Title: Contracting with Unconscious Biases

Abstract: A principal and an agent have non-common priors on uncertainty in optimal contracting with moral hazard. I introduce an outside observer's belief considered as accurate to conduct objective welfare analysis. Without incentive provision, the two players' biases exhibit asymmetric effects on welfare. An overconfident (underconfident) agent is better-off if the principal is more overconfident (underconfident) than him. However, a biased principal not only benefits if the agent is more biased than him in the same direction, but also could be better-off if the agent biases towards a different direction. With incentive provision, only the agent's bias affects welfare. It costs a biased principal less as long as the agent is overconfident, while only an underconfident agent benefits.

Title: Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

Title to be advised.

Title: "Subcontracting Away Strategic Uncertainty" (with Costas Cavounidis)

MS Teams Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3a44e76bae944e45478914cb98497b7098%40thread.tacv2/1665048380873?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22aac8c148-e99c-4793-9a9e-9a8b8d83de0e%22%7dLink opens in a new window

Title: History-Dependent Self-Control and Emotional Decision-Making

MS Teams Link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3a44e76bae944e45478914cb98497b7098%40thread.tacv2/1665048380873?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%2209bacfbd-47ef-4465-9265-3546f2eaf6bc%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22aac8c148-e99c-4793-9a9e-9a8b8d83de0e%22%7d

Title: Dynamic Predation and Entry Deterrence.

Title: Signaling effect of information design

Title: Partition Dependent Expected Utility

Title: Quantum Observables as Kolmogorov Random Variables

Yating will present his paper titled 'Path-Dependent Equilibrium and Polarization in Public Responses to a Pandemic'.

Title is: Natural Language Equilibrium: Signaling Games

Abstract. We refine sequential equilibrium in signaling games by incorporating natural language in the form of meaningful cheap talk directly into the theory. Because meaning in any language can be usurped by equilibrium conventions to the contrary, the import of natural language in games must stem from how meaning is assigned to language used off the path of play. We find that a simple and intuitive convention about the players’ common understanding of language off-path has surprising power to refine sequential equilibrium in signaling games.

Title: If You’re NOT So Smart, Why Are You Rich? Robust Market Selection with General Recursive Preferences, with Jaden Yang Chen (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA)

Title: Smart Banks (with Maxi Guennewig and Yuliyan Mitkov)

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

Abstract: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can erase signals from their records. When players are sufficiently long-lived and have strictly dominant actions, they will play their dominant actions with probability close to one in all equilibria. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, there exist purifiable equilibria with a positive level of cooperation in the submodular prisoner's dilemma but not in the supermodular prisoner's dilemma. Therefore, the maximal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with respect to players' expected lifespans and the complementarity in players' actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation.

Title: Selling data with private information source

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.

Title to be advised.