

Do women want to work more or more regularly? Evidence from a natural experiment*

Emma Duchini[†], Clémentine Van Effenterre[‡]

This version: April 2017

Abstract

This paper studies women's employment decisions when institutions limit their chances of having a regular working schedule. Since 1972, French children in kindergarten and primary school had no school on Wednesday. In 2013, a reform reallocates some classes to Wednesday morning. A descriptive analysis of the pre-reform period suggests that women value flexibility when children demand it. Importantly, we observe that women's decision to stay at home on Wednesday hinges on the interplay between the cost of flexibility associated with their occupation and their bargaining power at work. Next, we take advantage of the 2013 reform to obtain the first estimate of women's elasticity to the value of flexibility. To measure mothers' response we exploit variation in the implementation of this policy over time and across the age of the youngest child. Our results show that, although mothers do not increase their total weekly hours of work, they do take advantage of the fall in the value of flexibility to close 1/3 of their initial gap in the probability of working on Wednesday with respect to the control group. This response seems to be driven by mothers who are more rewarded for a regular presence at work, such as those working in managerial positions.

JEL codes: H52, J13, J16, J22.

Keywords: school schedule; institutional constraints; female labor supply; cost of flexibility.

*We are grateful to Antoine Bozio, Gabrielle Fack, Julien Grenet, Thomas Piketty, Xavier d'Hautfoeuille and Sandra McNally for their advice and support. We also acknowledge Libertad Gonzalez, Camille Hémet, Alessandro Tarozzi, and all the participants in the UPF and PSE seminars for their useful comments. We further thank Philippe Aghion, Richard Blundell, Monica Costa Dias, Steven Pischke, Alan Manning, Sandra McNally, Guy Micheals, Samuel Berlinski, Lena Edlund, Douglas Almond, François Gerard, Pierre-André Chiappori, Miguel Urquiola and seminar participants in the 2015 London EDP Jamboree, the 29th EEA conference, the LSE Labor WIP seminar, and Columbia internal seminar for their constructive comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to the French Ministry of Education for giving us access to the Enrysc database, and to the Institut des politiques publiques (IPP) for its financial support on this project. Van Effenterre further thanks the Alliance Program, the Labex OSE "Ouvrir la science économique", and the Institut du Genre for their additional financial support.

[†] University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Office S0.66, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. *Email:* e.duchini@warwick.ac.uk.

[‡] Paris School of Economics, Center for Economic Performance (London School of Economics), 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, WC2A 3PH, United Kingdom. *Email:* c.vaneffenterre@psemail.eu.

1 Introduction

Since the introduction of compulsory primary education in 1882, French children had a full day off in the middle of the week. This was first allocated to Thursday and from 1972 onwards to Wednesday. While other aspects of the school calendar have changed over the last decades, the break on Wednesday has always been maintained. In the meantime, women labour force participation in France has constantly increased to attain nowadays one of the highest level across OECD countries (OECD 2016b). Yet, as displayed in figure 1, the Multinational Time Use Survey (Gershuny and Fisher 2013) tells us that, while women with children in the UK, Germany and Spain distribute their working time equally along the week, French mothers work significantly less time on Wednesday than on the other working days of the week. On the contrary French fathers and women without children have a regular working schedule.

An increasing number of studies suggest that as women's labor force participation rates increase, their wage elasticity may fall down to approach men's one (Cascio 2009, Fitzpatrick 2010, Gelbach 2002, Goldin 2006, Havnes and Mogstad 2011). At the same time, several papers show that women value flexibility at work more than men (Filer 1985, Goldin and Katz 2011, Flabbi and Moro 2012, Wiswall and Zafar 2016, Mas and Pallais 2016). Goldin (2014) and Goldin and Katz (2016) further argue that this quest for flexibility can result in wage penalizations, especially in those occupations where the continuous presence at work and the availability to work long hours is particularly rewarded.

In this paper we exploit the peculiarity of the French school schedule to show that women value flexibility when their children demand it. However, we also observe that the possibility to adopt a flexible working schedule hinges on the interplay between the cost that this imposes at work and the bargaining power that women have vis-à-vis their employer.

Next, we take advantage of a recent reform of the school schedule to obtain the first estimate of women's elasticity to the value of flexibility, and to test whether women are indeed becoming less sensitive to changes in their own wages. Since 2008, children in kindergarten and primary school had 24 hours of classes per week, split over only four days. In January 2013, the French government decided to reduce the length of the instruction time per day and

add an extra half day of classes on Wednesday morning, in order to lighten the daily workload of children, while maintaining invariant the total amount of weekly teaching hours. Moreover, in order to compensate for the shortening of each school day, the government introduced three optional hours of extra-curricular activities, at almost no additional cost for families.

On the one hand, we use the reorganization of the teaching time and, in particular, the introduction of classes on Wednesday morning, to estimate women's elasticity to the value of flexibility and to study how this varies along its cost curve. On the other hand, we exploit the implicit wage subsidy delivered by this reform via the introduction of the extracurricular activities to obtain a new estimate of women's own wage elasticity in a context of high female labor force participation.

To analyze mothers' employment decisions we choose to focus on mothers whose youngest child is of primary school age and compare them to mothers whose youngest child is slightly older. To carry out this study we use the quarterly data of the French Labor Force Survey from 2009 to 2015. Moreover, to identify which occupations reward more a regular and prolonged presence at work, potentially imposing a higher cost of flexibility, we exploit the O*NET classification of occupations. This online platform, created by the U.S. Department of Labor, regroups jobs on the basis of the skills used and activities performed at work. Following Goldin (2014), we classify occupations as imposing a high or a low cost of flexibility, by focusing on elements such as the degree of time pressure, the importance of interpersonal relationships with co-workers, and the extent to which the worker has close substitutes.

In a descriptive analysis of the pre-reform period, we show that considering the interplay between the cost of flexibility associated to women's occupation, and their bargaining power at work is crucial to understand women's behavior. Before 2013, more than 40 percent of women with children in primary school age stay at home on Wednesday, in comparison with only 30 percent of those with older children. This proportion is larger among women with a higher bargaining power at work - proxied in particular by their level of education - despite the fact that these women tend to be the ones facing a high cost of flexibility. Yet, women working in managerial positions, who have potentially both a very strong bargaining power

and a very high cost of flexibility, are more likely to work on Wednesday than the average high-skilled mother with her youngest child in primary school, especially if they work in large firms.

Next, comparing the evolution of employment decisions of mothers with primary school aged children to that of mothers with children aged twelve to fourteen, in a difference-in-difference framework, we show that mothers do react to the 2013 reform. Although this intervention does not boost labor force participation or total weekly hours of treated mothers, their probability of working on Wednesday rises by more than three percentage points. In other words, the reform allows treated mothers to close up to 1/3 of the pre-existing gap with control mothers, and 1/6 of the initial gender gap on this margin. Taken together, these findings imply that treated mothers reorganize their working time in accordance to their children's new school schedule, but that they do not react to the implicit wage subsidy this reform provides. In accordance with the insights delivered by the descriptive analysis, we find suggestive evidence that these results are driven by mothers facing the highest cost of flexibility, and in particular by women occupying managerial positions. In addition, these mothers also seem to take advantage of the introduction of the extracurricular activities to slightly increase their weekly hours of work.

To complete our analysis, we also study fathers' reaction to the reform and find no evidence that this intervention affects their employment decisions. On the one hand, this result supports the findings of the recent strand of the literature establishing the importance of cultural norms as determinants of gender identity and women's employment decisions (Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004, Fortin 2005, Bertrand 2011, Fernandez 2011, Kleven, Landais, and Sogaard 2015). On the other hand, it shows that, precisely because a strict division of roles persists within the household even in a context of high female labor force participation, limiting institutional constraints can help modify these cultural beliefs.

Overall, our findings have several policy implications. First, we prove that women value flexible working schedules in the presence of institutional constraints, but tend to abandon such arrangements as soon as these constraints are relaxed. This suggests that women do not

have an intrinsic and higher taste for flexibility than men, and that removing institutional constraints must remain a priority for governments that want to boost female labor supply, as suggested also by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017). Secondly, our study suggests that adopting a flexible working schedule is simply not an option for many workers and this is true both for a low-skilled worker who cannot organize her work independently and for the top-manager who must show up at work to coordinate others' job. Technological advancements are already enhancing the ability of firms and workers to develop new forms of work, and even create forms of flexible work that are suitable to low-skilled workers. Yet, policy makers who want to promote flexible work arrangements as a way to achieve a better work-life balance, on the one hand, and help women breaking the glass ceiling, on the other, still have to take into account these specific job constraints. Finally, the fact we do not observe a strong reaction to the implicit wage subsidy offered by the 2013 reform provides some support for the hypothesis that women's wage elasticity might indeed be weaker in countries with high female labor market participation rates. Yet, it might also indicate that parents' negative perception regarding the quality of childcare services might influence their decision to take advantage of these programs, as suggested by ample anecdotal evidence circulating in the French press. Besides, three additional hours of childcare might simply not be enough to generate a substitution of work for leisure.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed description of the French primary school system and how this has been affected by the 2013 reform. Section 3 describes the data used to conduct this analysis. Section 4 contains two subsections. The first one presents a descriptive analysis of the pre-reform period. The second one focuses on the impact of the reform and discusses the identification strategy, the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 analyzes potential channels and consequences of these results. Section 6 concludes.

2 The French primary school system

The French educational system is divided into three stages: elementary education, for children aged six to eleven; secondary education – in turn divided into middle school (*collège*) and high school (*lycée*) – and tertiary education. Education is compulsory since the age of six till sixteen. However, parents can send their children to free public pre-kindergarten (*école pre-maternelle*) already when they are two, or to kindergarten (*école maternelle*) at the age of three. By now, 23 percent of two-years old children and 95 percent of children aged three to five attend this pre-school stage (Goux and Maurin 2010).

Public primary schools are financed by municipalities. The private sector comprises mainly religious schools and enrolls fourteen percent of all primary school pupils.

With respect to the structure of the school calendar, France has always been one of the countries with the longest period of holidays, longest number of hours per year, and longest school day, in primary school.

Since the introduction of compulsory primary education in 1882 (*Loi Ferry*) until the end of the 1960s, children spend five full days at school, with a break on Thursday and Sunday, for a total of 30 hours per week. In 1969, Saturday afternoon is abolished, and three years later, in 1972, the break in the middle of the week is advanced from Thursday to Wednesday, and two hours of physical activities are added to the school week.

It is only with the development of the chronobiology in the 1980s that an intense debate on the optimal structure of the school schedule spreads out. Experts of this discipline point out that primary school children need more frequent holidays and a shorter day at school. As a consequence, the Jospin Law restructures the school year in 36 weeks over five periods, and reduces by one hour the weekly schedule. Moreover, in 1991, a ministerial decree gives municipalities the possibilities to adopt a four-days schedule. Only a few choose this possibility. In 1995 it is the Ministry of education that relaunches this option by selecting a pool of pilot schools to experiment the four-days school week. From that moment, several municipalities start to consider this option. Finally, in 2008, under an harsh debate, the four-days schedule is extended to all primary schools in France and weekly hours are reduced from 26

to 24. Nonetheless, in 2013, under the pressure of chronobiologists, the Minister of Education reintroduces the four-and-half days school week.

In particular, with the 2013 reform, the school day is shortened by 45 minutes; in order to maintain invariant the total amount of weekly hours, an half day is added, mainly on Wednesday morning, and exceptionally on Saturday; and municipalities are invited to provide free extra-curriculum activities for children, for a total of three weekly hours; these should compensate for the reduction of the daily instruction time. Importantly, municipalities are given the possibility to implement the new schedule either in the year 2013-14 or in 2014-15. 20 percent of them chose to do it in 2013; the rest adopts the new system only in 2014. Moreover, each municipality can chose how to allocate the extracurricular activities, whether to concentrate them on two days a week or spread them along the week. Regarding private schools, these have the freedom to chose whether to implement the 2013 reform or not at all, and, by the end of the academic year 2014-2015, fifteen percent of them, comprising 13.5 percent of French pupils attending a private school, adopt the new schedule.¹

Finally, it is important to notice that both the 2008 and 2013 reforms affect only kindergarten and primary school children. In middle and secondary school, pupils have at least 24 hours and a half of classes per week, spread over five days, and this schedule has not modified for a long time.

3 Data description

Our study relies on the use of several databases. First, we use the 2009-2014 waves of the French Labor Force Survey (*Enquête Emploi en Continu*) or FLFS. This data set collects information on work-related statistics with quarterly interviews to a representative sample of the French population. From the FLFS we extract data on women's age, level of educa-

¹ In our data we cannot tell whether a family sends their child to a public or a private school. We can only observe the aggregate proportions of students enrolled in public and private schools every year and these remain stable over the years of implementation of the reform. In other words, it does not seem that some families are moving their children from one type of school to the other because of the reform. Overall, this implies that our estimates might be slightly downward-biased as around twelve percent of families in our sample are not affected by the reform (corresponding to the 87 percent of the fourteen percent of children attending private schools.)

tion, marital status, present and past labor market status, income, and the structure of the household in which they reside. Crucially, we exploit the information on the municipality of residence, the number of children women have, and their age.

Secondly, in order to identify the timing of the implementation of the 2013 reform across municipalities, we exploit the Enryesco database. This is an administrative data set that has been created by the French Ministry of Education and provides a precise description of the weekly teaching schedule for each school, in each municipality.

Next, we exploit the *Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales*, a large-scale administrative data set of matched employer-employee information, which is based upon mandatory employers' reports of their workers' gross earnings. The French statistical agency gives access to researchers to an extract of this database containing information on all individuals employed in French private firms and born in October of even-numbered years. For the moment it is available up to 2013, and we use it to precisely measure workers' earnings in the pre-reform period.

Finally, to better investigate the mechanisms that drive women's demand for flexibility, we exploit the United States Department of Labor Occupational Information Network, or O*NET. This database, available online, classifies occupations on the base of the activities performed and skills used at work. There are eight broad categories: abilities, interests, knowledge, skills, work activities, work context, work style, and work values. Following Goldin (2014), we focus on the categories of work activities and work context, which comprise several aspects of the work environment that can help us understand quantifying how costly flexible work arrangements can be for women in terms of wage and career advancements.

4 Empirical analysis

4.1 Pre-reform period

Table 2.1 describes the characteristics of French mothers aged between 18 and 55 and interviewed in the Labour Force Survey before the introduction of the 2013 reform. We regroup

them along the age of their youngest child. Three preliminary considerations are worth mentioning. First, mothers of younger children tend not only to be younger but also more likely to hold a college degree, which is consistent with the well-documented increasing trend in female education attainment common to many OECD countries (OECD 2016a). This suggests that looking at incentives, constraints and choices of highly educated women is particularly relevant to predict the behavior of future generations. Secondly, mothers' labor force participation is strongly correlated with their children's age and, in particular, we can see that it increases discontinuously as soon as their youngest child starts attending primary school. Third, conditional on participation, we can see that the probability of working part-time decreases as the youngest child ages and the average number of hours and days increases accordingly.

However, what appears especially striking in this table is the large gap in the proportion of mothers who are working on Wednesday as the youngest child goes from primary to middle school. More than 40 percent of working mothers whose youngest child is in kindergarten or primary school do not work on Wednesday, and this proportion decreases by almost ten percentage points as soon as the youngest child enrolls in middle school. Besides, such pattern does not emerge at all when looking at the probability of working on another day of the week such as Thursday. These figures are consistent with the evidence provided by the Time Use Survey. As shown in figure 2, they are also in line with the results of a survey on childcare arrangements for Wednesday directed to families with children aged 0-6. There, up to 70 percent of respondents declare that parents themselves are taking care of their children when they do not have school on Wednesday.

And what these figures clearly show is that the institutional constraint imposed by children's school schedule appears to bind for a large fraction of women. Or, in other words, that a large proportion of working mothers needs a flexible working schedule in the pre-reform period.

To get more insight on who actually adopts such a schedule, from now on we mainly focus on mothers whose youngest child is in primary school, as it appears uncontroversial to compare their behavior to that of mothers with slightly older children. Table 2.1 tells us

indeed that, except for the allocation of their working time along the week, their behavior in terms of educational, marriage and employment decisions closely resembles that of mothers whose youngest child is in middle school.²

When we break down the previous figures by mothers' characteristics, a few factors appear especially important to predict which mothers are adopting a flexible working schedule prior to the reform, as shown in table 2.2. First, despite working more than four hours more per week, highly educated women whose youngest child is in primary school are significantly less likely to work on Wednesday than low educated mothers and such difference is reduced for mothers whose youngest child is in middle school (table 2.3). We exclude that these correlations are driven by the differential cost of alternative child care arrangements for high-income versus low-income households, as this does not vary much by family income, as shown in table 2.6. We rather believe that these figures indicate that bargaining power plays a crucial role in the ability of workers to negotiate a flexible working schedule with their employer, which is also consistent with the evidence provided by Katz and Krueger (2016) that the recent growth in freelance and contract work largely excludes the low-wage sector.

In addition, it has to be remarked that highly educated women are more likely to negotiate a flexible work schedule, despite the fact that they have also higher chances of working in occupations where a regular presence at work could be more rewarded. We get to this conclusion when looking at the probability of working on Wednesday by cost of flexibility, a concept that we borrow from Goldin (2014). In this recent contribution, Goldin argues that in some occupations working longer hours and/or a regular presence at work might be more rewarded than in others or, in other words, that the wage penalization for adopting a flexible working schedule might be especially high in certain occupations rather than in others. Such

² Concerning mothers with children in kindergarten age instead, table 2.1 clearly shows that their participation rate in the labor market, as well as several observable characteristics, differ substantially from that of mothers with older children. This suggests that the incentives driving their decisions might differ as well. For instance, mothers with children between two and three in France are entitled to receive specific childcare subsidies that are withdrawn as children enter in primary school. In addition, kindergarten is not compulsory and only 30 percent of families whose youngest child is two years old actually make use of this service (Goux and Maurin 2010). For all these reasons, we prefer to exclude mothers with children aged two to five from our analysis. For these same reasons, we decide to exclude them as well from the regression analysis studying the impact of the 2013 reform. However, in table 2.18 in the appendix we show that our results do not change substantially when we include them in the treatment group.

professions are in particularly those in which it is important to build solid relationships with co-workers, meeting clients often, perform tasks under pressure, and where the worker is less likely to have close substitutes. Following Goldin, we use the O*NET database to classify occupations on the basis of these characteristics.³ The importance of each of these aspects in every occupation is measured by a score ranging from zero to 100. An index of the cost of flexibility can then be obtained as the average of the standardized scores of these characteristics. Strikingly, figure 3, constructed using French matched employer-employee data, shows that the larger is this index, the wider the gender wage gap tends to be. In other words, this figure tells that the wage penalization that women experience in the labor market with respect to men is higher precisely in those occupations where the availability to work longer hours and having a regular presence at work are particularly important. We then regroup women's occupations in two groups, the ones imposing a low cost versus those characterized by a high cost of flexibility, depending on whether the average score is below or above the median for the entire sample. As shown in table 2.2, mothers whose youngest child is in primary school, working in occupations imposing a high cost of flexibility are significantly less likely to work on Wednesday in the pre-reform period than mothers facing a low cost of flexibility. Yet, the former work significantly more hours per week than the latter. Once again these differences attenuate as the youngest child gets to middle school (table 2.3). These figures show that flexibility becomes costly for women precisely in those occupations in which their position, or once again, their bargaining power, allows them to ask for flexibility in the first place - note that almost 70 percent of highly educated women work in occupations imposing a high cost of flexibility.

However, and here we come to the second point, there seems to exist a threshold in the cost

³ In detail, we rank occupations depending on their importance of five specific dimensions: time pressure, which uses the question "How often does this job require the worker to meet strict deadlines"; frequency of decision making, referring to the incidence with which a worker is required to make decisions that affect other people, the financial resources, and/or the image and reputation of the organization; structured versus unstructured work, representing the extent to which the job is structured for the worker, rather than allowing her to determine tasks, priorities, and goals; contact with others, referring to the extent the job requires the worker to be in contact with others (face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise) in order to perform it; establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships, representing the importance of developing constructive and cooperative working relationships with others, and maintaining them over time.

of flexibility, above which mothers become less likely to adopt a flexible work arrangement, despite having the bargaining power for doing so. This is the case of women occupying managerial positions in particular, who, especially in large firms, are more likely to work on Wednesday, and work more hours than the average highly educated mother whose youngest child is in primary school.

Third, as it is plausible to expect, the characteristics of the employer are also strongly correlated with the probability that mothers work or not Wednesday in the pre-reform period. Women working in firms with less than 20 employees are 5 percentage points less likely to stay at home on Wednesday than those employed in larger firms. And mothers working in the public sector are up to 10 percentage points less likely to work on Wednesday than those employed in the private sector. Besides, both in small firms and in the public sector, women are more likely to work part-time than in the private sector and in large firms.

Importantly, the gap in the ability to negotiate a flexible working schedule between high-skilled and low-skilled mothers, whose youngest child is in primary school, persist across jobs' characteristics, such as public versus private sector, or firm size. For instance, our data show that in small firms low-educated mothers whose youngest child is in primary school are up to five percentage points more likely to work on Wednesday than highly-educated mothers in the pre-reform period, with the proportions being respectively 64 and 59 percent. Said differently, while there is clearly evidence of sorting to the extent that mothers working in small firms or the public sector are more likely to stay at home on Wednesday, highly educated mothers have always higher chances of doing so than low educated ones.

Importantly, table 2.4 tells us something more. Contrary to what suggested by Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) for the United States, in France couples in which the woman is highly educated seem more likely to specialize according to their comparative advantages. In households in which the youngest child is in primary school, wherever the mother is more likely to be the breadwinner in the household - as her level of education is higher than that of her husband - she is more likely to work on Wednesday than in those couples in which the woman has the same or a lower level of education than her partner - saying couples where the

woman holds a bachelor's degree and her partner holds a master's degree. Interestingly, in couples where the woman has at most a high school degree, mothers' probability of working on Wednesday does not seem to vary with her role in the household.

Overall, this first part of the empirical analysis clearly suggests that women value flexibility when children demand it. However, it also shows that the possibility of adopting a flexible schedule relates to the interplay of different factors, among which women's bargaining power at work and the career cost of flexibility play an important role.

4.2 The impact of the 2013 reform

To further study how the 2013 reform affects mother employment decisions, we adopt a difference-in-difference strategy. We define a woman as being treated if her youngest child is affected by this intervention. Next, as in the descriptive analysis, we choose to compare mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven, with those whose youngest child is between twelve and fourteen – corresponding to the age-interval of middle school pupils. The graphical analysis of pre-treatment trends in the labor supply measures we have chosen, displayed in figure 6,⁴ supports this choice, as the employment decisions of the treatment and control group exhibit a comparable evolution.

Even though the evolution of several labor supply measures is similar among mothers with children in kindergarten and those with older children, we decide to exclude the former from the treatment group for the same reasons explained in the previous paragraph. Their baseline characteristics are indeed too different from those of our control group to assume that absent the reform they would respond to the same type of incentives.

Next, in the main regressions we consider both mothers living in municipalities that implement the reform in 2013 and those living in municipalities that postpone its introduction to 2014.⁵

⁴ This figure shows trends in selective outcomes, notably the probability of working on Wednesday and the number of days worked per week. Figure 9 in the appendix reports the evolution of the other outcomes we study, that is labor force participation and hours worked per week.

⁵ In principle, to identify the effect of the reform, we could exploit the variation over time and across municipalities in the implementation of the reform. In this way, we would compare mothers whose youngest child is in the affected age-range and live in municipalities that introduced the reform in 2013, with the same

On the basis of these choices, we run the following specification on mothers aged 18 to 55, interviewed between 2009 and 2015, and whose youngest child is between six and fourteen years old:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{icmt} &= \gamma_m + \delta_t + \pi * X_{icmt} + \alpha * Yst_Child_btw_6_11_c \\
 &+ \beta * Yst_Child_btw_6_11 * Post_Sep_2013_{ct} + u_{icmt}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

Here i stand for each interviewed woman, c for the age of the youngest child, m for the municipality of residence and t for the wave in which the woman is interviewed. Y_{icmt} represents the outcome considered. These comprise labor force participation, the choice of working part-time or full-time, hours worked per week, days worked per week, and the decision to work on each specific day of the week.⁶ The vector X_{icmt} includes all the individual variables that can affect women's labor supply decisions. These include age, age squared, level of education, number of children, marital status, and presence of other members in the household; α measures the impact of having the youngest child in primary school age. $Post_Sep_2013_{ct}$ is a dummy equal to one starting from September 2013 for those mothers living in municipalities that introduced the reform in 2013, and from September 2014 for mothers living in municipalities that postponed the implementation to 2014. The main coefficient of interest is β that should capture any deviation from a parallel evolution in the outcome of interest

group of mothers who live in municipalities that postponed the implementation of the reform to 2014. However, we prefer not to adopt this strategy for two reasons. First, the comparison of the pre-trends in labor supply measures for these two groups of mothers – figure 10 – reveals that their dynamics seem to diverge before the implementation of the reform. Therefore, it is hard to claim that, absent the reform, the evolution of labor supply would have been the same across these groups. This concern is also confirmed by a formal test on the parallel trend assumption. In a regression model that compares the evolution of labor supply for these two groups of mothers, we include a battery of dummies taking value one for mothers "treated in 2013", in the three waves before September 2013. A test on their joint significance leads us to reject the null for all the outcomes considered. Secondly, by adopting this strategy we would be able to study only the impact of the reform in his first year of implementation, given that from 2014 onward, all municipalities adopt the new schedule. As it might take some time for its effect to manifest, we think that considering only its short-run impact would considerably limit the objectives of our analysis.

⁶ To measure these outcomes we construct, respectively: a dummy equal to one if the woman belongs to the active population; a dummy equal to one if the woman works part-time, a continuous variable indicating the number of hours worked on average per week, one measuring the number of days worked per week, and a dummy equal to one if the woman works on a specific day of the week.

between the treatment and the control group, due to the implementation of the new schedule in primary school. In all regressions we also include municipality of residence, γ_m , and wave of interview fixed effects, δ_t . Finally, in all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to account for any correlation of the outcomes for women residing in the same municipality.

Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the main results. As expected, the 2013 reform does not trigger any response at the extensive margin – table 2.7, column 1. Point estimates in table 2.7, column 2 and 3, suggest that, after the implementation of the reform, treated mothers are less likely to work part-time and tend to work more hours. However, these coefficients are not precisely estimated. In contrast, column 4 indicates that the reform has a significant impact on the number of days worked per week, as treated mothers work on average one fourth of a day more, from a pre-reform level of slightly more than four days and half. In table 2.8, we can see that, accordingly, their probability of working on Wednesday increases by roughly three percentage points, significant at one percent significance-level. Reassuringly, with the exception of Saturday, their likelihood of working on each other day of the week does not change with respect to the pre-reform period, in comparison with control mothers.⁷ The fact that we find a negative effect of the reform on the probability of working on Saturday simply suggests that some of the few mothers who, prior to the reform, were working on Saturday – probably to compensate for their absence on Wednesday – take advantage of the reorganization of the school schedule to allocate their Saturday hours to Wednesday.

4.3 Robustness checks

For the difference-in-difference strategy to accurately identify the effect of interest, we need to assume that, in the absence of the reform, the evolution of mothers' labor supply would have been the same for the treated and control group (parallel-trend assumption). In other words, we should check that our estimates are not capturing the effect of other factors that affect

⁷ It has to be noticed that, in the FLFS, the decision to work on each days of the week is measured only from 2013 onward. However, the fact that the reform also has a significant impact on the number of days worked per week shows that the effect on the probability of working on Wednesday does not merely depend on the span of time over which this outcome is observed.

treated and control mothers in a different way at the same time as the reform takes place.

To support this assumption, besides the visual inspection of the pre-treatment trends in labor supply measures, we can conduct a series of robustness checks. First of all, we can analyze the dynamic impact of the reform. Figures 7 and 8 provide a graphical analysis of the treatment dynamics. In particular, they show the coefficients of the leads and lags in the treatment, estimated with this regression:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{icmt} &= \gamma_m + \delta_t + \pi * X_{icmt} + \alpha * Y_{st_Child_btw_6_11_c} \\
 &+ \sum_{k \geq t-j} \beta_k * Y_{st_Child_btw_6_11} * Leads_Lags_{ck} + u_{icmt}
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where j takes value 4 when the outcome is the number of days worked per week, and value 2 when it represents the decision to work on Wednesday. The first thing to be noticed is that the coefficients on the leads are jointly insignificant, in both regressions, with a corresponding p-value of 0.843 when the outcome is the number of days worked per week and 0.274 when this is the decision to work on Wednesday. This strongly suggests that we are truly identify the impact of the reform, rather than picking the effect of other elements that were affecting the treatment and control groups differently already before the introduction of this intervention. In addition, this analysis rules out significant anticipation effects. Importantly, these regressions allow us to implicitly perform a placebo test. In the first year of implementation of the reform, this should not have any impact on mothers living in municipalities that postponed its introduction in 2014. As these represent 80 percent of our sample, when we look at the impact of the reform on both groups of municipalities at the same time, this is exactly what we observe. None of the coefficients capturing the impact from September 2013 to August 2014 turns out significant in the two regressions, while, in a previous version of this paper, we showed that the reform did have an impact on mothers living in municipalities implementing the reform in 2013.⁸

Next, in tables 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12, we change the size of the treatment and control

⁸ These results are available upon request.

group to show that our results are not sensitive to the definition we adopted. This robustness check can be performed both on the outcome measuring the number of days worked per week, as on the one concerning decision to work on Wednesday. In tables 2.9 and 2.11, we can see that restricting the treatment group does not alter substantially the magnitude of the effect, and the impact of the reform remains significant in almost all columns, for both outcomes. Tables 2.10 and 2.12 further show that, for both outcomes, restricting or expanding the control group does not affect either the magnitude or the significance of the reform coefficients.

In addition, as the variable measuring the number of days worked per week is available for the entire sample period, in table 2.13 we can check the impact of a series of placebo reforms on this outcome. In the first column of table 2.13 we report the baseline result. In the second one, we exclude from the sample the post-treatment period and we pretend that the reform was implemented at the beginning of 2013. In the third column, we consider the period spanning between 2009 and 2011 and look at the effect of a placebo reform introduced in January 2011. Finally, in the last column, we restrict the sample to comprise only women interviewed between 2009 and 2010 and we pretend that the reform took place in January 2011. Reassuringly, none of these placebo reforms appears to have a significant effect, suggesting that in our main regression we are not simply capturing the impact of factors that systematically affect treated and control mothers differently.

Finally, in table 2.14 we show that the impact of the reform on both outcomes is not driven either by mothers living in municipalities that introduce the reform in 2013 or by those living in municipalities that postpone the implementation to 2014. The effect is comparable across both groups of municipalities.

Overall, these tests seem to strongly support the validity of our identification strategy.⁹

⁹ In a separate regression, we further exclude that our results are not driven by the mechanical effect of the reform on teachers. These results are available upon request.

5 Mechanisms behind the main results

5.1 Cost and demand of flexibility

The main peculiarity of the 2013 intervention is that, by making children's school schedule more regular, it actually decreases the value of flexibility for their mothers. This allows us to test for the first time Goldin's theory. According to it, we should expect that mothers who are potentially bearing a higher cost of choosing a flexible working schedule should be especially interested in regularizing it once its value drops. Table 2.15 provides some evidence to support this hypothesis. Although the probability to work on Wednesday seems to increase by the same amount for mothers facing a low cost and a high cost of flexibility, the response in terms on number of days worked per week is stronger - though not significantly different between the two subgroups - for the latter than the former.

Consistent with this, we find suggestive evidence that the reform has a stronger impact on high-skilled women. As shown in table 2.15, the point estimate for the impact of the reform on the probability of working on Wednesday - and number of days worked per week - are larger for highly-educated women, though not statistically different from the coefficient on low-educated mothers. In turn, among the high-skilled women, those working in managerial positions, who already before the introduction of the reform were slightly more likely to work on Wednesday than the average woman with her youngest child in primary school, seem to respond more to the reform than mothers in other types of occupations. Though the coefficients are not statistically different from the ones on other occupations, the point estimates - especially the ones on the number of days worked per week - suggest that following the introduction of the reform, they are more likely to abandon a flexible schedule than women in other professions. Overall, this seems to suggest that high-skilled women tend to exhibit a higher elasticity to the demand for flexibility than low-skilled ones, which is consistent with them being more likely to face a higher cost of flexibility as well.

Importantly, table 2.15 provides suggestive evidence that high-skilled women, and especially the ones working in managerial positions take advantage of the introduction of the

extracurricular activities to increase the overall number of hours worked per week, as well. The probability of working part-time, in particular, decreases by 2 (highly educated mothers) to 5 percentage points (the managers) among the high-skilled mothers, while it basically does not change for the corresponding reference group - and this difference is statistically significant when comparing mothers in managerial positions versus those working in other intermediary or elementary occupations. In other words, the reform seems to trigger an important substitution effect for this subgroup of women that induces women to abandon any form of flexible schedule. However, note that mothers facing a low cost of flexibility, who were substantially more likely to work part-time in the pre-reform period are also more likely to abandon this form of flexibility in response to the introduction of the reform.

To conclude the heterogeneity analysis, it is important to add that we do not find any clear evidence of a differential effect by mother's age, number of children, firm size, or type of sector, being this private or public. However, we do find that women in temporary contracts take advantage of this reform to increase their working hours and make their schedule more regular, probably to signal their willingness of working hard to their employer.¹⁰

5.2 Impact on fathers

In principle this reform might affect the employment decisions of both parents. Therefore, to identify all the implications of this intervention, we also analyze fathers' response. As shown in table 2.16, we find no evidence that men's employment decisions are influenced by a change in their children's school schedule. This result is to be considered together with the fact that, among parents in employment, 76 percent of fathers worked on Wednesday before the introduction of this reform, against 56 percent of mothers. These numbers show that even in a country in which a high proportion of women participate in the labor market, a strict division of roles persists within households with children, and that institutional constraints bind only for women. As a consequence, removing barriers to work for women might play the double role of enhancing the attachment to the labor market, and of contributing to change

¹⁰ All these results are available upon request.

gender norms.

6 Discussion and conclusion

This paper studies women's employment decisions in a context where institutions limit their chances of having a regular working schedule. This setting allows us to bring several insights.

First, we observe that the possibility to adopt a flexible working schedule greatly hinges on the interplay between the cost of flexibility associated to women's occupation and their bargaining power at work.

Secondly, the relaxation of institutional constraints allows us to provide the first estimate of women's elasticity to the value of flexibility. In particular, we bring evidence that mothers take advantage of a fall in the value of flexibility to regularize their working schedule, especially if they work in occupations where the regular presence at work is particularly rewarded, such as mothers employed in managerial positions. Overall, this implies that women's demand for flexibility is clearly related to the presence of children, and to the persistence of traditional gender norms, while it does not depend on an intrinsic taste for it.

Third, this setting allows us to test whether women's own wage elasticity is low in a country characterized by high women's labor force participation. In this respect, we show that, on average, treated mothers do not increase total weekly hours of work in response to the implicit wage subsidy that comes together with the relaxation of institutional constraints. This may confirm that women's wage elasticity might indeed be weaker in countries with high female labor market participation rates, as an increasing number of studies suggest. However, we do not exclude that the wage subsidy implicit in the reform might simply be insufficient to trigger a substitution effect of work for leisure. Moreover, the fact that some municipalities chose to concentrate the extracurricular activities in a few days, rather than spread them along the week, might prevent mothers from taking advantage of them. Finally, at least in the first years of implementation, mothers might perceive the new extracurricular activities to be of low quality, when compared to the alternative after-school-care options. If this were the case,

their response might change as their perception or the actual quality of the new service offered improves.

To conclude, two considerations are worth mentioning. First, so far we do not find evidence that the reform affects women's wages. On the one hand, this might depend on the fact that on average we do not observe any increase in total hours of work. On the other hand, any financial reward for a more regular presence at work might take some time to materialize. In the same way, it is possible that a more regular working schedule will eventually affect the career path of mothers, by allowing them to perform more tasks and occupations, and by expanding their chances of receiving on-the-job training and promotions (Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor 1996). Clearly, we will keep on monitoring these potential long-term effects of the reform. Secondly, so far we are only considering how institutional constraints affect mothers' labor supply. However, the sudden availability of a larger pool of female employees willing to adopt a regular working schedule might also affect their co-workers and firms' decisions regarding the overall organization of the work environment. Upon the release of the appropriate data, it will be certainly important to study all these responses.


References

- BERTRAND, M. (2011): “New Perspectives on Gender,” in *Handbook of Labor Economics*, vol. 4, pp. 1543–1590. North Holland: Elsevier.
- BERTRAND, M., E. KAMENICA, AND J. PAN (2015): “Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(2), pp. 571–614.
- CASCIO, E. U. (2009): “Maternal Labor Supply and the Introduction of Kindergartens into American Public Schools,” *Journal of Human Resources*, 44(1), pp. 140–170.
- FERNANDEZ, R. (2011): “Does Culture Matter?,” in *Handbook of Social Economics*, pp. 481–510. North Holland: Elsevier.
- FERNANDEZ, R., A. FOGLI, AND C. OLIVETTI (2004): “Mothers and Sons: Preference Formation and Female Labor Force Dynamics,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pp. 1249–1299.
- FILER, R. K. (1985): “Male-Female Wage Differences: The Importance of Compensating Differentials,” *Industrial & Labor Relations Review*, 38(3), pp. 426–437.
- FITZPATRICK, M. D. (2010): “Preschoolers Enrolled and Mothers at Work? The Effects of Universal Prekindergarten,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 28(1), pp. 51–85.
- FLABBI, L., AND A. MORO (2012): “The Effect of Job Flexibility on Female Labor Market Outcomes: Estimates from a Search and Bargaining Model,” *Journal of Econometrics*, 168(1), pp. 81–95.
- FORTIN, N. M. (2005): “Gender Role Attitudes and the Labour-Market Outcomes of Women across OECD Countries,” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 21(3), pp. 416–438.
- GELBACH, J. B. (2002): “Public Schooling for Young Children and Maternal Labor Supply,” *American Economic Review*, pp. 307–322.
- GERSHUNY, J., AND K. FISHER (2013): “Multinational Time Use Study,” *Centre for Time Use Research*.
- GOLDIN, C. (2006): “The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family,” *American Economic Review*, 96(2), pp. 1–21.
- (2014): “A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter,” *American Economic Review*, 104(4), pp. 1091–1119.
- GOLDIN, C., AND L. F. KATZ (2011): “The Cost of Workplace Flexibility for High-Powered Professionals,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 638(1), pp. 45–67.
- (2016): “A Most Egalitarian Profession: Pharmacy and the Evolution of a Family-Friendly Occupation,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 34(3), pp. 705–746.
- GOUX, D., AND E. MAURIN (2010): “Public School Availability for Two-Year Olds and Mothers’ Labour Supply,” *Labour Economics*, 17(6), pp. 951–962.

- HAVNES, T., AND M. MOGSTAD (2011): “Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal Employment,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(11), pp. 1455–1465.
- KATZ, L. F., AND A. B. KRUEGER (2016): “The rise and nature of alternative work arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015,” Discussion paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- KLEVEN, H. J., C. LANDAIS, AND J. E. SOGAARD (2015): “Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark,” Discussion paper, London School of Economics.
- LANDERS, R. M., J. B. REBITZER, AND L. J. TAYLOR (1996): “Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms,” *American Economic Review*, pp. 329–348.
- MAS, A., AND A. PALLAIS (2016): “Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements,” Discussion paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- OECD (2016a): “Education at a Glance 2016,” .
- (2016b): “OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics 2016,” .
- OLIVETTI, C., AND B. PETRONGOLO (2017): “The economic consequences of family policies: lessons from a century of legislation in high-income countries,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(1), 205–230.
- WISWALL, M., AND B. ZAFAR (2016): “Preference for the Workplace, Investment in Human Capital, and Gender,” Staff Report No. 767, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

7 Tables and Figures


Figure 1: Time Use across European countries



Source: Multinomial Time Use Study, 1991-2010 averages.

Note: the figures report bar graphs representing the average number of minutes spent at work by, respectively, mothers with children younger than 12 years old, women without children and men, in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Working time includes paid work, paid work at home, second job, and travel to/from work. To highlight the peculiarity of the French case, we show separately the working time declared for Wednesday from that reported for the other days of the week. The graph is constructed using the 1991-2010 averages of the Multinational Time Use Survey. Finally, we report 95 percent-confidence intervals obtained from the estimation of a regression of the outcome of interest on the treated category, with standard errors clustered at the country level.


Figure 2: Childcare arrangements for children between 0 and 6 - 2002/2013



Source: CNAF survey on childcare arrangements.


Note: the figure shows which childcare arrangements families adopt to take care of their children when they are not in school on Wednesday prior to the introduction of the reform. The sample comprises 8461 parents with children aged 0 to 6 interviewed in 2002, 2007 and 2013 - prior to the introduction of the reform.

Figure 3: Gender wage gap by occupation in France, 2009-2013



Source: French Matched Employer-Employee data set, 2009-2013, and O*NET classification of occupations. Note: the figure presents the correlation between the within occupation wage difference between men and women and the measure of cost of flexibility borrowed from Goldin (2014). In detail, this index is an average of the standardized scores given to five factors, namely time pressure, frequency of decision making, structured versus unstructured work, contact with others, establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships. A detailed description of these characteristics and the score assigned to them is given in section 5.


Figure 4: Pre-reform period
 Proportion of women working on Wednesday by type of household



Source: French Labor force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: the figures report bar graphs representing the percentage of women working on Wednesday among mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven, on the left, and mothers whose youngest child is between twelve and fourteen on the right. In each graph, we consider separately women with at least a college degree from those without college degree. Within each of these two groups, we compare women whose educational level is strictly higher than their partner's one, labelled "High M Low M", with women whose educational level is at most equal to their partner's one, called "Low W High M". All figures refer to the pre-reform period and are further displayed in tables 2.4 and 2.5. On each bar we report 95 percent-confidence intervals. Finally, for each educational level, we indicate the results of T-tests for the difference in means between the two types of household.


Figure 5: Pre-reform period
Hours worked per week by type of household



Source: French Labor force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: the figures report bar graphs representing the average number of hours worked per week among mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven, on the left, and mothers whose youngest child is between twelve and fourteen on the right. In each graph, we consider separately women with at least a college degree from those without college degree. Within each of these two groups, we compare women whose educational level is strictly higher than their partner's one, labelled "High M Low M", with women whose educational level is at most equal to their partner's one, called "Low W High M". All figures refer to the pre-reform period and are further displayed in tables 2.4 and 2.5. On each bar we report 95 percent-confidence intervals. Finally, for each educational level, we indicate the results of T-tests for the difference in means between the two types of household.


Figure 6: Trends in mothers' labor supply measures by age of the youngest child



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: the graphs show the evolution of different measures of labor supply over the period 2009-2015. The sample is restricted to mothers whose youngest child is between the age of six and fourteen. We represent in red treated mothers, that is those whose youngest child is between six and eleven years old. Mothers whose youngest child is in middle school age, or control mothers, are represented in blue. The vertical bar named "A" corresponds to April 2013, when municipalities announce in which year they will introduce the reform. The bar called "I" corresponds to September 2013, when 20 percent of municipalities implement the reform. The bar labelled "I2" corresponds to September 2014, when the rest of of municipalities implement the reform.


Figure 7: Dynamic response to the reform



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: in this graph we report the dynamic response to the reform concerning the days worked per week. The coefficients are obtained from the estimation of regression 2 on the years 2013-2015. We also report 95-percent confidence intervals. The estimation sample includes all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen. The implementation dates I and I2 correspond to, respectively, the last quarter of 2013 and the last quarter of 2014.

Figure 8: Dynamic response to the reform



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: in this graph we report the dynamic response to the reform concerning the decision to work on Wednesday. The coefficients are obtained from the estimation of regression 2 on the years 2013-2015. We also report 95-percent confidence intervals. The estimation sample includes all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen. The implementation dates I and I2 correspond to, respectively, the last quarter of 2013 and the last quarter of 2014.

Table 2.1: **Descriptive statistics of mothers' characteristics by age of the youngest child**

	Youngest child aged between				
	0-1	2-5	6-11	12-14	15-18
Age	31.21 (5.26)	34.68 (5.47)	40.56 (5.26)	44.71 (4.58)	46.92 (4.21)
Married	0.92 (0.27)	0.87 (0.33)	0.81 (0.39)	0.79 (0.40)	0.79 (0.41)
Immigrant	0.16 (0.37)	0.15 (0.35)	0.12 (0.32)	0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.31)
College degree or more	0.43 (0.49)	0.40 (0.49)	0.35 (0.48)	0.29 (0.45)	0.26 (0.44)
No college degree	0.57 (0.49)	0.59 (0.49)	0.65 (0.48)	0.70 (0.46)	0.73 (0.44)
Number of children	1.93 (1.02)	2.02 (0.93)	1.95 (0.79)	1.52 (0.59)	1.11 (0.32)
Labor Force participation	0.63 (0.48)	0.79 (0.41)	0.86 (0.35)	0.87 (0.34)	0.85 (0.35)
Hours worked per week	34.09 (9.57)	33.87 (10.21)	34.38 (10.89)	34.88 (11.33)	35.09 (11.42)
Part-time work	0.36 (0.48)	0.37 (0.48)	0.36 (0.48)	0.34 (0.47)	0.31 (0.46)
Worked days	4.57 (0.91)	4.59 (0.91)	4.67 (0.90)	4.75 (0.89)	4.77 (0.90)
Work on Wednesday	0.49 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.57 (0.49)	0.65 (0.48)	0.68 (0.47)
Work on Thursday	0.60 (0.49)	0.71 (0.45)	0.74 (0.44)	0.75 (0.43)	0.74 (0.44)
N	53,326	82,354	92,437	42,342	33,963

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: the table presents summary statistics for mothers' characteristics, computed for each age-interval of their youngest child. The studied sample comprises all French mothers aged between 18 and 55 and interviewed in the FLFS before the implementation of the reform.

Table 2.2: **Descriptive statistics - Youngest child between 6-11**

	No college degree	<i>N</i>	College degree or more	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.72	42,936	4.57	28,784	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.34	42,936	35.95	28,784	0.00
Work on Wednesday	58.83	11,011	55.29	8,646	0.00
Part-time	38.49	42,936	31.38	28,784	0.00
	Non managerial occupations	<i>N</i>	Managerial occupations	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.66	61,787	4.65	9,933	0.24
Hours worked per week	33.76	61,787	38.29	9,933	0.00
Work on Wednesday	57.29	16,898	57.15	2,759	0.89
Part-time	37.05	61,787	26.87	9,933	0.00
	Low cost of flexibility	<i>N</i>	High cost of flexibility	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.70	9,150	4.62	8,337	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.78	9,150	35.67	8,337	0.00
Work on Wednesday	60.30	9,150	54.07	8,337	0.00
Part-time	41.22	9,150	28.84	8,337	0.00
	Firm size ≤ 20	<i>N</i>	Firm size >20	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.58	19,447	4.69	39,778	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.22	19,447	35.20	39,778	0.00
Work on Wednesday	54.09	8,289	59.53	9,427	0.00
Part-time	37.21	19,447	32.33	39,778	0.00
	Public sector	<i>N</i>	Private sector	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.49	19,642	4.67	45,986	0.00
Hours worked per week	34.38	19,642	33.38	45,986	0.00
Work on Wednesday	48.86	5,366	59.59	12,551	0.00
Part-time	35.00	19,642	37.57	45,986	0.00

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: this table reports pre-reform statistics regarding several measures of labor supply for mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven. In the last column of the table, for each outcome considered, we report the p-value of the T-tests for the difference in means between the two groups.

Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics - Youngest child between 12-14

	No college degree	<i>N</i>	College degree or more	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.79	22,777	4.67	11,051	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.82	22,777	37.09	11,051	0.06
Work on Wednesday	65.68	6,116	63.81	3,443	0.00
Part-time	37.17	22,777	27.00	11,051	0.00
	Non managerial occupations	<i>N</i>	Managerial occupations	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.74	29,334	4.77	4,494	0.03
Hours worked per week	34.16	29,334	39.64	4,494	0.00
Work on Wednesday	64.70	8,288	66.95	1,271	0.11
Part-time	35.67	29,334	21.94	4,494	0.00
	Low cost of flexibility	<i>N</i>	High cost of flexibility	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.81	4,680	4.72	3,767	0.00
Hours worked per week	34.45	4,680	36.11	3,767	0.00
Work on Wednesday	66.88	4,680	63.25	3,767	0.00
Part-time	38.18	4,680	27.97	3,767	0.00
	Firm size ≤ 20	<i>N</i>	Firm size >20	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.67	9,052	4.77	18,968	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.46	9,052	35.57	18,968	0.00
Work on Wednesday	63.01	3,996	66.37	4,580	0.00
Part-time	36.41	9,052	30.31	18,968	0.00
	Public sector	<i>N</i>	Private sector	<i>N</i>	P-value T-test
Days worked per week	4.63	9,323	4.72	21,636	0.00
Hours worked per week	34.97	9,323	33.60	21,636	0.00
Work on Wednesday	56.16	2,692	67.80	6,106	0.00
Part-time	30.50	9,323	37.04	21,636	0.00

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: this table reports pre-reform statistics regarding several measures of labor supply for mothers whose youngest child is between twelve and fourteen. In the last column of the table, for each outcome considered, we report the p-value of the T-tests for the difference in means between the two groups.

Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics by type of household - Youngest child between 6-11

	Low W High M	N	High W Low M	N	P-value T-test
College degree or more					
Days worked per week	4.49	11,193	4.62	12,756	0.00
Hours worked per week	35.63	11,214	35.96	12,780	0.01
Work on Wednesday	52.31	3,355	56.59	3,944	0.00
Part-time	36.66	11,247	30.26	12,817	0.00
No college degree					
Days worked per week	4.70	23,550	4.74	10,473	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.27	23,828	33.96	10,532	0.00
Work on Wednesday	58.52	5,959	58.98	2,796	0.68
Part-time	40.58	24,095	36.58	10,618	0.00
High cost of flexibility					
Days worked per week	4.62	3,685	4.60	3,318	0.24
Hours worked per week	35.72	3,685	35.71	3,318	0.97
Work on Wednesday	51.97	3,685	55.30	3,318	0.01
Part-time	31.11	3,700	27.60	3,330	0.00
Low cost of flexibility					
Days worked per week	4.68	4,550	4.73	2,781	0.04
Hours worked per week	33.46	4,551	35.14	2,781	0.00
Work on Wednesday	60.03	4,551	59.94	2,781	0.94
Part-time	44.59	4,609	37.54	2,800	0.00
Managerial occupations					
Days worked per week	4.57	5,098	4.74	3,161	0.00
Hours worked per week	37.24	5,100	39.25	3,163	0.00
Work on Wednesday	54.72	1,387	60.33	978	0.01
Part-time	33.89	5,114	21.25	3,167	0.00
Other occupations					
Days worked per week	4.65	29,656	4.66	20,075	0.13
Hours worked per week	33.47	29,953	34.40	20,156	0.00
Work on Wednesday	56.56	7,928	57.12	5,762	0.52
Part-time	40.26	30,243	34.99	20,281	0.00

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: this table reports pre-reform statistics regarding several measures of labor supply for mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven. For each category considered, being this education level, cost of flexibility at work or type of occupation held, we consider separately women whose educational level is strictly higher than their partner's one, labelled "High M Low M", and women whose educational level is at most equal to their partner's one, called "Low W High M". In the last column of the table, for each outcome considered, we report the p-value of the T-tests for the difference in means between the two types of household.

Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics by type of household - Youngest child between 12-14

	Low W High M	N	High W Low M	N	P-value T-test
College degree or more					
Days worked per week	4.60	4,198	4.69	4,608	0.00
Hours worked per week	36.91	4,202	36.88	4,612	0.92
Work on Wednesday	62.20	1,270	64.59	1,511	0.19
Part-time	33.47	4,213	27.13	4,641	0.00
No college degree					
Days worked per week	4.78	12,308	4.80	5,352	0.23
Hours worked per week	33.65	12,404	34.53	5,386	0.00
Work on Wednesday	64.72	3,336	67.90	1,411	0.04
Part-time	40.04	12,509	35.79	5,423	0.00
High cost of flexibility					
Days worked per week	4.68	1,653	4.75	1,329	0.04
Hours worked per week	35.95	1,653	36.45	1,329	0.14
Work on Wednesday	62.43	1,653	63.43	1,280	0.57
Part-time	33.23	1,658	25.39	1,335	0.00
Low cost of flexibility					
Days worked per week	4.78	2,438	4.86	1,268	0.02
Hours worked per week	33.94	2,438	35.49	1,268	0.00
Work on Wednesday	65.42	2,438	68.77	1,268	0.04
Part-time	40.80	2,461	37.73	1,280	0.07
Managerial occupations					
Days worked per week	4.73	2,185	4.78	1,345	0.07
Hours worked per week	39.41	2,186	39.58	1,345	0.64
Work on Wednesday	65.92	584	66.08	454	0.96
Part-time	26.99	2,190	20.46	1,345	0.07
Other occupations					
Days worked per week	4.74	14,327	4.74	8,616	0.53
Hours worked per week	33.73	14,426	35.00	8,654	0.00
Work on Wednesday	63.76	4,023	66.21	2,468	0.05
Part-time	40.11	14,539	33.57	8,717	0.00

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: this table reports pre-reform statistics regarding several measures of labor supply for mothers whose youngest child is between twelve and fourteen. For each category considered, being this education level, cost of flexibility at work or type of occupation held, we consider separately women whose educational level is strictly higher than their partner's one, labelled "High M Low M", and women whose educational level is at most equal to their partner's one, called "Low W High M". In the last column of the table, for each outcome considered, we report the p-value of the T-tests for the difference in means between the two types of household.

Table 2.6: **Childcare options - monthly cost**

		Cost of a nursery		Cost of a FT baby sitter	
		Gross wage of both parents (in euros)			
		2800	5600	2800	5600
		(2*minimum wage)		(2*minimum wage)	
Number of children	1	295	342	747	747
	2	246	428	747	747
	3	197	513	747	747

Source: *Crèches de France, Casamape.*

Note: the table provides an estimate of monthly childcare costs by type of service, number of children, and household income, as at 2013.

Table 2.7: Labor supply response to the reform - Youngest child between 6 and 11

	(1) Labor force participation	(2) Part-time	(3) Hours worked per week	(4) Days worked per week
Treatment	0.003 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.010)	0.190 (0.228)	0.048** (0.019)
Ygst child btw 6-11	-0.015*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.007)	-0.794*** (0.156)	-0.093*** (0.012)
Observations	168821	132684	132684	132684
Adjusted R^2	0.148	0.131	0.139	0.123
F	34.91	19.65	22.87	10.15
Pre-treatment means	85.75	35.64	34.39	4.616

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The different columns refer to the outcome considered, being respectively labor force participation, column 1, the decision to work part-time, column 2, number of hours worked per week, column 3, and number of days worked per week, column 4. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household. The estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen years old. In column 2, 3, 4, and 5 we only consider mothers who are employed at the time of the interview.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.8: Labor supply response to the reform - Days of the week - Youngest child between 6 and 11

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Treatment	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.027*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.003 (0.005)
Ygst child btw 6-11	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.067*** (0.000)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.005)
Observations	56382	56382	56382	56382	56382	56382	56382
Adjusted R^2	0.053	0.060	0.071	0.058	0.056	0.100	0.082
F	20.97	39.53	25.96	24.59	22.46	16.75	4.41
Pre-treatment means	69.97	76.91	57.27	74.07	74.18	20.67	7.61

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2013-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The different columns refer to the outcome considered, corresponding to probability of working each day of the week. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household. The estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen years old who are employed at the time of the interview. As the French Labor Force Survey starts including questions on the allocation of working time along the week only in 2013, the sample considered here only comprises women interviewed between 2013 and 2015.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.9: **Decision to work on Wednesday - Changing the definition of the treated groups**

	6-14	7-14	8-14	9-14	10-14
Treated group 6-11	0.027*** (0.009)				
Treated group 7-11		0.025*** (0.010)			
Treated group 8-11			0.023** (0.010)		
Treated group 9-11				0.020* (0.011)	
Treated group 10-11					0.026* (0.011)
Observations	56382	49753	43399	37085	30831
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.075	0.082	0.089	0.095
F	25.96	22.65	19.46	17.32	13.49

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform on the probability of working on Wednesday. They are obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The first column reports the coefficient of the main specification, where the estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between 6 and 14 years old. From column 2 onward, we progressively restrict the control group. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.10: **Decision to work on Wednesday - Changing the definition of the control groups**

	6-13	6-14	6-15	6-16	6-17
Treatment vs 12-13	0.020** (0.010)				
Treatment vs 12-14		0.027*** (0.009)			
Treatment vs 12-15			0.030*** (0.008)		
Treatment vs 12-16				0.028*** (0.008)	
Treatment vs 12-17					0.031*** (0.008)
Observations	50246	56382	62177	67876	73138
Adjusted R^2	0.073	0.071	0.069	0.066	0.064
F	23.37	25.96	30.02	33.85	37.28

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform on the decision to work on Wednesday. They are obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The first column reports the coefficient of the main specification, where the estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen years old. From column 2 onward, we progressively enlarge the control group. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.11: Days worked per week - Changing the definition of the treated groups

	6-14	7-14	8-14	9-14	10-14
Treated group 6-11	0.048** (0.019)				
Treated group 7-11		0.056*** (0.020)			
Treated group 8-11			0.056*** (0.021)		
Treated group 9-11				0.054** (0.023)	
Treated group 10-11					0.041 (0.027)
Observations	132684	116990	101657	86803	72130
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.130	0.141	0.154	0.169
F	10.15	9.39	7.94	6.27	4.92

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform on the number of days worked per week. They are obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The first column reports the coefficient of the main specification, where the estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between 6 and 14 years old. From column 2 onward, we progressively restrict the treatment group. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.12: Days worked per week - Changing the definition of the control groups

	6-13	6-14	6-15	6-16	6-17
Treatment vs 12-13	0.042** (0.021)				
Treatment vs 12-14		0.048** (0.019)			
Treatment vs 12-15			0.056*** (0.018)		
Treatment vs 12-16				0.055*** (0.017)	
Treatment vs 12-17					0.058*** (0.017)
Observations	118539	132684	146081	158955	167914
Adjusted R^2	0.128	0.123	0.117	0.111	0.107
F	8.82	10.15	10.90	11.98	12.38

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform on the number of days worked per week. They are obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The first column reports the coefficient of the main specification, where the estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen years old. From column 2 onward, we progressively enlarge the control group. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.13: Days worked per week - Placebo reforms

	Baseline	Placebo Jan 2013	Placebo Jan 2011	Placebo Mars 2010
Treatment	0.047** (0.019)			
Placebo reform		-0.014 (0.025)	0.026 (0.021)	0.033 (0.028)
Observations	132684	90761	61019	35744
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.157	0.192	0.219
F	10.15	10.45	10.20	8.59
Sample	2009-2015	2009-Sept 2013	2009-2011	2009-2010

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the impact of a series of placebo reforms on the number of days worked per week, for mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven. The first column reports the impact of the 2013 reform. In the second column, we exclude from the sample the post-treatment period and we pretend that the reform was implemented at the beginning of 2013. In the third column, we consider the period spanning between 2009 and 2011 and look at the effect of a placebo reform introduced in January 2011. Finally, in the last column, we restrict the sample to comprise only women interviewed between 2009 and 2010 and we pretend that the reform took place in January 2011.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.14: Impact of the reform by group of municipalities

	Days worked per week			Working on Wednesday		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All municipalities	2013 municipalities	2014 municipalities	All municipalities	2013 municipalities	2014 municipalities
Treatment	0.048** (0.019)	0.072* (0.038)	0.059** (0.026)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.042* (0.022)	0.035*** (0.012)
Observations	132684	29496	103188	56382	12305	44077
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.091	0.132	0.071	0.061	0.073
F	10.15	3.04	8.77	25.96	7.05	20.69

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the impact of the reform on the number of days worked per week and on the decision to work on Wednesday, for mothers whose youngest child is between six and eleven. Columns (1) and (4) report the baseline results for all municipalities. Columns (2) and (5) display the impact of the reform on mothers living in municipalities that implement it in Septembre 2013. Columns (3) and (6) show the effect of this intervention on mothers living in municipalities that postponed its introduction to September 2014.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2.15: Labor supply response to the reform by subgroup

	Days worked per week		Working on Wednesday		Hours worked per week		Part-time	
	Estimate	Pre-treatment mean	Estimate	Pre-treatment mean	Estimate	Pre-treatment mean	Estimate	Pre-treatment mean
Panel A. Educational level								
No college degree	0.025 (0.024)	4.72	0.021* (0.012)	0.552	-0.026 (0.302)	33.95	-0.006 (0.013)	0.384
College degree or more	0.067** (0.028)	4.57	0.031** (0.014)	0.588	0.503 (0.355)	35.95	-0.027* (0.015)	0.313
P-value difference	0.256		0.604		0.258		0.295	
N	132,684		56,382		132,684		132,684	
Panel B. Cost of flexibility								
Low cost of flexibility	0.039 (0.031)	4.70	0.029** (0.013)	0.602	0.318 (0.407)	33.78	-0.037** (0.017)	0.412
High cost of flexibility	0.055* (0.030)	4.62	0.029** (0.014)	0.541	0.006 (0.361)	35.68	0.022 (0.016)	0.284
P-value difference	0.716		0.998		0.580		0.018	
N	49,927		49,927		49,927		49,927	
Panel C. Type of occupations								
Non managerial occupations	0.0375* (0.021)	4.66	0.024** (0.009)	0.572	0.140 (0.241)	33.76	-0.009 (0.010)	0.370
Managerial occupations	0.108*** (0.037)	4.65	0.036* (0.019)	0.571	0.790 (0.481)	38.29	-0.050*** (0.019)	0.268
P-value difference	0.07		0.580		0.199		0.044	
N	132,684		56,382		132,684		132,684	

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: the table reports the impact of the reform on labor supply decisions of different subgroups. To conduct this analysis, we chose to estimate a regression on the entire sample in which all regressors are interacted with the subgroups considered, except for municipality fixed effects. Otherwise, all regressions include the standard covariates, namely age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household. We also checked that the effect of the treatment was statistically different across the subgroups considered. For each subgroup, we present the coefficient of the treatment interacted with the subgroup considered, as well as the P-value of difference of the impact of the treatment across the two subgroups. Finally, we provide the pre-treatment mean of each outcome for the each subgroup considered in each panel. The analysis by cost of flexibility can only be conducted from 2013 onwards.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.16: Fathers' labor supply response to the reform - Youngest child between 6 and 11


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Labor force participation	Part-time	Hours worked per week per week	Days worked per week	Work on Wednesday
Treatment	-0.009 (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.025 (0.242)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.003 (0.007)
Ygst child btw 6-11	-0.003 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.499*** (0.161)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.020* (0.006)
Observations	134000	121771	121771	121771	51810
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.161	0.097	0.131	0.056
F	8.06	4.23	15.04	2.73	27.81
Pre-treatment means	95.81	3.92	42.14	5.06	77.67

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform, obtained from the estimation of regression 1 on fathers. The different columns refer to the outcome considered, being, respectively, labor force participation, column 1, the decision to work part-time, column 2, number of hours worked per week, column 3, number of days worked per week, column 4 and decision to work on Wednesday, column 5. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household. The estimation sample comprises all fathers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen years old. In column 2, 3, 4, and 5 we consider only fathers who are employed at the time of the interview. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8 Appendix


Figure 9: Trends in mothers' labor supply measures by age of the youngest child



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: the graphs show the evolution of different measures of labor supply over the period 2009-2015. The sample is restricted to mothers whose youngest child is between the age of six and fourteen. We represent in red treated mothers, that is those whose youngest child is between six and eleven years old. Mothers whose youngest child is in middle school age, or control mothers, are represented in blue. The vertical bar labelled "A" corresponds to April 2013, when municipalities announce in which year they will introduce the reform. The bar called "I" corresponds to September 2013, when 20 percent of municipalities implement the reform. The bar named "I2" corresponds to September 2014, when the rest of municipalities implement the reform.


Figure 10: Trends in mothers' labor supply measures across different municipalities



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: the graphs show the evolution of three labor supply measures between 2009 and 2015, for mothers whose youngest child is between two and eleven years old. We compare mothers living in municipalities that introduce the reform in 2013, in red, to those living in municipalities that postpone the implementation of the reform to 2014, in blue. The labor supply measures we consider are labor force participation, the number of hours worked per week, the number of days worked per week and the decision to work on Wednesday. The vertical bar labelled "A" corresponds to April 2013, when municipalities announce in which year they will introduce the reform. The bar called "I" corresponds to September 2013, when 20 percent of municipalities implement the reform. The bar named "I2" corresponds to September 2014, when the rest of municipalities implement the reform.


Figure 11: Pre-reform period - Women's employment decisions by type of household - Youngest child between 12-18



Source: French Labor force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: the figures report bar graphs representing the percentage of women working on Wednesday and the average number of hours worked per week among mothers whose youngest child is between twelve and eighteen. In each graph, we consider separately women with at least a college degree from those without college degree. Within each of these two groups, we compare women whose educational level is strictly higher than their partner's one, labelled "High M Low M", with women whose educational level is at most equal to their partner's one, called "Low W High M". All figures refer to the pre-reform period and are further displayed in table 2.17. On each bar we report 95 percent-confidence intervals. Finally, for each educational level, we indicate the results of T-tests for the difference in means between the two types of household.


Figure 12: Dynamic response to the reform



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: in this graph we report the dynamic response to the reform concerning the hours worked per week. The coefficients are obtained from the estimation of regression 2 on the years 2013-2015. We also report 95-percent confidence intervals. The estimation sample includes all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen. The implementation dates I and I2 correspond to, respectively, the last quarter of 2013 and the last quarter of 2014.

Figure 13: Dynamic response to the reform



Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: in this graph we report the dynamic response to the reform concerning the decision to work part-time. The coefficients are obtained from the estimation of regression 2 on the years 2013-2015. We also report 95-percent confidence intervals. The estimation sample includes all mothers whose youngest child is between six and fourteen. The implementation dates I and I2 correspond to, respectively, the last quarter of 2013 and the last quarter of 2014.

Table 2.17: Descriptive statistics by type of household - Youngest child between 12-18

	Low W High M	N	High W Low M	N	P-value T-test
College degree or more					
Days worked per week	4.58	5,915	4.68	6,475	0.00
Hours worked per week	36.88	5,920	36.83	6,488	0.83
Work on Wednesday	63.23	2,192	64.72	2,659	0.28
Part-time	32.77	5,933	26.21	6,516	0.00
No college degree					
Days worked per week	4.79	19,511	4.81	8,364	0.03
Hours worked per week	33.84	19,666	34.51	8,417	0.00
Work on Wednesday	65.95	6,388	69.88	2,732	0.00
Part-time	38.31	19,840	33.97	8,470	0.00
High cost of flexibility					
Days worked per week	4.69	3,028	4.78	2,439	0.00
Hours worked per week	36.30	3,028	36.91	2,439	0.02
Work on Wednesday	64.89	3,028	64.66	2,439	0.86
Part-time	32.74	3,042	23.60	2,445	0.00
Low cost of flexibility					
Days worked per week	4.76	4,510	4.89	2,337	0.00
Hours worked per week	33.64	4,511	35.70	2,337	0.00
Work on Wednesday	66.13	4,511	70.52	2,337	0.00
Part-time	40.17	4,556	34.44	2,355	0.00
Managerial occupations					
Days worked per week	4.72	3,685	4.78	2,387	0.00
Hours worked per week	39.44	3,687	39.71	2,388	0.34
Work on Wednesday	67.22	1,092	67.55	795	0.88
Part-time	25.70	3,693	19.14	2,393	0.00
Other occupations					
Days worked per week	4.74	26,014	4.76	15,192	0.02
Hours worked per week	33.86	26,172	34.95	15,257	0.00
Work on Wednesday	64.98	7,490	67.30	4,596	0.01
Part-time	38.56	26,388	32.34	15,349	0.00

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2014.

Note: this table reports pre-reform statistics regarding several measures of labor supply for mothers whose youngest child is between twelve and eighteen. For each category considered, being this education level, cost of flexibility at work or type of occupation held, we consider separately women whose educational level is strictly higher than their partner's one, labelled "High M Low M", and women whose educational level is at most equal to their partner's one, called "Low W High M". In the last column of the table, for each outcome considered, we report the p-value of the T-tests for the difference in means between the two types of household.

Table 2.18: Labor supply response to the reform - Youngest child between 2 and 11

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Labor force participation	Part-time	Hours worked per week	Days worked per week	Working on Wednesday
Treatment	0.005 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.057 (0.186)	0.020 (0.015)	0.0261*** (0.007)
Youngest child btw 2-11	-0.015*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.006)	-0.773*** (0.145)	-0.095*** (0.011)	-0.0664*** (0.008)
Observations	308137	221064	221064	221064	93544
Adjusted R^2	0.195	0.099	0.108	0.094	0.060
F	131.51	34.93	36.35	25.89	50.93

Source: French Labor Force Survey 2009-2015.

Note: this table shows the coefficients capturing the effect of the reform, obtained from the estimation of regression 1. The different columns refer to the outcome considered, being, respectively, labor force participation, column 1, the decision to work part-time, column 2, number of hours per week, column 3, number of days worked per week, column 4, and decision to work on Wednesday, column 5. All regressions include age and age square, marital status, number of children, a dummy for immigration status, municipality and wave fixed effects, dummies for the level of education, and a dummy for the presence of other members in the household. The estimation sample comprises all mothers whose youngest child is between two and fourteen years old. In column 2, 3, 4, and 5 we only consider mothers who are employed at the time of the interview.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.