

# ANDREA TULLI

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Department of Economics  
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## EDUCATION

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2020-Present	<b><i>Assistant Professor in Public Economics, University of Tübingen</i></b> Research interests: Public Economics (primary), Applied Microeconomics, Political Economy
2016-2020	<b><i>PhD in Economics, University of Warwick</i></b> <i>Supervisors:</i> Miguel Almunia, James Fenske and Carlo Perroni
Fall 2018	<b><i>Visiting PhD student, Columbia University</i></b> <i>Invited by Michael Best</i>
2014-2016	<b><i>MRes in Economics, University of Warwick</i></b>
2012-2014	<b><i>MSc in Economics, University of Rome (Tor Vergata)</i></b>
2011-2012	<b><i>Exchange student, Humboldt University</i></b>
2009-2012	<b><i>BSc in Economics, University of Rome (Tor Vergata)</i></b>

## RESEARCH

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Working Papers    **Sweeping the Dirt under the Rug: Measuring Spillovers from an Anti-Corruption Measure**

Using data on Italian public procurement, I show that the implementation of a law enforcement measure on a municipal government has two effects on neighbouring municipalities. First, they increase the number of contracts under a threshold below which evidentiary requirements become less stringent, making it more difficult to prove any infraction. This response accounts for 1 percent of the yearly expenditure on large contracts. Second, they renegotiate fewer contracts, a practice that is often associated with corruption. The results suggest that, in response to law enforcement, local administrators exploit less monitored margins of the procurement process and engage less in activities that are signals of potential corruption so as to minimise scrutiny by law enforcement bodies. I provide evidence that this is indeed the case. Using a technique from natural language processing, I show that municipalities split large projects into contracts smaller than the threshold and the response occurs only in sectors that are more vulnerable to corruption (i.e. construction and waste management).

**Free to spend? The effect of fiscal autonomy on local government spending** (with Maggie Shi)

This paper considers whether decentralization of fiscal autonomy to local governments affects the amount of tax revenue raised and how it is spent. We study a 2012 Italian decentralization reform which (1) expanded municipalities' discretion in setting property tax rates, and (2) increased the share of the budget a municipality is responsible for raising through taxation. In response to increased discretion, municipalities raised more revenue than the national government would have – on average, municipalities raised 1.56 Euros for every Euro the national government expected them to raise. We use the decentralization reform as an instrument for the increase in the budget share the municipality was responsible for raising. We find that municipalities with larger increases in responsibility tended to raise more additional property tax revenue. This additional revenue was spent on current expenditure for public goods in territory/environment, education, culture, sports, police, justice, and social categories. In contrast, it was not spent on investment expenditure, or the administration, roads and transport, production services, and tourism categories. Our findings suggest that the level of government which holds fiscal autonomy matters for the amount of revenue raised and how it is spent.

Work in Progress    **"How do Fiscal Rules Influence Public Spending? Evidence from Italian Municipalities"** (with Audinga Baltruinate)

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

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<b>Teaching</b>	Lecturer, Fiscal Federalism, University of Tübingen	2020-Present
	Teaching Assistant, Microeconomics 1, University of Warwick	2018-2020
	Teaching Assistant, Principles of Economics 1, Warwick Summer School	Summer 2019
	Teaching Assistant, Industrial Economics 1 & 2, University of Warwick	2017-2018
	Teaching Assistant, Economics 1, University of Warwick	2016-2018
<b>Advising</b>	Advising Assistant, for M.Sc. students, University of Warwick	Summer 2018
<b>Refereeing</b>	Journal of Law, Economics and Organization	
<b>Others</b>	Research assistant for Profs. Pancrazi, Van Rens and Vukotic ( <i>Inequality in Diet</i> )	
	Organiser of the Econometrics reading group, University of Warwick	

## AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

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2016-2019	ESRC Doctoral Scholarship
2014-2016	Departmental scholarship for MRes

## PRESENTATIONS

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2020	EEA Congress
	NTA Congress
	Four Friday for Corruption
	JKU, University of Linz
2019	Young Economists Symposium at Columbia University
	5th Workshop on the Economics of Organized Crime at Bocconi University
	Seminar at HEC Montreal
	7th SIde Workshop for PhD students in Econometrics and Empirical Economics

## SOFTWARE PROFICIENCY

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<b>R</b>	Advanced	<b>Matlab</b>	Basic
<b>Stata</b>	Advanced	<b>Python</b>	Basic
<b>Latex</b>	Advanced		

## OTHER INFORMATION

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<b>Languages</b>	Italian (native)
	English (fluent)
	German (intermediate)
<b>Citizenship</b>	Italian

## REFERENCES

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<b>Name</b>	Miguel Almunia	<b>Name</b>	Michael Best
	CUNEF		Columbia University
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