Professor of Economics | Dean of Warwick in London
Abhinay Muthoo is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics. He is also the Dean of Warwick in London and Co-Director of the Warwick Policy Lab at the University of Warwick.
Prior to starting his current role as the Dean of Warwick in London, on 1st August 2016, Abhinay was the Head of the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick for 8 years.
Abhinay was educated at the London School of Economics and the University of Cambridge. Abhinay has published research papers in many top academic journals including in the Review of Economic Studies, Journal Economic Theory, and The Economic Journal.
He is the author of Bargaining Theory with Applications, described as a book on the subject of negotiations that any researcher should want to have as a reference.
For Abhinay's non-technical articles and other material (including interviews) on the subject of negotiations (including on Brexit negotiations), please visit his Negotiations page.
Current Research Interests
- Dispute Resolution
- Conflict and Cooperation
- Digital Economy and Ecosystem Economics
- Big Data and Property Rights
- Law and Economics
- Political Institutions
- Political Economy
- Coalition Formation
- Foundations of Social Order
- International Development
- International Relations
- Public Policy.
Other Research Interests:
- Game Theory
- Bargaining Theory
- Higher Education
- Economics and Literature
- Political Philosophy.
1. Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1999. [Chinese translation published by Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2005].
1. Bargaining Without Commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 291-297.
2. A Note on Bargaining Over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements, Economic Theory, 1991, 290-292.
3. Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining, Economic Journal, 1992, 378-387.
4. Sequential Bargaining and Competition, Economic Theory, 1993, 353-363.
5. A Note on Repeated-Offers Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information, Economic Theory, 1994, 295-301.
6. A Bargaining Model with Players' Perceptions on the Retractability of Offers, Theory and Decision, 1995, 85-98.
7. On the Strategic Role of Outside Options in Bilateral Bargaining, Operations Research, 1995, 292-297.
8. Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination, Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 590-598.
9. A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic, Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 134-152.
10. Rationality, Learning and Social Norms, Economic Journal, 1996, 1357-1359.
11. Sunk Costs and the Inefficiency of Relationship-Specific Investment, Economica, 1998, 97-106.
12. Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium, (jointly with Melvyn Coles), Review of Economic Studies, 1998, 235-260.
13. Renegotiation-Proof Tenurial Contracts as Screening Mechanisms, Journal of Development Economics, 1998, 1-26.
14. Rationality in the Face of Uncertainty, in The Elgar Companion to Consumer Research and Economic Psychology, edited by Peter Earl and Simon Kemp, Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999, 487-495.
15. Corruption, Extortion and Evasion, (jointly with Jean Hindriks and Michael Keen), Journal of Public Economics, 1999, 395-430. [Reprinted as chapter 15 in Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, Abed and Gupta (eds), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2002].
16. A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory, World Economics, 2000, 145-166.
17. Equilibrium Partner Switching in a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information, (jointly with Gianni De Fraja), International Economic Review, 2000, 849-870.
18. On John Nash's Scientific Contributions, in Game Theory: A Festschrift in honor of John Nash, edited by C. Kottaridi and G. Siourounis, Eurasia Publications, Athens, Greece, 2002, 134-137.
19. The Economics of Bargaining, in Knowledge for Sustainable Development: An Insight into the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, UNESCO and EOLSS: EOLSS Publishers Co. Ltd, 2002.
20. Bargaining in a Non-Stationary Environment, (jointly with Melvyn Coles), Journal of Economic Theory, March 2003, 70-89.
21. Bargaining, in The Social Science Encyclopedia, Third Edition, edited by Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, London: Routledge, October 2004.
22. A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights, Games and Economic Behavior, November 2004, 288-312.
23. Bargaining Theory and Royalty Contract Negotiations, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, June 2006, 19-28.
24. The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism, (jointly with Kenneth A. Shepsle), in Institutions and Economic Performance, edited by Elhanan Helpman, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, 249-291.
25. Information, Institutions and Constitutional Arrangements, (jointly with Kenneth A. Shepsle), Public Choice, July 2010, 1-36. (Winner of the Duncan Black Prize for best paper published in Public Choice in 2010).
26. Imperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets, (jointly with Suresh Mutuswami), Economic Journal, May 2011, 580-594.
27. Control Rights in Complex Partnerships, (jointly with Marco Francesconi), Journal of the European Economic Association, June 2011. 551-589.
28. Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures, (jointly with Kenneth A. Shepsle), Economics & Politics, March 2014, 13-37.
1. Bargaining and Markets, by Ariel Rubinstein and Martin J. Osborne: Economica, 1991, 408-410.
2. A Course in Game Theory, by Ariel Rubinstein and Martin J. Osborne: Economica, 1996, 164-165.
3. Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium: Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games, by Douglas Gale: Economica, 2002, 681-683.