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The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders

The logic of costly punishment reversed: Expropriation of free-riders and outsiders

315/2017 David Hugh-Jones and Carlo Perroni
culture and development, working papers
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.006

315/2017 David Hugh-Jones and Carlo Perroni

Current literature views the punishment of free-riders as an under-supplied public good, carried out by individuals at a cost to themselves. It need not be so: often, free-riders’ property can be forcibly appropriated by a coordinated group. This power makes punishment profitable, but it can also be abused. It is easier to contain abuses, and focus group punishment on free-riders, in societies where coordinated expropriation is harder. Our theory explains why public goods are undersupplied in heterogenous communities: because groups target minorities instead of free-riders. In our laboratory experiment, outcomes were more efficient when coordination was more difficult, while outgroup members were targeted more than ingroup members, and reacted differently to punishment.

Culture and Development

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.006