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RESEARCH INTERESTS Microeconomic theory, information economics, industrial organization, health economics, mechanism design, innovation economics

EDUCATION **PhD in Economics**, University of Warwick 2022 - 2026(*expected*)
Supervisors: Motty Perry, Jacob Glazer, Francesco Squintani
MRes in Economics, *Distinction*, University of Warwick 2020 - 2022
MSc in Economics, IGIDR, Mumbai 2016 - 2018
BA (Hons) in Economics, Miranda House, Delhi University 2013 - 2016

WORKING PAPERS **Screening Information (Job Market Paper)**
Abstract: How does the presence of fake news affect incentives to acquire legitimate information? I study a model of costly information acquisition where either an honest or a fake sender communicates with a receiver through a platform. The honest sender sends a true but noisy signal, whereas the fake sender sends a false and uninformative signal. The platform can verify the signal's authenticity; however, it faces a tradeoff. Fake news, although harmful for the receiver, makes her more skeptical and increases the honest sender's incentives for acquiring more precise information. The platform commits to a policy that indicates the screening probability and a disclosure rule. My central finding is that the screening policy that maximizes the receiver's welfare often requires tolerating fake news, *even when such screening is costless*. Moreover, not informing the receiver of the screening outcome is sometimes better than full transparency. These findings suggest that complete moderation and fact-checking of content may inadvertently leave the receiver worse off.

Medicare Price Negotiations

Abstract: The exorbitant prices of prescription drugs have been a prominent challenge for the United States government. In a bid to combat high prices, a new law now allows the US government to directly negotiate with pharmaceutical firms to determine prices. We adopt a theoretical approach to examine the three-stage bargaining mechanism outlined in the government guidelines. A novel feature of the current mechanism is that the coinsurance for these drugs will be determined after a price has been accepted. Assuming an asymmetry of information about the government's budget allocation that determines the coinsurance for different drugs, we analyze all the equilibria of the bargaining game. In equilibrium, the firm either never infers the coinsurance from the price offer or only learns if the price offer is high enough. Even with an asymmetry of information about the budget, the 3-stage bargaining game is equivalent to a *take-it-or-leave-it* offer. The main insight is that the high-budget type of government is often worse off in equilibrium; in contrast, the low-budget type is better off when compared with a complete information environment. Only when the government's belief that the budget for the drug is high is above a threshold, is it better to commit to a coinsurance along with the price offer.

Disclosure through Intermediaries

Abstract: This paper develops a model of disclosure where an unbiased sender communicates with a receiver through a biased intermediary. Evidence is modeled as verifiable information that can be hidden, but not fabricated. The sender privately observes the realized evidence and then decides how much information to disclose to the intermediary. An intermediary is a strategic player who can further decide how much evidence to disclose to the receiver. Perhaps surprisingly, the receiver may choose the opposite action, even when the unbiased sender and the biased intermediary align on their preferred action. If the sender is always endowed with evidence, there exists an equilibrium where the sender can steer the receiver to take the correct action despite the presence of a biased intermediary. However, if with some positive probability the sender may not have any evidence and the prior favors the intermediary's preferred action, such an equilibrium can never be sustained.

WORK IN PROGRESS	Optimal Risk Sharing Contracts <i>Abstract:</i> This paper studies a novel contract for experimentation in a principal-agent setting called the risk-sharing contract. A principal contracts with two agents for different tasks, each of which needs to be successful for the project to come together. The contract stipulates that no single agent will be paid unless both tasks achieve the desired breakthrough. I solve for the optimal stopping time and optimal wage payments of the agents. While closed-form solutions cannot be attained, some comparative static results are derived.	
RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS	Professor Francesco Squintani	2024-25
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	TA for EC107: Microeconomics TA for EC107: Macroeconomics TA for EC202: Intermediate Microeconomics TA for EC326: Industrial Economics	2021, 2022 2022, 2023 2023, 2024 2024, 2025
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	Business Analyst, American Express, Gurgaon, India	2018-2020
AWARDS AND GRANTS	Economics Department Scholarship, University of Warwick Teaching Excellence Award (x4) Discretionary Research Fund, University of Warwick Open Philanthropy sponsorship for NBER Innovation Bootcamp Analyst of the Quarter, American Express	2020-2026 2024, 2025 2024 2019
CONFERENCES	2024: RGS Doctoral Conference [†] ; RES Annual Conference, Belfast; 23rd European Health Economics Workshop, Toulouse; 2nd Health Economics Conference [†] , Toulouse; ASHEcon Conference 2024, 2025: Lisbon Meetings on Game Theory and Applications [†] ; 2025 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society* (EWMES 2025); 20th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development* <i>† – Withdrawn due to visa issues, * – Scheduled</i>	
ACADEMIC SERVICE	Co-organizer, Warwick PhD Conference Referee, Warwick PhD Conference Mentor, Applicant Mentoring Program (AMP)	2024 2023-25 2024
SKILLS	Programming: L ^A T _E X, MATLAB, SAS, SQL	
PERSONAL INFORMATION	Languages: English (Fluent), Hindi (Native), Spanish (Beginner) Citizenship: India	
REFERENCES	Professor Motty Perry, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, UK M.M.Perry@warwick.ac.uk Professor Jacob Glazer, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, UK J.Glazer@warwick.ac.uk Professor Francesco Squintani, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, UK F.Squintani@warwick.ac.uk	