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This material has been published in the International Journalof Game Theory (1996) 25: 245-258 the only definitive repository of the content that has been certified and accepted after peer review. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by Springer-Verlag Heidelberg. This material may not be copied or reposted without explicit permission. (Copyright(C) 1996 ) Springer-Verlag Heidelberg

The Nonemptiness of the f-core of a Game without Side Payments

Mamoru Kaneko (Virginia Polytechnic Instituteand State University, Blacksburg)

and

Myrna Wooders (University of Toronto)

Abstract

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without sidepayments where only small coalitions - ones bounded in absolute size offinite cardinality - are permitted. This result covers assignments games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignments games, such as housing and automobile markets

International Journal of Game Theory (1996) 25:245-258

Copyright © 1996 Springer-Verlag Heidelberg