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Contents of Volume 3

Contents of Volume 3

Volume 3, Number 1

Perspectives:

Roger H. Gordon and John D. Wilson

Taxes and Spending

David Pines and Jacques-Francois Thisse

Urban Systems: Market and Efficiency

Roger Guesnerie

Second Best Redistributive Policies: The case of International Trade

Articles

Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque

Social Security, Optimality and Equilibria in a Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy

Stanley Reiter

Interdependent Preferences and Groups of Agents

William Hoyt and Richard Jensen

Product Differentiation and Public Education

Jean Hindriks

Mobility and Redistributive Politics

Book Review

Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contradictory Visions of the State, James M. Buchanan and Richard A. Musgrave,

Reviewed by Gareth D. Myles

Conference Program

Program for the 2000 meetings of the Association for Public Economic Theory, University of Warwick, UK.

Volume 3, Number 2
Articles

Gareth D. Myles

Economic Mismeasurement and the Bias in Policy Choice

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus

Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

Anderea Dall’Olio and Rajiv Vohra

Efficiency in an Economy with Fixed Costs

Sophia Delipalla and Peter Sanfey

Commodity Taxes, Wage Determination and Profits

Benyamin Shitovitz and Menahem Spiegel

Stable Provision Vs. Cournot-Nash Equilibrium in Pure Public Good Economies

Gideon Yaniv

Revenge, Tax Informing, and the Optimal Bounty

Volume 3, Number 3

Articles

Alberto Cavaliere

Voluntary Provision of Public Goods by Correlated Equilibria

Szilvia Papai

Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments

Paolo Bertoletti

On Endogenous Efficiency in Public and Private Firms

Youngsub Chun

Population Monotonicity and Egalitarianism for Binary Social Choice Problems

Achim Wambach

On Social Transfers and Income Taxation

Kevin Siqueira

Common Agency and Partial Cooperation

Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi

A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fundraising: The Roll of Refunds

Errata

Mamoru Kaneko and Akihiko Matsui

Errata: Inductive Game Theory, Discrimination and Prejudices