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**UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK**

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**Job Market Paper:**

**Two-Dimensional Information Design**

**Education:**

PhD in Economics, University of Warwick	2012-2018
Postgraduate Studies, University of Bielefeld	2011-2012
M.A. in Economics, Tbilisi State University, ISET	2008-2010
B.A. in Economics and Law, Georgian Technical University	1997-2001

**Research Interests:**

Information Economics, Game Theory

**Research Experience and Other Employment:**

Research Assistant, Gerald Willmann, University of Bielefeld	2011-2012
Researcher, National Bank of Georgia	06.2011-09.2011
Project Consulting, GTZ	2001-2005

### Presentations:

Royal Economic Society Annual Conference	2018
Micro Theory Work in Progress, Warwick	2017
Royal Economic Society PhD Meeting (Poster Session)	2017

### Scholarships and Fellowships:

Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, University of Warwick	2016-Present
ESRC Studentship	2013-2016
Warwick Postgraduate Fellow in Economics, University of Warwick	2012-2013

### Teaching Experience (TA at Warwick):

Years	Subject	Avg. Evaluation
2017-2018	Industrial Economics 1: Market Structure (EC208)	4.2/5
2017-2018	Industrial Economics 2: Strategy and Planning (EC326)	4.1/5
2017-2018	Topics in Economic Theory (EC314)	4.3/5
2016-2017	Introductory Mathematics & Statistics	NA
2012-2018	Microeconomics 2 (EC202)	4/5

### Research Papers:

#### **“Two-Dimensional Information Design”**

<https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/dkhantadze/jmpprogress.pdf>

I study two-dimensional information design setting, in which the ex-ante information correlation constrains the sender’s ability to design information for each dimension. The receiver has to make two decisions. The sender can influence each of the decisions by providing information. I study two game forms - in the simultaneous game the receiver makes two decisions simultaneously; in the sequential game the receiver makes decisions sequentially. I show that if two dimensions are not negatively correlated, then in the sequential game the sender is able to overcome the correlation constraint, even if the sender is only allowed to inform directly only about one dimension at a time. I compare equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game and the sequential game with constrained strategy set. I also analyse the sequential game with unconstrained strategy set of the sender.

#### **“Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment”** (joint work with Philipp K ulpmann)

<https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/dkhantadze/hob.pdf>

In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games. We introduce cognitive types into a pure coordination game in which there is no common knowledge about the distribution of cognitive types. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects managed to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium despite the absence of common knowledge. However, around 9% of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, we compare our results with predictions of different models of higher-order beliefs, commonly used in the literature.

### Languages:

English (Fluent), Georgian (Mother tongue), German (Fluent), Russian (Fluent)

**References:**

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**Prof. Ilan Kremer**  
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**Prof. Phil Reny**  
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