

**If You Do Not Change Your Behavior:  
Preventive Repression in Lithuania under Soviet Rule**

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# If You Do Not Change Your Behavior: Preventive Repression in Lithuania under Soviet Rule\*

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## Abstract

Who is targeted by preventive repression and why? In the Soviet Union, the KGB applied a form of low-intensity preventive policing, called *profilaktika*. Citizens found to be engaging in politically and socially disruptive misdemeanors were invited to discuss their behavior and to receive a warning. Using novel data from Lithuania, a former Soviet republic, in the late 1950s and the 1970s, we study the profile and behaviors of the citizens who became subjects of interest to the KGB. We use topic modeling to investigate the operational focuses of *profilaktika*. We find that *profilaktika* began as a way of managing specific threats or “known risks” that arose from the experience of postwar Sovietization. The proportion of “unknown risks” – people without risk factors in their background or personal records – increased by the 1970s. These people were targeted because of their anti-Soviet behaviour, which the KGB attributed to “contagious” foreign influences and the spread of harmful values.

*Keywords:* coercion, communism, preventive repression, security, social norms, surveillance, Soviet Union.

*JEL codes:* N44, P37.

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*[She] was warned that, in the event of a repetition on her part of similar remarks, more severe measures of influence would be applied to her.*<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

How can an authoritarian regime prevent citizens from expressing public dissent? State repression has been widely studied as a tool of political control in authoritarian regimes (Hassan et al. (2022) provide a recent review). To stop citizens at risk of committing anti-regime crimes, autocrats can use preventive repression. Preventive repression targets individuals engaged in a wide range of politically and socially disruptive misdemeanors, which the regime considers harmful. Conformity, rather than inner loyalty, is the desired result of preventive repression. As long as individuals conform, there is no risk of contagion from more to less susceptible people.

Who is targeted by preventive repression, when and why? For this paper, we collected and digitized formerly secret archival documentation of the preventive work, called *profilaktika*, of the Soviet postwar secret police, the KGB, in Soviet Lithuania.<sup>2</sup> The preventive work of the KGB provides a canonical example of everyday or “low-intensity” repression (described by Frantz, 2020, 107). While “high-intensity” actions such as killings and mass arrests are more easily associated with the everyday work of communist intelligence and counterintelligence in the 1930s and 1940s, from the 1950s the violence was dialed down. In the 1960s and 1970s, the period from which we take our data, surveillance and prevention became the core of the KGB’s domestic agenda. *Profilaktika* is not just a relic of history, however: in 2022, preventive warnings were once again in use in Russia to intimidate dissenters from regime policies.<sup>3</sup>

The citizens who became subjects of *profilaktika* drew the KGB’s attention through their suspicious behavior, which became known to the KGB through its channels of surveillance, described by Harrison (2016, 180–181, 185–206): either signals (wire-tapping or the interception of mail) or human intelligence (reports by KGB watchers and informers). *Profilaktika* subjects included people who got drunk and talked too much, told subversive jokes, painted slogans, raised illegal flags, distributed anonymous letters or leaflets, were too interested in state secrets, were too interested in foreign and pre-Soviet culture and art, listened to foreign radio broadcasts and passed on what they heard, had unauthorized

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<sup>1</sup>Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Lietuvos SSR Valstybes Saugumo Komitetas, Selected Records of the Lithuanian Special Archive (Lietuvos ypatingasis archyvas – LYA), collection K-1, inventory 3, file 682 (hereafter Hoover/LYA Hoover K-1/3/682): 12-12ob (Klaipeda KGB first division commissioner lieutenant Kulikov, report on implementation of *profilaktika*, December 12, 1970).

<sup>2</sup>The central records of the KGB in Moscow remain closed; only those held in former Soviet states that have broken with former communist elites are open to historical research.

<sup>3</sup>See the OVD-Legal website at <https://ovd.legal/instruction/beseda>, last accessed on August 8, 2022. The federal law (182-FZ) on the foundations of crime prevention was enacted in 2016.

contact with foreigners such as relatives abroad or foreign sailors, or behaved badly while travelling abroad or at the border. When they were observed doing these things, they entered into a long-term relationship with the KGB in which the preventive discussion was a rare moment of face-to-face encounter. In fact, this relationship often began long before and would continue afterwards during months or years of surveillance.

Profilaktika typically took the form of a face-to-face encounter described as a “discussion” or “conversation.” The conversation was not violent and it specifically did not take the form of an interrogation (Elkner, 2009, 153). It was meant to be a two-way exchange that would lead to mutual understanding. The KGB wanted to understand the causes of the subject’s suspicious behavior and help the subject understand the possible consequences. The discussion could be two-way, but it was not open-ended. There was always a desired outcome, which was for the subject to acknowledge having made a mistake and to pledge to correct it. The spirit of profilaktika was preventive, not punitive. By prevention, it was hoped to reduce the need for severe punishment of the future offences that would not now be committed. “An ounce of prevention is worth of a pound of cure” (Dragu and Przeworski, 2019, 78).<sup>4</sup>

While the tone of discussion was ostensibly helpful to the subject, it was framed explicitly by the threat that an uncooperative subject would face more serious sanctions. Such threats were made credible by the KGB’s fearsome reputation and by its privileged access to the courts and justice system as well as to the subject’s landlord, employer, neighbors, colleagues, teachers, doctors, and other agencies that could decide the future prospects of the subject and family members.<sup>5</sup>

On the basis of two novel datasets (at the individual and case levels) covering the late 1950s and 1970s, we provide the first quantitative empirical evidence on the shifting focus and goals of KGB preventive repression. From there, we document the detailed profile of persons and everyday behaviors that were of primary interest to the communist secret police. We show that in Soviet Lithuania most subjects of KGB profilaktika were young male Lithuanians of quite ordinary status. As time passed, the fractions of women, of non-Lithuanians, and of party members increased.

We employ the methods of quantitative textual analysis and topic modeling to find the most common topics in the data. We test conjectures suggested by the existing qualitative literature and provide the first quantitative measures of the operational focus of KGB

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<sup>4</sup>In some cases, however, prevention was reinforced by immediate penalties that fell far short of long imprisonment or execution but could still be life-changing. For example, expulsion from a course of study (Fedor, 2011, 52).

<sup>5</sup>In some cases, the preventive warning was delivered in public, the occasion being an assembly at work, school, or college, where the subject was expected to acknowledge and apologize for the past behavior, while others present joined in public criticism. This was called profilaktika “with the public’s help” (Cohn, 2017).

prevention and its direction of change through time. We identify the language in which the KGB formulated its philosophy of prevention, that is, how it thought prevention worked. We show that in the early years of *profilaktika* the primary emphasis fell on changing the individual subject’s behavior through re-education in Soviet beliefs and norms. By the 1970s, the emphasis had moved from re-education of the individual to the ideological health of the community.

Using unsupervised topic modeling, we find that the KGB was concerned not only about the misbehavior of a few young people but also about the underlying influences that persuaded them to misbehave and the bad examples they passed on to others. In the perception of the KGB, these influences changed over time. In the 1950s, the KGB was particularly concerned that the young people of the Baltic region were being led astray by the older generation, who had grown up in independent Lithuania and had perhaps fought for its independence, and by the old religions, which persisted in Soviet Lithuania. In the 1970s, the influences of concern emanated not from the past but from the present, from the contemporary world beyond Soviet frontiers, which was increasingly accessible to young Lithuanians.

Our paper contributes to the existing research on preventive repression by [Ritter and Conrad \(2016\)](#) and [Tertychnaya \(Forthcoming\)](#), who study the repression of anti-regime collective action by measures such as curfews, prohibitions on assembly, and protest permit denials. These represent strategies of prevention that rely on raising the sense of threat faced by regime opponents.<sup>6</sup> In our context, however, there are several differences: the repressive measures that we study are entirely secret, individually targeted, do not rely on creating new crimes, and aim to suppress behaviors that, while not necessarily criminal in themselves, are thought to be precursors of more serious political crime. Preventive warnings were practiced not only in the Soviet Union, but also elsewhere under communism ([Pucci, 2020](#), 68, 158, 178, 185–186, 289) – although not in East Germany where, from 1962, the party leadership endorsed suspended sentences, public censure, and referral of “bad” behavior to “conflict commissions” at work, as alternatives to formal repression ([Gieseke, 2020](#), 28). Closely related are studies of preemptive repression ([Truex, 2019](#)) and of the undercover surveillance ([Hager and Krakowski, 2022](#); [Lichter et al., 2020](#)) required to inform and direct preventive repression.<sup>7</sup> Preventive repression is subtle and thus difficult to measure ([Frantz, 2020](#), 107). Existing studies in historical political economy rely on proxies such as the total number of secret police officers in Communist Poland

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<sup>6</sup>For the purpose of inducing fear and compliance with the state, it is convenient to distinguish between violence and the threat of violence ([Hassan et al., 2022](#), 159). The threat of violence is *ex ante* preventive repression, different from *ex post* “remedial” violent repression ([Dragu and Przeworski, 2019](#), 79).

<sup>7</sup>[Dragu and Przeworski \(2019\)](#) formalize preventive repression as a moral hazard problem arising between the autocrat and secret police officers engaged in repression.

(Hager and Krakowski, 2022) or the number of the Stasi informers in East Germany (Lichter et al., 2020). Our data take us inside the process of preventive repression.

In [Section 1](#), we describe what is known about preventive repression (profilaktika) by the KGB and discuss the external validity of the case of Lithuania. We argue that profilaktika was one element of the overall system designed by the KGB, in Soviet Lithuania as elsewhere. In [Section 2](#), we discuss the testable conjectures found in the existing literature on the KGB philosophy of prevention and the evolution of profilaktika. In [Section 3](#), we describe our data, which takes the form of a text corpus. [Section 4](#) gives an overview of the people subjected to profilaktika. In [Section 5](#) and [Section 6](#) we look at term frequencies and use unsupervised topic modelling to test the conjectures from the literature and discuss the robustness of our findings. Finally we conclude.

## 1 KGB profilaktika: what we know

### 1.1 The history of profilaktika

In its heyday, KGB profilaktika was perhaps the largest and most effective programme for personally targeted behavior modification anywhere in the world outside school and college. Its scale and ambitions are suggested by a “top secret” report to the members of the Central Committee of the ruling Soviet Communist Party, made by KGB chairman Yurii Andropov on October 31, 1975.

In the war on anti-Soviet activity, Andropov wrote, we are winning. He began by pointing to a steep decline in the number of prosecutions for state crimes such as treason and anti-Soviet agitation—from more than 1,300 a year at the end of the 1950s to less than half that number in the early 1970s. The figures he used are shown in [Table 1](#). But what was driving this success? Andropov proposed four factors:

The further reinforcement of the moral-political unity of our society; the growth of political consciousness of Soviet people; the correct penal policy of the Soviet state; and the dominant role of *preventive-warning* work to deter criminality.<sup>8</sup>

In Andropov’s analysis, behind the decline in crimes committed lay an increase in crimes prevented. Andropov went on to show that the KGB was issuing preventive warnings to tens of thousands of people each year – and to claim that these warnings were remarkably effective. Out of the 120,000 that received such a warning between 1967 and 1974,

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<sup>8</sup>Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, container 28 (reel 18) (USSR KGB chairman Iurii Andropov, memorandum “Concerning some results of the warning and preventive work of the organs of state security,” October 31, 1975). The emphasis is added.

Table 1: Prosecutions for state crimes and preventive warnings in the Soviet Union, 1959-1974

	1959-62	1963-66	1967-70	1971-74
Prosecutions, total	5,413	3,251	2,456	2,423
Preventive warnings, total	...	...	58,298	63,108
Tried on criminal charges, of those preventively warned	...	...	100	50

*Note:* For more information, see [Table A-1](#) in [Appendix A](#). From 1975 to 1985 the number of preventive warnings appears to have remained steady at 15,000 to 16,000 annually, but under Gorbachev and perestroika it declined sharply, falling to a few hundred a year by 1989 ([Gieseke, 2020, 28](#)).

Andropov stated, just 150, or barely more than one per thousand, were subsequently brought to court charged with a state crime. In short, prevention worked.

Communist security services differed from those found in the West not only in their commitment to the ruling party’s monopoly of power, but also in combining foreign intelligence and domestic counterintelligence under one roof.<sup>9</sup> According to the KGB lexicon, the purpose of hostile intelligence services was not only to gather information and send it abroad, but to disrupt the Soviet political and social order from within through conscious and unconscious agents of influence. The mission of KGB counterintelligence ([Nikitchenko and others, 1972, 142](#)) was to forestall hostile disruption by identifying the agents, repressing and punishing those that acted consciously to undermine the Soviet order, and preventing the unconscious ones from continuing their activities. It was the unconscious agents, the “politically immature, confused” citizens who from time to time committed “politically damaging misdemeanors” ([Nikitchenko and others, 1972, 220](#)) that were not yet state crimes but could become state crimes if unchecked, who were suitable for treatment by profilaktika ([Nikitchenko and others, 1972, 237](#)).

The KGB adopted this concept at the end of the 1950s, a few years after its post-Stalin reform of 1954. The adoption of profilaktika was associated with four developments. In June 1958, a USSR Supreme Court review of cases brought under the law against counter-revolutionary crimes determined that too many prosecutions lacked evidence of counter-revolutionary intent. In December Aleksandr Shelepin, who favored a milder policy, replaced Ivan Serov (who did not) as head of the KGB. At the twenty-first party congress, which opened in January 1959, Khrushchev announced that profilaktika would become central to the civic education of young people ([Hornsby, 2013, 120–121, 211–212](#)).

<sup>9</sup>The postwar evolution of the Soviet KGB and its role in upholding the authority of the Soviet state are the subject of an inside history by [Chebrikov et al. \(1977\)](#) and of independent studies by [Knight \(1990\)](#), [Albats \(1995\)](#), [Weiner and Rahi-Tamm \(2012\)](#), [Sever \(2008\)](#), [Fedor \(2011\)](#), [Hornsby \(2013\)](#), [Harrison \(2016\)](#), and [Harrison and Zaksauskienė \(2016\)](#). Also of relevance is the history of occasional outbreaks of mass disorder under Soviet rule, catalogued by the [CIA \(1983\)](#) and [Kozlov \(1999\)](#), and the bloody suppression of particular disturbances as described by [Baron \(2001\)](#) and [Barenberg \(2014\)](#).



And in March, the government adopted a new statute governing the legal rights and duties of the KGB, the first since 1923.<sup>10</sup>

[Knight \(1990, 193–197\)](#), [Elkner \(2009, 153–156\)](#), [Fedor \(2011, 51–56\)](#), and [Hornsby \(2013, 211–212\)](#) briefly describe the general idea of KGB profilaktika. The technique is summarized by [Knight \(1990, 184\)](#) as follows:

If for example the KGB learns that a Soviet citizen is having contact with foreigners or is speaking in a negative fashion about the Soviet regime, this citizen is called in for a “chat” and efforts are made to set him or her straight.

[Harrison \(2016, 125–161\)](#) and [Cohn \(2017, 2018a,b\)](#) offer more detailed accounts of profilaktika in practice from many intriguing or poignant examples based on documentation from the Baltic region, in particular from Lithuania, where KGB records are now accessible to researchers – unlike the central records held in Moscow.

## 1.2 The case of Lithuania

Soviet rule in the Baltic was established in 1940 and re-established in 1944/45 (the region was occupied by Germany during the war). The often-violent establishment of Soviet rule in the region has been traced by [Reklaitis \(2007\)](#), [Tannberg \(2010\)](#), [Statiev \(2010\)](#), and [Weiner and Rahi-Tamm \(2012\)](#). The role of KGB repression in Soviet Lithuania has been much studied by Lithuanian historians (e.g., [Anušauskas, 2008](#); [Burinskaitė and Okuličiūtė, 2010](#)).<sup>11</sup>

Lithuania, a Western borderland of relatively recent accession to the Union, had approximately 3 million residents in 1970, making little more than one per cent of the Soviet population.<sup>12</sup> Comparing local and all-Union reports of KGB profilaktika from 1967 to 1974, [Table 2](#) shows a rate of preventive warnings per head of the Lithuanian population twice that across the Soviet Union as a whole (119 per million per year, compared to 60 per million). This prompts a question: does Lithuania show us an experience representative of Soviet rule more widely, or was the local regime “colonial” or otherwise different?

A border region with a history of nationalist resistance and a large diaspora in Western Europe and North America, Lithuania posed heightened risks to Moscow’s security. These

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<sup>10</sup>An undated draft of the statute is reprinted by [Kokurin and Petrov, eds \(2003\)](#) (693–698). Although the statute did not mention profilaktika, it was a significant step towards placing the KGB under regulatory authority in accordance with the wider norms and rules of the Soviet system ([Pozharov, 2018](#)).

<sup>11</sup>Of particular interest are the mass disturbances of May 1972 in Kaunas and other towns and the KGB response (a contemporary account is [Remeikis \(1972\)](#); see also [Anušauskas \(2008\)](#); [Swain \(2013\)](#); [Harrison \(2016\)](#)).

<sup>12</sup>Other differences: in 1970 the population of Lithuania was somewhat less urbanised and less educated than that of Soviet Russia; it enjoyed somewhat higher living standards measured by the value of retail trade per head. See the data appendix to [Harrison and Zaksauskienė \(2016\)](#), Table A-1, at <https://warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/data/counter-intelligence/appendix.pdf>.

Table 2: Rates of preventive warning, 1967 to 1974, Soviet Union and Soviet Lithuania

	Soviet Union	Soviet Lithuania
Resident population, 1970	241.7 million	3.128 million
<b>Preventive warnings:</b>		
Total	116,406	2,987
Per million residents	481	955
Per million per year	60	119

*Sources:* Resident populations on January 15, 1970, are from (TsSU SSSR, 1972, 10). Persons subject to preventive warning, 1967 to 1974: in the Soviet Union, calculated from Table A-1, and in Soviet Lithuania, from Table A-2.

risks provide context to some of the detail that we will observe. But Moscow’s template of risk management in Lithuania was exactly the same as that applied everywhere, including in Russia: seal the borders, register the population, remove former elites; recruit an informer network; seize public and private records; monopolize housing and all business; control or suppress schools, media, civic and cultural organizations. This template was tried and tested first in Russia, then in the new Soviet borderlands of 1939–45, and after that across Eastern Europe. Making no concessions to local usage or cultural difference, it was simple enough that it could be operated by anyone: it worked anywhere and it was applied everywhere. Profilaktika was one element of the system, in Soviet Lithuania as elsewhere.

For the topic of profilaktika, the idea of one Soviet system is reinforced by the presence in the Lithuania KGB files of case reports from the faraway Tomsk and Krasnoïarsk provinces of the Russian Republic, collected by the center and disseminated for local study and emulation.<sup>13</sup>

## 2 Conjectures from the literature

Several aspects of profilaktika remain subject to conjecture. One is how and when the idea of the individually targeted preventive warning came into being, and who was targeted by profilaktika. Another is the effectiveness of profilaktika and, if it worked, through what channels. These are conjectures that we will seek to resolve.

<sup>13</sup>Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/569, 37–43 (Circular to the KGB chiefs of all Union and Autonomous Republics, regions, and provinces from the chief of the KGB fourth administration in Moscow, September 11, 1959). These cases are excluded from our data, however.

## 2.1 Origins of profilaktika

The first attempts of the Soviet state at preventive policing were indiscriminate and severe. As practised in the “Red Terror” that followed the Revolution and the “Great Terror” of the 1930s, preventive measures were typically aimed at entire social or ethnic groups, based on suspicion alone and without any attempt at individual selection. They ranged from preventive detention or forced resettlement to mass killing. Even if the secret police aspired to more selective targeting of preventive measures, it lacked the capacity to do so (Shearer, 2009, 125).

At this time, the term profilaktika was seldom used. A rare instance is found in a decree of 1930 that assigned to the local units of the Ukraine GPU the task of keeping kulaks and other “alien” elements away from state enterprises and local government. Here “profilaktika” was used, not in the modern sense of individual behavior modification, but to mean the social exclusion of an entire class of suspicious people, based on family origins and connections.<sup>14</sup>

In June 1954, Khrushchev advocated a turn to “profilaktika” to an audience of KGB officers (Tomilina, ed, 2009, 510–511). The turn he had in mind was from preventive killing to preventive detention. He preferred detention on the grounds that mistaken arrest could be remedied by release, whereas mistaken execution was forever. At this time, a year after Stalin’s death, therefore preventive repression still meant punishment based on suspicion, and the issue was simply the severity of the punishment, so this was not yet profilaktika as practiced later.

If we look for the earliest use of profilaktika in the modern sense of personally targeted interventions involving a form of probation or suspended sentence, we find it not in the Soviet Union but in Poland under postwar Soviet occupation (Pucci, 2020, 68, 157–196). In that setting, preventive interventions included discussions and verbal warnings (*rozmowy profilaktyczne*). In some cases they still extended to punitive measures such as temporary detention.

If we turn to the Baltic region after World War II, it seems highly likely that preventive warnings were introduced to manage the new problems created by the return of the region to Soviet rule, which were arguably similar to those in Poland at the same time. In 1940, and again in 1945, there was the problem of what to do with the priests of the Catholic Church in the western borderlands, given that it was decided not to imprison them all. Already on the occasion of the first occupation of Lithuania in 1940, Moscow included preventive warnings in the NKVD toolkit to manage the Catholic Church.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>“Statute on the Structure, Operational and Administrative Functions and Right of Local Organs of the Ukrainian SSR GPU (sectors and urban and rural district apparatuses)” in Kokurin and Petrov, eds (2003, 509).

<sup>15</sup>“Make a practice of summoning the bishops to the NKVD with the aim of warning them of [their]

In the early 1950s, another problem specific to the western borderlands became acute: how to bring back into society (“legalize”) those young men that had taken to the forests at the end of the war and continued to live undercover, without documents. In the mid-1950s a third problem arose when tens of thousands of former prisoners and “special settlers” were allowed to return home from Siberia.<sup>16</sup>

Each of these groups was substantial in number and included people who were still suspected of holding to anti-Soviet beliefs. Perhaps preventive warnings generally turned out to be an effective way of managing them. One supposes (but direct evidence is lacking) that in Moscow someone made the following calculation: if preventive warnings could manage the relatively dangerous people, who were numbered in tens or hundreds of thousands, but were still only a tiny percentage of the total Soviet population, would the same methods not also work in the less dangerous cases that were potentially far more numerous? In the Baltic region, at least, the focus of profilaktika seems to have shifted gradually away from the problems caused by the nationalists and priests of the older generation to . . . well, to everyone.

Other developments internal to the Soviet Union of the later 1950s may also have contributed. One was Khrushchev’s initiative to mobilize “public opinion” (*obshchestvennost’*, the opinion of those active in society) and volunteering to supplement the powers of the state to control deviance and disorder. Cohn (2017, 276) points out the close links between the *obshchestvennost’* campaign and the increased use of preventive warnings, especially when conducted in public.

Another contributory factor, suggested by Fedor (2011, 52), may have been the widening interface of Soviet society with the outside world. The growing scope for interaction ran from trade, tourism, and cultural exchange, all officially sanctioned under heavy regulation, to letters and visits from friends and relatives living abroad (tolerated but frowned on) and listening to Western radio broadcasts (which could not be prevented in the borderlands, but passing on what one heard to friends or colleagues was strictly prohibited). All these channels created risks for the naïve Soviet citizen, risks that required surveillance, management, and, if necessary, a preventive discussion and warning.

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responsibility for the anti-Soviet actions of the priests under their rule.” Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/149: 125 (USSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beriia and head of chief administration of state security Merkulov, memo to Soviet Lithuania People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Guzevičius, no date but not later than January 1941).

<sup>16</sup>For example, returnees from Siberia: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/557: 2-5 (Soviet Lithuania KGB commissioner for Balninkai district Šatas, report “On the status of work among persons returning from detention and special settlement,” April 21, 1959) and many similar district reports. On numbers in various categories subjected to profilaktika see for example Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/558: 41–48 (Soviet Lithuania KGB commissioner for Varniai district captain Misonas, report “On the status of agent-operative work in relation to bourgeois nationalists and returnees from places of detention, exile, and special settlement on the territory of Varniai district,” September 5, 1959) and many similar district reports.

To summarize, the literature suggests that preventive warnings were introduced as a temporary expedient to manage particular problems of postwar society associated with the old religions and the reintegration of former partisans and prisoners into society. Within thirty years, the practice had evolved to the key to regime security described by Andropov to the Central Committee in 1975, and in 1977 in a handbook for trainee officers by [Chebrikov et al. \(1977, 503–504\)](#). A signal of the transition is that profilaktika was practiced by the KGB, not just in normal times, but also to manage emergencies, for example the mass disturbances of 1972 in Kaunas, Lithuania: when young people took the streets in protest, the KGB responded not with massive reprisals but by a sustained increase in the rate of preventive warnings ([Harrison, 2016, 148–153](#)).

## 2.2 How well did profilaktika work?

Did profilaktika work? Did it reliably change behavior? Reporting on three years of experience in July 1962, KGB chief Semichastnyi said yes, although he gave no details.<sup>17</sup> Reporting in October 1974 on the aftermath of the Kaunas disturbances, a group of senior officers of the Lithuania KGB also said yes: of 885 persons interviewed after the demonstrations, only 9 (one per 100) had to be warned a second time.<sup>18</sup> A year later, as we have seen, KGB chief Andropov also said yes: at that time the rate of progression to serious offending following a preventive warning was one per thousand.<sup>19</sup>

If profilaktika worked, how did it work exactly? Again, a range of conjectures is available; these are inferred from the concepts that the KGB developed in reflecting on its practice. We call the set of these concepts the KGB “philosophy of prevention.”<sup>20</sup> This philosophy

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<sup>17</sup>“Prophylactic work on the prevention of crimes has fully justified itself.” Decree of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Committee on State Security (V. Semichastnyi) for 1962 “On reinforcement of the struggle of the organs of state security with the hostile manifestations of anti-Soviet elements,” reprinted in [Kokurin and Petrov, eds \(2003, 704\)](#).

<sup>18</sup>These interviews were held over 18 months from January 1, 1973. Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/717: 123–130 (Lithuania KGB fifth department deputy chief Stalauskas, second administration third department deputy chief Grishechkin, and senior inspector under the Lithuania KGB chairman Malakhov, “Report on the condition of preventive work in the Lithuania KGB and measures to improve it,” October 17, 1974).

<sup>19</sup>Reoffending rates of one per thousand or even per hundred are orders of magnitude below all the one, two, and three-year reoffending rates for ordinary criminals currently reported worldwide by [Yukhnenko et al. \(2019, 7–9\)](#). We cannot reliably evaluate reoffending rates from our data. As we explain in [Section 3](#), our dataset has limited temporal coverage: it contains two separate time periods (the late 1950s and the 1970s), missing the period during the 1960s. In the 1970s (1970–78), we can evaluate reoffending rates by examining individuals who appear in the records more than once. Out of 340 unique subjects, four individuals were under profilaktika more than once: one person was under profilaktika three times (1972, 1973, 1974), and two individuals became the subjects of profilaktika twice (one in 1973 and 1977; the other one in 1973 and 1974).

<sup>20</sup>We use the term “philosophy” to stand for what [Hall \(1993, 279\)](#) calls a “policy paradigm”: “a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing [...] this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole.”

can be elaborated along two dimensions. First, did profilaktika change minds, or did it merely change behavior? Second, was the intended effect of profilaktika limited to the subject's behavior, or did it extend to the wider influence of one person's misconduct on many others in the subject's social network?

Did the KGB think profilaktika would change minds? One strand of the literature suggests not. In the 1950s Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer interviewed thousands of Soviet emigrants about their experience of Soviet rule. They concluded (Inkeles et al., 1959, 283) that Soviet rulers understood perfectly that many of their citizens held grievances and would have disloyal thoughts. They did not expect inner loyalty. They were satisfied to “assure reliable behavior regardless of how the citizen might feel about the regime.” In the same spirit Harrison (2016, 157–159) conjectures that KGB profilaktika achieved its successes through fear rather than by re-education. From a broader comparative perspective on the “authoritarian public sphere” Dukalskis (2017, 142) concurs:

Authoritarian legitimation . . . is as much about forestalling the emergence of critiques of the government by controlling public discourse as it is about the more common view that legitimation aims to secure consent or zealous belief.

Contrary to such views, Cohn (2017, 273) identifies two other strands of thinking in KGB texts of the late 1950s. One emphasized “*vospitanie*” (best translated in this context as civic education or re-education). In this view, the subject's misconduct was attributable to a lack of understanding of how the world worked, the position of the Soviet Union in the world, and the norms that underpinned Soviet society and citizenship. Reference to civic re-education therefore indicated the belief that behavior change could be reinforced by normative change. While this might sound implausible at first sight, the fact is that many profilaktika subjects were either established citizens in responsible roles or had aspirations in that directions for themselves or for their children. In such cases the first encounter with the KGB was not just a bruising shock; it also created strong incentives to rethink attitudes to the state and society.

Another strand that Cohn (2017) finds to be characteristic of KGB thinking in the late 1950s was the power of *obshchestvennost'* (public opinion) to change the subject's behavior. Associated with it was often the recourse to public profilaktika, when the subject's misconduct would be ritually condemned by a succession of peers and superiors. It's not clear (e.g., Cohn (2017): 290) whether the unpleasant ritual was supposed to realign the subject's norms or just their activities. Perhaps it could be either, or perhaps it did not matter.

The second dimension of the KGB philosophy of prevention was the frame of concern: was it limited to the direct damage to the state arising from the subject's misconduct alone, or did it extend more widely? Cohn (2018b) suggests that profilaktika could be

thought of as zero-tolerance or “broken windows” policing. In this wider frame the direct cost of one broken window may be trivial, but a much larger indirect cost arises from the encouragement of the sense that nobody cares. KGB texts suggested such an approach when they noted that curtailing the subject’s bad example entailed a positive influence on those “around” the subject or in the subject’s milieu (*okruzhenie*) or social environment, who might otherwise have been led astray.

When we find these varied ways of thinking in KGB documentation, there is no need to think of them as mutually exclusive or as substitutes: any or all of them might combine to have their effect. As an example, the Lithuania KGB review of the aftermath of the Kaunas events of 1972 lists the positive influences of KGB profilaktika (a) on the behavior of the subject, (b) on others in the subject’s milieu, and (c) on the KGB’s own capacity to carry out effective ‘civic re-education in the subjects’ places of work and study:

Such measures [of KGB profilaktika], as a rule, have positively influenced not only those preventively warned, but also those around them, and have helped to uncover the factors giving rise to unwanted manifestations, to eliminate defects, and to improve *educational work* (*vospitatel’noi raboty*) in the college and workplace collectives of those being warned.<sup>21</sup>

In “broken windows” policing, the focus is not so much on changing the norms and preferences of potential criminals as on enforcing the norms and preferences of the community (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). On this interpretation, the priority is to suppress misdemeanors, not to reform individual morality or psychopathology.

The same holds true for a related conceptual model for profilaktika, that of public health. In criminal epidemiology, deviant behavior spreads through contagion from more to less susceptible people. The infected are no more to blame than those who infect them. The contagion is controlled by monitoring, triage, and treatment of those who can be saved. (Once treated, however, the patient who has been saved can be held responsible if they put society at risk by returning to an infected milieu.)

Harrison (2016, 144–145) and Cohn (2018a) note the traces of a medicalized terminology in KGB documentation. The word profilaktika itself is borrowed from medical science. Among the goals of profilaktika set out in a 1964 resolution of the KGB collegium was “protection of Soviet citizens from bourgeois ideology” (Chebrikov et al. (1977, 584); see also Elkner (2009, 152)).<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/717: 123–130 (Lithuania KGB fifth department deputy chief Stalaukas, second administration third department deputy chief Grishechkin, and senior inspector under the Lithuania KGB chairman Malakhov, “Report on the condition of preventive work in the Lithuania KGB and measures to improve it,” October 17, 1974). Our emphasis is added.

<sup>22</sup>Greitens and Gewirtz (2020) highlight the convergence of securitization of public health with medicalization of dissent in present-day China.

In the same spirit, KGB reports frequently lamented the public expression of “unhealthy” ideas. To give an example, one subject of a preventive warning, “while in a café, made unhealthy remarks” on various topics, including “specifically in relation to persons of Russian nationality.”<sup>23</sup> The problem of such cases was not that the subject’s beliefs or norms were incorrect. What mattered was the risk of contagion: the subject let them slip in front of an unprotected audience, on the street, in the classroom, or at work.

This aspect of KGB treatment suggests a notable feature. Every year in Soviet Lithuania a tiny proportion of the population (119 per million according to [Table 2](#)) was directly treated by profilaktika. These people, the profilaktika subjects, felt the full force of KGB coercion. But the wider effect of treatment was felt indirectly by the far larger numbers of “those around them.” These larger numbers had no personal contact with the KGB. They felt the influence of KGB coercion indirectly, through what they did not see or hear: the colleague or neighbor who used to complain, who used to share a joke or pass on a rumor, or who once voiced the dream of a different life, but did so no longer.

To summarize, the literature suggests two sets of conjectures that can be treated as open questions for further investigation. The first concerns the KGB philosophy of prevention: What was the importance of “civic re-education” of the subject (as opposed to instilling fear)? What was the importance of mobilizing public pressure (as opposed to private threats)? To what extent were the roots of the subject’s deviant behavior medicalized as sickness (as opposed to moral or political rebellion)? Was the priority to modify the subject’s internal psychopathology (as opposed to limiting the contagious spread of bad behavior to others)? We use quantitative text analysis and calculate how often specific keywords are mentioned in the archival documents, and how these mentions change over time.

The second set of conjectures concerns historical origins. Given that profilaktika emerged gradually in the early postwar years, what were the key threats that it was intended to manage: the Catholic church, the returning deportees and prisoners, the growing interface between Soviet society and the foreign world? If any or all of these prove to have been the focuses of the early years, did the focus move away over the years that followed?

To evaluate both sets of conjectures, we will examine the individuals targeted by profilaktika, extracting their observable characteristics from the archival data; calculate frequencies of selected keywords and how these change over time; and use unsupervised topic modeling to classify the archival reports.

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<sup>23</sup>Hoover K-1/3/682: 25-27 (Klaipeda city and Lithuanian seaport KGB first division senior lieutenant Kelauskas, report on profilaktika, April 1970).



### 3 Our data

We analyze 359 archival documents from the Lithuanian Special (KGB) Archive in Vilnius, held on microfilm at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, California. Each document is a report written and signed by KGB officers and has its own archival reference number.<sup>24</sup>

With some variation, the typical report summarizes one or more cases of *profilaktika*. A case involved one or more associated individuals whose behavior had come to the attention of the KGB. The typical report of each case follows through a complete cycle that began with the original incident or incidents, the investigation that followed, the encounter between the subject and a KGB officer, and the outcome. Included in each report is the personal data (*ustanovochnye dannye*) of the subject or subjects; these generally include a varying subset of full name (implying gender), place and year of birth, marital status (in some cases), ethnicity, place of residence, level of education, place of work or study, and party membership status.

For each document, we identify whether it is a self-contained report about an individual or a group of individuals, or whether it is a part of a larger case. In some instances, when several documents come from the same case, we merged archival records.<sup>25</sup> This way we identify 359 separate records in total.

The time distribution of our records shows 71 reports from the late 1950s (1957–1960) and 288 reports from the 1970s (1970–1978). The years 1961 to 1969 are not represented in our data. The representation of particular years is also quite uneven. At the same time, although the reports of the late 1950s are fewer, the number of *profilaktika* subjects covered is very similar to the number covered in the 1970s. This is because the structure of original reports changed greatly between the two periods, as shown in [Figure 1](#). In our data, a typical report of the 1950s was much longer and more detailed compared to the 1970s and was often structured as an overall annual report covering several unrelated *profilaktika* cases. In the 1970s, the reports in our data are much shorter, and a typical report is roughly equivalent to a single case. To illustrate these patterns, we recoded each archival record in the 1950s, split it into separate cases related to *profilaktika*, and excluded any cases not related to *profilaktika*. In 1959, 52 archival records summarized 202 separate cases of preventive discussions with 368 individuals.


For all these reasons, in our analysis, we treat the reports as broadly representing two separate periods, the late 1950s and the 1970s. This means, however, that we lack sample

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<sup>24</sup>Hoover/LYA, collection K-1, inventory 3, files 556, 557, 569, 682, 687, 710, 713, 726, 730, 744, 753, and inventory 10, file 250.] The total size of original documentation is around 1,200 typescript pages and a quarter of a million (non-unique) words.

<sup>25</sup>See [Appendix B](#) for more details about the recoded archival records.


Figure 1: Number of reports and number of persons in our data, 1957 to 1978.



Source: constructed by the authors, see text.

data for the 1960s, when profilaktika continued without a break.

Figure 2: Numbers of persons subject to profilaktika: Soviet Lithuania, 1957 to 1978.



Note: For 1960 and 1962, Cohn (2017) offers lower bounds rather than exact figures.

The representativeness of our data can be gauged by comparing the annual totals of profilaktika subjects in our samples with the population totals for Soviet Lithuania reported by Cohn (2017) and reproduced in Appendix Table A-2. These are plotted together in Figure 2. They show that in the first period of overlap, 1959–1960, our data capture just under half (54 percent) of the 700 or more persons reported by Cohn as having undergone profilaktika at that time. In 1970–1974, in contrast, our data capture

just 17 per cent of the more than 2,000 persons reported by Cohn.

We use archival text as data in two separate ways. First, we extract information about the individual subjects treated by profilaktika. Second, we study the content of profilaktika, treating the archival documents as a single text corpus; we search for keywords that we identify from the literature, and we use machine learning methods to classify documents into separate topics.

Every person has a different story. Our records are full of stories (e.g., [Harrison, 2016](#), 125–161) that are rich in detail and often poignant. How can we know what stories are typical? How did the KGB think its interventions worked on society? How did the KGB focus its interventions across the range of threats? And how did all these things change over time?<sup>26</sup>

To answer these questions, we convert our stories to data. First, we manually verify and filter out parts of archival reports not related to preventive discussions. Then, we use quantitative text analysis to measure the aspects of interest. To turn original reports into data, we preprocess them: we split text into sentences, convert the text into lower case, and tokenize and lemmatize it into pairs of words (so-called bigrams).<sup>27</sup> We exclude a list of both common and formal “stopwords.” Examples of common stopwords are “and” and “but”; formal stopwords include ranks and positions (e.g., lieutenant, secretary), procedural terms (e.g., profilaktika, decree, report, file) and organizational phrases (KGB, Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic or LitSSR); at this point we also exclude personal names and geographic locations. This gives us a dataset of 67,886 lemmatized bigrams (compared with 240,000 words originally), of which 44,654 bigrams are unique.

Our goal is to learn more about the focus of KGB interventions, and whether it changed from the 1950s to the 1970s. First, we test the conjectures we identified from the existing literature. We calculate the frequencies of the keywords discussed in [Section 2](#) and examine the changes from the 1950s to the 1970s. Second, we employ unsupervised topic modelling to find the most common topics in the data.

To give a first impression of what is to come, we calculate the most common bigrams

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<sup>26</sup>Were our stories fabricated? Based on an interview with a former Polish SB officer, [Dragu and Przeworski \(2019, 80\)](#) raise the theoretical possibility that secret police reports were fabricated by officers seeking to create the appearance of work. While we cannot exclude this in general, it does not appear to be an issue in our data ([Harrison, 2023, 183, 187](#)). Senior officers of the Soviet Lithuania KGB continually scrutinized the work of subordinates for defects. In conference speeches and internal reports, they continually excoriated such persistent failings as the recruitment of unreliable or unproductive informers, and the neglect of signals of anti-Soviet activity coming from informers or other Soviet agencies. The fabrication of surveillance activities does not feature among such criticisms. Efforts to triangulate on reports of anti-Soviet or disruptive activity such as testing the signal of one informer by setting another informer to gather confirmation are also well documented.

<sup>27</sup>This is particularly demanding because Russian nouns decline and verbs conjugate. We use the [pymorphy](#) morphological analyzer in Python for lemmatization in Russian ([Korobov, 2015](#)). Lemmatization returns the base form of a word.

in each sub-period, the 1950s and the 1970s. [Table 3](#) shows the top 10 (the [Appendix Figure D-1](#) from which it is drawn shows the top 50). We see already that the language of the 1950s emphasized schools and group activities (such as leafleting) and this is absent from the 1970s, when individual attitudes and expressions come to the fore.

In [Table 3](#), the “most common” bigrams are most frequent. We also calculate the “most different” bigrams in [Table 4](#), that is, the most common bigrams that are exclusive to each period. In other words, we ignore terms that are common throughout.<sup>28</sup>

Table 3: Top 10 most common bigrams: the 1950s vs the 1970s

Late 1950s		1970s	
<i>srednii shkola</i>	secondary school	<i>politicheski vrednyi</i>	politically harmful
<i>antisovetskii listovka</i>	anti-soviet leaflet	<i>vrednyi vyskazyvanie</i>	harmful statement
<i>antisovetskii deiatelnost</i>	anti-soviet activity	<i>ideologicheski vrednyi</i>	ideologically harmful
<i>anonimnyi pismo</i>	anonymous letter	<i>sovetskii vlast</i>	soviet power
<i>antisovetskii organizatsiia</i>	anti-soviet organization	<i>sovetskii deystvitel'nost</i>	soviet reality
<i>sovetskii vlast</i>	soviet power	<i>vrednyi suzhdenie</i>	harmful judgement
<i>antisovetskii grupa</i>	anti-soviet group	<i>mesto rabota</i>	place (of) work
<i>uchenik klass</i>	student grade	<i>obraz zhizn</i>	lifestyle
<i>ugolovnyi otvestvennost</i>	criminal responsibility	<i>kharakterizovatsia polozhitel'no</i>	characterize positively
<i>klass srednii</i>	grade high (school)	<i>netrezvyi sostoianie</i>	drunken state

Note: For more details (top-50 bigrams and term frequencies, TF), see [Appendix D Figure D-1](#).

Again the language specific to the 1950s suggests the problem of unruly schoolchildren making and distributing anti-Soviet propaganda, but creeping into the top ten of the early period is also a core element of rural society, the collective farm or kolkhoz. The language specific to the 1970s is dominated by personal misconduct, but somehow foreign sailors are also featured; the kolkhoz has dropped out of the leader board.

## 4 The subjects of profilaktika

Our data identify more than 1,800 unique civilians, in addition to 182 KGB officers who either signed a report or were mentioned in the text, and 264 civilian informers of the KGB (categorized as *agenty*, *doverennye litsa*, or more generally *istochniki*). Out of roughly 1,800 civilians in total, 790 were selected for preventive discussions by the KGB. It is this group that is our primary focus. The remainder were persons of operational interest to the KGB in other ways, including some who were closely monitored but not necessarily

<sup>28</sup>Among documents, “most different” words are based on term frequency (tf) in each document multiplied by the log of inverse document frequency (idf), where inverse document frequency is the number of documents divided by number of periods in which the term appears, so  $\log(\text{idf})$  tends to zero as the number of documents in which the term appears increases. Here we interpret each period as a single document (alternatively we substitute inverse period frequency for inverse document frequency).

Table 4: Top 10 most different bigrams: the 1950s vs the 1970s

Late 1950s		1970s	
<i>antisovetskii organizatsiia</i>	antisoviet organization	<i>vrednyi vyskazyvanie</i>	harmful statement
<i>uchastnik gruppa</i>	member group	<i>ideologicheski vrednyi</i>	ideologically harmful
<i>pishushchii mashinka</i>	typewriter	<i>vrednyi suzhdenie</i>	harmful judgement
<i>ugrozhat kharakter</i>	threaten character	<i>kontakt inostranets</i>	contact foreigner
<i>rasprostranenie anti-sovetskii</i>	distribution anti-soviet	<i>narushenie pravilo</i>	break rule
<i>semiletnii shkola</i>	high school	<i>sovetskii moriak</i>	soviet sailor
<i>rasprostranit antisovetskii</i>	distribute anti-soviet	<i>nablyudenie techenie</i>	surveillance over (time)
<i>uchastnik antisovetskii</i>	member antisoviet	<i>pravilo povedenie</i>	rules (of) conduct
<i>antisovetskii proiavlenie</i>	anti-soviet manifestation	<i>povedenie sovetskii</i>	behavior soviet
<i>pravlenie kolkhoz</i>	administration kolkhoz	<i>politicheskii ushcherb</i>	political harm

Note: For more details (top-50 bigrams and term frequency – inverse time period frequencies, TF-IDF), see [Appendix D Figure D-2](#).

treated with profilaktika, as well as relatives, witnesses, victims, and perpetrators who were arrested.


What kinds of people did the KGB identify for profilaktika? This is shown in [Figure 3](#) (more details provided in [Table C-1](#) and [Table C-2](#) in [Appendix C](#)). Starting from the late 1950s, relative to the population of Soviet Lithuania aged 15 and over, we see that profilaktika subjects were much more male, substantially younger, and substantially less well educated.<sup>29</sup> They were nearly all of Lithuanian ethnicity (in other words, with Russians, Poles, and other ethnic minorities largely unrepresented among them). Minorities had criminal records or had been resettled in the early years of the Soviet occupation. Also in a minority were party members – but the probability of party membership was slightly higher than in the population as a whole.<sup>30</sup>

Making the same comparisons for the 1970s, we see that over time the profilaktika subjects became somewhat older and better educated (as did the general population), and somewhat more female, with more involvement of non-Lithuanian minorities. They became much less likely to have spent time in a prison or labor camp or in resettlement. The probability of party membership increased, remaining much higher than in the population. The majority of profilaktika subjects both in the late 1950s and in the 1970s were of working class origins, with a small share of senior managers and educators such as teachers.

<sup>29</sup>Before comparing our data with the population means from the Soviet census, we drop the youngest individuals in the 1950s: 21 individuals aged below 15. The youngest individual in the sample is 11 years old, and one report describes a group of individuals under profilaktika as from 7 to 14 years old.

<sup>30</sup>These were adult party members; we do not count members of the party youth league (Komsomol or VLKSM).

Figure 3: Summary statistics for persons under profilaktika: Soviet Lithuania in the late 1950s and the 1970s




Next, we map the profilaktika subjects, making the same comparison between the 1950s and 1970s. Our maps, shown in Figure 4, distinguish between urban and rural districts. Rural districts (*raiony*) are shaded. Urban districts (*goroda*) are shown as black points, sized according to the numbers of cases. Lithuania’s five towns with more than 20,000 residents in 1970 are identified individually. In the 1950s, we see profilaktika everywhere – except in Šiauliai, a military garrison town. By the 1970s, profilaktika has faded out in much of the countryside, becoming an increasingly urban phenomenon – especially in Šiauliai.

One way to think about the KGB profiling of persons of interest is to divide them into two groups, the “known” and the “unknown” risks to state security (e.g., Harrison, 2016, 33–35). Known risks were those suspects that already had card entries in the KGB catalogue: they had held land or other property or high status before the Sovietization of the country caused them to be disenfranchised or expropriated or imprisoned or resettled. They could be assumed to be embittered or unreconciled towards the Soviet regime. These people represented known security risks, not least for the influence they could exert on others, for example children in their families or colleagues at work.

The evidence of Figure 3 is that the proportion of known risks, predictable from their past criminal or other records, was always small and declined over time. Most profilaktika

Figure 4: The spatial distribution of profilaktika subjects: Soviet Lithuania in the late 1950s and the 1970s



Note: LitSSR raion borders as of 1980.

Key: The shading indicates the number of subjects under profilaktika in rural areas (raions); darker shading indicates more persons. The dots indicate the number of persons in urban areas (cities); bigger dots indicate more persons. Towns shown in order of diminishing size in 1970 are (1) Vilnius, Lithuania’s Soviet-era republican capital (2) Kaunas, the capital before the Soviet occupation (3) Klaipeda, Lithuania’s most important port on the Baltic (4) Šiauliai, an important military garrison town and headquarters for air and strategic missile forces (5) Panevežys, a market town.

subjects turned out to be unknown risks, people with no previous record – including, increasingly, holders of the precious party membership card, whose lapses into anti-Soviet behavior could not have been predicted. In this sense, the KGB’s risk portfolio shifted towards more dangerous people.

## 5 Testing conjectures


### 5.1 The philosophy of prevention

We continue the text analysis by testing our conjectures with simple word frequencies for specific terms of interest. The selection of specific keywords is based on the conjectures in the existing literature outlined in Section 2.2. We hypothesize that the KGB philosophy of prevention changed over time.

In Figure 5 we look at raw frequencies by period for four terms: *vospitanie* (correction

of the subject’s behavior by civic re-education), *obshchestvennost* (correction by public condemnation), *okruzhenie* (indicating concern for the subject’s bad example as an external influence on those witnessing it, for example *v ego okruzhenii*), and *nezdorovyi* (indicating concern for the subject as a carrier and spreader of “unhealthy” behavior, for example *she was making unhealthy remarks*).

Figure 5: The KGB philosophy of prevention: the 1950s vs the 1970s



Notes: Appendix Table D-3 includes a table of the verbal context in which each of these terms was most commonly used. For example, the term most commonly associated with *nezdorovyi* (*unhealthy*) was *suzhdeniye* (*judgement*).

Figure 5 summarizes our findings. References to civic re-education declined somewhat over the two periods; references to public condemnation were initially infrequent and remained at a low level. There was strong concern for the impact of the subject’s behavior or conversation on friends and colleagues, and this increased over the two periods. The tendency to medicalize deviant behavior increased strongly over time.


## 5.2 Historical origins

We hypothesize that the primary focus of profilaktika shifted over time from specific to more general threats (see the discussion that motivates the selection of keywords in Section 2.1). Specific threats of the early postwar period in the Baltic region were former prisoners and deportees returning from terms of forced labor and exile, fugitives re-entering society from the forests, and the priests and congregations of the Catholic and other churches. Later, the stability of Soviet society was threatened more generally by



increasing contacts with foreign media, with foreigners bearing commodities and cultural values, and with the Baltic diaspora in the West.

Figure 6: The churches: the 1950s vs the 1970s




Notes: Appendix Table D-4 includes a list of bigrams to illustrate the verbal context in which each of these terms was most commonly used. For example, the term most commonly associated with *ksendz* (Catholic priest) was *zakliuchennyi* (detained).

For references to the threat of church activity, we compute the raw frequencies of *baptist* (Baptist), *katolicheskii* (Catholic), *kostel* (chapel), *ksendz* (Catholic priest), *religiia* (religion), *religiozni* (religious) and *sekta* (religious sect). Figure 6 shows that all are present in the 1950s. By the 1970s, they have all but vanished.

For concern with those re-entering society from prison, exile, or the forests, we look in Figure 7 at the frequencies of *ITL* (the abbreviation of “corrective-labor camp”), *legalizatsia* (legalization, the re-registration of citizens previously sheltering under false names or in the forests, combined with the associated verb *legalizirovatia*), *nelegalnyi* (illegal, referring those living “off grid”, combined with the adverb *nelegalno*), and *spetsposelenie* (special settlers or settlements, a term for internal exile). Again we find these terms all present in the 1950s; in the 1970s they persist but at much reduced levels.

For the emerging threat from abroad, we look at the frequency of three terms, *zagranitsa* (the Russian term for “abroad” is a bigram, including *za granitse*, literally “beyond the border”), *zagranichnyi* (the derived adjective, meaning foreign), and *inostrannyi* (another term for foreign). As Figure 8 shows, these concerns were relatively unimportant in the 1950s, but had risen to prominence by the 1970s.

Figure 7: Returning to society: the 1950s vs the 1970s



Notes: Appendix Table D-5 includes a list of bigrams to illustrate the verbal context in which each of these terms was most commonly used. For example, the term *nelegalnyi* (illegal) in the 1950s was most commonly associated with the term *polozhenie* (status). However, in the 1970s, illegal was mostly associated with smuggling (*vyvoz, provoz*).


To summarize, we have investigated conjectures suggested by the literature. Some conjectures concerned the KGB philosophy of prevention: Comparing the 1970s with the late 1950s, we find that civic re-education of the subject, an important theme initially, faded somewhat over time. The strongest concern, one that increased over time, was not for the subject but for the subject’s influence on others. There was a strong trend to medicalization of the subject’s behavior as “unhealthy.”

Other conjectures concerned historical origins. We confirm that the management of churches and their congregations, and of returning deportees and prisoners, featured strongly in the 1950s. By the 1970s, these were no longer significant concerns. In contrast, management of Soviet society’s relationship with the world beyond the frontiers was not important in the early years of profilaktika, but it became a major preoccupation in the 1970s.

## 6 Topic modeling: the range of threats

To further investigate and track the evolution of the threats that profilaktika was required to manage, we use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) method, an unsupervised topic modeling algorithm, to classify archival reports into a fixed number of topics. LDA is

Figure 8: Foreign intrusions: the 1950s vs the 1970s



Notes: Appendix Figure Table D-6 includes includes a list of bigrams to illustrate the verbal context in which each of these terms was most commonly used. For example, the term *zagranichnyi* (foreign) was most commonly associated with the term *radioperedacha* (radio broadcast). *inostrannyi* (foreign) combines: *inostrannyi*, *inostranets*, *inostranka* (foreign, foreigner).

a text clustering method based on a probabilistic model that has three levels: words, topics and documents. Each document is modeled as a probabilistic mixture over the fixed number of topics, and each topic, in turn, is modeled as a probabilistic mixture over words or phrases (preprocessed  $n$ -grams) (Blei et al., 2003; Grün and Hornik, 2011).

We treat all documents from the 1950s and the 1970s as one text corpus. First, we manually split the archival records that summarize several cases into separate cases (mainly the records from the 1950s, as presented in Figure 1). This approach also allows us to filter out parts of the reports not related to preventive discussions (general discussion or personal characteristics of individuals already included in Figure 3). We use a case as the unit of analysis (a document).<sup>31</sup> Since we report personal characteristics of individuals under profilaktika separately, we are less interested in who gets the attention of the KGB and more interested in what they do to get it. We need to classify the types of misdemeanors that got them in trouble. For 536 cases, we could potentially classify documents manually. We use topic modeling instead to avoid making subjective choices about unknown categories and to extract the range of topics from the data in a more systematic way. Later, we will use twelve cases from the 1970s with KGB-assigned topics

<sup>31</sup>As a robustness check, in Appendix D we also report the results of topic modeling for the original archival records, where a record is the unit of analysis (a document).

(propaganda, treason, contraband) to validate our LDA classification.

With 44,654 unique bigrams our dataset is very sparse: some bigrams only appear in a single document (case). To resolve sparsity issues, which could negatively influence the output from topic models, we drop the least frequent bigrams (mentioned only in a single case out of 536). After we drop the least frequent bigrams, we are left with 6,684 unique bigrams.

One of the key assumptions of the standard LDA method by [Blei et al. \(2003\)](#) is that the number of topics should be known in advance. We run the LDA model with five topics. With 536 documents, we set the number of topics at five, based on interpretability of the topics and topic validation criteria ([Mimno et al., 2011](#); [Bischof and Airoldi, 2012](#)).<sup>32</sup>

[Figure D-4](#) in the Appendix summarizes the LDA results and presents top-20 bigrams with highest term probabilities by the five topics. Based on the top bigrams, we assign meaningful labels to each topic: (1) “adult non-conformists,” (2) “young rebels,” (3) “foreign goods,” (4) “foreign contacts,” and (5) “harmful values.”

At the core of “adult non-conformists” is the behavior of adults who, having returned from prison or resettlement, shared bitter experiences and unreconstructed attitudes in public and attracted KGB attention at work or in the community. “Young rebels” in contrast were less often motivated by family experiences; for them, an important source of agitation was the ideas and cultural values circulating within their own peer group at school or college.

As for the topics of “foreign goods” and “foreign contacts,” these differed in more obvious ways. Foreign commodities were desirable for consumption and were subject to smuggling and resale, linking the foreign world with economic crime. Foreign contacts were occasionally casual but more often involved family ties stretched across borders by the Lithuanian diaspora, which stubbornly persisted, providing points of entry into Soviet society for the aspirations and ideas circulating in Western communities.

In [Figure 9](#) below we show a separation between the topics that dominated the discussion in the KGB reports in the late 1950s compared to the 1970s.

We see that “young rebels” was the most prominent topic of the 1950s. A secondary focus of the earlier period was the topic of “adult non-conformists.”<sup>33</sup> At this time the topics of

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<sup>32</sup>We calculate exclusivity and semantic coherence scores in [Appendix D](#) for the range of topics (from 3 to 20). Exclusivity requires that topics do not overlap with each other in terms of most frequent phrases (bigrams). Semantic coherence requires that bigrams within each topic frequently occur together or go together semantically. [Figure D-3](#) in [Appendix D](#) suggests the classification with five topics, which has the highest semantic coherence score ([Roberts et al., 2019](#)) and allows us to assign meaningful labels, compared to a larger number of topics (e.g., six topics or more) or a smaller number of topics (e.g., four topics). See [Appendix D](#) for robustness checks with four and six topics.

<sup>33</sup>The topic of “adult non-conformists” becomes more prominent in the data if we use full records

“foreign goods,” “foreign contacts,” and “harmful values” were less salient and are barely featured in many reports.

In the 1970s, the preoccupations of the 1950s have stepped down, their place taken by the influences of the foreign world and of ideological contagion. This is illustrated by the change in the average topic probabilities in the 1970s compared to the 1950s (Figure D-5 in Appendix D). The highest average probability in Figure D-5 (although with considerable variation, as we can see in Figure 9) is that a report will be assigned to “harmful values,” which could have originated either at home or abroad. This is closely followed by “foreign goods” and “foreign contacts.”<sup>34</sup>

Figure 9 shows the distribution of per-document-per-topic probabilities (the median probabilities and the interquartile range)<sup>35</sup>, two topics “harmful values” and “foreign goods” become more prominent in the 1970s, while the “young rebels” topic is less visible in the 1970s. This is confirmed by our descriptive analysis of the pool of profilaktika subjects changing toward more adult individuals.

The median probability that a profilaktika case belongs to any one of the five topics is quite low (less than 25%). The outliers reported in Figure 9 highlight the cases that are more likely to belong to a single topic (probability over 50%). We can see that in the 1970s there are more documents that are likely to be about a single topic, such as “foreign goods,” “foreign contacts,” or “harmful values”.

Interestingly, although harmful values specifically are not much discussed in the 1950s (the highest document-probability for this topic is about 25 percent), it is present in many documents in the 1970s. Our quantitative results support the existing qualitative evidence about the declining proportion of “known risks” among profilaktika subjects, with “unknown risks” rising in the 1970s (Harrison, 2016, 33–35).

Twelve cases from the 1970s have a feature that allows a check on the validity of our unsupervised topic modeling results. These are cases that the KGB itself classified according to the type of threat, by assigning to them one or another “color,” of anti-state activity (*delo s okraskoi*). The so-called colors appear to correspond to clauses of Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code (*Ugolovnyy Kodeks RSFSR, 1950*) which designated the main types of state crime. The colored cases included two involving intention to flee abroad (Article 58-1), one of espionage (Article 58-6), and seven of anti-Soviet propaganda or


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instead of splitting records into individual cases (see Figure D-13 and Figure D-14 in Appendix D). However, since archival documents in the 1950s include long reports summarizing several cases, the topics of “adult non-conformists” and “young rebels” become less clearly separated. In addition, archival documents in the 1950s contain cases where subjects are monitored by the KGB but not treated with profilaktika.

<sup>34</sup>On average, the probability of “adult non-conformists” remains about the same (see Figure D-5 in Appendix D), but with more significant variation visible in Figure 9.

<sup>35</sup>Average topic probabilities are reported in the Appendix Figure D-5 in Appendix D.

Figure 9: Topic modelling with five topics: the 1950s vs the 1970s



Notes: Under LDA assumptions each document can present a mix of topics, for example, 50 percent of a report might be about one topic, 30 percent about another, and the remaining 20 percent about a third. This yields probabilities with which any report is assigned to any of the five topics. The assignment probability of a document is measured on the vertical axis. Every document is represented under every topic. The interquartile range (from the 25th to the 75th percentile) is illustrated by a box. A deep box (from top to bottom) shows that records vary widely in their assignment probabilities; a shallow box shows little variation. A box that is placed high shows a preponderance of records with high assignment probabilities; if placed low, most probabilities are low. The limits of the vertical lines (“whiskers”) mark the 12.5th and 87.5th percentiles. The whiskers have similar interpretation to the boxes, but they include more very high and very low probability assignments. Documents that fall outside the whiskers’ bounds, represented by individual dots, can be considered outliers. Average per-document-per-topic probabilities over time are reported in [Figure D-5](#) in the Appendix.

agitation (Article 58-10). Also among them are two instances of smuggling (*kontrabanda*); on the face of it, that offence fell under a different article (Article 83), enforced by the customs service, but we suppose that it became of interest to the KGB when it involved contacts with foreigners that might weaken the state (Article 58-3).

We ask whether our unsupervised topic model assigns the twelve cases consistently. From [Table 5](#) we can see that seven cases formally marked “*anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda*” are classified by our topic model as “*harmful values*” (with the highest topic probability of 44%). This could be partially explained by the variation in the language used in the seven cases on agitation and propaganda, while we only have a few cases (one or two) of other types. The cases marked “*contraband*” have the highest average topic probabilities of “*foreign goods*” (31%), followed by “*foreign contacts*” (30%). Our model somewhat

struggles to capture the single case we have marked as “espionage,” which seems to be a mixture of several topics, with “*harmful values*” (35%) as a dominant component.<sup>36</sup> For the two cases marked as “*intention to emigrate*,” our model classifies this document as a mixture of topics, with the highest probability for the topic of “*foreign contacts*” (26%).<sup>37</sup>

Table 5: ‘Colored’ cases and average probabilities distributed across five topics recovered from unsupervised topic modeling.

Colored cases	Adult non-conformists	Young rebels	Foreign goods	Foreign contacts	Harmful values	Number of cases
Anti-Soviet propaganda	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.44	7
Contraband	0.16	0.13	0.31	0.30	0.11	2
Espionage	0.24	0.10	0.16	0.15	0.35	1
Intention to emigrate	0.17	0.16	0.21	0.26	0.20	2

*Note:* The comparison is based on the pre-assigned labels in the 1970s data. For the cases with pre-assigned labels, we calculate the distribution of the probabilities for each label (on average). This is in-sample prediction. Average probabilities are rounded to two decimal places.

## Conclusions

Profilaktika was a key element of everyday or low-intensity secret policing in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This paper reports our work on novel datasets constructed from a digitized text corpus from the archive of the Lithuania KGB. The digitized data contains KGB reports from the later 1950s and the decade during the 1970s. Based on our results, we can add to what was already known as follows.

The subjects of profilaktika in Soviet Lithuania were typically young men who engaged in a wide range of politically and socially disruptive misdemeanors. The purpose of profilaktika from the 1950s onward was to correct misbehavior and prevent more serious offending without incurring the costs of removing the subjects from society by detention or killing.

Most subjects of profilaktika were young male Lithuanians, as expected – but of very ordinary background. They were typically not highly educated or intellectual dissidents. In the 1950s, a minority of profilaktika subjects had imprisonment or resettlement in their backgrounds. This declined as time passed, however. Comparing the 1970s with the 1950s, the fractions of women, older people, and non-Lithuanians caught up in profilaktika became more substantial. Another minority was those with party membership. This

<sup>36</sup>Table D-2 in Appendix D confirms that top bigrams for the case of espionage are associated with harmful values.

<sup>37</sup>For external validity, we can also compare the range of topics identified in the reports from the Soviet Lithuania to the range of topics provided by Andryushchenko based on reports from the Ukrainian archives: anti-Soviet activity, foreign influence and harmful values. E. Andryushchenko, *Kultura krasnykh papochek. Kak spetslyzhby formirovali kartinu mira dlya rukovodstva SSSR*. <https://zona.media/article/2020/11/13/redfolded>, November 13, 2020; last accessed on August 9, 2022.

minority was notably overrepresented among profilaktika subjects, and it increased over time. A more abstract classification suggests that the proportion of “known risks” among profilaktika subjects declined, with “unknown risks,” (people without risk factors in their background or personal records, including those previously accepted into the party) taking their place in the mix.

We study the evolution of the KGB’s preventive philosophy, employing a supervised search for key terms. KGB records show a degree of concern for the re-education of profilaktika subjects, including by exposing them to social pressure. It is not clear how deep this was supposed to go in changing the subject’s inner convictions. Over time, the emphasis shifted away from belief change to behavior change. A consistent KGB priority was to curtail the influence of the subject’s nonconformist expressions on the friends and colleagues exposed to them. By the 1970s, the terminology that expressed this was increasingly medicalized, as if the KGB saw itself as a public health agency charged with preventing contagion. Increasingly, the ideological health of the community took priority over the re-education of the individual.

We also study the operational targets of profilaktika. We hypothesize that these targets shifted over time from particular concerns arising from the struggle to Sovietize Lithuania to more general ones in later decades. The KGB was concerned not just with profilaktika subjects but with the influences that drove them to deviate from Soviet norms. We show that in the 1950s the KGB was preoccupied with the “legacy” influences of the older generation and the old religions. These concerns faded over time. Their place was taken by concerns about the disruptive influences of the foreign world.

We use unsupervised topic modelling to identify five topics of preventive secret policing. The most prominent topic of the 1950s we call “young rebels” – young people, often school children, who joined in small acts of resistance in response to peer influences rather than family influences. A less prominent topic was “adult non-conformists” – adults who responded to their experiences of the occupation period by flouting Soviet conventions. By the 1970s these topics had been mostly replaced by others that we call “foreign goods” (the object of economic misdemeanors involving foreigners), “foreign contacts” (channels for Western values and aspirations), and “harmful values” that supported attitudes critical of Soviet political and social norms.



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## A Appendix: General information about profilaktika

Table A-1: Prosecutions for state crimes and preventive warnings in the Soviet Union, 1959-1974

	1959-62	1963-66	1967-70	1971-74
<b>Prosecutions, total</b>	5,413	3,251	2,456	2,423
<b>Of which, for:</b>				
Treason	1,010	457	423	350
Espionage	28	8	10	9
Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda	1,601	502	381	348
Smuggling	47	103	183	474
Violation of currency regulations	587	474	382	401
Illegal border crossing	926	613	704	553
Disclosure or loss of state secrets	22	31	19	18
Other crimes	1,003	1,011	328	
<b>Preventive warnings, total</b>	...	...	58,298	63,108
<b>Of which, for:</b>				
Having suspicious contact with foreigners or holding treasonous intentions	...	...	5,039	6,310
Taking part in anti-Soviet activity	...	...	35,316	34,700
<b>Warned with involvement of the public</b>	...	...	23,611	27,079
<b>Of which:</b>				
At general gatherings of workers and staff, in comradesly courts, etc.	...	...	10,624	11,836
In the form of discussion with representatives of public opinion	...	...	12,987	15,243
Formally cautioned (1973-74 only)	...	...	...	981
Tried on criminal charges, of those preventively warned	...	...	100	50

*Note:* The figures reported here were first published by (Pikhoia, 1998, 365-366). A copy of the original is found in the Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, container 28 (reel 18) (USSR KGB chairman Iurii Andropov, memorandum “Concerning some results of the warning and preventive work of the organs of state security,” October 31, 1975). From 1975 to 1985 the number of preventive warnings appears to have remained steady at 15,000 to 16,000 annually, but then it declined sharply, falling to a few hundred a year by 1989 (Gieseke, 2020, 28).

Table A-2: Numbers of persons subjected to KGB profilaktika (including public profilaktika) in Soviet Lithuania, 1957-1974

	Persons subject to profilaktika	Of which, subject to profilaktika “with the public’s help”
1957	161	...
1958	180	...
1959	397	73
1960	303 or 574	58
1961	646	251
1962	more than 400	...
1963	161	96
1964	191	...
1965	242	...
1966	295	113
1967	234	78
1968	444	169
1969	285	105
1970	418	182
1971	282	87
1972	359	95
1973	440	160
1974	525	195

*Note:* Source: (Cohn, 2017, 277). Cohn (2017) refers to these figures as numbers of “cases,” implying that a case could involve more than one person, but the original sources indicate that these are numbers of persons (e.g. “chislo profilaktirovannykh”).

## B Appendix: Information about archival records

The collection from which we draw our records can be found at the Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Lietuvos SSR Valstybes Saugumo Komitetas, Selected Records of the Lithuanian Special Archive (Lietuvos ypatingasis archyvas – LYA). The records we have digitized cover the periods 1957–60 and 1970–77.

The number of unique archival records originally digitized is 396. Each digitized record is labelled by file and folio numbers. For example, collection *K-1*, inventory *3*, file *713* (hereafter Hoover/LYA Hoover *K-1/3/713*). Each file contains reports, and each report is labelled according to its page number, for example, *K-1/3/713 pp.2-3*.

We manually checked all digitized archival records and merged the following records because they continue or duplicate a single case:

- *K-1/3/556 pp.80-83* and *K-1/3/710 p.84-85*. Pages 80 to 85 merged.
- *K-1/3/710 pp.31-32* and *K-1/3/710 p.30*. Pages 30 to 32 merged.
- *K-1/3/713 pp.2-3*, *K-1/3/713 pp.4-6* and *K-1/3/713 p.7*. Pages 2 to 7 merged.
- *K-1/3/713 pp.18-21* and *K-1/3/713 pp.22-27*. Pages 18 to 27 merged.
- *K-1/3/713 pp.37-39* and *K-1/3/713 pp.42-44*. Pages 37-39 and 42-44 merged.
- *K-1/3/713 p.53* and *K-1/3/713 pp.54-56*. Pages 53 to 56 merged.
- *K-1/3/726 pp.12* and *K-1/3/713 pp.66-67* merged. One file dated Aug 14, 1974 and the other one from Aug 19, 1974, this is the report on the same case and person stored in two different folders (most likely, misplaced in one of folders).
- *K-1/3/726 pp.16* and *K-1/3/726 pp.17-19*. Pages 16 to 19 merged.
- *K-1/3/726 pp.28-29* and *K-1/3/726 pp.27*. Pages 27 to 29 merged.
- *K-1/3/726 pp.30-32* and *K-1/3/726 pp.33-35*. Pages 30 to 35 merged.
- *K-1/3/726 pp.41* and *K-1/3/726 pp.42-44*. Pages 41 to 44 merged.
- *K-1/3/730 p.6* and *K-1/3/730 pp.7-9*. Pages 6 to 9 merged.
- *K-1/3/744 pp.14-15* and *K-1/3/744 pp.16-17*. Pages 14 to 17 merged.
- *K-1/3/744 pp.41-42* and *K-1/3/744 pp.46-47*. Pages 41-42 and 46-47 merged.
- *K-1/3/744 pp.90* and *K-1/3/744 pp.91-92*. Pages 90 to 92 merged.
- *K-1/3/744 pp.130* and *K-1/3/730 p.45* merged. One file dated Dec 23, 1977 when the case was sent to the archive and the other one is undated but refers to May 1976 when the person of interest was still under profilaktika. This is a report on the same person under profilaktika in two different folders.
- *K-1/3/744 pp.136* and *K-1/3/744 pp.132-135*. Pages 132 to 136 merged.
- *K-1/3/753 p.11* and *K-1/3/753 pp.12-13*. Pages 11 to 13 merged.
- *K-1/3/753 p.26* and *K-1/3/753 pp.27-28*. Pages 26 to 28 merged.
- *K-1/3/753 p.44* and *K-1/3/753 pp.45-46*. Pages 44 to 46 merged.
- *K-1/3/753 p.49* and *K-1/3/753 pp.50-51*. Pages 49 to 51 merged.



- K-1/3/753 p.52 and K-1/3/753 pp.53-54. Pages 52 to 54 merged.
- K-1/3/753 p.55 and K-1/3/753 pp.56-57. Pages 55 to 57 merged.
- K-1/3/753 p.64 and K-1/3/753 pp.65-66. Pages 64 to 66 merged.
- K-1/3/753 pp.70-72 and K-1/3/753 p.73. Pages 70 to 73 merged.

Out of the records that remained, we filtered out records not related to individual profilaktika cases:

- K-1/10/250 pp.1-23o – general information about profilaktika, no individual cases.
- K-1/3/556 pp.1-2 and K-1/3/556 pp.142-143 – a memo asking Moscow to send examples of good practice/examples of profilaktika.
- K-1/3/557 pp.126-165 – on recruiting agents and general information about profilaktika, no individual cases.
- K-1/3/569 pp.37-43 and K-1/3/569 pp.44-48 – reports on profilaktika cases (examples of ‘good practice’) from Tomsk and Krasnodar in Russia.
- K-1/3/697 p.20 – a newspaper article *Ugol padeniya* attached to a report about profilaktika.
- K-1/3/713 p.53 – a description (opis’) of archived case materials (four lines of text), no substantive information.
- K-1/3/744 p.131 – this document (opis’) contains information (*ustanovochnye dannye*) about the subject of profilaktika, which we code separately, and no substantive details about the case.
- K-1/3/744 pp.139 – this document (opis’) contains information (*ustanovochnye dannye*) about the subject of profilaktika, which we code separately, and no substantive details about the case.
- K-1/3/744 pp.140 – another formal description (opis’).

The dataset with remaining 361 records is our ‘full sample’. We use the full sample for robustness checks (text analysis results with full records are presented in [Figure D-12](#) and [Figure D-14](#), [Appendix D](#)). For the main analysis, in addition to the previous steps, we filter out parts of the documents not related to profilaktika. We split (manually) archival reports into cases, i.e., for each document, we identify whether it is a self-contained report about an individual or a group of individuals, or whether it is a part of a larger case. We add special symbols and stopwords (e.g., **\*\*begin case\*\***, **\*\*end case\*\***) to automatically split longer documents into cases and filter out information not related to subject-specific profilaktika at the text pre-processing stage. We further drop the following archival records that do not contain cases of profilaktika (i.e., subjects are monitored but not treated with profilaktika):

- K-1/3/556 pp.24-27 – this is monitoring, not profilaktika
- K-1/3/557 p.124 – this is monitoring, not profilaktika

We coded manually the following characteristics of the remaining 359 archival records (merged reports):

- **Year** = the year when the report (case) was filed (usually, can be found at the end of the report). When this date is unavailable, we use the last year mentioned in the report. When no dates are mentioned in the report, we infer the year of the report by looking at the report right before and right after this report in the records. This is how we infer that most of our cases come from the two separate periods: 1957–60 and 1970–78. However, for most of the analyses we collapse years into two general periods: the late 1950s and the 1970s.
- **Location** = the local KGB office from which the report was filed. We have two types of offices in the records: cities and rural district (raion) offices. For example, the city of Vilnius, Šiauliai, Klaipeda, etc.; the Vilnius raion, the Šiauliai raion, the Klaipeda raion. We use these location to illustrate the spatial distribution of cases in [Figure 4](#).

## C Appendix: Descriptive characteristics of the subjects of profilaktika

With the help of research assistants, we manually entered personal characteristics from the archival records. Our data identify more than 1800 unique civilians, in addition to 182 KGB officers who either signed a report or were mentioned in the text, and 264 civilian informers of the KGB (categorized as *agenty*, *doverennye litsa*, or more generally *istochniki*). Out of 1836 civilians in total, 790 were selected for profilaktika discussions by the KGB. It is this group that is our primary focus.

In some cases, coding individual characteristics is easy because the so-called *ustanovochnye dannye* are provided in a separate paragraph (see [Figure C-1](#)). In other cases, individual characteristics can be extracted from the general description (see [Figure C-2](#)). We coded individual characteristics in two separate iterations: first, we extracted relevant characteristics from the raw text in an automated fashion with regular expressions; second, we manually verified all automatically extracted entries and corrected errors and/or added missing entries.

Figure C-1: Excerpt from the 1957 report

В 1957 году, в день 16-го февраля, так называемого бывшего буржуазного праздника "независимости Литвы" в гор. Аникшчяй, на симофоре ж.д. станции был вывешен националистический флаг двумя учащимися Аникшчяйской средней школы [REDACTED] и [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], как инициатор данного проявления был привлечен к уголовной ответственности, а с [REDACTED], 1942 года рождения, было проведено профилактическое мероприятие. В беседе с родителями [REDACTED], последние выразили убеждение, что они в дальнейшем будут <sup>беспрестанно</sup> за действием своего сына строгий контроль и воспитают его правильно. Родители [REDACTED] рабочие, отец работает в электромонтажной мастерской чернорабочим.

Archival source: K-1/3/556 pp.20-22, this archival record was redacted by the authors.

Figure C-2: Excerpt from the 1972 report

Докладываем, что согласно санкции Вашего заместителя полковника тов. [REDACTED] нами, ст. оперуполномоченным 2 отделения отдела КГБ при СМ Лит.ССР по г.Клайпеде и ЛМБ капитаном [REDACTED] и оперуполномоченным того же отделения лейтенантом [REDACTED], проведена профилактика группы лиц из числа связей иностранных моряков -

[REDACTED], 1949 г. рождения, урож. [REDACTED], Лит.ССР, гр-ки СССР, с 7-летним образованием, незамужней, не работавшей, проживавшей в г.Клайпеде, [REDACTED]

✓ [REDACTED], 1947 г. рождения, урож. [REDACTED], Лит.ССР, гр-ки СССР, беспартийной, с 8-летним образованием, незамужней, рабочей чулочной фабрики, прожив. в г.Клайпеде, [REDACTED]

Archival source: K-1/3/697 pp.15-19, this archival record was redacted by the authors.

We report the following individual characteristics. Note: descriptive statistics by period (1950s, 1970s) are reported in [Table C-1](#) and [Table C-2](#).

- **Female:** dummy variable for gender = 1 if female, 0 otherwise. The gender of an individual is reported in some cases, in other cases it is inferred from the discussion in the report (in Russian, verbs conjugate with gender).
- **Non-Lithuanian:** dummy variable = 1 if an individual is Non-Lithuanian. In selected cases, non-Lithuanian ethnicity can be coded based on the information from the report (e.g. Polish, Jewish, Belorussian, Russian). However, in most cases we code non-Lithuanian names based on individuals' last names.
- **Convicted:** dummy variable = 1 if spent time in a prison or a labor camp.
- **Resettled:** dummy variable = 1 if spent time in a special settlement (*spetsposeleniye* or *ssylka* mentioned).
- **Higher education:** dummy variable for completed higher education = 1, 0 otherwise (including cases of incomplete higher education).
- **Party = 1** dummy variable = 1 when party membership (*KPSS*) is mentioned. Zeros include “non-party” (*b/p* or *bespartiinyi*) and when no information is provided). We do not count youth league (Komsomol or *VLKSM*) membership.
- **Student:** dummy variable = 1 if a student at school, college, or university.
- **Teacher:** dummy variable for occupation as an educator = 1 (e.g. teacher at school, college, or university, i.e. *uchitel* or *prepodavatel*).
- **Senior manager:** dummy variable for occupation as a senior manager = 1 (e.g. *direktor*, *nachalnik*, *chlen pravleniya*, *predsedatel*).

Table C-1: Summary statistics for persons under profilaktika (N = 450), 1957–1960

Variable	1959 Census	Our sample in 1957-60				
	Census Mean	Mean	StDev	Min	Max	Missing obs
Female (15 and over)	0.559	0.171	0.377	0	1.00	0
Age (15 and over)	40.6	26.6	13.3	15.0	69.0	231
Non-Lithuanian (all ages)	0.206	0.0622	0.242	0	1.00	0
Higher education (15 and over)	0.0179	0	0	0	0	0
Convicted	...	0.0800	0.272	0	1.00	0
Resettled	...	0.0556	0.229	0	1.00	0
Student	...	0.404	0.491	0	1.00	0
Party member	0.0255	0.0533	0.225	0	1.00	0
Senior manager	...	0.00889	0.0940	0	1.00	0
Teacher	...	0.0200	0.140	0	1.00	0

Table C-2: Summary statistics for persons under profilaktika (N = 340), 1970–1978

Variable	1979 Census	Our sample in 1970-78				
	Census Mean	Mean	StDev	Min	Max	Missing obs
Female (15 and over)	0.539	0.251	0.434	0	1.00	0
Age (15 and over)	42.8	32.6	10.9	15.0	62.0	24
Non-Lithuanian (all ages)	0.200	0.391	0.489	0	1.00	0
Higher education (15 and over)	0.0674	0.0698	0.255	0	1.00	0
Convicted	...	0.0735	0.261	0	1.00	0
Resettled	...	0.0176	0.132	0	1.00	0
Student	...	0.0382	0.192	0	1.00	0
Party member (15 and over)	0.0621	0.0824	0.275	0	1.00	0
Senior manager	...	0.0412	0.199	0	1.00	0
Teacher	...	0.00294	0.0542	0	1.00	0

*Note:* All census data are taken or calculated from the Demoscope website at <http://www.demoscope.ru>. Figures relate to the census population aged 15 and over, except for ethnicity for which the total population is used. Only completed higher education is counted. Party membership is taken from “Communist Party of Lithuania” on Wikipedia at [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist\\_Party\\_of\\_Lithuania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Lithuania) (accessed 4 August 2021), using linear interpolation between 1955 and 1960, and 1975 and 1980, to obtain figures for census years; while the ultimate source for the Wikipedia figures is uncertain, they are consistent with figures reported by Grybkauskas (2020). Our sample data are as described in the text. For comparability with the census data, we exclude a group of 21 children aged 7 to 14 from the sample data in the 1950s before calculating the figures shown.

## D Appendix: Text analysis and topic modeling

### D.1 Reasons for profilaktika

In some cases we were able to extract (manually) a summary from the text for the **Reasons** behind profilaktika (where available as a clearly defined paragraph or sentence(s) in the text), i.e., why individuals were targeted by the KGB. To determine the reasons for profilaktika, we rely on topic modeling (LDA). To compare with the topics identified by LDA, we extract top bigrams from the coded **Reasons** variable as a robustness check (see [Table D-1](#) in ([Appendix D](#))).

In [Table D-1](#), we report top-10 most common words encountered in the 1950s and the 1970s. We can see that the most frequent phrases that indicate reasons for an individual to become a profilaktika subject overlap with the top phrases in the five topics produced by unsupervised topic modeling.

Table D-1: Top 10 most common phrases (bigrams): Reasons for profilaktika in the 1950s vs the 1970s

Late 1950s		1970s	
antisovetskii listovka	anti-soviet leaflet	politicheski vrednyi	politically harmful
ugrozhat kharakter	threaten character	ideologicheski vrednyi	ideologically harmful
anonimnyi pismo	anonymous letter	obraz zhizn	lifestyle
antisovetskii gruppa	anti-soviet group	kapitalisticheskii strana	capitalist country
sovetskii vlast	soviet power	sovetskii deystvitel'nost	soviet reality
pismo ugrozhat	letter threaten	vrednyi suzhdenie	harmful judgement
rasprostranit antisovetskii	distribute anti-soviet	dopuskat politicheski	allow politically
netrezvyi sostoianie	drunken state	vrednyi vyskazyvanie	harmful statement
vkhodit antisovetskii	membership antisoviet	netrezvyi sostoianie	drunken state
golos amerika	voice (of) america (radio)	litso natsionalnost	person ethnicity

*Note:* Reasons for profilaktika extracted from the archival documentation manually (where possible and clear) as short descriptions, the text was pre-processed in a standard way (described in the paper) and split into phrases (bigrams).

## D.2 ‘Colored’ cases

Twelve cases from the 1970s have a feature that allows a check on the validity of our unsupervised topic modeling results. These are cases that the KGB itself classified according to the type of threat, by assigning to them one or another ‘color’ of anti-state activity (‘delo s okraskoi’). The so-called colors appear to correspond to clauses of Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code which designated the main types of state crime. The colored cases included two involving intention to flee abroad (Article 58-1), one of espionage (Article 58-6), and seven of anti-Soviet propaganda or agitation (Article 58-10). Also among them are two instances of smuggling (‘kontrabanda’); on the face of it, that offence fell under a different article (Article 83), enforced by the customs service, but we suppose that it became of interest to the KGB when it involved contacts with foreigners that might weaken the state (Article 58-3). In the table below, we present top 10 most common bigrams that can be extracted from the ‘colored’ cases of each type. The text used to select top bigrams based on their frequencies was pre-processed in a standard way (described in the paper).

Table D-2: Top 10 most common phrases (bigrams) in Russian: ‘Colored’ cases the 1970s

<b>Anti-Soviet propaganda</b>	<b>Contraband</b>	<b>Espionage</b>	<b>Intention to emigrate</b>
politicheski vrednyi	sdelka inostranets	politicheski vrednyi	begstvo zgranitsu
agitatsiia propaganda	serebrianyi moneta	antisovetskii vyskazyvanie	vyiezd zgranitsu
antisovetskii agitatsiia	bolshoy kolichestvo	bolshoy storona	dannye svidetelstvuyushchii
vrednyi vyskazyvanie	vesti iskrenne	vrednyi vyskazyvanie	delo okraska
vrednyi suzhdenie	grazhdanin ssha	vremia zaiavit	kachestvo turist
okraska antisovetskii	kvitantsiia nochleg	vyskazyvanie mesto	pobyvat zgranitsey
sovetskii vlast	povedenie zgranitsey	pismennyi obiasnenie	agenturnyi dannye
sovetskii deystvitelnost	pravilo povedenie	prediavit preteniia	byt kharakterizovatsia
vred sovetskii	protivozakonnyi deystvie	sovetskii vlast	vliianie roditel
dopuskat politicheski	avtomobilnyi transport	storona povtoritsia	voennyi morskoy



Figure D-1: Top-50 most common bigrams (in Russian) by period




Figure D-2: Top-50 most different bigrams (in Russian) by period




Table D-3: Conjectures: The philosophy of prevention. Most frequent bigrams (in Russian) for the terms *vospitanie*, *obshchestvennost*, *okruzhenie*, *nezdorovyi*.

Late 1950s	1970s
vospitanie uchitsia	nezdorovyi vyskazyvanie
nezdorovyi vyskazyvanie	nezdorovyi suzhdenie
vospitanie rebënok	okruzhenie dopuskat
nezdorovyi iavlenie	okruzhenie chislo
nezdorovyi nastroyenie	okruzhenie vyskazyvat
okruzhenie vyskazyvat	obshchestvennost zavod
nezdorovyi politicheskii	okruzhenie rabota
nezdorovyi suzhdenie	nezdorovyi politicheskii
obshchestvennost obsuzhdat	nezdorovyi politicheskii
obshchestvennost odobrit	nezdorovyi razgovor

Table D-4: Conjectures: The churches. Most frequent bigrams (in Russian) for the terms *ksemdz*, *katolicheskii*, *kostel*, *religiia*, *religioznyi*, *baptist*, *sekta*.

Late 1950s	1970s
zakon religiia	kniga religioznyi
sekta piatidesiatnik	religioznyi sodержanie
uchastnik sekta	antisovetskii religioznyi
religioznyi obriad	diskussiiia religioznyi
aktivnyi sektant	fantasticheskii religioznyi
baptist obshchatsia	religioznyi dogma
baptist zaiavit	religioznyi ideologicheskii
deiatelnost sektant	religioznyi krestik
material sektant	religioznyi religioznyi
porvat religiia	religioznyi tema


Table D-5: Conjectures: Returning to society. Most frequent bigrams (in Russian) for the terms *legalizatsiia*, *nelegalnyi*, *spetsposelenie*, *ITL*.

Late 1950s	1970s
nelegalnyi sborishche	nelegalnyi provoz
nelegalnyi polozhenie	nelegalnyi put
vernutsia spetsposelenie	nelegalnyi vyvoz
vozvratitsia spetsposelenie	spetsposelenie irkutskii
pereyti nelegalnyi	zagranitsu nelegalnyi
provodit nelegalnyi	iskat nelegalnyi
nakhoditsia nelegalnyi	koltso nelegalnyi
nelegalnyi obuchenie	nakhoditsia spetsposelenie
nelegalnyi organizovat	nelegalnyi dostavka
organizovat nelegalnyi	nelegalnyi ukhod

Table D-6: Conjectures: Foreign intrusions. Most frequent bigrams (in Russian) for the terms *inostrannyi*, *zagraniitsa*, *zagraniichnyi*.

Late 1950s	1970s
inostrannyi marka	zagraniichnyi radioperedacha
pistolet inostrannyi	inostrannyi moriak
radioperedacha zagraniitsa	inostrannyi port
zagraniichnyi antisovetskii	inostrannyi valyuta
radio zagraniitsa	inostrannyi tovar
rasskazat zagraniichnyi	slushat zagraniichnyi
slushat zagraniichnyi	proslushivat zagraniichnyi
soderzhanie zagraniichnyi	zagraniichnyi antisovetskii
vintovka inostrannyi	inostrannyi radioperedacha
zagraniichnyi radioperedacha	proslushivanie zagraniichnyi


Figure D-3: Topic validation measures: Model diagnostics by the number of topics



*Note:* *Exclusivity* requires that topics do not overlap with each other in terms of most frequent phrases (bigrams). *Semantic coherence* requires that bigrams within each topic frequently occur together or go together semantically. We prefer the classification with five topics, which has the highest semantic coherence and allows us to assign meaningful labels, compared to a larger number of topics (e.g., six topics or more, based on higher exclusivity). Exclusivity and coherence scores are calculated from the *stm* package in R (Roberts et al., 2019).

Figure D-4: Top-20 phrases (bigrams) associated with five different topics in our archival data (in Russian)

Highest bigram probabilities for each topic



Per-bigram-per-topic probability

Figure D-5: Average topic probabilities over time






Figure D-6: Cosine similarity matrix for per-bigram-per-topic probabilities



*Note:* This symmetric matrix reflects the cosine similarity (varies from 0 and 1) between vectors of per-bigram-per-topic probabilities from the main LDA specification with five labelled topics on the X/Y-axes (*Adult non-conformists*; *Young rebels*; *Foreign goods*; *Foreign contacts*; *Harmful values*) and the LDA specification with six topics (labelled as *New topic*) on the X-axis. High (low) values reflect high (low) similarity. Low values of cosine similarity suggest that the five topics identified in the data are different enough.

Figure D-7: Cosine similarity matrix for per-bigram-per-topic probabilities: Comparison of the baseline model with five topics and the model with four topics



*Note:* This matrix reflects the cosine similarity (varies from 0 and 1) between vectors of per-bigram-per-topic probabilities from two different LDA models: the main LDA specification with five labelled topics (*Adult non-conformists*; *Young rebels*; *Foreign goods*; *Foreign contacts*; *Harmful values*) on the Y-axis, and the LDA specification with four topics (labelled as *New topic*) on the X-axis. High (low) values reflect high (low) similarity. We can see from this diagram that with four topics, four out of five topics from the main specification remain relatively robust (cosine similarity of new topics with the labelled topics  $\geq 0.8$ ): *Young rebels*; *Foreign goods*; *Harmful values*. The topic of *Adult rebels* is less robust: when the number of topics goes down from five to four it is merged into other topics (mostly, with *Harmful values* and *Foreign contacts*).



Figure D-8: Robustness check with four topics: Average topic probabilities over time






Figure D-9: Robustness check with four topics: Top-20 phrases (bigrams) associated with four topics in our archival data (in Russian)

Highest bigram probabilities for each topic




Note: This model with four topics is a robustness check. The similarity of these new topics with the old topics (from the main specification with five topics) is presented in Figure D-7, and the changes in average topic probabilities over time are reflected in Figure D-8.

Figure D-10: Cosine similarity matrix for per-bigram-per-topic probabilities: Comparison of the baseline model with five topics and the model with six topics




*Note:* This matrix reflects the cosine similarity (varies from 0 and 1) between vectors of per-bigram-per-topic probabilities from two different LDA models: the main LDA specification with five labelled topics on the Y-axis (*Adult non-conformists*; *Young rebels*; *Foreign goods*; *Foreign contacts*; *Harmful values*) and the LDA specification with six topics (labelled as *New topic*) on the X-axis. High (low) values reflect high (low) similarity. Three out of five topics from the main specification remain relatively robust. Cosine similarity of the three old topics *Young rebels*; *Foreign contacts*; *Harmful values* with the three out of six new topics is over 0.8. *Adult non-conformists* is the topic that is less robust again (0.7), and the topic of *Foreign goods* is now split between two new topics.

Figure D-11: Robustness check with six topics: Average topic probabilities over time




*Note:* We can see from this figure that adding topics leads to each period becoming even more of a mixture of topics, with the topics becoming less coherent for a substantive interpretation (see also [Figure D-12](#) below).

Figure D-12: Robustness check with six topics: Top-20 phrases (bigrams) associated with six topics in our archival data (in Russian)



Note: This model with six topics is a robustness check. The similarity of these new topics with the old topics (from the main specification with five topics) is presented in Figure D-10, and the changes in average topic probabilities over time are reflected in Figure D-11.


Figure D-13: Full records: Topic modeling with five topics, the 1950s vs the 1970s



Notes: Under LDA assumptions each document can present a mix of topics, for example, 50 percent of a report might be about one topic, 30 percent about another, and the remaining 20 percent about a third. This yields probabilities with which any report is assigned to any of the five topics. The assignment probability of a document is measured on the vertical axis. Every document is represented under every topic. One topic that becomes more prominent in the 1950s data when full records are used is the topic of *Adult non-conformists*. The reason why it becomes more prominent is because our archival records include the subjects of profilaktika and the subjects (‘known enemies’ of the regime, e.g. those who return from prison or labor camps) that were monitored (information is being collected on them) but not yet invited for a ‘prophylactic chat’ or arrested and/or sent to prison. When we split archival records into shorter cases, we are able to separate cases of profilaktika from other cases that do not directly involve profilaktika.


The interquartile range (from the 25th to the 75th percentile) is illustrated by a box. A deep box (from top to bottom) shows that records vary widely in their assignment probabilities; a shallow box shows little variation. A box that is placed high shows a preponderance of records with high assignment probabilities; if placed low, most probabilities are low. The limits of the vertical lines (“whiskers”) mark the 12.5th and 87.5th percentiles. The whiskers have similar interpretation to the boxes, but they include more very high and very low probability assignments. Documents that fall outside the whiskers’ bounds, represented by individual dots, can be considered outliers. Average per-document-per-topic probabilities over time are reported in [Figure D-5](#) in the Appendix.

Figure D-14: Full archival records: Top-20 phrases (bigrams) associated with five topics in our archival data (in Russian)



*Note:* With original archival reports (not split into cases), five topics are substantively equivalent to the topics identified with cases used as a unit of analysis (main results). However, since archival documents (in the 1950s data) can include long reports summarizing several cases, the topics of *Adult non-conformists* and *Young rebels* are less clearly separated in the data. There is a higher value of cosine similarity between the two topics (0.2) in [Figure D-15](#) below (compared to the cosine similarity in the baseline model (0.06) in [Figure D-6](#)).

Figure D-15: Cosine similarity matrix for per-bigram-per-topic probabilities: Full records and five topics



*Note:* This symmetric matrix reflects the cosine similarity (varies from 0 and 1) between vectors of per-bigram-per-topic probabilities from the main LDA specification with five labelled topics on the X/Y-axes (*Adult non-conformists*; *Young rebels*; *Foreign goods*; *Foreign contacts*; *Harmful values*). High (low) values reflect high (low) similarity. Low values of cosine similarity suggest that the five topics identified in the data are different enough, except for *Adult non-conformists* and *Young rebels*, which are less clearly separated in the data (0.2).