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For the Record

A number of my working papers are occasionally cited. The purpose of this page is to provide scanned copies of these papers. Here is what we have scanned so far.


The following two papers were to become a book. Much of this material now appears here in a volume edited by J-F. Mertens and S. Sorin. The second paper has a section entitled "Applications to Hedonic Pricing and Monotonicity," (primarily a discussion of the literature) which has recently been cited, although without citation to the Discussion Paper.
"On Large Games and Competitive Markets 1: Theory, " Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Discussion Paper No. B-195, 1991 (revised March 1992)."

"On Large Games and Competitive Markets 2: Applications, " Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Discussion Paper No. B-196, 1991 (revised January 1992).

The next paper has not yet been submitted for publication -- we think that a more straightforward proof might be possible, but now, after more than a decade, are planning to proceed with publication. This paper (along with other earlier working papers, discusses a limiting per capita payoff function for a large game derived from a pregame).
"On Large Games with Bounded Coalition Sizes, " (with E. Winter), University of Bonn, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 Discussion Paper A-317 (1990).

While a 1980 paper of mine was not published, many of the results were used in a Cowles CFDP with Martin Shubik.


"Near Markets and Market Games," (with M. Shubik) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 657 (1982), published in part in Economic Studies Quarterly 37 (1986) 289-299 and in " Clubs, Markets, and Near-Market Games," (with M. Shubik) in Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics; Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, ed. M.H. Wooders, Fields Institute Communication Volume 23, The American Mathematical Society (1999).

The 1980 paper below was widely circulated. It extends earlier working papers to hold under the apparently mild condition of per capita boundedness -- finiteness of the supremum of average payoff over all games.
"Asymptotic Cores and Asymptotic Balancedness of Large Replica Games," S.U.N.Y.-Stony Brook Working Paper No. 215 (1979) Revised 1980.

Following is a widely circulated paper (cited in other papers, including Bennett and Wooders 1979, which also contains statements of some of the results), containing many results on cores, approximate cores, and convergence of approximate cores to cores of limit games. The results were obtained under an assumption ensuring that all improvement can be achieved by coalitions bounded in size (strict small group effectiveness or exhaustion of gains to scale). A referee for a leading journal recommended publication and the paper has benefitted from his comments. But an Associate Editor `urged' rejection on the grounds that the results would be subsumed. In fact, he was right -- many of the results have been subsumed, by myself and others.

"A Characterization of Approximate Equilibria and Cores in a Class of Coalition Economies," A revision of SUNY-Stony Brook Working Paper No. 184 (1979).