

VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY  
LITHUANIAN INSTITUTE OF HISTORY

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**INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT  
IN SOVIET LITHUANIA 1965–1985:  
TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS**

Summary of doctoral dissertation  
Humanities, History (05 H)



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VYTAUTO DIDŽIOJO UNIVERSITETAS  
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**PRAMONĖS VALDYMAS SOVIETINĖJE  
LIETUVOJE 1965–1985 M:  
ĮTAMPOS IR KONFLIKTAI**

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## Introduction

The twentieth century has entered Lithuanian history as a period of important political events, not only the winning, loss, and restoration of its statehood but also its rapid industrialisation. Unlike Western Europe, where the birth of the modern political nation coincided with intense industrial development, Lithuania's industrialisation was late, occurring under the conditions of the Soviet occupation and annexation. Industrial management is important as one of the areas of knowledge about the economic and social life that allows the structure, nature, and historical development of Lithuania's economy to be revealed.

In the broader sense, Soviet industry was an important area in the material activities of part of the society of that time, an area which influenced its way of life. The corporate work collectives, as separate production communities, perfectly reflect the aspirations, problems, and worries of the society of that time. The Soviet economic, social, and national policies and the societal controls implemented by the regime closely and accurately intertwined in industry, shaping both the reaction of the engineers and workers to government initiatives and the relations between the members of the factory and plant work collectives and the changes in them. Therefore an industrial management analysis allows one to better understand not only Lithuania's economic development and the formation of its structure but also how the significant part of the society who worked in the factories and plants perceived the Soviet system.

The **research object** is the industrial management in Soviet Lithuania.

The **aim of the work** is to reveal the industrial management system in Soviet Lithuania, the conflicts existing in it, and the expression of the system's tensions and conflicts.

The **principal tasks of the work** are to highlight the principal features of Soviet industrial management in Lithuania during the period under study; to describe the effect of the Soviet federal system on the economic system and the expression of the Lithuanian nomenclatura's economic nationalism; to analyse how the Lithuanian nomenclatura understood Lithuania's economic and social interests, how their conception changed, and what measures and means were used in order to realise these interests; and on the basis of examples of the management of all-union subordinated

enterprises to reveal the intersection of the interests of the big factories and plants with those of the republic's government.

– To analyse the measures of the republic's nomenclatura in respect to the management personnel of the Soviet enterprises; to reveal the significance of the nomenclatura system in industrial management and the place the factory managers held in the nomenclatura hierarchy, to highlight the main principles and criteria for the co-optation of industrial managers into the nomenclatura; and to evaluate the significance of the party's personnel control in the industrial management.

– To analyse the use of party penalties and their effect on industrial management as well as the possibilities for the party authorities to affect the managers of all-union subordinated enterprises and their decisions in the direction desired by the republic's government.

– To reveal the inconsistencies in the management of Soviet enterprises as an ideological – economic institution, and the manifestations, which they caused, of company manager dissatisfaction with the Soviet system.

– To describe the manner of the expression of the dissatisfaction of factory engineers and workers as well as its dynamics and influence on corporate management and economic development.

– By analysing the management of industrial enterprises, to reveal the importance of the authority of the enterprise manager as well as the conflicts and tensions between enterprise managers that were caused by the Soviet management system.

The **chronological boundaries of the work** coincide with important events and processes in the industrial management of the USSR. The economic reform, which began in September 1965, caused changes in the industrial management and its centralisation and at the same time changes in the relations between the government institutions and the enterprise managers. In March 1985 M. Gorbachev, who soon initiated new economic reforms, was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist party of Soviet Union (hereinafter referred as the CC CPSU).

**Novelty and relevancy of the work.** Soviet industrial management in Lithuania during 1965–1985 has been insufficiently investigated in historiography. The revelation of the tensions and conflicts existing in the economic system allows one to better understand the relations of the contemporary governance, the authoritarian regime, and the society as well as the effect of the system's tensions and conflicts on later events and, in part, the collapse of the Soviet system.

**Research methods.** The use of the theory of social conflict and the objective of revealing the existing institutional interests presupposes the importance of the *descriptive* and *analytic* methods. They are the most suitable for recognising the perception of interests by the different soviet government institutions in the general Soviet ideological narrative of the document flows as well as the accounts obtained from former figures using a *semi-structured interview* method.

But alongside these, other methods are also essential. In analysing economic activities it is impossible to dispense with the *statistical* method. It is used in revealing the influence of the Lithuanian nomenclatura on the economic structure. One of the most effective ways of identifying and statistically treating social groups is the fixation of empirical events and instances of mobility, giving these events meaning through analysis. The *statistical* method provides summarisation of large quantities of material and allows one to distinguish what positions should be ascribed to the technostructure, the proximity of the separate professional groups, and their connections.

**Historiography.** The economic topic was intensively studied during the Soviet era but has received little attention from Lithuanian historians after the restoration of Independence. Among the research of historians in independent Lithuania, the works of Vytautas Tininis and Kastytis Antanaitis should be mentioned. In his monographs V. Tininis has surveyed Soviet Lithuania's economic development and discussed its economic management from modern historical positions for the first time in Lithuanian historiography (V. Tininis, *Sovietinė Lietuva ir jos veikėjai*, Vilnius, 1994). K. Antanaitis has researched the Soviet nomenclatura as an administrative system and discussed the relations of the republic's government with the central government of the USSR and Lithuania's other social strata. The author has noted certain aspects of the autonomy of the nomenclatura, aspects which conflicted with the unity of the nomenclature class (K. Antanaitis, *Sovietinė Lietuvos, Latvijos ir Estijos nomenklatūra (1953–1990 m.). Dėsningumai ir ypatumai*, daktaro disertacija, Kaunas, 2001, p. 42). Although K. Antanaitis did not analyse these internal divisions of the Soviet nomenclature in detail and did not directly connect their formation with the institutional structure of the USSR, he nevertheless noted the existence of certain tensions among the government structures. According to him, institutional opposition served to spread Communist nationalism.

Jonas Rudokas' book about the period of the regional councils of the national economy (sovnarkhozy) (1957–1965) is significant for its research on the factory level. The archive material used in it presents many characteristics of the enterprise managers and it notes that the Soviet system caused a certain degree of the authoritarianism of enterprise directors (J. Rudokas, *Istorija, kuria galime didžiūotis*, Vilnius, 2002, p. 123).

The topics having been little studied in Lithuania for historiography, the work of foreign researchers and the models of Soviet social and economic development they present are very important. The works of foreign economists seek not only to describe the development of the USSR but also to understand the universal riddles of the authoritarian regime and the relationships between the authorities and the society. R. Wintrobe and Peter Boettke do not go into the systematic differences or the originality of the structure of the Soviet economic system. According to them, the Soviet planning institutions were the place where interests were co-ordinated, bureaucratic exchanges made, and the rights to monopolies distributed (Peter J. Boettke, *Calculation and Coordination*, Routledge, 2001, p. 141; Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, Cambridge University Press, 1998.). According to R. Wintrobe, the party's strength and the level of the repressions were closely connected with the economic growth (R. Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 217).

Other economists have placed a heavier emphasis on the importance of the Soviet economic system. Gabriel Temkin noted that the Soviet system was exceptional and the attempt to renounce forced labour and the introduction of a system of economic incentives were only implants from the West, which did not become established in the Soviet economic system (G. Temkin, Information and Motivation: Reflections on the Failure of the Socialist Economic System, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 1996, vol. 29, No. 1, p. 26). Janos Kornai and P. Gregory assert that the Soviet system that arose in the 1930s remained essentially unchanged until its very collapse. (Я. Корнай, *Социалистическая система. Политическая экономика коммунизма*, Москва, 2000, с. 47; P. R. Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, Cambridge, 2004, p. 1, 2). Control and coercion are perceived by many noted researchers as an inseparable part of the Soviet system, without which it could not have properly existed (М. Харрисон, Стабильны ли командные системы? Почему потерпела крах советская

экономика?, *Экономическая история. Обзорение*, под ред. Л. И. Бородкина, вып. 6, Москва, 2001, p. 120–141; P. Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945*, Pearson Education, 2003; Дж. Хоскинг, *История Советского Союза (1917–1991)*, Смоленск, с. 352). According to D. Filtzer, by using repressions, the Soviet regime succeeded in scattering possible opponents and atomising the working class. But individual dissatisfaction, manifesting itself primarily through absenteeism and changing jobs, became a phenomenon that was difficult for the authorities to overcome (D. Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.160).

The concept of soft budget constraints is important for an analysis of the relations that existed in a factory. This concept, according to R. C. Allen, not only allows the rate of industrialisation to be increased through the hiring of large numbers of employees but also causes, according to M. Harrison, the dependence of enterprises on the authorities as well as the weakening of economic initiative and bribery (R. C. Allen, *The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy*, *Canadian Journal of Economics*, vol. 34, No. 4, p. 865; M. Harrison, Review of Robert C. Allen's book *Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution*, Princeton University Press, 2003. <<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/reviews/allen.pdf>>). A book by a group of sociologists, who conducted during 1991–1994 micro-level research on labour relations, is significant for its micro-level research. In summarising the results of this research, Simon Clarke asserts the existence of a strong 'working class' feeling and the intersection of the lines of solidarity, conflicts, and identification with their factories (S. Clarke, *Management and Industry in Russia: Formal and Informal Relations in the Period of Transition*, Edward Elgar publishing company, 1995, p. 5).

It should be noted that researchers of the Soviet economic system accent the aspect of decision making and the realisation of these decisions in the lower links of government and in the enterprises while touching only briefly on the republic level. The works of Jerry F. Hough and Peter Rutland, who have researched party management in the regions, reveal the party's economic functions and place more emphasis on the activities of the partocrat – 'prefect', i.e. as an economic broker drowning in the everyday routine as well as his intermediation between the highest authorities

and the factories, while disregarding the essential difference between the Russian provinces or regions and the Soviet republics (J. F. Hough, *The soviet prefects: The local party organs in industrial decision-making*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969; P. Rutland, *The Politics of Economic Stagnation in the Soviet Union. The Role of Local Party Organs in Economic Management*, Cambridge University Press, 1992).

The works of the authors of the social contract paradigm investigate not only the Soviet economy but also the social policy. According to the representative of this theory, Linda J. Cook, an informal agreement, i.e. a social contract, existed between the Soviet elite (nomenclatura) and the inhabitants of the USSR, according to which the ruling stratum patronizingly carried out a social policy satisfying the inhabitants' needs (the equalisation of wages and income, flats, medical care, and education), thereby legalising itself in the eyes of its citizens (L. J. Cook, *The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed: Welfare Policy and Worker's Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin*, Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 71). W. D. Connor sees in the relations between the regime and society as well as in the efforts of the regime to maintain the stability of the Soviet system not only a contract but also coercion carried out by the regime. According to this author, the basis of the social contract was economic growth, which maintained the faith of the inhabitants in the system but economic stagnation must have unavoidably caused the entropy of the ties between the nomenclatura and the inhabitants (W. D. Connor, *Soviet Society, Public Attitudes, and Perils of Gorbachev's Reforms. The Social Context of the End of the USSR*, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Fall 2003, p. 48).

The conceptions of those who have investigated Soviet ethnic policy strongly resemble the descriptions of the relations between the regime and society created by the authors of the social contract. The difference is that the former replace the latter's generalised society with one broken down into its ethnic segments. The monograph of Romualdas J. Misiūnas and Rein Taagapera and the article by Peter Gatrell and Boris Anan'ich accent the effect of the economic development on this relationship between the government and society (R. J. Misiūnas, R. Taagapera, *Baltijos valstybės: priklausomybės metai 1940/1980*, Vilnius, 1992, p. 222; P. Gatrell, B. Anan'ich, National and non-national dimensions of economic development in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russia, in: A. Teichova, M. Her-

bert, *Nation, State and the Economy in History*, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Tomas Remeikis, Vytautas Vardys, and Augustinas Idzelis accent a certain dissatisfaction with Moscow's centralism that manifested itself in the republic's ruling strata and attempt to conceptualise the concept of institutional nationalism (T. Remeikis, *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945–1980*, Chicago, 1980; A. Idzelis, Commentary on "Institutional nationalism" in Lithuania, *Lithuanus*, 1983, vol. 29, No. 2; A. Idzelis, Branch-territorial Dichotomy and Manifestations of Republic Interests in Lithuania, *ibid*; V. Vardys, Brežnevo tautybių politika ir Lietuva, *I laisvę*, 1974, Nr. 61(98)). V. Kotov accents the conflicts of the economic management with Soviet national policy and the federal structure. In his opinion, the federal state structure opposed the logic of the 'united complex of the national economy' which expressed a unitary principle for ruling the country (В. И. Котов, Некоторые проблемы истории советского федерализма, in: Е. Полякова, *Опыт европейского федерализма. История и современность*, Москва, 2002, с. 136, 138). In the opinion of V. Kotov, a more effective development of the Soviet unitary economy and a more effective establishment of Soviet civic identity had to be the most effective direction for Soviet development. Although this thesis is interesting, it seems that V. Kotov insufficiently appreciates the authoritarian nature of the regime. The establishment of Soviet civil statehood required real civil rights, which the regime could not guarantee (Walter A. Kemp, *Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A Basic Contradiction?*, London, 1999, p. 86).

A synthesis of the research on nationalism and the Soviet economic system can offer a promising direction. According to W. Kemp, the Soviet Lithuanian government differed from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in its more intensive expression of nationalism. The realisation of the economic interests of the republic's nomenclatura and the nomenclatura's possibilities to influence the co-ordination of the republic's economic development and the allocation of its resources and to affect the formation of the structure of the economic branches in a direction favourable to it could reveal the importance of republic-level management in the Soviet economic system. Although an analysis of the system's conflicts could perhaps 'sharpen' the disagreements in the Soviet structure, the 'positive function of conflict' accented by the representative of the social

conflict theory, Lewis Coser, allows one to more deeply penetrate into the industrial management of that time, the tensions and conflicts existing in it, and the significance of the ideological repudiation of these conflicts in the interaction of the economic institutions.

**Sources.** During the Soviet era a great diversity of party and government decrees, legal codes, and statistical material was published. Their value for research, especially after access to the original, i.e. archival sources, became available, is slight. The economic interest preferences of the republic's government are well reflected in the periodical publications of that time, especially the economic journal, 'Liaudies ūkis' ['National Economy'].

Published recollections only episodically mention the economy of that time and its management, the character traits of the contemporary government representatives, and the relations between them (A. Brazauskas, *Lietuviškos skyrybos*, Vilnius, 1992; L. Šepetys, *Neprarastoji karta. Siluetai ir spalvos*, 2005; R. Sakalauskas, *Statybininko prisiminimai*, Vilnius, 2003).

In collecting material on the topic under study, interviews were conducted with the following representatives of government institutions from that time: the head of the Department of Industry and Transport of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the CC CPL) (1976–1990) L. Maksimovas, the head of the the Department of Industry of the Council of Ministers (hereinafter referred to as LSSR CM) the Department of Industry (1965–1982) Pranas Kuokštis, his former deputy (1965–1977) and later head of the LSSR CM Department of Science and Technology Antanas Karpavičius, the Deputy Chairman (1976–1979), First Deputy (1984–1988), and Chairman (1984–1988) of the LSSR State Planning Committee, Bronius Zaikauskas, the head of the LSSR State Planning Committee's Department of Machinery Manufacturing (1965–1981) and later Deputy Chairman (1981–1990) of this Committee, Albinas Jovarauskas, and 8 former heads of the republic's ministries and industrial enterprises.

The most important material for investigating this topic is preserved in the fonds of the Lithuanian Special Archive (hereinafter the LSA). The CPL document section contains the correspondence of the CC CPL party authorities with the CC CPSU as well as the reports and official letters sent to Moscow (fond 1771). The industrial administration is greatly reflected

in the CC CPL Bureau meetings, especially the material from the meeting minutes, which allows one to note the somewhat differing versions of party decrees and to see the importance given them by functionaries.

In detailing the positions of the republic's authorities as well as the administrative processes, the documents of the LSSR Council of Ministers (f. R-754) and the republic's Planning Committee (f. R-755), which are preserved in the Lithuanian Central State Archive, are important. The documents and statistical reports of the LSSR Central Statistics Office (fond 363) are valuable for revealing the influence of the Soviet Lithuanian government on the formation of the republic's economic structure.

The source base for researching micro (factory and plant) management is comprised of the party organisation documents for the Vilnius Radio Equipment Factory (fond 15008), Alytus Cotton Concern (fond 17389), Vilnius Drill Factory (fond 15007), Vilnius Plastic Products Factory (fond 16976), Vilnius Audėjas Factory (fond 4841), and Šiauliai Television Factory (fond 17149), which are preserved in the CPL Document Section of the Lithuanian Special Archive.

The material from the party documents is significantly augmented by the documents of LSSR KGB 2nd Directorate 3rd Department (as of 1983, 6th Department), which conducted counterintelligence activities in industrial enterprises and the material from the Kaunas, Panevėžys, and Alytus KGB Departments, all of which is stored in the KGB document section.

## **Dissertation structure**

The work consists of an Introduction, four chapters, Conclusions, Sources and References, and two Tables. The dissertation chapter *'The Soviet System: Features of its Functioning and Management'* analyses the system's preconditions for the tensions and conflicts that existed in industrial management. The subchapter *'Features of the Soviet Industrial Management System'* asserts that institutional interests and friction were not a new phenomenon characteristic to Brezhnev's management. Already during Stalin's rule conflicts and tensions had manifested themselves between the central government and the Soviet ministries. As a consequence of the active period of the regional councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy) during 1957–1965 and the Kosygin reform (1965) begun after the

overthrow of Khrushchev, the republic's Soviet nomenclatura and the managers of the industrial enterprises, who sought broader autonomy from the authorities, became active entities of the economic policy. Nevertheless the international circumstances (the events of the Prague Spring), the USSR partocracy's fear of losing its influence over the heads of the factories and plants due to the greater independence of the enterprises, and the certain degree of success experienced by the economic development, which had given the regime self-confidence in the second half of the 1960s, caused the suspension of the reform and the mediocre nature of its implementation. The attempts to reform the Soviet system failed and the market mechanisms did not become established. The planned system presupposed a passive corporate state. The economic reform was unable to transform an inert Soviet enterprise into an intense economic entity. Its development was caused by extensive economic factors: the size of the work force and the capital investments. The extensive nature of the economic development determined the importance of 'capital construction' in the relations among the republic's authorities, the all-union Soviet ministries, and the enterprises, it being precisely here that the most important institutional interests intersected. The subchapter *'The Industrial Management Institutions and their Hierarchy, Functions, and Functionaries'* discusses the activities of the most important management institutions and functionaries and the decision making mechanisms. A certain administrative parity between the republic's government and the Soviet all-union ministries existed in co-ordinating government decisions concerning corporate development and other questions. An investigation of the directions of the document flows (for what and to which person or institution a letter was sent from/to Moscow, who prepared the reply, how the republic's leadership construed that answer, and who signed the answer) as well as the details of the meetings of the CC CPL and LSSR CM reveal the existing industrial management hierarchy and the decision – making mechanisms.

The most important questions of industrial management and investment development were decided at the CC CPL Bureau or at LSSR Council of Ministers meetings. But questions of the development of individual and even big all-union subordinated enterprises rarely reached these government structures. The decisions of the republic's government were usually adopted by the LSSR CM Commission for Current Questions but the role

of the CC CPL Council for the Distribution and Development of the Republic's Manufacturing Work Force, which was founded in 1978, became stronger in the late 1970s. The decisions of the CC CPL and LSSR CM were essentially based on the conclusions prepared by the LSSR Planning Committee and usually repeated the affirmations of the written project prepared by it for the Soviet departments. Official letters to Soviet ministries were signed by CC CPL Economic Secretaries J. Maniušis (until 1967), A. Ferensas (1967–1977), and A. Brazauskas (1977–1988) as well as LSSR CM Deputy Chairmen P. Kulvietis (1965–1975) and J. Rusenka (1975–1990) who took care of industrial development questions for the LSSR Council of Ministers. It is possible to call the co-ordination of their industrial development questions with the deputy ministers of Soviet all-Union ministries an ordinary 'routine' level. Frequently they failed to solve a current question at this level and therefore tried to solve it at the next level. Requests addressed to USSR ministers and signed by the CC CPL first or second secretary or the chairman of the LSSR CM should be ascribed to letters of this 'extraordinary' level. If interests failed to be 'amicably' co-ordinated at the level of the institutional heads, the republic's government petitioned the supreme political 'arbitrators', i.e. the USSR CM or the CC CPSU. In this way the official letters testify to the objective of the Lithuanian nomenclatura to accent the importance of a problem and the inability to resolve it not only at the ordinary level but also at the highest level of the heads of the Soviet ministries and republic. One feature of this third group of official letters is distance, testifying to the growth of the tension into a conflict.

The subchapter "*Beyond the Limits*" of *Scientific Planning*' notes that the necessity of managing industry, like that of the entire economic space, forced the functionaries to violate the formal rules. The efforts to at least somewhat speed up decision making encouraged informal ties and at the same time the importance of personal trust between functionaries, as government representatives, and the managers of enterprises. These informal ties were very significant for the republic's government as an opportunity to ensure the loyalty of the managers of all-union subordinated enterprises through partocratic patron – client ties.

The subchapter *Industrial Management and the Economic Nationalism of the Lithuanian Nomenclatura*' reveals the economic nationalism of the Lithuanian nomenclatura, which greatly influenced the investment po-

licy. The nomenclatura was distinguished from the ordinary regional 'perfect' by its national status.

The economic nationalism of the Lithuanian nomenclatura was based on the Leninist thesis of the 'equal development of nations', which allowed the USSR to see not just the USSR economic aims but also the aspect of national fairness in USSR economic policy. During the Soviet era, the competition that existed with its 'brother republics' was not only an important environment for industrial development but also awoke nationalist feelings.

On the other hand, we can understand economic nationalism as a pragmatic strategy of the nomenclatura, its bureaucratic balancing between the implementation of Moscow's policy and the satisfaction of the needs and expectations of the republic's inhabitants. One of the consequences of the balancing was the objective to shape the structure of the republic's industry in a manner favourable to itself, which, on the one hand, could help expand the economic administrative power of the republic's nomenclatura. And on the other, the satisfaction of the inhabitants' economic and social needs had to guarantee the authority of the republic's government among the republic's inhabitants. The objective of the Lithuanian nomenclatura to legalise their authority caused a certain 'historical tension', where it competed 'in time' with the former economy of the interwar Lithuanian republic and strove to accent the 'backwardness of bourgeois Lithuania' and the economic victory of the Lithuanian nation during the Soviet era. The Soviet Lithuanian nomenclatura well understood the meaning of the 'political consequences' of consumer goods, which induced it to move in the direction of developing this production.

The chapter *'Industrial Macro Management: the Relations of the Soviet Lithuanian Government with the Soviet all-union Ministries'* analyses the conception of the republic's economic interests that was possessed by the LSSR government, the development of its content, the tensions and conflicts between the republic's government and the Soviet ministries, the means the Lithuanian nomenclatura used in attempting to maintain its control of all-union subordinated enterprises and to influence the formation of the economic structure.

Industrial macro management is revealed not so much by analysing the relations between the highest institutions of the Soviet government (the CC CPSU, the USSR CM, or the USSR State Planning Committee) and

the LSSR government institutions as by analysing those between the Soviet ministries and the republic's government. Because the research topic is very broad and some of the important sources (from the CC CPSU) are lacking, the risk of too abstract an analysis arises. Second, the macro level conflicts that existed in the Soviet management system are best revealed by an analysis of precisely the relations between the Soviet all-union ministries and the republics. Their activities, disagreements, and differences of interests were the main axis marking the conflicts and tensions caused by the Soviet management system. The management of the other branches, i.e. the factories under the control of all-union and the republic's ministries and those under the control of the republic's ministries, as well as the questions of their development also caused friction between the Soviet departments and the Lithuanian nomenclatura. Nevertheless these conflicts and tensions in the relations of the republic's government with the Soviet all-union ministries controlling heavy industry were more distinct.

The Soviet ideological dictionary recognised the 'local special features' of the republics and the expedience of the complexity of the economic – social development of the republics but the concept of the 'economic interests of the republics' was rarely used in official Soviet discourse due to ideological and political security as well as due to the threat of being accused of 'regionalism'. Nevertheless archival sources allow one to distinguish the economic interests perceived by the Lithuanian nomenclatura. They are investigated in the subchapter *'Industrial Development and the Dynamics of the Economic Interests'*. From the very death of Stalin the nomenclatura sought to rapidly industrialise the republic. The efforts of the Lithuanian nomenclatura to obtain as much investment as possible from Moscow for the development of heavy industry lasted until the late 1960s.

From the late 1960s the republic's government sought not to obtain but rather to restrict the investment in heavy industry, especially in the major cities, and vice versa, to increase it in agriculture, the development of roads, the non-manufacturing sector, residential and social construction and the traditional branches of industry, i.e. the light, construction material, and food industries. These shifts were caused by both economic changes and the centralisation of the economic administration. During the implementation of the 1965 Kosygin reform the management of heavy industry was transferred to Soviet ministries, which increased the tension between

these ministries and the republic's government. The latter was already not interested in using the limited labour resources for the development of industry not directly under its control. In 1968 the first intense conflicts manifested themselves with Soviet all-union ministries, which in less than three years from the start of the Kosygin reform had formed their own structures and acquired great administrative power. In addition, the USSR economic policy in the second half of the 1960s, especially the March 1965 plenum decrees of the CC CPSU, were favourable to the development of the agricultural sector and at the same time provided opportunities to intensify the food processing industry. The construction of large farms and the creation of collective farm settlements that were essential for 'industrial agricultural production' were indirectly connected with the development of the construction material industry.

The preparation of long-range plans had great significance for the rethinking of industrial development in the republic's nomenclatura stratum. The 1971–1980 plan for the distribution of the industrial capability of the entire USSR as well as the directions for the republic's economic development for 1971–1975 began to be prepared in 1968. Their preparation for the workers of the republic's Planning Committee became a favourable occasion to look at a somewhat longer range perspective.

The deceleration of the development of heavy industry, which was foreseen in the republic's long-term plans and other projects, received criticism from certain of the republic's economists and even stronger criticism from the USSR Planning Committee. Nevertheless the interests, which were firmly defended by the republic's government and the favourable political circumstances, of which the 'economic regime' accented in a 1970 CC CPSU decree and the decree's demand to avoid the transportation of materials and parts should be mentioned, allowed the priority development of traditional industry in the republic to be established in the principal documents, i.e. CPSU congress directives. Thus, the shortage of natural resources in the republic served the efforts of the Lithuanian nomenclatura to limit the industry under all-union ministry control.

The subchapter *'The Ways in which the Nomenclatura's Interests Were Realised'* discusses the measures used by the republic's government. In order to realise the economic development strategy and maintain some control of all-union subordinated enterprises, the Lithuanian nomenclatura used the decrees of the supreme political authorities as well as the eco-


conomic development programmes and planning procedures. The legal basis to influence capital investments in all-union ministry controlled industry was the CC CPSU and USSR CM decree of 4 October 1965, which foresaw the possibility of inspecting the plans prepared by Soviet ministries for the enterprises under their control and to submit suggestions in respect to them to the USSR Council of Ministers and the Soviet Planning Committee. The republic's nomenclatura also used the 18 July 1981 CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree, which foresaw the restriction of industrial development in major USSR cities.

The investment suggestions of the republic's government to the ministry and the USSR government had to be justified. The republic's labour shortage or the busyness of the construction organisations able to carry out the construction or expansion of Soviet enterprises created a kind of cliché of the republic's negative answers to the Soviet ministries. Complex economic programmes and initiatives, which appealed to the necessity of the republic's complex social and economic development, also existed. Of these should be mentioned the 30 March 1964 CC CPL approved general scheme for urban development and distribution of the manufacturing capability of the LSSR (hereinafter the Scheme), which foresaw restricting the growth of the republic's major cities, i.e. Vilnius, Kaunas, Šiauliai, and Panevėžys by developing industries in the regional centres. The negative answers of the republic's government to the Soviet ministries and its answers for reducing the investment amounts were frequently argued on the basis of the discrepancies the ministry's investment intensions posed for this Scheme. While the scheme encompassed the industrial distribution located in the territory of the entire republic, the aim of creating industrial districts was to compactly shape the construction of several factories and plants in one part of a city. The idea of industrial districts allowed the Soviet Lithuanian government to play the role of co-ordinator in the sizes of enterprises, their construction locations, and the development of the manufacturing infrastructure connected with them. The republic's government also sought to incorporate all-union subordinated enterprises into territorial associations. They were useful for the republic's leaders for two reasons: 1) after the merger of enterprises their economic weight and significance markedly increased in the management system of that Soviet ministry and others, therefore it was easier for the association to wring more capital investments for manufacturing and the development of the

social infrastructure, to erect residential premises, and to address other economic problems, 2) the association's leaders were more dependent on the republic's central government, which had influence in appointing the managing directors and other managing personnel of territorial associations.

The existing industrial management centralisation, the extensive nature of Soviet industry, and the calculation of the prices of products reduced the effectiveness of the policy for restricting the development of heavy industry implemented by the Lithuanian nomenclatura. In developing heavy industry, it was easier to improve the indicators for the implementation of the republic's plans. The republic's government was responsible for implementing the plans of enterprises located in republic's territory. It would have been difficult for Soviet enterprises to implement them if they were implemented without extensive development and a failure to accomplish the enterprises' plans could negatively affect the evaluation of the Lithuanian nomenclatura in Moscow.

The subchapter *'The Effect of the Soviet Lithuanian Government on the Formation of the Republic's Industrial Structure'* summarises the chapter graphically, empirically and statistically. This is reflected in the following chart:



This chart reflects the size  $I$  of the capital investments by the Soviet all-union ministries in the construction of industrial objects at year  $L$  in the context of the extensive development, which was characteristic of the Soviet economic system.

Vectors I2 and I3 essentially reflect their unlimited investment possibilities (in respect to Lithuania). The exception consists of the Soviet investments in year L1, which should not be ascribed to the late 1960s or later. The labour force curve N describes the maximum limits for the development of heavy industry that were possible in the republic at that time. From a temporal perspective the size of the investments for the construction of industrial premises had to decline since the size of the free labour force 'not engaged in public manufacturing' fell<sup>1</sup>. Curve NR expresses the objectives of the Lithuanian nomenclatura to restrict the investment intensions of the Soviet all-union ministries. Soviet ministry investment objectives I2 and I3 during years L2 and L3 are the most important for the problem of the topic under investigation. They were restricted at points B and D by the 'investment ceiling' determined by curve N of the maximum possible labour force. Points F and G reflect the republic's interests. Points FBDG mark the field of the intersection of the investment intensions of the Soviet all-union ministries and the objectives of the republic's government to reduce their sizes. Therefore we can describe the field between points CBDE as the size of the final effect the republic's nomenclatura had on the structure of the republic's industry. This is the 'field won' from the Soviet all-union departments, in which the LSSR government could additionally expand the economic branches it desired, i.e. the non-manufacturing and agricultural sectors and the light, food, wood processing, and construction materials industries.

The effect of the republic's government on the formation of the economic structure is revealed by the 1970 investment plans prepared during the typical year, 1969, that was selected. After calculating the proposals of the Soviet ministries controlling non-military<sup>2</sup> industries and the position of the republic's Planning Committee in respect to these investment questions, clear differences are seen. The Soviet all-union

<sup>1</sup> Two comments are important here: first, there is no information about the forced shipment of the labour force to the western part of the USSR; during the period under study a labour shortage was characteristic for the entire USSR. In addition, many people were sent to develop the eastern USSR, i.e. 'eastern education'. Second, the increase in the number of industrial personnel could have occurred only through a reduction of the social and non-manufacturing sectors but the latter circumstance greatly reduced the republic's attractiveness in the eyes of potential immigrants as well as the labour force.

<sup>2</sup> The consolidated capital investment reports created by the republic's Planning Committee reflected the indicators of not all the Soviet ministries. The proposals of the LSSR Planning Committee systemised only the objectives of the non-military industry enterprises and the ministries and the republic's position in respect to them. The data for the USSR radio technology, electronic, and ship building industries are lacking. The data for the development of the enterprises belonging to the military industrial complex were preserved in other files due to the requirements of that time for secret record keeping. It is possible to find these indicators in secret collection 13 for LSSR CM archival documents. Unfortunately, I have found the annual data only for the USSR ministry of electronic industry but for the other three ministries, only cover letters about the secret documents sent to the USSR Planning Committee. Therefore in this statistical analysis research, the military industry enterprises were not included in order to avoid distorting the general proportions.

ministries planned 12 310 000 roubles for industrial development construction in 1970 while the republic proposed reducing it by almost a third (29.66 %) to 8 660 000 roubles. The final plan reflects a closeness to the size of the republic's objective, i.e. 8 760 000 roubles.

A certain competition between the Soviet all-union ministries and the republic's government over influence could have had positive aspects for the economic management of the USSR. The existence of conflicts did not allow the economic objectives of the branches of industry, the republics, and the regions to coalesce. The Soviet regime, like many non-democratic governments, could not fail to feel the lack of objective information. The opposing proposals and data of the competing institutions could have at least somewhat helped it to solve the problems raised by the deficit of information.

The chapter *'Meso-Management: The Relations between the Government and the Heads of the Enterprises'* investigates the relations of the enterprises with the republic's government and the Soviet all-union ministries. The subchapter *'The Corporate Objectives to Obtain Expansion Permits from the Republic and their Argumentation'* notes that in requesting a permit from the LSSR government to enlarge manufacturing buildings, factory managers used the emotional rhetoric of economic nationalism, argued the necessity of economic and technological progress, complained about the 'anti-sanitary' working conditions in the enterprises, threatened to not fill important military production orders, and used personal contacts with government functionaries. The arguments of economic expedience and technological progress were usually used by the heads of electronic, radio technology, and radio equipment industries. The technost-structure's appeals to party directives or government decrees foreseeing the development of manufacturing and allusions to the factory's importance to the national economy of the entire USSR, especially the defence industry, were especially effective. Soviet Lithuania had few restricted access factories and enterprises since the Soviets were frightened that military objects located in the western USSR might interest the intelligence services of the NATO countries. The KGB was greatly worried when Plammer and Wagen-Smith, employees of the UK ambassador's military attaché, visited Vilnius in 1983. In the opinion of the security agents, these 'clarification agents' were interested in Vilnius Radio Measurement Instrument and "Vilma" Manufacturing associations, photographing them with hand-held

equipment (Report of the 1st section of the 6th Department of LSSR KGB about its work in 1983, *LSA*, f. K-1, c. 46, f. 2115, p. 143). The ‘secret’ factories located in the republic had the status of ‘restricted access enterprises with open subdivisions’ or ‘open enterprises with restricted access subdivisions’.

It is possible to call many of the arguments used by enterprises in respect to the republic’s government secondary, ‘diplomatic’, and disinformation since their aim was to conceal the true reasons for expansion. The republic’s government had limited possibilities to reject proposals by enterprises: the disregarding of allusions by enterprises to the ostensibly important needs of economic effectiveness and national defence could be seen by the USSR supreme government as ignoring the interests of the entire USSR or as ‘regionalism’.

The subchapter *‘Intermediation by the Republic’s Government on behalf of Enterprises’* states that the republic’s government was a significant business partner, helping to convince a ministry to reduce the planned manufacturing volume or to accelerate the obtaining of necessary materials.

The subchapter *‘The Importance of the Party’s Personnel Control in Industrial Management’* states that party personnel control was the most important instrument forcing enterprise managers to carry out the will of the partocracy. It strongly influenced the scenarios of the tensions and conflicts between the republic’s government and the Soviet all-union ministries. The CC CPL nomenclatura lists well reflected the priorities of the Soviet government in managing industry. The majority of the heads of heavy industry enterprises were included in the main or at least nominal (*учетная*) CC CPL nomenclatura. Conversely, just a few representatives from light, food, construction material, and wood industries, most of whom were the managing directors of associations uniting several enterprises rather than the directors of simple enterprises, obtained a place in only the nominal nomenclatura. Considering the nomenclatura mosaic, it is possible to distinguish three criteria for ‘rating’ directors: 1) the enterprise’s place in the general system for the management of the industrial branch, 2) the size of the factory or plant, and 3) the aspects of the secrecy and vulnerability of the enterprise’s production. Apparently, due to this circumstance, the heads of the military industrial complex and chemical factories, which were judged to be especially vulnerable enterprises, belonged to the

main nomenclatura. The aspect of corporate secrecy and vulnerability highlighted not only the nomenclatura system as one of privileges but also a system for increased control and ‘party attention’.

The CC CPL statistical report to the CC CPSU about the composition of the directors of industrial enterprises during 1963–1985<sup>3</sup> shows that their turnover during 1969–1977 was fairly large. The number of dismissals was no less than the number that occurred at the end of Khrushchev’s rule but the level achieved in 1973, when the greatest turnover of directors occurred, even surpassed this indicator at the end of the Khrushchev era, that of 11 directors dismissed in 1964<sup>4</sup> and 13 directors in 1973. But it is necessary to also consider the total number of directors reflected in the reports and the proportionality of their turnover. So, for example, the 1964 report records 50 and the 1973 report 89 directors. Their annual turnover rate was 22% in 1964 and 14.61% in 1973. Thus, even in 1973, when the most directors were dismissed during the period of Brezhnev’s rule, the turnover in terms of proportionality was not equal to that at the end of Khrushchev’s rule. On the other hand, the turnover data forces one to doubt the conventional statement about the ‘personnel stagnation under Brezhnev’, which is how the entire 1965–1985 period is described. During a period of stability, the personnel not only remain fairly constant but a ‘positive’ mobility character also dominates, when people dismissed for reason are not eliminated but ‘transferred’ or ‘selected’ for a higher position. As is seen from the aforementioned statistical reports, during 1969–1977<sup>5</sup> the number of ‘promotions’ (10 instances) lagged behind the number of directors dismissed as ‘bad managers’ or ‘compromised’ (11 instances).

The turnover of enterprise directors was greatly influenced by the international context and the fairly successful Soviet economic development. After the events of the 1968 ‘Prague Spring’ the tone of the supreme authorities, i.e. the CC CPSU, became markedly stricter. The Kosygin reform provisions about manager initiatives and economic stimuli replaced the party’s rhetoric of discipline, ‘responsibility for assigned work’, and ‘economic regime’. The demands, which were made in the December 1969

<sup>3</sup> These annual reports do not contain any data about the turnover at military industry enterprises.

<sup>4</sup> The reports were prepared on 1 July, therefore the personnel turnover actually occurred at the end of Khrushchev’s rule and not at the beginning of Brezhnev’s rule.

<sup>5</sup> The 1974 statistical reports could not be found in the archive.

CC CPSU plenum, for party responsibility and work discipline became the primary accent.

In the early 1970s, with economic stagnation becoming ever clearer, the Soviet regime did not rush to relax its political pressure on the technostructure. Conversely, the CC CPSU plenum, which took place in early 1973 and which also discussed the results of the December 1972 CC CPSU plenum and the increase in dismissals as a consequence of it, testifies to the attempts to recall the 'spirit' of the December 1969 CC CPSU plenum. The worsening results of the economic development in the second half of the 1970s forced the Soviet regime to retreat and soften its control of the technostructure and the penalties imposed on it. No rise in personnel purges, even slight, is noticeable at that time, although inspections by the KGB of the secrecy regime in enterprises revealed violations and unreliable people working in responsible positions.

Not only the threat of dismissal but also of party penalties was an important instrument in industrial management for maintaining 'planning discipline'. Fear of them is clearly noticeable in both archival sources and in the interviews with the former heads of industrial enterprises. The problem with the Soviet system was not the imposition of party penalties for a failure to perform direct functions, i.e. manufacturing tasks, or even worse, the falsification of the results but, conversely, the avoidance of severe punishments for managers. It was not easy for Soviet functionaries to clearly identify the limit, which, if crossed, must unavoidably lead to imposing party penalties on the technostructure. The abundance of planning indicators defining economic activities and the intertwining of the 'objective' and 'subjective' factors for the failure to perform manufacturing tasks diminished the effectiveness of party penalties as effective instruments of economic management. The punishment of enterprise managers essentially became subjective solutions determined by ideological drives. Whether one specific enterprise or another would be selected in implementing a party decree as a political target greatly depended on the patron – client relationship between the partocrats and enterprise managers.

In the Soviet system an industrial enterprise was not only an economic but also an ideological institution. This dualism caused the ideological vulnerability of the technostructure. Enterprise managers very frequently judged the activities of the party authorities, KGB, and military representatives (in military industry enterprises) to be government intervention in

management, which increased the managers' feeling of insecurity. Not only a failure to accomplish the plans but also weak ideological activities, the lack of collectivism in management, and biographical facts, especially 'concealed' facts that had not been declared in personal party forms received no fewer unmerciful penalties than a failure to perform production tasks. The 'compromised people' included not just shop and department supervisors but also the directors themselves and their deputies. The managing directors of even the biggest industrial enterprises in Vilnius received party penalties for the concealment of biographical facts.

Party functionaries used to obtain material compromising the technostructure through various channels, usually from the KGB. The 3rd department of the 2nd directorate of the KGB (as of 1983 the 6th department) supervised the military industry and other big factories. The KGB activities in industrial enterprises are analysed in the subchapter *KGB Activities in Industry*'. During agent – operational work this structure had to ensure the security of state secrets, manufacturing security, and production secrecy. Archival sources show that the KGB was fairly well informed about the corporate administrations, their moods, and even intimate details of their lives.

The subchapter *The relations between the Enterprise Managers and the Soviet Ministry*' discusses how this relationship differs from that between the enterprise managers and the Lithuanian authorities in respect to resources, investments, and quotas. Soviet centralisation of industrial management caused the close vertical ties of the technostructure with the ministry's centre and the ministries' chief administrations (*главные управления*), which directly managed the enterprises. Unlike the republic's party authorities, whose authority included the imposition of the party penalties frightening the managers, the ministries controlled the resources, which the enterprise managers sought to obtain in the greatest possible quantities rather than to avoid.

The subchapter *The Autonomy of the Technostructure*' discusses the conditional independence of the factories and summarises the relations with the authorities. Unlike the bureaucrats of Moscow's central departments, for whom industrial centralisation undid the 'harm' done by the regional councils of the national economy (*sovmarkhozy*) and created conditions to return from the provinces of the USSR to recreated and expanded ministries, the reverse occurred in the republic. Many of the high leaders

of the regional council of the national economy (sovnarkhoz) of the LSSR and quite a few of the party and Komsomol leaders were forced to become the managers of factories and plants. The personnel stagnation that manifested itself from the late 1970s and the coming to power ‘through the party line’ or the ‘personnel exchanges’ that occurred between government institutions must have shown the heads of the industrial enterprises that the position of director in the sense of a career was over and the possibilities of using it as a springboard to government institutions were poor. The rarity of the career step from corporate leader to government position in part determined the status of a director as the ‘pater familias’ of the enterprise.

The ‘production plans coming from above’ and the government’s ideological interventions diminished the possibilities for corporate independence. The dichotomy of the joint management by the Soviet ministries and the republic allowed enterprises to vacillate between and manipulate the authorities. This distanced enterprises from the principal economic aim, i.e. effective production. The possibility of vacillating gave enterprises conditional autonomy but at the same time also created a feeling of uncertainty for the technost-structure, awoke dissatisfaction with the economic system and the actions of the authorities, and awoke a desire to avoid the government’s ‘aegis’.

The dissertation chapter ‘*Micro Management: The Management of Industrial Enterprises*’ discusses the conflicts the Soviet industrial management system created inside enterprises. The subchapter ‘The Technost-structure and Workers in the Factories’ notes that a conditional internal ‘democracy’, which was controlled by the regime, was characteristic in factories during the Soviet era. The administration’s political and ideological function was to make sure that the ‘internal democracy’ did not grow into political generalisations or some other broader expression of dissatisfaction. The image of an immediate director, accessible to the workers and constantly consulting with his subordinates, was implanted during the Soviet era. Many industrial enterprise directors were also no stranger to a certain ‘two-faced’ game in internal corporate tensions. Nevertheless the personal responsibility, which was established in the system, forced managers to concentrate all the decisions in their own hands and not delegate responsibility to their subordinates. Archival sources and the material from recollections reveal the authoritarian traits of the directors.

In assessing a director's activities in work collectives his technical knowledge and skills were especially important. The significance of technical knowledge for an enterprise director is easily seen from contemporary party phrases for character traits: 'he has authority in the work collective', 'talented engineer', 'good specialist', or conversely, worker complaints to the authorities concerning a director's weak technical knowledge. A director's professional engineering skills served to establish his authority, especially in cases of conflicts with the workers. With technologies becoming more complex, factories becoming bigger, and associations being founded, the directors unavoidably became more distant from the workers and their recognition in the work collective as professional engineers was made ever more difficult to attain. This natural distancing from the inside destroyed the primal relationships in the Soviet factory work collective.

In a factory work collective a significant role was played by the middle managers, i.e. the foremen, chief foremen, shift, shop, and office supervisors, and engineers. The late industrialisation, postwar emigration to the West, and Stalin's deportations caused Lithuanian industrial engineers to be fairly young. Unlike the veterans and former soldiers, the pragmatic engineering staff sceptically judged the ideologised measures for solving production questions. Their admission to the CPSU was encouraged by the party personnel policy, greater career possibilities, and also an aspiration to guarantee a certain ideological security in relations with subordinates, especially during production difficulties and conflicts.

The authority of the engineers and the work motivation suffered due to the Soviet principle of egalitarianism. Additional income from labour-saving activities, bonus incentives, the possibility of obtaining a flat faster than other workers, and allocations for a motorcar and services were only partial measures for solving the problems caused by Soviet egalitarianism.

The work of factory workers was also accompanied by not only weak economic motivation, informal relations, and an objective to establish the workers' authority and status in the factory community but also the non-existence of the alternative, i.e. unemployment. The Soviet conception of work useful to society and its forced nature erased the border, which separates human work as expedient economic activity from marginalised factory behaviour, where an appearance of work was created only through the regime's insistence. Work in non-state enterprises, establishments, and collective farms was identified by the regime as an enemy of the system;

'existence' in a factory was markedly safer than economic activities in an area 'not useful to society'. The informal relations and personal obligations to one's manager encouraged a worker to work for or belong to a factory. A worker brought home from a factory more than just his salary or the enterprise's production. Even specialised factories resembled a 'natural economy' with the principle production being augmented by auxiliary workshops and sections. It was an excellent opportunity for the people working in a factory to expand the assortment of products and materials they brought home from the factory while the variety of tools also allowed them to manufacture these things at the work place. It is possible to discover in the factories' archival material many paradoxical illustrations of the scale of this underground production. According to the police, a worker at one Vilnius plastic ware factory was able to illegally manufacture 12 pistols during eleven months in 1970.

The subchapter '*Corporate Structure and the Conflicts within the Technostructure*' analyses the relations between enterprise managers. While they strongly felt the common factory interests and struggled together against external government intervention, they did not escape the internal conflicts of the technostructure. Regardless of whether an enterprise's director was authoritarian or a 'pseudo democrat', the composition of those he favoured and pushed away was determined by the size of the factory and his management model.

Association management was complex since the 'centrifugal force' of the branches and especially the design offices created many problems. The fairly broad autonomy of the design offices and the high status of the designers moved the design offices towards independence. The design offices were a hidden systemic 'bomb' of the Soviet era, which, after the fall of the USSR when no external control remained, brought down many manufacturing complexes. On the other hand, the existence of association subsidiary enterprises allowed the managing director to balance between the interests of the subsidiary enterprises and his immediate entourage, i.e. the chief engineer and deputy directors of the main enterprise.

The tensions between the director and the chief engineer were caused by the Soviet nomenclatura system and engineering professionalism. It became usual for the chief engineer to be held in reserve for the position of enterprise director. The most important function of the chief engineer was not only managing the already operating production but also organi-

sing new production. In the Soviet economy, in which enterprises suffered from a lack of materials, equipment, project documentation, and components, the organisation of new production required a great deal of will and effort from the chief engineer. It was not easy for the director and the chief engineer, who were characterised by strong wills and often authoritarian behaviour, to agree.

In factories it is possible to see two fairly polarised positions, which manifest the duality of the Soviet enterprise as an ideological – economic institution. The most important hubs of this duality were the enterprise’s chief engineer and party secretary. The enterprise’s chief engineer manifested the technocratic principles and a technical core, with the managers of the technical departments being grouped around him. The enterprise’s party secretary, conversely, embodied the factory as an ideological institution.

The discrepancy between the party secretary’s status / formal role and the real administrative power he held was characteristic of his position in the factory. The workers expected effective support in solving their problems. The party secretary did not have any real leverage, was forced to be in the director’s shadow, and was the first of the members of the technostructure to bear the blame for the corporate administration’s ideological ‘errors’ against the party authorities. This put the party secretary in a fairly difficult situation and encouraged the growth of his internal dissatisfaction and frustration.

The deputy director for personnel and security as well as the personnel department supervisor and employees were in the circle of colleagues closest to an enterprise’s party secretary. Their closeness to the party secretary was caused by both their professional activities, which had little to do with engineering work, and the commonality of the features of their mentality. Frequently the former employees of the factory’s personnel service were appointed (‘elected’) to the position of the enterprise’s party secretary. During 1967–1969 party secretaries from 19 enterprises were included in the CPL district control list (*контрольный список*) nomenclaturas of the Vilnius City CPL Districts. 5 of them, prior to being ‘selected’ for these positions, worked as deputy personnel directors or personnel department supervisors. The number of representatives from other professions and specialities was markedly less. In addition, the factory and plant

personnel departments frequently became sort of 'sanctuaries' for former party, Komsomol, and trade union functionaries.

The person who occupied the position of the head of an enterprise's personnel service could concentrate in his hands great authority and power in the factory. The secrecy of an enterprise's activities that was exaggerated by the Soviet regime, the knowledge of the employees' biographical facts, the possession of compromising material, and the close ties with the party structures and the KGB were an important source of power for the head of the personnel service. Many of them were KGB freelance employees, agents, reservists, or otherwise informers. It was very important for factory and plant managers to ensure the loyalty of the head of the personnel department and therefore directors sought to get rid of an unreliable head of the personnel department or, conversely, strove to make him their ally.

The subchapter *'Anti-Soviet Manifestations and Ethnic Conflicts in Industrial Enterprises'* analyses the ethnic relations, conflicts, and anti-Soviet manifestations in factories and plants. During the Soviet era Lithuania underwent economic and social changes, which were strong and conflicting and had great significance for the spread of nationalism and ethnic conflicts. During Khrushchev's thaw political prisoners and deportees repressed during the Stalin era returned to Lithuania from exile. On the other hand, due to the downsizing of the army and the KGB contingent that was carried out during Khrushchev's rule, former chekists and soldiers, whose mentality and views strongly differed from those of former political prisoners and deportees, found 'sanctuary' in the factories and plants.

The industrial development and the immigration it caused served to spread nationalism not just as a phenomenon destroying traditional ties. A factory or plant was a convenient place for anti-Soviet expression and ethnic competition. Big factories became favourable places for anti-Soviet proclamations and 'nationalistic' conversations. The constantly arising production and social problems boiled into ethnic strife. The inability or reluctance of the Soviet regime to make a distinction between ethnic expression and criticism of the system itself or simply everyday conversation about problems and deficiencies patently noticed by workers caused great frustration and the growth of dissatisfaction. Social competition frequently acquired the nature of an ethnic conflict. Many people, who

were not faithful to the regime, experienced repression under the Soviet occupation, or had lost a high social position, transferred their hatred of the Soviet regime to their Russian colleagues. It is interesting that neither the archival sources nor the interviews touched on Lithuanian – Polish conflicts in industrial factories. Apparently, the status of Poles as ‘local residents’ of the Vilnius region and not outsiders as well as their having the same faith was very significant. The large number of local Poles in industrial factories began to integrate with the labour force arriving in Vilnius from West Belarus.

The archival material contained not one conflict in factories, during which Russian speakers were accused of nationalism or Russian chauvinism. It is possible to see an interesting paradox in the interpretation of ‘Leninist ethnic policy’. Unlike at the macro level, where ‘Leninist ethnic policy’ was one of the cards of the Lithuanian nomenclatura in respect to the Soviet all-union ministries, at the factory level the Lithuanian technostucture was sort of held ‘hostage’ in order to allow the republic’s government to create the appearance of national harmony for Moscow. Ethnic conflicts had to be absorbed inside the enterprise and not leave the factory gates.

The Soviet objectives of protecting military and manufacturing secrets caused discrimination against Jews in factories. The authorities and security service were afraid that Jews holding high positions in factories would be well informed about numbered factories (*почтовый ящик* – restricted access soviet enterprises) and secret products and would, after emigrating to Israel, reveal them to the intelligence services of the NATO countries. Jews, due to the aforementioned Soviet ‘secrecy consideration’ in industrial enterprises, could not help but feel the KGB’s increased attention and see that their career possibilities were limited, especially in the numbered factories of electronic engineering, radio technology, and other military industries. Therefore a “non-secret” enterprise engaged in electrical engineering activities, such as the Vilnius Welding Equipment Manufacturing Association, was well suited as a springboard for Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel.

The intertwining of ethnic dissatisfaction with production and social problems in enterprises, the conception of *universally* compulsory, useful work, and the principle of egalitarianism caused great expression of dissatisfaction in the manufacturing work collective. In order to achieve a

deeper expression – analysis of the two phenomena, i.e. ethnic conflicts and dissatisfaction, they are distinguished in this work as separate problems, which allows the relations between the regime and society to be better understood.

The subchapter *'The Expression of Dissatisfaction by Engineers and Workers in Enterprises'* analyses its most intensive forms. Although there was sort of 'ludism' i.e. the deliberate damaging of an enterprise's equipment and even physical assaults on enterprise managers, it usually took the form of the writing of letters of dissatisfaction to various levels of government, resignation from the party, and especially worker strikes. Strikes could not be ideologically recognised and were judged to be 'an extraordinary event', the cause of which, in the opinion of the authorities, should be thought to be an 'ideological diversion' of the Western intelligence services or subjective mistakes by the managers. After a more carefully examination of the information about strikes that was possessed by the KGB during the period under study, certain stages should be noted. The first is the period of 1968–1973. It is possible to explain the absence of recorded worker strikes during 1966–1968 as due to a manifestation of the expectations at the beginning of the reform and of a certain optimism.

The next distinct stage in the manifestation of worker dissatisfaction and strikes in industrial enterprises began in the late 1970s. The corporate expansion problems and the example of the Polish Solidarity movement caused a wave of factory and plant worker dissatisfaction.

Corporate administrations were sort of sandwiched between two constraints: on the one hand, a failure to accomplish the plan and on the other hand, the possibility of provoking worker dissatisfaction or even a strike by putting pressure on the workers and demanding that the plan be accomplished. The consequences were identical, i.e. party penalties imposed on the enterprise's manager. The fear of party penalties frequently caused the objectives of factory managers to avoid raising production norms and to strive to not provoke worker dissatisfaction. The taboo of strikes and their ideological repudiation did not allow the production dissatisfaction that existed in the labour force to overflow and therefore there occurred a political frustration process from economic to political and ethnic dissatisfaction and conflict.

## Conclusions

1. Soviet industry was the most important economic sector, in which the political and economic interests of government institutions and economic agents intersected. The Soviet regime saw industry as more than just an object of economic management and ascribed to it not only economic and social aims but also ideological aims and aims for the political control of society. The intertwining of these aims caused contradictions, which manifested themselves through conflicts and tensions at all levels of industrial management: both in the relations between Soviet institutions and the republic's government and in the relations between the various government spheres and the economic agents. The Soviet authorities did not acknowledge these conflicts and sought to portray an ideologised social and national harmony, which blatantly conflicted with the reality, essentially hindered the rationalisation of management, and caused the growth of frustration and dissatisfaction with the system among the managers, engineers, and workers of industrial enterprises.

2. Like under Stalin's rule, during the investigated period the system was characterised by centralised decision making. Compared to the Stalin era, in the Brezhnev era the administrative – command system became more complex since not only did the USSR supreme political authorities, the planners, and the Soviet departments become active economic management entities but so did the nomenclatura of the republics, which had acquired greater power during the period of the regional councils of the national economy (sovnarkhozy), and the industrial enterprises, which sought autonomy from the authorities and the ministries. The extensive nature of the economy determined that capital construction was the most important area, in which the interests of the Soviet ministries, other Soviet institutions, the republic's government, and the enterprises intersected. The Soviet ministries sought to invest as much money as possible in the development of industrial production and sought to restrict their expenses for the construction of social and production infrastructure objects. Although they directly controlled the enterprises under them, the Soviet ministries were nevertheless unable to carry out the reconstruction of manufacturing facilities or to build new ones without the consent of the republic's government. The ministries' intentions to develop industry were

restricted by the Soviet Lithuanian authorities who sought to preserve their influence in the management of the republic's economy. Although the industrial management centralisation that followed the Kosygin reform reduced the possibilities of the republic's government to directly control heavy industry, the management of capital construction allowed it to indirectly influence the development of the all-union subordinated enterprises. The centralisation of industrial management caused an increase in the significance of capital construction, which the republic's nomenclatura clearly perceived. The growth of the influence and authority of A. Brazauskas who supervised this area in the LSSR State Planning Committee and his rise to the top of the republic's party authorities reveal the great significance the nomenclatura placed on the sphere of capital construction.

3. As a consequence of the 1965 Kosygin reform, in the late 1960s the economic interests of the republic's nomenclatura changed radically. In the mid-1960s the republic's government still sought to intensify industrialisation but three years later its intentions to halt the development of heavy industry are clearly noticeable. The changes in the objectives of the republic's government were induced by both the first sharper conflicts that arose in 1968 with the Soviet all-union ministries, which had become stronger in an administrative sense during the 3 years of the reform, and the work that was performed that same year in preparing the long-range plans. From the late 1960s the LSSR nomenclatura sought to use the republic's restricted labour resources in traditional economic branches, i.e. in the light, food, wood processing, and construction material industries as well as in the rapidly growing non-manufacturing sector and agriculture rather than in heavy industries under the control of Soviet all-union ministries. These former economic sectors were directly under the control of the republic's administration (branches under the joint control of all-union and the republic's ministries and those solely under the republic's control).

4. The highest industrial management level (Soviet ministry – republic) was characterised by 'routine' (USSR deputy minister – LSSR CM deputy chairman) and 'extraordinary' (USSR minister – CC CPL first and second secretaries and the chairman of the LSSR CM) decision co-ordination levels. The correspondence between the Soviet all-union ministries and the republic's functionaries allows one to see the parity between functionaries of the same level. If they failed to co-ordinate decisions at the 'extraordinary' level, an appeal was made to the supreme authorities of the USSR

(the CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers), which testifies to the existence of conflicts between the separate Soviet ministries and the LSSR government.

5. A group of supreme party and economic functionaries, who made essential decisions and spoke in the 'republic's' name, existed in the Lithuanian Soviet nomenclatura. Not just the party hierarchy, the functions in the party structure, or the position in the nomenclatura determined the personal composition of this group. Inclusion (in the group) was determined by both the vertical principle (party leadership – Council of Ministers – Planning Committee) and the close horizontal collaboration of these supreme government representatives. Besides the supreme leaders of the LSSR, i.e. the CC CPL first and second secretaries and the chairman of the LSSR Council of Ministers, this group of functionaries included the CC CPL economic secretary, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the Planning Committee, and his first deputy. Among the latter, the first deputy chairman of the LSSR CM, Ksaveras Kairys, and the chairman of the Planning Committee, Aleksandras Drobnys, who formulated the republic's interests the most clearly and represented them the most strongly in respect to the Soviet departments, should be distinguished.

6. Tensions and conflicts with the Soviet ministries caused the republic's nomenclatura to make an effort to justify their intensions and administrative claims in respect to Soviet institutions. It is possible to divide the most important actions of the republic's nomenclatura into economic social programmes, initiatives, and party punitive measures for pressuring corporate technostructures. It is possible to divide the economic social measures, programmes, and initiatives into two levels: 1) the most important of them was the use the republic's government made of the power granted by Moscow to inspect the USSR ministries' plans and investment intensions in the republic and to submit their proposals. 2) The basis of the argumentation of these proposals consisted of the following programmes and economic initiatives: the scheme for the urban development and the distribution of the manufacturing capability of the LSSR that had been adopted in 1964; the formation of industrial districts; and the objective to found all-union subordinated associations in the republic.

7. By using the granted rights and proposing economic programmes and initiatives, the republic's nomenclatura was able at least in part to shape an economic structure for the republic that was acceptable to it: to

reduce the rate of development of industrial branches under all-union ministry control, to develop in lieu of them industries under the joint control of all-union and the republic ministries or under the republic's sole control as well as the agricultural production sector. Nevertheless due to the centralisation that followed the 1965 reform, which attached greater importance to branch rather than territorial principles for governing industry, the tension between the Soviet institutions governing the branches of industry and the 'organs of the republic's government' became sharper. The latter were sufficiently experienced in the solution of local economic and social problems but after the management system changed, many of their economic programmes and initiatives were opposed by the Soviet ministries, i.e. the implementation of the scheme for the urban development and distribution of the manufacturing capability of the LSSR became complicated as the Soviet ministries hindered the creation of industrial districts and of joint all-union and republic subordinated associations and they did not meet the expectations concerning the possibilities of expanding the powers of the republic's Planning Commission, which caused the republic's administration to be dissatisfied.

8. Soviet industrial enterprises had to balance in their activities between the interests expressed by the Soviet all-union ministries and those by the republic's government. Unlike the ministries, they sought bigger allocations not only for industrial development but also for the construction of social infrastructure objects and housing for their workers. On the other hand, an enterprise's industrial development objectives conflicted with the interests of the republic's government to restrict the development of heavy industry. In seeking to obtain a permit from the republic's government to expand existing manufacturing facilities or build new ones, the factory and plant technostructures used arguments based on economic nationalism (allusions to the glorification of the name of Soviet Lithuania), the importance of the new planned production to the economy of the USSR, the use of new advanced technology, the improvement of the qualifications of the workers and engineers, and the importance of the production to the military industry. Although the LSSR government saw the corporate objectives to extensively increase production and to more easily fulfil their plans that were hiding under these arguments, its decisions concerning the expansion of all-union subordinated enterprises were restricted by the responsibility for fulfilling the plans of the enterprises

located in the republic and the fear of being accused of ‘regionalism’ through the hindering of the expansion of branches of industry ostensibly necessary for the entire USSR.

9. A very important lever for the realisation of the interests of the republic’s nomenclatura and the supervision of corporate activities was party control of the personnel, i.e. the nomenclatura system for hiring and dismissing management personnel and its right to impose party penalties, which had a big impact on the mobility of the technostructure of not only those enterprises under the republic’s control but also all-union subordinated enterprises. Information compromising the technostructure, which was accumulated during KGB activities in industrial enterprises and supplied to the party authorities, was an important lever for the party authorities, which allowed them to maintain the loyalty of the heads of the industrial enterprises to the republic’s party authorities. The wide use and abstractness of the imposition of party penalties and the relative uncertainty of the person being punished caused tension between the republic’s government and the corporate technostructure, which could have in part been alleviated by informal patron (party functionary) – client (enterprise manager) relationships.

10. The Soviet national policy and federal structure caused the economic nationalism of the Lithuanian nomenclatura, which manifested itself in the competition of the republic’s government with both Soviet all-union ministries for influence over the co-ordination of the republic’s economic development and with other Soviet, especially Baltic, republics for more rapid economic development and bigger investments by Moscow in the republic’s economy. The Lithuanian nomenclatura connected the recognition of its authority, as a good economic co-ordinator, in both Moscow and among the republic’s inhabitants, with industrial development. Through an accent on economic achievements, comparisons of the economic development indicators with those of interwar Lithuanian, the protection of the goods market from export and consumer products, and faster production, it sought to ensure the support of the republic’s inhabitants for its policies and to suppress the growth of national dissatisfaction.

11. The demonstration to Moscow of internationalism and ethnic harmony as well as the repudiation of the existence of ethnic problems handicapped ethnic relations in industrial enterprises. The ostensible ethnic harmony as well as the discrimination conducted by the regime against

former political prisoners and other politically unreliable people reduced the possibilities of effectively solving national problems. Consequently national dissatisfaction grew in the enterprises, the engineers and workers connected the manufacturing problems that arose with the national policy, and there was an abundance of people of foreign ethnic origin in the enterprises, which further increased the ethnic frustration of the Lithuanians. Large manufacturing organisations became a favourable place for ethnic competition as well as the spread of nationalism and anti-Soviet manifestations. With the authorities repudiating the ethnic problems and judging them to be only violations of the ‘Leninist personnel selection principle’ by the heads of individual factories and plants, enterprise managers essentially had few effective possibilities for solving the ethnic problems in an enterprise. The party penalties imposed on managers due to manifestations of ethnic discord in factories increased the technostructure’s dissatisfaction with the Soviet authorities.

12. The strengthening or weakening of the societal controls implemented by the regime was in part caused by the economic circumstances. The strengthening of the regime was clearly tangible in the late 1960s – mid-1970s. The big turnover in enterprise directors, the growth in the number of party penalties imposed on the technostructure, and the KGB implemented campaigns to issue permits to work with secret documents, which detected corporate management personnel unreliable to the regime, reveals the regime’s self-confidence. In the late 1970s, when economic stagnation had begun and extensive development was predominant, the regime was forced to retreat in the sphere of both the party control of enterprise managers and the professional and social mobility of politically unreliable people. The economic problems forced former political prisoners, deportees, the members of their families, and people suspected of anti-Soviet and nationalistic speech to be more reasonably evaluated for professional careers in industrial enterprises.

13. The corporate technostructure combined industrial and political ideological functions, i.e. the suppression of worker dissatisfaction with the existing industrial problems and with Soviet policy. These two functions determined the existence of an industrial enterprise as an economic – ideological institution. The successful reconciliation of the industrial and ideological functions was essentially impossible: the objectives of the Soviet authorities to give the centralised, authoritarian manner of industrial

organisation a seeming halo of internal Communist democracy caused the technological structure's dissatisfaction with the authorities, the ideological vulnerability of enterprise managers, and their feeling of insecurity. The technostructure had to balance between the efforts to intensify industry and the objective to not allow industrial development to provoke the dissatisfaction of the workers, who opposed the increasing of the work quotas under the conditions of an ineffective economic incentive system. The party penalties imposed on enterprise managers when there were manifestations of worker dissatisfaction and the fear of these penalties constrained the economic initiative of the technostructures of industrial enterprises and forced bigger industrial plans to be avoided, the implementation of which could have caused the expression of worker dissatisfaction.

14. The duality of an enterprise as an economic and ideological organisation heightened the disagreements both between different generations of workers and between the different department heads and the workers. The conflicts and tensions manifested themselves between those of the enterprise's technical departments, which embodied the technical origin (the chief engineers, design departments, manufacturing departments, etc), and the workers of the 'ideological front', i.e. party secretaries as well as personnel department heads and employees. The former were dissatisfied with the party supervision that hindered the management's rationality and the production efficiency. Joining the CPSU opened an opportunity for them to become established in administrative positions and corporate party committees, pushing out 'party veterans', and gave them a certain ideological security in respect to the authorities and confidence in their relations with subordinates. The corporate representatives of the 'ideological front' were dissatisfied with the objectives of the engineers to restrict themselves to the solution of just technical and production tasks. The discrepancy between the formal functions delegated to the party secretaries by the authorities and the real power to perform those functions created a certain amount of frustration and a lack of security for the party secretaries.

15. The Soviet management system created two types of directors: the authoritarian manager and the pseudo-democratic manager. The strategy in the behaviour of an enterprise's director was strongly influenced by the size of the factory and the management model. The management form of an association provided more possibilities to balance between subordi-

nates and the manufacturing subdivisions. In manufacturing associations many problems were raised by the objectives for independence that were possessed by their branches, especially the design departments. Tension between the director and the chief engineer was characteristic of monolithic enterprises rather than of associations.

16. Despite the harmony portrayed in the work collective by Soviet ideology, there were many manifestations of dissatisfaction among the engineers and workers. This manifested itself through the writing of complaints (usually anonymous) to government institutions, quitting the CPSU, and sometimes damaging equipment. The most intensive form of dissatisfaction was worker strikes. Although strikes were 'ideologically impossible', archival sources allow one to not only establish separate occurrences but to also distinguish two stages: 1968–1973 and the 1980s. In the 1970s (1973–1979), the Soviet government's repressive measures (KGB activities), party penalties, restriction of the spread of information about the strikes that had occurred, and worker wage increases succeeded in suppressing the more active manifestations of worker dissatisfaction.

# **Pramonės valdymas sovietinėje Lietuvoje 1965–1985 m.: įtampos ir konfliktai**

Santrauka

Šio darbo tyrimo objektas yra pramonės valdymas sovietinėje Lietuvoje. Čia siekiama atskleisti pramonės valdymo sovietinėje Lietuvoje sistemą, joje glūdėjusius konfliktus, sisteminių įtampų ir konfliktų raišką. Ekonominėje sistemoje glūdėjusių įtampų ir konfliktų atskleidimas leidžia geriau suvokti tuometinį valdymą, autoritarinio režimo bei visuomenės santykius, sisteminių įtampų bei konfliktų poveikį vėlesniems įvykiams, iš dalies – sovietinės sistemos žlugimui.

Darbą sudaro keturi skyriai, šaltinių ir literatūros sąrašas ir lentelės. Pirmajame disertacijos skyriuje *Sovietinė ekonominė sistema ir nomenklatūros ekonominis nacionalizmas* analizuojamos pramonės valdyme egzistavusių konfliktų ir įtampos sisteminės prielaidos. Poskyryje *Sovietinės pramonės valdymo sistemos bruožai* analizuojami pokyčiai L. Brežnevo valdymo laikotarpiu nuo „klasikinės“ sovietinės ekonomikos valdymo sistemos, ekonomikos ekstensyvus pobūdis ir ūkio kapitalinės statybos svarba ekonomikos valdyme; poskyryje *Pramonės valdymo institucijos, hierarchija, funkcijos ir funkcionieriai* aptariama svarbiausių valdymo institucijų, funkcionierių veikla, sprendimų priėmimo mechanizmas; poskyryje *Mokslinio planavimo „užribyje“* atskleidžiama funkcionierių neformalių ryšių svarba pramonės valdymui, poskyryje *Pramonės valdymas ir lietuviškosios nomenklatūros ekonominis nacionalizmas* atskleidžiamas lietuvių nomenklatūros ekonominis nacionalizmas, turėjęs nemažai įtakos investicinei politikai, strategija, jos biurokratinis laviravimas tarp Maskvos politikos įgyvendinimo ir respublikos gyventojų poreikių bei lūkesčių tenkinimo.

Antrajame skyriuje *Pramonės valdymo makrolygmuo: sovietinės Lietuvos valdžios santykiai su sąjunginėmis ministerijomis* analizuojama LSSR valdžios turėta respublikos ekonominių interesų samprata, jos turinio raida, įtampos ir konfliktai tarp respublikos valdžios ir sąjunginių ministerijų, lietuviškosios nomenklatūros naudoti būdai siekiant išlaikyti sąjunginio pavaldumo įmonių kontrolę, įtakoti ekonominės struktūros formavimą.

Trečiajame skyriuje *Mezolygmuo: valdžios ir įmonių vadovų santykiai* tyrinėjami sąjunginio pavaldumo įmonių santykiai su respublikos valdžia bei sąjunginėmis ministerijomis. Poskyryje *Įmonių siekiai gauti res-*

*publikos leidimus plėstis bei jų argumentavimas* atskleidžiami įmonių vadovų naudoti būdai ir argumentai; poskyryje *Respublikos valdžios tarpininkavimas įmonėms* atskleidžiama nomenklatūros, kaip ekonominio tarpininko, vaidmuo; poskyryje *Partinės kadru kontrolės svarba pramonės valdyme* tyrinėjama kadru politikos svarba pramonės valdyme, analizuojamas pramonės įmonių vadovų atstovavimas LKP CK nomenklatūriniuose sąrašuose, pramonės įmonių vadovų kaita ir ją lėmę politiniai veiksniai. KGB veikla pramonės įmonėse analizuojama poskyryje *KGB „kompromatas“ pramonės valdyme*; poskyryje *Įmonės vadovų santykiai su sąjungine ministerija* aptariami įmonių vadovų santykiai su sąjungine ministerija; poskyryje *Įmonių technostruktūros autonomija* aptiriamas sąlygiškas gamyklų savarankiškumas, apibendrinami jų santykiai su valdžia.

Ketvirtajame skyriuje analizuojami pramonės valdymo sistemos sąlygoti konfliktai įmonėse. Poskyryje *Technostruktūra ir darbininkai gamykloje* analizuojama sąlygiška režimo kontroliuota vidinė „demokratija“ gamykloje, direktoriaus, inžinierių autoriteto svarba įmonės valdyme, sovietinės lygiavos keliamos problemos; poskyryje *Įmonių struktūra ir konfliktai technostruktūroje* atskleidžiami santykiai tarp įmonės vadovų; poskyryje *Antisovietinės apraiškos ir nacionaliniai konfliktai pramonės įmonėse* tyrinėjami tautiniai santykiai, konfliktai ir antisovietiniai aktai gamyklose ir fabrikuose; poskyryje *Inžinierių ir darbininkų nepasitenkinimo raiška įmonėse* analizuojamos jos intensyviausios formos: skundų rašymas, išstojimas iš SSKP ir streikai.

Gauti tyrimo rezultatai apibendrinti išvadose.

Tyrimo metu vartoti šaltiniai ir literatūra pateikiami šaltinių ir literatūros sąrašė.

Lentelėse pateikiami duomenys apie KGB veiklos pramonės įmonėse kryptis ir etapus, pramonės įmonių vadovų atstovavimą LKP CK 1966 m., 1972 m. ir 1977 m. nomenklatūriniuose sąrašuose.

## **Išvados**

1. Sovietinė pramonė buvo svarbiausias ekonomikos sektorius, kuriamė kirtosi valdžios institucijų ir ekonominių agentų politiniai ir ūkiniai interesai. Sovietinis režimas į pramonę žvelgė ne vien kaip į ekonomikos valdymo objektą, jai priskyrė ne tik ūkinius ir socialinius, bet ir ideologinius bei visuomenės politinės kontrolės tikslus. Šių tikslų susipynimas lėmė

prieštaravimus, pasireiškusius konfliktais ir įtampomis visais pramonės valdymo lygmenimis: tiek santykiuose tarp sąjunginių institucijų ir respublikos valdžios, tiek santykiuose tarp įvairių valdžios sferų ir ekonominių agentų. Sovietinė valdžia nepripažino šių konfliktų, siekė vaizduoti ideologizuotą socialinę ir nacionalinę harmoniją, kas akivaizdžiai prieštaravo realybei, iš esmės trukdė valdymo racionalizacijai, sąlygojo pramonės įmonių vadovų, inžinierių bei darbininkų frustracijos ir nepasitenkinimo sistema augimą.

2. Panašiai kaip J. Stalino valdymo metais, tyrinētu laikotarpiu sistemai būdingas centralizuotas sprendimų priėmimas. Lyginant su J. Stalino laikotarpio komandine administracine sistema, L. Brežnevo epochoje ji darėsi sudėtingesnė, nes aktyviais ekonomikos valdymo subjektais tapo ne vien SSRS aukščiausioji politinė valdžia, planuotojai bei sąjunginės žinybos, bet ir didesnę galią Liaudies ūkio tarybų laikotarpiu įgijusi respublikų nomenklatūra bei autonomiškumo nuo valdžios ir ministerijų siekusios pramonės įmonės. Ekstensyvus ekonomikos pobūdis lėmė, kad kapitalinė statyba buvo svarbiausia sritis, kurioje kryžiausiai sąjunginių ministerijų, kitų sąjunginių institucijų, respublikos valdžios ir įmonių interesai. Sąjunginės ministerijos siekė kuo didesnių investicijų į pramonės gamybos plėtrą, riboja savo išlaidas socialinės ir gamybinės infrastruktūros objektų statybai. Tiesiogiai kontroliuojamos joms pavaldžias įmones, sąjunginės ministerijos vis dėlto negalėjo be respublikos valdžios sutikimo vykdyti jų rekonstrukciją bei statyti naujas gamybines patalpas. Ministerijų gamybos plėtos ketinimus varžė sovietinės Lietuvos valdžia, siekusi išsaugoti savo įtaką respublikos ekonomikos valdymui. Nors po Kosyginio reformos sekusi pramonės valdymo centralizacija sumažino respublikos valdžios galimybes tiesiogiai kontroliuoti sunkiąją pramonę, kapitalinės statybos valdymas leido jai netiesiogiai įtakoti sąjunginio pavaldumo pramonės įmonių plėtrą. Pramonės valdymo centralizacija sąlygojo kapitalinės statybos reikšmės išaugimą, kurią respublikos nomenklatūra gerai suvokė. Šią sritį LSSR Plano komitete kuravusio A. Brazausko įtakos ir autoriteto augimas, jo iškilimas į respublikos partinės valdžios viršūnę atskleidžia nomenklatūros teiktą didelę reikšmę kapitalinės statybos sferai.

3. 1965 m. Kosyginio reformos išdavoje VII dešimtmečio pabaigoje iš esmės keitėsi respublikos nomenklatūros ekonominiai interesai. Dar VII dešimtmečio viduryje respublikos valdžia siekė intensyvinti industrializaciją, o po trejų metų akivaizdžiai pastebimi jos ketinimai stabdyti sunkiosios pramonės plėtrą. 1968 m. iškilę pirmieji aštresni konfliktai su administracine

prasmė sustiprėjusiomis sąjunginėmis ministerijomis bei tais pačiais metais vykdomi ilgalaikių perspektyvinių planų rengimo darbai paskatino respublikos valdžią pakoreguoti savo siekius. Nuo VII dešimtmečio pabaigos ji siekė ribotus respublikos darbo jėgos resursus panaudoti ne sąjunginio pavaldumo pramonėje, o tradicinėse ūkio šakose – lengvojoje, maisto, medžio apdirbimo, statybinių medžiagų pramonėje, taip pat sparčiai augančiame negamybiniame sektoriuje bei žemės ūkyje. Šie ekonomikos sektoriai buvo tiesiogiai pavaldūs respublikos administracijai (sąjunginio respublikinio ir respublikinio pavaldumo šakos).

4. Aukščiausiam pramonės valdymui (sąjunginė ministerija – respublika) būdingi „rutininis“ (SSRS ministro pavaduotojas – LSSR MT pirmininko pavaduotojas) ir „ekstraordinarinis“ (SSRS ministras – LKP CK pirmasis ir antrasis sekretoriai bei LSSR Ministrų Tarybos pirmininkas) sprendimų derinimo lygmenys. Susirašinėjimas tarp sąjunginės ministerijos ir respublikos funkcionierių leidžia išvengti paritetą tarp to paties lygmens funkcionierių. Nepavykus suderinti sprendimų „ekstraordinariu“ būdu, buvo kreipiamasi į SSRS aukščiausiąją valdžią (SSKP CK, SSRS Ministrų Tarybą), o tai liudija konfliktų tarp atskiros sąjunginės ministerijos bei LSSR valdžios buvimą.

5. Lietuviškoje sovietinėje nomenklatūroje egzistavo aukščiausių partinių ir ūkinių funkcionierių grupė, priimdavusi esminius sprendimus ir kalbėjusi „respublikos“ vardu. Ne vien partinė hierarchija, funkcijos partinėje struktūroje ar padėtis nomenklatūriniuose sąrašuose lėmė šios grupės asmeninę sudėtį. Priklausymą jai (grupei) lėmė tiek vertikalūs principas (partinė vadovybė – Ministrų Taryba – Plano komitetas), tiek glaudus horizontalus šių aukščiausių valdžios atstovų bendradarbiavimas. Be aukščiausių LSSR vadovų – LKP CK pirmojo ir antrojo sekretorių bei LSSR Ministrų Tarybos pirmininko, šiai funkcionierių grupei priklausė LKP CK sekretorius ekonomikai, Ministrų Tarybos pirmininko pavaduotojai, Plano komisijos pirmininkas ir jo pirmasis pavaduotojas. Iš pastarųjų išskirtini Ksaveras Kairys ir Aleksandras Drobnys, kurie aiškiausiai formulavo respublikos interesus ir tvirčiausiai jiems atstovavo sąjunginėse žinybose.

6. Įtampos ir konfliktai su sąjunginėmis ministerijomis sąlygojo respublikos nomenklatūros pastangas pagrįsti savo ketinimus bei administracines pretenzijas sąjunginių institucijų atžvilgiu. Svarbiausius respublikos nomenklatūros veiksmus galima skirstyti į ekonomines socialines programas, iniciatyvas bei partines baudžiamąsias spaudimo sąjunginio pavaldumo

mo įmonių technostruktūroms priemonės. Ekonominės socialines priemones, programas ir iniciatyvas galima skirti į du lygius:

a. Svarbiausias iš jų buvo respublikos valdžiai Centro suteikta galia peržiūrėti SSRS ministerijų planus ir investicinius ketinimus respublikoje bei teikti savo siūlymus.

b. Respublikos siūlymų argumentacijos pagrindą sudarė šios programos bei ekonominės iniciatyvos: LSSR miestų vystymo ir gamybinių jėgų išdėstymo schema, pramonės mazgų iniciatyva, siekis kurti bei plėtoti respublikinius sąjunginio pavaldumo susivienijimus.

7. Išnaudodama suteiktas teises bei siūlydama ekonomines programas ir iniciatyvas, respublikos nomenklatūra bent iš dalies sugebėjo formuoti jai priimtina respublikos ekonominę struktūrą: sumažinti LSSR valdžiai tiesiogiai nepavaldžių sąjunginio pavaldumo pramonės šakų plėtros tempus, jų vietoje vystyti sąjunginio respublikinio bei respublikinio pavaldumo pramonę ir žemės ūkio gamybos sektorių. Tačiau dėl 1965 m. reformos, kuri suabsoliutino šakinio pramonės valdymo ir centralizacijos principus, stiprėjo įtampa tarp sąjunginių institucijų ir „respublikos valdžios organų“. Pastarieji buvo pakankamai patyrę sprendami vietines ekonomines ir socialines problemas, tačiau, pakitus valdymo sistemai, daugelis jų ekonominių programų ir iniciatyvų sulaukė sąjunginių ministerijų pasipriešinimo – komplikuotas tapo 1964 m. priimtose LSSR miestų vystymo ir gamybinių jėgų išdėstymo schemas įgyvendinimas, sąjunginės ministerijos trukdė pramoninių mazgų bei respublikinių sąjunginio pavaldumo susivienijimų kūrimui, nepasiteisino lūkesčiai dėl galimybės išplėsti respublikos Plano komisijos kompetenciją. Tai kėlė respublikos administracijos nepasitenkinimą.

8. Sąjunginės pramonės įmonės savo veikloje privalėjo balansuoti tarp sąjunginės ministerijos ir respublikos valdžios interesų. Skirtingai nuo ministerijos, jos siekė didesnių asignavimų ne tik gamybinei plėtrai, bet ir socialinės infrastruktūros objektų bei gyvenamųjų pastatų savo darbuotojams statybai. Antra vertus, įmonės gamybinės plėtros siekiai prieštaravo respublikos valdžios interesams riboti sunkiosios pramonės plėtrą. Siekdamas gauti respublikos valdžios leidimą plėsti turimas ar statyti naujas gamybines patalpas, gamyklų ir fabrikų technostruktūros naudojo ekonominio nacionalizmo (aliuzijos į sovietinės Lietuvos vardo garsinimą), planuojamas gaminti produkcijos svarbos SSRS ekonomikai, naujos progresyvios technikos naudojimo ir darbininkų bei inžinierių kvalifikacijos kėlimo, produkcijos svarbos karinei gamybai argumentus. Nors LSSR valdžia išvelgė po

šiais argumentais slypinčius įmonių siekius ekstensyviu būdu padidinti gamybą, lengvesniu būdu įvykdyti planus, jos sprendimus dėl sąjunginių įmonių plėtros ribojimo varžė atsakomybė už respublikoje esančių įmonių planų įvykdymą ir baimė būti apkaltinti „vietininkiškumu“ – trukdymu plėsti neva visai SSRS reikšmingas pramonės šakas.

9. Labai svarbus respublikos nomenklatūros interesų įgyvendinimo ir įmonių veiklos priežiūros svertas buvo partinė kadru kontrolė – nomenklatūrinė vadovaujančių darbuotojų skyrimo ir atleidimo sistema bei teisė skirti partines bausmes, turėjusias didelį poveikį ne tik respublikos, bet ir sąjunginio pavaldumo įmonių technostruktūros mobilumui. KGB veiklos pramonės įmonėse metu kaupiama ir partinei valdžiai teikiama technostruktūrą kompromituojanti informacija buvo svarbus partinės valdžios svertas, leidęs išlaikyti pramonės įmonių vadovus lojaliais respublikos partinei valdžiai. Partinių bausmių skyrimo neapibrėžtumas, jo sąlygotas netikrumas didino trintį tarp respublikos valdžios bei įmonių technostruktūrų, kurią tik iš dalies galėjo palengvinti neformalus patrono (partinio funkcionieriaus) ir kliento (įmonės vadovo) santykiai.

10. Sovietinė nacionalinė politika bei federacinė sąranga lėmė lietuviškosios nomenklatūros ekonominį nacionalizmą, pasireiškusį respublikos valdžios konkurencijoje tiek su sąjunginėmis ministerijomis dėl įtakos respublikos ūkio plėtros koordinavimui, tiek su kitomis sovietinėmis, ypač Pabaltijo, respublikomis dėl spartesnės ekonominės plėtros, didesnių investicijų į respublikos ūkį iš Centro. Su pramonės plėtra lietuviškoji nomenklatūra siejo jos autoriteto, kaip gero ekonomikos koordinatoriaus pripažinimą tiek Maskvoje, tiek ir tarpe respublikos gyventojų. Ekonominių laimėjimų akcentavimu, ūkio raidos lyginimais su tarpukario Lietuvos rodikliais, prekių rinkos apsauga nuo išvežimo bei vartojimui skirtų produktų spartesne gamyba siekta užsitikrinti respublikos gyventojų paramą jos politikai, užgniaužti tautinio nepasitenkinimo augimą.

11. Internacionalizmo ir tautinės harmonijos Maskvai demonstravimas bei tautinių problemų egzistavimo nepripažinimas apsunkino nacionalinius santykius pramonės įmonėse. Tariama nacionalinė harmonija, režimo vykdyta buvusių politinių kalinių bei kitų politiškai nepatikimų asmenų diskriminacija mažino galimybes efektyviai spręsti tautines problemas, todėl įmonėse augo tautinis nepasitenkinimas, kylančios gamybinės problemos inžinierių bei darbininkų buvo siejamos su nacionaline politika, svetimtaučių įmonėje gausa, kas dar labiau didino nacionalinę frustraciją. Stambios gamybinės

organizacijos tapo palankia nacionalizmo, antisovietinių pasireiškimų sklaidos bei tautinės konkurencijos vieta. Valdžiai nepripažįstant tautinių problemų ir jas vertinant tik kaip atskirų gamyklų ar fabrikų vadovų „lenininio kadru parinkimo principo“ pažeidimus, įmonių vadovai iš esmės turėjo mažai nacionalinių problemų įmonėje sprendimo efektyvių galimybių. Dėl nacionalinės nesantaikos atvejų gamybose jų vadovams skiriamos partinės bausmės didino technostruktūros nepasitenkinimą sovietine valdžia.

12. Režimo vykdytos visuomenės kontrolės stiprėjimą ar silpnėjimą iš dalies lėmė ekonominė konjunktūra. Režimo stiprėjimas akivaizdžiai junta mas XX amžiaus VII dešimtmečio pabaigoje – VIII dešimtmečio viduryje. Didelė įmonių direktorių kaista, partinių bausmių technostruktūrai daugėjimas, KGB vykdytos leidimų dirbti su slaptais dokumentais kampanijos išsiaiškinant režimui nepatikimus asmenis įmonių vadovybėse atskleidžia režimo pasitikėjimą savo galia. XX amžiaus VIII dešimtmečio pabaigoje, prasidėjus ūkio stagnacijai, vyraujant ekstensyviai plėtrai, režimas buvo priverstas rezignuoti tiek įmonių vadovų partinės kontrolės, tiek ir politiškai nepatikimų žmonių profesinio ir socialinio mobilumo sferoje. Ekonominės problemos vertė nuosaukiau vertinti buvusių politinių kalinių, tremtinių, jų šeimos narių bei antisovietiniais ir nacionalistiniais pasisakymais įtariamų asmenų profesinę karjerą pramonės įmonėse.

13. Įmonės technostruktūrą vienijo gamybinių tikslų siekimas ir režimo jai patikėta politinė ideologinė funkcija – darbuotojų nepasitenkinimo esančiomis gamybinėmis problemomis, sovietine politika užgniaužimas. Šios dvi funkcijos lėmė pramonės įmonės, kaip ekonominio-ideologinio instituto, būklę. Šių dviejų siekių derinimas iš esmės buvo neįmanomas: sovietinės valdžios siekiai centralizuotam, autoritariniam gamybos organizavimo būdai suteikti menamą vidinės komunistinės demokratijos aureolę sąlygojo technostruktūros nepasitenkinimą valdžia, įmonės vadovų ideologinį pažeidžiamumą ir jų nesaugumo jausmą. Technostruktūra privalėjo laviruoti tarp pastangų intensyvinti gamybą ir siekio gamybine plėtra nesukelti darbuotojų nepasitenkinimo, kurie neefektyvios ekonominio skatinimo sistemos sąlygomis priešinosi darbo normų didinimui. Esant darbininkų nepasitenkinimo pasireiškimams, įmonių vadovams skiriamos partinės bausmės, jų baimė sukaustė pramonės įmonių technostruktūrų ūkinį iniciatyvumą, vertė vengti didesnių gamybinių planų, kurių įgyvendinimas galėjo didinti darbininkų nepasitenkinimą.

14. Įmonės kaip ekonominės ir ideologinės organizacijos dualumas išryškino nesutarimus tiek tarp skirtingų kartų darbuotojų, tiek tarp atskirų tarnybų vadovų bei darbuotojų. Pasireiškė konfliktai ir įtampos tarp techninį pradą išreiškiančių įmonių techninių tarnybų (vyr. inžinieriaus, konstruktorių, gamybos skyriai ir kt.) bei „ideologinio fronto“ darbuotojų – partinių sekretorių, personalo tarnybos vadovų ir darbuotojų. Pirmieji buvo nepatenkinti valdymo racionalumui ir gamybos efektyvumui trukdančia partine priežiūra. Stojimas į SSKP atvėrė jiems galimybę įsitvirtinti administracinėse pareigose, įmonių partijos komitetuose, išstumiant „partinius veteranus“, teikė tam tikrą ideologinį saugumą valdžios atžvilgiu bei pasitikėjimą santykiuose su valdiniais. Įmonės „ideologinio fronto“ atstovai buvo nepatenkinti inžinierių siekiais apsiriboti vien techninių ir gamybinių uždavinių sprendimu. Formalių valdžios partiniams sekretoriams deleguotų funkcijų ir realių galių tas funkcijas vykdyti neatitikimas sąlygojo tam tikrą partinių sekretorių frustraciją bei jų saugumo stoką.

15. Sovietinė valdymo sistema sąlygojo du direktorių tipus: autoritarinę vadovą bei pseudodemokratinę vadovą. Įmonės direktoriaus elgsenos strategija buvo stipriai įtakojama gamyklos dydžio ir valdymo modelio. Susivienijimo valdymo forma teikė daugiau galimybių laviruoti tarp pavaldinių ir gamybinių padalinių. Gamybiniuose susivienijimuose nemažai problemų kėlė jų filialų, ypač konstruktorių biurų, savarankiškumo siekiai. Monolitinei, ne susivienijimo, įmonės struktūrai buvo būdinga įtampa tarp direktoriaus ir vyriausiojo inžinieriaus.

16. Nepaisant sovietinės ideologijos vaizduotos harmonijos darbo kolektyve, nepasitenkinimo apraiškų tarp inžinerijos ir darbininkijos būta nemažai. Ji pasireiškė skundų (dažniausiai anoniminių) rašymu valdžios institucijoms, išstojimu iš SSKP, kartais – įrangos gadinimu. Intensyviausia nepasitenkinimo forma buvo darbininkų streikai. Nors pastarieji buvo „ideologiškai neįmanomi“, archyviniai šaltiniai leidžia ne tik fiksuoti atskirus jų atvejus, bet ir išskirti du etapus: 1968–1973 m. laikotarpį bei devintąjį dešimtmetį. Sovietinei valdžiai panaudojus represinius instrumentus (KGB veikla), partines bausmes, ribojant informacijos apie įvykusius streikus sklaidą bei didinant darbininkų uždarbį, aštuntajame dešimtmetyje (1973–1979) pavyko užgniaužti aktyvesnius darbininkų nepasitenkinimo pasireiškimus.

### **Mokslinių straipsnių disertacijos tema sąrašas**

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