Title:On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the informed principal model with common values. It provides conditions that allow for the characterisation of the set of equilibrium allocations of the game in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a mechanism to the agent. In particular, it is shown that the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation (i.e., the allocation that is undominated for the principal within the set of allocations that are incentive compatible for the principal and type-by-type individually rational for the agent) and every allocation that dominates it and is individually rational for the agent relative to the prior beliefs (if such an allocation exists) constitutes an equilibrium allocation whenever the RSW allocation is interim optimal relative to some strictly positive beliefs. If the principal confines herself to offering direct revelation mechanisms, the RSW allocation and every allocation that dominates and is individually rational for the agent relative to the prior beliefs (if such an allocation exists) constitutes equilibrium allocations without imposing any condition. Sufficient conditions are presented such that the set of equilibrium allocations is fully characterised. The results are shown to be in contrast to those obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1992) and illustrated in several economic applications.

Title to be advised.

This workshop will be via Microsoft Teams

Speaker: Costas Cavounidis

Title: Education and Human Capital in General Equilibrium: Who does what - and why. (joint w/ Vittoria Dicandia, Kevin Lang, Raghav Malhotra).

Join on your computer or mobile app

Click here to join the meeting 

Lingsi Wei is going to present the following paper.

Constantinides, G., & Duffie, D. (1996). Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers. Journal of Political Economy, 104(2), 219-240. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138925

Please find the meeting details below.

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85821621631?pwd=YXZoV2dBU0p1QlM0dElHUWRuTVpPUT09

Meeting ID: 858 2162 1631

Passcode: 419234

Raghav will be presenting: Variance Based tests of market demand

Link: Click here to join the meeting

Alperen will present paper: Barro, Robert J. 2009. Rare Disasters, Asset Prices, and Welfare Costs, American Economic Review, 99 (1): 243-64. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.243

Meeting ID: 858 2162 1631 Passcode: 419234

Costas will present: Losing by Betting on Success (w/ Sambuddha Ghosh).

​Abstract: A principal incentivizes agents to exert effort, when only the success or failure of a joint project is observable. We construct a mechanism in which agents message the principal before exerting effort. The mechanism interprets messages as bets on the success of the project. We show that if full effort is uniquely implementable by some scheme, our mechanism can uniquely implement it using the equilibrium transfers from any Nash implementation. Hence, the result of high and unequal wages in Winter 2004 is reversed if the principal can solicit messages. This despite the fact that agents have no information to signal.

Teams link: Click here to join the meeting

Amedeo is going to give a talk about ambiguity in asset pricing based on the following paper.

Ju, N. and Miao, J. (2012), Ambiguity, Learning, and Asset Returns. Econometrica, 80: 559-591. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7618

Meeting details are the same as previous weeks:

Topic: MIMA

Meeting ID: 858 2162 1631

Passcode: 419234

Oliver will present his paper Monetary Policy in Times of Low Attention.

This workshop is via Zoom, the meeting details are as follows.

Topic: MIMA

Time: Jul 14, 2021 01:00 PM London

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88447563681?pwd=TGZZbmFJMGJNU05RS2JDTFFvOUpZdz09

Meeting ID: 884 4756 3681

Passcode: 642957

Julian will present paper: Bayesian Topic Regression for Causal Inference.

Abstract: Causal inference using observational text data is becoming increasingly popular in many research areas. This paper presents the Bayesian Topic Regression (BTR) model that uses both text and numerical information to model an outcome variable. It allows estimation of both discrete and continuous treatment effects. Furthermore, it allows for the inclusion of additional numerical confounding factors next to text data. To this end, we combine a supervised Bayesian topic model with a Bayesian regression framework and perform supervised representation learning for the text features jointly with the regression parameter training, respecting the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem. Our paper makes two main contributions. First, we provide a regression framework that allows causal inference in settings when both text and numerical confounders are of relevance. We show with synthetic and semi-synthetic datasets that our joint approach recovers ground truth with lower bias than any benchmark model, when text and numerical features are correlated. Second, experiments on two real-world datasets demonstrate that a joint and supervised learning strategy also yields superior prediction results compared to strategies that estimate regression weights for text and non-text features separately, being even competitive with more complex deep neural networks.

Agustin will give a crash course on temptation and self-control preferences based on the following paper:

Lipman, B. L., & Pesendorfer, W. (2013). Temptation. In Advances in economics and econometrics: Tenth World Congress (Vol. 1, pp. 243-288). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139060011.009

This is via Zoom https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89616093576?pwd=TTRnTzZ2UW9hNlhmSFcrdFB4NDI4dz09

Meeting ID: 896 1609 3576 Passcode: 066953

Topic: MIMA

Time: Wednesdays 1.00PM London

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89616093576?pwd=TTRnTzZ2UW9hNlhmSFcrdFB4NDI4dz09

Meeting ID: 896 1609 3576

Passcode: 066953

Carolina will be presenting the following paper:

Bordalo P., Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer. (2020). Memory, Attention, and Choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 135, Issue 3,Pages 1399-1442. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa007.

Please find the details for the meeting below.

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89616093576?pwd=TTRnTzZ2UW9hNlhmSFcrdFB4NDI4dz09

Meeting ID: 896 1609 3576 Passcode: 066953

Diego Calderon’s presentation will be on the following paper:

Kozlowski, J., Veldkamp, L., & Venkateswaran, V. (2020). The Tail That Wags the Economy: Beliefs and Persistent Stagnation. Journal Of Political Economy, 128(8), 2839-2879.

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241

Passcode: 983859

Chen Lian will be presenting 'Determinacy without the Taylor Principle'

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241

Passcode: 983859

Nikolaos Kokonas will be presenting 'Equilibrium unemployment and vacancies under exponential satisficing behaviour'

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241

Passcode: 983859

Title: Central Bank Account for All: Efficiency and Risk-Taking (joint with Cyril Monnet and Mariana Rojas-Breu)

Abstract: “ We analyze the effect that an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC), that competes with bank deposits as a medium of exchange, has on the banking sector. Monopolistic banks issue deposits to lend to productive investment projects. We show that CBDC leads to increased remuneration on bank deposits. CBDC promotes intermediation and increases bank profits for low to moderate interest rate levels. We characterize the optimal interest rate on CBDC and demonstrate that a higher rate leads to sub-optimal investment decisions and build-up of banking sector risk. Until investment efficiency is achieved, it is optimal for the central bank to offer the same remuneration on CBDC and reserves. If the CBDC rate is set higher than the optimal level, reserves become an important policy tool to crowd out sub-optimal investment and mitigate banking sector risk. ”

Via Zoom : Meeting ID - 858 6905 0241 Passcode: 983859

George will be talking on the following paper:

Sendhil Mullainathan, A Memory-Based Model of Bounded Rationality, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 117, Issue 3, August 2002, Pages 735–774, https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302760193887

This Workshop is online via Zoom, meeting details below.

Zoom Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85869050241?pwd=dlZtMHlOUDVyOGN4L3d6R2NhakNlUT09Link opens in a new window

Meeting ID: 858 6905 0241 Passcode: 983859

Title - Bargaining with Moral Agents

Title - Rationality of Decisions That Avoid Predictably Regrettable Consequences (in working progress)

Abstract - A novel characterization of rationality is offered which relies on the hypothesis that under no predictable circumstances should behaviour in any finite decision tree ever lead to a consequence which, relative to the predicted feasible set F, belongs to a specified subset R(F) of regrettable consequences. The hypothesis is applied to behaviour that is defined on an unrestricted domain of finite decision trees, including continuation subtrees, with:

(i) decision nodes where the decision maker must make a move;

(ii) chance nodes at which a “roulette lottery” with exogenously specified strictly positive probabilities is resolved;

(iii) event nodes at which a “horse lottery” is resolved.

Building on earlier discussions of consequentialist behaviour, the hypothesis is shown to imply that behaviour must maximize a complete and transitive preference relation over consequence lotteries, with preferences that satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory, as well as a strict form of Anscombe and Aumann's extension of Savage's sure thing principle. Assuming continuity, non-trivial consequence domains, and a generalized form of state independence, the hypothesis is equivalent to a refined form of Bayesian rationality that excludes zero probabilities.

Nick Scholz presenting "A continuous time health mechanism without money ". The seminar will be online only via MS Teams.

MS Teams: Meeting scheduled in the Microeconomics Channel

Title: Belief Heterogeneity and Risk Amplication

Title: Lead Us Not Into Temptation: on the Dynamics of History Dependent Self-Control

Title: Contracting with Unconscious Biases

Abstract: A principal and an agent have non-common priors on uncertainty in optimal contracting with moral hazard. I introduce an outside observer's belief considered as accurate to conduct objective welfare analysis. Without incentive provision, the two players' biases exhibit asymmetric effects on welfare. An overconfident (underconfident) agent is better-off if the principal is more overconfident (underconfident) than him. However, a biased principal not only benefits if the agent is more biased than him in the same direction, but also could be better-off if the agent biases towards a different direction. With incentive provision, only the agent's bias affects welfare. It costs a biased principal less as long as the agent is overconfident, while only an underconfident agent benefits.

Title: A Behavioral Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian Model

Abstract: “We develop a New Keynesian model with household heterogeneity and bounded rationality in the form of cognitive discounting. The resulting behavioral heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model is consistent with recent empirical facts about the effectiveness and the transmission mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policy: monetary policy is amplified through indirect general equilibrium effects, fiscal multipliers on consumption are positive and the model delivers empirically-realistic intertemporal marginal propensities to consume. Simultaneously, and consistent with the data, the model resolves the forward guidance puzzle and remains stable at the effective lower bound as the model features equilibrium determinacy even under an interest-rate peg. The model is analytically tractable and nests a wide range of existing models as special cases, none of which can produce all the listed features within one model. We further show how the main insights from the tractable model extend to a quantitative version of the model, how the model-implied household expectations can be aligned with recent findings from survey data, and how to derive an equivalence result between heterogeneous-household models with bounded rationality and those featuring incomplete information and learning.”

This MIMA session is via Zoom, information below

Time: 31/05/2022, Tuesday 05:00 PM London

Zoom Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81719302554?pwd=TTFMVUhwSjRobERnK0czRXZFeEpXZz09

Meeting ID: 817 1930 2554 Passcode: MIMA

Title: Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

Title to be advised.

Title: "Subcontracting Away Strategic Uncertainty" (with Costas Cavounidis)

MS Teams Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3a44e76bae944e45478914cb98497b7098%40thread.tacv2/1665048380873?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22aac8c148-e99c-4793-9a9e-9a8b8d83de0e%22%7dLink opens in a new window

Title: History-Dependent Self-Control and Emotional Decision-Making

MS Teams Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3a44e76bae944e45478914cb98497b7098%40thread.tacv2/1665048380873?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22aac8c148-e99c-4793-9a9e-9a8b8d83de0e%22%7d

Title: Dynamic Predation and Entry Deterrence.