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Copying informal Institutions: The role of British colonial officers during the decolonization of British Africa

Copying informal Institutions: The role of British colonial officers during the decolonization of British Africa

346/2017 Valentin Seidler
economic history, working papers
Journal of Institutional Economics
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000443

346/2017 Valentin Seidler

Institutional reforms in developing countries often involve copying institutions from developed countries. Such institutional copying is likely to fail, if formal institutions alone are copied without the informal institutions on which they rest in the originating country. This paper investigates the role of human actors in copying informal institutions. At independence, all British African colonies imported the same institution intended to safeguard the political neutrality of their civil services. While the necessary formal provisions were copied into the constitutions of all African colonies, the extent to which they were put into practice varies. The paper investigates the connection between the variation in the legal practice and the presence of British colonial officers after independence. A natural experiment around compensation payments to British officers explains the variation in the number of officers who remained in service after independence. Interviews with retired officers suggest that the extended presence of British personnel promoted the acceptance of imported British institutions among local colleagues.

Economic History

Journal of Institutional Economics

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000443