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Micro Theory Work in Progress

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Thu 24 Feb, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Jose Rivero Wildemauwe (CY Cergy Paris Universite)
via Zoom

Title - Bargaining with Moral Agents

Thu 3 Mar, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Working in Progress) - Peter Hammond

Title - Rationality of Decisions That Avoid Predictably Regrettable Consequences (in working progress)

Abstract - A novel characterization of rationality is offered which relies on the hypothesis that under no predictable circumstances should behaviour in any finite decision tree ever lead to a consequence which, relative to the predicted feasible set F, belongs to a specified subset R(F) of regrettable consequences. The hypothesis is applied to behaviour that is defined on an unrestricted domain of finite decision trees, including continuation subtrees, with:

(i) decision nodes where the decision maker must make a move;

(ii) chance nodes at which a “roulette lottery” with exogenously specified strictly positive probabilities is resolved;

(iii) event nodes at which a “horse lottery” is resolved.

Building on earlier discussions of consequentialist behaviour, the hypothesis is shown to imply that behaviour must maximize a complete and transitive preference relation over consequence lotteries, with preferences that satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory, as well as a strict form of Anscombe and Aumann's extension of Savage's sure thing principle. Assuming continuity, non-trivial consequence domains, and a generalized form of state independence, the hypothesis is equivalent to a refined form of Bayesian rationality that excludes zero probabilities.

Thu 10 Mar, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Nick Scholz (PGR)
via MS Teams

Nick Scholz presenting "A continuous time health mechanism without money ". The seminar will be online only via MS Teams.

MS Teams: Meeting scheduled in the Microeconomics Channel

Thu 17 Mar, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Agustin Troccoli Moretti (PGR)
S2.79

Title: Lead Us Not Into Temptation: on the Dynamics of History Dependent Self-Control

Thu 26 May, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Seminar - Xueying Zhao (PGR)
S2.79

Title: Contracting with Unconscious Biases

Abstract: A principal and an agent have non-common priors on uncertainty in optimal contracting with moral hazard. I introduce an outside observer's belief considered as accurate to conduct objective welfare analysis. Without incentive provision, the two players' biases exhibit asymmetric effects on welfare. An overconfident (underconfident) agent is better-off if the principal is more overconfident (underconfident) than him. However, a biased principal not only benefits if the agent is more biased than him in the same direction, but also could be better-off if the agent biases towards a different direction. With incentive provision, only the agent's bias affects welfare. It costs a biased principal less as long as the agent is overconfident, while only an underconfident agent benefits.

Thu 6 Oct, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Alkis Georgiadis-Harris (Bonn)
S2.79

Title: Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture

Thu 27 Oct, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Francesco Rocciolo (Imperial)
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Thu 10 Nov, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Hyungmin Park (PGR)
S2.79 via MS Teams
Thu 24 Nov, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Agustin Troccoli Moretti
S2.79
Thu 1 Dec, '22
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Doruk Cetemen
S2.79

Title: Dynamic Predation and Entry Deterrence.

Thu 16 Feb, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - tba
S2.79
Thu 23 Feb, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Xueying Zhao (PGR)
S2.79

Title: Signaling effect of information design

Thu 2 Mar, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - tba
S2.79
Thu 9 Mar, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Nick Scholz (PGR)
S2.79

Title: Partition Dependent Expected Utility

Thu 16 Mar, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Peter Hammond
S2.79

Title: Quantum Observables as Kolmogorov Random Variables

Thu 22 Jun, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Yating Yuan
S2.79

Yating will present his paper titled 'Path-Dependent Equilibrium and Polarization in Public Responses to a Pandemic'.

Wed 18 Oct, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Theory Work in Progress) Workshop - Professor Phil Reny (Chicago) - to be confirmed
S2.77 Cowling Room

Title is: Natural Language Equilibrium: Signaling Games

Abstract. We refine sequential equilibrium in signaling games by incorporating natural language in the form of meaningful cheap talk directly into the theory. Because meaning in any language can be usurped by equilibrium conventions to the contrary, the import of natural language in games must stem from how meaning is assigned to language used off the path of play. We find that a simple and intuitive convention about the players’ common understanding of language off-path has surprising power to refine sequential equilibrium in signaling games.

Thu 19 Oct, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Pablo Beker
S2.79

Title: If You’re NOT So Smart, Why Are You Rich? Robust Market Selection with General Recursive Preferences, with Jaden Yang Chen (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA)

 

Thu 2 Nov, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Alkis Georgiadis-Harris
S2.79

Title: Smart Banks (with Maxi Guennewig and Yuliyan Mitkov)

Thu 9 Nov, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Workshop - Raghav Malhotra (Leicester)
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Thu 16 Nov, '23
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Massimiliano Furlan (MRes)
S2.79

Title to be advised.

Thu 14 Mar, '24
-
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Harry Pei
S2.79

Title: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

Abstract: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can erase signals from their records. When players are sufficiently long-lived and have strictly dominant actions, they will play their dominant actions with probability close to one in all equilibria. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, there exist purifiable equilibria with a positive level of cooperation in the submodular prisoner's dilemma but not in the supermodular prisoner's dilemma. Therefore, the maximal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with respect to players' expected lifespans and the complementarity in players' actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation.

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