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Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers

September 2023 **No: 2023/65**

ISSN 2754-3129 (Online)

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Recommended citation: Zhong, Y. (2023). Does Electing Criminally Accused Politicians Affect the Constituency Level Maoist Incidents? Evidence from India. *Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers* 2023/65.

[1] Warwick Economics would like to thank Gianna Boero and Samuel Obeng for their contributions towards the selection process.

Does electing criminally accused politicians affect the constituency level Maoist incidents? Evidence from India

Yuchen Zhong*

Abstract

This paper estimates the causal effects of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents in India at the constituency level. The research leverages the methodology of regression discontinuity design, contrasting constituency where criminally accused candidates barely lost with constituencies where non-accused candidates barely lost. The findings provide preliminary indications of the negative effect of electing criminally accused leaders on the Maoist-initiated incidents. Notably, this effect is more pronounced when accounting for variations across different states. The analysis reveals that the election of criminally accused leaders correlated with a reduction of nearly three Maoist-initiated incidents in Jharkhand, and notably, this effect remains observable over an extended period.

JEL classifications: D72, D74

Keywords: Criminal Accusations; Regression Discontinuity; Maoist incidents.

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Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Professor Pushkar Maitra, my supervisor, for the invaluable guidance and support provided throughout this endeavor.

1. Introduction

The escalating prevalence of politicians with criminal accusations across all tiers of the Indian governmental structure has garnered increasing attention in both media coverage and academic literature. Despite the Supreme Court of India's mandate in 2003, requiring election candidates to disclose their records of accusations, individuals with criminal charges persistently enter the political arena and emerge victorious in elections. Notably, in the Lok Sabha elections, the percentage of victorious candidates with declared criminal cases rose from 30 percent in 2009 to a substantial 43 percent in 2019. Disturbingly, a significant number of Parliament and state assembly members carry severe charges, including instances of murders. The presence of criminally accused leaders carries considerable potential for imposing economic burdens on constituencies (Prakash, Rockmore, Uppal, 2019), while also exerting detrimental effects on the region's criminal landscape (Prakash, Sahoo, Saraswat & Sindhi, 2022). Moreover, these leaders erode the integrity of institutions by manipulating law enforcement agencies and lay the groundwork for a problematic cycle by facilitating the rise of more criminally accused politicians, further undermining the effectiveness of the police (Kim & Lee, 2022).

Referred to as the most significant domestic security concern within India, the escalating influence of the Maoist group can be reasonably attributed to its dual political-criminal identity (Mahadevan, 2012). The group's expansion is intricately linked to corruption and extortion practices, which ensure a parallel development with the increasing affluence of various Indian states. Additionally, the success of insurgencies hinges upon active endorsement from the civilian populace (Singhal & Nilakantan, 2016), with a clear association between the occurrence of terrorist activities and the absence of essential services (Berman, Shapiro & Felter, 2011).

This study delves into the effect of criminally accused politicians on the occurrence of local violence at the constituency level. It is extensively debated how criminally accused leaders influence the social dynamics, often pointing out divergent trends. One strand of literature emphasizes the connection between criminally accused politicians and organized crime networks, contending that the election of such figures results in a surge of criminal incidents within the region (Paoli, 2014; Prakash et al., 2022). This relationship is particularly pronounced in regions with fragile governance structures, prompting local politicians to establish ties with criminal syndicates (Acemoglu, Feo, & Luca, 2020). Another vein of literature contends that voters perceive criminally accused politicians as patrons capable of providing assistance to the local community during times of socioeconomic distress (Vaishnav, 2017). These politicians often hold significant sway within the locality and

exercise restraint in periods of violence while in positions of authority.

We employ the regression discontinuity design (RD design) as a method to isolate the causal effect of criminally accused politicians within constituencies (Prakash et al., 2022; Meyersson, 2014; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). This involves a comparison between constituencies that elect criminally accused leaders and those that elect non-accused leaders in close elections. Our study's scope encompasses the period from 2009 to 2018, a range chosen to ensure comprehensive access to candidates' background information. Moreover, the analysis focuses on eight specific states, selected based on the criterion of having recorded more than 100 incidents within each state during the stipulated time frame.

To ensure the internal validity of the RD design, we execute two validation tests. Firstly, we employ the McCrary density test, which ensures that criminally accused politicians do not manipulate the vote shares to win the election within our specific context. Secondly, we assess the continuity of additional observable characteristics associated with constituencies and candidates. The preservation of these characteristics around the threshold is crucial for affirming the validity of the RD design's foundational assumptions (Prakash et al., 2022).

Our study reveals preliminary evidence pointing to the negative effects of constituencies electing criminally accused politicians on incidents initiated by both Maoist groups and the government. Additionally, the temporal trajectory of these effects indicates a distinction in the final year of the term between Maoist-initiated and government-initiated incidents. Furthermore, these effects exhibit greater magnitude when the candidates carry severe charges or multiple accusations. Moreover, the impact of leaders with criminal charges displays variability depending on the state context. Particularly noteworthy is the pronounced effect observed in Jharkhand, a region rich in mineral resources.

The structure of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the backdrop of Indian politics and the occurrences of Maoist-initiated incidents in India are introduced, along with a discussion of the conceptual framework. Moving on to Section 3, the data pertaining to politicians with criminal accusations and incidents at the constituency level is detailed. This is followed by an outline of the empirical approach and an assessment of the validity of the regression discontinuity design in Section 4. Section 5 presents the outcomes related to the impact of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents. Lastly, the paper concludes with the discussion and summary of findings in Section 6.

2. Background and Conceptual Framework

2.1. Political Structure in India

India operates as a federal republic and follows a parliamentary system of governance. At the core of the nation's legislative framework is the Parliament of India, which consists of two distinct chambers: the Upper House and the Lower House. The Upper House is identified as Rajya Sabha, also referred to as the Council of States, while the Lower House goes by Lok Sabha, known as the House of the People. Collectively, the representatives in both Houses are designated as Members of Parliament (MPs). The selection process for Upper House members entails election by the various States and nominations by the President of India, whereas the constituents of the Lower House are elected by the country's voting population.

The structure of state governance mirrors the national framework, featuring an Upper House termed the Legislative Council, alongside a Lower House known as the Legislative Assembly. Within the context of the state legislative assembly, the members are recognized as Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), which constitutes the primary emphasis of our study. The electoral mechanism at the state level adheres to the "first-past-the-post" system. This involves the division of each state into multiple state assembly constituencies. Typically, MLAs serve fixed terms spanning a duration of five years.

During their tenure, MLAs wield substantial authority encompassing legislative, financial, and executive power. Beyond these domains, they exert notable influence over the state's bureaucracy and the broader social milieu.

2.2. Criminality in Indian Politics

The nexus between criminality and politics in India has been a well-known phenomenon. Vaishnav (2017) offers insights into the dynamics surrounding the presence and demand for criminal influence within Indian politics. On one hand, the surge in political volatility and heightened competition serves as an impetus for criminals to opt for direct political engagement rather than merely extending financial support to candidates in return for political safeguarding. Additionally, political parties exhibit a willingness to nominate individuals with criminal backgrounds for political positions, primarily driven by considerations such as contributions, membership fees, and the candidates' capability to independently finance their campaigns.

On the demand side of criminal involvement in Indian politics, one school of thought aligns with the "ignorant voter hypothesis," asserting that voters often lack comprehensive awareness. Banerjee et al. (2011) contend that had information regarding candidates' qualifications been widely disseminated, electoral outcomes could have altered in the two most

closely contested elections. Conversely, an alternative perspective within the literature posits that criminal participation in politics is an outcome of rational behavior by well-informed voters. Vaishnav (2017) suggests that in regions characterized by weaker state capacity, voters tend to perceive politicians facing criminal charges as patrons who can provide support to the local populace.

2.3. Maoist Conflicts in India

The Maoist insurgency, also known as the Naxalite movement, first originated in West Bengal during the 1960s and gradually expanded its influence to other Indian states over subsequent decades. In the 1970s, the Indian government quelled the movement, resulting in a significant decline that reached its lowest point in 1985. However, the insurgency experienced a resurgence in the 1980s with the emergence of key groups like the People's War Group and the Communist Party of India. By the early 2000s, Naxal factions began to consolidate their efforts; notably, the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India merged, culminating in the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004. Following this consolidation, the Maoist movement gained momentum, expanding its presence to encompass a majority of states in east-central India. Particularly concentrated within India's "Red Corridor," this region situated in the Center-East of the country has witnessed a longstanding conflict between the Maoist insurgency and state forces.

The Maoist-affected region in India is endowed with valuable mineral resources and is marked by widespread illegal mining operations. This aspect has garnered significant attention in academic literature, especially concerning the impact of abundant natural resources on conflicts. Kennedy (2013) contends that mineral wealth profoundly influences regions in central India, where the links between communities and nature are strong and symbolic. Another study conducted by Mukherjee (2018) explores the correlation between historical legacies of colonial institutions and the emergence of the Maoist insurgency. This study highlights that the commencement of the civil conflict can be elucidated by the historical roots of weakened state capacity and ethnic grievances stemming from the exploitation of natural resources.

2.4. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The escalation of violence observed in districts rich in mineral resources signifies a compelling motivation for insurgency groups to establish control over these territories. Furthermore, the success of insurgencies relies significantly on the active backing of the civilian population. The "hearts and minds" concept suggests that the government can alter

public sentiment toward its administration by delivering essential public services. This approach is believed to encourage civilians to support the government's efforts and provide crucial information for counterinsurgency initiatives (Singhal, Nilakantan, 2016).

Bruck et al. (2011) and Singhal, Nilakantan (2016) present a conceptual framework that examines the intricate tripartite interplay between insurgency, counterinsurgency, and economic outcomes. Existing literature has established a robust connection between insurgency and economic consequences, indicating a detrimental impact of insurgency on economic activities. While state governments are tasked with managing counterinsurgency efforts within their jurisdictions, their motivations for resource allocation toward conflict management can differ, particularly in regions rich in mineral resources, due to specific fiscal policies. Building on this, Shapiro and Eynde (2020) contribute valuable insights by highlighting the role of fiscal policies in shaping incentives for engaging in conflicts. Their findings suggest a noteworthy surge in violence following the royalty hike, emphasizing the impact of fiscal policy adjustments on conflict dynamics.

3. Data Description

3.1. Criminally Criminally Accused Politicians in India

The election-related information is sourced from the Election Commission of India (ECI) Statistics Reports on General Elections to State Legislative Assemblies. This dataset encompasses various details such as the size of the electorate, the count of voters, the categorization of constituencies (whether reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) or Scheduled Tribes (STs)), constituency names and codes, candidates' gender, age, positions, and their respective vote shares. Regarding candidates' accusation status, the dataset relies on data provided by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR). Post the 2003 Supreme Court directive, candidates participating in elections are mandated to disclose pertinent background data, which includes their accusation status. The ADR dataset encompasses information concerning candidates' educational backgrounds, assets, liabilities, and the number of charges they face. Furthermore, the inclusion of Indian Penal Code (IPC) details in the dataset facilitates the identification of candidates facing severe charges.

Our study focuses on state assembly elections conducted between 2009 and 2018. While data on candidate affidavits exist from 2003, information collected prior to 2009 is comparatively less comprehensive. Table 1 in our study provides an overview of summary statistics for both the entire sample and a mixed sample. In our analysis, we categorize constituencies based on the accusation status and positions of the top two candidates. We define "seat-type one" for constituencies where a criminally accused winner prevails over a criminally accused runner-up, and "seat-type four" for those where a non-accused winner

triumphs over a non-accused runner-up. For constituencies where a non-accused winner prevails over a criminally accused runner-up, and vice versa, we label them "seat-type two" and "seat-type three," respectively. This categorization structure aids in examining various scenarios within our analysis.

Our primary focus centers on the choice between two distinct candidate types—criminally accused and non-accused. Consequently, our dataset encompasses a mixed sample which pertains to constituencies featuring candidates of varying accusation statuses. This choice results in a reduction of our sample size from the original 2126 constituencies to a subset of 941 constituencies. Table 1 showcases summary statistics for both the full sample and the mixed sample. The mean values indicate slight distinctions between these two sample groups. Notably, constituencies with candidates of differing accusation statuses demonstrate slightly higher mean numbers of candidates and an increased average electorate size compared to the full sample. Additionally, within the mixed sample, both winners and runner-ups display greater affluence and age. Furthermore, winners alone exhibit decreased educational attainment, while indicating higher counts of charges and serious charges in the mixed sample.

For additional insights into the characteristics of criminally accused and non-accused candidates within our dataset, we present table 2 that is categorized based on the accusation status of candidates. In comparison to non-accused winners, on average, criminally accused winners are characterized by being younger, possessing greater wealth, and having lower educational qualifications. Furthermore, data regarding the Permanent Account Number (PAN) issued by the Income Tax Department reveals that criminally accused winners are more inclined to report their income tax compared to their non-accused counterpart.

3.2. Maoist-initiated incidents and Government-initiated incidents

The data concerning conflict events is sourced from the Georeferenced Event Dataset maintained by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Our analysis is constrained by the available affidavit data, focusing on incidents spanning from 2009 to 2019. This period extends one year beyond the election data timeframe due to the examination of conflict events in the year following the elections. The dataset provides information on various aspects of violence, encompassing the count of incidents, the number of fatalities, and details about the involved conflict groups. Additionally, each event within the dataset is geographically coded and further disaggregated into individual days. Consequently, our approach involves arranging the dataset according to the geographical coordinates of state and assembly constituencies. This categorization accounts for both Maoist-initiated and government-

initiated incidents, contributing to our comprehensive analysis of the conflict landscape.

Figure 1 (a)-(d) depicts the chronological progression of incidents instigated by Maoist groups and the government between 2009 and 2019. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate histograms showcasing the daily frequency of incidents, while panels (c) and (d) illustrate histograms presenting the daily count of fatalities. In Figure 1. (a), following an upsurge in 2010, a subsequent decline in the number and frequency of Maoist-initiated incidents is evident. It's notable that, when comparing government-initiated incidents, the count of fatalities attributed to Maoists is notably lower.

Table 3 furnishes a summarized overview of statistics pertaining to these conflicts. Over the span of 2009 to 2019, Maoist-initiated and government-initiated incidents transpired on approximately 22.13% and 23.65% of all days, respectively. In total, events unfolded on 39.28% of all days. With the exception of the maximum daily event count, all other metrics indicate a consistent pattern wherein government-initiated incidents exceed those initiated by Maoists.

3.3. Combined Data

The estimation of the effect of criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents is conducted at the constituency level. Consequently, we amalgamate election data and conflict data using the state name and the code of the assembly constituency. Due to the constraints posed by the available affidavit data, we examine the total events within each state from 2009 to 2018 within our dataset. We exclude states with less than 100 Maoist-initiated incidents. Moreover, as a consequence of incident counts being below 100 in both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana during this period, we aggregate these two states, given that Telangana was carved out from Andhra Pradesh in 2014. This process yields a dataset spanning the years 2009 to 2018 and encompasses eight states: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, and West Bengal.

Table 4 provides a comprehensive overview of summary statistics regarding the accusation status of candidates in each individual state. Across all states, 31.87% of elected politicians carry criminal accusations, while 32.52% of all candidates face similar accusations. Within the group of states, six exhibit proportions of criminally accused winners surpassing 31.87%, and seven states witness figures exceeding 32.52% for criminally accused candidates. Notably, Jharkhand records the highest ratios of both criminally accused winners and candidates when compared to other states.

Table 5 presents data on the count of Maoist-initiated and government-initiated incidents in each state across different time periods. Within the set of eight states, Jharkhand,

Odisha, and Chhattisgarh stand out with the highest numbers of both Maoist-initiated and government-initiated incidents. Particularly, Chhattisgarh distinguishes itself with notably higher counts of total incidents, wherein government-initiated incidents surpass Maoist-initiated incidents. The temporal progression of incident counts highlights varied patterns among the states.

In addition, figure 2 displays the cumulative count of Maoist-initiated and government-initiated incidents over time. Notably, government-initiated incidents surpass Maoist-initiated incidents from 2012 onward, displaying fluctuations over time. In contrast, Maoist-initiated incidents exhibit a consistent decline from 2010 onward.

4. Regression Discontinuity Design and Validity Tests

4.1. The RD design

A key contribution of this paper is the identification of the causal effect of electing criminally accused politicians to state assemblies in India on a constituency level of Maoist conflicts. lies in the non-random nature of electoral victories involving politicians with criminal accusations. For instance, there might be certain constituencies where such politicians have a higher likelihood of winning. This inherent non-randomness introduces unobservable variables that could potentially result in biased outcomes when employing standard regression analysis techniques.

The regression discontinuity (RD) design, as outlined by Prakash et al. (2022), Meyersson (2014), and Imbens & Lemieux (2008), offers a method to leverage a distinct discontinuity in the assignment of a treatment variable in order to identify the causal effect. The basic idea of the RD design is rooted in the notion that treatment allocation is determined solely based on the cut-off value, c, of the forcing variable. In our specific context, the treatment variable ("accused" or "not accused" candidate), $accused_i$, is determined solely on the cut-off value ($c = 0$), of the forcing variable ($margin_i$), known as the margin of victory of criminally accused candidates. The margin of victory is defined as the difference in the vote share between the criminally accused candidates and non-accused candidates, resulting in a cut-off point at zero.

The assignment process adheres to a clearly defined deterministic rule: $accused_i = 1\ (margin_i \geq 0)$, where $1(.)$ representing the indicator function. Concretely, constituencies falling below the cut-off point ($c = 0$), where the margin of victory for criminally accused candidates is negative, elect candidates without accusations . Conversely, constituencies surpassing the cut-off point ($c = 0$) , where the margin of victory for candidates with

criminal accusations is positive, elect candidates with criminal accusations.

The utilization of the RD design to assess the impact of election outcomes capitalizes on "the discontinuous relationship between political support and electoral success" (Eggers, Fowler, Hainmueller, Hall, & Snyder Jr., 2015). This means that the outcome of an election is solely contingent on a threshold value of political support. Consequently, close election results permit meaningful comparisons between winners and losers. In our setting, the presence of voter fragmentation across all candidates contributes to closely contested elections across a broad spectrum of underlying vote shares for criminally accused candidates. Figure 3 illustrates this concept by plotting the margin of victory for candidates with criminal accusations against their corresponding vote shares. Notably, observations within a 5 percent range of victory margin exhibit variations spanning from just under 20 percent up to 50 percent of total vote shares for candidates with criminal accusations.

We consider the following specification for estimating the RD treatment effect,

$$(1) \quad y_{i+n} = \alpha + \beta accused_i + f(margin_i) + u_i, \quad \forall margin_i \ \epsilon \ (c-h, c+h)$$

where y_{i+n} is the events that occur in the next n year(s) following the election, $accused_i$ denotes the treatment variable, while $margin_i$ is the forcing variable. The term u_i signifies the error component, and h signifies the neighborhood around the cut-off point $c = 0$, known as the bandwidth. The control function $f(margin_i)$ is some continuous function, usually a n-order polynomial in the forcing variable on each side of c.

In our estimation, we employ a local linear regression methodology. This approach offers the advantage of integrating an appropriate bandwidth selection alongside a linear control function. To determine the optimal bandwidth, we adopt the algorithm proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). To enhance the robustness of our analysis, we also conduct estimations using bandwidths that are half the optimal value $(0.5h)$, and twice the optimal bandwidth$(2h)$. Within our specific context, we analyze conflict events taking place in the subsequent 2, 3, and 4 years following the election year. This temporal consideration allows us to capture the effects over time and discern any patterns that may emerge.

4.2. Validity of the RD Design

Before moving to the RD results, we conduct two standard tests to validate the integrity of the RD design within our specific context.

The initial test employs the McCrary test (2008) to assess the continuity of the density of the forcing variable, namely the margin of victory, at the cutoff point. This examination

investigates the potential manipulation of elections by criminally accused politicians, gauging whether they exhibit a higher likelihood of victory. Should this manipulation occur, a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable would be observable at the cutoff point, along with a heightened frequency of criminally accused candidates as opposed to non-accused candidates in the vicinity of the cutoff.

In Figure 4(a), the histogram of the density of the forcing variable, specifically the margin of victory, is presented to scrutinize its continuity at the cutoff. Furthermore, Figure 4(b) provides a formal presentation of the McCrary density test, evaluating any abrupt shifts at the discontinuity. Notably, neither graph demonstrates a substantial jump or conspicuous sorting around the cutoff point. The estimate resulting from the McCrary test is minimal and statistically insignificant, affirming the absence of significant manipulation or irregularities.

Continuing our assessment of the RD design, we turn our attention to verifying the continuity of observable characteristics within constituencies and among candidates. To substantiate the RD design's validity, pre-existing constituency attributes must exhibit continuity at the cutoff point.

Figure 5 offers an analysis of various constituency and winner characteristics, encompassing factors like constituency type (whether reserved for SCs/STs or not), vote shares for candidates with criminal accusations, electorate size, and turnout percentage. It also takes into account winners' attributes like age, educational attainment, and gender. These graphs demonstrate the absence of substantial jumps at the cutoff between constituencies electing candidates with criminal accusations and those without.

Additionally, Table 2 furnishes a balance test, furnishing more nuanced insights into the distinctions between candidates with criminal accusations and those without. Notably, within the mixed sample and when confined to a 5% margin of victory, any significant differences in characteristics such as total votes, gender, and winner's income tax disclosure tend to dissipate. Only the education level of the runner-up remains significant.

Of particular note is the upper left graph of Figure 5, which presents the relationship between vote shares for candidates with criminal accusations and the margin of victory. Importantly, no substantial leap at the cutoff from non-accused to accused candidates is evident. This observation aligns with the consistent pattern showcased in Figure 3, signifying the continuity of vote shares for candidates with criminal accusations across the cutoff point.

5. Criminally Accused Politicians and Maoist Incidents

5.1. Main results

We initiate our exploration of the RD results with Figure 6, a graphical depiction that

delineates the Maoist conflicts against the margin of victory for the criminally accused candidates over time in bins of 8 per cent. The solid curves represent the outcomes of a local linear regression employing the optimal bandwidth recommended by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Meanwhile, the scatter plot denotes the instances of Maoist conflicts within each interval of the margin of victory. Accompanying grey lines delineate the 95 percent confidence intervals, while the vertical dashed line designates the cutoff point at zero.

By examining the margins of victory, we can differentiate between constituencies that elect candidates with criminal accusations over non-accused candidates (positive margins of victory) and those that select non-accused candidates over candidates with criminal accusations (negative margins of victory). The vertical disparity between the curves at the cutoff point provides a quantification of the causal impact of electing candidates with criminal accusations on the occurrence of conflict events.

Figure 6(a) serves as our main specification, showing the effect of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist conflicts in the next year of the election. capturing the effect of electing politicians with criminal accusations on Maoist conflicts in the subsequent year after the election. The discernible decline in Maoist conflicts around the cutoff point points to a negative influence of electing candidates with criminal accusations on the occurrence of Maoist conflicts. This trend suggests that constituencies choosing criminally accused politicians experience a reduced frequency of Maoist conflicts in comparison to those opting for non-accused candidates.

Figure 6(b) through 6(d) extend the analysis to include the total count of Maoist conflicts in the years following the election: two, three, and four years, respectively. A noticeable ascent in the jump at the cutoff can be observed from (a) to (c), and a subsequent reduction from (c) to (d). This pattern indicates that the impact of electing criminally accused politicians becomes more pronounced over time, with the exception of the final year of the leader's term.

A similar trend can be gleaned from the graphical representation of the RD effects on government-initiated incidents and total events, depicted in Figure 7. These graphs align with our observations from the Maoist conflicts analysis, indicating that constituencies selecting criminally accused leaders witness fewer government-initiated incidents and overall events in comparison to those choosing non-accused candidates. Additionally, the magnitudes of the effects on government-initiated incidents grow more substantial over time, while the effects on total events exhibit a trend similar to that of Maoist-initiated incidents.

Table 6 underscores our main RD analysis of the impacts on Maoist-initiated incidents. In Column (1), we present the outcomes of an OLS regression, which yields a minuscule

coefficient on Maoist-initiated incidents, this coefficient is considerably smaller compared to the result of the RD design. However, it's important to recognize that OLS results could be biased, given the non-random nature of criminally accused candidates' victories.

Column (2) focuses on a local linear regression employing the optimal bandwidth of 3.08. This specification reveals a reduction of 0.158 Maoist-initiated incidents in constituencies electing candidates with criminal accusations. To enhance the robustness of our findings, we also conduct local linear regressions with half and double the optimal bandwidth, presented in Columns (3) and (4) respectively. Remarkably, within the half bandwidth, the RD outcome indicates a positive effect of electing candidates with criminal accusations.

Shifting from Panel B to Panel C, we delve into the effects on Maoist-initiated incidents over the subsequent two, three, and four years. The magnitudes of the effects expand over time, peaking at the third year and receding during the final year of the term. The consistently negative coefficients across this time span provide empirical support for the assertion that constituencies electing criminally accused leaders experience a reduction in Maoist-initiated incidents in comparison to those opting for non-accused candidates.

The results presented in Tables 7 and 8 shed light on our estimation outcomes pertaining to government-initiated incidents and overall events. In Table 7, the coefficients derived from the RD estimates in Columns (2) through (4) reveal a comparatively milder negative impact of electing candidates with criminal allegations on government-initiated incidents, as contrasted with the effects observed for Maoist-initiated incidents.

Furthermore, as indicated by the coefficients from Table 7, columns (2) to (4), the election of criminally accused politicians seems to have a discouraging effect on government-initiated incidents. Additionally, the trend of effects on government-initiated incidents over time does not indicate a reduction during the last year of a criminally accused politician's term, providing a glimpse into the institutional effect caused by criminality in politics.

When compared to the effects on Maoist-initiated incidents, the impact on government-initiated incidents appears notably smaller. In Table 8, which assesses the effect of electing criminally accused politicians on total events, the temporal effects follow the same trajectory as those observed for Maoist-initiated incidents. The findings suggest a more pronounced effect on the overall conflict landscape than on specific institutional aspects.

5.2. Serious Charges and Several Charges

In our earlier estimations, we observed that electing criminally accused politicians leads to a reduction in Maoist-initiated incidents within constituencies. This outcome can be interpreted

through the lens of the "godfather" influence that criminally accused politicians wield over their constituencies, as suggested by existing literature.

Our subsequent investigation delves into whether the specific nature of criminal allegations against politicians affects the potency of the impact brought about by electing them. To assess this, we concentrate on politicians facing serious charges or having more than two charges. We create a binary variable to denote whether a candidate is accused of any serious charge. This binary variable takes the value of 1 for politicians with multiple serious charges and 0 for those without any serious charges.

Table 9 provides our findings with a focus on politicians facing serious charges. Comparing these results to the main specification, we observe that electing politicians with serious charges has a larger impact, leading to a reduction of 0.276 Maoist-initiated incidents in the year following the election. The trend over time and within a half bandwidth remains consistent with the primary results. This suggests that the effect of electing criminally accused politicians becomes more pronounced when they are facing serious charges.

In Table 10, we delve into the effect of the number of charges and investigate constituencies with candidates facing at least two charges. Similarly to the trends observed in the previous estimations, the impact of electing candidates with more than two charges increases over time until the final year of their term. The magnitude of the negative effect is even greater compared to that of criminally accused and seriously accused candidates, resulting in a decrease of 0.484 incidents in the year immediately following the election. Furthermore, unlike the positive results within the half bandwidth in prior estimations, the estimate for politicians with more than two charges within the half bandwidth showcases a negative impact on Maoist-initiated incidents. This underscores that politicians with a more extensive history of criminal involvement exert a more substantial influence on local conflict.

5.3. State Specific Difference

In the context of examining the effect of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents across different states, it's important to consider variations in criminality and the extent of Maoist activities in each state. Since Telangana was separated from Andhra Pradesh in 2014, their incidents are combined for the analysis.

Turning to Table 11, we observe a substantial negative effect in Jharkhand, significant at the 1% level. This effect signifies a decrease of nearly 3 Maoist-initiated incidents in the year following the election, within the 2.81 bandwidth. This substantial impact suggests that electing criminally accused politicians has a strong influence on the crime environment in Jharkhand.

For West Bengal, observations are omitted. Furthermore, when considering the RD estimates within the optimal bandwidth, there are sufficient observations only for Bihar, Jharkhand, and Maharashtra. By doubling the bandwidth, there emerges a small but negative effect of constituencies electing criminally accused politicians in Andhra Pradesh and Odisha. Conversely, Chhattisgarh shows a positive effect with an increase in Maoist-initiated incidents by around 1 case. Table 5 underscores that Chhattisgarh has more government-initiated incidents than Maoist-initiated incidents, indicating a stronger institutional power in comparison to other states.

In Table 12, we delve into the effects of electing criminally accused politicians over time in Jharkhand. The results are statistically significant and show an increasing impact over time. This indicates that constituencies electing criminally accused politicians experience four fewer Maoist-initiated incidents in the next two years following the election, five fewer incidents in the subsequent three years, and almost six fewer incidents in the next four years. Interestingly, unlike the decrease observed in the effects during the last year of the term of office in previous estimates, the impact of electing criminally accused politicians persists even in the final year.

Jharkhand, known for its abundance of mineral resources, also exhibits the highest ratio of criminally accused winners to criminally accused candidates and the highest ratio of criminally accused candidates to all candidates. This prevalence of criminality contributes to the significant influence wielded by criminally accused leaders in Jharkhand, allowing them to exert substantial control over the area and thus having a significant effect on Maoist-initiated incidents.

6. Discussion

We assess the effect of electing criminally accused politicians across 941 constituencies in a sample encompassing 8 states. Our findings demonstrate that electing criminally accused politicians results in a reduction of both Maoist-instigated and government-initiated occurrences within these constituencies. Various segments of literature acknowledge the influence of criminally accused leaders from contrasting perspectives. The initial perspective highlights the nexus between politicians and criminals, implying an exacerbation of the criminal landscape due to the prevalence of such leaders. Conversely, the second viewpoint contends that leaders facing criminal accusations can provide assistance to the community through their robust local standing, consequently leading to a decrease in criminal activities.

Our findings from the Jharkhand corroborate the notion that politicians facing criminal accusations wield significant influence over the local crime landscape, resulting in a reduction

of incidents. Following the first year post-election, Maoist-initiated incidents in Jharkhand diminished by three cases, with the impact of these accused leaders persisting over time. While our primary model reveals a decline in the effect of criminally accused politicians during the final year of their term, this pattern does not hold true for Jharkhand. Despite a noted attenuation in the effect's magnitude during their last year in office, these leaders still exert a noteworthy influence on Maoist activities within the constituencies.

The impact of criminally accused candidates on Maoist incidents in Jharkhand cannot be solely attributed to the concept of accused politicians' control over the local environment. Upon analyzing the presence of such politicians in each state, it becomes evident that Bihar and Jharkhand have the highest proportions of accused candidates and leaders. Nevertheless, their impact on Maoist incidents displays opposing trends in these two states. Regression discontinuity (RD) results indicate a positive correlation between accused leaders and Maoist conflicts in Bihar, whereas Jharkhand exhibits a significantly negative effect through local linear regression within the optimal bandwidth.

Apart from the substantial representation of criminally accused politicians, Jharkhand is renowned for its abundant mineral resources, which are closely linked to Maoist activities. A prevailing notion in the literature proposes that "criminal and state rule are substitutes" (Skarbek, 2011). Recent studies by Blattman, Duncan, Lessing, and Tobon (2021) underscore how criminal groups provide governance to safeguard their business interests, and improved state governance can supplant criminal influence. This mechanism could shed light on our Jharkhand findings. However, we haven't assessed to what extent Maoist-initiated incidents can be considered a proxy for the Maoist group's governance. The election of candidates facing criminal accusations leads to a decrease in violent incidents, sparking concerns about the positive aspects of electing such politicians. Subsequent research could delve into the criminal governance dynamics of each state to comprehensively comprehend variations in electing candidates with criminal backgrounds.

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

Figure 1. – This visualization illustrates the chronological progression of Maoist-initiated incidents and government-initiated incidents spanning the years 2009 to 2019. Each panel showcases the daily frequency of events within its respective category. In Panels (a) and (b), the daily count of Maoist-initiated incidents and government-initiated incidents are depicted. In Panels (c) and (d), the daily count of fatalities attributed to Maoist groups and the government is plotted.



Figure 2. – Black line plots the number of government-initiated incidents over time from 2009 to 2019; blue line plots the number of Maoist-initiated incidents over time from 2009 to 2019.



Figure 3. – Margin of victory and vote share for criminally accused candidates. The margin of victory is defined as the difference in vote shares between criminally accused candidates and non- accused candidates. The graph plots the total vote share for the criminally accused candidates against their margin of victory. Red dots present observations within 5 percentage of margin of victory.



(a) Histogram



(b) McCrary Test

Figure 4. – Density test of the forcing variable. The forcing variable is the victory margin of criminally accused candidates. Positive victory margins are the differences in vote share between criminally accused winners and non-accused runner-up. Negative victory margins are the difference in vote share between non-accused winner and criminally accused runner-up.

Discontinuity estimate = -0.0027 (s.e.=0.132)



Figure 5. – Continuity check on constituency and candidates' characteristics such as vote share for criminally accused candidates, electorate size, total vote share, constituency type that whether they are reserved for SCs (STs) or not, and winner's age, level of education, gender. None of the graphs shows a significant jump at the cut-off.



Figure 6. – The graphical illustration of the RD estimates of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents. The vertical difference between two curves at the cut-off indicates the estimated effect of electing criminally accused politicians. (a) is the main specification of estimates on the Maoist-initiated incidents one year after the election. (b)-(d) are the illustrations of estimates on the total Maoist-initiated incidents in the next 2 years, next 3 years, next 4 years respectively.



Figure 7. – Panel (a)-(d) are the graphical illustration of the RD estimates of electing criminally accused politicians on government-initiated incidents over time. Panel (e)-(h) are the graphical illustration of the RD estimates of electing criminally accused politicians on total events over time.

Table 1
Summary Statistics

	Full Sample			Top-2 Mixed Sample		
	N	Mean	Std. Dev	N	Mean	Std. Dev
Constituency						
Number of Candidates	2126	11.802	5.414	941	11.818	5.388
Turnout	2126	68.994	12.884	941	68.421	12.845
Log Electorate size	2126	12.347	0.208	941	12.356	0.206
Log Valid Votes	2126	11.957	0.200	941	11.957	0.197
GEN	2126	0.721	0.449	941	0.749	0.434
SC Reserved	2126	0.157	0.364	941	0.147	0.354
ST Reserved	2126	0.122	0.328	941	0.104	0.306
Candidates' Characteristics						
Female Winner	2126	0.094	0.292	941	0.085	0.279
Female Runner-up	2126	0.095	0.293	941	0.086	0.281
Criminal Winner	2126	0.465	0.499	941	0.522	0.500
Criminal Runner-up	2126	0.445	0.497	941	0.478	0.500
Winner with pan	2126	0.884	0.321	941	0.879	0.326
Runner-up with pan	2126	0.855	0.353	941	0.860	0.347
Winner's cases	2119	1.806	3.836	937	1.939	4.142
Runner-up's cases	2122	1.394	2.835	940	1.320	2.404
Winner's IPC counts	2119	1.298	3.287	937	1.411	3.116
Runner-up's IPC counts	2122	1.095	2.954	940	1.059	2.707
Winner's Total Assets	2126	16.201	1.834	941	16.262	1.714
Runner-up's Total Assets	2126	16.009	1.799	941	16.064	1.775
Winner's education level	2126	5.112	2.782	941	5.062	2.810
Runner-up's education level	2126	5.098	2.811	941	5.181	2.741
Winner's age	2126	50.491	10.650	941	50.589	10.418
Runner-up's age	2126	49.939	10.358	941	50.184	10.181

Notes: Full sample refers to constituencies irrespective whether the top 2 candidates are of difference accusation status or not. Top-2 mixed sample refers to constituencies electing criminally accused winner against non-accused runner-up, and non-accused winner against criminally accused runner-up.

Table 2
Balance test

	Top-2 Mixed Sample			Top-2 Mixed Sample within 5% margin		
	Criminal	Non-Criminals	Diff.	Criminal	Non-Criminals	Diff.
Constituency						
Number of Candidates	12.108	11.502	-0.606	12.309	11.770	-0.538
	(5.608)	(5.124)	(0.351)	(5.166)	(5.121)	(0.657)
Turnout	68.884	67.917	-0.967	70.845	68.518	-2.328
	(13.002)	(12.666)	(0.838)	(12.644)	(12.560)	(1.610)
Log Electorate size	12.365	12.345	-0.020	12.347	12.357	0.010
	(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.013)	(0.179)	(0.193)	(0.024)
Log Valid Votes	11.974	11.940	-0.034**	11.985	11.962	-0.024
	(0.188)	(0.205)	(0.013)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.022)
GEN	0.758	0.740	-0.018	0.789	0.730	-0.059
	(0.429)	(0.439)	(0.028)	(0.410)	(0.446)	(0.055)
SC Reserved	0.141	0.153	0.013	0.089	0.131	0.042
	(0.348)	(0.361)	(0.023)	(0.287)	(0.339)	(0.040)
ST Reserved	0.102	0.107	0.005	0.122	0.139	0.017
	(0.303)	(0.309)	(0.020)	(0.329)	(0.348)	(0.043)
Candidates' Characteristics						
Female Winner	0.049	0.124	0.076***	0.049	0.098	0.050
	(0.216)	(0.330)	(0.018)	(0.216)	(0.299)	(0.033)
Female Runner-up	0.106	0.064	-0.041*	0.065	0.057	-0.008
	(0.308)	(0.246)	(0.018)	(0.248)	(0.234)	(0.031)
Winner with pan	0.910	0.844	-0.066**	0.902	0.828	-0.075
	(0.286)	(0.363)	(0.021)	(0.298)	(0.379)	(0.044)
Runner-up with pan	0.855	0.864	0.009	0.862	0.893	0.032
	(0.352)	(0.343)	(0.023)	(0.347)	(0.310)	(0.042)
Winner's Total Assets	16.343	16.174	-0.168	16.234	15.992	-0.241
	(1.669)	(1.758)	(0.112)	(1.709)	(1.701)	(0.218)
Runner-up's Total Assets	16.161	15.959	-0.202	16.162	15.985	-0.177
	(1.851)	(1.683)	(0.116)	(2.191)	(1.728)	(0.252)
Winner's Education Level	4.709	4.889	0.180	4.496	4.762	0.266
	(1.636)	(1.767)	(0.111)	(1.739)	(1.800)	(0.226)
Runner-up's Education Level	4.949	4.671	-0.278*	5.211	4.705	-0.506*
	(1.798)	(1.770)	(0.116)	(1.651)	(1.589)	(0.207)
Winner's age	50.255	50.953	0.699	50.366	51.844	1.478
	(9.807)	(11.047)	(0.680)	(9.888)	(10.973)	(1.334)
Runner-up's age	50.352	50.000	-0.352	49.927	49.533	-0.394
	(10.722)	(9.563)	(0.665)	(10.532)	(10.908)	(1.370)

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: Top-2 Mixed Sample refers to constituencies having candidates of different accusation status in the top 2. The 5% margin is the 5% margin of victory, which is defined as the differences between the vote shares of criminally accused candidates and non-accused candidates.

Table3
Summary Statistics on Conflict Events

	Maoist	Government	Total
Total Number of Events	1137	1159	2296
Number of Days with Events	889	950	1578
Number of Fatalities	1523	3201	4724
Mean Events per Day	0.31	0.32	0.63
Maximum Events per Day	7	5	7
Percentage of Days With Events	24.34%	26.01%	43.21%

Notes: The percentage of days with events is calculated by number of days with events out of 4017 days, from year 2009 to year 2019.

Table4
State Specific Summary on Candidates

	Accused Winners	Criminally Accused Candidates	Number of Winners	Number of Candidates	% of Accused Winners	% of Accused Candidates
Chhatisgarh	38	57	171	342	22.22%	16.67%
Telangana	43	78	69	138	62.32%	56.52%
Andhra Pradesh	65	115	128	256	50.78%	44.92%
Jharkhand	97	187	144	288	67.36%	64.93%
Odisha	91	239	286	572	31.82%	41.78%
West Bengal	154	282	431	864	35.73%	32.64%
Bihar	209	416	364	728	57.42%	57.14%
Maharashra	291	562	533	1066	54.60%	52.72%
All States	283	578	888	1778	31.87%	32.51%

Note: This table provides information on several key aspects related to candidates with criminal accusations. The columns display the count of criminally accused candidates, the total number of candidates, the count of winners among the total candidates, and the count of criminally accused winners. The "% of accused winners" represents the ratio of accused winners to the total number of criminally accused candidates, while "% of accused candidates" reflects the ratio of criminally accused candidates to the total candidates in each state. The final row aggregates data from all states considered within our analysis.

Table 5
Incidents over time

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Maoist-initiated incidents												
Andhra Pradesh	5	13	5	10	6	5	5	3	3	2	3	60
Bihar	13	20	22	15	12	3	3	5	14	14	14	135
Chhatisgarh	53	34	44	23	34	27	48	59	53	91	47	513
Jharkhand	50	68	59	36	23	30	18	19	19	14	24	360
Maharashtra	22	24	42	32	16	18	18	28	12	10	26	248
Odisha	49	67	60	43	40	38	36	28	35	19	20	435
Telangana	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
West Bengal	71	116	21	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	210
All States	263	345	253	161	131	121	128	142	136	150	134	1964
Government-initiated incidents												
Andhra Pradesh	7	6	5	8	3	4	1	4	1	2	4	45
Bihar	15	20	7	9	9	11	5	10	3	3	5	97
Chhatisgarh	132	104	75	94	81	77	92	203	128	174	98	1258
Jharkhand	75	56	36	41	24	22	21	19	5	14	27	340
Maharashtra	14	18	12	18	22	16	10	16	22	20	14	182
Odisha	28	37	24	45	22	21	16	20	16	18	12	259
Telangana	4	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	8
West Bengal	12	23	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	46
All States	287	264	167	219	161	153	145	272	175	231	161	2235

Notes: This table presents the number of Maoist-initiated and government-initiated incidents happened from 2009 to 2019. Telangana is separated from Andhra Pradesh in 2014.

Table 6

Effects of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents

Outcome	Maoist-initiated incidents			
	OLS	RD Results		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A			
	1 Year After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.010	-0.158	0.060	-0.139
	(0.026)	(0.176)	(0.096)	(0.138)
Bandwidth		3.08	1.54	6.16
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0002			
	Panel B			
	2 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.0005	-0.508	-0.238	-0.297
	(0.054)	(0.486)	(0.393)	(0.334)
Bandwidth		3.90	1.95	7.80
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0000			
	Panel C			
	3 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	-0.024	-0.590	-0.346	-0.379
	(0.068)	(0.559)	(0.480)	(0.381)
Bandwidth		4.06	2.03	8.12
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0001			
	Panel D			
	4 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.018	-0.544	-0.455	-0.336
	(0.084)	(0.530)	(0.523)	(0.357)
Bandwidth		4.49	2.25	8.98
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0001			

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: Column (1) presents the estimates from OLS. Column (2)-(4) present the RD estimates on a local linear regression using the IK bandwidth, half IK bandwidth, and double IK bandwidth respectively. Panel A presents our main specification of the RD effects of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents happened in the next year of election. Panel B-D present the RD estimates on the total Maoist-initiated incidents happened in the next 2 years, next 3 years, and next 4 years respectively.

Table 7

Effects of electing criminally accused politicians on Government-initiated incidents

Outcome	Government-initiated incidents			
	OLS	RD Results		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A			
	1 Year After the Election			
Criminally Accused	-0.004	-0.028	0.032	-0.025
	(0.026)	(0.091)	(0.039)	(0.074)
Bandwidth		2.72	1.36	5.45
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0000			
	Panel B			
	2 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.021	-0.114	-0.061	-0.101
	(0.093)	(0.164)	(0.119)	(0.121)
Bandwidth		3.67	1.83	7.33
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0001			
	Panel C			
	3 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.036	-0.210	-0.221	-0.153
	(0.109)	(0.308)	(0.284)	(0.212)
Bandwidth		4.26	2.13	8.52
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0001			
	Panel D			
	4 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.041	-0.232	-0.264	-0.209
	(0.147)	(0.338)	(0.330)	(0.234)
Bandwidth		4.47	2.23	8.93
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0001			

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: This table presents the effect of electing criminally accused politicians on government- initiated incidents. Column (1) presents the result from OLS regression. Column (2)-(4) present the RD results within optimal bandwidth, half bandwidth, and double bandwidth respectively. Panel A-Panel D reports on government-initiated incidents in the next year, next two years, next three years, and next four years.

Table 8

Effects of electing criminally accused politicians on Total incidents

Outcome	Total incidents			
	OLS	RD Results		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A			
	1 Year After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.006	-0.215	-0.032	-0.149
	(0.048)	(0.252)	(0.178)	(0.181)
Bandwidth		3.60	1.80	7.20
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0000			
	Panel B			
	2 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.021	-0.606	-0.424	-0.388
	(0.119)	(0.607)	(0.583)	(0.408)
Bandwidth		4.38	2.19	8.76
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0000			
	Panel C			
	3 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.012	-0.809	-0.557	-0.530
	(0.166)	(0.866)	(0.738)	(0.591)
Bandwidth		4.05	2.03	8.10
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0000			
	Panel D			
	4 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	0.059	-0.749	-0.737	-0.525
	(0.387)	(0.787)	(0.921)	(0.498)
Bandwidth		5.36	2.68	10.72
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0001			

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: This table presents the effect of electing criminally accused politicians on total events. Column (1) presents the result from OLS regression. Column (2)-(4) present the RD results within optimal bandwidth, half bandwidth, and double bandwidth respectively. Panel A-Panel D reports on total events in the next year, next two years, next three years, and next four years.

Table 9

Effects of electing seriously charged politicians

Outcome	Maoist-initiated incidents			
	OLS	RD Results		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A			
	1 Year After the Election			
Seriously Accused	0.030	-0.276	0.002	-0.270
	(0.034)	(0.298)	(0.167)	(0.222)
Bandwidth		3.10	1.55	6.20
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0012			
	Panel B			
	2 Years After the Election			
Seriously Accused	0.044	-0.859	-0.519	-0.565
	(0.066)	(0.817)	(0.713)	(0.521)
Bandwidth		3.93	1.97	7.86
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0007			
	Panel C			
	3 Years After the Election			
Seriously Accused	0.026	-0.996	-0.725	-0.698
	(0.082)	(0.929)	(0.879)	(0.584)
Bandwidth		4.16	2.08	8.32
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0002			
	Panel D			
	4 Years After the Election			
Seriously Accused	0.063	-1.01	-0.690	-0.662
	(0.098)	(0.948)	(0.845)	(0.602)
Bandwidth		4.00	2.00	8.00
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0007			

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: This table presents the effect of electing seriously accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents. Column (1) presents the result from OLS regression. Column (2)-(4) present the RD results within optimal bandwidth, half bandwidth, and double bandwidth respectively. Panel A- Panel D reports the effect of electing seriously accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents in the next year, next two years, next three years, and next four years.

Table 10
Effects of electing politicians with more than 2 accusations

Outcome	Maoist-initiated incidents			
	OLS	RD Results		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A			
	1 Year After the Election			
Criminally Accused	-0.017	-0.484	-0.119	-0.330
	(0.027)	(0.463)	(0.367)	(0.280)
Bandwidth		3.33	1.66	6.66
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0007			
	Panel B			
	2 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	-0.056	-1.343	-0.607	-0.875
	(0.064)	(1.317)	(1.087)	(0.778)
Bandwidth		3.39	1.70	6.78
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0013			
	Panel C			
	3 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	-0.094	-1.574	-1.039	-1.030
	(0.074)	(1.479)	(1.432)	(0.842)
Bandwidth		3.74	1.87	7.48
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0029			
	Panel D			
	4 Years After the Election			
Criminally Accused	-0.063	-1.463	-1.363	-0.943
	(0.201)	(1.317)	(1.595)	(0.749)
Bandwidth		4.31	2.15	8.63
Bandwidth Type		IK(h)	h/2	2h
R-squared	0.0010			

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: This table presents the effect of electing politicians with more than 2 accusations on Maoist-initiated incidents. Column (1) presents the result from OLS regression. Column (2)-(4) present the RD results within optimal bandwidth, half bandwidth, and double bandwidth respectively. Panel A-Panel D reports the effect of electing politicians with more than 2 accusations on Maoist-initiated incidents in the next year, next two years, next three years, and next four years.

Table 11
State specific effects of electing criminally accused politicians

Outcome	Maoist-initiated incidents 1 Year After the Election					
	Panel A					
	Andhra Pradesh	Bihar	Chhatisgarh	Jharkhand	Maharashtra	Odisha
Criminally Accused	0	0.052	0	-2.971***	-0.309	0
	(omitted)	(0.055)	(omitted)	(0.000)	(0.314)	(omitted)
Bandwidth	3.70	2.97	3.82	2.81	4.14	4.62
Bandwidth Type	IK(h)	IK(h)	IK(h)	IK(h)	IK(h)	IK(h)
	Panel B					
	Andhra Pradesh	Bihar	Chhatisgarh	Jharkhand	Maharashtra	Odisha
Criminally Accused	0	0	0	0.249	-0.198	0
	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(1.082)	(0.225)	(omitted)
Bandwidth	1.85	1.49	1.91	1.403	2.07	2.31
Bandwidth Type	h/2	h/2	h/2	h/2	h/2	h/2
	Panel C					
	Andhra Pradesh	Bihar	Chhatisgarh	Jharkhand	Maharashtra	Odisha
Criminally Accused	-0.015	-0.030	1.418	-1.287	-0.259	-0.088
	(0.018)	(0.084)	(1.393)	(0.876)	(0.247)	(0.060)
Bandwidth	7.40	5.94	7.64	5.611	8.29	9.24
Bandwidth Type	2h	2h	2h	2h	2h	2h

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: This table reports the effect of electing criminally accused politicians on Maoist-initiated incidents in the next year of election. Observations for West Bengal are omitted. The RD estimates in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha are restricted by the lack of the sample within the optimal bandwidth.

Table 12
Effects of electing criminally accused politicians in Jharkhand over time

Outcome	Maoist-initiated incidents			
	In the Next Year	In the Next 2 Years	In the Next 3 Years	In the Next 4 Years
Criminally Accused	-2.971***	-4.059***	-5.596***	-5.703***
	(0.000)	(0.930)	(0.942)	(0.944)
Bandwidth	2.81	3.63	3.64	
Bandwidth Type	IK(h)	IK(h)	IK(h)	IK(h)

Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Notes: This table reports the effect of electing criminally accused politicians in Jharkhand on Maoist- initiated incidents happened in the next year, next 2 years, next 3 years, and next 4 years after the election.