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This material has been published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 34, No. 1, Jan 2001, pp. 138-152,
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Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples by Reinhard Selten 1, Myrna H. Wooders 2, 3,

1 Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
2 Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, M5S 3G7
3 Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

(Received September 14, 1995; published electronically January 02, 2001)


We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repeated infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry. Journal of Economic Literature

Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.

 Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 34, No. 1, Jan 2001, pp. 138-152

Copyright © 1997 Academic Press