The Economic–Cultural Trade-Off in Attitudes toward Immigrants*

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(Latest version)

Abstract

Many countries use economic criteria in immigration policies, yet public attitudes also respond to cultural concerns. Can higher economic contributions compensate for cultural distance in public attitudes toward immigrants? To answer this question, we conduct an online experiment in the UK using a multiple price list design. Respondents require an immigrant from a culturally distant country to earn, on average, 57% more than an immigrant from a culturally close country before supporting their application for permanent residence. This number is reduced to 16% when participants learn that the distant-origin immigrant personally holds UK-typical views. Therefore, much of the initial disadvantage reflects assumptions about immigrants' personal views inferred from their cultural origin. Incentivised tasks involving actual immigrants show similar patterns. Exploring mechanisms, we find that disclosing UK-typical views reduces cultural concerns, whereas higher income does not systematically change beliefs about an immigrant's personal views. Our findings suggest that higher earnings can offset the disadvantage associated with cultural distance at sufficiently high levels. Communicating information on shared values directly addresses cultural concerns that are difficult to alleviate through economic criteria alone.

JEL Codes: J15, F22, D83, Z13.
Keywords: Cultural Distance, Immigration, Public Attitudes, Immigration Policy.

1 Introduction

Countries differ in the emphasis they place on economic and cultural considerations in immigration policy. While the United Kingdom and the United States place considerable emphasis on economic criteria, many continental European countries also require immigrants to make a formal commitment to respecting core cultural values (OECD 2024). How do these considerations interact in

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shaping public attitudes toward immigrants? Understanding this interaction matters because public attitudes shape not only support for immigration policies but also how immigrants are treated in the host society, with implications for their social and economic integration (Fouka 2022).

Using data from 21 European countries, Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) find that cultural concerns are more strongly associated with attitudes toward immigration than economic concerns. Building on this literature, we examine whether, and to what extent, immigrants' economic contributions can compensate for cultural distance between their countries of origin and the host country. Specifically, do individuals require greater economic contributions from immigrants coming from culturally distant countries? If so, one possible explanation is that individuals use immigrants' countries of origin to infer their personal values. We therefore ask whether the additional economic contribution required changes when individuals learn that an immigrant from a culturally distant country personally holds views aligned with those prevalent in the host country.

Studying the economic versus cultural trade-off is challenging using observational data. Possible confounding between immigrants' economic and cultural characteristics makes it difficult to isolate their roles in shaping public attitudes toward immigrants. Moreover, individuals may hold inaccurate beliefs about immigrants' characteristics. For example, Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2023) document that individuals perceive immigrants as economically weaker and more culturally distant than they actually are. To address these challenges, we conduct an experiment that systematically varies descriptions of immigrants' economic and cultural characteristics while controlling for other factors. This design allows us to quantify the extent to which economic contributions can compensate for cultural distance and how this trade-off changes when respondents receive information about immigrants' personal views.

Our study takes place in the UK, where immigration features prominently in public and political debate, with concerns centring on its economic and cultural impacts (Dustmann, Kastis, and Preston 2024). The post-Brexit shift toward non-EU immigration and the use of economic criteria in immigration policy make the UK a particularly relevant setting for studying how these considerations interact.[1] We conduct the experiment with an online sample of 1,063 UK-born adults, representative in terms of age, gender and political affiliation.

We operationalise cultural distance using three questions from the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al. 2022). These questions include whether men should have priority over women when jobs are

[1]For immigration trends, see the Office for National Statistics, *Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025*. For salary requirements, see House of Commons Library, *Changes to legal migration rules for family and work visas in 2024*.

scarce, whether one's own religion is the only acceptable religion, and whether the army should take over when the government is incompetent. We select these questions because they capture distinct social and political values and show the largest gaps in average standardised responses between the UK and major countries of origin among immigrants to the UK. Each respondent is randomly assigned one of the three questions and compares two hypothetical immigrants who qualify for permanent residence. We describe cultural distance through vignettes: for the assigned question, the distant-origin immigrant comes from a country where the typical response is "Agree", while the close-origin immigrant comes from a country where the typical response is "Disagree", as in the UK. We omit country names to prevent unobserved associations with particular origins. We focus on immigrants who are legally resident in the UK and use male immigrant profiles to avoid conflating cultural distance with humanitarian concerns about women facing discrimination in their countries of origin. Education, criminal record and English-language proficiency are held constant across the close- and distant-origin immigrants.

The close-origin immigrant provides a fixed benchmark across conditions, always holding the UK-typical view on the assigned question and earning £40,000 annually, close to median annual earnings in the UK at the time. We randomly assign respondents to a baseline condition, with no information about the distant-origin immigrant's personal view, or to a disclosure condition, in which they learn that he holds the UK-typical view. For example, in the gender-roles vignette, the distant-origin immigrant comes from a country where the typical view is that men should have priority when jobs are scarce, but respondents in the disclosure condition learn that he personally disagrees.

To make the link between income and economic contribution explicit, we explain that higher earnings generate higher tax payments to fund public services and that both immigrants comply fully with tax rules. Respondents then complete a multiple price list (MPL) (Jack, McDermott, and Sautmann 2022), choosing which immigrant they would prefer to see receive permanent residence as the distant-origin immigrant's income rises from half to more than twice the fixed close-origin benchmark. Respondents can select either immigrant or both, with the latter indicating indifference. These choices yield an estimated *switch point*: the income threshold at which a respondent becomes willing to select the distant-origin immigrant. Although we impose no monotonicity restrictions, over 95% of respondents exhibit choice patterns consistent with weak monotonicity.

At baseline, 40.5% of respondents never select the distant-origin immigrant, even when he earns more than twice the close-origin benchmark. Learning that he holds the UK-typical view reduces

this share to 16.1%. Disclosure therefore makes many more respondents willing to select the distant-origin immigrant at some income level. With boundary responses coded just outside the offered range, the average baseline switch point is £62,996, placing it above the 85th percentile of UK employee earnings. This implies that respondents require an additional £22,996 in annual income to offset cultural distance relative to the £40,000 benchmark. Disclosing that the immigrant holds the UK-typical view reduces this required income difference to £6,486 per year, a decline of 71.8%. The remaining difference may reflect beliefs about other unobserved characteristics, consistent with statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972; Bohren, Haggag, Imas, and Pope 2025), or intrinsic preferences over origin, consistent with taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957). While we cannot separate these residual sources, the results demonstrate that learning about a single shared view removes most of the initial disadvantage.

These patterns extend beyond hypothetical survey choices to incentivised decisions involving actual immigrants. We conduct two incentivised tasks, each with a pair of immigrant participants whose backgrounds match the vignette profiles and whose incomes are similar. In one task, respondents allocate a monetary bonus between them; in the other, they choose who receives contact details for an immigration lawyer assisting with permanent residence applications. Learning that the distant-origin participant holds the UK-typical view shifts both decisions toward that participant, increasing his share of the monetary bonus by 8.2 percentage points and the probability of receiving the lawyer's contact details by 14.9 percentage points. Moreover, respondents who require higher additional income in the hypothetical vignettes allocate significantly less bonus money to the distant-origin participant and are less likely to select him to receive the lawyer's contact details. The trade-offs documented in hypothetical choices therefore predict consequential behaviour with real stakes.

We find little evidence that higher earnings substitute for information about the immigrant's personal view. Respondents may interpret higher earnings as a signal that the distant-origin immigrant holds UK-typical views or would integrate more easily. If so, learning that he holds the UK-typical view on the assigned question should matter less as his income rises. However, disclosing this view increases the share of respondents selecting him at every offered income level. The effect of this disclosure on selection does not systematically diminish as his income rises, suggesting that higher earnings do not substitute for direct information about his personal view. Supplementary survey questions show little evidence that higher earnings change respondents' beliefs about his views upon arrival in the UK or his ease of integration. These findings suggest that higher earn-

ings can offset the disadvantage associated with cultural distance without substantially altering perceptions of cultural compatibility.

What changes, then, when respondents learn the immigrant's current view? At baseline, respondents assign an average probability of 68.5% that the distant-origin immigrant holds the view typical of his origin country, and approximately half cite cultural damage or extremism as their primary concern. Learning that he currently holds the UK-typical view reduces the share citing these concerns by 18.5 percentage points and improves expectations about the immigrant's future integration. We find little evidence that disclosure changes perceptions of the immigrant's origin. In both conditions, respondents most frequently associate him with the Middle East or Muslim-majority countries, suggesting that disclosure primarily changes beliefs about the individual rather than his origin.

Disclosing the distant-origin immigrant's UK-typical view lowers required income across political and demographic groups, although partisan differences persist. At baseline, the additional income required to select the distant-origin immigrant is positive across all political affiliations, but highest among Conservative and Reform UK supporters. After disclosure, the Conservative–Labour difference is no longer statistically significant, but Reform UK supporters still require approximately £14,500 more than Labour supporters. This remaining gap does not appear to be explained by respondents' own answers to the cultural questions. Reform UK supporters, on average, hold views closer to those prevalent in the distant-origin countries than Labour supporters do. Moreover, controlling for respondents' own views leaves the partisan gap largely unchanged. The remaining gap therefore likely reflects concerns beyond the specific cultural view disclosed. The response to disclosure is also broadly similar across age, gender and education groups. We also find little evidence that it varies systematically with the immigrant share in respondents' current living or birth areas.

Higher earnings could matter because they correlate with skills and fiscal contributions, or because they change an immigrant's competition with the respondent in the labour market. We find little evidence for the second channel. Personal labour-market competition does not appear to drive respondents' choices, consistent with evidence that sociotropic concerns can dominate (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Respondents do not become systematically less willing to select the distant-origin immigrant when his income is close to their own, as job-competition concerns would predict. Switch points also vary little with respondents' income, employment status or employment in industries with high immigrant shares. The main findings remain robust to alternative switch-point

definitions, different treatments of censored responses and the exclusion of irregular choices. Follow-up experiments also reproduce the required income difference and its reduction when we remove references to taxes, reverse the income order or lower the benchmark income. Finally, excluding respondents whose open-ended explanations suggest possible experimenter demand leaves the effect of disclosing the UK-typical view largely unchanged.

These findings have implications for immigration policy. Many host countries, including the UK, use earnings thresholds in their immigration criteria. Our results suggest that higher earnings can offset the disadvantage associated with cultural distance, but only at very high levels, and without substantially changing perceptions of immigrants' personal values. In contrast, disclosing that a distant-origin immigrant holds the UK-typical view on a particular cultural question substantially reduces this disadvantage across political groups and income levels. These findings point to a potential role for communicating immigrants' personal views, alongside economic criteria, in shaping support for immigrants from culturally distant countries.

Related Literature. This paper contributes to three literatures. First, research on immigration attitudes examines the relative importance of economic and non-economic considerations, including cultural concerns. Cultural considerations often matter at least as much as economic ones (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Alesina and Tabellini 2024), and can sustain political opposition even when immigration brings economic benefits (Tabellini 2020). We contribute by quantifying how economic contributions and cultural distance interact in shaping attitudes toward immigrants, and the extent to which greater economic contributions can offset the disadvantage associated with cultural distance.

Second, a large experimental literature documents differences in support for immigrants across countries of origin, religion and cultural background (e.g., Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016; Christley and Zhirkov 2025; Aviña et al. 2026). Related studies use information treatments to correct misperceptions about immigrants as a group (e.g., Haaland and Roth 2020; Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal 2020; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023). We instead examine how information about an immigrant's personal views affects support while holding his cultural origin and the values prevailing there fixed. Furthermore, while conjoint experiments typically estimate average trade-offs between economic and cultural attributes, our multiple price list design directly elicits respondent-level measures of these trade-offs. This allows us to examine their distribution, including the share of individuals unwilling to select a culturally distant immigrant even at the highest income offered.

Third, we contribute to research on immigrant assimilation, which has examined observable behaviours such as language acquisition, choosing native-sounding names and intermarriage (e.g., Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2020; Fouka 2020; Gagliarducci and Tabellini 2025). We focus on less visible personal values and build on work examining how natives respond to immigrants' cultural similarity (Schachter 2016; Fouka 2022). Identifying this response is challenging in observational settings because immigrants' decisions to assimilate and native attitudes mutually reinforce one another (Jaschke, Sardoschau, and Tabellini 2025; Bisin and Tura 2026). We contribute by identifying how information about immigrants' personal views affects native support, distinguishing individual-level cultural similarity from the cultural distance associated with their origins.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, experimental design and outcome measures. Section 3 presents the findings, and Section 4 examines the mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.

2 Design and Data

2.1 Data Collection and Sample

We conducted the survey experiment in the UK in February 2025 using Prolific, a widely used platform for social science research (Peer et al. 2022). A total of 1,203 adult UK residents completed the survey. Following our pre-registration, we restrict the main analysis to the 1,063 respondents born in the UK and include respondents born abroad in the heterogeneity analysis. We classify UK residents as natives or immigrants according to whether they were born in the UK or abroad, consistent with the UK Census, the UK Labour Force Survey, and prior studies (Anderson and Blinder 2024; Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023; Dustmann, Kastis, and Preston 2024).

We recruited participants through Prolific's representative-sample procedure, which applies quotas for age, gender, and political affiliation.[2] Table 1 shows that the main analysis sample closely resembles the UK-born adult population in age, gender, employment status, and ethnicity, but contains a higher share of university graduates. Its political composition is broadly similar to voting intentions recorded before the July 2024 general election, although Labour and Conservative support is lower and Reform UK support is higher.[3] These differences are consistent with changes

[2]Prolific uses UK Census and Statista data to construct subgroups that approximate national population distributions among UK residents. At the time of the experiment, its political-affiliation quotas were based on Statista voting-intention data from July 2024, collected shortly before the UK general election. Details are available at `https://researcher-help.prolific.com/en/article/95c345`.

[3]The benchmarks are from YouGov's voting-intention tracker, which also underlies the Statista data used by

Table 1: Sample Characteristics and UK Population Benchmarks

Variable	**Sample Mean**	**UK Mean**
Age	47.8	50.2
	(15.5)	(19.0)
Female	0.51	0.51
Degree and above	0.51	0.35
Employment rate (aged 18–64)	0.76	0.77
White	0.93	0.94
Personal income (pre-tax, all sources)		
– Below £20K	0.36	0.39
– £20K–40K	0.41	0.39
– £40K–60K	0.15	0.13
– £60K and above	0.08	0.09
Party: Labour	0.37	0.39
Party: Conservative	0.18	0.22
Party: Reform UK	0.17	0.15
Observations	1,063	–

Notes: The table compares the natives sample with UK population benchmarks. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for continuous variables; p-values in brackets are from one-sample t-tests of the sample mean against the benchmark value, treating the latter as fixed. Demographic benchmarks are based on the Annual Population Survey (APS), January to December 2024 (Office for National Statistics 2025), restricted to individuals aged 18 and above who were born in the UK, to ensure comparability with our natives sample, and weighted using APS person weights. The employment rate refers to respondents aged 64 or below who work full time, work part time, or are self-employed, both in the sample and in the APS. Personal income is total gross income from all sources, compared in bands; the benchmark is the Family Resources Survey 2023–24 (Department for Work and Pensions 2026), restricted to UK-born adults aged 18 and above and weighted using the FRS grossing factors. Party benchmarks are based on YouGov's voting-intention survey of 3 July 2024.

in voting intentions between July 2024, when Prolific set the quotas, and February 2025, when we conducted the survey. We address the educational and political imbalances by reweighting the sample to match the latest available population distributions (Haaland and Roth 2020).

Survey attrition was 4%, and is not predicted by experimental assignment (Table A.1). The median completion time was 17.6 minutes and the mean was 19.3 minutes. Respondents received £2.70, consistent with Prolific's recommended hourly compensation at the time. Observable characteristics are balanced across experimental conditions and across assignments to cultural dimensions (Tables A.2 and A.3).

Prolific to set its political-affiliation quotas: `https://yougov.com/en-gb/trackers/voting-intention`.

2.2 Context

The composition of UK immigration changed substantially in the years preceding the experiment.[4] In the year ending December 2019, non-EU nationals accounted for approximately 47% of arrivals, compared with 44% for EU nationals. By the year ending December 2024, these shares had shifted to 77% and 9%, respectively. Total immigration also increased over this period. The change therefore involved not only higher immigration, but a pronounced shift in its origins. Most non-EU migrants came to study or work, and Indian and Pakistani nationals made up the largest non-EU groups.

Immigration was also highly politically salient at the time of the experiment. In February 2025, 45% of respondents to a YouGov survey named immigration among the most important issues facing the country, second only to the economy.[5] Respondents cited benefit claims, pressure on public services and housing, the admission of people with extremist views, and damage to British culture and traditions among their main concerns about immigration.[6]

In December 2023, the Conservative government announced an increase in the minimum earnings threshold for Skilled Worker visa sponsorship, from £26,200 to £38,700 per year. The subsequent Labour government implemented further salary increases to £41,700 in July 2025, and restricted eligible roles to degree-level positions, confining lower-skilled immigration to a tightly regulated shortage list.[7]

Together, these features describe the environment in which respondents formed their views: immigration from culturally distant origins had risen sharply, public concerns centred on its cultural and economic effects, and earnings thresholds were among the government's main instruments for selecting immigrants.

2.3 Design

The experiment combines a vignette-based multiple price list with belief elicitation and incentivised behavioural tasks to study how immigrants' cultural origins, economic contributions, and personal

[4] Migration figures in this paragraph are from the Office for National Statistics, *Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025.*

[5] The figure is from YouGov's weekly tracker of GB adults, which asks respondents to select up to three issues: `https://yougov.com/en-gb/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country`.

[6] This evidence is from YouGov's biannual tracker of GB adults, which asks respondents to select two or three main negative effects of immigration: `https://yougov.com/en-gb/trackers/what-are-the-main-negative-effects-of-immigration`.

[7] Details can be found in https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-changes-to-the-immigration-rules-hc-997-1-july-2025




Figure 1: Overview of the Survey Flow

Notes: Dashed boxes indicate stages at which respondents are randomly assigned with equal probability. Respondents proceed beyond the attention check only after answering correctly.

values shape immigration preferences. Figure 1 summarises the survey structure, and Appendix B provides the complete instructions.[8]

2.3.1 Eliciting Trade-offs between Cultural Origin and Economic Contribution

Definitions. We define culture as group-level beliefs and values, and cultural distance as a difference in the distribution of beliefs and values across groups (Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Fernández 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006). On a cultural dimension s—for example, attitudes to gender roles—an origin is culturally distant when these distributions differ and culturally close when they are similar. We treat an immigrant's personal beliefs and preferences as a draw from the origin-country distribution. An immigrant has *similar values* on dimension s when their values

[8] A complete replication of the survey experiment is available at `https://warwickecon.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a4VcrxiUkqf7CeO`.

resemble those typically held in the UK (for brevity, UK-typical values).

We operationalise these definitions using Wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey (WVS) (Haerpfer et al. 2022), restricting attention to items that measure broad social and political values rather than attitudes tied to particular national institutions or policies. From each of three modules—Social Values, Attitudes and Stereotypes; Religious Values; and Political Culture and Political Regimes—we select the item for which the UK mean differs most from that of at least one major country of origin among UK immigrants.[9] The selected items capture attitudes to:

- *Gender roles:* "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women."
- *Religion:* "The only acceptable religion is my religion."
- *Democracy:* "The army [should] take over when the government is incompetent."[10]

Figure A.1 compares the response distributions in the UK and in two major immigrant-origin countries. For each item, responses in the UK and the culturally close country tend to disagree, whereas responses in the culturally distant country tend to agree.

Vignette structure and randomisation. The vignettes present two hypothetical immigrants: Immigrant C, from a culturally close origin, and Immigrant D, from a culturally distant origin.[11] We hold their background characteristics constant. Both are unmarried men in their thirties, belong to the majority ethnic group in their origin country, entered the UK legally for work five years earlier, and are eligible to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR), the UK's permanent residence status. Both meet the residence and English-language requirements, have passed the knowledge-of-society test required for ILR, and have no criminal record. They also have the same education level, randomly assigned as either university-educated or not. By holding these characteristics constant, we limit differences in how respondents evaluate the two immigrants based on legal status, family circumstances, or education (Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023). Male profiles avoid conflating cultural distance with humanitarian concern for women facing discrimination in

[9] Responses are standardised using the UK mean and standard deviation. Based on the 2021 Census figures reported by Cuibus (2024), the ten largest countries of origin among UK immigrants are India, Poland, Pakistan, Romania, Ireland, Nigeria, Italy, Germany, Bangladesh, and South Africa. These figures describe the stock of foreign-born residents rather than recent migration flows. WVS Wave 7 does not cover Poland, Ireland, Italy, or South Africa.

[10] The item "Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws" produces a slightly larger cross-country gap in the Political Culture and Political Regimes module. We use the army-takeover statement to avoid introducing a second religious dimension.

[11] The experiment labels the profiles Immigrant A and Immigrant B; we use C and D in the paper for expositional clarity.

Table 2: Example Vignette: Gender Roles

	Distant Origin	**Close Origin**
Culture in country of birth	**Immigrant A**'s country of birth has significant cultural differences from the UK regarding gender roles. In his country of birth, the typical response to the statement "*Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce*" is "Agree", whereas in the UK, the typical response is "Disagree".	**Immigrant B**'s country of birth is culturally closer to the UK. In both his native country and the UK, the typical response to the statement "*Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce*" is "Disagree".
Personal values	*Unknown Values:* It is unknown what **Immigrant A**'s beliefs about this statement were at the time of his arrival. *Similar Values:* It is unknown what **Immigrant A**'s beliefs about this statement were at the time of his arrival. His current view aligns with the typical response in the UK and he disagrees with the statement.	**Immigrant B**'s beliefs have consistently aligned with this typical response, and he disagrees with the statement.

Notes: The table reproduces verbatim the vignette shown to respondents assigned to the gender-roles dimension, with emphasis as in the original. The experiment labelled the distant- and close-origin profiles Immigrant A and Immigrant B; the paper refers to them as Immigrant D and Immigrant C. The religion and democracy vignettes are identical except for the statement.

their origin countries (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016), and the age range matches that of male immigrants five years after arrival (Office for National Statistics 2025).

We randomly assign participants to one of the three cultural dimension. For the assigned dimension, the profiles describe each origin through its typical response to the corresponding WVS item. Immigrant C comes from an origin where the typical response is the same as in the UK. Immigrant D comes from an origin where it differs. Table 2 presents the gender-roles vignette; the religion and democracy vignettes follow the same structure and substitute the relevant statement.

We then randomly assign participants to the *Unknown Values* or *Similar Values* condition. We hold Immigrant C's profile fixed across conditions: respondents always learn that he comes from the culturally close origin and holds UK-typical values on the assigned dimension. This fully specified profile is the benchmark against which respondents evaluate Immigrant D. The treatment varies only the information about him. In the *Unknown Values* condition, respondents receive no information about Immigrant D's current values. In the *Similar Values* condition, they learn that he, too, holds UK-typical values on the assigned dimension. The difference between conditions therefore identifies the effect of revealing Immigrant D's values, holding everything else constant.

We focus on Immigrant D's values after five years in the UK, when he becomes eligible for permanent residence, and do not specify his values at arrival. We instead elicit respondents' beliefs about these initial values in follow-up questions, which allows us to examine whether respondents interpret his disclosed UK-typical values as reflecting pre-migration selection or post-migration change. We also omit country names to limit political, economic, and historical associations beyond the cultural dimension we vary, and later ask respondents which countries or regions they infer. Cultural-origin information may still shape perceptions of race or ethnicity, which may in turn affect the cultural premium. Because the vignettes describe each immigrant as belonging to the majority ethnic group of his origin country, however, perceived ethnicity can differ across conditions only if perceived origin does. Section 4 finds no evidence of such differences.

Multiple price list task. Following each vignette, respondents complete a multiple price list (MPL) with fifteen pairs of pre-tax annual incomes for Immigrants C and D (Jack, McDermott, and Sautmann 2022). We hold Immigrant C's income fixed at £40,000, close to both the median income of UK full-time workers and the Skilled Worker visa threshold at the time of the experiment (£38,700). We vary Immigrant D's income from £20,000, around the minimum salary then required for work-visa sponsorship, to £90,000, close to the 95$^{\text{th}}$ percentile of UK employee earnings, in £5,000 increments.[12]

Before respondents make their choices, we explain that income affects each immigrant's fiscal contribution. Higher income leads to higher tax payments, which fund public services. We also state that both immigrants comply fully with UK tax regulations. We then ask respondents, for each income pair, which immigrant they would prefer to remain in the UK, given that only one can stay. We clarify that selecting both indicates no preference between them. Figure 2 presents the interface. Respondents can choose freely in each row and can switch between options more than once. Since both immigrants already live in the UK, the choice concerns only who should remain, holding the number of immigrants fixed and limiting the role of concerns about overall immigration levels.

[12]Income percentiles are calculated using the ONS Earnings and Employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information dataset for December 2024, which covers payrolled UK employees. See `https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2024`. The government reports visa salary thresholds at `https://www.gov.uk/health-care-worker-visa/your-job` and `https://www.gov.uk/skilled-worker-visa`.




Figure 2: Screenshot of the MPL Design

Notes: In the experiment, Immigrants D and C were labelled A and B, respectively. The choice question reads: "Please review each scenario in the table below: Imagine only one immigrant could stay. Which one would you prefer to remain in the UK?", with the instruction that "Selecting both options means that you don't favour one over the other."

Constructing the income switch point. We construct each respondent's income switch point from their MPL choices, as the first income at which the respondent moves from not selecting Immigrant D to selecting him, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C. Following standard MPL practice, we measure the switch point as the midpoint of the income interval containing the first switch (Allcott and Kessler 2019; Guerreiro, Hazell, Lian, and Patterson 2025). When respondents never switch within the displayed range, we treat their switch points as censored and code them just outside the range (Morag and Loewenstein 2025; Bursztyn, Handel, Jiménez-Durán, and Roth 2025). In the robustness analysis, we vary both the definition of the switch point and the coding of censored observations.

Under our baseline definition, we calculate the income switch point, y^{SP}, as:

$$y^{SP} = \begin{cases} y_{\min} - 2{,}500, & \text{if the respondent selects } \mathbf{D}\text{, alone or jointly, in every row,} \\ \dfrac{y_{i_D} + y_{i_D-1}}{2}, & \text{if the respondent first selects } \mathbf{D}\text{, alone or jointly, at income } y_{i_D}\text{,} \\ y_{\max} + 2{,}500, & \text{if the respondent selects } \mathbf{C} \text{ alone in every row.} \end{cases}$$

Here, $y_{\min} = £20{,}000$ and $y_{\max} = £90{,}000$, and the MPL increases Immigrant D's income in £5,000 increments. For example, if a respondent selects Immigrant C at every income up to and including £50,000 and first selects Immigrant D at £55,000, their switch point is $y^{SP} = £52{,}500$.

For respondents who switch more than once—for example, from C to D and then back to C—we use the first switch in the main analysis (Exley 2016). Respondents who initially select Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with C, but later switch to C alone receive the same coding as those who always select D, with their first switch treated as occurring just below the lower bound of the MPL.[13] We examine robustness to excluding respondents with non-monotonic or multiple-switch choice sequences.

The cultural premium is the difference between the income switch point and Immigrant C's fixed income of £40,000. A positive premium indicates that Immigrant D must earn more than Immigrant C before the respondent selects him.

Attention and comprehension. Before viewing the vignettes, respondents complete an attention check and proceed only after answering correctly. After each vignette, they answer comprehension questions about the immigrants' background characteristics and cultural origins and must answer correctly before continuing. We also restate the relevant information in summary tables throughout the survey, particularly on the MPL page, to limit recall errors. After completing the MPL, respondents may revise their responses (Yu, Zhang, and Zuo 2021); we use their final choices in the analysis.[14]

2.3.2 Eliciting beliefs and concerns

We use follow-up questions to distinguish the beliefs and concerns underlying respondents' MPL choices. After completing the MPL task, respondents explain their decisions in an open-ended question. Holding both immigrants' incomes at £40,000, we then ask them to identify the main negative effect, if any, of having more immigrants like Immigrant D stay in the UK. The response options are adapted from a long-running tracker of the British public's concerns about immigration, and include pressure on public services, pressure on housing, job competition, damage to British culture and traditions, the admission of people with extremist views, and crime; respondents can instead report that such immigration has no negative effects.[15] We separately measure how respondents evaluate the vignette statement itself by asking whether the UK would become a better or worse

[13] Our pre-registration specified that the main analysis would focus on respondents who switch from Immigrant C at lower incomes to Immigrant D, alone or jointly, at higher incomes, or who maintain the same choice throughout. Assigning £17,500 to respondents who later switch back to C preserves the first-switch rule.

[14] Fewer than 3% of respondents revise their choices at this stage, and the results remain robust when we exclude them.

[15] See YouGov's tracker: `https://yougov.com/en-gb/trackers/what-are-the-main-negative-effects-of-immigration`.

place to live if more people agreed with the statement. At the end of the survey, respondents also report their own position on the statement.

A second set of questions elicits beliefs about Immigrant D's values and integration. Respondents report the view they believe he held when he first arrived in the UK, how difficult he would have found adjusting to life in the UK at that time, and how difficult they expect him to find adjusting in the future. Each adjustment question asks for a single overall rating and instructs respondents to consider aspects such as language proficiency, understanding of local customs, sense of belonging, and social interaction. These aspects correspond to the linguistic, navigational, psychological, and social dimensions of immigrant integration in Harder et al. (2018). We randomly assign Immigrant D an income of £20,000, £40,000, or £90,000 in these questions to examine whether income changes perceived values or integration prospects. In the *Unknown Values* condition, respondents additionally report their beliefs about Immigrant D's current values.

2.3.3 Incentivised real-stakes tasks

We use two incentivised tasks to test whether the vignette results extend to decisions with real consequences for immigrants. We recruit male immigrant Prolific users who have lived in the UK for at least five years, elicit their views on the three statements, and retain those whose cultural origin and personal views match one of the vignette profiles. Each task presents respondents with one close-origin and one distant-origin immigrant. The descriptions of cultural origin and personal values follow the vignettes and the information conditions. We also state that the two immigrants have similar incomes.

Legal support task. In the first task, respondents choose one of the two immigrants to receive contact details for qualified local immigration lawyers who help with applications for permanent residence. We truthfully inform respondents that both immigrants have expressed interest in receiving these contact details. Respondents can also choose not to answer. Among those who answer, we randomly select one respondent to receive a bonus worth approximately twice the participation payment. We also randomly select one response and implement it by sending the contact details to the selected immigrant.

Allocation task. In the second task, respondents allocate £5 between a new pair of immigrant participants. We ask them to choose among six unequal allocations: £5–£0, £4–£1, £3–£2, £2–£3,




Figure 3: Net Preference for the Distant-Origin Immigrant as a Function of Income

Notes: The figure plots net preference for Immigrant D at each income level, defined as the share choosing Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C, minus the share choosing Immigrant C alone. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. Immigrant C's income is fixed at £40,000, and responses are pooled across cultural dimensions.

£1–£4, and £0–£5, where the first amount goes to Immigrant C and the second to Immigrant D. Excluding an equal split provides a task-based justification for unequal allocations and reduces the image concerns that can distort side-by-side choices between individuals (Coffman, Exley, and Niederle 2021). Respondents can also choose not to answer. Among those who answer, we randomly select one respondent to receive a bonus and one response to implement.

3 Results

Figure 3 summarises the multiple price list choices. At each income level for Immigrant D, it plots the net preference for him: the share selecting Immigrant D, alone or jointly with Immigrant C, minus the share selecting Immigrant C alone. A value of zero indicates equal aggregate support for the two immigrants.

Net preference for Immigrant D rises with income in both conditions, showing that economic contribution partly offsets a culturally distant origin. At every income level, however, net preference for Immigrant D is higher in the *Similar Values* condition than in the *Unknown Values* condition. We use these choices to estimate the cultural premium and the extent to which information about Immigrant D's personal values changes it.

3.1 The Cultural Premium

We estimate the baseline cultural premium in the *Unknown Values* condition, where respondents observe Immigrant D's culturally distant origin but not his current personal values. Aggregate choices locate the income at which support for the two immigrants is equal; individual switch points then measure the premium. At income parity, net preference favours Immigrant C in the *Unknown Values* condition. Immigrant D becomes preferred on net only when his income reaches approximately £65,000, and 40.5% of respondents never select him, even at £90,000.

Each respondent completes the full price list, so we observe individual choice paths rather than only aggregate shares. Individual choices are overwhelmingly consistent with weak monotonicity: once respondents begin selecting Immigrant D, they rarely switch back. Overall, 95.11% of respondents make weakly monotone choices. Among the remaining respondents, 2.16% switch back once to Immigrant C, while 2.73% switch back and forth repeatedly, revealing little about their preferences (Table A.4). Since most respondents choose weakly monotonically, the income switch point captures each respondent's choice sequence almost completely. This is the lowest—and, in most cases, only—income at which they switch from Immigrant C alone to selecting Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C (Section 2).

In the *Unknown Values* condition, the mean switch point is £62,996. Since Immigrant C earns £40,000 throughout, respondents require Immigrant D to earn an additional £22,996, on average, before selecting him. This difference is the baseline cultural premium. The mean switch point exceeds the 85^{th} percentile of UK employee earnings at the time of the experiment, indicating that the premium is economically substantial.

Interpreting the cultural premium. To interpret the premium, we view each choice as a comparison: the respondent attaches a value to each immigrant's staying in the UK and selects the one with the higher value. She does not observe everything relevant to this assessment. In the *Unknown Values* condition, she sees Immigrant D's distant origin and his income, but not his current personal view. The value she attaches to his staying is therefore an *expected* valuation, formed from the characteristics shown and those she infers from them.

Income enters this valuation directly. As Immigrant D's income rises, so does the expected valuation of his staying; the switch point is the income at which this valuation first reaches that of Immigrant C's staying. The baseline cultural premium thus measures the origin disadvantage in income units: the additional income required to compensate for everything that a distant origin

changes in the respondent's assessment, relative to a close origin.

Appendix C formalises when the switch point admits this interpretation. The expected valuation of Immigrant D's staying must be continuous and non-decreasing in his income, and it must be lower than Immigrant C's when his income is sufficiently low and reach it when his income is sufficiently high. The choice patterns documented above are consistent with these conditions, as most respondents choose weakly monotonically. For respondents who never select Immigrant D within the displayed range, we treat the switch point as right-censored and code it just above the range (Section 2).

The premium itself is a bundle. A distant origin may lower the expected valuation because respondents dislike the origin in itself, or because they associate it with characteristics they value less. The baseline premium measures the combined effect of these channels.

A caveat in interpreting the baseline premium is that, in the *Unknown Values* condition, Immigrant C's UK-typical values are disclosed whereas Immigrant D's values are not. We retain this asymmetry to keep Immigrant C as a fixed benchmark and to ensure that the treatment varies only the information about Immigrant D. The baseline premium may therefore partly reflect Immigrant C's informational advantage. If respondents already infer UK-typical values from Immigrant C's close origin, the disclosure adds little, and the baseline premium approximates the premium when neither immigrant's values are disclosed. If instead the disclosure raises the expected valuation of Immigrant C's staying, the baseline premium also incorporates this increase. Because the disclosure is not varied, we cannot separate these components; Appendix C characterises the gap between the baseline premium and the premium under no disclosure for either immigrant. We expect this gap to be small: the culturally close origin countries in our vignettes exhibit a clear consensus in the direction of UK-typical values (Figure A.1), so the explicit disclosure plausibly adds little to what respondents already infer from Immigrant C's origin. Since Immigrant C's profile is fixed across information conditions, however, the asymmetry does not confound the treatment effect.

3.2 Information on Personal Values Reduces the Cultural Premium

In the *Unknown Values* condition, Immigrant D's current personal values are unspecified. Respondents must therefore form beliefs about them, potentially using his culturally distant origin as a signal. The *Similar Values* treatment instead reveals that Immigrant D holds values similar to those typically held in the UK. Because assignment is random and all other information remains unchanged, comparing the two conditions identifies how information about Immigrant D's values




Figure 4: Distribution of Income Switch Points

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of income switch points. Respondents who never select Immigrant D are assigned the censored value of £92,500; those who select him from the outset are assigned £17,500. Each bar reports the share of respondents in each experimental group with an income switch point in the corresponding category. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Responses are pooled across all cultural dimensions.

changes the income required for respondents to select him.

Figure 4 shows two changes in respondents' choices. First, revealing UK-typical values affects whether Immigrant D is selected at all. The share who never select him falls by 24.4 percentage points, to 16.1%, so more respondents select him somewhere in the MPL range. Second, it affects the income at which respondents first select him. A larger share of respondents in the *Similar Values* condition starts selecting Immigrant D at or below Immigrant C's income of £40,000. Overall, the distribution shifts significantly to the left in the *Similar Values* condition (Kolmogorov–Smirnov $D = 0.30, p < 0.001$).

Table 3 quantifies this shift. Revealing Immigrant D's UK-typical values lowers the mean switch point by £16,510 after controlling for respondent and vignette characteristics. Relative to the *Unknown Values* mean of £62,996, this implies a switch point of £46,486 and a cultural premium of £6,486, down from £22,996. Information about Immigrant D's values therefore removes 71.8% of the baseline premium, although a smaller premium remains.

The reduction in the cultural premium is consistent with respondents inferring Immigrant D's values from his origin when they are left unspecified. In a follow-up question, respondents in the *Unknown Values* condition assign an average probability of 68.5% that Immigrant D currently holds

Table 3: Value Similarity and Income Switch Point

	Income Switch Point (£)				
	Pooled		By Cultural Dimension		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Similar Values	-16,693***	-16,510***	-21,681***	-13,458***	-13,585***
	(1,588)	(1,529)	(2,598)	(2,672)	(2,791)
Sample	Pooled	Pooled	Gender Roles	Democracy	Religion
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,063	1,063	347	362	354
DV Mean	62,996	62,996	68,095	59,095	62,324

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates for the income switch point. Columns (1)–(2) pool all cultural dimensions; columns (3)–(5) estimate the effect separately by cultural dimension. *Similar Values* is an indicator equal to one when respondents are informed that Immigrant D's current values are similar to those typically held in the UK. *DV Mean* is the mean income switch point in the *Unknown Values* condition. Column (1) includes no controls. Columns (2)–(5) control for age and its square, gender, degree attainment, the logs of personal and household income, political orientation, labour-force status, ethnicity, having at least one parent born abroad, and the immigrants' assigned education in the vignette; the pooled specifications also include indicators for the assigned cultural dimension. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

the culturally distant view associated with his origin. Disclosing his UK-typical values removes much of the premium generated by this inference. Whether such inferences matter depends on how well origin actually predicts immigrants' current personal values. Immigrants' own responses in Wave 7 of the WVS shed light on this. Among UK residents born in countries whose typical response differs from the UK's, only 11% hold the view typical of their origin country (i.e., agree with the statement) on gender roles ($n = 94$), 14% on democracy ($n = 50$), and 28% on religion ($n = 96$). These samples are small, but the pattern aligns with broader evidence on misperceptions (Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023; Platt, Rasul, and Tiwari 2025). Natives may thus place too much weight on origin when inferring personal values. To the extent that the baseline premium reflects such inferences, immigrants whose personal values are unobserved—as in our *Unknown Values* condition—may be penalised for culturally distant values that natives attribute to them but that they do not hold.

Cultural premium across dimensions. Across all three dimensions of cultural difference, respondents require a premium to select Immigrant D when his personal values are unknown. In the *Unknown Values* condition, the baseline premiums for democracy and religion are similar, while the premium for gender roles is largest: the mean switch point is approximately £9,000 higher than for democracy (Table A.5). Gender roles is also the dimension in which respondents view the

culturally distant position as most harmful to UK society (Figure A.2).[16] The pattern suggests that natives may require a larger cultural premium when the values they infer from an immigrant's origin are perceived to carry greater social costs.

Information about Immigrant D's values reduces the switch point in every dimension. A positive premium remains in all three, but does not differ significantly across them (Table A.5). This suggests that, once respondents know Immigrant D holds the UK-typical view, the remaining premium reflects considerations common across dimensions rather than dimension-specific concerns. The reduction in all three dimensions also supports the external validity of the information effect across cultural issues.

Interpreting the treatment effect. The treatment effect measures, in income units, how learning that Immigrant D currently holds UK-typical values changes the expected valuation of his staying. In each condition, the switch point is the income at which this valuation first reaches Immigrant C's. The difference between the two switch points therefore reflects the additional income required when Immigrant D's values are inferred from his origin rather than disclosed.[17] Under the assumption that the disclosure leaves the expected valuation of Immigrant C's staying unchanged, this additional income is £16,510.

Interpreting the residual premium. When respondents learn Immigrant D's values, they still require him to earn £6,486 more than Immigrant C on average before selecting him ($p < 0.001$ against a premium of zero). The residual premium may reflect both beliefs and preferences. Because we disclose Immigrant D's view on only one cultural dimension, respondents may still form unfavourable beliefs about his other values and characteristics from his origin; they may also hold intrinsic preferences over origin itself. Our design does not distinguish between these channels. The residual premium is, however, systematically related to respondents' remaining concerns: within the *Similar Values* condition, those whose cultural and integration concerns persist after the disclosure also require the largest premiums (Section 4).

Income as a signal of cultural characteristics. The MPL design allows us to express the effect of disclosing Immigrant D's personal values in income units, as the difference between the switch points across the two conditions. This interpretation requires that income affects the valuation

[16] This need not imply that respondents value gender equality more than democracy; they may view the democracy statement as less consequential given existing UK institutions.


[17] Appendix C formalises this interpretation.

of Immigrant D's staying only through expected economic contribution, without also changing the cultural characteristics respondents infer from the information provided. However, income may also carry cultural information. For example, respondents may associate a higher income with greater education and hence expect less conservative values (Meyer 2017), or perceive higher-earning immigrants as more familiar with UK norms and customs.

If respondents read higher income as a signal of cultural characteristics they regard favourably, their valuation of Immigrant D's staying at a given income is higher than it would be if income carried no cultural information. Income then partially substitutes for learning that he holds UK-typical values, reducing the premium in the *Unknown Values* condition and decreasing the switch-point difference. The estimated effect is therefore a lower bound on the valuation gain from the disclosure, measured in income units (Appendix C). If higher income instead signals values less typical of the UK, the reverse holds and the estimate is an upper bound. If income carries no cultural signal, the switch-point difference identifies this gain exactly.

We provide three pieces of evidence that income operates primarily through economic contribution rather than as a systematic signal of personal values. First, Figure 3 shows approximately parallel income gradients across the two information conditions at incomes above parity. If higher income signalled greater value similarity, it would partly substitute for direct information about Immigrant D's values. The income gradient would then be steeper in the *Unknown Values* condition, and the gap between the two curves would narrow as income rises. Instead, information about Immigrant D's UK-typical values shifts support for him upward without materially changing the income gradient (joint test above income parity: $p = 0.19$; Figure A.3). This pattern is consistent with income and personal-value information affecting the valuation of Immigrant D's staying through separate channels.

Second, follow-up questions provide little evidence that Immigrant D's income shifts beliefs about his cultural characteristics. In these questions, we randomly assign Immigrant D an income of £20,000, £40,000, or £90,000 and elicit beliefs about his values and ease of integration at arrival. At every income level, respondents place his initial values closer to those of his origin country than to UK-typical values in both conditions, with responses at £90,000 nearly identical to those at £20,000. Perceived ease of integration upon arrival also remains close to "difficult" at all three levels. A related possibility is that income signals educational attainment, which respondents may associate with similar values. However, randomly describing both immigrants as holding a university degree in the vignettes has no statistically significant effect on the income switch point



(a) Perceived Initial Values

(b) Perceived Ease of Integration

Figure 5: Perceived Initial Values and Ease of Integration, by Assigned Income

Notes: Panel (a) reports mean responses to the question asking respondents what they believed Immigrant D's view on the vignette statement was when he first arrived in the UK. Responses range from (1) to (5), with higher values indicating views closer to the UK-typical position. Panel (b) reports mean responses to the question asking how easy it would have been for Immigrant D to adjust to life in the UK upon arrival. Responses range from *very difficult* (1) to *very easy* (5). For both questions, Immigrant D is randomly assigned an income of £20,000, £40,000, or £90,000. Means are reported separately by assigned income and experimental group, pooling across cultural dimensions. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.


and does not significantly alter the effect of the *Similar Values* treatment (Table A.6).

Finally, respondents' open-ended explanations of their MPL choices (N = 1,063) rarely treat income as a signal of personal values. Fewer than 2.5% link income to cultural or social traits, such as inferring that a higher-earning Immigrant D is less likely to hold distant values.[18]

Assimilation or immigrant selection. In the *Similar Values* condition, respondents learn Immigrant D's current values, five years after his arrival, but not his values at arrival. The information therefore admits two interpretations. Respondents may read it as evidence of pre-migration selection: immigrants whose values already resemble those prevalent in the host country are more likely to migrate there, so similarity precedes arrival (Bazzi and Fiszbein 2025). Alternatively, they may read it as evidence of post-migration assimilation: immigrants shedding their origin country's culture and adopting the practices of the host society (Harder et al. 2018), so that similarity emerges after migration.

Figure 6 pools responses across Immigrant D's three assigned income levels and compares beliefs about his values and integration upon arrival between the two information conditions. Selection

[18]Responses were coded independently by hand and by GPT-5.1 using the same binary codebook, following Haaland, Roth, Stantcheva, and Wohlfart (2025). The manual coding flags 16 respondents and GPT-5.1 flags 25. Appendix D reports the coding instructions, prompt, and agreement statistics.



(a) Perceived Initial Values


(b) Perceived Ease of Integration

Figure 6: Distribution of Beliefs about Distant-Origin Immigrant upon Arrival

Notes: Panel (a) presents the distribution of responses to the question asking respondents what they believed Immigrant D's view on the vignette statement was when he first arrived in the UK. Panel (b) presents the distribution of responses to the question asking how easy it would have been for Immigrant D to adjust to life in the UK upon arrival. For both questions, Immigrant D is randomly assigned an income of £20,000, £40,000, or £90,000. Responses are pooled across income levels and cultural dimensions. Bars report the share of respondents in each experimental group giving each response; vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

predicts more UK-typical initial values and easier integration in the *Similar Values* condition, whereas assimilation predicts little change in his perceived starting point. The evidence points mainly towards assimilation. Revealing similar values produces only a modest shift in beliefs about Immigrant D's initial values: the mean rises from 2.41 to 2.63 ($p < 0.01$), but the modal response remains origin-typical and most responses remain below the midpoint. Similarly, perceived ease of integration does not differ significantly between the two conditions. Mean responses are 2.06 and 2.10 in the *Unknown* and *Similar Values* conditions, respectively, and nearly 80% in both conditions expect integration to have been difficult or very difficult.

These results capture respondents' beliefs, not whether immigrants actually assimilate. Existing evidence finds both persistence and convergence toward host-country values, with substantial variation across cultural traits (Manning and Georgiadis 2012; Abramitzky and Boustan 2017; Fernández 2011). While this literature largely asks whether and how far immigrants' values converge, our results speak to whether such convergence increases natives' acceptance of immigrants. Because respondents largely interpret Immigrant D's current UK-typical values as acquired after migration, the lower cultural premium in the *Similar Values* condition suggests that natives respond positively to what they perceive as cultural assimilation.



(a) Legal Support Task

(b) Allocation Task

Figure 7: Distribution of Responses in Behavioural Measures


Notes: Panel 7a shows the distribution of responses to the legal support decision task. Panel 7b shows the distribution of the share of the £5 allocated to the distant-origin immigrant. Bars report the share of respondents in each experimental group giving each response; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Allocation choices range from £0 to £5 sent to the distant-origin immigrant, in £1 increments; the horizontal axis reports the share of the bonus sent to him. Responses are pooled across all cultural dimensions.

3.3 Real-Stakes Outcomes

We complement the MPL with two incentivised measures of support involving actual immigrant participants whose origins correspond to the vignette descriptions and whose incomes are similar (Section 2). Respondents choose which immigrant receives information about qualified local immigration lawyers and how to divide a £5 bonus between them. Figure 7 presents the response distributions.

Panel 7a shows that the *Similar Values* condition shifts legal support from Immigrant C toward Immigrant D, while also modestly increasing the share providing no answer. We summarise these choices using an index equal to 0 for Immigrant C, 0.5 for no answer, and 1 for Immigrant D. The mean index is 0.28 in the *Unknown Values* condition and rises by 0.15 points in the *Similar Values* condition ($p < 0.01$; Table A.7). Panel 7b shows a similar shift in the allocation task. With no-answer responses assigned the neutral allocation of £2.50, the mean amount allocated to Immigrant D increases from £1.79 in the *Unknown Values* condition to £2.21 in the *Similar Values* condition ($p < 0.01$; Table A.7). Both results are robust to alternative coding of no-answer responses and alternative specifications (Table A.8).

Figure 8 shows a clear correspondence between incentivised choices and MPL switch points. Respondents who send the legal information to Immigrant D have lower switch points than those who send it to Immigrant C. Similarly, respondents who allocate a higher share to Immigrant D have



(a) Legal Support Task

(b) Allocation Task

Figure 8: Average Income Switch Point and Behavioural Measures

Notes: The figure shows the relationship between the average income switch point and responses in the legal support task (left) and the allocation task (right), within each experimental group. In the legal support task, the x-axis equals 1 if respondents selected the distant-origin immigrant to receive the legal information, 0.5 if they preferred not to answer, and 0 if they selected the close-origin immigrant. In the allocation task, the x-axis represents the amount (out of £5) allocated to the distant-origin immigrant, with £2.5 assigned to respondents who preferred not to answer. Allocation responses are winsorised at £3. The points show the mean switch point by response category, and the vertical error bars show 95% confidence intervals for those means. The fitted curves show locally estimated scatterplot smoothing (LOESS) fits based on the respondent-level observations, and the shaded areas indicate the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

lower switch points. Together, these patterns indicate that the hypothetical choices summarised by the income switch point carry over to real-stakes decisions.

3.4 Robustness

We examine whether the estimated reduction in the income switch point depends on its construction, the treatment of censored observations, irregular choice sequences or response revisions, aggregation of the MPL responses, or differences between our sample and the UK population.

Table A.9 first varies the construction of the switch point. Columns (1) and (2) change the values assigned to responses censored at the lower and upper ends of the MPL. Column (1) assigns respondents who always select Immigrant D the 5^{th} percentile of UK employee earnings, while Column (2) assigns respondents who never select Immigrant D the 99^{th} percentile. Both changes increase the estimated effect in absolute value. Column (3) instead defines the switch point as the first income at which a respondent selects Immigrant D alone, excluding joint selection with Immigrant C. The estimate becomes smaller but remains statistically significant in the pooled

sample and for each cultural dimension. This attenuation is expected because the stricter definition ignores movements from selecting Immigrant C alone to selecting both immigrants, which occur disproportionately in the *Similar Values* condition.[19]

Columns (4) and (5) address censoring and interval measurement directly. Column (4) estimates a Tobit model with censoring at the limits of the displayed income range. Column (5) uses interval regression, assigning each respondent to the income interval containing the switch rather than imputing its midpoint. Both estimators imply a reduction of approximately £25,000, larger than the baseline estimate. They also imply a larger baseline premium: the estimated mean switch point in the *Unknown Values* condition is approximately £70,700, implying a baseline cultural premium of roughly £30,700 rather than £22,996. The censored midpoint coding is therefore conservative for both the baseline premium and the treatment effect. Columns (6) and (7) then exclude respondents with non-monotonic or multiple-switch sequences and those who revised their initial choices, respectively. The resulting estimates remain close to the baseline.

Figure A.3 presents choice-level estimates using the underlying MPL responses. At each income level, we estimate the effect of the *Similar Values* condition on the probability of selecting Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C. The effect is positive throughout the income range, rises sharply around income parity, and remains large and stable at higher incomes. These choice-level estimates corroborate the switch-point results across the full MPL.

Finally, the estimates are robust to reweighting the sample to match the UK population, using the joint distributions of gender and party support, age and party support, and age, gender, and degree status.[20] Table A.10 reports pooled estimates ranging from $-£16{,}290$ to $-£14{,}799$, all of which remain statistically significant. The estimates are also stable across weighting schemes within each cultural dimension, indicating that observable differences between our sample and the UK population do not drive the results.

[19] Selecting both immigrants is common: across the full multiple price list, 28.1% of respondents in the *Unknown Values* condition and 42.9% in the *Similar Values* condition select both at least once. Among respondents who never select Immigrant D alone, 24.8% in the *Unknown Values* condition and 57.6% in the *Similar Values* condition select both immigrants at some income level. The baseline definition records these choices as switches, whereas the stricter definition treats them as right-censored.

[20] Available population data do not report the joint distribution of age, gender, and party support. We therefore construct separate gender–party and age–party weights rather than imposing assumptions about their three-way association.

3.5 Heterogeneity

We next ask how the cultural premium and the response to information about Immigrant D's values vary across respondents. We consider four dimensions: respondents' own values, political affiliation, local immigrant exposure in their current and birth areas, and their ethnic and immigration backgrounds. We then turn to demographic characteristics.

Natives' personal values. How do respondents' own views affect the premium they require of the distant-origin immigrant? After the MPL task, respondents report their views on the vignette statement. Most hold the UK-typical position: 66% strongly disagree with the statement, 22% disagree, 8% are neutral, and 4% agree or strongly agree. Mean responses are nearly identical in the *Unknown Values* and *Similar Values* conditions (4.47 vs. 4.50 on the five-point scale, $p = 0.63$).

Column (1) of Table A.11 reports estimates relative to respondents who disagree, the omitted category, controlling for the same characteristics as in Table 3. Under *Unknown Values*, those who strongly disagree have switch points £7,814 higher, while those who agree or are neutral do not differ significantly. The *Similar Values* condition lowers switch points by £9,044 among those who disagree and by an additional £11,171 among those who strongly disagree. Respondents whose views conflict most strongly with the position associated with Immigrant D's origin thus impose the largest baseline premium and respond most to the disclosure of his UK-typical view. In the *Similar Values* condition, switch points no longer differ statistically across respondents' own views. This suggests that the residual premium is not primarily driven by disagreement over the particular view described in the vignettes.

Political affiliation. Political affiliation is among the strongest individual correlates of attitudes toward minorities (Platt, Rasul, and Tiwari 2025; Alesina, Ferroni, and Stantcheva 2021). We examine how the cultural premium varies across supporters of major parties in the UK and whether disclosing Immigrant D's personal values narrows these differences.

Figure 9 shows a positive cultural premium for every party group under *Unknown Values*. The premium increases across party supporters from the left to the right of the political spectrum.[21] After controlling for individual characteristics, including age and education, and relative to Labour

[21] Using a scale from –3 (very left-wing) to +3 (very right-wing) to measure respondents' self-reported political position, the mean positions are –1.83 among Green Party supporters, –1.28 among Labour supporters, –0.84 among Liberal Democrat supporters, 0.99 among Conservative supporters, and 1.28 among Reform UK supporters. For an overview of party positions on the UK political spectrum, see YouGov: yougov.co.uk/articles/52080.




Figure 9: Income Switch Points by Party Support

Notes: The figure presents mean income switch points, pooled across all cultural dimensions, by respondent's self-reported party affiliation and experimental group; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The figure omits 30 respondents (2.8%) who support the SNP, 8 (0.8%) who select "Other", and 47 (4.4%) who do not report a party affiliation.

supporters, the premium is £10,016 lower for Green Party supporters, £10,259 higher for Conservatives, and £16,194 higher for Reform UK supporters. The difference between Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters is not statistically significant (Table A.11, Column 2).

Under *Similar Values*, mean switch points fall significantly in every party group; the size of the decline is statistically similar to that for Labour supporters in every case. The Conservative–Labour difference under *Unknown Values* is no longer statistically significant once Immigrant D's similar values are disclosed. Not all baseline differences disappear, however. For Reform UK, the party furthest to the right in our analysis, the gap relative to Labour remains significant at £14,557 (Table A.11, Column 2).

Reform UK supporters have the largest baseline cultural premium even though they are less personally opposed to the culturally distant position than Labour supporters. The share who disagree or strongly disagree is 76% among Reform UK supporters, compared with 92% among Labour supporters. An explanation based on respondents' own values would therefore predict smaller premiums for Reform UK supporters. Instead, their switch points are substantially higher. Controlling for respondents' own positions does not change the partisan gap (Table A.11, Column 4), nor does allowing the treatment effect to vary with every observed characteristic (Column 5). The remaining partisan gap is thus consistent with beliefs and preferences that extend beyond the specific view

we disclose.

Geographic exposure and immigration background. The cultural premium may vary with respondents' prior exposure to immigration. Table A.12 considers two forms of exposure: (i) being born or living in an area with more immigrants and (ii) having personal or parental immigration experience. Contact with immigrants can shape immigration attitudes (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm 2019; Bursztyn, Chaney, Hassan, and Rao 2024; Achard et al. 2025), while immigration experience may affect both beliefs about immigrants and preferences over origin.

Geographic exposure appears to play little role in either the premium or the response to disclosure. We compare respondents whose current or birth areas have above- and below-average shares of residents born in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia. These are the regions respondents most often associate with Immigrant D (Figure A.5), and the most culturally distant from the UK on our vignette dimensions. Mean switch points are statistically indistinguishable across the groups in both conditions. Greater local exposure to immigration from these regions therefore shows no detectable association with either a smaller baseline cultural premium or a different response to value disclosure.

The second form of exposure is personal or parental immigration experience. Column (3) classifies UK-born respondents by ethnicity and parental immigration background, with White respondents without immigrant parents as the omitted category. Under *Unknown Values*, White respondents with immigrant parents have similar switch points to this group, while non-White respondents have lower switch points regardless of parental background—although the difference is statistically significant only for those with immigrant parents. Expanding the sample to include respondents born outside the UK (Column 4, with White UK-born respondents as the omitted category) yields a clearer pattern: White immigrants resemble White UK-born respondents, while non-White respondents have lower switch points whether they are UK-born or immigrants. The baseline cultural premium therefore varies more with ethnicity than with geographic, personal, or parental exposure to immigration. These gaps largely disappear once Immigrant D's values are disclosed, suggesting that they operate through the inferences respondents draw when his values are unknown. These subgroups are small, however, so the estimates are exploratory.

Other characteristics. Switch points do not vary significantly with respondent gender under either information condition (Table A.13). Respondents with a university degree have switch points

£6,160 lower under *Unknown Values*, in line with evidence that more educated individuals hold more favourable attitudes toward immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Their response to the disclosure is statistically indistinguishable from that of respondents without a degree; the education gap therefore persists under *Similar Values*. In the *Unknown Values* condition, switch points rise by £1,945 per decade of age, and the response to disclosure strengthens by £2,681 per decade, so that no age difference remains statistically significant under *Similar Values*. The information effect is therefore not confined to particular demographic groups, and where it differs—by age—it is stronger precisely where the baseline premium is larger.

4 Mechanisms

Respondents require a substantial premium to select the culturally distant-origin immigrant when his values are unknown, and information about a single shared view removes most of it. This section examines the mechanisms behind these results. The premium is closely tied to the perceived social costs of the culturally distant values themselves: respondents regard these values as harmful to UK society, appear to infer from a distant origin that Immigrant D is likely to hold them, and require the largest premiums when they perceive the greatest harm. Consistent with this, respondents in the *Unknown Values* condition more often cite cultural than economic concerns as the main negative effect of admitting such immigrants, in contrast with the long-standing emphasis on jobs, wages, and public services in explaining opposition to immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006). The disclosure of UK-typical values reduces these concerns and improves expectations about future integration. We find little evidence that the results are driven by changes in perceived origin, labour-market competition, features of the experimental design, or experimenter demand.

4.1 Cultural Concerns and Expected Integration

Culturally distant values are perceived as socially harmful. Respondents regard the culturally distant positions in the vignettes as harmful to UK society. When asked whether the UK would become a better or worse place if more people agreed with the vignette statement, large majorities in every cultural dimension report that it would become worse: 90% for gender roles, 82% for religion, and 74% for democracy (Figure A.2). Importantly, the question makes no reference to immigrants, and responses do not differ significantly across the two conditions. Respondents therefore object to the wider prevalence of these values regardless of who holds them.

If the cultural premium reflects, at least in part, concerns about the values themselves, it should be largest among respondents who consider those values most harmful—and information about Immigrant D's values should matter most for them. Both predictions hold. Under *Unknown Values*, respondents who expect the UK to become a much worse place require Immigrant D to earn substantially more than other respondents do (Table A.14). Disclosing Immigrant D's values lowers switch points most strongly for this group, so that under *Similar Values* perceived harm no longer predicts the switch point. In the *Unknown Values* condition, respondents may infer—correctly or otherwise—from Immigrant D's distant origin that he holds the view typical in his origin country and attach its perceived social costs to his staying. This inference maps directly into the premium: the quarter of respondents most convinced that Immigrant D holds the culturally distant view associated with his origin (average believed probability: 94%) require a premium 2.4 times that of the least convinced quarter (average belief: 39%)—£33,000 versus £14,000.[22]

Concerns are primarily cultural, and the disclosure reduces them. We next ask what form this perceived harm takes when such views are associated with immigrants. Respondents identify the main negative effect, if any, of having more immigrants like Immigrant D stay in the UK, choosing from a menu of cultural, economic, and other potential harms.

In the *Unknown Values* condition, 51.5% cite a cultural concern, either damage to British culture and traditions or the admission of people with extreme views or terrorist sympathies. By comparison, 21.2% cite an economic concern related to public services, housing, or wage and job competition, while 20.6% report no negative effects (Figure 10; Table A.15). Learning that Immigrant D holds UK-typical values reduces the share citing a cultural concern by 18.5 percentage points. At the same time, the share citing an economic concern rises by 14.3 percentage points, while the share reporting no negative effects rises by 6.1 percentage points. Because respondents report only their primary concern, the increase in economic concerns likely reflects their greater relative importance once cultural concerns recede, rather than an increase in perceived economic costs. Moreover, since the question asks about the consequences if more immigrants like Immigrant D stayed in the UK, respondents may be reacting to the scale of immigration rather than the economic effects of any single immigrant staying.

Respondents in the *Similar Values* condition who nevertheless cite a cultural concern have an

[22]We sort respondents in the *Unknown Values* condition into quartiles of their reported probability that Immigrant D currently holds the culturally distant view associated with his origin, and compute the mean premium (switch point minus £40,000) within the top and bottom quartiles. Premiums are rounded to the nearest £1,000. The sample-average belief is 68.5%; see Section 3.




Figure 10: Distribution of Concerns About Having More Immigrants Similar to Immigrant D

Notes: Respondents identify the main negative effect if more immigrants similar to the distant-origin immigrant described in the vignette were to stay in the UK. Bars report the share of respondents within each experimental group selecting each category; vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The response options are: (1) increasing the pressure and demand for public services, (2) reducing wages by undercutting British workers/taking jobs from British workers, (3) damaging Britain's own culture and traditions, (4) allowing in people with extreme views or terrorist sympathies, (5) increasing the pressure and demand for housing, (6) increasing the level of crime, (7) none of these — there are no negative effects from such immigration, (8) other. The survey presents the response options in random order. These categories are adapted from: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/what-are-the-main-negative-effects-of-immigration.

average income switch point approximately £25,100 higher than those who do not. Thus, larger premiums are observed among respondents whose cultural concerns persist despite the disclosure. Since the treatment reveals information only about the view presented in the vignette, these respondents may continue to infer differences along other cultural dimensions and have broader concerns about Immigrant D's integration prospects.

Similar values improve expected future integration. Respondents also treat value similarity as evidence that Immigrant D will integrate more easily into UK society. On a five-point scale from *very difficult* to *very easy*, revealing UK-typical values reduces the share expecting Immigrant D to find adjusting to life in the UK difficult from 46.2% to 28.8% and raises the mean response from 2.56 to 2.97 (Figure A.4). Within the *Similar Values* condition, respondents who cite a cultural concern are also 26.3 percentage points more likely to expect future integration to be difficult. Together, these results suggest that personal values also serve as signals of broader integration into UK society. However, similarity on a single view need not fully offset the wider cultural and integration concerns respondents infer from Immigrant D's origin, leaving a residual premium in

the *Similar Values* condition.

4.2 Other Potential Mechanisms

Perceived country of origin. Our interpretation assumes that the treatment changes beliefs about Immigrant D's personal values while leaving his perceived origin unchanged. Because his country is not named, however, respondents could interpret UK-typical values as evidence that he comes from a culturally closer country. In that case, the treatment effect would reflect a change in Immigrant D's perceived origin, and possibly his race, rather than a response to the values themselves.

We ask respondents which country or region they believe Immigrant D comes from. The Middle East is the most frequently reported region in both experimental conditions, and the overall distributions are similar (Figure A.5).[23] Perceived origin therefore appears unchanged, and since the vignette describes Immigrant D as belonging to the majority ethnic group in his origin country, the treatment is also unlikely to change his perceived race.

Labour-market competition. Respondents may interpret income not only as economic contribution but also as an indicator of whether Immigrant D competes for jobs similar to their own. If so, support for Immigrant D should fall when his income approaches the respondent's income and recover as it moves beyond that range.

We find no such pattern. Immigrant D is no less likely to be selected when his income lies within £10,000 of the respondent's income. Choice reversals are rare (Tables A.16 and A.4). Switch points also do not vary systematically with respondents' income, employment status, or employment in industries with high immigrant shares under either condition. Personal labour-market competition therefore appears to play a limited role. These findings align with evidence that immigration attitudes are driven more by sociotropic concerns about the host country's cultural and economic conditions than by personal economic circumstances (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Framing effects. We test whether the results depend on three features of the design. Follow-up experiments (i) remove references to taxes, which may frame income as economic contribution; (ii) reverse the MPL order so that Immigrant D's income falls from £90,000 to £20,000; and (iii)

[23] We manually code the countries and regions named by respondents. When a response mentions multiple locations, we code each separately; responses containing no identifiable geographic location are excluded. The figure reports locations mentioned by at least 10 respondents.

reduce Immigrant C's fixed income from £40,000 to £20,000, changing the original benchmark (Jack, McDermott, and Sautmann 2022).[24] Each design reproduces the cultural premium and the effect of disclosing similar values (Table A.17). The findings are therefore unlikely to depend on tax framing, menu order, or Immigrant C's income benchmark.

Experimenter demand effects. Experimenter demand could bias the treatment effect if respondents in the *Similar Values* condition infer that the researchers expect them to favour Immigrant D. The design limits this possibility in two ways. First, responses are anonymous, which can reduce experimenter demand and social-desirability concerns (de Quidt, Vesterlund, and Wilson 2019; Bursztyn, Haaland, Röver, and Roth 2025). We explicitly remind respondents of this anonymity and tell them that their responses will contribute to independent academic research. Second, the treatment is between subjects. Each respondent observes only one version of Immigrant D and therefore cannot observe the experimental variation in his values or the comparison underlying our hypothesis.

We nevertheless test directly for demand effects in the data. First, we assess whether respondents infer the study's hypothesis. At the end of the survey, we ask them to identify its purpose, following Haaland, Roth, Stantcheva, and Wohlfart (2025). Only 31 respondents (2.9%) fully or partially identify the hypothesis that information about Immigrant D's values affects choices.[25] Excluding them leaves the estimated reduction in the switch point virtually unchanged at £16,218 (SE = £1,558). Second, the MPL's format or wording could shape recorded choices even when respondents do not infer the study's purpose. We ask respondents to explain the key factors that influenced their choices. We code an explanation as evidence of experimenter demand when respondents report that the task, rather than their underlying preferences, changed what they recorded. For example, they may report choosing one immigrant despite preferring both or neither, considering tax only because the survey highlighted it, or answering as they believed the researchers expected. We identify 81 such respondents (7.6%).[26] Excluding these respondents again leaves the estimated reduction unchanged at £16,571 (SE = £1,602; mean switch point under *Unknown Values* = £63,626).

[24] These experiments use the gender-roles vignette, balance respondent gender, and replicate the party-support distribution in the main experiment. The samples are small and the experiments were not pre-registered.

[25] Manual coding identifies 30 respondents and GPT-5.1 identifies 20, with 19 common to both. To be conservative, we exclude anyone identified by either approach, yielding 31 exclusions. Respondents who leave the question blank are included. See Appendix D.

[26] Manual coding identifies 75 respondents and GPT-5.1 identifies 48, with 42 common to both. We exclude anyone identified by either approach, yielding 81 exclusions. See Appendix D.

Finally, respondents' MPL choices strongly predict their behaviour in both incentivised tasks, where experimenter demand is expected to be weaker because choices carry real stakes (Stantcheva 2023). Together, these results provide little evidence that experimenter demand drives the main findings.

5 Conclusion

The composition of immigration to the US and Europe has changed substantially in recent decades, with immigrants increasingly arriving from origins perceived as culturally distant from host-country populations. At the same time, immigration has become a more salient source of political conflict. Drawing on experimental evidence from the UK, this paper provides three findings about the role of cultural distance in shaping immigration preferences.

First, cultural concerns are consequential: respondents require immigrants from culturally distant origins to earn substantially more than otherwise comparable immigrants from culturally close origins. Second, much of this penalty reflects uncertainty about immigrants' personal values. People use cultural origin to form beliefs about these values, and learning that an immigrant from a culturally distant origin holds values similar to UK typical values substantially reduces the premium. Third, higher income is not a substitute for information about values. Respondents do not systematically interpret higher earnings as evidence of more similar values or greater integration.

These findings suggest that raising income thresholds—as in recent UK immigration policy—is unlikely to address opposition rooted in cultural concerns. Policies that promote integration and credibly communicate immigrants' values and assimilation may address such concerns more directly. Information about similar values reduces the cultural premium across the political spectrum, including among groups generally more resistant to immigration from culturally distant origins. Substantial political differences nevertheless remain: right-leaning respondents continue to require a larger income premium for immigrants from culturally distant origins even when those immigrants are known to hold similar values, indicating that information about values does not fully eliminate the influence of cultural origin on their choices.

Several avenues remain open for future work. First, we provide suggestive evidence that natives may overestimate the extent to which immigrants from culturally distant origins arrive with, and continue to hold, the values of their origin countries. Future work could measure these misperceptions more directly, particularly with respect to immigrants' less observable cultural values. Second,

while our real-stakes measures support the external validity of our results, observational data could extend these findings where feasible. For example, future policy reforms that alter the cultural characteristics or integration trajectories of incoming immigrants may generate useful variation for identifying the effects of value similarity on natives' attitudes toward immigrants of distant cultural origins.

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A Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Attrition Propensity

	Finished the survey	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	0.00643	0.00599
	(0.0115)	(0.0115)
N	1,257	1,257
DV Mean	0.954	0.954
Controls	No	Yes

Notes: The table presents OLS regression results for attrition propensity. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent completes the survey experiment. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the control group (*Unknown Values*). Controls include age and age squared, a female indicator, indicators for centre and right-leaning political orientation (left omitted), an indicator for holding a college degree, indicators for Asian, Black, and Mixed/Other ethnicities (White omitted), and vignette indicators for college education, *Gender roles*, and *Religion* (with *Democracy* as the omitted category). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.2: Balance across Unknown and Similar Values Groups

	Mean		Difference		Obs	
Variable	C	T	Std.	p-value	C	T
Age	48.26	47.34	-0.06	0.33	524	539
	(15.22)	(15.77)				
Female	0.49	0.53	0.07	0.23	524	539
Highest Qualification: Degree and above	0.52	0.50	-0.03	0.64	524	539
- Other higher education	0.08	0.07	-0.04	0.48	524	539
- A-levels/SCE Highers	0.20	0.23	0.08	0.21	524	539
- Qualifications below A-levels	0.19	0.18	-0.03	0.65	524	539
- No formal qualifications	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.39	524	539
Ethnicity: White	0.93	0.92	-0.02	0.73	524	539
- Black	0.02	0.02	0	0.95	524	539
- Asian	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.79	524	539
- Mixed/Other	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.75	524	539
- Has immigrant parent(s)	0.10	0.11	0.02	0.74	524	539
Very left-wing	0.05	0.04	-0.04	0.50	524	539
- Fairly left-wing	0.23	0.27	0.09	0.13	524	539
- Slightly left of centre	0.22	0.18	-0.08	0.19	524	539
- Centre	0.18	0.20	0.03	0.58	524	539
- Slightly right of centre	0.17	0.14	-0.06	0.30	524	539
- Fairly right-wing	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.76	524	539
- Very right-wing	0.02	0.01	-0.07	0.22	524	539
- Labour	0.35	0.39	0.08	0.22	524	539
- Conservative	0.19	0.17	-0.05	0.39	524	539
- Liberal Democrats	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.88	524	539
- Green Party	0.09	0.10	0.03	0.64	524	539
- Reform UK	0.18	0.17	-0.02	0.71	524	539
- Scottish National Party	0.03	0.02	-0.05	0.41	524	539
- Chooses immigration as top issue	0.44	0.39	-0.10	0.10	524	539
Employment and Earnings: Full-time	0.46	0.42	-0.09	0.14	524	539
- Part-time	0.13	0.14	0.03	0.66	524	539
- Self-employed	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.92	524	539
- Unemployed (looking for work)	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.71	524	539
- Student	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.32	524	539
- Not in labour force	0.21	0.23	0.04	0.52	524	539
- Personal income (pre-tax, £)	29.78K	28.36K	-0.07	0.24	524	539
	(19.42K)	(19.58K)				
- Household income (pre-tax, £)	47.67K	48.40K	0.03	0.64	524	539
	(25.18K)	(25.86K)				
Exposure: Immigrant share (industry)	0.16	0.16	0.09	0.17	490	493
	(0.04)	(0.04)				
- Immigrant share (living area)	0.15	0.14	-0.07	0.25	507	524
	(0.13)	(0.12)				
- Immigrant share (birth area)	0.17	0.18	0.02	0.76	437	470
	(0.14)	(0.14)				
- ME/Asia/Africa Immigrant share (living area)	0.07	0.07	-0.07	0.24	507	524
	(0.08)	(0.07)				
- ME/Asia/Africa Immigrant share (birth area)	0.09	0.09	0	0.96	437	470
	(0.09)	(0.08)				
Joint significance test (F), p-value				0.53		

Notes: The table reports balance in respondent characteristics across experimental groups, pooling observations from all cultural dimensions. Columns 1–2 report group means for the *Unknown Values* (C) and *Similar Values* (T) groups, with standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables. Columns 3–4 report standardised mean differences and the corresponding p-values, calculated from an OLS regression of each characteristic on a constant and the treatment indicator, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Standardised differences use the pooled standard deviation. The joint significance test reports the p-value from an F-test that no covariate predicts assignment, from an OLS regression of the treatment indicator on all covariates jointly (respondents observed on all covariates: 835). Respondents reported personal and household income in brackets: £0–£9.99K, followed by £5K increments up to £90K and above; brackets are coded using their midpoint, where the highest bracket is coded as £92.5K. Immigrant shares in industries are calculated from the Annual Population Survey (SIC 2007 categories). Geographic exposure is measured using the outward part of respondents' current and birthplace postcodes. Foreign-born shares are derived from Census 2021 (England/Wales, ONS; Northern Ireland, NISRA) and Census 2022 (Scotland, NRS), with postcodes linked to output areas via ONS Geography Portal mappings and assuming uniform distribution within output areas. Balance tables within each cultural dimension are available upon request.

Table A.3: Balance across Cultural-Dimension Assignments

	Mean			Difference				Obs		
				G – D		R – D				
Variable	G	D	R	Std.	*p*-value	Std.	*p*-value	G	D	R
Age	47.54	48.17	47.67	-0.04	0.59	-0.03	0.66	347	362	354
	(15.55)	(15.31)	(15.66)							
Female	0.52	0.51	0.50	0.00	0.96	-0.03	0.66	347	362	354
Highest Qualification: Degree and above	0.52	0.54	0.48	-0.04	0.59	-0.11	0.16	347	362	354
- Other higher education	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.01	0.89	0.20	0.01	347	362	354
- A-levels/SCE Highers	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.01	0.92	0.05	0.54	347	362	354
- Qualifications below A-levels	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.02	0.78	-0.07	0.35	347	362	354
- No formal qualifications	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.24	0.06	0.40	347	362	354
Ethnicity: White	0.91	0.93	0.93	-0.08	0.31	-0.01	0.94	347	362	354
- Black	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.84	-0.04	0.59	347	362	354
- Asian	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.25	0.04	0.62	347	362	354
- Mixed/Other	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.57	0.00	0.96	347	362	354
- Has immigrant parent(s)	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.03	0.66	0.03	0.73	347	362	354
Political attitudes: Very left-wing	0.03	0.04	0.06	-0.05	0.51	0.08	0.29	347	362	354
- Fairly left-wing	0.23	0.25	0.25	-0.06	0.41	0.00	1.00	347	362	354
- Slightly left of centre	0.19	0.20	0.21	-0.04	0.63	0.02	0.81	347	362	354
- Centre	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.04	0.64	-0.04	0.59	347	362	354
- Slightly right of centre	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.01	0.89	-0.01	0.85	347	362	354
- Fairly right-wing	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.04	0.58	-0.03	0.71	347	362	354
- Very right-wing	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.72	0.00	0.97	347	362	354
Party support: Labour	0.36	0.37	0.39	-0.01	0.84	0.04	0.59	347	362	354
- Conservative	0.20	0.17	0.16	0.07	0.34	-0.03	0.71	347	362	354
- Liberal Democrats	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.03	0.66	0.08	0.28	347	362	354
- Green Party	0.07	0.12	0.09	-0.16	0.04	-0.10	0.18	347	362	354
- Reform UK	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.79	-0.05	0.51	347	362	354
- Scottish National Party	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.32	0.04	0.60	347	362	354
- Chooses immigration as top issue	0.41	0.43	0.40	-0.04	0.56	-0.07	0.34	347	362	354
Employment and Earnings: Full-time	0.46	0.45	0.40	0.02	0.83	-0.11	0.14	347	362	354
- Part-time	0.13	0.14	0.14	-0.04	0.59	-0.02	0.76	347	362	354
- Self-employed	0.10	0.14	0.13	-0.11	0.16	-0.03	0.66	347	362	354
- Unemployed (looking for work)	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.11	0.14	0.09	0.21	347	362	354
- Student	0.03	0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.77	0.05	0.54	347	362	354
- Not in labour force	0.22	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.45	0.09	0.25	347	362	354
- Personal income (pre-tax, £)	30.5K	28.5K	28.3K	0.11	0.16	-0.01	0.89	347	362	354
	(19.5K)	(19.2K)	(19.7K)							
- Household income (pre-tax, £)	48.8K	46.7K	48.6K	0.08	0.29	0.07	0.32	347	362	354
	(26.0K)	(25.5K)	(25.1K)							
Exposure: Immigrant share (industry)	0.16	0.16	0.16	-0.01	0.92	0.13	0.09	324	336	323
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)							
- Immigrant share (living area)	0.15	0.15	0.14	-0.01	0.91	-0.04	0.61	335	355	341
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)							
- Immigrant share (birth area)	0.17	0.17	0.18	-0.01	0.88	0.08	0.32	296	311	300
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)							
- ME/Asia/Africa immigrant share (living area)	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.67	-0.02	0.80	335	355	341
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)							
- ME/Asia/Africa immigrant share (birth area)	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.00	0.96	0.08	0.31	296	311	300
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)							
Joint significance test (F), p-value					0.95		0.76			

Notes: The table reports balance in respondent characteristics across assignment to the three cultural dimensions: *Gender roles* (G), *Democracy* (D), and *Religion* (R). Columns 1–3 report group means, with standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables. Columns 4–7 report pairwise standardised differences and the corresponding p-values, calculated from an OLS regression of each characteristic on a constant and dimension indicators (*Democracy* as the omitted category), with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Standardised differences are calculated using the pooled standard deviation. Columns 8–10 report the number of non-missing observations in each group. The joint significance test reports the p-value from an F-test that no covariate predicts assignment, from an OLS regression of an indicator for the dimension pair on all covariates jointly (respondents observed on all covariates: 561 for G vs. D and 562 for R vs. D). Respondents reported personal and household income in brackets: £0–£9.99K, followed by £5K increments up to £90K and above; brackets are coded using their midpoint, where the highest bracket is coded as £92.5K. Immigrant shares in industries are calculated from the Annual Population Survey (SIC 2007 categories). Geographic exposure is measured using the outward part of respondents' current and birthplace postcodes. Foreign-born shares are derived from Census data (Office for National Statistics 2024a; National Records of Scotland 2024; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 2024), with postcodes linked to output areas using Office for National Statistics (2024b) mappings and assuming uniform distribution within output areas.

Table A.4: Distribution of Switching Patterns and Assigned Income Switch Points

Switching Pattern	Frequency	Share (%)	Assigned Switch Point
Constant Choices			
- Always D	4	0.38	£17.5K
- Always D/C	124	11.67	£17.5K
- Always C	299	28.13	£92.5K
One Switch			
- D/C → D	4	0.38	£17.5K
- C → D	354	33.30	Midpoint of switch range
- C → D/C	58	5.46	Midpoint of switch range
Explicit Two Switches			
- C → D/C → D	168	15.80	Midpoint at first switch range
- C → D or D/C → D/C or C	8	0.75	Midpoint at first switch range
- D/C → D → D/C	0	0.00	£17.5K
Implicit Two Switches			
- D → C	13	1.22	£17.5K
- D/C → C	2	0.19	£17.5K
Other			
- Start with D and switch more than once	8	0.75	£17.5K
- Start with C and switch more than twice	21	1.98	Midpoint at first switch range
Total	1,063	100.00	

Notes: The table reports the frequency of each switching pattern observed in the data. D refers to the distant-origin immigrant, and C to the close-origin immigrant. The final column shows the value assigned to each pattern as the income switch point in the main analysis. D/C indicates that the participant selects both Immigrant D and Immigrant C. Explicit switches refer to switches starting with C. Implicit switches refer to switches starting with D (or both) and later reverting to C, implying an unobserved switch from C to D.

Table A.5: Comparing Treatment Effects across Cultural Dimensions

	Income Switch Point (£)		Legal Support		Bonus Allocation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	-14,432***	-14,138***	0.163***	0.161***	0.279**	0.264**
	(2,678)	(2,603)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.119)	(0.115)
Gender Roles	9,090***	8,968***	-0.094**	-0.098**	-0.441***	-0.450***
	(2,856)	(2,737)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.130)	(0.127)
Gender Roles × Treatment	-7,421*	-7,552**	0.033	0.033	0.331*	0.334**
	(3,792)	(3,667)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.172)	(0.168)
Religion	3,318	3,317	-0.009	-0.013	-0.109	-0.123
	(2,966)	(2,862)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.133)	(0.129)
Religion × Treatment	124.3	292.1	-0.064	-0.068	0.120	0.116
	(3,903)	(3,785)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.172)	(0.166)
N	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063
DV Mean	59,005	59,005	0.315	0.315	1.968	1.968
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The table presents OLS regression results. In Columns 1–2, the dependent variable is the income switch point. In Columns 3–4, the dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent chose to send legal support to the distant-origin immigrant, 0 if to the close-origin immigrant, and 0.5 if they did not answer. In Columns 5–6, the dependent variable is the bonus amount sent to the distant-origin immigrant; non-response is coded as 2.5. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. For Column 2, under *Similar Values*, the switch-point differences relative to the attitudes-to-democracy dimension, calculated as the sum of the dimension main effect and its interaction with *Treatment*, are £1,416 for gender roles ($p = 0.57$) and £3,609 for *Religion* ($p = 0.14$); standard errors for these linear combinations are calculated from the coefficient covariance matrix. *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the omitted category, the attitudes-to-democracy vignette under the *Unknown Values* group. Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.6: Education and the Income Switch Point

	Income Switch Point (£)
	(1)
Treatment	-17,185***
	(2,142)
Immigrant with Degree	-654.8
	(2,283)
Immigrant with Degree × Treatment	1,328
	(3,059)
N	1,063
DV Mean	63,327

Notes: The table reports results of OLS regression of the income switch point on educational attainment and experimental group, pooling across cultural dimensions. *Treatment* is an indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. *Immigrant with Degree* is an indicator for vignettes in which both immigrants are described as holding a university degree; the omitted category is no degree. *DV Mean* is the mean income switch point in the *Unknown Values* group when the immigrants are described as not holding a degree. The regression includes the same controls as Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Value Similarity and Behavioural Measures

	Legal Support		Bonus Allocation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Pooled				
Treatment	0.151***	0.149***	0.423***	0.412***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.071)	(0.069)
N	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063
DV Mean	0.281	0.281	1.791	1.791
Panel B: Gender Roles				
Treatment	0.196***	0.186***	0.610***	0.594***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.124)	(0.121)
N	347	347	347	347
DV Mean	0.220	0.220	1.527	1.527
Panel C: Democracy				
Treatment	0.163***	0.153***	0.279**	0.225*
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.119)	(0.118)
N	362	362	362	362
DV Mean	0.315	0.315	1.968	1.968
Panel D: Religion				
Treatment	0.099**	0.090**	0.399***	0.374***
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.125)	(0.121)
N	354	354	354	354
DV Mean	0.306	0.306	1.859	1.859
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: The table reports OLS regression results for behavioural outcomes, estimated for all cultural dimensions pooled (Panel A) and separately by cultural dimension (Panels B–D). In Columns 1–2, the dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent chose to send legal support to the distant-origin immigrant, 0 if to the close-origin immigrant, and 0.5 if they did not answer. In Columns 3–4, the dependent variable is the bonus amount sent to the distant-origin immigrant; non-response is coded as 2.5. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the control group (*Unknown Values*). Controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Robustness: Alternative Estimations for Behavioural Measures

	Legal Support			Bonus Allocation (£)		
	Choose D	Choose D	No answer	Bonus to D	Bonus to D	No answer
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Pooled						
Treatment	0.124***	0.845***	0.709***	0.320***	0.807***	0.332*
	(0.027)	(0.153)	(0.185)	(0.080)	(0.124)	(0.187)
N	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063	923	1,063
DV Mean	0.218			1.510		
Panel B: Gender Roles						
Treatment	0.143***	1.041***	1.142***	0.439***	1.023***	0.751**
	(0.046)	(0.278)	(0.365)	(0.134)	(0.220)	(0.379)
N	347	347	347	347	309	347
DV Mean	0.179			1.333		
Panel C: Democracy						
Treatment	0.153***	0.872***	0.369	0.203	0.618***	0.081
	(0.048)	(0.262)	(0.334)	(0.138)	(0.216)	(0.341)
N	362	362	362	362	317	362
DV Mean	0.242			1.672		
Panel D: Religion						
Treatment	0.064	0.565**	0.611**	0.312**	0.795***	0.229
	(0.045)	(0.281)	(0.308)	(0.144)	(0.222)	(0.306)
N	354	354	354	354	297	354
DV Mean	0.229			1.506		

Notes: The table presents results under alternative estimation approaches for behavioural measures, pooled across all dimensions (Panel A) and separately by cultural trait (Panels B–D). Column 1 reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent chooses to send legal support to Immigrant D, and 0 otherwise (including abstentions). Columns 2–3 report results from multinomial logit regressions for legal support, where the dependent variable is the respondent's choice regarding who should be sent legal support. The reference category is "Give support to the Immigrant C" (the close-origin immigrant). Column 4 reports OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the amount of bonus allocated to Immigrant D (ranging from £0 to £5), coding non-responses as 0. Column 5 reports ordered logit regressions where the outcome is the amount of bonus allocated to the distant-origin immigrant, restricted to respondents who chose to allocate a bonus. Column 6 reports logit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent did not respond to the allocation question. Logit, multinomial logit, and ordered logit coefficients are reported in log-odds units. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. In Columns 1 and 4, *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the *Unknown Values* group. All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Robustness: Alternative Switch Point Definitions, Estimation Models and Sample Selection

	Income Switch Point (£)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Pooled							
Treatment	-17,509***	-40,167***	-8,786***	-25,254***	-25,276***	-16,636***	-16,815***
	(1,671)	(3,945)	(1,404)	(2,521)	(2,499)	(1,555)	(1,549)
N	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,011	1,034
DV Mean	61,872	103,043	73,177	70,736	70,758	64,361	63,294
Panel B: Gender Roles							
Treatment	-23,075***	-50,408***	-10,404***	-33,215***	-33,241***	-21,235***	-21,286***
	(2,834)	(6,824)	(2,367)	(4,309)	(4,351)	(2,676)	(2,641)
N	347	347	347	347	347	328	338
DV Mean	67,367	113,463	76,012	78,453	78,481	69,116	68,262
Panel C: Democracy							
Treatment	-13,736***	-34,191***	-9,825***	-19,153***	-19,171***	-14,655***	-14,291***
	(2,927)	(6,856)	(2,516)	(4,122)	(4,106)	(2,710)	(2,719)
N	362	362	362	362	362	340	349
DV Mean	57,452	94,129	70,860	63,859	63,878	60,986	59,306
Panel D: Religion							
Treatment	-14,730***	-34,034***	-6,396***	-22,086***	-22,107***	-13,245***	-13,823***
	(3,043)	(7,194)	(2,474)	(4,650)	(4,623)	(2,798)	(2,843)
N	354	354	354	354	354	343	347
DV Mean	61,277	102,499	72,912	70,703	70,725	63,223	62,711
Robustness Method	Min SP $= 5^{th}$ UK inc. pctile	Max SP $= 99^{th}$ UK inc. pctile	First choice of D alone	Tobit regression	Interval regression	Drop ≥ 2 switches	Drop revised choices

Notes: The table reports results pooled across all dimensions (Panel A) and separately by cultural dimension (Panels B–D). The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2, 6, and 7 is the income switch point for each respondent. Columns correspond to the following specifications: Columns 1 and 2 adjust the bounds of the income switch point, changing the minimum from £17,500 to the 5^{th} percentile (£6,384) and the maximum from £92,500 to the 99^{th} percentile (£191,484) of the UK employee income distribution, corresponding to the lowest and highest reported percentiles in Office for National Statistics (2025b). Column 3 redefines the switch point as the first income level at which the respondent chooses Immigrant D alone, assigning the maximum switch point to respondents who never do so. Column 4 reports estimates from a Tobit model in which the dependent variable is the observed income switch point, treated as left-censored at £20,000 and right-censored at £90,000. Column 5 reports estimates from an interval regression in which the dependent variable is the interval containing the respondent's switch point, left-censored for respondents at the lowest switch point, and right-censored for respondents at the highest switch point. Column 6 excludes responses exhibiting switches from Immigrant D to Immigrant C or more than two switching points. Column 7 excludes respondents who revise their choices. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. *DV Mean* in Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 is the mean of the dependent variable in the control group (*Unknown Values*). For Columns 4 and 5, *DV Mean* is the estimated constant from the Tobit and interval regressions *without* controls. All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Value Similarity and Income Switch Point – Re-weighted Sample

	Income Switch Point (£)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Pooled			
Treatment	-14,799***	-16,290***	-15,810***
	(1,781)	(1,752)	(1,676)
N	1,016	1,016	1,063
DV Mean	64,772	65,521	63,363
Panel B: Gender Roles			
Treatment	-19,857***	-20,903***	-19,386***
	(3,163)	(3,061)	(2,897)
N	335	335	347
DV Mean	69,535	69,428	67,244
Panel C: Democracy			
Treatment	-11,900***	-13,522***	-14,424***
	(3,013)	(2,912)	(2,855)
N	345	345	362
DV Mean	60,346	61,783	60,648
Panel D: Religion			
Treatment	-11,295***	-12,401***	-13,686***
	(3,111)	(3,078)	(2,972)
N	336	336	354
DV Mean	64,780	65,606	62,379
Weighting Cells	Gender,Party	Age,Party	Gender,Age, Education

Notes: The table presents OLS regression results for the income switch point, pooled across all cultural dimensions (Panel A) and estimated separately by cultural trait (Panels B–D). The sample is re-weighted to match population distributions using cell-level weights constructed from external data sources. In Column 1, weights are based on the joint distribution of gender and party support, with cells defined as combinations of party category (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Green, Reform UK, SNP, and Other) and gender (2 groups), yielding 14 cells. In Column 2, weights are based on the joint distribution of age group (4 categories: 18–24, 25–49, 50–64, 65+) and party support (7 groups), yielding 28 cells. In both cases, population shares are derived from YouGov voting intention data collected on 17 February 2025, close to the timing of the experiment. In Column 3, weights are constructed using the joint distribution of age group (4 categories), gender (2 categories), and education (degree vs. non-degree), yielding up to 16 cells. Population shares for these cells are obtained from the Annual Population Survey (January–December 2024) (Office for National Statistics 2025a). A full three-way interaction of age, gender, and party support is not implemented for the YouGov-based weights because the data do not provide the joint distribution across all three dimensions. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the control group (*Unknown Values*). All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.11: Heterogeneity by Party Support and Own Values

	Income Switch Point (£)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-9,044***	-14,416***	-14,435***	-7,445**	-6,212
	(3,116)	(2,466)	(2,465)	(3,770)	(5,382)
Agrees or Is Neutral	2,169			674	757
	(3,813)			(3,956)	(3,959)
Agrees or Is Neutral × Treatment	-304			1,563	767
	(5,486)			(5,670)	(5,576)
Strongly Disagrees	7,814***			6,669**	6,673**
	(2,703)			(2,701)	(2,735)
Strongly Disagrees × Treatment	-11,171***			-9,773***	-9,102**
	(3,643)			(3,726)	(3,856)
Conservative		10,259***	10,261***	11,191***	10,541***
		(3,188)	(3,208)	(3,219)	(3,293)
Conservative × Treatment		-6,345	-6,336	-7,751*	-6,487
		(4,485)	(4,509)	(4,518)	(4,655)
Green Party		-10,016**	-10,112**	-9,280**	-9,244**
		(4,557)	(4,564)	(4,478)	(4,647)
Green Party × Treatment		2,366	2,699	1,884	2,157
		(5,473)	(5,498)	(5,448)	(5,614)
Liberal Democrats		4,073	4,103	3,685	3,209
		(4,069)	(4,075)	(4,124)	(4,142)
Liberal Democrats × Treatment		-4,488	-4,488	-3,710	-3,475
		(5,265)	(5,268)	(5,303)	(5,307)
Reform UK		16,194***	15,867***	17,525***	15,852***
		(3,178)	(3,203)	(3,229)	(3,318)
Reform UK × Treatment		-1,637	-1,292	-4,333	-151
		(4,466)	(4,546)	(4,645)	(4,900)
N	1,050	978	968	968	968
DV Mean	58,450	57,986	57,986	49,929	49,929
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls × Treatment	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table presents OLS regressions of the income switch point, pooling across all cultural dimensions. In Column 1, the estimation sample includes all native respondents with non-missing responses to the statement corresponding to the cultural dimension shown in the vignette. The specification includes respondents' own-value indicators and their interactions with *Treatment*. *Agrees or Is Neutral* equals 1 for respondents who strongly agree, agree, or neither agree nor disagree with the statement, while *Strongly Disagrees* equals 1 for respondents who strongly disagree. Respondents who disagree are the omitted own-value category. In Columns 2–5, the estimation sample is restricted to respondents who reported support for Labour, the Conservative Party, the Green Party, the Liberal Democrats, or Reform UK, with Labour supporters as the omitted party group. Column 2 includes party indicators and their interactions with *Treatment*. Column 3 estimates the same specification after restricting the sample to respondents with non-missing own-value responses. Column 4 adds the own-value indicators and their interactions with *Treatment* to the specification of Column 3. Column 5 repeats the specification of Column 4 while additionally interacting *Treatment* with every control, so that the treatment effect may vary with all observable characteristics. The continuous controls are re-centred at their means within the Column 5 estimation sample; the *Treatment* row in that column therefore reports the effect at those means and with every binary control set to zero, and is not comparable to the *Treatment* row in Columns 1–4. *Treatment* equals 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. Under *Similar Values*, the Column 4 differences, calculated as the sum of the relevant main effect and interaction, are £13,193 for Reform UK supporters ($p < 0.01$), £3,440 for Conservative supporters ($p = 0.29$), and $-$£3,104 for respondents who strongly disagree ($p = 0.24$); the corresponding Column 1 difference for respondents who strongly disagree is $-$£3,357 ($p = 0.19$). The corresponding Column 5 differences are £15,701 for Reform UK supporters ($p < 0.01$), £4,054 for Conservative supporters ($p = 0.22$), and $-$£2,429 for respondents who strongly disagree ($p = 0.37$). Standard errors and p-values for these linear combinations are calculated from the coefficient covariance matrix. *DV Mean* is the mean switch point for the omitted group under *Unknown Values*: respondents who disagree with the statement in Column 1, Labour supporters in Columns 2–3, and Labour supporters who disagree with the statement in Columns 4–5. All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3; these enter additively in Columns 1–4 and additively and interacted with *Treatment* in Column 5. Columns 2–5 exclude the *Right* and *Centre* indicators, which the party indicators absorb, while Column 1 retains them. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Heterogeneity by Local Immigrant Exposure and Immigration Background

	Income Switch Point			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	−18,382***	−15,761***	−17,664***	−17,384***
	(1,953)	(2,305)	(1,659)	(1,605)
High Asia/Africa-Born Share, Current Area (36%)	−1,302			
	(2,451)			
High Asia/Africa-Born Share, Current Area × T	4,764			
	(3,242)			
High Asia/Africa-Born Share, Birth Area (45%)		96		
		(2,599)		
High Asia/Africa-Born Share, Birth Area × T		−226		
		(3,389)		
Non-White, No Immigrant Parent(s) (1%)			−13,384	
			(10,901)	
Non-White, No Immigrant Parent(s) × T			16,821	
			(13,213)	
White, Immigrant Parent(s) (5%)			−5,452	
			(4,801)	
White, Immigrant Parent(s) × T			6,842	
			(6,385)	
Non-White, Immigrant Parent(s) (6%)			−15,787***	
			(4,319)	
Non-White, Immigrant Parent(s) × T			9,950*	
			(5,192)	
Non-White, UK-Born (6%)				−15,434***
				(4,082)
Non-White, UK-Born × T				11,425**
				(4,979)
White Immigrant (5%)				−5,163
				(5,751)
White, Immigrant × T				9,749
				(7,083)
Non-White, Immigrant (6%)				−12,884***
				(4,257)
Non-White, Immigrant × T				15,442**
				(6,390)
N	1,031	907	1,063	1,203
DV Mean	64,891	63,378	64,541	64,215

Notes: The table presents OLS regression results for the income switch point, pooling across all cultural dimensions. Each column is a separate regression of the switch point on *Treatment*, the subgroup indicator(s) shown, and their interactions. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group; the *Treatment* row reports the treatment effect for the omitted category in each column. All subgroup indicators are binary, and the percentages next to them are the share of the column's estimation sample in that subgroup. The omitted category in each column is as follows. In Columns 1–2, the exposure indicators equal 1 when the share of residents born in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia in the respondent's current or birth postcode district is at least 6.5%, the mean share across UK postcode districts; and the omitted category is respondents with a below-average share; sample sizes differ because some respondents did not report their residential or birth location. In Column 3, UK-born respondents are classified by ethnicity and parental immigration background into four mutually exclusive groups, with White UK-born respondents without immigrant parents as the omitted category. The gap for non-White respondents with immigrant parents narrows from £15,787 under *Unknown Values* to £5,837 under *Similar Values*, and remains marginally statistically distinguishable from zero (SE = 3,175, $p = 0.07$). Column 4 expands the sample to include respondents born outside the UK and classifies all respondents into four mutually exclusive groups based on ethnicity and country of birth, with White UK-born respondents as the omitted category. Under *Similar Values*, none of the three estimated gaps is statistically distinguishable from zero: −4,009 (SE = 3,072, $p = 0.19$) for non-White UK-born respondents, 4,586 (SE = 4,197, $p = 0.27$) for White immigrant respondents, and 2,558 (SE = 4,885, $p = 0.60$) for non-White immigrant respondents. Among non-White respondents, immigrant and UK-born respondents also do not differ significantly, either under *Unknown Values* (difference = 2,550, SE = 5,533, $p = 0.65$) or under *Similar Values* (difference = 6,567, SE = 5,480, $p = 0.23$). Standard errors for these linear combinations are computed from the coefficient covariance matrix. *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable for the omitted category in the *Unknown Values* group. Controls are those of Table 3, included additively; Controls that are components of the subgroup indicators are excluded, namely the ethnicity indicators and the immigrant-parents indicator in Columns 3–4. Subgroup sizes in Columns 3–4 are small, so these estimates are exploratory. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.13: Heterogeneity by Respondent Gender, Education, and Age

	Income Switch Point (£)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	−15,940***	−17,430***	−16,475***
	(2,150)	(2,266)	(1,521)
Female (51%)	−839		
	(2,335)		
Female × T	−1,120		
	(3,045)		
Degree and Above (51%)		−6,160***	
		(2,362)	
Degree and Above × T		1,806	
		(3,070)	
Age (years, centred)			194.5**
			(78.5)
Age × T			−268.1***
			(93.4)
N	1,063	1,063	1,063
DV Mean	62,949	67,480	62,996

Notes: The table presents OLS regressions of the income switch point on *Treatment*, the characteristic shown, and their interaction, pooling across all cultural dimensions. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. In Columns 1–2, the moderators are binary, and the percentages in parentheses report the share of the estimation sample belonging to the subgroup; the *Treatment* row reports the treatment effect for the omitted category (respondents not reporting female gender in Column 1; respondents without a degree in Column 2). In Column 3, age enters in years, centred at the sample mean of 47.8, so the *Treatment* row reports the treatment effect at the mean age; a quadratic age interaction is small and statistically insignificant. Under *Similar Values*, calculated as the sum of the relevant main effect and interaction, the difference between female and other respondents is $-£1{,}960$ ($p = 0.34$), the difference between respondents with and without a degree is $-£4{,}354$ ($p = 0.04$), and the age slope is $-£74$ per year ($p = 0.27$); standard errors for these linear combinations are calculated from the coefficient covariance matrix. *DV Mean* is the mean switch point in the *Unknown Values* group for the omitted category in Columns 1–2 and for the full estimation sample in Column 3. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3, entered additively, excluding the *Female* indicator in Column 1, the *Degree* indicator in Column 2, and age and age squared in Column 3. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Heterogeneity by Perceived Harm of the Statement

	Income Switch Point (£)
	(1)
Treatment	−12,764***
	(2,762)
Better or No Difference (18%)	−3,162
	(3,301)
Better or No Difference × T	3,807
	(4,492)
Much Worse (53%)	6,783***
	(2,600)
Much Worse × T	−8,362**
	(3,474)
N	1,063
DV Mean	59,337

Notes: The table presents OLS regression results pooling across all cultural dimensions. The dependent variable is the income switch point, regressed on *Treatment*, indicators for respondents' perceived impact of the statement, and their interactions with *Treatment*. Perceived impact comes from the question of whether the UK would become a better or worse place to live if more people agreed with the statement shown in the vignette. *Much Worse* equals 1 for respondents who answer "much worse"; *Better or No Difference* equals 1 for respondents who answer "much better," "somewhat better," or "no impact." Respondents answering "somewhat worse" are the omitted category. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group; the *Treatment* row reports the treatment effect for the omitted category. The percentages in parentheses report the share of the estimation sample belonging to each subgroup. Under *Similar Values*, the difference between respondents answering "much worse" and the omitted category, calculated as the sum of the main effect and interaction, is $-£1{,}579$ ($p = 0.50$); standard errors for this linear combination are calculated from the coefficient covariance matrix. *DV Mean* is the mean switch point of the omitted category in the *Unknown Values* group. The regression includes the same controls as Table 3, entered additively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Value Similarity and Respondents' Concerns and Perceptions

	Concerns				Future
	Cultural	Economic	None	Other	Integration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Pooled					
Treatment	-0.185***	0.143***	0.061**	-0.019	0.405***
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.054)
N	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063
DV Mean	0.515	0.212	0.206	0.067	2.565
Panel B: Gender Roles					
Treatment	-0.243***	0.156***	0.101**	-0.014	0.380***
	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.090)
N	347	347	347	347	347
DV Mean	0.560	0.202	0.155	0.083	2.476
Panel C: Democracy					
Treatment	-0.194***	0.191***	0.020	-0.016	0.455***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.023)	(0.097)
N	362	362	362	362	362
DV Mean	0.473	0.204	0.269	0.054	2.661
Panel D: Religion					
Treatment	-0.117**	0.075	0.066	-0.025	0.382***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.095)
N	354	354	354	354	354
DV Mean	0.518	0.229	0.188	0.065	2.547

Notes: The table reports OLS regression results. In Columns 1–4, the dependent variables are indicator variables equal to one if the respondent selected cultural concerns, economic concerns, no concerns, or other concerns, respectively, as their main concern if more immigrants similar to the distant-origin immigrant were to stay in the UK. Cultural concerns include damage to Britain's culture or allowing individuals with extreme views; economic concerns include demand for public services, housing, or wage/job competition; other concerns include crime or the 'Other, please explain' option. Column 5 reports responses on the immigrant's future integration prospects, measured on a 1–5 scale where higher values indicate greater perceived ease of integration. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the control group (*Unknown Values*). All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.16: Labour-Market Competition: Choice-Level and Switch-Point Evidence


	Prob. of Choosing D			Income Switch Point		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.215***		0.227***	−18,151***	−20,336***	−16,727***
	(0.020)		(0.021)	(1,999)	(2,716)	(2,436)
D's Income in Own Segment	0.008	0.007	0.041**			
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.018)			
Own Segment × T			−0.068**			
			(0.027)			
Income 30–50K (29%)				−985		
				(2,878)		
Income 30–50K × T				4,412		
				(3,525)		
Income 50K+ (13%)				1,718		
				(3,605)		
Income 50K+ × T				3,819		
				(4,534)		
Employed (70%)					−2,561	
					(2,911)	
Employed × T					5,475*	
					(3,283)	
High-Immigrant-Share Industry (59%)						3,896
						(2,390)
High-Immigrant-Share Industry × T						−25
						(3,228)
MPL income-level FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	–	–
Respondent FE	No	Yes	No	–	–	–
N	15,945	15,945	15,945	1,063	1,063	983
DV Mean	0.377	0.377	0.377	63,948	66,385	60,706

Notes: The table presents OLS regression results pooling across all cultural dimensions. Columns 1–3 are estimated at the choice level, with 15 MPL income rows per respondent. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent chooses Immigrant D at that row, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C. All three specifications include MPL income-level fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. *D's Income in Own Segment* equals 1 when Immigrant D's income is within £10,000 of the respondent's reported personal income; under a labour-market competition mechanism, its coefficient should be negative. Column 2 includes respondent fixed effects, which absorb the *Treatment* main effect and all respondent characteristics. In Column 3, the implied own-segment effect in the *Similar Values* group is −0.027 (SE = 0.019, $p = 0.16$) and is therefore not statistically distinguishable from zero. The *Employed* × *Treatment* interaction is marginally significant; however, the implied employment gap in switch points is not statistically significant under either condition (−£2,561, SE = 2,911, $p = 0.38$, under *Unknown Values*; £2,914, SE = 2,471, $p = 0.24$, under *Similar Values*). Standard errors for these linear combinations are calculated from the coefficient covariance matrix. In Columns 4–6, the dependent variable is the income switch point, and each column reports a separate respondent-level regression of the switch point on *Treatment*, the subgroup indicator shown, and their interaction, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. The *Treatment* row reports the overall treatment effect in Column 1, the treatment effect outside the respondent's own income segment in Column 3, and the treatment effect for the omitted category in Columns 4–6. All subgroup indicators are binary. For the respondent-level subgroup indicators, the percentages in parentheses report the share of the relevant estimation sample belonging to that subgroup. In Column 4, respondents are grouped by their reported pre-tax personal income relative to the £40,000 income assigned to Immigrant C: £30,000–£50,000 and £50,000 or more, with respondents earning below £30,000 as the omitted category. In Column 5, the omitted category is respondents who are not employed. In Column 6, the exposure indicator equals 1 when the immigrant share in the respondent's current or most recent industry is at least 20.1%, the average share across the 21 industry sections in the APS, weighted by the APS person weight; respondents who report that the industry question does not apply to them, predominantly those outside the labour force, are excluded. The implied difference under *Similar Values* is £3,871 (SE = 2,216, $p = 0.08$). *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the *Unknown Values* group in Columns 1–3 and for the omitted category within the *Unknown Values* group in Columns 4–6. Columns 1, 3, and 4–6 include the same controls as Table 3. Column 2 instead includes respondent fixed effects. The log personal-income control is excluded from Column 4, and the unemployment and labour-force-status indicators are excluded from Column 5. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Table A.17: Robustness: Alternative Experimental Designs

	Income Switch Point (£)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	-19,685***	-21,787***	-15,109*	-21,691***	-22,033**	-21,643***
	(5,596)	(2,608)	(8,675)	(2,601)	(9,036)	(2,598)
Robustness		-606.0		-3,682		-9,167
		(4,783)		(5,732)		(6,160)
Treatment × Robustness		1,588		7,276		694.7
		(6,013)		(7,744)		(8,104)
N	100	447	63	410	58	405
DV Mean	67,704	68,095	64,500	68,095	57,845	68,095
Robustness Design	No tax	No tax	Reverse MPL order	Reverse MPL order	Change C's income	Change C's income


Notes: The table reports OLS regression results for the income switch point under follow-up experimental designs for the *gender roles* vignette. Columns 1 and 2 show results for the design in which the vignettes omit any mention of a link between higher income and tax contributions. Columns 3 and 4 show results for the design where the distant-origin immigrant's income starts at £90K and decreases to £20K. Columns 5 and 6 show results for the design where the close-origin immigrant's income is set at £20K. *Treatment* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for respondents in the *Similar Values* group. In Columns 1, 3, and 5, only the follow-up sample is used. In Columns 2, 4, and 6, we pool the follow-up sample with the main sample. *Robustness* is a binary indicator equal to 1 for responses in the follow-up sample. In Columns 1, 3, 5, *DV Mean* refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the control group (*Unknown Values*). In Columns 2, 4, 6, it refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the control group, for observations in the main data. All regressions include the same controls as in Table 3. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. $***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1$.



(a) Gender Roles



(b) Democracy



(c) Religion

Figure A.1: Distribution of responses to Cultural Values Questions from WVS

Notes: Each panel shows the distribution of responses to an item from the World Values Survey (Wave 7), which constitute the basis of the vignettes in the survey experiment. *Gender Roles:*"When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." *Democracy:* "The army takes over when the government is incompetent." *Religion:* "The only acceptable religion is my religion."




Figure A.2: Perceptions of the Impact of the Vignette Statement by Cultural Dimension

Notes: The figure shows responses to the question: "Do you think the UK becomes a worse or better place to live if more people in the UK agree with the statement: {*the statement presented in the vignette*}?" Bars report the proportion of respondents in each response category within each experimental group, separately by cultural dimension. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. P-values report differences between the *Unknown Values* and *Similar Values* groups from linear probability models estimated separately for each response category, with robust standard errors. For gender roles, the mean response is 4.56 in the *Unknown Values* group (SE = 0.055, $n = 168$) and 4.52 in the *Similar Values* group (SE = 0.058, $n = 179$; $p = 0.619$). For *Democracy*, the corresponding means are 3.99 (SE = 0.072, $n = 186$) and 4.14 (SE = 0.071, $n = 176$; $p = 0.146$). For *Religion*, they are 4.34 (SE = 0.069, $n = 170$) and 4.24 (SE = 0.075, $n = 184$; $p = 0.372$).




Figure A.3: Treatment Effect on Selecting Immigrant D by Income Level

Notes: The figure reports, at each income level, the estimated effect of the *Similar Values* treatment on the probability of selecting Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C. The outcome is constructed directly from the underlying multiple price list choices rather than from the income switch point. Estimates come from a single linear probability model that interacts the treatment indicator (*Similar Values* = 1, *Unknown Values* = 0) with income-level indicators and includes the same controls as Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Points report the estimated treatment effect at each income level, and the shaded area shows pointwise 95% confidence intervals. The dashed horizontal line denotes a zero treatment effect. We cannot reject that the treatment effect is constant across income levels from £45,000 to £90,000 ($F(9, 15{,}898) = 1.38$, $p = 0.19$).




Figure A.4: Perceived Ease of Future Integration for the Distant-Origin Immigrant

Notes: The figure presents responses to the question asking respondents to consider the distant-origin immigrant's future integration, and evaluate how difficult integration is likely to be for him in the future. We randomise the immigrant's income (£20,000, £40,000, or £90,000) and pool responses across income levels and cultural dimensions. Bars report the proportion of respondents in each bin within each experimental group; vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. P-values report treatment–control differences from a linear probability model for each category, with robust standard errors.




Figure A.5: Perceptions of Distant-Origin Immigrant's Regions and Countries

Notes: The figure shows the percentage of respondents (out of all respondents in an experimental group) who mentioned each region or country in their open-ended response to the question about the likely origin of the distant-origin immigrant. Only regions or countries mentioned by at least 10 respondents in total are included. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

B Survey Design

B.1 Pre-Screening and Demographics

What is your age in years?

In what country do you currently reside? *United Kingdom/Other*

Participation Agreement Leaflet

Participant Information Leaflet

You have been invited to take part in a research study run by research students at the University of Warwick. The project will require you to answer a number of questions. There will also be some demographic questions. The survey is expected to take around 18 minutes to complete. Please read the following statements carefully and answer the question below.

The research is funded by the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick.

Your participation is completely voluntary. You can withdraw at any time, and for any reason, simply by closing your browser.

No identifiable data will be collected from you as part of this study. This means that once your responses have been submitted to the research team, it will not be possible to withdraw this data as your individual responses cannot be identified.

Data will be securely stored on University of Warwick computers and will be processed only for the purpose of scientific analysis. Access to the data will be restricted to the researchers. Summaries may be presented at conferences and included in scientific publications. Data will be reviewed on completion of the research, in line with the University of Warwick data retention policy.

Please refer to the University of Warwick Research Privacy Notice which is available here: [Link]

This study has been reviewed and approved in accordance with the ethical approval procedures at the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick. If you require further information, please contact survey.information.warwick@gmail.com.

Who should I contact if I wish to make a complaint? Any complaint should be addressed to the person below, who is a senior University of Warwick official entirely independent of this study: Head of Research Governance Research & Impact Services University House University of Warwick Coventry CV4 8UW Email: researchgovernance@warwick.ac.uk Tel: 02476 575733

If you wish to raise a complaint on how we have handled your personal data, you can contact our Data Protection Officer who will investigate the matter: DPO@warwick.ac.uk.

If you are not satisfied with our response or believe we are processing your personal data in a way that is not lawful you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).

Thank you for taking the time to read this concise Participant Information Leaflet.

I have read the above and: *I consent to take part in this study/I do not wish to participate.*

Attention Screener

Please tick the box below to confirm you are human. *[Captcha inserted]*

The next question is about the following problem: In surveys like ours, sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and instead quickly click through the survey. This can result in random answers that compromise the quality of research findings. To show that you read our questions carefully, please select both "Complete silence" and "Music" in response to the question below. We truly appreciate your attention throughout the survey. Based on

the instructions above, what sounds best describe your current environment? (options presented in randomised order) *Construction noise/Traffic noise/People talking/Music/Nature sounds (e.g., birds, wind)/Complete silence/Other.*

Are you taking this survey on your mobile phone? *Yes/No*

What is your gender? *Male / Female / Non-binary / Other / Prefer not to say*

What ethnic group do you belong to?
Asian or Asian British / Black, Black British, Caribbean or African / Mixed or multiple ethnic groups / White / Other ethnic group / Prefer not to say

Which of the following best describes your highest educational qualification?
No formal qualifications / Qualifications below A-levels, such as GCSE/O Level/Standard Grade, vocational level 2 or equivalent / A-levels/SCE Highers including vocational level 3 or equivalent, and above / Other Higher Education, including Diplomas in higher education, HNC and HND (e.g., Teaching qualifications, Nursing or other medical qualifications) / Degree or equivalent and above (e.g., Bachelor's degree, Master's degree, PhD) / Other qualification, please specify

Some people talk about 'left', 'right' and 'centre' to describe parties and politicians. With this in mind, where would you place yourself? *Very left-wing / Fairly left-wing / Slightly left-of-centre / Centre / Slightly right-of-centre / Fairly right-wing / Very right-wing / Don't know / rather not say*

Which of the following political parties do you most identify with? *Conservative / Green Party / Labour / Liberal Democrats / Reform UK / Scottish National Party (SNP) / Other, please specify / Not applicable / rather not say*

Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this time? Please tick up to three.(options presented in randomised order)[1] *The economy / Immigration / Health / Housing / Crime / Tax / The environment / Welfare benefits / Family life and childcare / Defence and security / Transport / Education / Pensions / Britain leaving the EU / None of these / Don't know*

B.2 Vignette Block

Page 1

Welcome to this Survey! In this survey, we will show you some hypothetical profiles of individuals and ask for your opinion. It is important that you read all the text carefully before submitting your answers. Your responses are anonymous and will contribute to independent academic research. Please click the button if you understand and agree to proceed. *I understand and I wish to proceed.*

Page 2

Comparing Hypothetical Immigrants: Common Background

Consider two hypothetical immigrants, named **Immigrant A** and **Immigrant B**.

Immigrant A and **Immigrant B** arrived in the UK legally five years ago, after receiving job offers in the UK. They are both:

- male,

[1]This question is adapted from YouGov's survey on the most important issues facing the country, available at https://yougov.co.uk/topics/society/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country.

- in their thirties,
- unmarried,
- of ethnicities matching the majority group in their respective countries,
- and both have college degrees (or) neither has a college degree.

They plan to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR), which will grant them the right to live and work in the UK indefinitely. **Neither immigrant has a criminal record, and both meet all ILR criteria, including passing the English language requirement and the Life in the UK test.**

Based on the information provided, is the following statement true or false: "Both immigrants meet the ILR requirements." (options presented in randomised order) *True/False/Not enough information provided*

Based on the information provided, are Immigrant A and Immigrant B similar in terms of their gender, age group, marital status, whether they have a college degree, and criminal record? (options presented in randomised order) *Yes/No/Not enough information provided*

Page 3

Comparing Hypothetical Immigrants: Culture in Home Country

Unknown Values Condition

Culture in Home Country: Gender Roles (or) **Attitudes Towards Democracy** (or) **Religious Values**

- **Immigrant A**'s country of birth has significant cultural differences from the UK regarding gender roles/attitudes towards democracy/religious values.
  - In his country of birth, the typical response to the statement "Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce" (or)"It is acceptable for the army to take over when the government is incompetent" (or) "The only acceptable religion is my religion" is "Agree", whereas in the UK, the typical response is "Disagree".
  - It is unknown what **Immigrant A**'s beliefs about this statement were at the time of his arrival.
- **Immigrant B**'s country of birth is culturally closer to the UK.
  - In both his native country and the UK, the typical response to the statement "{statement}" is "Disagree".
  - **Immigrant B**'s beliefs have consistently aligned with this typical response, and he disagrees with the statement.

Similar Values Condition

Culture in Home Country: Gender Roles (or) **Attitudes Towards Democracy** (or) **Religious Values**

- **Immigrant A**'s country of birth has significant cultural differences from the UK regarding gender roles/attitudes towards democracy/religious values.

  - In his country of birth, the typical response to the statement "Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce" (or)"It is acceptable for the army to take over when the government is incompetent" (or) "The only acceptable religion is my religion" is "Agree", whereas in the UK, the typical response is "Disagree".
  - It is unknown what **Immigrant A**'s beliefs about this statement were at the time of his arrival. His current view aligns with the typical response in the UK and he disagrees with the statement.

- **Immigrant B**'s country of birth is culturally closer to the UK.
  - In both his native country and the UK, the typical response to the statement "{statement}" is "Disagree".
  - **Immigrant B**'s beliefs have consistently aligned with this typical response, and he disagrees with the statement.

Based on the information provided, which of the two immigrants comes from a country that is culturally closer to the UK in terms of gender roles (or) attitudes towards democracy (or) religious values? (options presented in randomised order) *Immigrant A/Immigrant B/Not enough information given.*

Page 4

Comparing Hypothetical Immigrants: Income in the UK

	Summarising Information on A and B	
	Immigrant A	Immigrant B
Common Background	Unmarried male in his thirties, legally arrived five years ago upon job offer, with (or without) college education, of majority ethnicity in his birth country, no criminal record, meets all Indefinite Leave to Remain requirements including English and Life in the UK tests.	
Gender Roles (or) Attitudes to Democracy (or) Religious Values in Country of Origin	Distant from the UK	Close to the UK
Personal Views on Gender Roles (or) Attitudes to Democracy (or) Religious Values	Unknown at the time of arrival (or) Although unknown at the time of arrival, same as the UK now	Same as the UK

We are interested in your views on whether you prefer Immigrant A or Immigrant B to stay in the UK. Until now, we have not provided any details about A or B's earnings.

We present information on their income, as it affects how much tax they pay. Taxes are important as they fund key public services like the NHS, schools, and public transport. A higher income corresponds to a higher tax payment.

Income in the UK

Below, we show various scenarios of Immigrant A and Immigrant B's annual pre-tax income, on which they pay taxes to the UK government. Both immigrants fully comply with tax regulations in paying their taxes.

Please review each annual income level and indicate whether you prefer Immigrant A or Immigrant B to stay in the UK, given their specified income and corresponding tax contributions.

Selecting both options means that you don't favour one over the other.

Please review each scenario in the table below: Imagine only one immigrant could stay. Which one would you prefer to remain in the UK?

	Immigrant A	**Immigrant B**
A earns £20,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £25,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £30,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £35,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £40,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £45,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £50,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £55,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £60,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £65,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £70,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £75,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £80,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £85,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐
A earns £90,000; B earns £40,000	☐	☐

Please briefly explain your answer. Think about the key factors that influenced your choice. To ensure a thorough response, please provide at least two sentences, which is usually around 30 words. *[text box]*

Page 5

Your Answers

[The same vignette summary table inserted]

The table below shows your answers. Please review them and make any changes if needed. To change an answer, simply check the appropriate box.

[The same MPL table pre-populated with the respondent's choices]

B.3 Belief Elicitation

Page 1

Impact on Society Consider Immigrants A and B from earlier. All previous details remain the same, except for one update: both now earn £40,000 annually before tax.

[The same vignette summary table inserted, with an additional row indicating income at 40K.]

If more immigrants like Immigrant A were to stay in the UK, what do you think would be the main NEGATIVE effects of their immigration? (options presented in random order) *Increasing the pressure and demand for public services,Damaging Britain's own culture and traditions,Reducing wages by undercutting British workers/Taking jobs from British workers, Allowing in people with extreme views or terrorist sympathies, Increasing the pressure and demand for housing, Increasing the level of crime, Other, please explain, None of these – there are no negative effects from such immigration.*[2] Comparing responses across experimental groups allows us to assess whether stated concerns change when Immigrant D's values are known to be aligned.

Page 2

Impact on Society

Do you think the UK becomes a worse or better place to live if more people in the UK agree with the statement: [same statement as in the vignette] *It would make the UK a much better place to live./It would make the UK a somewhat better place to live./It would have no impact on how good or bad the UK is to live./It would make the UK a somewhat worse place to live./It would make the UK a much worse place to live.*

Page 3

Perceptions and Beliefs

Consider Immigrants A and B from earlier. All previous details remain the same. As for their incomes, both now earn £20,000 (or) £40,000 (or) £90,000.

[The same vignette summary table inserted, with an additional row indicating income.]

When Immigrant A first arrived in the UK, what do you think were his initial views on [same statement as in the vignette] *He strongly disagreed with the statement / He disagreed with the statement / He neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement / He agreed with the statement / He strongly agreed with the statement*

How difficult do you think it was for Immigrant A to adjust to life in the UK when he first arrived? Consider aspects such as learning the language, understanding local customs, feeling a sense of belonging, and interacting with British society. *It was very difficult for him to adjust / It was somewhat difficult for him to adjust / It was neither easy nor difficult for him to adjust / It was somewhat easy for him to adjust / It was very easy for him to adjust*[3]

What do you think is the likelihood that Immigrant A will find it difficult to adjust to life in the UK in the future? Again, consider aspects such as learning the language, understanding local customs, feeling a sense of belonging, and interacting with British society. *It is very likely he will*

[2]These response options are adapted from YouGov, a global survey company that has tracked UK residents' main concerns about immigration since 2019. The tracker is available at
`https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/what-are-the-main-negative-effects-of-immigration`

[3]This and the next question measure beliefs about immigrants' integration, drawing on aspects of integration adapted from Harder et al. (2018).

find it difficult to adjust / It is likely he will find it difficult to adjust / There is an equal chance he may or may not find it difficult to adjust / It is unlikely he will find it difficult to adjust / It is very unlikely he will find it difficult to adjust

Page 4

Perceptions and Beliefs

Are there any regions or types of countries that you think might align with Immigrant A's described cultural background?

Are there any regions or types of countries that you think might align with Immigrant B's described cultural background?

B.4 Behavioural Measures

Page 1

Help with Immigration Lawyer Access

We interviewed two real immigrant participants on Prolific who closely match the hypothetical profiles shown earlier. Participant A and Participant B are both male immigrants who have lived in the UK for at least five years and have similar income levels.

Similar to the hypothetical scenarios, Participant A comes from a culturally distant background from the UK in terms of gender roles (or) attitudes to democracy (or) religious values, where the typical response in his home country to the statement [same statement as in the vignette] is "Agree" [*in the Treatment group:* , while he personally disagrees]. In contrast, Participant B comes from a culturally similar background to the UK, such that both the typical response in his country and his personal view align with "Disagree".

Many people applying for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) choose to work with immigration lawyers to help ensure their application process goes smoothly. Immigration lawyers assist with organising and preparing all necessary paperwork correctly, making the ILR application process more straightforward and efficient. We have informational resources to help one participant connect with a qualified immigration lawyer in their local area. Both participants have expressed interest in receiving this support.

Which participant, A or B, would you like us to send the information about qualified local immigration lawyers to?

One of the survey respondents' choices will be randomly selected. Based on that selection, either Participant A or Participant B will receive this support. If you select "Prefer not to answer", your choice will not be included in the selection. As a thank-you for participating, everyone who makes a choice will be entered into a draw to win £5.

Who would you like us to provide the immigration lawyer support to—Participant A or Participant B? *Option 1: Give support to A / Option 2: Give support to B/ Prefer not to answer*

B.4.1 Page 2

Decide Who Receives a Bonus!

Now, consider two other actual immigrant participants we interviewed on Prolific. They are not the same immigrants shown earlier but resemble the hypothetical profiles you saw. Participant A and Participant B are both male immigrants who have lived in the UK for at least five years and have similar income levels.

Participant A comes from a culturally distant background from the UK in terms of ender roles (or) attitudes to democracy (or) religious values where the typical response in his home country to the statement [same statement as in the vignette] is "Agree" [*in the Treatment group:* , while he personally disagrees]. In contrast, Participant B comes from a culturally similar background to the UK, such that both the typical response in his country and his personal view align with "Disagree".

You have the opportunity to help us allocate a £5 bonus between Participant A and Participant B.

One of the survey respondents' choices will be randomly selected, and either Participant A or Participant B will receive the bonus amount based on that selection. If you select "Prefer not to answer," your choice will not be included in the selection. As a thank-you for participating, everyone who makes a choice will be entered into a separate draw to win £5.

How would you like to split the £5 between Participant A and Participant B? *Option 1: Give £0 to A and £5 to B / Option 2: Give £1 to A and £4 to B / Option 3: Give £2 to A and £3 to B / Option 4: Give £3 to A and £2 to B / Option 5: Give £4 to A and £1 to B / Option 6: Give £5 to A and £0 to B/Prefer not to answer*

B.5 Belief Elicitation (Only Control Group)

Thinking back to the hypothetical scenarios, remember that Immigrant A comes from a country where the typical response to the statement [same statement as in the vignette] is "Agree". How likely do you think it is that Immigrant A personally agrees with this statement? Please rate your answer on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means he is certain to disagree and 100 means he is certain to agree.

[Slider inserted]

B.6 Demographics Cont. and End of Survey Questions

About You

Please enter the first part of your postcode (the part before the space), known as the outward code. This helps identify the general area where you live. (Example: in the postcode EC1A 7BS, the outward code is EC1A; in NW1 3AX, it is NW1; and in N1 1SW, it is N1). If you are unsure, prefer not to answer, or it's not applicable, please enter N/A. [text box]

Were you born in the UK? *Yes, I was born in the UK/No, I was born outside the UK and moved here.*

[If Yes] Please enter the first part of the postcode (the part before the space) for the area where you were born. Again, this is known as the outward code, and helps identify the general area of your birthplace. (Example: in the postcode EC1A 7BS, the outward code is EC1A; in NW1 3AX, it is NW1; and in N1 1SW, it is N1). If you are unsure, prefer not to answer, or it's not applicable, please enter N/A.

If you don't remember the postcode of your birthplace, please select the region where you were born from the dropdown menu below. *England: North East / England: North West / England: Yorkshire and the Humber / England: East Midlands / England: West Midlands / England: East of England / England: London / England: South East / England: South West / Scotland and Northern Ireland / Wales / Not applicable* [If No] Where were you born? Please enter N/A if you prefer not to say

Did either of your parents immigrate to the UK? *Yes/No*

What was your total household income from all sources in 2024, before taxes and other deductions? *£0 – £9,999 / £10,000 – £14,999 / £15,000 – £19,999 / £20,000 – £24,999 / £25,000 – £29,999 / £30,000 – £34,999 / £35,000 – £39,999 / £40,000 – £44,999 / £45,000 – £49,999 / £50,000 – £54,999 / £55,000 – £59,999 / £60,000 – £64,999 / £65,000 – £69,999 / £70,000 – £74,999 / £75,000 – £79,999 / £80,000 – £84,999 / £85,000 – £89,999 / £90,000 and above*

What was your total personal income from all sources in 2024, before taxes and other deductions? *£0 – £9,999 / £10,000 – £14,999 / £15,000 – £19,999 / £20,000 – £24,999 / £25,000 – £29,999 / £30,000 – £34,999 / £35,000 – £39,999 / £40,000 – £44,999 / £45,000 – £49,999 / £50,000 – £54,999 / £55,000 – £59,999 / £60,000 – £64,999 / £65,000 – £69,999 / £70,000 – £74,999 / £75,000 – £79,999 / £80,000 – £84,999 / £85,000 – £89,999 / £90,000 and above*

What is your current employment status? *Full-time employee / Part-time employee / Self-employed or small business owner / Unemployed and looking for work / Student / Not in labour force (for example, retired or full-time parent) / Other, please specify*

Which of the following categories best describes the industry you are currently working in or most recently worked in? *Agriculture, forestry and fishing / Mining and quarrying / Manufacturing / Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply / Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities / Construction / Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles / Transportation and storage / Accommodation and food service activities / Information and communication / Financial and insurance activities / Real estate activities / Professional, scientific and technical activities / Administrative and support service activities / Public administration and defence; compulsory social security / Education / Human health and social work activities / Arts, entertainment and recreation / Other service activities / Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use / Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies / Other, please specify / Not applicable*

What is your current or most recent job title? Enter N/A if not applicable. [text box]

How would you feel about the following statement? Do you agree or disagree: [same statement as in the vignette] *Agree strongly/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Disagree strongly.Do not know/Prefer not to answer*

Feedback Block

Thank you for sharing your thoughts. In the final section of this survey, we would like to gather your feedback on the survey itself. Please briefly describe what you believe was the aim of the research conducted through this survey. [text box]

[Next page] Feedback and Debrief This research examines how people view integration when immigrants become UK residents, with a focus on promoting social cohesion in diverse communities. Your responses will contribute to a deeper understanding of how we can foster more inclusive and united societies that embrace diversity. Your insights are incredibly valuable—thank you for your time and effort! Please keep these details confidential to preserve the integrity of the research. If you have any feedback or comments about the study, please share them below. Your comments are much appreciated.

We want to ensure that your experience with this questionnaire is positive and safe. If you have any concerns or need support, please reach out to Citizens Advice for confidential assistance.[Link]

Please proceed to the next page to be redirected to Prolific. This will ensure your submission is recorded.

Thank you very much for taking part in this survey.

C Conceptual Framework

To structure the analysis and clarify how to interpret the income switch points and the effect of information about value similarity, we introduce a simple conceptual framework.

C.1 Setup

Consider a native respondent, indexed by n, choosing between two immigrant profiles and indicating which immigrant she would prefer to remain in the country. Following Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012), let the native's indirect utility depend on her disposable income and on characteristics of the society in which she lives. The presence of an immigrant may affect this utility through both cultural and economic channels (Dustmann and Preston 2007; Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012; Alesina and Tabellini 2024).

We represent immigrant i's characteristics by two multidimensional vectors: cultural traits, κ_i, and economic traits, θ_i. Cultural traits include the immigrant's social preferences, beliefs, and behaviour, while economic traits include his skills, fiscal contribution, and potential effects on the labour market and welfare state. Conditional on immigrant i remaining in the country, native n's indirect utility is

$$U_n^i = \bar{u}_n + V_n(\kappa_i, \theta_i) + \epsilon_{n,i}, \tag{C.1}$$

where U_n^i is the indirect utility of native n if immigrant i stays, $\bar{u}_n$ collects components that do not vary across the two immigrant profiles in the choice, $V_n(\kappa_i, \theta_i)$ captures the consequences associated with immigrant i's cultural and economic traits, and $\epsilon_{n,i}$ captures idiosyncratic profile-specific considerations not represented by these traits. We normalise this component to have mean zero across natives for each profile:[4]

$$E_n[\epsilon_{n,i}] = 0. \tag{C.2}$$

Because $\bar{u}_n$ is common across profiles, native n weakly prefers immigrant i to immigrant j when

$$U_n^i \geq U_n^j \quad \iff \quad V_n(\kappa_i, \theta_i) + \epsilon_{n,i} \geq V_n(\kappa_j, \theta_j) + \epsilon_{n,j}. \tag{C.3}$$

The native does not observe κ_i or θ_i, but forms expectations about them using three signals:

[4] Throughout this section, $E_n[\cdot]$ denotes an expectation across natives.

- the immigrant's cultural origin, $O_{i,s} \in \{c, d\}$, indicating whether the typical values in his country of origin on issue s are similar to host-country typical values (c) or differ from them (d);
- his individual values on the same issue, $A_{i,s} \in [0, 1]$, where $A_{i,s} = 1$ denotes complete similarity with host-country typical values on issue s, while $A_{i,s} < 1$ denotes some degree of value dissimilarity on that issue; and
- his income in the host country, Y_i.

We assume that higher income weakly increases the native's expected valuation of the immigrant. The signals need not map exclusively into one dimension: income may convey information about both cultural and economic traits, while cultural origin and individual values may also convey information about both dimensions. Thus, $(O_{i,s}, A_{i,s}, Y_i)$ jointly shape the native's expectations about both κ_i and θ_i.

C.2 Income Switch Points

Consistent with the experimental design, native n chooses between two immigrant profiles, Immigrant C and Immigrant D. Immigrant C comes from a culturally close origin, is known to hold values similar to host-country typical values, and earns a fixed income $\tilde{y}$. Immigrant D comes from a culturally distant origin and earns income y_D. Depending on the information condition, Immigrant D's individual values are either not disclosed or are revealed to be completely similar to host-country typical values. Formally,

$$O_{C,s} = c, \qquad A_{C,s} = 1, \qquad Y_C = \tilde{y},$$

while

$$O_{D,s} = d, \qquad Y_D = y_D,$$

with $A_{D,s}$ not disclosed in the *Unknown Values* condition and $A_{D,s} = 1$ in the *Similar Values* condition.

Let $\mathbb{E}_i^n[\cdot \mid \cdot]$ denote native n's subjective expectation over immigrant i's unobserved cultural and economic traits, conditional on the signals provided. The expectation is therefore taken over (κ_i, θ_i) only. We allow uncertainty about these traits to affect the native's valuation: because $V_n(\kappa_i, \theta_i)$ need not be linear in the underlying traits, the native need not be indifferent between profiles with

the same expected traits but different degrees of uncertainty. Revealing Immigrant D's individual values may therefore affect his expected valuation both by changing beliefs about his traits and by reducing uncertainty about them.

We treat $\bar{u}_n$ and $\epsilon_{n,i}$ as fixed from the native's perspective at the time of choice, so they pass through the expectation operator. Thus, the expected valuation of Immigrant C's fixed profile is

$$\begin{aligned} EU_n^C &\equiv \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[U_n^C \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, A_{C,s} = 1,\, Y_C = \tilde{y} \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[\bar{u}_n + V_n(\kappa_C, \theta_C) + \epsilon_{n,C} \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, A_{C,s} = 1,\, Y_C = \tilde{y} \right] \\ &= \bar{u}_n + \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[V_n(\kappa_C, \theta_C) \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, A_{C,s} = 1,\, Y_C = \tilde{y} \right] + \epsilon_{n,C}. \end{aligned} \tag{C.4}$$

In the *Unknown Values* condition, the expected valuation of Immigrant D at income y_D is

$$\begin{aligned} EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y_D) &\equiv \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[U_n^D \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, Y_D = y_D \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[\bar{u}_n + V_n(\kappa_D, \theta_D) + \epsilon_{n,D} \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, Y_D = y_D \right] \\ &= \bar{u}_n + \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[V_n(\kappa_D, \theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, Y_D = y_D \right] + \epsilon_{n,D}. \end{aligned} \tag{C.5}$$

In the *Similar Values* condition, the expected valuation of Immigrant D at income y_D is

$$\begin{aligned} EU_n^{D,\text{sim}}(y_D) &\equiv \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[U_n^D \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[\bar{u}_n + V_n(\kappa_D, \theta_D) + \epsilon_{n,D} \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D \right] \\ &= \bar{u}_n + \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[V_n(\kappa_D, \theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D \right] + \epsilon_{n,D}. \end{aligned} \tag{C.6}$$

We assume that $EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(\cdot)$ and $EU_n^{D,\text{sim}}(\cdot)$ are continuous and weakly increasing in y_D. We further assume that native n prefers Immigrant C when Immigrant D's income is sufficiently low, but is willing to select Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C, when his income is sufficiently high.

We allow for the possibility that a native regards both immigrants as equally acceptable over a range of incomes, rather than becoming indifferent at a single income level. We therefore treat choosing both immigrants as indicating that Immigrant D's expected valuation has reached that of Immigrant C, even if it has not exceeded it. The relevant threshold is thus the point at which the native becomes willing to select Immigrant D, either alone or jointly with Immigrant C, rather than necessarily the point at which she strictly prefers him.

Given continuity and the boundary conditions above, such a threshold exists. Let $y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$ and

$y_D^{n,\text{sim}}$ denote the minimum income levels at which native n is willing to select Immigrant D under the *Unknown Values* and *Similar Values* conditions, respectively. Defining the switch point as the minimum such income yields a unique threshold even when expected valuation is constant over some income ranges.

At the switch point in each information condition, Immigrant D's expected valuation reaches that of Immigrant C. Because Immigrant C's profile and the idiosyncratic components do not vary across the two information conditions, the switch-point conditions imply

$$\begin{aligned} EU_n^{D,\text{sim}}(y_D^{n,\text{sim}}) = EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}) \iff \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[V_n(\kappa_D,\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d,\, A_{D,s}=1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right] \\ = \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[V_n(\kappa_D,\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right]. \end{aligned} \tag{C.7}$$

Equation (C.7) equates the expected valuation of Immigrant D when his similar values are known, evaluated at the *Similar Values* switch point, with his expected valuation when his individual values are unknown, evaluated at the *Unknown Values* switch point.

To capture the effect of the information provided in the *Similar Values* condition, define

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_n(y) &\equiv EU_n^{D,\text{sim}}(y) - EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y) \\ &= \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[V_n(\kappa_D,\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d,\, A_{D,s}=1,\, Y_D = y\right] \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[V_n(\kappa_D,\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d,\, Y_D = y\right]. \end{aligned} \tag{C.8}$$

The term $\Delta_n(y)$ captures the effect on native n's expected valuation of Immigrant D of learning that his values are completely similar to host-country typical values, relative to leaving his individual values unknown, at income y. We assume that $\Delta_n(y) \geq 0$ for all y, so learning that Immigrant D holds similar values never lowers his expected valuation.

This assumption has a direct implication for the switch points. Since

$$EU_n^{D,\text{sim}}(y) = EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y) + \Delta_n(y) \geq EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y)$$

at every income level, any income at which native n is willing to select Immigrant D under the *Unknown Values* condition also satisfies the selection condition under the *Similar Values* condition:

$$\{y : EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y) \geq EU_n^C\} \subseteq \{y : EU_n^{D,\text{sim}}(y) \geq EU_n^C\}.$$

Taking the minimum over these sets therefore implies

$$y_D^{n,\text{sim}} \leq y_D^{n,\text{unk}} \tag{C.9}$$

for every native.

Using equation (C.8), equation (C.7) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[V_n(\kappa_D,\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d,\, A_{D,s}=1,\, Y_D=y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right]\\&\quad-\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[V_n(\kappa_D,\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d,\, A_{D,s}=1,\, Y_D=y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right]=\Delta_n\left(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right).\end{aligned} \tag{C.10}$$

Equation (C.10) shows how the informational effect of revealing similar values is reflected in the income switch points. Holding Immigrant D's revealed values fixed at $A_{D,s}=1$, the left-hand side is the increase in his expected valuation associated with raising his income from the *Similar Values* switch point, $y_D^{n,\text{sim}}$, to the *Unknown Values* switch point, $y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$. This increase exactly offsets the informational effect of revealing similar values, evaluated at $y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$.

Because Immigrant D's expected valuation is weakly increasing in income, the information provided in the *Similar Values* condition can lower the income required for his expected valuation to reach that of Immigrant C. Equation (C.10) characterises this relationship in valuation terms. To express it directly in terms of the income difference $y_D^{n,\text{unk}} - y_D^{n,\text{sim}}$, we next impose additional structure on the valuation function.

To distinguish the cultural and economic components of this valuation change, assume that the valuation function is additively separable:

$$V_n(\kappa_i,\theta_i)=\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_i)+\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_i), \tag{C.11}$$

where $\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_i)$ and $\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_i)$ capture native n's valuation of the immigrant's cultural and economic traits, respectively. Importantly, we place no restriction on which signals inform which component: income may convey information about cultural traits, and cultural origin and individual values may convey information about economic traits. The informational effect $\Delta_n(y)$ should therefore be interpreted as the total effect of revealing that Immigrant D holds similar values, operating through the native's inferences about both his cultural traits and, possibly, his economic traits.[5]

[5]If one additionally assumes that, conditional on income, signals about cultural origin and individual values do not affect expectations about economic traits, i.e. $\mathbb{E}_i^n[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_i) \mid O_{i,s}, A_{i,s}, Y_i] = \mathbb{E}_i^n[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_i) \mid Y_i]$, then $\Delta_n(y)$ reduces to a purely cultural effect: $\Delta_n(y) = \mathbb{E}_D^n[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d, A_{D,s}=1, Y_D=y] - \mathbb{E}_D^n[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s}=d, Y_D=y]$.

We impose two monotonicity conditions on the components of the valuation, holding Immigrant D's disclosed profile fixed at $O_{D,s} = d$ and $A_{D,s} = 1$. First, the expected cultural valuation $\mathbb{E}_D^n[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y]$ is weakly increasing in y: higher income never lowers the native's expected cultural valuation. Second, the expected economic valuation $\mathbb{E}_D^n[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y]$ is continuous and weakly increasing in y. These conditions are consistent with the weak monotonicity of the total valuations assumed above: either component may remain constant over ranges of income, consistent with respondents selecting both immigrants over a range of income levels.

Substituting equation (C.11) into equation (C.10) and rearranging gives

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right] - \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right] \\
&= \left(\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right] - \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right]\right) \\
&\quad + \Delta_n\left(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right). \qquad \text{(C.12)}
\end{aligned}$$

The left-hand side is the difference in the expected economic valuation of Immigrant D between the two income switch points, holding his disclosed values fixed at $A_{D,s} = 1$. The term $\Delta_n(y_D^{n,\text{unk}})$ is the informational effect of revealing similar values, evaluated at the *Unknown Values* switch point. The term in parentheses adjusts for the possibility that income itself conveys information about cultural traits. Because expected cultural valuation is weakly increasing in income and $y_D^{n,\text{sim}} \leq y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$, this term is weakly negative: the lower income at the *Similar Values* switch point may be associated with a lower expected cultural valuation of Immigrant D.

To express the informational effect in income units, define the income-equivalent informational effect, $\tilde{\delta}_n$, as the largest reduction in Immigrant D's income whose associated loss in expected economic valuation does not exceed the informational effect:

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{\delta}_n \equiv \max\Bigg\{ &\delta \geq 0 : \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right] \\
&- \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}} - \delta\right] \leq \Delta_n\left(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right)\Bigg\}. \qquad \text{(C.13)}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\tilde{\delta}_n$ is the largest reduction in income whose economic cost can be offset by the value-

Our results do not require this restriction.

similarity information to native n; it measures the income-equivalent value of that information. We assume that the feasible income domain extends sufficiently far below $y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$ for the loss in expected economic valuation eventually to exceed $\Delta_n(y_D^{n,\text{unk}})$. Given continuity of expected economic valuation, the maximum in equation (C.13) is then attained, and the defining inequality holds with equality at $\delta = \tilde{\delta}_n$:

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right] \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}} - \tilde{\delta}_n\right] = \Delta_n\left(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right). \end{aligned} \tag{C.14}$$

This definition parallels the definition of the income switch points above. When expected valuations may remain constant over ranges of income, the income-equivalent effect selects the largest income reduction that the informational effect can offset.

Proposition 1 (The switch-point change provides a lower bound)**.** *Suppose the expected cultural valuation of Immigrant D is weakly increasing in income. Then, for every native, the change in the income switch point weakly understates the income-equivalent informational effect:*

$$y_D^{n,\text{unk}} - y_D^{n,\text{sim}} \;\leq\; \tilde{\delta}_n.$$

Proof. By equation (C.9), $y_D^{n,\text{sim}} \leq y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$. Because expected cultural valuation is weakly increasing in income,

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right] \\ &\quad \leq \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{1,n}(\kappa_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right].\end{aligned}$$

The term in parentheses in equation (C.12) is therefore weakly negative, implying

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right] \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}_D^n\left[\gamma_{2,n}(\theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, A_{D,s} = 1,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right] \;\leq\; \Delta_n\left(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right). \end{aligned} \tag{C.15}$$

Setting $\delta = y_D^{n,\text{unk}} - y_D^{n,\text{sim}}$ in equation (C.13), equation (C.15) shows that this income reduction belongs to the set over which $\tilde{\delta}_n$ is defined. Since $\tilde{\delta}_n$ is the maximum of that set,

$$y_D^{n,\text{unk}} - y_D^{n,\text{sim}} \leq \tilde{\delta}_n.$$

□

The proposition is stated at the level of an individual native, for whom $y_D^{n,\text{unk}}$ and $y_D^{n,\text{sim}}$ denote the two latent switch points that would arise under each information condition. In the experiment, each respondent is assigned to only one condition, so only one of the two switch points is observed. Under random assignment, however, the difference in mean switch points across the two experimental groups identifies $E_n[y_D^{n,\text{unk}}] - E_n[y_D^{n,\text{sim}}]$. Taking expectations of the inequality in Proposition 1 across natives therefore implies

$$E_n\left[y_D^{n,\text{unk}}\right] - E_n\left[y_D^{n,\text{sim}}\right] \;\leq\; E_n\left[\tilde{\delta}_n\right], \tag{C.16}$$

so the estimated reduction in the mean income switch point provides a lower bound on the average income-equivalent value of the value-similarity information.

Proposition 1 formalises the conservative interpretation of the estimated switch-point change. When higher income also conveys favourable information about cultural traits, part of the informational effect of revealing similar values is offset by the less favourable cultural inference associated with the lower income at the *Similar Values* switch point. The reduction in the income switch point therefore weakly understates the income-equivalent value of the value-similarity information. The size of this wedge depends on how strongly income affects respondents' cultural inferences.

C.3 Asymmetric Information about Immigrant C's Values

In the *Unknown Values* condition, respondents are informed that Immigrant C holds values similar to host-country typical values, while Immigrant D's individual values are not stated. One possible concern is therefore that the observed cultural premium partly reflects this asymmetry in information, rather than only the difference between the immigrants' cultural origins.

This asymmetry does not confound the experimental comparison between the *Unknown Values* and *Similar Values* conditions. Immigrant C's profile, including the disclosure of his similar values, is identical across the two conditions. The only information that changes experimentally is whether Immigrant D's individual values are disclosed. Thus, the difference in mean switch points across conditions identifies the effect of providing value-similarity information about Immigrant D, relative to the common benchmark provided by Immigrant C. The disclosure of Immigrant C's values may, however, affect the level of the switch points and therefore matters for the interpretation of the cultural premium in the *Unknown Values* condition. We examine this issue by considering the

counterfactual in which Immigrant C's individual values are also unstated.

Native n's expected valuation of this counterfactual profile is

$$\begin{aligned} EU_n^{C,\text{unk}} &\equiv \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[U_n^C \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, Y_C = \tilde{y} \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[\bar{u}_n + V_n(\kappa_C, \theta_C) + \epsilon_{n,C} \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, Y_C = \tilde{y} \right] \\ &= \bar{u}_n + \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[V_n(\kappa_C, \theta_C) \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, Y_C = \tilde{y} \right] + \epsilon_{n,C}. \end{aligned} \tag{C.17}$$

As in Section C.2, the counterfactual differs from the observed profile only in the information disclosed about Immigrant C's individual values. The same idiosyncratic component $\epsilon_{n,C}$ therefore enters both valuations, while the effect of the disclosure operates through the native's expectations about Immigrant C's traits. Define the effect of explicitly revealing Immigrant C's similar values as

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_n^C(y) &\equiv \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[U_n^C \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, A_{C,s} = 1,\, Y_C = y \right] - \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[U_n^C \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, Y_C = y \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[V_n(\kappa_C, \theta_C) \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, A_{C,s} = 1,\, Y_C = y \right] - \mathbb{E}_C^n \left[V_n(\kappa_C, \theta_C) \mid O_{C,s} = c,\, Y_C = y \right]. \end{aligned} \tag{C.18}$$

Let $y_D^{n,\text{sym}}$ denote the counterfactual income switch point under symmetric information, when the individual values of both immigrants are unstated. Analogously to the switch points defined in Section C.2,

$$y_D^{n,\text{sym}} \equiv \min \left\{ y :\, EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y) \geq EU_n^{C,\text{unk}} \right\}. \tag{C.19}$$

Provided that native n prefers the counterfactual close-origin profile when Immigrant D's income is sufficiently low, which we assume, continuity implies that

$$EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y_D^{n,\text{sym}}) = EU_n^{C,\text{unk}}.$$

Comparing this switch-point condition with $EU_n^{D,\text{unk}}(y_D^{n,\text{unk}}) = EU_n^C$ gives

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbb{E}_D^n \left[V_n(\kappa_D, \theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{unk}} \right] \\ &\quad - \mathbb{E}_D^n \left[V_n(\kappa_D, \theta_D) \mid O_{D,s} = d,\, Y_D = y_D^{n,\text{sym}} \right] = \Delta_n^C(\tilde{y}). \end{aligned} \tag{C.20}$$

Equation (C.20) isolates the contribution of explicitly revealing Immigrant C's individual values to the level of the *Unknown Values* switch point. If revealing Immigrant C's similar values raises

his expected valuation, then the observed *Unknown Values* switch point is weakly higher than the counterfactual switch point that would arise if neither immigrant's individual values were stated. Part of the observed cultural premium may therefore reflect the informational advantage given to Immigrant C.

The importance of this concern depends on the size of $\Delta_n^C(\tilde{y})$. If respondents already expect Immigrant C to hold values similar to host-country typical values based on his close cultural origin, explicitly stating his individual values adds little to his expected valuation. The same is true if information about individual value similarity has little incremental effect on the evaluation of a close-origin immigrant. In either case, $\Delta_n^C(\tilde{y})$ is small, and the observed *Unknown Values* switch point is close to the counterfactual switch point under symmetric information. Our vignettes focus on issues for which the culturally close countries exhibit a clear consensus in the direction of host-country typical values (see Figure A.1), making this a plausible interpretation.

D Open Ended Responses

D.1 Coding Scheme for Income as a Cultural Signal

We manually coded all 1,063 responses using a binary coding scheme. A response was coded as one when it treated income, salary, or earning capacity as evidence about Immigrant D's cultural similarity, personal values, moderation, or social integration. Responses in which income merely offset a cultural concern, without changing what respondents inferred about Immigrant D's values or cultural characteristics, were coded as zero.

As a robustness exercise, we independently classified the same responses using GPT-5.1. The model received only the respondent's explanation and the coding instructions reported below. Each response was classified separately, and the model was required to return a binary classification and a brief justification.

The following system prompt was supplied unchanged for every response:

```
You are coding open-ended survey responses for INCOME-AS-CULTURAL-SIGNAL REASONING.

STUDY CONTEXT
Respondents repeatedly chose which of two hypothetical immigrants (A and B) should remain in
the UK if only one could stay. Immigrant A came from a culturally distant country; Immigrant B
from a culturally closer one. Immigrant A's personal values were either unknown or stated to
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match typical UK values. Across choices, Immigrant A's income varied while B's stayed fixed;
respondents were told higher income meant higher tax payments. Afterward they explained their
reasoning in free text. You see only this explanation.

CODING OBJECTIVE
Code 1 if the respondent treats income, salary, or earning capacity as EVIDENCE ABOUT an
immigrant's cultural or social characteristics -- not merely as an economic contribution. The
inference must run from income (or the education/skill/job it implies) to at least one of:
- cultural similarity, compatibility, assimilation, or social integration with the UK;
- personal values or beliefs; understanding of UK customs or ways of life;
- moderation, liberalism, tolerance, open-mindedness;
- a lower likelihood of conservative, traditional, extremist, anti-democratic, or dangerous
    beliefs.

CODE 1 -- the response infers a cultural/social trait FROM income:

1. Income -> cultural similarity or assimilation.
   "A high salary suggests he has integrated into the UK / understands our way of life."

2. Income -> more moderate or UK-similar values (or less conservative/traditional/intolerant).
   "At that income he is less likely to hold negative views about women."
   Tentative wording ("probably", "may", "I assume", "more likely") still counts.

3. Income -> lower extremism or culturally-linked risk.
   "Once they earn above a certain amount, they are less likely to be extreme."
   (Income reducing merely financial crime does NOT count unless tied to culture/ideology.)

4. Income -> education/skill/occupation -> a cultural trait.
   "Higher earnings imply more education, so he is probably more open-minded."
   The chain must END in a cultural/values/integration claim; stopping at "more educated" or
   "more skilled" is NOT enough.

5. Implicit version of any of the above -- the chain is not fully spelled out, but the response
   still indicates income changes what the respondent infers the person's culture or values ARE.
   "His high salary made me assume he had probably already adopted UK values."

CRITICAL EXCLUSION -- TRADE-OFF vs SIGNAL (the most common error)
Do NOT code 1 when income merely OUTWEIGHS, OFFSETS, or makes the respondent OVERLOOK / WORRY
LESS ABOUT a cultural concern they still hold. In a trade-off the respondent still believes the
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cultural difference exists and just judges the economic benefit worth it -- CODE 0. Code 1 only
when income changes what the person is INFERRED to be like (culturally fine), not merely worth
tolerating.
- Trade-off (CODE 0), real response: "Once immigrant A earns significantly more, the increase in
  tax is more beneficial to the country, and at this point it also outweighs the potential for
     any
  cultural differences that may arise."
- Trade-off (CODE 0): "When income gets high enough, the beliefs matter less." / "I still prefer
     B
  culturally, but the money wins out."
- Signal (CODE 1): "His high salary made me think he had probably adopted UK values."

CODE 0 -- income used non-culturally, or not at all:
- Income only as tax/fiscal contribution, funding public services, or benefit use.
- Income only as skill, education, productivity, employability, or success, with no further
  cultural claim.
- Income only as financial self-sufficiency / not relying on welfare.
- Preference based on culture/values STATED IN THE SURVEY, not inferred from income.
- Income and culture raised as SEPARATE, unconnected considerations.
- The respondent rejects the idea that income reveals culture or values.
- Vague, off-topic, or no income-to-culture inference.

USEFUL CONTRASTS
- "His salary shows he is successfully employed and contributing to the economy." -> 0 (economic)
     .
- "His salary shows he has probably integrated into British society." -> 1 (social/cultural).
- "A's own views were not given, so his high salary made me think he was probably more moderate."
  -> 1 (income used to fill in unknown values).

BORDERLINE RULE
The trade-off pattern is common and superficially resembles the signal; the CRITICAL EXCLUSION
always wins. Do not code 1 merely because income, education, and culture appear together -- there
must be a plausible inferential link FROM income TO a cultural/values/social trait, describing
     what
the person is actually like.

OUTPUT FORMAT
Return strict JSON and nothing else:
{"code": 0 or 1, "reason": "<one short sentence identifying the income-to-culture inference, or
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    stating that income is used only economically>"}
```

D.2 Coding Scheme for Guessing the Study's Hypothesis

We manually coded all non-empty responses to the end-of-survey question asking respondents to guess the study's aim, using a binary scheme, and independently classified them with GPT-5.1 using the prompt below. A response was coded one when the guess captured the tension between the immigrant's own personal values and his country-level cultural background.

```
You are coding respondents' open-ended GUESSES about the aim of a survey experiment.

STUDY CONTEXT
Respondents repeatedly chose which of two hypothetical immigrants (A and B) should remain in the
UK if only one could stay. Immigrant A came from a culturally distant country (its typical views
on gender roles, religion, or democracy differed from the UK's); Immigrant B came from a
culturally closer country and personally held UK-typical views. Immigrant A's income varied
    across
choices; B's was fixed. Crucially, the experiment varied what was known about Immigrant A's OWN
personal values: in some conditions they were UNKNOWN, in others he was said to PERSONALLY hold
UK-similar values despite his distant origin. Afterward respondents guessed the study's aim. You
see only the guess.

WHAT A CORRECT GUESS MUST CAPTURE
That the study is about whether people judge an immigrant by his COUNTRY-LEVEL cultural
    background
versus his OWN individual values -- specifically any of: (a) whether revealing that a culturally
distant immigrant personally shares UK values makes people more accepting of him; (b) whether
people fall back on his country's typical values when his own are unknown; (c) whether his
    distant
origin still counts against him even when his personal values match the UK.

CODE correct_guess = 1
The guess identifies or clearly implies the tension between the immigrant's OWN/personal/actual
beliefs and his COUNTRY/culture/origin's typical beliefs, in any of the forms above. Plain-
    language
equivalents count; tentative wording counts; the respondent need not describe the full design.
Examples:
- "Whether people judge immigrants by their country or by what they personally believe."
- "Whether sharing UK values can overcome concerns about where someone comes from."
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- "Whether people assume his beliefs from his country when his own views aren't given."
- "Whether prejudice about his origin remains even once we're told he shares our values."
- "We were never told what A personally believed, so it's testing what we infer from his
    background."

CODE correct_guess = 0 (does NOT capture the mechanism)
- General attitudes to immigration, or which immigrant is preferred.
- The income-vs-culture trade-off, or income/tax/economic contribution alone.
- General discrimination, prejudice, or stereotyping, or that culture/religion/nationality
    matters
  -- WITHOUT reference to the individual's own values, the absence of that information, or the
  effect of revealing it.
- The cultural topic alone ("to study views on gender equality").
- That values matter, or preferring immigrants with similar values, WITHOUT the
  individual-vs-country distinction.
- The respondent's own politics/morality, or whether they read carefully ("to test if I'm racist
    ").
- Vague, generic, off-topic, or "I don't know."

KEY DISTINCTION (this is where precision is won or lost)
Merely mentioning culture, values, prejudice, stereotypes, or "information given" is NOT enough.
There must be a plausible reference to the immigrant's OWN personal values versus (or inferred
from) his COUNTRY-LEVEL background.
- "Whether people prefer culturally similar immigrants." -> 0.
- "Whether people judge him by his country rather than his own beliefs." -> 1.
- "Whether people stereotype immigrants." -> 0.
- "Whether people still stereotype him by his country even though he shares our values." -> 1.

BORDERLINE RULE
Inclusive but disciplined. Code 1 when the guess plausibly captures the individual-vs-country-
    values
tension. Do NOT code 1 for generic "perception / information / culture" guesses that never invoke
the individual's own values against his origin.

OUTPUT FORMAT
Return strict JSON and nothing else:
{"code": 0 or 1, "reason": "<one short sentence: the individual-vs-country-values phrase, or why
    the guess is too generic>"}
```

D.3 Coding Scheme for Experimenter Demand in the MPL

We manually coded all non-empty MPL explanations for signs of experimenter demand, using a binary scheme, and independently classified them with GPT-5.1 using the prompt below. This is a deliberately inclusive upper-bound measure: a response was coded one when it indicated the respondent's recorded choices were shaped by the survey's format, wording, or perceived purpose rather than a stable preference of their own.

```
You are coding open-ended survey responses for EXPERIMENTER DEMAND.

STUDY CONTEXT
Respondents repeatedly chose which of two hypothetical immigrants (A and B) should remain in the
UK if only one could stay. On every choice they could pick A, pick B, or pick "both" -- where
"both" meant they did not favour one over the other (it did NOT mean both would actually be
admitted). Immigrant A's income varied across choices while B's stayed fixed; higher income meant
more tax. A and B also differed in cultural origin, and in some conditions A's personal values
were stated. Afterward respondents explained their reasoning in free text. You see only this
explanation, not their recorded choices.

CODING OBJECTIVE
Code 1 if the response indicates the respondent's RECORDED choices were shaped by the survey's
forced format, wording, or perceived purpose rather than a stable preference of their own. This
    is
a deliberately inclusive UPPER-BOUND measure -- when genuinely uncertain, code 1 -- but it must
    be
demand, not ordinary decision-making (see the CRITICAL EXCLUSION).

CODE 1 when the response shows any of:
1. CUE-INDUCED CHANGE -- the answer would have differed if the survey had not mentioned/varied an
   attribute. "If you hadn't mentioned tax, I'd have said both."
2. TRUE VIEW vs RECORDED CHOICE -- their genuine view is that BOTH should stay, NEITHER should,
   they don't want to choose, or they reject the premise, AND they explicitly indicate they
   nonetheless picked ONE (not "both"). "I'd have kept both, but since I had to pick one I went
   with the higher earner."
3. PERCEIVED RESEARCHER EXPECTATION -- they answered as they thought the researcher wanted or was
   testing. "I assumed income was the answer you were looking for."
4. PERCEIVED FORCED CHOICE -- they say they felt required to choose ONE despite NO preference,
   including wrongly claiming no equal/both option existed. "I had no preference, but had to pick
     one."
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5. HYPOTHESIS AWARENESS that changed their answers -- they identified the aim and say it affected
   how they chose. "I realised you were testing income against culture, so I switched to choosing
   on income."

CRITICAL EXCLUSION -- GENUINE PREFERENCE vs DEMAND (the most common error)
The experiment is DESIGNED for respondents to weigh income against culture and to switch between
    A
and B as income changes. These are NORMAL decision-making, NOT demand -- CODE 0:
- Using income/tax as the decision criterion because it is what matters to them or the main thing
  distinguishing the two: "I chose whoever pays more tax, as that benefits the country." (Merely
  using the information the survey provides is never, by itself, demand.)
- Switching from B to A once A earns enough: "I preferred B culturally, but once A earned much
    more
  I switched." (The switch is the intended behaviour, not a survey-induced distortion.)
- Being indifferent only when earnings are EQUAL: "When they earned the same I had no preference;
  otherwise I chose the higher earner." (Indifference at exact ties is part of an income-based
  preference.)
- Expressing INDIFFERENCE or that the two are EQUAL -- "I have no preference", "no difference
  between them", "both should be able to stay", "both contribute equally" -- is NOT demand by
  itself. The survey offered a "both/equal" option for exactly this, so a respondent who sees no
  difference may simply have used it. Do NOT infer demand from an expression of indifference
    alone.

Code 1 ONLY when the respondent EXPLICITLY signals the recorded choice conflicts with their real
preference -- e.g. they say they had to pick ONE (not "both") despite wanting both/neither, or
    that
the format forced a choice against their view. Bare indifference, without that signal, is CODE 0.

CODE 0 (not demand):
- A stable decision rule (income, tax, culture, values) applied to the choices, with no sign the
  format changed it.
- Preferring the higher earner for tax/economic reasons; preferring cultural similarity or stated
  values; a genuine income-vs-culture trade-off or switch point.
- Expressing indifference / no preference / no difference, or choosing "both" when indifferent
  (the option working as intended).
- Vague, low-effort, or off-topic, with no sign of framing influence.

REAL EXAMPLES -- CODE 0:
"I chose on the basis that the more they earn the more they contribute to our country's tax
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    system.
I did not choose on the basis of either immigrant's [other] information."
-> 0. Using income as the decision criterion is an ordinary preference; the respondent does not
    say
they would rather keep both or that the format forced a choice against their view.

"Both would be contributing towards taxes at every pay grade, I do not have a preference towards
either based on the limited information given..."
-> 0. A plain statement of no preference given the information; no sign they were forced to
    record a
single choice against wanting both -- the equal option covers this.

"No difference, both A and B have the same right to work and remain. The income earned is not the
issue as long as they pay into the UK tax system at source."
-> 0. Genuine indifference; does not say the format forced a single choice against that view.

BORDERLINE RULE
Inclusive upper bound, but the CRITICAL EXCLUSION always wins. Do not code 1 merely because the
respondent based their choice on income/tax, switched as income rose, was indifferent at ties, or
expressed no preference / no difference. There must be an EXPLICIT sign the RECORDED choice
    departs
from what they actually wanted -- a forced single choice made against a preference for both/
    neither.

OUTPUT FORMAT
Return strict JSON and nothing else:
{"code": 0 or 1, "reason": "<one short sentence: the demand signal, or why the response is
    ordinary decision-making>"}
```

D.4 Example Responses and Classification Validation

Table D.1 reports example responses for each coding task, reproduced as respondents wrote them. For each open-ended coding task used in the paper, we compare the manual classification with an independent GPT-5.1 classification obtained from the same codebook. Table D.2 reports the overall agreement rate, Cohen's κ, and, for the positive category, precision, recall, and F1, taking the manual coding as the reference.

Table D.1: Example Responses and Assigned Codes

Response (reproduced verbatim)	Manual	GPT-5.1
Panel A: Income as a cultural signal		
"I would say that for highly skilled jobs and the higher salary you would assume that immigrant A would be able to understand cultural differences and be a professional highly skilled individual"	1	1
"immigrant B would contribute more over the lower pay scale and is more aligned with our beliefs. However at the higher pay bracket A would contribute more and one would hope that he would align with our way of life"	1	1
"I tend to prefer B as his values are more in line with the UK. However when A earns significantly more then I have to go with A rather than B."	0	0
Panel B: Guessed the study's hypothesis		
"Attitudes to immigrants based on where they are from as opposed to their individual views"	1	1
"Whether people's views of immigrants are based on where they are from or their actual beliefs."	1	1
"Immigration"	0	0
Panel C: Experimenter demand in the MPL		
"They have the same skill level and similar opinions which allign with ours. It is difficul to choose just one, I only chose one because i had to. I would let both stay"	1	1
"Obviously we don't want A as much as B in a general sense. But I actually don;t want either of them and they will add nothing to my world. So I wentr with the economic choice."	1	1
"It does not bother me who earns more or pays more tax. If they are both looking to stay in the UK and neither have no criminal record, let them."	0	0

Notes: Responses are reproduced as written, including spelling and punctuation errors. Panel A contrasts income used as evidence about cultural traits (coded one) with income outweighing a cultural concern the respondent still holds (coded zero). Panel C contrasts a recorded choice the respondent says conflicts with their true preference (coded one) with plain indifference (coded zero).

Table D.2: Manual versus GPT-5.1 Classification Agreement

Coding task	Agreement	Cohen's κ	Precision	Recall	F1
Income as a cultural signal	98.2%	0.53	0.44	0.69	0.54
Guessed the hypothesis	98.8%	0.75	0.95	0.63	0.76
Experimenter demand in the MPL	96.3%	0.66	0.88	0.56	0.68

Notes: Agreement and Cohen's κ are computed over all coded responses; precision, recall, and F1 refer to the positive (coded-one) category, with the manual coding as the reference.

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