Categorize Then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice and Welfare

Paola Manzini  
Queen Mary, University of London and IZA

Marco Mariotti*  
Queen Mary, University of London

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Abstract

If people are irrational, how are they irrational? And how can we describe their behavior and perform welfare analysis? We study the question theoretically and experimentally. We propose a boundedly rational decision model where agents categorize alternatives before choosing. This model offers a solution to the problem of making welfare judgements on the basis of choice data produced by boundedly rational decision makers. In an experiment, we first show ‘menu effects’ to drive irrationality more than cycles of choice. Then, by using a ‘revealed preference’ methodology, we show that a version of the Categorise Then Choose model we propose performs best (in terms of the Selten score of predictive success) in a group of models.

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1 Introduction

If people are inconsistent in their choices, how are they inconsistent? And how can we describe their behavior and perform welfare analysis? In the textbook description of a decision maker, choice behavior results from the maximization of some binary preference relation, possibly summarized by a utility function. Yet, choice behavior is often incompatible with this model.\(^1\) This is problematic not only at the descriptive level, but also at the normative one: if there is no utility, how can an external observer make welfare judgements on the basis of choice data? This paper offers two main contributions, one theoretical and one empirical. The empirical contribution is to study experimentally the general nature of choice inconsistencies which lead to violations of the utility maximization model. The theoretical contribution is to characterize a specific new model of boundedly rational choice behavior that responds to the descriptive and to the normative challenge. Together, these contributions make some headway in answering the opening question of the papers.

By relying on a theoretical result which classifies choice ‘anomalies’ into two elementary distinct phenomena (pairwise cycles and menu effects), we present laboratory choice data that identify one of the two types of violation as far more relevant than the other. The bulk of experimental literature on decision ‘anomalies’ has focussed on testing pairwise preferences between alternatives. This necessarily leads to disregarding menu effects. And in general, neglecting choices from non-binary sets, which are easily elicited, amounts to discarding an enormous amount of information: out of a grand set of 4 alternatives, there are only 64 possible different observations of pairwise choice, but over 20,000 patterns of choice from subsets: thus, many individuals who look indistinguishable on the basis of their pairwise choices might be distinguished by observing their ‘higher order’ choices. In this way, we also show that while the majority of individuals exhibits choice inconsistencies that are incompatible with utility maximization (specifically, they violate the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, or WARP in short), the large majority of them nevertheless exhibits a weaker but distinctive form of choice consistency (specifically, they satisfy a weaker property than WARP, WWARP in short, introduced in Manzini and Mariotti

\(^1\)See e.g. Roelofsma and Read [29], Tversky [40], and Waite [41] who find evidence of pairwise cycles of choice. Additional discussion on cycles is contained in Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8]. Menu effects are another important class of choice anomalies which is widely discussed in the marketing and consumer research literature in several guises (e.g. ‘attraction effects’ and ‘compromise effects’), as well as in economics: see e.g. Masatlioglu and Nakajima [25], Eliaz and Spiegler [10] The evidence presented in this paper points to further violations of rational behavior.
This opens the possibility of describing behavior through an enriched model of preference maximization, and brings us to the second main goal of this paper.

We introduce a decision making procedure (‘Categorize Then Choose’, henceforth CTC) based on the idea that, prior to the maximization of preferences, a decision maker simplifies his task by categorizing alternatives and focusing on ‘winning’ categories. Only in the second stage does he maximize a binary preference relation, and indeed pick an alternative which is preferred to all surviving alternatives. Categorization is a natural simplifying operation for a decision maker to perform in the presence of choice sets which are sufficiently rich, either in terms of the number of objects to compare, or in terms of the features of the alternatives to be compared (or both). Suppose you find yourself in a new town, and the hotel provides you with a long list of restaurants to choose from for dinner. You first categorize restaurants (for example) by type of cuisine, decide that you prefer an Italian restaurant, and then pick (what you believe to be) the best Italian (maybe the hotel list will have actually performed the categorization for you, or maybe you’ll just ignore the non-Italian restaurants when skimming down the list). Observe that this is perfectly compatible with your picking a Mexican restaurant over an Italian one, were you to focus just on these two, sitting at the two sides of the hotel. Or, looking for a mortgage plan and trying to find your way in a maze of product offerings, you first focus on a category of products (say, fixed rate mortgages), and then pick the best in that category. The CTC model formalizes this type of boundedly rational choice procedure.\(^3\)

In this way we are able to explain both cycles of choice and other even more important violations of the pure preference maximization model, without completely abandoning the central idea of the maximization of a binary preference relation on alternatives. Importantly, while in general a set of observed choice data is compatible with several categorization schemes, the CTC model permits to recover uniquely the underlying binary relation which is being maximized in the post-categorization stage, on the basis of observed choice data alone. This is claimed in the sense that the preference relation being optimized is the same across all possible categorizations that rationalize the choice data. In the more permissive version of the CTC model, the recovered preference relation may be ‘garbled’\(^2\).

\(^2\)WWARP adds to WARP the clauses between brackets in the following definition: if \(x\) is directly revealed preferred to \(y\) [both in pairwise contests and in the presence of a ‘menu’ of other alternatives], then \(y\) cannot be directly revealed preferred to \(x\) [in the presence of a smaller menu].

\(^3\)While we argue that the procedure we propose is an efficient response to complexity. It is interesting to note that even the utility maximization model can be given an efficient procedural foundation in terms of operations of categorization, provided a sufficient number of categories and a sufficient number of steps is allowed. See Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti [19] for details. And Salant [35] argues that there is a sense in which utility maximization is computationally efficient.
to some extent (i.e. contain cycles), but, to repeat, it will be ‘rational’ to the extent that the chosen alternative will always be strictly preferred to all the alternatives surviving the first stage. In addition we also introduce a more restrictive version of the CTC model, where the preference relation is transitive, and so it coincides with the preference relation of textbook decision makers.

The uniqueness of the preference representation is important for welfare analysis. It is an ongoing puzzle how to perform welfare judgements in the presence of boundedly rational decision makers. Recent important attacks to this problem (Bernheim and Rangel [5], Green and Hojman [13]) have both proposed methods that allow an external observer to make partial welfare rankings on the basis of standard observed choice data. However, [13] do so on the basis of a theory that while normatively meaningful, is empty from the positive point of view: it does not exclude any conceivable choice behavior and it is therefore not falsifiable. We think it is of interest to have a theory of boundedly rational choice that, like the textbook model, has a strong positive content as well as a normative content. Moreover, both methods proposed by [5] and by [13] are by design normatively incomplete: even if all choices by a decision maker are observed, it is not possible in general to infer a complete welfare ranking when these choices violate WARP (so that the set of welfare maximal elements is large). In contrast, the transitive CTC model, which holds under less restrictive conditions than WARP, permits complete welfare inferences.\footnote{Another recent important contribution by Chambers and Hayashi [7] also proposes a theory of welfare analysis for (possibly) boundedly rational decision makers. However, the nature of that model is rather different from our and the other mentioned contributions, in that the primitive is a stochastic choice function.}

The CTC model is fully characterized in terms of few, simple conditions on observable data on choices out of feasible sets. This permits direct, simple and nonparametric tests of the model. In this sense, we follow a standard ‘revealed preference’ economic approach as pioneered by Samuelson [34]. In both the permissive version (characterized by the single property WWARP) and the restrictive version (characterized by WWARP and the condition that pairwise choices are acyclic) the CTC model performs very well in explaining our experimental data. Of course, any other model characterized by WWARP would perform just as well as the permissive CTC model, notably the recent ‘Rationalization’ model proposed by Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8]. This shows that sometimes we might need even richer sets of choice data, or non-choice data, to discern which model the decision makers are actually following. Fortunately, however, we shall be able to distinguish by choice data alone the restrictive versions of the rationalization and the CTC model.
Before summarizing in more detail our experimental findings, let us dwell on the behavioral properties we test. If you pick option A over option B, option B over option C and option C over option A, you have exhibited a \textit{pairwise cycle of choice}. If you pick option A over both option B and option C in binary comparisons, but you do not pick option A when choosing between A, B and C, then you exhibit an elementary form of \textit{menu dependence}. If a choice behavior is not consistent with WARP, it either exhibits pairwise cycles or menu dependence (or both). This is a useful classification of ‘irrationality’, because it zeroes in on two very different aspects of it: one involving only binary comparisons, and one involving the ability to use binary comparisons to make higher order choices form larger sets.

In the experiment we test the violations of these two elementary properties, as well as the axioms characterizing alternative decision making procedures. We use as choice alternatives time sequences of monetary rewards. We elicit two entire choice functions from each subject, over the domain of all subsets of a grand set of four alternatives. This allows us to have a much richer and informative dataset than the more frequent method of eliciting only the binary choices over alternatives, which could never detect menu dependence. Our data show that \textit{WARP is violated by a majority of subjects}. Is this due prevalently to pairwise cyclical choices or to menu dependence? In our context, more than 15% pairwise cyclical choices were observed. But, interestingly, these violations of full rationality were strongly associated with menu effects. Menu effects are largely responsible for failures of WARP. The consequence of this fact is that in this case any procedure that fails to account for menu effects will not make a significant improvement of the standard maximization model on the basis of our data.

Our main experimental finding is that models which are characterized by WWARP, such as the CTC model and the Rationalization model, yield a step change in explanatory power in the present case. Indeed, the \textit{large majority of subjects satisfies WWARP} in all their choices. Note well: this is not simply a consequence of the fact that WWARP, being a weaker axiom, is able to bring in most of the observed choices. We demonstrate this by using \textit{Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success}, which takes into account not only the ‘hit rate’ of a model (proportion of correctly predicted observations), but also its ‘parsimony’ (inversely measured by the proportion of possible cases in principle compatible with the model). Using our data, the CTC model scores higher than Full Rationality also in terms of Selten’s Measure. This is true in both its permissive version (which allows pairwise cycles) and in its restricted version (which forbids pairwise cycles and demands the preference relation to be transitive).
We present the theoretical results in section 2, while the experiment is discussed in section 3. Section 4 concludes.

2 Theory

2.1 Preliminaries

Let \( X \) be a finite set of alternatives. The situations in which the decision maker may find himself are described by the domain of choice, a collection of nonempty subsets (choice sets) \( \Sigma \subset 2^X \). A choice function on \( \Sigma \) is a function \( \gamma : \Sigma \to X \) such that \( \gamma(S) \in S \) for all \( S \in \Sigma \), which describes the decision maker’s behavior, namely his selection from each choice set in the domain. The only additional assumption on the domain \( \Sigma \) is that all pairs of alternatives are included in the domain, that is: for all distinct \( x, y \in X \), \( \{x, y\} \in \Sigma \).

For a binary relation \( \succ \in X \times X \) denote the \( \succ \) –maximal elements of a set \( S \in \Sigma \) by \( \max(S, \succ) \), that is:

\[
\max(S, \succ) = \{x \in S | \nexists y \in S \text{ for which } y \succ x\}
\]

**Definition 1** A choice function is fully rational if there exists a complete order \( \succ \) on \( X \) such that \( \{\gamma(S)\} = \max(S, \succ) \) for all \( S \in \Sigma \).

As is well-known,\(^5\) in the present context the fully rational choice functions are exactly those that satisfy Samuelson’s [34] Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), defined below:

**WARP**: If \( x = \gamma(S), y \in S \text{ and } x \in T \) then \( y \neq \gamma(T) \).

WARP says that if an alternative is directly revealed preferred to another, the latter alternative can never be directly revealed preferred to the former (revealed preference is an asymmetric relation).

Failures of WARP may mix together more than one elementary form of inconsistency. To reduce the lack of full rationality to its building blocks (to be studied in the experiment), we consider two conceptually distinct and very basic violations of WARP, menu dependence and pairwise inconsistency. The latter category involves exclusively choices between *pairs* of alternatives, while the former category involves choices from larger sets.

\(^5\)See e.g. Moulin [27] or Suzumura [39]
The following property captures the elementary form of menu independence:

**Condorcet consistency**: If \( x = \gamma(x, z) \) for all \( z \in S \setminus \{x\} \) for some \( S \in \Sigma \), then \( x = \gamma(S) \).

Condorcet consistency says that if the same alternative is chosen in pairwise contests against any other alternative in a set, then this alternative will be chosen from the set.

Let \( \succ \) denote the base relation of a choice function \( \gamma \), that is \( x \succ y \) if and only if \( x = \gamma(x, y) \). A set \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \) is a is a base cycle of \( \gamma \) if \( x_i \succ x_{i+1} \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n-1 \) and \( x_1 = x_n \).

**Pairwise consistency**: There is no base cycle of \( \gamma \).

This is the classification result, decomposing WARP into Condorcet and Pairwise consistency, which we shall use in the experiment.\(^6\)

**Proposition 1** Suppose that all triples \( \{x, y, z\} \) are in \( \Sigma \). Then a choice function on \( \Sigma \) satisfies WARP if and only if satisfies both Condorcet consistency and Pairwise consistency.

**Proof**: It is obvious that a choice function that violates Condorcet consistency also violates WARP. Suppose it violates pairwise consistency. Then, since each pair of alternatives is in \( \Sigma \) by assumption, any \( \succ \) cycle includes a \( \succ \) cycle involving only three alternatives. That is, there exist \( x, y, z \in X \) for which \( x \succ y \succ z \), and \( z \succ x \), so that WARP is contradicted (since \( \{x, y, z\} \in \Sigma \) by assumption).

For the converse implication, suppose that \( \gamma \) violates WARP, and let in particular \( S, T \in \Sigma \) be such that \( x = \gamma(S) \neq y = \gamma(T) \), \( x, y \in T \cap S \). Suppose that \( \gamma \) satisfies pairwise consistency: we show that then \( \gamma \) must violate Condorcet consistency. By pairwise consistency there exist \( \succ \) maximal elements in \( S \) and \( T \). Since \( \succ \) is asymmetric and complete, these elements are unique. So there are unique and distinct \( s \in S \) and \( t \in T \) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
s & = \gamma(\{s, z\}) \text{ for all } z \in S \setminus \{s\} \\
t & = \gamma(\{t, z\}) \text{ for all } z \in T \setminus \{t\}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^6\)In Manzini and Mariotti [20] we prove an analogous but weaker result on a much less general domain (the inductive method of proof used there would not work on the present domain).
If \( s \neq x \), then Condorcet consistency is violated on \( S \). If \( s = x \), then in particular \( x = \gamma(\{x, y\}) \). So \( y \neq t \) and Condorcet consistency is violated on \( T \).\(^7\)

## 2.2 Categorize Then Choose

As discussed in the introduction, the basic idea of the new choice procedure proposed in this paper is that decision makers respond to complexity by going through an initial ‘categorization’ stage. This appears very natural as soon as the set of alternatives exhibits some complexity. Indeed related ideas have been considered in psychology, where categorization is a central concept in the analysis of human reasoning.\(^8\) The grouping into categories occurs on the basis of some criterion, and a traditional criterion considered in psychology is ‘similarity’, with each category comprised of alternatives which are ‘similar’ to each other.\(^9\) However many other methods for categorization may apply, depending on context.\(^10\) In our formal model we eschew this difficult and still open issue to focus directly on the categories, and their role in decision making, rather than how they arise from the underlying categorization method. The categorization stage is helpful in simplifying the decision process because it allows the decision maker to ignore entire categories which look inferior (in the restaurant example of the introduction, the category ‘Italian restaurants’ trumps all other restaurants). Formally, we assume that categories can be (partially) compared:

**Definition 2** A rationale by categorization on \( X \) is an asymmetric (possibly incomplete) relation \( \succ \) on \( 2^X \) satisfying the following two properties:

\[
\begin{align*}
(i) & \quad R \cap S = \emptyset \text{ whenever } R \succ S \\
(ii) & \quad |R \cup S| > 2 \text{ whenever } R \succ S
\end{align*}
\]

It is useful to think of \( \succ \) as a ‘psychological shading’ relation: when \( R \succ S \), category \( S \) is ignored if \( R \) is available: \( R \) ‘shades’ \( S \). More than one criterion may be relevant in the categorization stage, hence we do not assume that categories are mutually disjoint (think of categorizing products by price band and brand). However, the decision-maker can only

\(^7\)Note that this method of proof would yield a similar conclusion on infinite domains, provided pairwise choices were suitably continuous (so that in each choice set the base relation has a maximal element).

\(^8\)See e.g. Smith, Patalano and Jonides [38] and Medin and Aguilar [22].

\(^9\)Rubinstein [30] (and more recently [31]) pioneered in economic theory the analysis of similarity considerations in decision-making. See also Leland [18].

\(^10\)Smith, Patalano and Jonides [38] even find indirect evidence of neurological differences between ‘rule-based categorization’ and ‘similarity-based categorization’ (with the former involving frontal regions, and the latter involving posterior areas). See Pothos [28] and the ensuing discussion for a more recent overview of the relationship between these two types of categorization.
compare disjoint categories (condition (i)). Moreover, what the relation \( \succ \) compares are genuine groups: degenerate comparisons between singletons are not allowed (condition (ii)). For example, with alternatives such as those used in the experiment (time streams of monetary payments), obvious criteria for categorization would be the ‘shape’ of the stream, or its final payment. Increasing streams could form a category, streams with no large final payment could form another category, and so on.

**Definition 3** Given a rationale by categorization \( \succ \) and \( S \in \Sigma \), the \( \succ - \) maximal set on \( S \) is given by:

\[
\max (S, \succ) = \{ x \in S \mid \text{for no } R', R'' \subseteq S \text{ it is the case that } R' \succ R'' \text{ and } x \in R'' \}
\]

We shall call any asymmetric and complete binary relation on \( X \) a preference. We are now ready for our main definition:

**Definition 4** A choice function \( \gamma \) is **Categorize-Then-Choose (CTC)** if and only if there exists a rationale by categorization \( \succ \) and a preference \( \succ^* \) such that:

For all \( S \in \Sigma \): \( \gamma (S) \in \max (S, \succ) \) and \( \gamma (S) \succ^* y \) for all \( y \in \max (S, \succ) \setminus \{ \gamma (S) \} \),

In this case \( \succ \) and \( \succ^* \) are said to rationalize \( \gamma \).

So, the decision maker whose behavior is CTC looks first at group rankings within the feasible set, and eliminates any category which is dominated by another category. Then, he picks among the remaining alternatives the one that he prefers to all others. For example, if the choice set is comprised of some non-decreasing streams of money and some decreasing streams, the decision maker may first select the category of non-decreasing streams and then select the preferred stream within that category. Or he may decide conversely (as would be economically rational to do) that increasing streams are obviously worse than non-increasing streams, and simply ignore all increasing streams: indeed, if he is economically rational, why should he ever bother to pairwise compare increasing streams among themselves and with the non-increasing ones? In the same way that a chess player ignores obviously bad moves, the decision maker just ‘knows’ that he should focus immediately on the ‘correct’, non-increasing streams. When this procedure leads to a single chosen alternative for each choice set, the resulting choice function is CTC.

CTC choice functions can explain menu dependence, as they need not satisfy Condorcet consistency. For instance, take the following choice function, with the base relation
as indicated in figure 1 (where an arrow going from a to b indicates that a is selected in pair-
wise choice between a and b): $X = \{x, y, w, z\}$, $\gamma (X) = \gamma (\{x, y, w\}) = \gamma (\{y, w, z\}) = y,$
$\gamma (\{x, w, z\}) = \gamma (\{x, y, z\}) = x$. Condorcet consistency is violated, since $x$ is chosen in pair-
wise comparisons over each of the other alternatives but is not chosen from the grand
set, nor from $\{x, y, w\}$. However, this choice function is CTC with $\{y\} \succ \{x, w\}$, and $\succ^*$
coinciding with the base relation $\succ_{\gamma}$.

CTC choice functions can also explain pairwise cycles of choice. Consider the basic
three-cycle $\gamma (\{x, y, w\}) = \gamma (\{x, y\}) = x$, $\gamma (\{y, w\}) = y$, $\gamma (\{x, w\}) = w$. This is a CTC
using $\{x, y\} \succ \{w\}$ and with the preference $\succ^*$ coinciding with the base relation.

But CTC choice functions are not a vacuous notion: they do provide testable restric-
tions on behavior. As an example, let $X = \{x, y, w, z\}$ and let $\gamma (X) = \gamma (\{x, y, w\}) = x,$
$\gamma (\{x, y, z\}) = \gamma (\{y, w, z\}) = y$ and $\gamma (\{x, w, z\}) = w$, with the base relation as in figure
2. Then, since $y$ is chosen in $\{x, y, z\}$, there must be categories $R, R' \subset \{x, y, z\}$ with
$R \succ R'$ and $x \in R'$, so that $x$ is eliminated before it can eliminate $y$. Since $\{x, y, z\} \subset X,$
$\gamma (X) = x$ cannot be rationalized.

Perhaps surprisingly, CTC choice functions are characterized by the single property
Weak WARP (WWARP) which we introduced in [20].

**WWARP**: For all $R, S \in \Sigma$ : If $\{x, y\} \subset R \subset S$ and $x = \gamma (\{x, y\}) = \gamma (S) \neq y$ then $y \neq \gamma (R)$.

WWARP weakens WARP, and it says that if e.g. you choose steamed salmon over
steak tartare when they are the only available choices, and you also choose steamed
salmon from a large menu including steak tartare, then you cannot choose steak tartare
from a small menu including steamed salmon. In other words, if adding a large number
of alternatives to the menu does not overturn a revealed preference, then adding just a
subset of those alternatives cannot overturn the revealed preference either. In this sense WWARP can be seen alternatively as a ‘monotonicity’ restriction on menu effects.\footnote{WWARP is equivalent (on this domain) to the following stronger looking property: If \( x, y \in R \subseteq S \subseteq T \) and \( y \neq x = \gamma (R) = \gamma (T) \), then \( y \neq \gamma (S) \). In other words, the ‘small set’ in the statement of WWARP needs not be binary. To see that WWARP implies the property, suppose the latter fails, that is: \( x, y \in R \subseteq S \subseteq T \), \( y \neq x = \gamma (R) = \gamma (T) \), and \( y = \gamma (S) \). If \( x = \gamma (\{x, y\}) \), then WWARP is violated using the sets \( \{x, y\} \), \( R \) and \( S \). This equivalence breaks down on domains that do not include all pairs.}

**Theorem 1** A choice function \( \gamma \) is CTC if and only if it satisfies WWARP. Moreover, if there is a preference relation \( \succ^* \) that rationalizes \( \gamma \), it is unique: if \( (\succ, \succ^*) \) and \( (\succ', \succ'^*) \) both rationalize \( \gamma \), then \( \succ^* = \succ'^* \).

**Proof:** Necessity. Suppose that \( \gamma \) is CTC with rationale by categorization \( \succ \) and preference \( \succ^* \). Suppose \( x = \gamma (\{x, y\}) \) and \( x = \gamma (S) \) with \( y \in S \). Now suppose by contradiction that \( y = \gamma (R) \) with \( x \in R \subseteq S \). This means that \( x \) must be eliminated in the first round of elimination in \( R \), since \( x = \gamma (\{x, y\}) \) implies \( x \succ^* y \). In particular there exist \( R', R'' \subseteq R \), such that \( R' \succ R'' \) and \( x \in R'' \). Since \( R', R'' \subseteq S \) this contradicts \( x = \gamma (S) \).

Sufficiency. Define: \( x \succ^* y \) if and only if \( x = \gamma (\{x, y\}) \). \( \succ^* \) is obviously asymmetric and complete. Observe also that, by (ii) in the definition of a rationale by categorization, this is the only possible choice for \( \succ^* \), since all pairwise choices need to be rationalized and they can only be rationalized by the preference relation. Fixing the choice function \( \gamma \), we define the upper and lower contour sets of an alternative on a set \( S \in \Sigma \) as

\[
Up_{\gamma} (x, S) = \{ y \in X | y \succ^* x \} \cap S
\]

and

\[
Lo_{\gamma} (x, S) = \{ y \in X | x \succ^* y \} \cap S
\]

respectively. Define: \( R \succ S \) if and only if there exists \( T \in \Sigma \) such that

\[
R = \{ \gamma (T) \} \cup Lo_{\gamma} (\gamma (T), T)
\]

and

\[
S = Up_{\gamma} (\gamma (T), T) \neq \emptyset
\]

\( \succ \) is also obviously asymmetric and note that \( R \cap S = \emptyset \) whenever \( R \) and \( S \) are related by \( \succ \).
Now let $S \in \Sigma$ and let $x = \gamma(S)$. We show that $x$ is not eliminated in either round. Suppose first that $y \succ^* x$ for some $y \in S$. Then by construction

$$\{x\} \cup Lo_\gamma(x, S) \succ Up_\gamma(x, S)$$

and $y$ is eliminated in the first round.

Next, suppose by contradiction that $x$ is eliminated in the first round. Then there exists $R', R'' \subseteq S$ with $R' \succ R''$ and $x \in R''$. Define $R = R' \cup R''$. By construction of $\succ$ it must be

$$R' = \{\gamma(R)\} \cup Lo_\gamma(\gamma(R), R)$$

and

$$R'' = Up_\gamma(\gamma(R), R)$$

(Notice that here a separate assumption of closure under union of the domain is not needed). This means that

$$x = \gamma(\{x, \gamma(R)\})$$

Together with $x = \gamma(S)$ (and noting that $R = R' \cup R'' \subseteq S$) this contradicts either $x = \gamma(S)$ (if $R' \cup R'' = S$) or WWARP (if $R' \cup R'' \subset S$). It remains to note that by construction, $x \succ^* y$ for all $y$ that survive to the second round (since then $y \in Lo_\gamma(x, S)$).

So, while there is some leeway in recovering the categories from choice data and the ranking between them, CTC choice functions are designed in such a way that their preference relation is pinned down uniquely. This preference relation may be non-standard as it may include cycles, but these cycles never involve the chosen alternative in the post-categorization stage: so, the chosen alternative is always strictly preferred to all rejected alternatives which survive to the post-categorization stage.\footnote{Ehlers and Sprumont \cite{EhlersSprumont2018} also consider possibly cyclical preference relations. They study which choice functions can be ‘rationalized’ as the top cycle of an asymmetric and complete preference relation (a tournament).} The uniqueness of the preference relation plays an important role in the welfare analysis below.

### 2.3 Transitive Categorize Then Choose

We consider now a more restrictive version of CTC choice functions which demands more rationality on the part of the decision maker, by requiring the preference relation to be
standard (a complete ordering):

**Definition 5** A choice function $\gamma$ is a **Transitive CTC (TCTC)** if and only if it is a CTC and it is rationalized by a preference $\succ^*$ which is transitive (beside asymmetric and complete).

**Theorem 2** A choice function $\gamma$ is a Transitive CTC if and only if it satisfies WWARP and Pairwise consistency. In this case, the rationale by categorization can be chosen to be acyclic.

**Proof:** For the first part of the statement, in view of theorem 1 it suffices to recall that the preference $\succ^*$ must coincide with the base relation $\succ_\gamma$, and that (as is easily checked) given the assumptions on the domain implying the completeness of $\succ_\gamma$, if $\succ_\gamma$ is acyclic it must also be transitive.

For the second part of the statement, repeat the construction of $\succ$ in the proof of theorem 1. Obviously this construction still rationalizes the choice. Suppose that $R_1 \succ R_2 \succ \ldots \succ R_k$. Then for each $R_{i-1}, R_i, R_{i+1}$, there exists $S_i, S_{i+1} \in \Sigma$ such that $R_{i-1} = Lo_\gamma (\gamma (S_i), S_i)$, $R_i = Up_\gamma (\gamma (S_i), S_i) = Lo_\gamma (\gamma (S_{i+1}), S_{i+1})$ and $R_{i+1} = Up_\gamma (\gamma (S_{i+1}), S_{i+1})$ (notation as before). So for some $y \in S_{i+1}$ we have $y \succ_\gamma \gamma (S_{i+1}) \succ_\gamma \gamma (S_i)$. Then if $\succ$ were cyclic we would also have a base cycle, in violation of Pairwise consistency.

When behavior is represented by a TCTC choice function, the only possible anomalies are ‘failures of aggregation’ caused by menu dependence: the binary revealed preferences is perfectly rational, but the decision maker fails to it them to determine choices from larger sets. At the experimental level, this fact highlights how in order to test the TCTC procedure it is indispensable to elicit the entire choice function, beyond binary preferences.

### 2.4 Two related models

We discuss here two more models which are closely related to the previous analysis, and which we also test in the experiment. Both models bear a family resemblance to CTC as they invoke two-stage decision procedures and, as it turns out, are characterized by similar properties. The first is the Rational Shortlist Method we introduced in Manzini and Mariotti [20].
**Definition 6** A choice function $\gamma$ is a **Rational Shortlist Method (RSM)** if and only if there exists an ordered pair $(\succ_1, \succ_2)$ of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) such that:

$$\text{For all } S \in \Sigma: \{ \gamma(S) \} = \max (\max (S, \succ_1), \succ_2)$$

In that case $(\succ_1, \succ_2)$ are said to sequentially rationalize $\gamma$.

So the choice from each $S$ can be represented as if the decision maker went through two sequential rounds of elimination of alternatives. In the first round he makes a ‘shortlist’ by retaining only the elements which are maximal according to rationale $\succ_1$. In the second round, he retains only the element which is maximal according to rationale $\succ_2$: that element is his choice. RSM’s are characterized on the domain we are considering by two properties, one of which is WWARP, and the other is an Expansion axiom:

**Expansion:** Let $\{S_i\}$ be a class of sets such that $S_i \in \Sigma$ for all $i$ and $\cup_i S_i \in \Sigma$. If $x = \gamma(S_i)$ for all $i$ then $x = \gamma(\cup_i S_i)$.

Expansion says that if steamed salmon is chosen in each of a series of menus, then it is also chosen when all the menus are merged.

The following characterization result follows easily by adapting the argument in the proof of Theorem 1 in [20].

**Corollary 1** Suppose the domain $\Sigma$ is closed under set union. Then a choice function on $\Sigma$ is an RSM if and only if it satisfies WWARP and Expansion.

It follows from theorem 1 and corollary 1 that the RSM model is strictly nested in the CTC model, in the sense that any choice function which is an RSM can also be seen as being CTC, but not viceversa.

**Corollary 2** Every RSM is also a CTC choice function, and there exist CTC choice functions which are not RSMs.

The second model we consider is introduced in very recent work by Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8].

**Definition 7** (Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8]) A choice function $\gamma$ is **Rationalized** if and only if there exist a set of asymmetric and transitive relations (rationales)
\{\succ_1, \succ_2, \ldots, \succ_K\} and an asymmetric relation (preference) \succ^* such that:

For all \( S \in \Sigma \): there exists \( \succ_i \) such that \( x = \gamma(S) \succ_i y \) for all \( y \in S \setminus \{x\} \), and \( x \succ^* y \) for all \( y \in S \) with \( x \neq y \) for which there exists \( \succ_i \) such that \( y \succ_i z \) for all \( z \in S \setminus \{y\} \).

This definition captures another plausible procedure, in which the decision maker acts on the basis of multiple motivations (‘rationales’). More precisely, in the first stage he uses a set of rationales to eliminate alternatives that are not optimal according to any of the rationales. In the second stage, he maximizes preferences. Interestingly, this procedure generates (on the full domain) exactly the same choice data as a CTC choice function:

**Corollary 3** Let \( \Sigma = 2^X \setminus \emptyset \). Then a choice function is Rationalized if and only if it is CTC.

**Proof:** The result follows immediately from theorem 1 in Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8], stating that a choice function is rationalized if and only if it satisfies WWARP, and from theorem 1 above.

In other words, CTC choice functions and rationalized choice functions cannot be distinguished on the basis of choice data alone. Nevertheless, it turns out that the two models do have different testable implications in their more restrictive versions, where the preference relation is required to be transitive.

Define the nested revealed preference relation \( R^N_\gamma \) by \( xR^N_\gamma y \) iff there exist \( S, T \in \Sigma \) with \( x, y \in S \subset T \), \( x = \gamma(S) \) and \( y = \gamma(T) \).

**Theorem 3** (Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8]). A choice function is Rationalized with a transitive preference (i.e. it is Order Rationalized) if and only if the nested revealed preference relation is acyclic.

Observe that \( R^N_\gamma \)–acyclicity implies WWARP (a violation of WWARP is a 2-cycle of \( R^N_\gamma \)). But, interestingly, theorem 3 and our characterization of theorem 2 imply that the CTC model is strictly nested in the rationalization model:

**Corollary 4** Every TCTC choice function is also rationalized with a transitive preference, but there exist choice functions rationalized with a transitive preference that are not TCTC.
Proof: We first show that Pairwise consistency and WWARP imply the acyclicity of $R^N_\gamma$. Suppose that there exists a $R^N_\gamma$-cycle. That is, there exist $x_i, i = 1...n$ such that $x_i R^N_\gamma x_{i+1}$ for all $i = 1, 2..., n - 1$ and $x_n R^N_\gamma x_1$. So there exist pairs of sets $(R_i, S_i), i = 1...n$ such that $x_i, x_{i+1} \in R_i \subset S_i$, $x_i = \gamma (R_i)$, $x_{i+1} = \gamma (S_i)$ for $i = 1,..., n - 1$, and $x_n = \gamma (R_i), x_1 = \gamma (S_i)$. If WWARP is violated we are done, so suppose it holds. Then it must be that $x_i = \gamma (\{x_i, x_{i+1}\})$ for all $i = 1,..., n - 1$ and $x_n = \gamma (\{x_1, x_n\})$, a violation of Pairwise consistency.

Next, we provide an example that satisfies acyclicity of $R^N_\gamma$ (and WWARP) but fails Pairwise consistency. This is simply the basic 3-cycle, with $X = \{x, y, z\}$ and $x = \gamma (\{x, y\}) = \gamma (\{x, y, z\})$, $y = \gamma (\{y, z\})$ and $z = \gamma (\{x, z\})$. Given the pairwise choices, the acyclicity of $R^N_\gamma$ implies only that $x R^N_\gamma y$ (examples involving more alternatives are also easy to find).

2.5 Welfare

When WARP is violated and the decision maker may reveal contradictory preferences, basing welfare judgments on a revealed preference approach, as is standard in normative economics, might seem a desperate task. Here we argue that when WWARP holds, all is not lost as regards welfare analysis.

Before doing so, we give a very rapid summary of the methodology of two recent fundamental contributions on the topic. Bernheim and Rangel [5] propose notions (strict and weak) of welfare improvement based on the following revealed preference relations: $x$ strictly improves on $y$ if $y$ is never chosen in the presence of $x$ and $x$ is sometimes chosen in the presence of $y$. And $x$ weakly improves on $y$ if $x$ is chosen whenever $y$ is chosen and $x$ is available, and sometimes $x$ is chosen and $y$ is not chosen despite being available. A strict welfare optimum is such that there is no weak improvement, and a weak welfare optimum is such that there is no strict improvement. These welfare criteria may be incomplete (in the case of weak welfare optimum) or inconsistent (in the the case of a strict welfare optimum). Green and Hojman [13], unlike Bernheim and Rangel [5] and like us, base their normative approach on a specific theory of individual behavior. The model assumes that an individual acts on the basis of multiple, possibly contradictory, preference relations, which are aggregated in some way. This model can rationalize any set of choice data and is thus not falsifiable empirically by choice data alone. Nevertheless, it is normatively useful - even if there is generally a multiplicity of possible preferences compatible with

14 The authors however suggest how richer sets of data might render the model falsifiable.
observed behavior - because it permits the following welfare inference: if $y$ is never chosen when $x$ is available, then all preferences that rationalize the choice data rank $x$ above $y$; and we can thus assert the welfare superiority of $x$ over $y$.

We propose that the TCTC model can be used as the basis for welfare inferences. Interpreting, as is standard, the revealed preferences as aligned with individual welfare, the TCTC permits an external observer to make unambiguous, complete welfare comparisons when the feasible set changes, on the basis of the preference $\succ^*$ revealed by the choice data. If $x = \gamma(S)$ and $y = \gamma(T)$, the further observation that $x = \gamma(\{x, y\})$ (so that $x \succ^* y$) means, within a dataset compatible with the TCTC model, that the decision maker’s welfare improves when moving from choice situation $S$ to choice situation $T$. This inference can be made also in some cases where both the textbook model and the recent proposals by Bernheim and Rangel [5] and Green and Hojman [13] are not entirely successful, namely when WARP is violated: when $x, y \in S \cap T$ the utility maximization model allows no preference inference; the Green and Hojman model permits contradictory preference inferences, preventing an unambiguous welfare judgement; and the Bernheim and Rangel approach either includes both $x$ and $y$ in the set of welfare optima (weak sense) of $\{x, y\}$ or it excludes both of them (strict sense).

In contrast, the TCTC model forces the observation $x = \gamma(\{x, y\})$ to reveal the ‘unclouded’ preference of the decision maker between $x$ and $y$, the preference to be used for welfare analysis. We argue that any revealed preference reversal in larger sets is due to complexity, or better to the way the agent copes with complexity (categorization), and should not be used in welfare judgements. We view our approach as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the others mentioned. Our model cannot be applied when there are pairwise cycles of choice: if $\gamma(\{x, y, z\}) = \gamma(\{x, y\}) = x, \gamma(\{y, z\}) = y, \gamma(\{x, z\}) = z$, the Bernheim and Rangel proposal, for example would still claim a nonempty set of weak welfare optima in $\{x, z\}$ (namely $\{x, z\}$) and the Green and Hojman model would evaluate the move from $\{x, y, z\}$ to $\{y, z\}$ as a welfare worsening ($y$ is never chosen in the presence of $x$), while the TCTC model does not permit a welfare ranking.

It is interesting to compare this interpretation of revealed preference with the interpretation that emerges from the Rationalization model. In that model, as noted by the authors, the observation that $x = \gamma(\{x, y\})$ is not enough (unlike in the TCTC model) to make a welfare ranking inference. $x$ could be chosen over $y$ because of the fact that $x$ is genuinely preferred to $y$ (that is $x \succ^* y$), but also because $y$ cannot be rationalized in the presence of $x$ (that is, there is no $i$ for which $y \succ^*_i x$). What is needed to infer that $x$ is preferred to $y$ is a second observation from a larger set $S$, and specifically the observation
that \( y = \gamma(S) \) with \( x \in S \). This ‘anomaly’ establishes that \( y \) can be rationalized in the presence of \( x \), and therefore, together with \( x = \gamma(\{x, y\}) \), that \( x \) is preferred to \( y \).

Which interpretation is more appropriate depends on the context of choice: as Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8] observe, familiar phenomena such as the ‘warm glow effect’ are best attributed to conflicting psychological motivations which are aptly captured by the Rationalization theory. On the other hand, when complexity is an issue, the TCTC model, which focuses on mere binary rankings, may be more appropriate.

The TCTC interpretation of the revealed preference \( \succ \gamma \succ^* \) as a welfare ranking has interesting comparative statics implications even for the basic CTC model. In the fully rational model the chosen alternative in each set is better than any other feasible alternative. Therefore, adding an inferior alternative can be neither welfare worsening nor welfare improving. In the CTC model, the alternative chosen in a set by a boundedly rational decision maker is not necessarily preferred in pairwise choices to all other available alternatives. Thus it is in principle possible that if an inferior alternative is added, the decision maker shifts his choice to this or to another inferior alternative already present in the original choice set. Recall the restaurant example in the introduction: from a large list you may choose an Italian restaurant (because ‘as a rule’ Italian restaurants are better) even if it is inferior to that specific Mexican restaurant in a detailed straight comparison. Arguably, the abundance of alternatives may induce the decision maker in categorizations that mentally delete an alternative which would be valued better in pairwise comparisons.

But the other, positive side of the coin is that by deleting unchosen alternatives (good or bad) the decision maker is welfare protected even if he changes his choice.

Say that the choice set \( S \) is welfare superior to \( T \) if \( \gamma(S) \succ \gamma(T) \) (this terminology is justified by the previous discussion):

**Proposition 2** (Welfare comparative statics) Suppose the CTC model holds. If either (i) \( S = T \setminus \{r\} \), \( r \neq \gamma(T) \), or (ii) \( T = S \cup \{r\} \), \( \gamma(S) \succ \gamma(T) \); then \( T \) cannot be welfare superior to \( S \).

**Proof:** (i) Immediate, by checking that if \( \gamma(T) \succ \gamma(S) \) WWARP would be violated. (ii) If \( \gamma(T) \neq r \) WWARP is violated, and if \( r = \gamma(T) \) then \( \gamma(S) \succ \gamma(T) \) by assumption.

Viewing the change as one from the small set \( S \) to the large set \( T \), Proposition 2 highlights that the decision maker can be manipulated (by suitably inflating the feasible set) into making detrimental choices that constitute a welfare worsening, a phenomenon
familiar to marketing experts. Viewing the change as one from \( T \) to \( S \), Proposition 2 highlights that a ‘simplification’ of the problem that removes (even good) alternatives can lead to violations of WARP but not to a welfare worsening: welfare is bounded below by that corresponding to the initial choice, and can possibly increase.

3 Experiment

3.1 Experimental Design

Our experiment consists in eliciting the choice function over a set of alternatives. The task is straightforward: pick the one you prefer among a set of alternative remuneration plans in installments to be received staggered over a time horizon of nine months, each consisting of 48 overall. We consider two treatments, one where payment to subjects consists of a 5 showup fee only (a total 56 subjects in 4 sessions), and one with payments based on actual choice (a total of 102 subjects in 9 sessions). We will refer to these two treatments as HYP (for hypothetical) and PAY (for paid), respectively. More precisely, in the case of the PAY treatment it was explained that at the end of the experiment one screen would be selected at random, and the preferred plan for that screen would be delivered to the subjects.

Unlike the majority of choice experiments in the literature, we elicit the entire choice functions with domain over all subsets for each of the two grand sets. This enables us to check whether or not the axioms discussed in section 2 hold. In particular, we can

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\[15\] The experiment was carried out at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Trento, in Italy. We ran a total of 13 sessions. Participants were recruited through bulletin board advertising from the student population. Male and female subjects took part in each experimental session in roughly equal proportions. The experiment was computerised, and each participant was seated at an individual computer station, using separators so that subjects could not see the choices made by other participants. Experimental sessions lasted an average of around 26 minutes, of which an average of 18 minutes of effective play, with the shortest session lasting approximately 16 minutes and the longest around 37 minutes. At the beginning of the experiment subjects read instructions on their monitor, while an experimenter read the instructions aloud to the participants (see the appendix for the translation of the original instructions). Instructions were the same in both treatments, bar for one sentence, which in the HYP treatment clarified that choices were purely hypothetical, so that the only payment to be received would be the show up fee.

\[16\] The show up fee alone, for an average of less than thirty minute long experimental session, was higher than the hourly pay on campus, which was 8. At the time of the experiments the exchange rate of the Euro was approximately 1=1.2=0.7.

\[17\] Distinguishing by treatment, sessions lasted an average of about 28 minutes for the PAY treatment, of which an average of just above 19 minutes of effective play; and an average of around 22 minutes for the HYP treatment, of which an average of about 16 minutes of effective play.

\[18\] The experimental lab has a long tradition, so there was no issue of (mis)trust in receiving delayed payments. All subjects have been paid.
assess (i) what the main reason is for the failure of full rationality (violation of Pairwise Consistency or violation of Condorcet consistency), and (ii) the predictive success of the various models discussed in the theoretical section.

Each of the two grand sets, which differed in the number of installments, consisted of four plans each, namely an increasing (I), a decreasing (D), a constant (K) and a jump (J) series of payments, over either two or three installments, as shown below. Though in both cases payments extended over nine months, because of the different number of installments we abuse terminology and refer to ‘two-period’ and ‘three-period’ sequences rather than two/three-installment sequences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two period sequences</th>
<th>Three period sequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I2  D2  K2  J2</td>
<td>I3  D3  K3  J3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in three months</td>
<td>in three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16  32  24  8</td>
<td>8  24  16  8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in nine months</td>
<td>in six months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32  16  24  40</td>
<td>16  16  16  8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24  8  16  32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: the base remuneration plans

The use of payment plans as alternatives stems from our desire to present the experimental subjects with alternatives of a ‘richer’ description than mere money amounts (sequences can be classified by their ‘shapes’), but which at the same time are objectively expressed in money terms, so as to reduce difficult to control emotive connotations (which might happen, for example, by using food items).

Figure 3 displays sample screenshots of the choices subject had to make. The participants made their choice by clicking with their mouse on the button corresponding to the preferred remuneration plan. Once made, each choice had to be confirmed, so as to minimize the possibility of errors. Both the order in which the questions appeared on screen and the position of each option on the screen was randomized.

3.1.1 Two remarks on the experimental design

**Why two treatments (PAY and HYP)?** As we have discussed at length, one of the issues up for testing is consistency in choice. As observed by Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter [17], ‘people seem to prefer to do what they say they would do’. In our context, this might imply that subjects who have revealed the preference of a over b, say, in one choice set, might favour replicating this preference in other choice sets only to avoid cognitive dissonance.\[19\] If experimental subjects worry about consistency in choice, it is a

\[19\] The notion of cognitive dissonance was introduced in Festinger [11], and refers to the discomfort experience by a subject when he is made aware that he is holding two conflicting beliefs, or that he has
possibility that the administration of purely hypothetical questions might result in fewer violations of WARP when compared to a situation with real, incentive compatible choices. For this reason we ran a session with real payments, and one with only hypothetical ones. As we will see, although we do find that inconsistencies are uniformly less numerous in the HYP than in the PAY treatment, even in the case of purely hypothetical questions Full Rationality fails, underlying the need for an alternative explanation of observed choice patterns.

**Why two types of sequences (two and three periods)?** In order to put theories to the test, we need to have as many choices as possible for each subject. The minimum cardinality of the grand set which allows for violations of either WWARP or $R^N$ acyclicity to be observed is four. Teasing out the complete choice function from each subject requires eleven questions to be asked. On the other hand, increasing the size of the grand set by just one extra element would require an additional twenty questions to be asked (as there would be 31 non empty subsets in the full domain) in a rather repetitive task. For this reason we opted for two choice functions based on a grand set of four alternatives each, that would require only 22 questions to be asked to each subject, with the important additional bonus of more variety in the display. Then, we consider a subject’s choice function as satisfying a given axiom if and only if both of his choice functions satisfy the produced contrasting choices.
3.2 Experimental results: Evaluating the models

3.2.1 Choosing at Random?

We begin by noting that, whatever the subjects are doing, they are certainly not pressing buttons at random. Since we are eliciting the entire choice functions from universal sets with four alternatives, with a uniform probability distribution on each choice set, the probability of observing even only two subjects with the same choice is effectively zero for all practical purposes. In fact, as there are a possible $2^6 \times 3^4 \times 4 = 20,736$ choice functions on each universal set, the probability of any given choice function being picked by two subjects is $(20,736)^{-2} = 2.3257 \times 10^{-9}$. On the contrary for both treatments and for both universal sets $X_2$ and $X_3$ we find almost half of the subjects with the same modal choice function. For illustration we report the frequency distributions of the observed choice functions only graphically in Figure 4 (we omit labels for legibility).

3.2.2 Which Type of Rationality Failure?

Before turning to the evaluation of the models, we check which, if any, of the two distinct elementary failures of full rationality highlighted in Proposition 1 in section 2.1 is more prevalent. To this effect we begin by reporting aggregate data for the violations of Pairwise and Condorcet Consistency by experimental subject:

\footnotetext{20}{It could be argued that a subject might satisfy WARP, say, because both of his choice functions do, but at the same time it may be that they do so in very different ways, for instance with $D_2 \succ K_2 \succ J_2 \succ I_2$ as the linear order determining choices in the two period set, and $K_3 \succ D_3 \succ I_3 \succ J_3$ in the three period set. Indeed, it should be observed that, in spite of our own labeling, these are all distinct alternatives, and there is no reason in principle why a subject should activate the same categorizations or any other heuristic when making choices in the two domains. The analysis of the type of time preferences compatible with our data is available in a separate paper (Manzini, Mariotti and Mittone [21]).}

\footnotetext{21}{Purely random choice is an important benchmark. Within consumer choice, the idea was first advanced by Becker [4] and it is used for example as the alternative hypothesis in the popular Bronars [6] index of power for nonparametric revealed preference tests. See Andreoni and Harbaugh [2] for a recent discussion of this issue.}

\footnotetext{22}{The corresponding data are reported in tables 2 and 3 in the technical appendix available online at http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/pmanzini/twosimiltechnical_and_data_appendix.pdf.}

\footnotetext{23}{All the exact statistical analysis has been carried out using StatXact, v.7. For a comprehensive treatment of exact and other methods in categorical data analysis see Agresti [1].}

\footnotetext{24}{Since we are mainly interested in the decisions of individual subjects over all their choices, throughout the paper we report data of axiom violations by experimental subject. The reader inter-}
Figure 4: Frequency distributions of choice profiles by treatment and sequence length
Table 2: Overall violations of PC and CC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAY #</th>
<th>PAY %</th>
<th>HYP #</th>
<th>HYP %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condorcet Consistency</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairwise Consistency</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From table 2 it emerges that failures of Condorcet Consistency are substantially more frequent than violations of Pairwise Consistency. This difference is statistically significant, regardless of treatment. In fact, the McNemar test of the hypothesis that the proportions of subjects violating Condorcet Consistency is the same as the proportion of subjects violating Pairwise Consistency yields exact p-values of 0.009 in the case of the PAY treatment, and of 0.001 in the case of the HYP treatment. If we then look at the differences in the proportion of violations of each of the two axioms across treatments, the fall in the proportion of violations when moving from the PAY to the HYP treatment is not statistically significant: Fisher test’s exact mid-p values are 0.110 for Condorcet Consistency and 0.470 for Pairwise Consistency.

In short, then, as conjectured above, it is the case that in the HYP treatment violations are less than in the PAY treatment; nevertheless, they are sizeable even when subjects are arguably more concerned with being consistent. As we will see below, this pattern is confirmed in all other tests, that is although violations are consistently higher in the PAY treatment, they are substantial in the HYP treatment, too.

3.2.3 How Well Do the Models Describe the Data?

Next, we turn to the models examined in sections 2.2 and 2.4, and we study the violations of the axioms which characterize those models. It is convenient to recall in a table the set of axioms characterizing each model.

Table 4 reports violations of the remaining axioms. As before, the proportion of violators falls when moving from the PAY to the HYP treatment. Of these differences,

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25 In our experiment we use a small universal set of alternatives. Evidence for choice from budget sets includes Fevrier and Visser [12], Mattei [26] and especially Sippel [37], who find substantial violations of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences in choices out of budget sets. However, Andreoni and Harbaugh [2] argue that most of these violations are ‘small’ on the basis of Afriat’s efficiency index. Indeed Harbaugh, Krause and Berry [15] and especially Andreoni and Miller [3] find that subjects have choices consistent with GARP in experiments with budget sets.

---

24
Table 3: Theories and their characterization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Axioms</th>
<th>WARP</th>
<th>Weak WARP</th>
<th>Pairwise Cons.</th>
<th>Expansion</th>
<th>$R_n^N$ acyclicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Rationality</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Shortlist Method</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorize Then Choose</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitive CTC</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order Rationalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Overall axiom violations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Axioms</th>
<th>PAY #</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>HYP #</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak WARP</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARP</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_n^N$ acyclicity</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 confirms that WARP, i.e. the full rationality model, does not describe the data well, especially in the PAY treatment where less than half of the subjects fit the model.

Consider now RSMs. The crosstabulation of violations of the two axioms characterizing it is reported in table 5. Interestingly, in both treatments, no individual who satisfies Expansion violates Weak WARP. That is, the (large) number of Expansion violators is not joined by another separate group of Weak WARP violators in order to determine

---

26For comparisons between the proportion of violations of other pairs of axioms it is not possible to rely on a McNemar test, as violations of either Expansion or Weak WARP imply violations of WARP (i.e. the relevant contingency table would have structural zeroes). We defer tackling of this issue to our discussion of the relative performance of alternative theories further below.
the RSM violators. The RSM violators are simply counted by Expansion violators (of which some are also Weak WARP violators). So although Weak WARP and Expansion are logically independent properties, in our experimental sample they are not statistically independent. This also shows that, quite remarkably, although RSM is a much weaker notion than full rationality, in our experimental sample it does not do a substantially better job than the fully rational model at explaining the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAY Expansion</th>
<th>HYP Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak WARP</td>
<td>Weak WARP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× 29</td>
<td>× 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ 22</td>
<td>✓ 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Violations of Weak WARP and Expansion

RSMs improve only marginally on order maximization in their ability to explain the data for the PAY treatment (decreasing the violations from 52.9% in the case of WARP to 50% in the case of RSM), and they are as bad in the HYP treatment. This is due to the fact that binary cycles, which violate full rationality but not RSM, are not a very relevant phenomenon here, unlike menu effects (in the sense of violations of Condorcet Consistency), which cannot accommodated by either of these two theories.

Turning now to Transitive CTCs, the crosstabulation of violations of the two axioms characterizing is in table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAY Pairwise Consistency</th>
<th>HYP Pairwise Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak WARP</td>
<td>Weak WARP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× 11</td>
<td>× 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ 6</td>
<td>✓ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Violations of Weak WARP and Pairwise Consistency

Transitive CTCs provide a considerable improvement on RSMs in terms of accommodating the choice of a substantial majority of subjects in both treatments, for the
same reason as RSMs do not improve much on standard order maximization, namely the paucity of binary cycles observed, and the abundance of menu dependent choice.

Finally, we turn to Weak WARP and the models it characterizes. From Table 4 we can see that Weak WARP is satisfied by just below 72% of the subjects in the PAY treatment and just below 86% of the subjects in the HYP treatment.

In summary then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>PAY #</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>HYP #</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full rationality</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Shortlist Method</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorize then choose/Rationalization</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitive CTC</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order Rationalization</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Explanatory power of competing theories.

The three models are nested, that is

Full Rationality $\Rightarrow$ RSM $\Rightarrow$ CTC/Rationalization $\Rightarrow$ Order Rationalization

Full Rationality $\Rightarrow$ Transitive CTC $\Rightarrow$ CTC/Rationalization $\Rightarrow$ Order Rationalization

In order to compare the incremental ‘explanatory’ power in each more general theory in a meaningful way, we have to take into account this nestedness. We do so in the next section.

3.2.4 Comparing Theories with Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success

In order to compare the models we use Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success (Selten [36]). This measure was specifically designed to evaluate ‘area theories’ like the ones considered in this paper, namely theories that exclude deterministically a subset of the possible outcomes. The measure takes into account not only the ‘descriptive power’ of the model (measured by the proportion of ‘hits’, the observed outcomes consistent with the model), but also its ‘parsimony’. The lower the proportion of theoretically possible outcomes consistent with the model, the more parsimonious the model. In our specific case, one possible criticism of our ‘revealed preference’ type of tests might be that the experiment does not have enough power to reject Weak WARP even if it happened to be the wrong
hypothesis. For example, if each universal set consisted of only three, instead of four, alternatives, Weak WARP could never be violated. But the observed 100% hit rate should be interpreted as a failure of the experimental design rather than a validation of the model of RSM by categorization. By introducing the ‘parsimony’ element, Selten’s measure would pick up this problem. More precisely, the measure, denoted \( s \), is expressed as

\[
s = r - a
\]

where \( r \) is the descriptive power (number of actually observed outcomes compatible with the model divided by the number of possible outcomes) and \( a \) is the ‘relative area’ of the model, namely the number of outcomes in principle compatible with the model divided by the number of all possible outcomes. In the hypothetical example of a universal set of three alternatives, \( s = 0 \) for the model of RSM by categorization.

In our experiment, we observed two choice functions for each subject. So the number of all logically possible observations of choice behavior for each subject was \((20,736)^2\). A ‘hit’ consists of the subject not violating the axioms (characterizing a specific model) in either of the two choice functions. Thus the values of \( r \) for the various models are in Table 7. In order to compute \( a \) for a model we have to compute the proportion of choice functions compatible with the set of axioms characterizing that model. We begin with Full Rationality. For each universal set of alternatives, the number of choice functions satisfying WARP is simply the number of strict orderings on a set of cardinality four, that is \( 4! = 24 \). Therefore for each individual there are only \( 24^2 \) possible patterns of behavior in the experiment compatible with the Full Rationality model. The area of the Full Rationality model is:

\[
a_{FR} = \left( \frac{24}{20,736} \right)^2 \approx 0
\]

The Full Rationality model is thus a beautifully parsimonious model whose Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success is entirely determined by its descriptive power. From Table 7 above we thus have, for the PAY and HYP treatments, the following values of Selten’s Measure for this model:

\[
\begin{align*}
s^R_{PAY} & \approx 0.471 \\
s^R_{HYP} & \approx 0.607
\end{align*}
\]

The RSM model, as we have seen, does not improve significantly in this experiment on the Full Rationality model even in terms of sheer descriptive power. So a fortiori it is not
an interesting competitor to the latter in terms of overall predictive success. Therefore we move to the computation of the values for the CTC model.

We need to compute first the number of choice functions that satisfy Weak WARP. This can be done by considering four possible exhaustive and mutually exclusive configurations, depending on whether the choice from the grand set, $\gamma(X)$, is selected in pairwise choice over all three other alternatives (Configuration A), over exactly two other alternatives (Configuration B), over exactly one other alternative (Configuration C), or over none of the other alternatives (Configuration D).

How many possible cases of Configuration A are there in which WWARP is satisfied? The choices for all sets of cardinality three which include $\gamma(S)$ are forced, as $\gamma(S)$ must be chosen from them in order not to violate WWARP. So, the four possible choices of $\gamma(S)$ can be combined with the three possible choices from the set of cardinality three not including $\gamma(S)$, and with the $2^3$ possible choice combinations from the three binary sets that do not include $\gamma(S)$. All in all, we have $4 \times 3 \times 2^3 = 96$ possible choice functions compatible with WWARP in this configuration.

For Configuration B, we have first of all that the four possible choices for $\gamma(S)$ can be combined with three possible choices for the alternative which is chosen over $\gamma(S)$ in binary comparison. For each of these combinations, there are $3^2 \times 2^2$ choice combinations from the sets of cardinality three (since only two choices compatible with WWARP can be made from the two sets of cardinality three that include $\gamma(S)$ and the alternative that ‘beats’ it in binary comparison), together with the $2^3$ choice combinations from the binary sets that do not include $\gamma(S)$. All in all, we have $4 \times 3 \times (3 \times 2^2) \times 2^3 = 1,152$ possible choice functions compatible with WWARP in this configuration.

Reasoning along similar lines leads to the count of $4 \times 3 \times (3^2 \times 2^2) \times 2^3 = 5,184$ possible choice functions compatible with WWARP in configuration C, and to $4 \times 3^4 \times 2^3 = 2,592$ in Configuration D.

Adding up, in total there are 9,024 possible choice functions compatible with WWARP when the grand set has cardinality four, and thus $(9,024)^2$ possible types of choice behavior compatible with WWARP in our experiment. This leads to the area value

$$a_{WWARP} = \left( \frac{9,024}{20,736} \right)^2 = 0.189$$

So both the CTC and the Rationalization models are as expected far less parsimonious than the Full Rationality model. However, they do improve on the full rationality model:
We now turn to the restricted versions of these two models. Consider now Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni’s Order Rationalization model. In order to compute the area of this theory, recall from the proof of corollary 4 that violations of WWARP imply violations of $R_N^\gamma$ acyclicity. However, there can be choice functions that satisfy WWARP but are not Order Rationalizable - that is, in order to compute the area of this theory, it suffices to subtract from the area satisfying WWARP those cases that fail $R_N^\gamma$ acyclicity. Recall that $xR_N^\gamma y$ if and only if there exist two sets $T$ and $T'$ with $x, y \in T \subset T'$ such that $x = \gamma(T)$ and $y = \gamma(T')$. For convenience, we will refer to $T$ as a ‘small set’ in what follows. For ease of notation, let $X = \{w, x, y, z\}$ denote our grand set of four alternatives, and fix $\gamma(X) = x$. Note that $x = \gamma(X)$ cannot be part of any $R_N^\gamma$ cycle. Suppose it is, and that $xR_N^\gamma y$. This is impossible, since then $x$ must be chosen in a ‘small set’: but if $x = \gamma(xy)$ and $y = \gamma(S)$ we have a violation of WWARP (if $S \subset X$) or (if $S = X$) a contradiction; and if $x = \gamma(xyz)$, for some $z$ then for $xR_N^\gamma y$ it must be $y = \gamma(X)$, a contradiction. So there cannot be any $R_N^\gamma$ cycle of length 4. An $R_N^\gamma$ cycle of length 2 is just a violation of WWARP. Thus we look for $R_N^\gamma$ cycles of length 3.

There cannot be any $R_N^\gamma$ cycle involving any ‘small set’ of cardinality 3 or more. For, a ‘small set’ of cardinality 3 forces uniquely the choice from $X$ by the definition of $R_N^\gamma$. Let $x = \gamma(X)$ and $yR_N^\gamma w$ with a small set of cardinality 3. This means that $w = \gamma(X)$, contradiction. So we look for $R_N^\gamma$ cycles where the small sets are all pairs. Fix $y = \gamma(ywz)$ and let the cycle order be $yR_N^\gamma wR_N^\gamma zR_N^\gamma y$. For $yR_N^\gamma w$ it must be $\gamma(xyw) = w$ and for $wR_N^\gamma z$ it must be $z = \gamma(wzx)$. These two equalities and WWARP imply that $\gamma(xw) = w$ and $\gamma(xz) = z$. Moreover, we can exclude the case $x = \gamma(xy)$, $y = \gamma(xyz)$ by WWARP. So the possible combinations are given by remaining the combinations of choices from $\{x, y\}$ and from $\{x, y, z\}$, that is either $y = \gamma(xyz) = \gamma(xy)$; or $x = \gamma(xyz) = \gamma(xy)$; or $x = \gamma(xyz)$, $y = \gamma(xy)$. These three possibilities can arise in any of the $4 \times 3 \times 2$ possible configurations (four ways to pick $\gamma(X)$, three ways to pick the choice from the remaining alternatives, and two directions of cycle. So in all 72 possibilities, yielding an area

\[
a^{O\text{Rat}} = \left(\frac{9.024 - 72}{20,736}\right)^2 = 0.186
\]

which is only slightly lower than the area for just WWARP, so that the corresponding
Selten’s indices in each treatment are

\[
\begin{align*}
    s_{PAY}^{ORat} &= 0.716 - 0.186 = 0.53 \\
    s_{HYP}^{ORat} &= 0.857 - 0.186 = 0.671
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, we turn to the TCTC model, again distinguishing by the four possible exhaustive and mutually exclusive configurations A, B, C and D, depending on whether the choice from the grand set, \(\gamma(X)\), is selected in pairwise choice over all three other alternatives, over exactly two other alternatives, over exactly one other alternative, or over none of the other alternatives (as we did when computing the area for WWARP). Indeed, we do have to proceed as for WWARP, but this time making sure we eliminate pairwise cyclical choices. For Case A, there are \(4 \times 3 \times 6 = 72\) cases (where the last number in the multiplication is explained by there being \(2^3\) pairwise choices in all in the 3-sets, but we deduct the two cycles). For case B, in the 3-set that does not include \(\gamma(X)\), the pairwise choice is forced for two binary comparisons - otherwise a cycle obtains. This leaves only two possible binary choices, the ranking of the two alternatives beaten by \(\gamma(X)\), resulting in \(4 \times 3 \times 3 \times 4 \times 2 = 288\) cases. For case C, in the 3-set that does not include \(\gamma(X)\), the pairwise choice is forced for two binary comparisons - otherwise a cycle obtains. This leaves only two possible binary choices, the ranking between the two alternatives that beat \(\gamma(X)\), resulting in \(4 \times 3 \times 9 \times 4 \times 2 = 864\) cases. Finally, case D is similar to case A, noting that now WWARP imposes no restriction on the choice from any set of cardinality three, resulting in \(4 \times 3^4 \times 6 = 1,944\) cases.

In total, then, we have 3,168 cases, yielding an area

\[
a_{TCTC} = \left( \frac{3168}{20736} \right)^2 = 0.023
\]

so that

\[
\begin{align*}
    s_{PAY}^{TCTC} &= 0.657 - 0.023 = 0.634 \\
    s_{HYP}^{TCTC} &= 0.821 - 0.023 = 0.798
\end{align*}
\]
3.2.5 Summary and Comment.

The general indication we draw from the data is that a model addressing the lack of full rationality in the choice function must be able to explain menu-effects in the form of Condorcet inconsistency. Pairwise cycles of choice appear to be less crucial. This suggests that, while it is not difficult to induce cyclical behavior in the laboratory (e.g. Roelofsma and Read [29], Tversky [40], and Waite [41]), such behavior may apply mainly to a well identified class of circumstances, where ‘adjacent’ alternatives in the cycle are similar in some dimension (Tversky [40], Rubinstein [30], Leland [18] all noted the importance of this aspect in decision making). The typical cycles observed result from having the subject compare multidimensional objects, say simple gambles of the form \((x; p)\), where \(p\) is the probability of winning the amount \(x\). If \(x\) is close to \(y\), it is likely that the choice between \((x; p)\) and \((y; q)\) is dictated by the probability dimension alone. A sufficiently long chain of such choices may however eventually break the similarity in outcome, turning the outcome into the decisive criterion. The indication of our experiment is that outside of such circumstances, menu effects tend to dominate.

This indication is confirmed in the analysis of the models we have studied in this paper. Neither the full rationality nor the RSM model are compatible with menu effects of the Condorcet inconsistency type, and indeed they both fail at explaining the data. The RSM model performs only marginally better than the full rationality model. The proportion of successes in explaining behavior is not increased significantly when weakening WARP to the combination of Expansion and WWARP.

The models of Categorize Then Choose and Rationalizability are compatible with Condorcet inconsistency, and are successful in the experiment. There is a significant leap in the proportion of successes in explaining behavior when weakening WARP to WWARP. The resulting models can explain 50% more data compared to the other two models, namely over 70% in one treatment and over 85% in the other treatment.

In addition, the loss of parsimony of the models of CTC and Rationalization is much smaller than the increase in descriptive power, as evidenced by their superiority on the basis of Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success.

When the CTC and the Rationalization models are strengthened, as is the case for Transitive CTC and Order Rationalization, the latter has a worse Selten’s index than its more permissive version, since it does not have a better hit rate, while at the same time it has a similar area. To the contrary, the TCTC model loses a few data points, but it decreases its area substantially. This results in the best Selten’s index of predictive
success among all of the theories under scrutiny.\footnote{Our data suggest a plethora of additional considerations - due to space limitations we cannot analyze them all in this paper, and limit ourselves to highlighting just a few in a separate appendix, available online at http://webspaces.qmul.ac.uk/pmanzini/twosimilar/technical_and_data_appendix.pdf.}

To summarize, the Selten index ranks the new models and the textbook one in the following decreasing order of success:

TCTC; Order Rationalization; WWARP theories (CTC and Rationalization); Full Rationality.

4 Concluding remarks

We hope to have made several points with this paper:

Methodology. One aspect of the paper has been to show with a concrete experiment how the standard (nonparametric) revealed preference methodology can be successfully used to study ‘psychological’ choice procedures and compare their predictive success. The general methodological point has been argued elsewhere by e.g. Rubinstein and Salant ([33] and [32]), Bernheim and Rangel ([5]), Manzini and Mariotti ([20]), Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8], Masatlioglu and Ok ([23], [24]) and Masatlioglu and Nakajima [25]. Note well: we are not claiming that only direct choice data are relevant for economics (as argued for example by Gul and Pesendorfer [14]), but that even these data alone can be extremely helpful in discriminating between the standard choice model and models of boundedly rational choice, and between different models of boundedly rational choice.

In addition, we hope the use and computation of Selten’s Measure of Predictive Success for various ‘area theories’ can be of independent methodological interest, in view of the relatively rare use of this index.\footnote{See e.g. Hey and Lee [16] for a recent application.}

‘Revealed preference’ facts. Whether one believes the models we have studied or not, the experiment has also established quite clearly two series of facts that are model-independent. First, it has highlighted the importance of a precise type of menu effect in choice. This fact could only be discovered because we elicited entire choice functions from the subjects, rather than asking them to express their binary preferences.

Secondly, the experiment has demonstrated that while one step in weakening the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (to the combination of Weak WARP and Expansion) does not capture a significant new portion of observed behaviors, another step in this weakening (to Weak WARP alone, or Weak WARP and Pairwise consistency) is dramatically more effective.
Models of boundedly rational choice and Welfare Analysis. As a consequence of the facts above, the experiment suggests what a good model has to do in order to explain deviations from utility maximization. The utility maximization model and the RSM model ([20]) unfortunately cannot explain well the choice data elicited in our experiment because they can’t address menu effects. Both the new Categorize-Then-Choose (CTC) model proposed in this paper and the Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [8] Rationalization model, in both their restrictive and permissive versions, instead perform definitely better (not only in terms of brute number of observations explained but also in terms of Selten’s [36] Measure of Predictive Success). The Transitive CTC model has the highest Selten score. It is likely nevertheless that in situations where cycles play a more important role, the Rationalization model will score better.

To conclude, we believe that the CTC model has three main attractions. First, its easy testability by means of choice data. Second, its ability to capture in a direct way menu effects: in this model preferences are simply revealed (uniquely) by binary choices. Third, and consequently, offering a solution to the thorny issue of welfare analysis in the context of boundedly rational choice.

References


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Appendix: Instructions

Please note: you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants for the entire duration of the experiment.

The instructions are the same for all you. You are taking part in an experiment to study intertemporal preferences. The project is financed by the ESRC.

Shortly you will see on your screen a series of displays. Each display contains various remuneration plans worth the same total amount of €48 each, staggered in three, six and nine months installments. For every display you will have to select the plan that you prefer, clicking on the button with the letter corresponding to the chosen plan. (HYP: These remuneration plans are purely hypothetical. At the end of the experiment you’ll be given a participation fee of €5) (PAY: At the end of the experiment one of the displays will be drawn at random and your remuneration will be made according to the plan you have chosen in that display).

In order to familiarize yourself with the way the plans will be presented onscreen, we shall now give you a completely hypothetical example, based on a €7 total remuneration.

Plan A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much</th>
<th>When</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€3</td>
<td>in one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1</td>
<td>in two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1</td>
<td>in three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€2</td>
<td>in four years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plan B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much</th>
<th>When</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€1</td>
<td>in one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€2</td>
<td>in two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€3</td>
<td>in three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€1</td>
<td>in four years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example plan A yields €7 in total in installments of €3, €1, €1 and €2 in a year, two years, three years and four years from now, respectively, while plan B yields €7 in total in installments of €1, €2, €3 and €1 in a year, two years, three years and four years from now, respectively.