

# **EC202 Seminar Week 5**

## **Covering Materials from Week 3**

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# Recap

- Pure exchange economy
- Utility function
- Edgeworth Box
  - Convex indifference curves
  - Pareto dominating set
  - Pareto optimal set
- Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS)
- Marginal utility
- Budget set
- Allocation

# Notions

- Excess demand and supply

The excess demand of good  $j$ , denoted  $z_j$  can be calculated as

$$z_j = \sum_{i \in I} x_{ij} - \sum_{i \in I} e_{ij}$$

For a  $2 \times 2$  economy, this means:

$$z_1 = (x_{A1} + x_{B1}) - (e_{A1} + e_{B1}) \quad z_2 = (x_{A2} + x_{B2}) - (e_{A2} + e_{B2})$$

- Utility Maximisation Problem

$$\max_{\mathbf{x}_i \in X} u_i(\mathbf{x}_i) \text{ subject to } \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{x}_i \leq \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{e}_i$$

- Walrasian Equilibrium

Definition A price vector  $\mathbf{p}^* = (p_1^*, p_2^*, \dots, p_J^*) \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^J$  and an allocation  $\mathbf{x}^* = (\mathbf{x}_i^*)_{i \in I} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{I \times J}$  constitute a Walrasian Equilibrium if

- i) For each consumer  $i \in I$ , bundle  $\mathbf{x}_i^*$  solves the consumer's (UMP) at prices  $p^*$ .
- ii) All markets clear:  $\sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{x}_i^* = \sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{e}_i$

We call  $\mathbf{p}^*$  a Walrasian Equilibrium price vector and  $\mathbf{x}^*$  a Walrasian Equilibrium allocation.

- Existence?
- Uniqueness?

# More Notions...

- What is an Walrasian Equilibrium allocation,  $\mathbf{x}$ ?
- Aggregate demand and supply **function**

Definition 3.2. The aggregate demand function  $\sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{x}_i(\mathbf{p}) \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^J$  is the total demanded by consumers as a function of prices. This is a J-dimensional vector whose  $j^{\text{th}}$  element is  $\sum_{i \in I} x_{ij}(\mathbf{p})$

- Excess demand and supply **function**

Definition 3.3. The excess demand function is  $\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{p}) = \sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{x}_i(\mathbf{p}) - \sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{e}_i \in \mathbb{R}^J$ . We can also talk about the excess demand for good  $j$  as the  $j^{\text{th}}$  element of this, which is  $z_j(\mathbf{p}) = \sum_{i \in I} x_{ij}(\mathbf{p}) - \sum_{i \in I} e_{ij}$ . When  $z_j(\mathbf{p}) > 0$  we say that there is excess demand of good  $j$  and when  $z_j(\mathbf{p}) < 0$  we say there is excess supply of good  $j$ .

- What is a price vector,  $\mathbf{v}$ ?
- What (the heck) is, Walras' Law?

Proposition 3.1. Walras' Law: Assuming all individuals have locally nonsatiated preferences, for every price vector  $\mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^J$  for which individuals' demand functions are finite,  $\mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{z}(\mathbf{p}) = p_1 z_1(\mathbf{p}) + \dots + p_J z_J(\mathbf{p}) = 0$ . In words the value of the excess demand vector equals 0. This holds for all prices regardless of whether they are equilibrium prices or not.

- $\mathbf{p}^* \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{w}$

# In-class Question

Q3. Consider a  $2 \times 2$  economy where preferences are represented by  $u_A, u_B : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^2$  where  $u_A = x_{A1}^\alpha x_{A2}^{1-\alpha}$  and  $u_B = x_{B1}^\beta x_{B2}^{1-\beta}$  for some  $\alpha, \beta \in (0, 1)$ . Assume both goods are in strictly positive supply.

- a) Argue that, for any initial endowment, there are no Walrasian Equilibria where one good has price 0 and hence in an Walrasian Equilibrium we must have  $(p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}^2$ .
- b) Let prices be  $(p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}^2$  and incomes be  $M_A, M_B$ . Verify that optimal demands are

$$\mathbf{x}_A(\mathbf{p}, M_A) = \left( \frac{\alpha M_A}{p_1}, \frac{(1 - \alpha) M_A}{p_2} \right)$$
$$\mathbf{x}_B(\mathbf{p}, M_B) = \left( \frac{\beta M_B}{p_1}, \frac{(1 - \beta) M_B}{p_2} \right)$$

## In-class Question

- c) Consider the initial endowment  $\mathbf{e}_A = (0, 1)$ ,  $\mathbf{e}_B = (1, 0)$  :
- i) Find optimal demands  $\mathbf{x}_A(\mathbf{p})$  and  $\mathbf{x}_B(\mathbf{p})$ . Show that these demands satisfy Walras' Law.
  - ii) Find the Walrasian Equilibrium and illustrate it on an Edgeworth box.
  - iii) Verify on your Edgeworth box and algebraically that both players prefer the Walrasian Equilibrium to their initial allocation.
- d) Repeat b) for initial endowment  $\mathbf{e}_A = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$ ,  $\mathbf{e}_B = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$  and  $\alpha < \beta$