Title of paper to be advised.

This seminar is via Zoom, details to follow.

Title to be advised.

Organisers: Bishnupriya Gupta & Claudia Rei

Meeting registration: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19yAXbaJWko_UNrgwuktv3INE3rSueMLWviHEcgHYicM/edit#gid=0

This seminar is joint with Bristol University and Warwick will be hosting today's event.

Title to be advised.

Seminar organisers: Manuel Bagues & Ludovica Gazze

Title to be advised

Title of paper to be advised.

This seminar is via Zoom, details to follow.

This will be the 100th webinar we host since we began the series in April 2020.

Title: “Tackling Sexual Harassment: Evidence from India”

Zoom Link: https://monash.zoom.us/j/83010180431?pwd=TU81bnRFWmxYd2hTaDJ0Z3p5UUtKQT09

The title and link for David’s talk will be Rising Wage Inequality: Technological Change and Search Frictions.

Abstract: This paper examines whether labor market frictions can explain the level and growth of the college wage premium in the US. I develop a novel model where both capital skill complementarity and differences in the search frictions faced by college and non-college workers drive the college wage premium. The presence of search frictions, and hence monopsonistic power, provides a range of explanations for rising college premiums not present in competitive models i.e. changes to relative job offer rates, to firm heterogeneity or to bargaining power between education groups. College workers enjoy substantially lower job destruction rates and higher job offer rates than non-college workers, which generates the presence of a significant, and relatively stable, college wage premium in my model. I also find that bargaining strength, as captured by unionization rates, starts off at similar levels for college and non-college workers but declines more severely for non-college workers. This trend explains a substantial portion of the growth in the college wage premium in my baseline model.

David will be visiting the department for this Seminar - Dita Eckardt will be hosting this visit.

Title to be advised.

Title of paper to be advised.

This seminar is via Zoom, details to follow.

Title of paper to be advised.

This seminar is via Zoom, details to follow.

Title of paper: Trading Non-Tradables: The Implications of Europe's Job Posting Policy

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Modibo Camara (Northwestern University), "Computationally Tractable Choice"

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09

Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Title of paper: Revealed Beliefs and the Marriage Market Return to Education

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Title of paper: Sequential Learning under Informational Ambiguity

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Enrico de Magistris (Boston University), "Investing in Outside Options in Bargaining"

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09

Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Title of paper: Mental Illness Discrimination

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Title of paper: The Grass is Actually Greener on the Other Side: Evidence on Green Multipliers from the United States

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Evgenii Safonov (Princeton University), "Slow and Easy: a Theory of Browsing"

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09
Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Title of paper: Rationing the Commons

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Yingkai Li (Northwestern University), "Optimization of Scoring Rules" (with Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan and Yifan Wu

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09
Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Ellen Muir (Stanford University), "Contracting and vertical control by a dominant platform" (with Zi Yang Kang)

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09
Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Title of paper: Robustness, Heterogeneous Treatment Effects and Covariate Shifts

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Title of paper: Bureaucratic Nepotism

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Title of paper: Monopsony Power, Spatial Equilibrium, and Minimum Wages

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Title of paper: Information Acquisition and the Timing of Actions

This paper develops a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which the decision maker lacks control over the timing of their action. It characterizes the optimal dynamic experiment when the decision maker can flexibly choose all relevant aspects of the information they acquire. The cost of an experiment depends on the quantity of information it produces. At the optimum, the decision maker concentrates resources in generating a single piece of breakthrough news, contradicting their plan of action. In the absence of such news, the decision maker becomes more confident in their intentions. This leads them to sacrifice the frequency with which breakthroughs arrive in order to increase their impact on choice behaviour. These are in stark contrast with the case where the timing of actions is endogenous, in which breakthroughs confirm beliefs, and the resolution of the trade-off between frequency and precision is reversed.

Time to be confirmed.

Sara Shahanaghi (Columbia University), "Competition and Errors in Breaking News"

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09
Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85257798189?pwd=emw0WE4rb2hSV2JmcVNpcGd1VFhBUT09
Meeting ID: 852 5779 8189
Passcode: SET2022

Title of paper: The Aggregate Effects of Acquisitions on Innovation and Economic Growth

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Title of paper: When should we tax firms ? Optimal corporate taxation with firm heterogeneity 

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