A million answers to twenty questions: choosing by checklist[*]

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Abstract

Several decision models in marketing science and psychology assume that a consumer chooses by proceeding sequentially through a checklist of desirable properties. These models are contrasted to the utility maximization model of rationality in economics. We show on the contrary that the two approaches are nearly equivalent. Moreover, the length of the shortest checklist as a proportion of the number of an agent's indifference classes shrinks to 0 (at an exponential rate) as the number of indifference classes increases. Checklists therefore provide a rapid procedural basis for utility maximization.

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1 Introduction

You go to a used car lot. You first state your maximum price, then ask if any cars with a manual transmission are available, then if any sport cars are available, then any Italian sport cars ... and you end up driving away in a red Alfa Romeo.

In this example you make your decision when facing a set of alternatives using only *properties* of the alternatives. A property is simply a subset of alternatives, e.g., all sports cars. You go through your checklist of properties until you are able to narrow down the set sufficiently. At each step you eliminate the alternatives that do not have the specified property, or, if no alternative has the property, you do not eliminate any options and move on to the next property. No maximization of utility or of preferences is invoked: all that is required is an ordered list of desirable attributes. That the list is ordered means that earlier properties always trump later properties; if the car buyer checks car color only with his final property, then color can never take precedence over the properties checked earlier on. This lexicographic feature of ordered properties makes choosing by checklist appear distant from the classical economic agent's pursuit of utility. Moreover, a checklist is an easy procedure to execute, while maximizing utility may seem to be a challenging task. In the words of Herbert Simon [23]:

> The assumption of a utility function postulates a consistency of human choice that is not always evidenced in reality. The assumption of maximization may also place a heavy (often unbearable) computational burden on the decision maker. (p. 16)

We will see that checklists present a challenge to Simon's view. Although easy to use, checklists implicitly impose a utility ordering on alternatives; the checklist and utility models are in fact nearly equivalent. Checklists in addition can make fine preference discriminations using only a handful of properties; from the checklist point of view, utility maximization is computationally undemanding.

The sequential elimination of alternatives by whether or not they possess properties un-

derlies several decision making models in psychology[1] and marketing science.[2] Any decision procedure that follows a flowchart of 'yes or no' questions can be written as a checklist. Checklists can also serve as normative guides in fields such as clinical medicine. For example, Fischer et al. [7] propose a simple rule to guide the prescription of a certain antibiotic to treat pneumonia in young children. Because resistance can develop, this drug should be prescribed only in specific cases. The rule is (1) if the patient has had fever for less than two days, do not prescribe, (2) otherwise, and if the patient is less than three years old, do not prescribe, and (3) otherwise, prescribe. We will translate the car and antibiotic examples into the language of our model in section 2, where we incorporate 'deal-killing' properties that an option must possess in order to be chosen.

Decision-making with a checklist is considered basic precisely because it eschews any use of preference relations over alternatives, the hallmark of economic analysis. Its attraction is its simplicity: in the language of Gigerenzer and Todd [11], it generates 'fast and frugal' heuristics, appropriate when time, knowledge and computational power are scarce. Gigerenzer and Todd indeed emphasize the contrast between such heuristics and 'demonic rationality', by which they mean preference or utility maximization.

As the views of Simon and the psychologists illustrate, it is not clear at first sight that there is a connection between checklists and the economic model of maximization. And the fact that discriminations among alternatives made by one property can never be overturned by later properties suggests that the only maximizing agents that the model can capture are lexicographic agents who do not make trade-offs among different types of goods (where, e.g., agents prefer more of good 1 and good 2 quantities are decisive only when good 1 quantities are tied). We will see that the reverse is the case: agents who use a checklist to make their decisions always maximize a preference relation, and, when agents choose among commodity bundles, checklists display the tractability that attracts psychologists if and only if agents *do* display the trade-offs of classical utility maximizers. In particular, agents with a tractable checklist – where all the alternatives that will be rejected are eliminated in finitely many

steps – cannot have lexicographic preferences.

We begin by showing that there is an exact equivalence between agents who choose using checklists and agents who maximize a preference relation. Whatever goes on in the minds of checklist users, they act just like preference maximizers. From the vantage point of revealed preference theory, checklists therefore provide an alternative to 'strong axiom' characterizations of preference maximization. But half of this equivalence – that any choice function that maximizes a preference relation has a checklist – is unsatisfying: the checklist might be impractical, because the elimination of options does not end in finitely many steps.

Much of the rest of the paper is devoted to showing that in the important economic settings rational maximizers can use the quick checklists that make for tractable choice procedures. That a checklist can be quick – where the number of properties the agent must go through is small relative to the number of preference discriminations – shows that checklist agents are not only rational but can sift through alternatives rapidly. Contrary to Simon, classical economic maximization can be computationally efficient.

First, when an agent has n (a finite number) indifference classes the agent can make do with a checklist with only a small number of properties relative to n. Agents with a checklist can in effect perform a binary search, and the ratio of the number of properties to n will converge to 0 at an exponential rate. For example, an agent who makes a 1,000,000 preference discriminations needs a checklist that is just 20 properties long.

Second, we consider the prototypical economic agent whose preferences over commodity bundles define uncountably many indifference curves. Despite this large set of discriminations, such an agent can make decisions with a checklist that executes quickly. For any finite set of alternatives, the agent will need to go through only finitely many properties on his or her checklist before coming to a decision: the checklist 'finitely terminates.'

We argue in both directions: not only will any utility-maximizer have a checklist that finitely terminates but any agent with a checklist that finitely terminates will have a utility function. This result requires a domain restriction, but without a domain restriction an alternative equivalence holds: an agent maximizes utility if and only if there is a checklist that approximates his or her behavior arbitrarily closely. The procedural model of checklists thus nearly coincides with the economic model of rationality.

We end up near the Gigerenzer and Todd [11] point of view but with a caveat. Checklists are indeed 'fast and frugal': they are a fast and frugal way to maximize utility.

2   Checklists

2.1   Standard checklists

Fix a nonempty set of alternatives X. An agent faces a domain Σ of choice sets, where each S in Σ is a nonempty subset of X. For each choice set S in Σ, the agent must select a nonempty $c(S) \subset S$. Following tradition, we call c a 'choice function' but each $c(S)$ is a set.

A decision maker who chooses by checklist decides on a $c(S)$ by going through a sequence of properties; for each property, if there is an alternative in S that has that property then the agent eliminates all those alternatives that do not. While an agent may use of a large pool of properties to discriminate among alternatives, we require that for every S a final selection is reached in a finite number of steps.

Formally, a *property* $P(i)$ is simply a set of alternatives, $P(i) \subset X$, and we say 'alternative x has property $P(i)$' when $x \in P(i)$. A *(standard) checklist* is a sequence of properties $P = (P(1), P(2), ...) = P(i)_{i \in I}$ where the set of indices I is either $\{1, ..., n\}$ or the entire set of natural numbers $\mathbb{N}$.

Given a choice set $S \subset X$ and a checklist P, define inductively the following 'survivor sets' $M_i(S)$:

$$M_0(S) = S$$

$$M_i(S) = \begin{cases} M_{i-1}(S) \cap P(i) & \text{if } M_{i-1}(S) \cap P(i) \neq \varnothing \\ M_{i-1}(S) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This sequence makes precise the elimination procedure we described. At each step i the agent checks whether the current set of surviving alternatives have the ith property. If some alternatives do, the alternatives that do not are thrown away. Otherwise, all alternatives survive to the next round. In both cases the agent moves to step $i + 1$.

Definition 1 *A choice function* $c : \Sigma \rightarrow X$ ***has a (standard) checklist*** *if and only if there exists a checklist* P *such that, for all* $S \in \Sigma$, *there is a property* $P(j)$ *where* j *satisfies*

$$M_i(S) = M_j(S) \text{ for all } i \geq j$$
$$c(S) = M_j(S), \tag{1}$$

and we then say that P *is a checklist for* c.

If the set of indices for the properties I is finite, the checklist is **finite**.

A choice function that has a standard checklist thus satisfies two features. First, the procedure 'finitely terminates': for any choice set S there exists a property in the checklist such that, from that stage onwards, the set of survivors does not shrink any further.[3] Second, this set of permanent survivors coincides with what the choice function selects from S.

We call a complete and transitive binary relation on X a *preference relation* and say that a choice function c with domain Σ *maximizes a preference relation* $\succsim$ if $c(S) = \{x \in S : x \succsim y$ for all $y \in S\}$ for all $S \in \Sigma$.

Example 1 In the car example of the introduction, we can model the option of not choosing any car by letting some or all of the attributes be 'deal killers,' i.e. attributes that a car must have for a purchase to go through. For any car lot, let an object of choice be either a vehicle v_i in the lot, or the option w of walking away without buying anything. A choice set S (a car lot) then has the form $\{v_1, v_2, ..., v_n, w\}$. For the consumer in the introduction, with an ordered set of desirable attributes, the first s attributes will be deal killers if each of these properties includes w. For example, if attribute 1, say having price less than \$30,000, and attribute 2, having a manual transmission, are deal killers then $w \in P(1)$ and $w \in P(2)$ and then a S that has no manual transmission car cheaper than \$30,000 will lead the consumer to walk. If every attribute is a deal killer, let w be in each $P(i)$ and add an extra property that repeats the final $P(i)$ but omits w. Then if there is a car in S with every desirable

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[3]For the agent, after reaching $P(j)$ in Definition 1, to execute a decision the agent must conclude that it would be pointless to consider any further properties. The agent can make this inference in two prominent cases: if M_j is a singleton or if M_j is a subset of a single indifference class (taking preferences as primitive in the latter case). The remaining cases are more problematic and 'finite termination' must be understood as an approximate description, as we will explain in section 6.

attribute it is chosen, and w is eliminated by the extra property; otherwise, every car in S is eliminated and w survives as the only option. ∎

Example 2 In the medical example in the introduction, an object of choice is a child who has had a fever for f days and is y years old, and who receives either the treatment $T = A$ if the antibiotic is prescribed or $T = NA$ if the antibiotic is not prescribed, hence a triple of the form (f, y, T). A choice set S is a $\{(f, y, A), (f, y, NA)\}$: any given child either does or does not receive the antibiotic. The checklist described in the introduction is then $P(1) = \{(f, y, T) : f < 2, T = NA\}$, $P(2) = \{(f, y, T) : y < 3, T = NA\}$, $P(3) = \{(f, y, T) : T = A\}$ which, as desired, ensures that only a child who has had a fever for two or more days and who is three or older receives the drug. There is a shorter checklist that delivers the same decision rule, the single property $Q(1) = P(1) \cup P(2) \cup \{(f, y, T) : f \geq 2, y \geq 3, T = A\}$. Evidently, because some alternatives do not group together naturally in the minds of decision-makers, the shortest possible checklist may not be the easiest to use. ∎

Example 3 (characteristics) In the spirit of Lancaster [16], we can recast the car example by viewing each car as a bundle of characteristics (horsepower, color, price, and so on). For any continuous characteristic, such as horsepower or price, there is a class of properties that we call 'coordinate cutoffs.' Suppose that there are two continuous characteristics and so $X = \mathbb{R}_+^2$. A coordinate cutoff is a property of the form $\{(x_1, x_2) : x_j \geq r\}$ or $\{(x_1, x_2) : x_j \leq r\}$ where j is the coordinate 1 or 2 and r is a real number. Coordinate cutoffs express categorical judgments about a single characteristic, e.g., if coordinate 1 is price and $P(1) = \{(x_1, x_2) : x_1 \leq 30{,}000\}$ then any car costing less than \$30,000 is ranked above any other car. For a picture of the preferences that can arise from coordinate cutoffs, all of the form $\{(x_1, x_2) : x_j \geq r\}$, see Figure 1, where the regions from worst to best are labeled 1 through 9 and the cutoff level of property $P(i)$ is labeled $r(i)$.

Properties in $\mathbb{R}_+^n$ of course do not have to be coordinate cutoffs. As a quick example, let coordinates 1 and 2 be two foods that make up a meal – say meat and potatoes. Then a property that placed a 800 calorie limit on the meal would be the 'calorie cutoff' $P(i) = \{(x_1, x_2) : k_1 x_1 + k_2 x_2 \leq 800\}$, where k_i is the number of calories per unit of food i. ∎

Figure 1: Coordinate cutoff preferences

Example 4 Suppose an agent has a preference relation $\succsim$ with n indifference classes, labeled $X(1), ..., X(n)$ going from worst to best. Let c be a choice function that maximizes $\succsim$ on some domain Σ. Then $P(1) = X(n)$, $P(2) = X(n-1)$, ..., $P(n-1) = X(2)$ is a finite checklist for c. ■

Example 4 is a worst case scenario: the checklist has only one fewer property than the number of indifference classes. An agent with a checklist of this sort could spend a long time eliminating alternatives before coming to a decision. Luckily, as we will see in section 4, the Example 4 checklists fail to be minimal when $n > 1$.

2.2   Extended checklists

We now present a more abstract model of checklists that allows sequences of properties to go beyond the standard counting numbers. Since the details of how this is done will not come up again until section 7, the reader can skip to section 3, noting only that any checklist in section 2.1 qualifies as an one of the 'extended checklists' that we now define.

In our earlier elimination procedure, each set of survivors $M_h(S)$ is a subset of its immediate predecessor $M_{h-1}(S)$. Since therefore $M_{i-1}(S) = \underset{k<i}{\cap} M_k(S)$, we could equivalently

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define the elimination by

$$M_0(S) = S$$

$$M_i(S) = \begin{cases} \underset{k<i}{\cap} M_k(S) \cap P(i) & \text{if } \underset{k<i}{\cap} M_k(S) \cap P(i) \neq \varnothing \\ \underset{k<i}{\cap} M_k(S) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

for each $i > 0$. This definition has the advantage that it can be applied to 'longer' sets of properties: we can weaken the assumption that the indices I in a checklist are a set of natural numbers and suppose instead that I is well-ordered by some $\leq$, setting 0 as the least element of I.[4] The assumption that I is well-ordered implies that each $i \in I$ has an immediate successor; thus the procession through the checklist of properties remains orderly. For an arbitrary well-ordered I, the above definition employs a variant of standard induction (transfinite induction) to specify each $M_i(S)$ as a function of its entire set of predecessors and $P(i)$.

We say that a choice function c has an **extended checklist** if c satisfies Definition 1 except that the $M_i(S)$ are defined as above and I is permitted to be any well-ordered set whose least element is 0.[5] The terminal step j continues to be defined as in Definition 1 but now need not be finite. Any standard checklist qualifies as an extended checklist, and conversely, if c has an extended checklist that 'finitely terminates' – for each $S \in \Sigma$, the index j identified in Definition 1 is finite – then c has a standard checklist since then we can excise all but the properties with finite indices.

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[4] A set A is *well-ordered* by $\leq$ if $\leq$ is a linear order (a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric relation) on A such that every nonempty subset of A has a least element a: $a \leq x$ for all $x \in A$. See Halmos [12] for the set theory concepts we use in this section.

[5] In terms of ordinal numbers, the distinction between standard and extended checklists is that the ordinal number of the former must be ω or less while the ordinal number of the latter is unrestricted. Also, notice that if we apply an arbitrary well-ordered set of properties to a choice set S, it could happen that $M_i(S)$ is empty for some i (when $\underset{k<i}{\cap} M_k(S) = \varnothing$). But if c has an extended checklist then this possibility does not arise since we require $c(S) \neq \varnothing$ for $S \in \Sigma$.

3   Checklists and preference maximization

We first show that any choice function that has a checklist maximizes a preference relation. This conclusion holds for extended checklists (and hence for standard checklists) and then the converse obtains. The result is valid no matter what the domain of the choice function; for example, it applies equally to budget sets in consumer theory and to finite sets.

Theorem 1 *A choice function has an extended checklist if and only if it maximizes a preference relation.*

Formal proofs are in the appendix. Since 'having an extended checklist,' as an assumption on choice functions, is equivalent to preference maximization, it is equivalent to any characterization of preference maximization for choice functions. For example, it is equivalent to the congruence formulation of the strong axiom of revealed preference (Richter [18]).

The 'only if' half of Theorem 1 says that an agent whose choices come from a checklist acts 'as if' he were maximizing a preference relation. Of course the agent does not have to think about preferences at all; the agent only needs to churn through his list of properties. But in fact it is easy to name the preference relation the agent implicitly maximizes. When a choice function has a checklist, we can identify each $x \in X$ with a sequence of 'ins' and 'outs' that indicate in any coordinate i whether x is in or is not in property $P(i)$, and declare $x \succsim y$ if the x and y sequences are identical or x scores an 'in' at the first coordinate where the sequences differ. This $\succsim$ defines a preference relation on X and c must maximize $\succsim$: if x is chosen from some S that also contains y then y could not score an 'in' before x does (this would eliminate x), and conversely if x is $\succsim$-maximizing on S then x can never be eliminated by any $y \in S$ since if there is a first property that has one of x and y but not both it must be y that is missing and is eliminated.[6]

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[6]A less general argument works via the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). A choice function with an extended checklist must satisfy WARP since if x is chosen when y is available it must be that if there is a first property $P(i)$ that contains either x or y but not both then $P(i)$ contains x, hence if y is chosen from any S that contains x then x must be chosen too. So on any domain where WARP implies that a choice function maximizes some preference relation, for example the finite subsets of X, a choice function with a checklist must also maximize a preference relation.

In fact, for a standard checklist P it is easy to strengthen the 'only if' half of Theorem 1. Suppose we write down the 'ins' and 'outs' as a sequence of 1's and 0's respectively. When P has finitely many properties, use 0's following the last property. For example, if P has four properties and $x \in P(1)$, $x \notin P(2)$, $x \notin P(3)$, $x \in P(4)$, the sequence for x is $1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ...$ Now we can read this sequence as the 0's and 1's of binary expansion of a number between 0 and 1; for the x above, this number is $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{16} = .5625$. Given a standard checklist P, each x has a 0 or 1 for each place in the binary expansion and thus defines a number in $[0, 1]$. Outside of a small class of exceptions, this number can serve as the utility of x for an agent who uses P! The reason is simply that these numbers can serve as a utility representation of the $\succsim$ defined in the previous paragraph.[7]

To state this result, define a choice function $c : \Sigma \to X$ to *maximize a utility function* if there exists a function $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $c(S) = \{x \in X : u(x) \geq u(y) \text{ for all } y \in X\}$ for all $S \in \Sigma$.

Theorem 2 *If a choice function has a standard checklist then it maximizes a utility function.*

Since lexicographic preferences cannot be represented by a utility function, we conclude that an agent who chooses with a standard checklist cannot have such preferences.[8] Checklist users, who at first glance seem not to make trade-offs, turn out to fit the textbook ideal of an economic consumer.

Example 5 (characteristics revisited) To eliminate the puzzle, suppose all of the properties in Example 3 are coordinate cutoffs of the form $\{(x_1, x_2) : x_j \geq r\}$, as in Figure 1. So if, e.g., $P(1) = \{(x_1, x_2) : x_1 \geq r\}$ then any bundle with $x_1 \geq r$ is ranked above any bundle with $x_1 < r$ according to the preferences maximized by any c that has $P(1)$ as its first property. Notice that in the four property checklist in Figure 1, the numbers in the figure can serve as utilities for the nine regions. If we increase the number of properties and let the cutoff levels 'fill in' each axis (become dense in $\mathbb{R}_+$), we approach preferences that have a strictly increasing utility function. But no matter how many coordinate cutoff

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[7]The exceptions are numbers in $[0, 1]$ with two binary representations, but this difficulty can be bypassed; see the proof of Theorem 2.

[8]On $\mathbb{R}_+^2$, for example, lexicographic preferences are defined by $x \succsim y$ if and only if $x_1 > y_1$ or $(x_1 = y_1$ and $x_2 \geq y_2)$.

properties an agent uses, the preferences that result *cannot* lexicographically rank bundles first according the level of coordinate 1 and second according the level of coordinate 2. That would require an *extended* checklist that begins with a countably infinite set of properties of type $\{(x_1, x_2) : x_1 \geq r\}$ (where the r's for these properties are dense in $\mathbb{R}_+$) and then proceeds to a countably infinite set of properties of type $\{(x_1, x_2) : x_2 \geq r\}$ (again with the r's dense in $\mathbb{R}_+$).

We turn to the other half of Theorem 1 – that any choice function c that maximizes a preference relation $\succsim$ has an extended checklist. A checklist can in fact be built from a familiar item, the better-than (weak upper-contour) sets of the preference relation $\succsim$: for each $x \in X$, set a property P_x equal to $\{y \in X : y \succsim x\}$, ignoring the duplicates that arise when $x \sim x'$. We then list – technically, we well-order – these properties to form an extended checklist. When this checklist is applied to some S, the agent will eventually hit a property P_x where $x \succsim y$ for all $y \in S$, whereupon no further eliminations occur.

When an agent has uncountably many indifference classes – the primary model of consumer theory – this construction is problematic; we have assembled a list of properties whose length goes beyond the natural numbers. Since such checklists need not finitely terminate, they are neither tractable nor realistic.[9] The conclusion in Theorem 1 that a preference-maximizing choice function has a checklist is therefore satisfying only when the preference relation has a finite or countable number of indifference classes; we then know that we can form a standard checklist (or in the finite case, recall Example 4). For checklists to furnish a plausible model when agents have uncountably many indifference classes, we must look for cases where agents can continue to make do with a standard checklist, where the elimination of options necessarily concludes after finitely many steps. Although finite termination might seem too ambitious a goal when an agent has uncountably many indifference classes, we will see that it can sometimes be achieved.

The problem of slow checklists can arise even when agents have finitely many indifference classes. To be useful, a checklist must execute quickly. An agent with n indifference classes who turns to the Example 4 checklist with $n - 1$ properties could end up with a procedure

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[9]The problem shows up in the proof of Theorem 1 when we take the nonconstructive step of well-ordering the upper contour sets to create the extended checklist.

that is plodding and profligate, not fast and frugal!

The rest of the paper addresses these points. Can an agent with finitely many indifference classes use a checklist that executes reasonably quickly? And can the agents of consumer theory use a standard checklist at all?

4   Finite checklists can always be quick

Suppose an agent maximizes a preference relation with n indifference classes (a finite number): what is the shortest checklist the agent can use? These indifference classes might be derived from some c that has a checklist. If the preference relation that c implicitly maximizes has n indifference classes then our question is, 'what is the shortest checklist for c?'.

Consider an example with four indifference classes

$$X = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$$

where the choice function c, defined on all subsets of X, maximizes the usual order $\geq$ on integers. It is easy to see that $P(1) = \{4, 3\}$, $P(2) = \{4, 2\}$ is a checklist for c.

Next, consider

$$X = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}$$

with c again maximizing $\geq$. Define the checklist $P(1) = \{8, 7, 6, 5\}$, $P(2) = \{8, 7, 4, 3\}$, $P(3) = \{8, 6, 4, 2\}$. Again, it is easy to verify that this is a checklist for c. (It suffices to consider just the two-element subsets of X.)

Notice how the first example is nested in the second: the last two properties $P(2)$ and $P(3)$ of the second example treat $\{5, 6, 7, 8\}$ and $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ just as P in the first example treats $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, with the additional first property $P(1)$ serving only to separate the two chains. So, we have provided a checklist with 2 properties for a preference relation with 4 levels, and a checklist with 3 properties for a preference relation with 8 levels. This conclusion extends inductively:

Theorem 3 *If c maximizes a preference relation with n indifference classes, then c has a checklist with k properties, where k is the smallest integer such that $2^k \geq n$. If in addition the domain of c includes all the two-element sets then the minimum number of properties in a checklist for c is k.*

Theorem 3 shows how checklists become more and more efficient as the number of indifference classes increases. Not only will the required number of properties as a proportion of the number of indifference classes n fall to zero as n increases, but it will do so at an exponential rate. Since $2^{20} \geq 1,000,000$, Theorem 3 explains the claim in the introduction that a 1,000,000 preference discriminations require only 20 checklist properties.[10]

The pertinent feature of a choice set is its highest indifference class; in the notation of the above examples, a decision maker needs to identify, given $S \subset \{1, ..., n\}$, the largest integer in S. The solution of this problem via 'yes or no' questions is a classic illustration of a binary search algorithm: first ask 'does S contain an integer between $\frac{n}{2}$ and n?', and then, if yes, ask 'does S contain an integer between $\frac{3n}{4}$ and n?' and, if no, ask 'does S contain an integer between $\frac{n}{4}$ and $\frac{n}{2}$?', and so on. That a recursive computer program, where the choice of the ith question depends on earlier answers, can execute this algorithm in $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$ steps is hardly news ($\lceil x \rceil$ denotes the least integer $\geq x$)).[11] What is notable about a checklist is that it executes the algorithm nonrecursively. A property $P(i)$ does not change as a function of the eliminations that occur prior to i, and every property is used for every S. To do without input from earlier steps, each property in effect encodes a set of questions. Consider again $X = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}$ and let m denote $\max S$. Then $P(1)$ 'asks' one question, 'is $m \in \{8, 7, 6, 5\}$?', $P(2)$ 'asks' two conditional questions, 'if $m \in \{8, 7, 6, 5\}$ then is $m \in \{8, 7\}$?' and 'if $m \notin \{8, 7, 6, 5\}$ then is $m \in \{4, 3\}$?, and $P(3)$ 'asks' four conditional questions. For $i > 1$, the eliminations prior to i ensure that only one of the antecedents of the $P(i)$ questions is satisfied. Property $P(i)$ therefore asks the right question, and without recursive instructions or an exhaustive tree of $n - 1$ 'if then' commands (where each answer to a command leads to a distinct subsequent command).

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[10]If c always selects a singleton, then Theorem 3 can be rephrased using the number of alternatives in X rather than the number of indifference classes.

[11]See, e.g., Knuth [15], chapter 6, Theorem B.

We can compare the efficiency of a checklist relative to an optimal tree of 'yes or no' questions. If we can ask questions of the form 'does S intersect $Y \subset \{1, ..., n\}$?', then, depending on the probabilities that particular integers lie in S, the minimum expected number of questions can be less than $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$. For example if it is highly likely that $m = \max S = 4$, then one can first ask 'does S intersect $\{5, 6, 7, 8\}$?' and if not 'does S intersect $\{4\}$?'. But if each $x \in X$ is equally likely to be m then $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$ is the minimum expected number of questions: the optimal tree does no better than the optimal checklist.[12]

5   Utility maximizers can have quick checklists

Finite checklists are appealingly concrete: there is a uniform upper bound on the number of properties the decision maker has to examine before the choice procedure terminates. In an arbitrary standard checklist, it remains true that each choice set needs to be checked against only finitely many properties but there might not be any bound on the number of properties that serves simultaneously for *all* choice sets. This small difference allows the reach of standard checklists to extend much further than finite checklists. Indeed, we will now see that, under a domain restriction, any agent who maximizes a utility function can use a standard checklist, which we label as 'quick' since the eliminations made by the checklist will end in a finite number of steps. Classical commodity consumers can thereby fit under the checklist umbrella.

Given a choice function c that maximizes a utility function u, we can build a standard checklist P by setting, for each rational number r, the property $P_r = \{x \in X : u(x) \geq r\}$ and then listing these properties in a standard checklist. The u-maximal alternatives in a S will never be eliminated: if at any stage i the set of survivors from the previous rounds contains some alternatives that are in $P(i)$, then the u-maximal alternatives must be among them. Conversely, any z in S that is not u-maximal will eventually be eliminated by a P_r such that r lies strictly between $u(z)$ and the maximum utility achieved by the alternatives in S. Thus, we have

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[12] If questions of the form 'is $m \in Y$?' are permitted, which is exactly the game 'Twenty questions,' Huffman coding [13] generates the optimal tree. See also Zimmerman [26], and Gilbert [10] for the connection to our problem.

Theorem 4 *If a choice function defined on a domain of finite sets maximizes a utility function then it has a standard checklist.*

Theorem 4 shows the power of standard checklists: they can mimic preference maximization even in some cases where a preference relation $\succsim$ has a continuum of indifference classes. In these cases, a standard checklist will, for any given choice set S, eliminate the inferior alternatives from S in a finite number of steps.

The following example shows that a domain restriction is required in Theorem 4.

Example 6 Let X be the interval $[0,1]$, let the domain of c be the closed sets in X, let the utility function $u : X \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that c maximizes be defined by $u(x) = x$, and suppose P is a standard checklist for c. Proposition 1 below shows we may assume that the checklist consists only of properties $P(i)$ that are weak or strict upper contour sets, i.e., sets of the form $\{x \in X : x \geq q\}$ or $\{x \in X : x > q\}$ for some $q \in X$. That is, if $\widehat{P}$ is a standard checklist for c then there is also a standard checklist P for c that consists solely of upper contour sets.

Assume then that there is a P that is a standard checklist for c that consists of upper contours. If we call glb(i) the greatest lower bound of $P(i)$, then there will be at most countably many glb(i) for the properties in P. Pick some $y \in X$ that is not one of these glb(i), and set $S = \{x \in X : x \leq y\}$. Then, for any i, $M_i(S)$ will equal the nonempty interval whose lower boundary equals max$\{\text{glb}(k) : \text{glb}(k) < y \text{ and } k \leq i\}$ and whose upper boundary equals y. (This interval contains y but may or may not contain its lower boundary.) Since $M_i(S) \neq \{y\} = c(S)$ for all i, P could not in fact be a checklist for c. ∎

That we may take a checklist in Example 6 to consist solely of (weak or strict) upper contours illustrates a wider principle. A set $U \subset X$ is an *upper cut of a preference relation* $\succsim$ *on* X if $(x \in U$ and $y \succsim x) \Longrightarrow y \in U$. For the preference relation $\geq$ on $\mathbb{R}$ (but not for an arbitrary preference relation), an upper cut must be a weak or strict upper contour set.

Proposition 1 (canonical checklists) *If c has a standard checklist and maximizes the preference relation $\succsim$, then c also has a standard checklist that consists solely of upper cuts of $\succsim$.*

If the domain of a choice function c is restricted sufficiently, c can maximize more than one preference relation; Proposition 1 applies to any these preference relations.

While Example 6 shows that some domain limitation is needed in Theorem 4, the restriction can be weakened. For instance, the conclusion of the theorem still holds on any domain that includes at most countably many infinite sets. But we do not have an attractive characterization of the maximum permissible domain. So, while the converse result, Theorem 2, is clearcut, the ideal way to fill the gap in 'A choice function ... if and only if it has a standard checklist' remains an open question.

6 Utility maximizers always have quick approximate checklists

As we have seen, the choice behavior of utility maximizers does not coincide exactly with that of agents who use a standard checklist (a domain restriction is necessary), nor of agents who use an extended checklist (since then we go beyond utility maximization to preference maximization). Nevertheless, standard checklists can closely *approximate* utility maximization regardless of the domain.

To capture the idea that a checklist can approximate the decision $c(S)$ we consider the limit of the set of survivors selected by a standard checklist: although the procedure never yields exactly the decision $c(S)$ at any finite step, it approximates $c(S)$ more and more accurately as the number of steps increases. In the limit, we get exact equivalence between the choices of standard checklist users and utility maximizers.

As no notion of distance is present in our set-up, we use a set-theoretic definition of the convergence of the $M_i(S)$. A choice function $c : \Sigma \to X$ has an **approximate checklist** if and only if there is a standard checklist P such that, for all $S \in \Sigma$,

$$c(S) = \bigcap_{i \in I} M_i(S),$$

where the $M_i(S)$ are defined from P as in section 2.1. Although after any finite number of steps the set of surviving alternatives may still contain other alternatives beside the chosen

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ones, it is only the chosen alternatives that survive all steps of elimination: for any alternative rejected by the choice function, there exists a property that it does not have.

Theorem 5 *A choice function maximizes a utility function if and only if it has an approximate checklist.*

Approximate checklists help explain how a standard checklist that has $\mathbb{N}$ as its set of indices would work practically. Such checklists can raise a termination problem: even when no further eliminations occur after some property $P(j)$, the agent may not know this fact. The agent will know it for choice functions that always select singletons or subsets of a single indifference class (see footnote 3). But in all other cases, the practical distinction between standard and approximate checklists is not sharp. For both of these checklist models, the agent would have to declare at some point that the set of alternatives has been winnowed down adequately.

7 Multivalued properties and the representation of preferences

While so far we have focussed on checklists as decision-making procedures, they can also be seen as a preference representation device. This section explores this possibility and the connection to Chipman [3]'s theory of lexicographic utility.

We can rephrase our initial model of standard checklists by replacing each property $P(i)$ with the indicator function of $P(i)$ – the function $u_i : X \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$ with $u_i(x) = 1$ if and only if $x \in P(i)$ – and redefining $M_i(S)$ to equal $\arg\max u_i(x)$ s.t. $x \in M_{i-1}(S)$ for all $i > 0$. Each of these newly defined $M_i(S)$ will coincide with our original definition of $M_i(S)$. For the more general case of extended checklists, we can instead use $M_i(S) = \arg\max u_i(x)$ s.t. $x \in \bigcap_{k<i} M_k(S)$ for $i > 0$.

This reformulation suggests replacing the u_i above with functions that have a larger range ('multivalued properties'). Among the prominent possibilities, we could admit any u_i that maps to a finite set with at least two elements, or any u_i that maps into $\mathbb{R}$. Indeed we could

go one step further and instead of functions, use a complete and transitive relation R_i on X, and set

$$M_i(S) = \{x \in \bigcap_{k<i} M_k(S) : xR_iy \text{ for all } y \in \bigcap_{k<i} M_k(S)\} \quad (2)$$

for $i > 0$. This last proposal is evidently the most general. Given a well-ordered set of indices I with least element 0 and a complete and transitive R_i for each $i \in I$, we call $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ a *multivalued checklist*. If each R_i has at most two indifference classes (our original model) we say $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ is a two-valued checklist, if the number of indifference classes of each R_i is finite we say $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ is a finite-valued checklist, and if each R_i has a real-valued utility representation we say $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ is a real-valued checklist.

With the $M_i(S)$ given by (2), we can define $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ to be a multivalued checklist for a choice function c by applying Definition 1.

Theorem 1 extends to any multivalued checklist: a choice function c has a multivalued checklist if and only if it maximizes a preference relation. The 'if' direction follows from our original statement of Theorem 1. For the 'only if' direction, some minor adjustments to the proof of Theorem 1 show that if $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ is a multivalued checklist for c then c maximizes the weak lexicographic order $\geq_L$ on X defined by[13]

$$x \geq_L y \iff [(xR_iy \text{ and } yR_ix \text{ for all } i \in I) \text{ or } (yR_ix \implies \exists k < i \text{ with } xR_ky)]. \quad (3)$$

Theorem 1's applicability to multivalued checklists suggests their use as a representation device. One way to proceed would be to say that a multivalued checklist $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ represents the preference relation $\succsim$ if $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ is a checklist for the choice function c, defined on finite subsets of X, that maximizes $\succsim$. But it is equivalent and simpler to omit any mention of choice functions and just say that a multivalued checklist $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ *represents the preference relation* $\succsim$ if $\succsim = \geq_L$ (as defined by (3)). Requiring that a checklist is n-valued (for $n =$ two, finite, real) provides a correspondingly more restrictive definition of representation.

A real-valued checklist is the definition of representation that Chipman [3] proposed in his classical work on utility theory.[14] To see that Chipman pitched his definition at the right level

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[13] This extension of Theorem 1 would not hold if the R_i were not required to be complete and transitive. See Manzini and Mariotti [17].

[14] We thank Chris Tyson for stressing the connection between our work and Chipman's. For a survey of

of generality, observe that with no restrictions on the admissible R_i, multivalued checklists can be trivial and have no value for representation purposes: any preference relation $\succsim$ can be represented by the multivalued checklist that consists of the single relation $\succsim$. Moreover, there are preference relations that can be 'concisely' represented by a real-valued checklist but that have neither a classical utility representation nor a 'concise' finite-valued checklist. The simplest example is the lexicographic ordering on $\mathbb{R}_+^2$, which can be represented by a real-valued checklist that consists of just two functions but where any finite-valued checklist representation must have an index set I that goes beyond $\mathbb{N}$ (this conclusion follows from Theorem 2). Thus real-valued checklists are restrictive enough to be useful but not so restrictive that they are always unwieldy. In fact, Chipman's construction would lose most of its value if we added even the smallest additional restriction on the admissible R_i, that each must have only countably many indifference classes: one may show that any such 'countably-valued' checklist that has an index set I that is finite or equal to $\mathbb{N}$ represents a preference relation that could also be represented by a classical utility function. To get a concise representation when a classical utility is unavailable, a real-valued checklist is required.

In our terminology, the main theorem in Chipman [3] states that any preference relation $\succsim$ can be represented by a real-valued checklist. Theorem 1 implies this result. Indeed, Chipman's proof uses utility functions with ranges that take on two values; thus, he implicitly showed that any $\succsim$ can be represented by a two-valued checklist, which is the content of Theorem 1.[15] Outside of Theorem 1, our results do not intersect with lexicographic utility theory, for the very reason that we restrict the range of the admissible R_i. The range restriction indeed exposes a rich structure hiding inside Chipman's theory; for example, the capacity of a two-valued checklist to make exponentially many preference discriminations has no parallel in the theory of real-valued checklists, since one real-valued function can by itself make infinitely many discriminations.

Finally, we note that our original model of two-valued checklists perform *reasonably* well as a representation tool. Chipman [4] showed that there are preferences relations that can be represented by only those real-valued checklists $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ that use a I that is uncountable.

Chipman's theory and related developments, see Fishburn [9].

[15] This result precedes Chipman in the mathematical literature on ordinal numbers, see Cuesta Dutari [5], [6] and Sierpinski [21].

Since Theorem 1 applies to such preference relations, they can be represented by two-valued checklists – as Chipman himself makes clear – though of course I must again be uncountable. Conversely, if a preference relation $\succsim$ is represented by a real-valued checklist $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$ with a set of indices I that is at most countable then it can be represented by a two-valued checklist where I is at most countable.[16] Real-valued checklists still have an edge: as we have seen, there are preference relations $\succsim$ that can be represented by a real-valued checklist with a set of indices that is finite or equal to $\mathbb{N}$ but where the only two-valued checklists that represent the same $\succsim$ have to use a set of indices with an ordinal number larger than $\mathbb{N}$. Of course it is this 'drawback' of two-valued checklists that guarantees the tight connection between their tractability as a decision procedure – that they terminate after finitely many steps – and utility maximization. Two-valued checklists have to use a set of properties that goes beyond $\mathbb{N}$ to represent a $\succsim$ in just the cases where $\succsim$ has no utility representation.

8   Concluding remarks

Since Simon's [22] contribution, we have been used to thinking of 'procedural rationality' as entirely separate from, and even in opposition to, 'substantive rationality.' This paper leads to a different view. We have considered a tractable, realistic procedure that can underpin utility maximization, thus blurring Simon's distinction.

There are ways to choose by checklist that do not fit the model of this paper. Consider a consumer shopping for a camera, who first looks for cameras on the top shelf, then for those priced between \$225 and \$250, and then for those with black finish. This agent could choose different cameras from stores that stocked the same set of cameras but put them on different shelves. Moreover, the properties (sets of cameras) in this list can differ by store whereas checklists as we have defined them are fixed across choice sets S. If we think of a store as a choice set, our model rules out this agent's choice procedure. Rubinstein and Salant [20]

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[16]To build a two-valued checklist from such a $\{R_i\}_{i \in I}$, it is easiest to use our notation for properties. For each R_i, there is an countable set $D_{R_i} \subset X$ that is R_i-order-dense. Hence for each R_i there is a function d_{R_i} that maps $\mathbb{N}$ onto D_{R_i} and we can define a property $P_{R_i}(j) = \{x \in X : x\, R_i\, d_{R_i}(j)\}$ for each 'index' (R_i, j) in the countable set $\{R_i\}_{i \in I} \times \mathbb{N}$. We define a well-ordering $\preceq$ of $\{R_i\}_{i \in I} \times \mathbb{N}$ by setting $(R_i, j) \preceq (R_m, l) \Leftrightarrow ((j \leq l \text{ and } i = m) \text{ or } i < m)$. It is easy to confirm that these properties as ordered by $\preceq$ define a two-valued checklist that represents $\succsim$.

better fits this example: the alternatives in each choice problem are presented to the decision maker in an exogenously specified order (e.g., the element on the top shelf is seen before the element on the next shelf). A choice problem is then an ordered list of alternatives $(a_1, ..., a_k)$, and a choice function associates each such list with one of its elements.

Although we believe that the checklist model is new to economics, we should mention Rubinstein [19], who underlines the potential importance of unary relations (what we call 'properties') in decision making. Although distantly related, that work was the initial stimulus for this project.

9 Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1: Let the choice function c have the extended checklist P. We identify each $x \in X$ with the vector $p_x \in \{0,1\}^I$ given by $p_x(i) = 1$ if $x \in P(i)$ and $p_x(i) = 0$ if $x \notin P(i)$ (of course each p_x can be associated with many alternatives). We order $\{0,1\}^I$ lexicographically: for $p, q \in \{0,1\}^I$, define $\geq_L$ by $p \geq_L q \iff (q(i) > p(i) \implies \exists k < i$ with $p(k) > q(k))$. The asymmetric and symmetric parts of $\geq_L$ are labeled $>_L$ and $=_L$ respectively. To conclude that $\geq_L$ is a linear order, we could appeal to the fact that the lexicographic order of any family of linear orders with well-ordered indices must itself be a linear order. But to argue directly, completeness follows from the fact that (1) if $p = q$ then $(q(i) > p(i) \implies \exists k < i$ with $p(k) > q(k))$ obtains vacuously, while (2) if $p \neq q$ then the well-ordering of I implies that $j = \min\{i : p(i) \neq q(i)\}$ is well-defined and hence $p >_L q$ if $p(j) > q(j)$ and $q >_L p$ if $q(j) > p(j)$. Case (2) also yields antisymmetry. For transitivity, if $p =_L q =_L r$ then $p = q = r$ and hence $p =_L r$. If on the other hand $p \geq_L q >_L r$ or $p >_L q \geq_L r$ set $j = \min\{i : p(i) \neq q(i)$ or $q(i) \neq r(i)\}$. Then $p(j) \geq q(j) \geq r(j)$ with at least one strict inequality. Hence $p(j) > r(j)$ and $p(i) = r(i)$ for $i < j$, i.e., $p >_L r$.

Let $\succsim$ now denote the relation on X given by $x \succsim y \iff p_x \geq_L p_y$: since $\geq_L$ on $\{0,1\}^I$ is a linear order, $\succsim$ on X is a preference relation. To see that for any $S \in \Sigma$, $c(S) = \{x \in S : x \succsim y$ for all $y \in S\}$, suppose first that $x \in c(S)$. If $y \succ x$ for some $y \in S$ and we set $j = \min\{i : p_x(i) \neq p_y(i)\}$ then the fact that $x \in M_i(S)$ for all $i < j$ implies that $y \in M_i(S)$ for all $i < j$. But since $y \in P(j)$ and $x \notin P(j)$, $x \notin M_j(S)$, contradicting

$x \in c(S)$. Conversely suppose $x \in S$ and $x \succsim y$ for all $y \in S$. Then, since $c(S)$ is nonempty, $x \succsim z$ for some $z \in c(S)$. Since $z \in M_i(S)$ for all i, $x \succsim z$ implies $\{i : p_x(i) \neq p_z(i)\} = \varnothing$ (otherwise z would be eliminated at $\min\{i : p_x(i) \neq p_z(i)\}$). So $x \in M_i(S)$ for all i, i.e., $x \in c(S)$.

Now suppose that c maximizes some preference relation $\succsim$. To construct a checklist, let $I = X \cup \{0\}$ and let $\leq$ be a well-ordering of I with $0 < x$ for any $x \in X$. (This is a nonconstructive step: the principle that any set can be well-ordered relies on the axiom of choice.) For each $x \in X$ define $P(x) = \{y \in X : y \succsim x\}$. Fix $S \in \Sigma$ and some $x \in c(S)$. Then, for any $z \in X$ with $x \notin P(z)$, the fact that $x \succsim y$ for $y \in S$ and the transitivity of $\succsim$ imply $y \notin P(z)$ for any $y \in S$. So, for any $z \in X$, if $x \in \cap_{w<z} M_w(S)$ then $x \in M_z(S)$. Since $x \in M_0(S)$, transfinite induction implies that $x \in M_z(S)$ for all $z \in X$. Moreover, for all $y \notin c(S)$, $y \notin P(x)$ and so $y \notin M_x(S)$. Finally observe that $M_z(S) = M_x(S)$ for all z such that $x \leq z$, so that the terminal step j in Definition 1 is well defined. ∎

Proof of Theorem 2: Let c have a standard checklist $P : I \to 2^X$. As in Theorem 1, given P, each $x \in X$ can be associated with a unique $p_x \in \{0,1\}^I$, where the ith component is defined by $p_x(i) = 1$ if $x \in P(i)$ and $p_x(i) = 0$ if $x \notin P(i)$. Define $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ by

$$u(x) = \sum_{i \in I} \frac{p_x(i)}{3^i}.$$

Since $\sum_{j>i} \frac{1}{3^j} < \frac{1}{3^i}$ for any $i \in I$, this u is a utility representation for $\succsim$, where, as in the proof of Theorem 1, $\succsim$ is the preference relation $\succsim$ on X induced by the lexicographic order $\geq_L$ on $\{0,1\}^I$. (A utility representation for $\succsim$ is a u such that $x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow u(x) \geq u(y)$.) The proof of Theorem 1 also shows that $c(S) = \{x \in X : x \succsim y \text{ for all } y \in X\}$ for all $S \in \Sigma$. Hence $c(S) = \{x \in X : u(x) \geq u(y) \text{ for all } y \in X\}$. ∎

Proof of Theorem 3: For any n, let $1, ..., n$ denote the indifference classes of the preference relation $\succsim$ and let the linear order over $\{1, ..., n\}$ that c induces be $\geq$ (the standard order on the integers). That is, $g \geq h$ for $g, h \in \{1, ..., n\}$ if and only if, for all $x \in g$ and $y \in h$, $x \succsim y$. It is sufficient to consider a choice function c defined on subsets of $\{1, ..., n\}$ that always selects the $\geq$-maximal element. Specifically, if $\widehat{c}$ is the choice function that maximizes $\succsim$, then let S be in the domain of c if and only if there is a $\widehat{S}$ in the domain of $\widehat{c}$

such that $\Big((x \in \widehat{S} \text{ and } x \in g) \Longrightarrow g \in S\Big)$ and $\Big(g \in S \Longrightarrow (\exists x \in \widehat{S} \text{ such that } x \in g)\Big)$.

Both conclusions of the theorem hold for $n = 1$ since the empty set of properties is minimal. So assume henceforth that $n > 1$.

Regarding minimality, suppose c has a checklist P with s properties. As in the proof of Theorem 1, identify each $x \in \{1, ..., n\}$ with the $p_x \in \{0, 1\}^s$ given by $p_x(i) = 1$ if $x \in P(i)$ and $p_x(i) = 0$ if $x \notin P(i)$. Since there are 2^s elements in $\{0, 1\}^s$ and given that $n > 1$, $2^s < n$ would imply that $p_x = p_y$ for some distinct pair $x, y \in \{1, ..., n\}$. Since the domain of c contains the two-element sets, then $\{x, y\} \in \Sigma$ and thus $c(\{x, y\}) = \{x, y\}$, contradicting the assumption that c maximizes $\geq$. So for this domain we cannot have $2^s < n$.

Regarding 'there exists a checklist with k properties, where k is the smallest integer such that $2^k \geq n$,' suppose this claim holds for $1, ..., n-1$. Partition $\{1, ..., n\}$ into $Z_l = \{1, ..., m\}$ and $Z_u = \{m+1, ..., n\}$, where $m = n/2$ if n is even and $m = (n+1)/2$ if n is odd. Then, since $n > 1$, we have $2^{k-1} \geq |Z_r|$ for both $r = l$ and $r = u$. The induction hypothesis implies that $c|Z_u$ (the choice function defined by restricting c to subsets of Z_u) has a checklist $P = (P(1), ..., P(k-1))$ and that $c|Z_l$ has a checklist $P' = (P'(1), ..., P'(k-1))$. Define the checklist Q by $Q(1) = Z_u$ and $Q(i+1) = P(i) \cup P'(i)$ for $i = 1, ..., k-1$.

For any checklist R, let $M_i^R(S)$ denote the ith set of survivors when R is applied to the choice set S.

To see that Q is a checklist for c, notice first that if $S \in Z_u$ then $M_k^Q(S) = M_{k-1}^Q(S) = c|Z_u(S \cap Z_u) = c(S)$, and similarly if $S \in Z_l$ then $M_k^Q(S) = c(S)$. For all S that contain both elements of Z_l and elements of Z_u, application of $Q(1)$ yields $M_1^Q(S) = S \cap Q(1) = S \cap Z_u$. Since $Q(i+1) \cap Z_u = P(i)$, for $i = 1, ..., k-1$, application of properties $Q(2)$ through $Q(k)$ yields $M_k^Q(S) = M_{k-1}^P(S \cap Z_u) = c|Z_u(S \cap Z_u) = c(S)$. ∎

Proof of Theorem 4: Given a choice function c that maximizes a utility function u, define for each rational r, the property $P_r = \{x \in X : u(x) \geq r\}$. We define a checklist P by letting $f : \mathbb{Q} \to \mathbb{N}$ be a bijection that enumerates the rationals and setting $P(i) = P_{f^{-1}(i)}$ for each $i \in \mathbb{N}$. Let S be a finite choice set. Then S has at least one u-maximal element, i.e., a $y \in S$ such that $u(y) \geq u(z)$ for all $z \in S$. Moreover, if y is u-maximal in S then the checklist P can never eliminate y: if $y \in M_{i-1}(S)$ and $z \in M_{i-1}(S) \cap P(i)$ then $y \in P(i)$ as well (since $u(y) \geq u(z)$) and hence y survives to stage i. If, on the other hand, $z \in S$

is not u-maximal then there is a u-maximal $y \in S$ and a property $P(f(r)) = P_r$ for some rational r such that $u(z) < r < u(y)$ and therefore z must be eliminated by property P_r if $z \in M_{i-1}(S)$. ∎

Proof of Proposition 1: Let c with domain Σ have the standard checklist P and let I be the indices of P. We know from the proof of Theorem 1 that c maximizes the preference relation $\succsim$ on X defined by $w \succsim z \iff p_w \geq_L p_z$, where $p_w \in \{0,1\}^I$ is given by $p_w(k) = 1 \iff w \in P(k)$ and $\geq_L$ is the lexicographic order on $\{0,1\}^I$. Define the countable family $\mathcal{P}$ of upper cuts of $\succsim$ by $P_q = \{w \in X : p_w \geq_L q\} \in \mathcal{P}$ if and only if $q \in \{0,1\}^I$ has finitely many coordinates k such that $q(k) = 1$. Enumerate $\mathcal{P}$ by a bijection $\kappa : \mathcal{P} \longrightarrow \widehat{I}$, where $\widehat{I}$ is well-ordered with least element 0, which defines a standard checklist $\widehat{P}$ and thus, for any $S \in \Sigma$, a sequence of survivor sets $\widehat{M}_i(S)$. Since P is a standard checklist for c, for every $S \in \Sigma$ there is an index $j \in I$ such that if $y \in S \backslash c(S)$ then the first index $i \in I$ such that $y \notin M_i(S)$ satisfies $i \leq j$; for any $y \in S \backslash c(S)$, let $i(y)$ denote this index i. Fix some $x \in c(S)$. Since each $\widehat{P}(k)$ is an upper cut of $\succsim$ and c maximizes $\succsim$, $x \in \widehat{M}_k(S)$ for all $k \in \widehat{I}$ (see the proof of Theorem 1). For any $y \in S \backslash c(S)$, we have $x \in P(i(y))$ and $y \notin P(i(y))$ while $x \in P(k) \iff y \in P(k)$ for $k < i(y)$. Thus

$$p_x \geq_L q^{i(y)} >_L p_y$$

where, for any index i, $q^i \in \{0,1\}^I$ is defined by $q^i(k) = x(k)$ for $k \leq i$ and $q^i(k) = 0$ for $k > i$. Thus, for the index $l = \kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}})$, $x \in \widehat{P}_l(S)$ and $y \notin \widehat{P}_l(S)$ and so $y \notin \widehat{M}_l(S)$. Since for any $y \in S \backslash c(S)$ the index $\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}})$ must be drawn from the finite set $J = \{l \in \widehat{I} : l = \kappa(P_{q^i})$ for some $i \leq j\}$, $\widehat{M}_{\max J}(S) = c(S)$. Thus c has a standard checklist that consists of upper cuts of $\succsim$.

If in addition c maximizes the preference relation $\succsim'$, define the standard checklist P' by setting $P'(k) = \{z \in X : z \succsim' w$ for some $w \in \widehat{P}(k)\}$ for each $k \in \widehat{I}$, and survivor sets $M_i'(S)$. The transitivity of $\succsim'$ implies that, for any $k \in \widehat{I}$, $P'(k)$ is an upper cut of $\succsim'$. Consider some $S \in \Sigma$ and suppose $x \in c(S)$ and $y \in S \backslash c(S)$. As in the previous paragraph, $x \in M_k'(S)$ for each $k \in \widehat{I}$. Moreover, $x \in P'(\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}}))$ since $x \in \widehat{P}(\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}}))$ and $\succsim'$ is reflexive, while $y \notin P'(\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}}))$ since otherwise there would be a $w \in \widehat{P}(\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}}))$ with

$y \succsim' w$ and therefore, since $\widehat{P}(\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}}))$ is an upper cut, $y \in \widehat{P}(\kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}}))$. Hence $y \notin M_l'(S)$ for $l = \kappa(P_{q^{i(y)}})$ and therefore $M_{\max J}'(S) = c(S)$. ∎

Proof of Theorem 5: The part of the proof of Theorem 1 that shows that a c with a checklist $P : I \longrightarrow 2^X$ maximizes the $\succsim$ induced by the lexicographic order on $\{0,1\}^I$ never uses the fact that P finitely terminates. The proof of Theorem 2 therefore also does not use finite termination, and so that proof establishes the 'if' part of the present Theorem. For the 'only if' part, where we are given a utility u that represents some $\succsim$ and a c that maximizes u, we use the same checklist constructed in the proof of Theorem 4. Once again for any $y \in c(S)$ and $i \in I$, we have $y \in M_i(S) \Longrightarrow y \in M_{i+1}(S)$ and therefore $y \in M_i(S)$ for all $i \in I$. And for all $z \in S \backslash \{c(S)\}$, where therefore $y \succ z$ for any $y \in c(S)$, there must exist $P(i) = P_r$ such that $u(z) < r < u(y)$. So it must be that $z \notin \cap_{i \in I} M_i(S)$, and thus $c(S) = \cap_{i \in I} M_i(S)$. ∎

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