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Sovereign Debt: Election Concerns and the Democratic Disadvantage

Sovereign Debt: Election Concerns and the Democratic Disadvantage

308/2016 Amrita Dhillon, Andrew Pickering and Tomas Sjöström
culture and development, working papers
Oxford Economic Papers
https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy036

308/2016 Amrita Dhillon, Andrew Pickering and Tomas Sjöström

We examine default decisions under different political systems. If democratically elected politicians are unable to make credible commitments to repay externally held debt, default rates are inefficiently high because politicians internalize voter utility loss from repayment. A politician who is motivated by election concerns is more likely to default in order to avoid voter utility losses, and, since lenders recognize this, interest rates and risk premia rise. Therefore, democracy potentially confers a credit market disadvantage. Institutions that are shielded from political competition, such as independent central banks, may ameliorate the disadvantage by adopting a more farsighted perspective, taking into account how interest rates respond to default risk. Using a numerical measure of institutional farsightedness obtained from the Government Insight Business Risk and Conditions database, we find that the observed relationship between credit-ratings and democratic status is indeed strongly conditional on farsightedness. With myopic institutions, democracy is estimated to cost on average about 2.5 investment grades. With farsighted institutions there is, if anything, a democratic advantage.

Culture and Development

Oxford Economic Papers

https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy036