

Selective Justice: Party Control Under Stalin

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Abstract: Soviet justice system on the whole was controlled by the Communist Party but still it is known relatively little how exactly justice was administered within the party system, a ubiquitous and multifaceted organization that included thousands of members at different levels of administrative hierarchy. Archival documents permit studying both punishment and pardons and reveal that justice for party members, especially party elites, differed from that for ordinary people. Instead of punishing specific crimes and maintaining certain levels of deterrence, it enforced loyalty for the regime among party members.

I. Introduction

Soviet justice has been analyzed in a number of studies (Conquest 1968; van den Berg 1985; Solomon 1996; Gorlizki 1997; Gregory 2009; Gregory and Belova 2009). These works describe how justice was administered to citizens but shed little light on how it was administered within the Communist party to its members. The system was clearly biased towards party and state elites, who often enjoyed selective justice, while most of the jurists were controlled by the Communist party. How exactly was party justice different from justice for others? Did the mechanisms of justice within the party system imitate the justice process outside? How and to what effect did the party treat its own members who committed crimes against the party and/or state, and against other individuals?

We use documents from formerly secret party archives to study party justice from different angles. Rather than focusing on periods of sudden and sweeping party purges (the 1932-3 and 1935-8 purges, the great terror, and the 1948 Leningrad affair), we focus on more routine mechanisms of party justice.¹ We examine not only the data on punishment but also pardons resulting from appeals reviewed by the Collegium of Party Control Commission (Partkollegiia KPK), a special agency supervising disciplinary practices of regional party organizations.²

The available archival records, both individual cases and statistical data, are very rich and diverse. To provide some intuition as to what kind of knowledge can be derived from this material we begin with a case of a comrade Brilevskii, which illustrates both common and specific practices discussed in the paper.

In April 1948, the Party Control Commission (hereafter, KPK), passed a resolution: “Overruling the Stalingrad *obkom* decision, [we] expel comrade Brilevskii from the party ranks and ban his re-instatement in the future”.³

¹ On purges, see, for example, Robert Conquest (1968), Getty (1985), and Getty and Naumov (1999); on the Leningrad affair, see Gorlizki and Khlevniuk (2004).

² Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State (hereafter, ASCP), Microfilm Collection, Hoover Institution Archives. Fond 6, Opis 6. The collection description and finding aids can be accessed online via the California Digital Library at oac.cdlib.org. Original documents are deposited in the Russian State Archives of Social and Political Information (RGASPI) in Moscow.

³ The purpose of the Commission of Party Control (Komissia Partiinogo Kontroliia pri Tsentralnom Komitete Partii, hereafter KPK) was to discipline party members involved in misconduct, including illegal use of state resources and violation of government decrees. KPK’s work was predominantly organized as campaigns monitoring implementation of specific government decrees, but many of KPK cases were also triggered by letters from rank-and-file party members signaling abuse of office by local party officers or production managers. Investigations of production managers could uncover a whole chain of people and organizations involved in misconduct, including local party secretaries. (See more in Getty 1985; Rees 1987; Belova 2001).

Brilevskii – the director of a food processing trust in Stalingrad and party member since 1922 – was charged with corruption, fraud, and misuse of state resources and the KPK ruling appears to be a reasonable and expected reaction to his crimes. What makes his case remarkable is that, since the early 1930s, Brilevskii had been subject to multiple disciplinary and criminal charges and had already been punished both by his home party organizations and KPK. He received at least five strict reprimands and was expelled from the party three times.⁴ Each time, however, he not only managed to get his reprimands removed and to be reinstated in the party ranks but he continued to belong to the pool of *nomenklatura* workers, occupying top managerial positions in the food industry.

We know a lot about the purging of the party apparatus and about coercion that party members faced. What we did not know is that many coercive measures were not final but, rather, included a mechanism for the appeal and reversal of judgments and fines. Moreover, certain kinds of minor or low-level infractions were apparently tolerated. For at least some people, primarily party members, justice was often negotiable. It appears that the leadership was aware of the fact that neither coercion nor positive incentives were sufficient to ensure that the party members would efficiently execute orders. In addition to coercion and persuasion, therefore, the regime leaders used forgiveness.

The Brilevskii case is not unique in revealing a long record of offenses, sanctions, and pardons. KPK files include thousands of similar cases where

⁴ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 111, l. 73-83.

appeals of disciplinary punishments were followed by either pardons and reinstatements or some sort of clemency, such as replacement of expulsion with a reprimand.⁵ Expulsion decisions were often made with special provisions that either permitted appeals to higher authorities or allowed the case to be re-opened after a certain period, thus adding a temporary component to party disciplinary sanctions. The unusual element in the Brilevskii case, therefore, is that his expulsion was final; he could never appeal again.

Why would the party punish its members and then forgive them? What determined the severity of punishment? Why would the party grant some appeals while rejecting others? The following sections seek to answer those questions by describing both the law enforcement policy within the party system (Section II) and the appeal procedure (Section III), and presenting trends in punishment and pardons in 1939-1951 (Section IV). The paper concludes by offering an interpretation of the observed patterns of party justice.

⁵ Clemency within the party system was not the only form of “mercy” under the Soviet rule. Amnesties and reinstatements of rights also applied to the outcasts outside the party. Already in the early 1920s and 1930s, while purging and alienating large groups of people, the regime introduced the institution of appeals. Disenfranchised Stalin’s outcasts of the 1920s, for example, sought the regime’s forgiveness by submitting petitions for the reinstatements of rights to a number of local and central organizations. (Alexopoulos 2003). The Soviet prison and labor camp system, its cruelty notwithstanding, had constant turnover of millions of criminals through the Gulag due to routine prisoners’ releases and amnesties – a phenomenon that Golfo Alexopoulos (2005) calls “the revolving door of Stalin’s Gulag”.

II. Party's Disciplinary Punishments

The unique and in many respects superior position of the Soviet Communist party dictated that its members could only be disciplined by the party itself. The party system had a special protocol for the enforcement of party rules and the imposition of punishments.⁶ Punishments were levied either by party committees or the party's internal police – control commissions. The central Party Control Commission, KPK, and especially its collegium, Partkollegiia KPK, were charged with oversight of the process. While no criminal prosecution against a party member could proceed without sanction by a party committee at the appropriate level, the KPK itself was predominantly concerned with embezzlement and fraud, and other non-violent offences such as abuse of office or corruption. The vast document trail of this central party organ's efforts to

⁶ Although the party itself was the ultimate overseer, all aspects of party operations – from the accuracy of paperwork by regional party finance departments to the everyday behavior of rank-and-file members – could be the subject of scrutiny by local or central supervisory agencies. The party system had internal and external overseers, each serving different purposes and providing different layers of information. The party financial audit – an internal organ ranging from the Central Audit Commission to regional auditors – enforced fiscal discipline to ensure the local party bureaucracy did not abuse their privileges and benefits. Focusing on financial statements and actual execution of budgets, the auditors revealed the party bureaucracy's attitude towards its own resources. The Commission of Party Control served as an external overseer to discipline party members involved in misconduct, including illegal use of state resources and violation of government decrees. In other words, KPK was vested with the power to identify, investigate, and punish cases of infringement against the dictator's property. KPK's work was predominantly organized as campaigns monitoring implementation of specific government decrees, but many of KPK cases were also triggered by letters from rank-and-file party members signaling abuse of office by local party officers or production managers.

administer justice to party members constitutes primary source for this investigation.

The most common forms of disciplinary punishment was reprimand of various degrees of gravity – from a warning (*postavit na vid*) to standard reprimand to severe reprimand – which potentially could leave a permanent mark in the party member's record and impede future career growth. Virtually all Soviet nomenklatura members, the party and industrial bureaucracy alike, could receive a reprimand or some other negative sanction (Urban 1989). A dismissal from the nomenklatura was not possible without the party imposing its most severe form of disciplinary punishment: expulsion from the party ranks. Even when the case clearly had to be passed over to the criminal court, the offender had to go through a special disciplinary hearing in his party organization to be stripped of his party membership first (Belova 2001). Disciplinary punishments, reprimands or expulsions from the party ranks brought a long lasting stigma. They could remain on a party member's record indefinitely, unless removed following a successful appeal or by an act of a higher-level authority. In some cases, the reprimand was accompanied by a ban on holding positions of responsibility for a designated period of time.

Generally, the severity of punishment increased with the gravity of the offense. Depending on the amount stolen and ability to return the stolen money, offenders could face criminal charges or lose their jobs. Embezzlement of six thousand rubles or more led to criminal charges, whereas embezzlement of one

thousand rubles, which was almost immediately repaid, resulted in a firing.⁷ In the Kuibyshev party organization, a party committee accountant, who embezzled some 800 rubles in cash from the membership dues but managed to return the money, was removed from his position with a reprimand on his record. At the same time, a technical worker who embezzled 19,000 rubles was expelled from the party and sentenced to a 14-year prison term.⁸ Despite the evidence of positive relationship between the severity of offense and the level of punishment is apparent, we neither find sentencing guidelines, nor can infer from data any definite brackets for the amount of harm. This suggests a considerable discretion and potential importance of other variables such as, for example, the status of the offender. In cases of embezzlement, clerical workers (*tekhnicheskie rabotniki*) were more likely to face charges and be punished than members of the party bureaucracy (*otvetrabotniki*).

The Brilevskii case mentioned earlier also supplies evidence of how his position protected him from a more severe punishment. Between 1931 and 1933, while he held administrative positions in the food processing industry of Moldova⁹, Brilevskii received at least two reprimands. In 1931, he refused to accept an appointment in the countryside that resulted in a reprimand issued by a district party control commission. In 1933, he received a strict reprimand from the Central Control Commission – the predecessor of KPK – for an illegal purchase

⁷ ASCP f. 17, op. 76, d. 1250, l. 11.

⁸ ASCP f. 17, op. 76, d. 1846, l. 10.

⁹ In the early 1930s, Moldova was an autonomous republic within Ukraine.

of an automobile from an Italian consul.¹⁰ The disciplinary sanctions remained on his record and ultimately contributed to his permanent expulsion from party, but at the time they had no immediate effect. The fact that he escaped more severe penalties in 1931-33 was likely due to his managerial position as an important resource-holder, someone whose access to the output of the food processing industry in a starving country allowed him to literally feed his influential connections.

In many cases, however, even the combined status of the offender and the gravity of offense failed to predict the outcome. An expulsion could follow embezzlement of a large amount of money or a violation of government regulations but there was no uniform standard of punishment, although KPK officials agreed that standards should be uniform. Internal KPK discussions show that such hard to measure factors as a particular plenipotentiary's style and the quality of work environment may have affected the final decisions. Furthermore, plenipotentiaries were known to change their work style when transferred.¹¹ KPK leaders asserted, however, that it was extremely important to strive for the strict

¹⁰ Brilevskii, then a manager at a food processing trust in Moldova, impersonated a member of the Central Control Commission and the Moldova regional government to get approval for the deal. He hugely overpaid for the car whose value should not have exceeded 5,000 rubles, but he paid the total of 51,000 rubles: 3,300 rubles for the car and the rest, allegedly, for its spare parts and maintenance tools. Despite the significant amount of money involved and the severity of the offense, this transaction resulted in no more than a reprimand. (ASCP f. 6, op.2, d. 111, l. 73-83.)

¹¹ ASCP f. 6, op. 1, d. 14, l. 79-86.

implementation of general decrees irrespective of the inspector's individual temperament.¹²

Uniformity of punishment was hard to achieve not only because of different philosophies within KPK. The ultimate goal of KPK was to ensure the proper execution of the “dictator’s orders” – party-state decrees – rather than to punish particular offenses or set the norms of “party justice”. The decrees hardly ever specified what kind of punishment should be applied. Moreover, KPK work was often organized as campaigns: immediately after a decree was issued, KPK engaged in frenetic activity pursuing its implementation. Brief but frequent *ad hoc* campaigns intended to enforce particular government decrees obscured the picture. Campaigns would suddenly boost the rate of expulsions as a particular category of crime was singled out for the campaign. In such cases, the violation could be for “non-conformance with government decree” of such and such date. The intensity of those campaigns faded however as controllers were given new assignments.¹³ A substantial portion of variation in the level of punishment for the same offense could be therefore explained by timing.

KPK was not the only enforcement agency supervising enterprises and administrative bodies, but its unique function as the party’s police blurred the

¹² ASCP f. 6, op. 1, d. 14, l. 148.

¹³ On December 30, 1934, a government decree banned increases in salaries. KPK immediately dispatched inspectors who vigorously reprimanded the managers when violations of the decree were identified (ASCP f. 6, op. 1, d. 41; d. 42.) In a few months, however, the KPK campaign was almost over and the “salary issue” was dropped from the agenda. The number of KPK investigators was insufficient to uniformly cover all the aspects of economic life, as well as geography, to enforce newly issued decrees and orders.

distinction between what was God's and what was Caesar's – between the KPK and non-party law enforcement agencies that included courts, regular police, secret police MGB-KGB, and other agencies. Confusion about when KPK should get involved and how party organs should respond to various sorts of misdemeanors arose frequently. At a 1936 KPK meeting, for example, an influential KPK official, Emelian Yaroslavskii, expressed his worries about the fine line between party disciplinary punishment and court sentences: “Sometimes [KPK] substitutes for Soviet courts. Sometimes [party] committees discuss every misdeed by an official, and they feel they have to levy disciplinary punishments. We must rigorously distinguish between cases that should be considered offenses against the party versus the state.”¹⁴ Given the dual role of KPK, this distinction was unachievable. The lack of legal background of KPK staff complicated the issue even further. KPK investigators rarely referenced what paragraph of the legal code had been violated. If they referred to any laws at all, their references were to the joint party-state decrees, although specific provisions of those decrees were not necessarily used to justify their decisions. More often cases were initiated and treated at the discretion of KPK officials, who had an imprecise understanding of what was legal and illegal but were largely driven by the party line and a vague sense of what was appropriate. Nevertheless, whenever KPK chose to pass a case to the state prosecutor's office, the punishment largely followed the recommendation supplied by the principal KPK investigator. After facing a trial, a

¹⁴ ASCP f. 6, op. 1, d. 15, l. 88-115.

party member could get a jail sentence, be sent to a labor camp, or even be sentenced to death, but the choice of punishment also depended on the position of the KPK plenipotentiary who recommended it.¹⁵

The divergent views within the KPK concerning the appropriate standards of enforcement and the understanding of “right” and “wrong” can be summarized as the division between “hard-liners”, who insisted on strict adherence to norms and the most severe punishment, and “realists”, who leaned towards rationalizing illegal actions by studying their causes.¹⁶ Those divisions were probably conditioned on the political environment and career concerns of KPK officials rather than on personal conviction. It is difficult to identify longtime KPK officeholders as consistent puritans or pragmatists, but at any moment, divisions were apparent. Minutes of KPK meetings in the 1930s record frank discussions of differences in approaches. Postwar records are less candid, but the divisions probably continued.

The bigger issue was that the norms of law, especially during Stalin’s era, were unrealistic, and orders were typically impossible to execute accurately. Even an “honest” manager – a loyal servant of the state intent on faithfully fulfilling tasks – was faced with a dilemma: to obey the numerous regulations and fail to

¹⁵ Party interventions into procedural justice continued into the post-Stalin period. Yoram Gorzki (1997) shows how Khrushchev’s attempts to revitalize the party ideologically by elevating party-based modes of leadership essentially offset the contemporary campaigns against party interventions and only increased party involvement in the administration of justice.

¹⁶ Arch Getty (1997) uses terms “puritans” and “pragmatists” to refer to these two patterns respectively.

deliver or break the rules to ensure that the main goal – the production target – was reached. As a result, every agent of the state – and in fact every citizen – operated in a gray zone, where it was impossible to avoid infractions. Even a major violation could be justified *ex post* on the grounds that it served a good purpose. The legal gap created by inconsistent constraints on individual behavior made discretion by the supervisors unavoidable. In a way this matched the dictator’s interests making it difficult for his agents to “beat the system”. Yet, a complex system of punishment was needed to compensate for this legal gap, which left the enforcers themselves vulnerable to accusations of either lack of vigilance or excessive harshness.

III. Party Mercy: The KPK as an Appeals Court

The party’s door was a revolving one. Not only could the offenders’ service records be cleared, at least partially, by removing the reprimands, but the expelled offenders could be reinstated in the party ranks. Party members could only be punished or pardoned by the party itself. Both pardons and clemency were subject to proof of loyalty to the regime and entailed a costly multi-stage appeal process that required many hours of work by party bureaucrats and assumed colossal paperwork. The possibility of future rehabilitation was embedded in many sentences given in party disciplinary cases. The repeated catch phrases were: “Allow to reconsider the case in one year on a petition from the primary party cell”, or “prohibit occupying any position of responsibility for two (or three) years”. Similar to

prison sentences, therefore, the party's disciplinary punishment was temporal and discrete. Deviant behavior by the regime's loyal supporters could be punished without completely shutting them out of the system.

The idea of instituting a rehabilitation process for party members goes back to the 1930s. A KPK official Beker, for example, suggested to the Third Assembly of KPK in 1936: "If a person corrects himself, we should remove the reprimand. This is one of the strong sides of party control. We remove reprimands after three or four inspections."¹⁷ This idea provoked an argument that the party reprimand may lose its power as an effective deterrent if offenders knew that the sanction would be routinely reversed either by their local party organization or the KPK.¹⁸ The deputy chairman of KPK, Shkiriakov, was concerned about the frequent use of reprimands. He cited the case of a director of a collective farm, who had received 18 reprimands since becoming a party candidate. Accustomed to this penalty, the manager simply expected a new reprimand when his next offence occurred.¹⁹ Some communists had more than ten reprimands. KPK secretary Yaroslavskii once noted that "often two to four pages are needed to be added to the member's card to provide space for recording all punishments."²⁰

Despite these objections, reprimands and appeal procedures were institutionalized. Not only were reprimands becoming accepted as routine by the

¹⁷ ASCP, f. 6, op. 1, d. 13, l. 109- 154.

¹⁸ In the 1930s, this evoked criticism from the KPK chair Yezhov, who argued that local party organizations too readily excused reprimanded managers. (ASCP f. 6, op. 1, d. 15, l. 88-115).

¹⁹ ASCP, f. 6, op. 1, d. 15.

²⁰ ASCP, f. 6, op. 1, d. 15, l. 88-115.

offenders; they were frequently reversed by their party secretaries and the KPK itself, thus becoming a sort of scoring system. One's "penalty score" – the number of reprimands on record – could increase or decrease depending on an individual's performance, deeds and misdeeds, and of course the efforts undertaken to appeal a reprimand. The party record was a flexible method of screening nomenklatura members. The rankings of bureaucratic positions reflected ones' current status, whereas the party record reflected one's potential for future career growth or decline. Every entry in party records, as positive or negative, could alter one's chances of either keeping a current position or getting a promotion. Reprimands, therefore, were a way of documenting observed deviant behavior.

Appeals of disciplinary punishments typically were filed with the local party organizations that originally issued them, but appellants could challenge the decision made by their home party organization by petitioning the Partkollegiia KPK or the Party Congress.²¹ Often, prior to making its decisions, the Partkollegiia required KPK regional plenipotentiaries to collect additional evidence. If it planned to override the sentence, it invited both the appellant and a

²¹ The original KPK cases constituted a small fraction of the disciplinary cases generated within the party system. Typically, they resulted from the CC CPSU requests to investigate unethical behavior – such as drunkenness, abuse of office, conspicuous consumption, weak political vigilance – of the party members during their business trips abroad. In 1939–1947, for example, only 540 cases (out of 91,551 processed in that period) originated in the Partkollegiia of which 281 resulted in expulsions and the rest in other disciplinary punishments (ASCP f.6, op.6, d.3).

representative from the local party organization for a meeting.²² In reviewing the appeal, the Partkollegiia considered the nature of the offence, the appellant's current status and position, as well recommendations from peers. Then the Partkollegiia either affirmed the previous sentence, or granted the appeal. In expulsion cases, the appeal might result in permission to re-enter the party following standard procedures. Essentially, this meant that the appellant's status was upgraded from expelled to party candidate (*pereveden v kandidaty*). A record of success on the "economic front", the lack of selfish motives, a sincere penitence, as well as a good biographical record could significantly increase one's chances of appeal.²³

At the personal level, people formed expectations with respect to the possibility of rehabilitation and acquired, by means of trial and error, valuable knowledge regarding how to meet the system's requirements and to maximize the probability of success. Appeals usually portrayed reliable and loyal servants of the regime who worked hard to correct their involuntary mistakes and were prepared to work even harder in the future. Appeals were often supported by recommendations from the home party organizations. But was the party justice actually designed to meet people's expectations? What was the ultimate reason behind the party's rules of punishment as well as clemency?

²² Sometimes, Partkollegiia required the party organization to review the case, which usually resulted in the reversal of the previous decision.

²³ Typically, a good biographical record included such characteristics as poor family origins, service in the Red Army, being a victim of the 'enemy' of the regime (such as the Tsarist government, White guards, or a former superior who was a 'counter-revolutionary') in the past.

There were different types of clemency. “Unconditional pardon” did not carry any residual punishment and resulted in an immediate reinstatement to the party ranks. “Pardon with reprimand” resulted in reinstatement in the party but implied that an additional appeal had to be filed to remove the residual reprimand from one’s record. “Demotion to party candidate” (“*pereveden v kandidaty*”) essentially sent the appellant back to square one with respect to his or her eligibility for the privileges and benefits associated with party membership. Although party candidates were allowed to become party members only after a certain probationary period, they paid the same membership dues as full party members.²⁴ Inconclusive evidence, insufficient documentation, or conflicting policies could send an appeal into a gray zone, where it could be neither affirmed nor reversed. The appeal acquired a “postponed” status and the appellant was allowed to resubmit the petition in a few months. The share of such uncertain cases fluctuated, reaching peaks of 11 percent immediately before and after the war and 12 percent in 1948 (see Figure 1).

²⁴ The rules of the Soviet Communist party (similar to other communist countries) specified a probationary period for new members. During this time, new party recruits were titled *candidates*. Upon passing the candidate review successfully, they became *full* party members (Lazarev 2007). Essentially, the difference between full party members and candidates was in the allowed benefits rather than actual requirements. Both full members and candidates paid equal membership dues and were to participate in the party meetings, and other activities. Rank-and-file party members enjoyed only minor non-pecuniary benefits of membership (such as softer punishment in case of criminal prosecution, preferential right to occupy certain types of jobs, etc.), whereas the party bureaucracy received substantial rents in the form of high salaries and fringe benefits. A major part of party expenditures, according to national party budgets, was geared to provide benefits to paid party officials, the remainder being used to cover operational expenses and to finance propaganda campaigns (Belova and Lazarev 2007).

“Repeated appeals” are defined as cases where one or more appeals were rejected but the expelled party members continued to appeal.²⁵ It is not clear whether there was definite end, a point after which no more appeal could be made, but KPK records suggest that the number of resubmission was quite large. Between 1939 and 1947, over one-third of the appeals of expulsions considered by the Partkollegiia had been submitted two or more times: out of 91,500 appeals considered during this period, 32,500 were repeated appeals; nearly four-fifth of these had been filed two times and the remaining one-fifth three or more times. During the war years, KPK received 11,500 repeat appeals concerning expulsions and over 80 percent of these were granted.²⁶ Nearly 13 percent of repeat appeals that resulted in reinstatement during the war were justified on the ground that the person redeemed themselves in the battlefield or through exemplary labor effort. In 15 percent of cases, good recommendations, support from army commanders and military party cell secretaries, and petitions from higher-level party committees (district or regional) played a decisive role; in four percent of cases the expulsion was replaced by a reprimand. Only one percent of repeat appeals were granted because new investigations did not confirm accusations.

²⁵ The KPK report for 1939-1951 noted that “A large number of former party members expelled for different offences continue to appeal to the Partkollegiia asking to reconsider their cases even though the Partkollegiia rejected their appeals over and over again as ungrounded.” (ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d.3, l. 36-38) Some cases were processed as many as seven times. One former party member continued to appeal even after at least four negative verdicts, the Partkollegiia sent his case to the archives.

²⁶ ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3.

The cases of repeat offences followed by repeat pardons or reduced sentences, as in the Brilevskii case, suggest that the regime was seeking an optimal punishment for its loyalists, the party members. Between 1931 and 1933, for example, Brilevskii received several strict reprimands but managed to retain both his freedom and his job. In 1933, soon after receiving a reprimand for the illegal purchase of a car from an Italian consul, Brilevskii was reprimanded by the Moldova obkom and expelled from the party by the Moldova KPK for exaggerating the fruit harvest, which resulted in a lower than expected supply of fruit to the industrial centers of the Donbass region, Ukraine, and overdrafts on the payroll account. In June 1934, the KPK reinstated Brilevskii in the party, reducing his punishment to a reprimand. In October 1935, again, the Partkollegiia KPK ruled to expel Brilevskii based on new evidence of his involvement in bribes and misuse of grain supplies by selling grain stocks meant as bonus payments to workers. In spite of everything, Brilevskii remained in the party nomenklatura and was appointed to a managerial position in Moldova. Already in July 1936, the Partkollegiia restored him to the party based on positive recommendations and “hard work”: he overfulfilled the production plan in the 1st half of 1936.

Another form of pardon was the permission to “re-apply” to the party “following the standard procedure” (*vstupit na obshchikh osnovaniakh*), if the appellant “redeemed himself” and his loyalty “passed the test of time”.²⁷ In other words, such a decision would mean that the party was willing to “forget” one’s

²⁷ ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3.

previous sins and re-consider his or her candidacy. The share of “re-entry” decisions was relatively stable – around one percent – throughout the period, briefly rising to four percent in 1945-6 (Figure 1).²⁸

Often the Partkollegiia issued pardons to correct harsh decisions made by local party organizations. Often personal rivalry or conflicts between old members and newly appointed members threatened to upset the shaky balance of the party justice. Every party member, however, was a regime supporter whose loyalty was paid for either by appointments, or education in party schools, or benefits. As an overseer of the party system, the KPK had to emphasize that party members should be judged not by a single transgression but by their behavior during the period of their membership.²⁹ A 1940 KPK report shows a characteristic criticism of party justice by local party bodies. The large proportion of pardons granted in that year was a direct result of regional obkoms misconstruing the notorious labor law of June 26th 1940 that led to expulsions of party members for a single case of tardiness.³⁰ Apparently, the punishment that was routinely given to ordinary workers was not meant to pertain to party members. Ordinary workers could be used as scapegoats, but party members had

²⁸ Between 1939 and 1947, the Partokollegia granted “re-entry” in 1108 cases such as of violation of work-place discipline (mostly tardy) (458 cases), domestic violence (“non-party behavior at home”) (135 cases), low political vigilance (133 cases), misrepresentation of social origins (112 cases), loss of party documents (85 cases). The majority of such cases involved appellants whose party membership was relatively short, less than ten years.

²⁹ ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 2, l.16. The 1940 KPK report to the CPSU Central Committee.

³⁰ ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 2, l. 20.

unique personal histories and were not supposed to be judged on the basis of a single transgression.

The KPK cassation machine, however, worked in both directions. It could override the decision of a local party organization if it found a punishment either too lenient or if it believed that the locals had granted groundless appeals. Thus the KPK was capable of offsetting the influence of local cliques by interfering with the party's incentive structure and promotion mechanisms.³¹ In 1940, for example, a KPK representative found that the Chkalovsk obkom³² granted a number of unsupported re-instatements such as, for example, the case of the party member since 1932, who was expelled in 1939 by a local *raikom* for abuse of office and embezzlement. In less than a year, the obkom granted his appeal and reduced the sentence to a strict reprimand but there was no any materials substantiating the reversal.³³ In June 1945, the director of a state farm in the Voronezh region, party member since 1919, was expelled by his local party organization for abuse of office, illegal transactions, and embezzlement of

³¹ Lazarev (2007) discusses a system of promotion incentives used by Soviet leaders to create the prospect, if illusory, of upward mobility so that party members would not relinquish their support to the regime, or seek outside options. For the incentives to be real, however, the current leaders would have to resign from their positions to make way for new promotions, which was hardly consistent with the Soviet leaders' objectives. Expectations of promotion created, nevertheless, incentives for activists to expend extra effort in a capacity as informants, voluntary supervisors in the workplace, or members of paramilitary. These services benefited the regime by increasing the leadership's control over the economy and/or exerting more effort from ordinary workers and therefore increase state revenues.

³² Now the city of Orenburg on the Ural River. From 1938 to 1957, the city bore the name Chkalov, after the test pilot Valery Chkalov.

³³ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 26, l. 22-24.

donations to the Red Army made by state farm workers. Just one month later, the Bureau of the Radchinskii raikom – the higher-level party organization – reversed the expulsion decision and thereby reduced the sentence to a reprimand.³⁴ Moreover, the secretary of the state farm party organization, the one who reported the director's misconduct, was removed from his position. Evaluating the reports from the Voronezh region, the Partkollegiia passed a resolution overturning the pardon by the Radchinskii raikom. It is likely that the KPK inspector suspected that the pardons resulted from an exchange of favors between local bosses, which appear particularly transparent in the last case, where the whistle-blower was persecuted.

Neither harsh punishment nor excessive leniency was in the dictator's best interests as both extremes could potentially upset the incentive structure and thereby reduce the stock of loyalty to the regime. While too harsh a punishment could decrease the number of loyalists, too lenient a punishment or quick mercy could result in a mismatch between the offender's current position and the benefits attached to it. If left unattended, excessive leniency could undermine the system of promotion incentives and thus threaten the party structure.

Another way to throw a monkey wrench into the party promotion machine was by refusing to accept appointments, which was treated as a major disciplinary offense punishable by expulsion. In 1960, for example, a party worker refused to work as a manager at a local state farm and was expelled by the Omsk obkom.

³⁴ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 87, l. 1-18.

Although his reason may sound personal, it was not unusual. His wife, a pharmacist, did not want to join him in the country side because she believed it would be hard for her to find a job. Later this person filed an appeal with the party control commission and was reinstated.³⁵ Job assignments were refused by tenured party bureaucrats as well as by new party-school graduates, who were typically assigned to local party organizations to start their journey up the bureaucratic ladder. For example, in 1959, Vladimir Navarnov (party member since 1943), a former secretary of the Borzinskii raikom in Chita region, was appointed the director of the collective farm “Put k Kommunizmu”. Claiming that “he is unfamiliar with the specifics of the country side and would not be good at that job,” Navarnov refused the new appointment and was expelled from the party. However, his case could be re-open if his appeal was supported by petitions from primary party organizations. Navarnov used this opportunity and in less than two years, in 1961, his appeal for reinstatement in the party was granted. Another example involves Alexei Petrov (party member since 1957), a new graduate of the Kysyl party school, the republic of Tuva. After four years of studying, he started working as a professional party secretary at the collective farm “Mezhgei,” while his family remained in Kysyl. He was doing a good job, but the Tuva obkom interpreted his frequent trips to the city as a sign of low moral, which eventually led to his expulsion from the party. The expulsion, however, was later replaced

35 ACSP f. 6, op. 5, d. 135, l. 30.

with a reprimand conditional on Petrov's unequivocal acceptance of his position at "Mezhgei"³⁶.

Overall, punishments for such misconduct as rejecting an appointment or lack of enthusiasm typically were removed relatively easily – as long as the offender agreed to accept his lot.³⁷ Such a lenient attitude might look surprising since, according to Stalin, there were no "irreplaceable people" in the Soviet Union. The party's readiness to "forgive" its members, however, should be explained not by its determination to impose rigid norms of behavior, but by its investment in producing loyal cadres, which were not to be lost. The party has invested substantial resources in people like Alexei Petrov and it was rational therefore to force him to perform the assigned task rather than let him go. It is entirely plausible that Petrov was not the best person for this task but allowing him the freedom to choose for himself rather than adhere to the party's plans would wreak havoc in the nomenklatura system. The marginal negative effect from a single case of renegotiation of appointment could have been particularly high in the small world of peripheral party organizations.

The general availability of pardons and reduced sentences did not imply that they could be obtained automatically. Even an appellant with no prior offences, a clean record and relatively high position in the party bureaucracy could face substantial obstacles in his or her appeal. In 1946, for example, the

³⁶ ACSP f. 6, op. 5, d. 30, l. 18.

³⁷ ACSP f. 6, op. 5, d. 30-63.

Bureau of KPK issued a reprimand to the secretary of the Stalingrad obkom for misusing the fund allocated exclusively to reward exemplary workers and managers.³⁸ The secretary petitioned, expressing his deep remorse and admitting his guilt. He argued that the reprimand was “too harsh a sentence” in his case asking to replace the reprimand with a warning based on his impeccable reputation during his 19-year tenure in the party. The plea, however, had no effect, which was not uncommon. There were many similar cases, like the one of the first secretary of the Livenskii raikom, for example, when neither support from local authorities nor legal provisions helped reduce the punishment.

In December of 1945, the first secretary of the Livenskii raikom received a reprimand from the Orlov obkom, a higher-level party organization, for violations of grain procurements in 1943 and the case was passed to the regional procurator. What makes this case interesting is that six months later the procurator’s office closed it citing the permission from the procurator general of RSFSR. This permission allowed closing the case according to Article 8 of the Criminal code of RSFSR, a special provision used by courts to free offenders when either they or their offenses did not pose a further immediate danger. At first, the secretary’s case appeared to have good prospects. Based on the materials from the procurator and the secretary’s clean record (he also was a war veteran), the KPK even drafted a resolution recommending limiting the punishment to a strict reprimand. Yet, the final ruling resulted in the expulsion of the secretary, along with the

³⁸ ASCP f.6, op.2, d.93, l.1-24.

director of the local procurement agency. The text of the final resolution suggests that the April 8, 1943 party-state decree that imposed strict personal liability for any violation of procurement procedures was of greater significance to KPK than the provision in the Criminal Code implying a lighter sentence.³⁹

IV. Trends in Punishments and Pardons, 1939-1951

Each year, about two percent of party members were expelled from the party. In the 1940s, as party membership grew, so did annual expulsions. By the late 1940s, when the rate of growth of party membership slowed down (from some 0.2 percent a year 1944 to the negative -0.01 in 1949) annual growth rates in expulsions also dropped from some 0.4 percent in 1944 to -0.17 in 1949 and remained negative at least until 1951, when our data series end.⁴⁰ Each year, a portion of those expelled appealed to higher level party institution, including the KPK. The available statistics reveal a downward trend in the percentage of appeals (Table 1). The percentage of expulsions that resulted in appeals, declined from over one-half in 1939 to one-third in 1943 to less than one-fifth in 1950.

Vested with the power to supervise disciplinary punishments by regional party organizations, the Partkollegia KPK decided hundreds of cases and collected its own statistics (Table 2). Between 1939 and 1947, the Partkollegiia processed nearly ten percent of all appeals submitted to the party system – over

³⁹ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 95, l. 89-130.

⁴⁰ Calculations of annual growth rates are made using the data from Table 1.

91,500 cases – of which 80 percent were appeals concerning expulsions from the party.⁴¹ The majority of the expelled faced political, criminal, or disciplinary charges. In the 1940s, abuse of office and embezzlement constituted the largest and fastest growing category reaching one-third of all cases (Table 5). They were followed by violations of party discipline (unauthorized relocation, non-participation in party activities), which resulted in approximately one-fifth of all expulsion cases processed by the Partkollegiia. Over the decade from 1940 to 1950, violations of workplace discipline, mostly tardiness or unauthorized absences, fell dramatically as a reason for expulsion from over one-fifth to some three percent of the cases.

The Partkollegiia granted on average over one-fifth of the appeals from former party members seeking reinstatement in the party ranks. Of the successful appeals, nearly three quarters resulted in unconditional pardons. In nearly one-fourth of them the sentence was reduced to a reprimand. In less than five percent of appeals, appellants were granted the party candidate status, which carried no benefits but required payments of standard membership dues, and allowed to be admitted to the party after a certain probation period.⁴² Between 1939 and 1947, Partkollegiia considered some 2,500 appeals of disciplinary punishments other than expulsions from the party, of which 13 percent resulted in a reduced

⁴¹ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 3.

⁴² ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3.

punishment, 12 percent resulted in unconditional reversal, and the remaining cases were affirmed.⁴³

Sometimes the lack of substantial incriminating evidence was cited as a main reason for reduced sentences and pardons. For example, in 1941, the director of an Altai state enterprise – a party member since 1926 – was accused of embezzlement and rigging output data and removed from his position. An additional investigation by KPK reduced his punishment from a strict reprimand on record to a simple reprimand because many of the accusations did not hold: The director had corrected the 1944 output data and had informed the ministry about the changes. Moreover, KPK found that the Altai *kraikom* broke the rules by failing to coordinate the removal of the director with the ministry.⁴⁴ It is likely that the director had friends within the ministry and enemies within his local party. In any event, KPK interpreted this as a case of a harsh punishment which could reduce the loyalty of a potentially valuable member.

The probability of successful appeals varied over time. Some appeals were granted within one year, others were either rejected or required several iterations.⁴⁵ In the 1940s, the period for which we have detailed statistics, KPK processed on average 9,000 appeals from expelled party members, each year, granting less than one-sixth of them.⁴⁶ Although no more than 15 percent of

⁴³ ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3.

⁴⁴ ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3.

⁴⁵ Between 1939 and 1947, over one third of all appeals processed by the Partkollegiia KPK were repeated appeals filed two or more times (ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3).

⁴⁶ ACSP f. 6, op. 6, d. 7-22.

appeals were granted each year on average, the highest probability of clemency falls on the early period. In 1939, some 11,000 appeals were processed, of which 35 percent resulted in some sort of clemency. In 1940, the annual number of processed appeals rose to 14,500. Although the probability of pardons and permissions to re-apply for the party membership following the standard procedure declined to 23 percent, it still was above the average in the decade of the 1940s. It is highly plausible that the fluctuations in the probability of successful appeals were not random. It is likely that frequent pardons of 1939 and 1940 were correcting the outcome of the party purges, a natural reaction to the excessive punishment used during the years of Great Terror, 1937-8. Over 60 percent of cases processed in 1940 appealed the sentences imposed prior to the 18th Party Congress in March 1939, which marked the end of the Great Terror. Those cases had a higher percentage of pardons granted by the Partkollegiia than the sentences imposed after the Congress.⁴⁷

The Partkollegiia decisions from the late 1930s to the late 1940s reveal an interesting regularity. The probability of a successful appeal declined reaching a low of ten percent by the mid 1940s, but it picked up gradually after 1948. In 1950, Partkollegiia granted nearly one-fifth of the processed appeals. As the appeal success rate increased, however, it became harder to get an unconditional pardon (Table 3). The share of reinstatements without reprimand dropped from 64 percent in 1946 to 34 percent in 1947 to 18 percent in 1948 and by 1951 it hardly

⁴⁷ ACSP f. 6, op. 6, d.2.

exceeded ten percent. The probability of a pardon with reprimand jumped from one-third in 1946 to some 60 percent in 1947 and stayed at that level until the end of our period of observation. One's chances of being granted candidate status, which allowed re-entry into the party, also rose from nearly one-tenth in 1947 to nearly one-fifth in 1948 to one third in 1950.

The case of the first secretary of the Astrakhan *okruzhkom* Golyshev, is consistent with the general dynamics in the probability of pardons. In November 1943, Golyshev took a fall for his deputies, who received bribes from local businesses and gave vouchers to the cafeteria for ranking officials to ineligible people.⁴⁸ While his deputies received strict reprimands and were demoted, Golyshev received a standard reprimand. As soon as June 1944, he began filing appeals to clear his record until KPK finally ruled in his favor in January 1948.⁴⁹

The Golyshev case seems to follow the general pattern of pardons rather closely. The appeal success rate was declining from 18 percent in 1943, to 12 percent in 1944, to 10 percent in 1946 (Table 3). From 1948, however, it began to pick up, and by 1951, the success rate nearly doubled increasing the odds for Golyshev-type appeals from the previous years.

Unlike the Golyshev case, the Brilevskii case is inconsistent with the general dynamics of pardons. Has Brilevskii been testing the party's patience for too long? What made the party repeatedly forgive Brilevskii against all odds only

⁴⁸ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 53, l. 8.

⁴⁹ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 110, l. 14-20.

to shut him out completely when the party's leniency to other offenders increased? Brilevskii was expelled in 1942, when the share of expulsions (relative to the total party membership) began to decline (see Table 1) and was restored to the party ranks in 1944, when only one of a dozen appeals was granted. In March 1947, Brilevskii – the director of the Stalingrad food trust, a holding of several state enterprises producing food preserves – was discharged and expelled again by the Stalingrad obkom on the charges of unauthorized barter and the illegal purchase a private vehicle.⁵⁰ This time around he was given the right to appeal in six months. Soon after that, however, the criminal case against him was closed and the charges dropped.⁵¹ Impressed with the positive recommendations from the secretary of the Stalingrad obkom and the minister of the Food industry, the Prosecutor General of the USSR decided that expulsion was a sufficient punishment, especially because Brilevskii was already removed from his post. Brilevskii did not consider this outcome the end of his career. To the contrary, he was certain that his appeal on re-instatement would be granted in no time. Indeed, by 1947, his prior history included five reprimands and four expulsions, but he continued to occupy top managerial positions in the food industry. In December 1947, six months after his expulsion, he filed an appeal to KPK and proactively wrote to the human resource

⁵⁰ ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 111, 73-83.

⁵¹ Technically, there was no rule dictating that criminal charges should immediately be followed by expulsion from the party; and KPK did not always turn cases over to the courts. For example, the chairman of the all-union trading agency was expelled from the party for embezzlement of substantial amounts of money, but the Bureau of KPK specifically noted that “it is not expedient to pass this case on to the court.”(ASCP f. 6, op. 1, d. 14, l. 1–13; d. 15, l. 88-115; d. 53, l. 69.)

department of his ministry inquiring what kind of job in the food industry they have to offer as his expulsion is almost over. This time, however, he ran out of luck.

Following the standard procedure, KPK requested additional information to make its ruling on the appeal, but evidence supplied by the KPK investigator in Stalingrad in 1948 worked against Brilevskii. The positive recommendations that played a critical role earlier turned out to be ungrounded. In fact, the Stalingrad obkom was not in favor of closing the criminal case against Brilevskii, and the procurator's office had collected over 700 documents confirming Brilevskii's involvement in the illegal distribution of the trust's output. Moreover, his personnel file at the ministerial human resource department contained numerous records of his violations and misdemeanors that went back 15 years. In his 1948 memo the KPK investigator wrote: "All those lessons taught Brilevskii nothing; he did not learn to respect Soviet rules. For his multiple offences, he was arrested and tried several times in the cities of Tiraspol, Derbent, and Astrakhan... All evidence points to the Brilevskii's offenses and his self-serving attitude. Since the procurator office and the food ministry maintain different opinions, and in light of new evidence, I recommend to hear the case at the Partkollegiia KPK." As we already know, KPK not only affirmed Brilevskii's expulsion but denied him the

possibility of future appeals.⁵² This was a definite end of the appeal process for Brilevskii and likely the end of his managerial career.

V. Discussion

Justice for party members, especially the party elites, differed significantly from Soviet justice procedures for ordinary people. While the regime could literally destroy a citizen for stealing a handful of grain or being late for work for three minutes, party justice was not as focused as law enforcement agencies were on punishing specific crimes or maintaining levels of deterrence. The main goal of party justice was to enforce a system of incentives, both negative and positive, that party members – the most reliable servants of the regime – indeed remain loyal. If misuse of party funds by party secretaries resulted from their incorrect perception that collected membership dues actually belonged to them rather than the party, those secretaries had to be taught a lesson, but not destroyed. It was not the party's intention to turn its members into antagonized outcasts. Instead, party membership could be used as a bargaining chip in cases of deviant behavior. At the same time, however, the party also had to prevent free-riding on state and party resources. Thus bureaucratic positions and benefits had to be synchronized with the individuals' history and performance.

Party justice was indeed biased towards the elites and in that it did replicate Soviet justice outside the party system. However, unlike on the outside

⁵² ASCP f. 6, op. 2, d. 111, l. 73-83.

of the party system, the regime sought 'optimal justice' for its loyalists, which was not necessarily true with respect to the general population. Party members could commit the exact same offence as an ordinary worker and yet face very different punishment. The main reason for that was that too severe a punishment would hinder potential loyalists from serving the regime. Thus often instead of facing criminal courts, offenders were disciplined by reprimands and demotions. Moreover, even expulsion from the party – a most severe form of party disciplinary punishment – was customarily reversed or reduced through the appeal procedure. The appeal procedure was no less elaborate than the system of incentives used to enhance loyalty. However, it did not give the offenders the “get out of jail free” card as offenders had to repeatedly prove their loyalty to the party and the regime in order to regain access to the careers, privileges, and benefits associated with party membership.

Too lenient a punishment, however, created a perception of impunity and fostered the abuse of state and party resources, which undermined the system of incentives carefully designed to enhance loyalty. Party justice, however, could not be executed from the center only. To a great extent it was delegated to the level of local party organizations, where conflicts between the party and the state as well as between the central and local leadership could be significant. Special institutions within the party, such as KPK and its Partkollegia, were established to monitor the implementation of party justice at the local level in pursuit of the best interests of the regime. One of their functions was to monitor the execution

of party justice at the local level. The Brilevskii case illustrates that while an offender could be valued and have a lot of friends in the ministry, he may not be so useful to the party. Perhaps as far as the ministry was concerned, Brilevskii was just doing his job but from the party's perspective, he added little to the loyalty stock.

An interesting fact is that, in the 1940-1950s, the contemporary political circumstances influenced the justice process within the party. Since 1947-8, the party system experienced considerable financial problems due to a sharp and unexpected decline in state subsidies (Belova and Lazarev 2008).⁵³ At the same time, as evident from increasing rates of successful appeals, the party abolished the quest for "optimal punishment" for its members. Although it became harder for an expelled party member to get an unconditional pardon which would virtually immediately resume all of the former offender's benefits and privileges, the probability of receiving pardons with reprimands doubled. On the one hand, this empirical fact suggests a greater lenience toward the offenders who normally would not be forgiven. On the other hand, although pardons with reprimands implied no benefits or privileges, such reinstatements in party ranks automatically meant payments of membership dues, which was one of the main sources of the party's own revenue. Another piece of evidence that fiscal considerations may

⁵³ In 1948, state subsidies to the party budget were reduced to cover no more than 25 percent of overall party expenditures. Specifically, federal subsidies funded exclusively propaganda and training of party cadre. At that time therefore, the party had to raise own funds to pay salaries to its officers and cover operational expenditures. To this ends, the party finance were reformed in several ways.

have determined the greater predisposition to more lenient sanctions toward the offenders is that appellants were given the party candidate status which implied standard membership dues but no benefits associated with the full member status.

The party justice statistics, as useful as they are, still are puzzling. There is no any evidence of a fee for the appeal procedure. If it was practically costless for the appellant, and there was so much at stake by means of regaining access to valuable income generating positions, why not all of the expelled or disciplined party members appealed? Why did not the appeal procedure become mechanical? More digging into archives is required to answer those questions.

Table 1. The CPSU membership, Expelled from the CPSU, and Appeals to KPK, 1939-1951.

Year	Party Membership	Expelled, cases	Departed, cases	Expelled, % of Membership	Appeals, % of Expelled	Appeals, Cases	Appeals to Parkollegiia KPK, cases	Appeals to Parkollegiia KPK, % of all Appeals
1939	2,306,973	27,952	2,273	0.01	59.50	15,279	10,976	0.72
1940	3,399,975	67,336	4,775	0.02	45.70	28,590	14,466	0.51
1941	3,872,465	96,613	8,163	0.02	10.30	9,110	5,069	0.56
1942	3,063,876	52,746	2,666	0.02	31.80	15,925	5,294	0.33
1943	3,854,701	52,436	1,882	0.01	32.70	16,531	5,315	0.32
1944	4,876,627	85,018	2,513	0.02	18.80	15,511	7,156	0.46
1945	5,760,369	103,125	2,886	0.02	20.80	20,850	7,655	0.37
1946	5,510,862	107,407	4,162	0.02	14.00	14,454	8,661	0.60
1947	6,051,901	132,566	9,105	0.02	13.40	16,544	8,161	0.49
1948	6,390,281	190,037	22,147	0.03	16.60	27,870	10,723	0.38
1949	6,352,572	162,364	22,086	0.02	15.60	21,883	11,953	0.55
1950	6,340,183	128,973	14,175	0.02	18.20	20,893	12,910	0.62
1951	6,462,975	98,924	13,313	0.01	33.00	28,252	7,650	0.27

Source: ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 7-22.

Table 2. Appeals of expulsions from the CPSU processed by KPK, 1939 – 1951.

Year	Total ^{*)} (cases)				Shares		
	Processed	Affirmed	Pardoned ^{**)}	Candidate Status	Affirmed	Pardoned	Candidate Status
1939	10,976	5,807	3,860	-	0.53	0.35	-
1940	14,466	11,010	3,258	-	0.76	0.23	-
1941	5,069	4,022	502	55	0.79	0.10	0.01
1942	5,294	3,805	947	61	0.72	0.18	0.01
1943	5,315	3,652	951	66	0.69	0.18	0.01
1944	7,156	5,780	869	89	0.81	0.12	0.01
1945	7,655	5,786	1,013	294	0.76	0.13	0.04
1946	8,661	7,792	869	380	0.90	0.10	0.04
1947	8,161	7,358	803	179	0.90	0.10	0.02
1948	10,723	8,094	1,153	62	0.75	0.11	0.01
1949	11,953	10,536	1,417	182	0.88	0.12	0.02
1950	12,910	11,249	1,661	235	0.87	0.13	0.02
1951	7,650	5,044	1,419	57	0.66	0.19	0.01
Average	8,922	6,918	1,440	151	0.77	0.16	0.02
Coef. of variation	0.341	0.389	0.691	0.746	0.140	0.457	0.686

Source: ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 7–22.

^{*)} Including appeals filed prior to the 18th Party Congress in March 1939; excluding appeals of reprimands.

^{**)} Including pardons with and without reprimands.

Table 3. Pardons issued by the Partkollegiia KPK, 1939-1951

Year	Pardons with Reprimand	Pardons w/o reprimand	Candidate Status	Postponed
1939	0.28	0.72	0.20	0.05
1940	0.21	0.79	0.06	0.04
1941	0.71	0.25	0.05	0.11
1942	0.23	0.75	0.02	0.10
1943	0.22	0.76	0.01	0.13
1944	0.33	0.65	0.02	0.07
1945	0.33	0.58	0.09	0.11
1946	0.33	0.64	0.04	0.04
1947	0.58	0.34	0.08	0.04
1948	0.65	0.18	0.18	0.12
1949	0.54	0.13	0.22	0.03
1950	0.48	0.11	0.30	0.06
1951	0.58	0.11	0.18	0.04
Average	0.42	0.46	0.11	0.07
Coef. of variation	0.41	0.60	0.84	0.51

Source: ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 7-22.

Table 4. Motivation of expulsions from the CPSU, 1939-1947

Offense	Number of Cases	Percent of Expelled
Political Offenses ¹⁾	16868	0.23
Violation of Workplace Discipline ²⁾	14366	0.19
Violation of Party Discipline	7898	0.11
Violations of Army Discipline	1411	0.02
Loss/Destruction of Party Documents	2980	0.04
Inappropriate ³⁾ behavior under German Occupation	7916	0.11
Domestic Violence ⁴⁾	5241	0.07
Misrepresentation of the Past ⁵⁾	7980	0.11
Abuse of Office, Embezzlement	5248	0.07
Criminal Offenses ⁶⁾	2112	0.03
Libel	1102	0.01
Violation of Revolutionary Law	647	0.01
Desertion from the Soviet Army	891	0.01
Total	74660	

Sources: ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 3.

Notes:

- 1) Political offences include but not limited to concealment of past participation in anti-government opposition, low political vigilance, high treason.
- 2) Violations of workplace discipline, including tardy.
- 3) Inappropriate behavior for a party member.
- 4) Domestic Violence – in the documents coined as a “non-party behavior at home” – includes drunkenness, domestic abuse, and hooliganism.
- 5) Misrepresentation of the past includes concealment of social origins, service in White Army, past convictions, etc.
- 6) Criminal Offenses include bribes, theft, falsifications, and murder.

Table 5. Expulsions from the CPSU by Offence (percent of expelled), 1941, 1948-1951.

Type of Offense	1941	1948	1949	1950	1951
Abuse of office, Embezzlement	16.2	31.4	30.2	34.2	30.3
Violations of party discipline ¹⁾	22	24.5	22.4	23.8	27
Inappropriate ²⁾ behavior under German Occupation		4.5	7.5	3.6	3.9
Criminal misdemeanors ³⁾	13.8	9.3	7.1	4.1	6.5
Inappropriate ²⁾ behavior at home	7.2	5.4	7.6	8.4	7.5
Violations of workplace discipline	21.7	1.2	6.3	3.2	1.3
Loss of party documents	4.8	4.6	7	3.4	4.2
Non-fulfillment of state plans/violation of state discipline	2.2				
		3.7	0.8	1.5	2.7
Political offences ⁵⁾	2.9	0.9	0.8	1.8	1.5
Misrepresentation of the Past ⁵⁾	3.5	2.2	2.6	3.5	3.3
Performance of religious rites		1.8	3.9	2.3	1.2
Violations of Army Discipline ⁶⁾	1.1	0.3	0.08	0.2	0.05
Violations of the State Farm Charter	0.2	2	1.3	2.4	1.6
Libel	0.4		0.03		0.03
Other	4	8.2	2.39	7.6	8.92

Sources: ASCP f. 6, op. 6, d. 1, Summary Report of the Communist Party Control Commission, 1939-1952.

Notes:

- 1) Violations of party discipline include unauthorized relocation, non-participation in party activities.
- 2) Inappropriate behavior for a party member.
- 3) Criminal misdemeanors of various degree of seriousness
- 4) Concealment of the past includes concealment of social origins, service in White Army, past convictions, etc.
- 5) Political offences include but not limited to concealment of past participation in opposition, low political vigilance, high treason.
- 6) Violations of Army Discipline include but not limited to desertion from the Soviet Army.

Figure 1. Postponed appeals of expulsions and “re-entry” decisions, shares of annual totals processed by Partkollegiia KPK, 1939-1951.





Figure 2. Composition of granted appeals of expulsions from the party, shares, 1939-1951.



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