Positively" (5) on a 5-point Likert scale. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

The table shows two relevant patterns. Agreement information shifts perceived approval in the expected direction, which is unsurprising. More importantly, uncertainty information tends to flatten the perceived social gradient around public campaigning. When Remain supporters are portrayed as more uncertain, respondents view public opposition to another referendum less

negatively and public support more ambivalently among Remainers. When Leave supporters are portrayed as more uncertain, respondents view public support for another referendum less negatively among Leavers. In both cases, uncertainty appears to lower the reputational cost of expressing the less camp-consistent norm position.

This is precisely the pattern one would expect if the campaigning results reflect weaker within-camp conformity pressure. Leave supporters who privately think another referendum is appropriate may be more willing to support the "People's Vote" when they infer that other Leavers are not fully settled. Remain supporters who privately think another referendum is inappropriate may analogously be more willing to support "Better Off Out" when other Remainers appear uncertain. We do not treat these perception measures as definitive proof of mechanism, but they are clearly more in line with a social-image account than with belief change about Brexit itself.

4.3 Strategic Considerations

Result 7. *Uncertainty also makes political action appear more effective.*

The final channel is strategic rather than reputational. If uncertainty signals that others are persuadable, then campaigning may appear more worthwhile (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). To test this idea, we ask respondents whether public support for or opposition to another referendum would be effective in convincing others. Table 16 shows that higher uncertainty among either Leave or Remain supporters increases agreement with both statements. The direction is consistent across both pro- and anti-referendum campaigning, which fits the idea that uncertainty raises perceived malleability rather than changing which side respondents think is normatively correct.

Table 16 Beliefs about Effectiveness

	Public Support Effective Tool	Public Opposition Effective Tool
High Level Remain	-0.022	-0.010
	(0.034)	(0.033)
High Uncert Remain	-0.095***	-0.079**
	(0.034)	(0.033)
High Level Leave	-0.070**	-0.008
	(0.034)	(0.033)
High Uncert Leave	-0.109***	-0.096***
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Observations	4041	4041
Control Mean	3.002722	3.000495

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on beliefs about the effectiveness of public campaigning. Columns one shows the impact on participants' beliefs about public support and column two about public opposition. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

This strategic channel complements, rather than replaces, the social-image channel. Respondents may speak out more when two conditions hold simultaneously: deviating from their camp appears less costly and public expression appears more consequential. The mechanism evidence therefore suggests a ranking of interpretations. We find little support for private-belief updating, and stronger evidence consistent with lower reputational costs and higher perceived returns to action.

5 Discussion

Our preferred interpretation is narrow but substantively important. Information about uncertainty within one's own political camp loosens conformity around a contested democratic norm and increases willingness to express cross-cutting norm views. The clearest behavioral pattern is not movement in private beliefs about Brexit or even in private beliefs about the norm itself. It is movement in expressed political activity toward the norm position that is less popular within

respondents' own political camp. That is a meaningful form of depolarization because it weakens camp-line sorting in democratic engagement.

This interpretation is especially plausible in settings where outcome preferences and norm views come apart. Some Leave supporters may have believed that another referendum was democratically appropriate even if they still preferred Leave as an outcome. Some Remain supporters may have believed that reopening the referendum question violated democratic procedure even if they preferred Remain. The treatment appears to matter for precisely these respondents: those whose private norm views may already have been cross-cutting, but whose public expression was constrained by perceived camp discipline.

The broader relevance of the result lies in norm conflicts that are nested inside partisan competition. Debates over repeat referendums, protest rights, legislative procedure, or court reform often involve both a substantive outcome and a contested rule of democratic contestation. In such settings, public reporting that focuses only on support levels may overstate how settled each camp really is (Bursztyn and Yang, 2022). Highlighting uncertainty may therefore reduce conformity pressure and make cross-cutting expression more visible. In our setting, one descriptive feature is that Leave supporters appear more uncertain than Remain supporters overall. That fact does not by itself identify the treatment effect, but it reinforces the point that camps can differ not only in what they support, but also in how settled they are.

At the same time, the scope of the result is limited. Our outcomes are survey-embedded and relatively low stakes. The setting is politically exceptional. The treatment values are constructed from scale-induced differences in truthful pilot responses. The mechanism evidence is indirect and post-treatment. And we do not identify durable long-run preference change, a complete structural mechanism, or broad depolarization of private beliefs. The contribution is therefore not that uncertainty information resolves polarization in general. It is that it can generate depolarization in democratic engagement around a contested norm in a context where private views and public camp discipline may diverge.

6 Conclusion

This paper studies whether information about uncertainty over a contested democratic norm changes political expression. In the Brexit setting, we show that it does. Respondents become more willing to campaign when they learn that others, especially members of their own political camp, are uncertain about whether a second referendum is appropriate. The strongest effects fall on support for the norm position that is less popular within one's own political camp. In the sense defined in the introduction, the treatment therefore generates depolarization in democratic engagement.

What the paper does not show is equally important. We do not find large changes in private

beliefs about the appropriateness of a second referendum, in support for Brexit or Remain as outcomes, or in beliefs about the consequences of Brexit. The mechanism evidence instead suggests that the treatment lowered perceived reputational costs of expressing cross-cutting norm views and increased the perceived effectiveness of doing so. These results are therefore more consistent with changing expression than with changing conviction.

The policy implication is correspondingly narrow but potentially important. Truthful information that highlights uncertainty around contested democratic norms may reduce conformity pressure and make cross-cutting views more publicly expressible, especially when citizens infer that their own camp is less settled than it appears. Whether such effects persist outside a survey environment, generalize beyond Brexit, or accumulate into durable political change remains an open question. When citizens believe their own camp is less certain than it appears, they may become more willing to publicly express norm views that cut across partisan lines, with positive implications for depolarization in democratic engagement.

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A Additional Figures

Figure 2 Example Treatment Screen



B Additional Reduced Form Tables

Table 17 Plans to Vote, Leavers

	Conservatives	Liberal Dem	Labour Party	Brexit Party	Abstaining
High Level Remain	-0.002	-0.007	-0.010	0.017	0.001
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)
High Uncert Remain	0.000	0.001	0.020	-0.037**	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)
High Level Leave	-0.019	0.007	0.004	-0.010	0.011
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)
High Uncert Leave	-0.019	-0.008	0.013	-0.014	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Observations	1922	1922	1922	1922	1922
Control Mean	.5015609	.0234131	.1316337	.116025	.0686785

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on the voting intentions of Leave supporters. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 18 Plans to Vote, Remainers

	Conservatives	Liberal Dem	Labour Party	Brexit Party	Abstaining
High Level Remain	0.016	0.010	-0.027	-0.006**	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.008)
High Uncert Remain	0.016	0.004	-0.023	0.002	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.008)
High Level Leave	0.003	-0.038**	0.016	0.002	0.014*
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.008)
High Uncert Leave	0.000	-0.029*	0.001	-0.000	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Observations	2333	2333	2333	2333	2333
Control Mean	.0672953	.1980283	.4809258	.0060009	.0488641

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on the voting intentions of Remain supporters. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 19 Manipulation Checks: Support for 2nd Referendum, Leavers

	Leave Supp	Leave Unc	Remain Supp	Remain Unc	RefGr Supp	RefGr Unc	Own Supp	Own Unc
High Level Remain	-1.285	-0.072	12.855***	-0.186	-0.045	-0.081	-0.006	0.094*
	(1.052)	(0.131)	(1.167)	(0.131)	(1.017)	(0.132)	(0.015)	(0.049)
High Uncert Remain	1.177	0.118	-0.349	0.242*	1.649	0.143	0.003	-0.012
	(1.058)	(0.132)	(1.166)	(0.131)	(1.025)	(0.133)	(0.015)	(0.049)
High Level Leave	5.257***	0.028	0.537	0.073	2.502**	0.137	0.031**	0.031
	(1.060)	(0.131)	(1.174)	(0.131)	(1.028)	(0.133)	(0.015)	(0.049)
High Uncert Leave	2.698**	-0.193	0.169	0.028	-0.159	0.220*	0.014	0.046
	(1.061)	(0.132)	(1.170)	(0.131)	(1.021)	(0.133)	(0.015)	(0.050)
Observations	1826	1826	1826	1826	1824	1824	1871	1871
Control Mean	25.15225	3.885542	59.20099	4.205367	23.68366	3.774671	.1437734	1.81721

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Leave supporters' beliefs about support for another referendum. Columns one, three & five show the impact on participants' beliefs about the share of Leavers, Remainers and their reference group supporting another referendum. Columns two, four & six show how uncertain they believe each group is, coded on a Likert scale ranging from "Very certain" (1) to "Very uncertain" (6). Columns seven and eight show the impact on participants' private support, coded as a binary variable, and uncertainty, coded as before. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 20 Manipulation Checks: Support for 2nd Referendum, Remainers

	Leave Supp	Leave Unc	Remain Supp	Remain Unc	RefGr Supp	RefGr Unc	Own Supp	Own Unc
High Level Remain	-0.588	0.051	13.716***	-0.276**	2.808***	0.116	0.007	-0.111**
	(0.859)	(0.111)	(0.927)	(0.124)	(1.081)	(0.122)	(0.014)	(0.044)
High Uncert Remain	2.318***	-0.137	-2.502***	0.102	-1.467	-0.063	-0.003	0.041
	(0.862)	(0.111)	(0.926)	(0.124)	(1.083)	(0.122)	(0.015)	(0.044)
High Level Leave	4.593***	0.025	0.167	-0.226*	-0.289	0.027	-0.004	0.026
	(0.858)	(0.111)	(0.923)	(0.124)	(1.084)	(0.121)	(0.014)	(0.044)
High Uncert Leave	1.637*	0.098	1.709*	-0.007	-1.546	-0.007	-0.004	0.070
	(0.857)	(0.111)	(0.918)	(0.124)	(1.083)	(0.121)	(0.014)	(0.044)
Observations	2238	2238	2240	2240	2235	2235	2268	2268
Control Mean	24.97498	4.153709	63.28884	4.205804	56.97629	4.035347	.8522928	2.080247

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Remain supporters' beliefs about support for another referendum. Columns one, three & five show the impact on participants' beliefs about the share of Leavers, Remainers and their reference group supporting another referendum. Columns two, four & six show how uncertain they believe each group is, coded on a Likert scale ranging from "Very certain" (1) to "Very uncertain" (6). Columns seven and eight show the impact on participants' private support, coded as a binary variable, and uncertainty, coded as before. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 21 Beliefs about Brexit, Leavers

	Share Pro Remain	Prob Remain Win	Personal Cons	Economic Cons	Societal Cons	Soc Cons, Uncert
High Level Remain	0.724	-0.129	0.044	0.072	0.078	0.019
	(0.645)	(0.915)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.050)
High Uncert Remain	1.382**	0.174	-0.058	0.095	0.089	0.052
	(0.648)	(0.925)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.050)
High Level Leave	1.408**	2.297**	0.103*	0.047	0.061	-0.032
	(0.653)	(0.927)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.051)
High Uncert Leave	-0.159	0.542	0.070	0.050	0.104*	0.154***
	(0.647)	(0.922)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.050)
Observations	1828	1811	1811	1811	1811	1811
Control Mean	44.55525	42.08283	3.31143	3.09111	2.912203	2.735505

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Leave supporters' beliefs about another referendum as well as Brexit. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' beliefs about the share of the population currently supporting Remain and likelihood of Remain winning a repeat referendum. Columns three to four show their assessment of the consequences of Brexit for the UK economy, them personally as well as society coded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "Very positive" (1) to "Very negative" (7). Column six shows how uncertain they are about their stance, coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Very Uncertain" (1) to "Very Certain" (5). All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 22 Beliefs about Brexit, Remainers

	Share Pro Remain	Prob Remain Win	Personal Cons	Economic Cons	Societal Cons	Soc Cons, Uncert
High Level Remain	1.790***	1.929***	0.082	0.033	0.099**	-0.064
	(0.548)	(0.677)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)
High Uncert Remain	-0.713	-0.770	-0.068	-0.094*	-0.112**	0.006
	(0.553)	(0.671)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)
High Level Leave	0.048	-0.270	0.011	-0.036	0.020	0.060
	(0.545)	(0.673)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.054)
High Uncert Leave	0.641	0.976	-0.149***	-0.029	-0.079	0.079
	(0.545)	(0.673)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Observations	2240	2228	2226	2226	2226	2226
Control Mean	54.6433	58.42684	5.404313	5.823899	5.689128	2.757862

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Remain supporters' beliefs about another referendum as well as Brexit. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' beliefs about the share of the population currently supporting Remain and likelihood of Remain winning a repeat referendum. Columns three to four show their assessment of the consequences of Brexit for the UK economy, them personally as well as society coded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "Very positive" (1) to "Very negative" (7). Column six shows how uncertain they are about their stance, coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Very Uncertain" (1) to "Very Certain" (5). All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 23 Plans for a Potential Repeat Referendum, Leavers

	Vote Remain	Vote Leave	Abstain	Accept Result
High Level Remain	-0.017*	0.019	-0.002	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.023)
High Uncert Remain	-0.023**	0.045***	-0.023*	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.023)
High Level Leave	0.011	-0.016	0.004	0.024
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.023)
High Uncert Leave	0.012	-0.007	-0.006	-0.017
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Observations	1811	1811	1811	1811
Control Mean	.0546659	.8514633	.0938708	.5146328

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Leave supporters' intentions for a potential repeat referendum. Columns one and two show the impact on intention to vote Remain or Leave in such a referendum respectively. Column three shows intention to abstain, and column four shows likelihood to accept the result. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 24 Plans for a Potential Repeat Referendum, Remainers

	Vote Remain	Vote Leave	Abstain	Accept Result
High Level Remain	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.013
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.014)
High Uncert Remain	-0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.019
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.014)
High Level Leave	0.002	-0.017***	0.014	-0.019
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.014)
High Uncert Leave	-0.000	0.002	-0.002	-0.014
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Observations	2228	2228	2228	2228
Control Mean	.9232496	.0233393	.0534111	.8819569

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Remain supporters' intentions for a potential repeat referendum. Columns one and two show the impact on intention to vote Remain or Leave in such a referendum respectively. Column three shows intention to abstain, and column four shows likelihood to accept the result. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 25 Beliefs about Perception of Supporters & Opponents of a Referendum, Leavers

	Public Support				Public Opposition			
	Population	Ref Group	Remainers	Leavers	Population	Ref Group	Remainers	Leavers
High Level Remain	0.024	0.021	0.200***	-0.068	-0.079	-0.082*	-0.185***	0.084
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.058)
High Uncert Remain	0.090*	0.098**	-0.049	0.046	0.024	0.006	0.028	0.064
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.058)
High Level Leave	0.090*	0.119**	0.092*	0.129**	-0.010	-0.013	0.062	-0.110*
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.058)
High Uncert Leave	0.032	0.012	-0.056	0.037	-0.036	-0.035	0.026	-0.166***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Observations	1818	1818	1818	1818	1818	1818	1818	1818
Control Mean	2.630363	2.473597	3.552805	2.193069	3.29868	3.552805	2.60396	3.59516

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Leave supporters' beliefs about the perception of public support for/opposition to it. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' beliefs on how the general population, their reference group, Remainers and Leavers view supporters of another referendum. Columns five to eight do the same for opponents of another referendum. The outcome is a categorical variable indicating whether participants think a specific group views opposition "Negatively" (1) or "Positively" (5) on a 5-point Likert scale. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 26 Beliefs about Perception of Supporters & Opponents of a Referendum, Remainers

	Public Support				Public Opposition			
	Population	Ref Group	Remainers	Leavers	Population	Ref Group	Remainers	Leavers
High Level Remain	0.090**	0.079**	0.174***	-0.073	0.005	-0.103**	-0.115**	0.163***
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.049)
High Uncert Remain	-0.002	-0.009	-0.094**	0.022	0.042	0.029	0.090**	-0.044
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.049)
High Level Leave	-0.000	-0.040	-0.060	0.075	0.034	0.031	0.007	-0.006
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.049)
High Uncert Leave	0.042	-0.043	-0.037	0.098**	-0.039	-0.003	0.040	-0.095*
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Observations	2229	2229	2229	2229	2229	2229	2229	2229
Control Mean	3.243607	3.677434	4.002692	2.315388	2.965904	2.696725	2.46882	3.513683

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Leave supporters' beliefs about the perception of public support for/opposition to it. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' beliefs on how the general population, their reference group, Remainers and Leavers view supporters of another referendum. Columns five to eight do the same for opponents of another referendum. The outcome is a categorical variable indicating whether participants think a specific group views opposition "Negatively" (1) or "Positively" (5) on a 5-point Likert scale. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 27 Beliefs about Effectiveness, Leavers

	Public Support Effective Tool	Public Opposition Effective Tool
High Level Remain	-0.012	-0.000
	(0.053)	(0.052)
High Uncert Remain	-0.111**	-0.043
	(0.053)	(0.052)
High Level Leave	-0.161***	-0.012
	(0.053)	(0.052)
High Uncert Leave	-0.154***	-0.123**
	(0.054)	(0.052)
Observations	1813	1813
Control Mean	3.381688	2.972421

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Leave supporters' beliefs about the effectiveness of public campaigning. Columns one shows the impact on participants' beliefs about public support and column two about public opposition. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 28 Beliefs about Effectiveness, Remainers

	Public Support Effective Tool	Public Opposition Effective Tool
High Level Remain	-0.033	-0.015
	(0.044)	(0.042)
High Uncert Remain	-0.061	-0.109***
	(0.044)	(0.042)
High Level Leave	0.016	-0.001
	(0.044)	(0.042)
High Uncert Leave	-0.064	-0.070*
	(0.044)	(0.041)
Observations	2228	2228
Control Mean	2.694345	3.023339

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a high fraction of Leavers/Remainers agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on Remain supporters' beliefs about the effectiveness of public campaigning. Columns one shows the impact on participants' beliefs about public support and column two about public opposition. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

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Table 29 Campaigning: Pooled

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
Higher Level	0.057	0.038	0.006	-0.027
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.037)
Higher Uncert	0.110*	0.110*	-0.012	0.009
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.041)
Observations	4116	4118	1958	1958
Control Mean	.3554422	.3016027	.0490642	.0343955

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of both Leavers and Remainers than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on willingness to campaign. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.

Table 30 Campaigning: Pooled, Own/Other

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
Higher Level Own	0.008	0.017	0.004	-0.011
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Higher Uncert Own	0.067*	0.067*	0.047*	-0.000
	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Higher Level Other	0.018	-0.006	-0.002	0.020
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Higher Uncert Other	0.061	0.025	-0.034	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Observations	4116	4118	1977	1977
Control Mean	.3554422	.3016027	.0490642	.0343955

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of people in one's own and the opposed political camp than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on willingness to campaign. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 31 Campaigning: Leavers

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
Higher Level Remain	0.002	-0.034	0.022	0.038
	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.036)
Higher Uncert Remain	0.036	-0.053	0.018	0.037
	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.029)	(0.058)
Higher Level Leave	0.064	0.045	0.025	-0.068
	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.037)	(0.071)
Higher Uncert Leave	0.115**	0.075	0.082**	-0.005
	(0.057)	(0.076)	(0.037)	(0.071)
Observations	1857	1860	752	752
Control Mean	.1513193	.5204301	.0171504	.0870712

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of Leavers/Remainers than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on willingness to campaign of Leave supporters. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 32 Campaigning: Remainers

	Donate Pro Ref	Donate Anti Ref	Tweet Pro Ref	Tweet Anti Ref
Higher Level Remain	-0.010	0.004	0.000	-0.004
	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.003)
Higher Uncert Remain	0.026	0.076**	0.023	0.000
	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.005)
Higher Level Leave	0.034	0.038	-0.055	0.001
	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.010)
Higher Uncert Leave	0.087	0.087**	-0.065	-0.001
	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.007)
Observations	2259	2258	1206	1206
Control Mean	.5232404	.1213463	.0689089	.0016407

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of Leavers/Remainers than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on willingness to campaign of Remain supporters. Columns one and two show the impact on participants' willingness to donate to the People's Vote and Better Off Out campaigns. Columns three and four shows the impact on their willingness to tweet their support for or opposition to a repeat referendum. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 33 Plans to Vote, Pooled

	Conserv	Lib Dem	Labour	Brexit	Abstain
Higher Level	-0.038	-0.054	0.011	-0.015	0.060*
	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Higher Uncert	-0.013	-0.062	-0.006	-0.067**	0.049
	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Observations	4172	4172	4172	4172	4172
Control Mean	.2610012	.1180442	.3201397	.0551804	.0572759

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of both Leavers and Remainers than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on voting intentions. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 34 Plans to Vote, Own Other

	Conserv	Lib Dem	Labour	Brexit	Abstain
Higher Level Own	-0.001	0.018	-0.029	-0.020	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Higher Uncert Own	-0.006	0.001	-0.024	-0.020	0.019
	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Higher Level Other	0.006	-0.063***	0.005	0.018	0.024
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Higher Uncert Other	0.005	-0.045	0.022	-0.054***	0.030
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Observations	4255	4255	4255	4255	4255
Control Mean	.2610012	.1180442	.3201397	.0551804	.0572759

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of people in one's own and the opposed political camp than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on voting intentions. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 35 Plans to Vote, Leave

	Conserv	Lib Dem	Labour	Brexit	Abstain
Higher Level Remain	0.002	-0.013	-0.016	0.032	0.002
	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.021)
Higher Uncert Remain	-0.011	0.001	0.064	-0.117***	0.029
	(0.066)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.034)
Higher Level Leave	-0.068	0.024	0.035	-0.046	0.052
	(0.080)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.041)
Higher Uncert Leave	-0.069	-0.023	0.047	-0.057	0.031
	(0.074)	(0.023)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.038)
Observations	1885	1885	1885	1885	1885
Control Mean	.5015609	.0234131	.1316337	.116025	.0686785

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of Leavers/Remainers than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on the voting intentions of Leave supporters. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** $p<0.01$,** $p<0.05$,* $p<0.1$.

Table 36 Plans to Vote, Remainers

	Conserv	Lib Dem	Labour	Brexit	Abstain
Higher Level Remain	0.026*	0.022	-0.036	-0.009**	0.011
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.012)
Higher Uncert Remain	0.040	0.008	-0.063	0.005	0.002
	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.008)	(0.022)
Higher Level Leave	0.014	-0.144**	0.055	0.006	0.054*
	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.011)	(0.030)
Higher Uncert Leave	0.002	-0.089*	-0.012	-0.001	0.030
	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.010)	(0.026)
Observations	2287	2287	2287	2287	2287
Control Mean	.0672953	.1980283	.4809258	.0060009	.0488641

Notes: This table shows the effects of learning that a higher fraction of Leavers/Remainers than previously thought agrees with the appropriateness of a repeat referendum and is uncertain about this stance on the voting intentions of Remain supporters. Columns one to four show the impact on participants' intent to vote for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour and the Brexit Party in the 2019 election respectively. Column five shows the impact on their intent to abstain from the election. All regressions include controls for age, gender, employment, education, region, vote in the 2016 referendum, current opinion on the UK leaving the EU and certainty thereof, share of the reference group supporting Leave, and frequency of consuming as well as discussing news. They are estimated by 2SLS using treatment assignment to high numbers as instruments. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at standard levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1.