Soviet primary accumulation processes:

some unresolved problems

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What is primary socialist accumulation?

The idea of 'primary' (sometimes called 'primitive') socialist accumulation was first developed by Preobrazhensky, the Bolshevik economist and spokesman for the Trotskyist opposition in the USSR in the 1920s. The idea was based on an analogy with Marx's writing on primary capitalist accumulation. Primary capitalist accumulation meant the initial phase of growth in which the capitalist elements of the economy developed at the expense of the pre-capitalist sector. With 'capitalist' changed to 'socialist' Preobrazhensky had the idea of primary socialist accumulation, clearly relevant to the USSR in the 1920s.

An interesting feature of recent years has been the rescue of the idea of primary socialist accumulation from two evil fates which awaited it in the passage of history. This 'rescue' consisted, firstly, of its rescue from an increasingly narrow and distorted version of what Preobrazhensky originally said and, secondly, of its rescue from Preobrazhensky himself.

The narrow and distorted version of what Preobrazhensky said focused on his view that a socialist state, seeking to industrialise a poor agrarian country, must do so by appropriating the surplus product of the peasantry and transferring it into the accumulation fund of nationalised industry. By ignoring other elements in Preobrazhensky's outlook, this version reduced the theory of primary socialist accumulation to a two-sector model of economic growth. Rejecting this narrow focus upon economic growth, the Hungarian writer Szamuely argued recently that:
the parallel drawn with the Marxian notion of primitive capitalist accumulation was unfortunate, for it gave rise to much misunderstanding and misinterpretation. ... Anyone who reads the famous 24th chapter in the first volume of Capital will see that, according to Marx, the substance of so-called primitive accumulation is not the development of the forces of production but, first and foremost, the transformation of the relations of production into capitalist ones. The 'production of the proletariat' is only one aspect of this process, and again not in the sense of 'creating' the main force of production, but in the sense of turning guild-artisans and feudally-bound serfs into free wage labourers (Szamuely, 1974, pp. 41-42).

This point has also been stressed by Millar who argues strongly that, not only for Marx but also for Preobrazhensky, primary accumulation was about more than just the rate of economic growth or the scale of appropriation of the surplus product of one mode of production by another. Re-reading Preobrazhensky, Millar finds his views both less well-defined and richer than conventional accounts allow: not just a case for rapid industrialisation, but a case for the socialist industrial state to restructure the resources and property relations of the pre-socialist economic forms:

Like Marx, Preobrazhensky views the concept as one in which two questions need not be differentiated. The first question is: where did (or must) the resources come from to support accumulation during the transition period? The second question is: how did (or must) the relations of production develop such that capitalism (socialism) might be established on a self-sustaining basis? Consequently, both Marx and Preobrazhensky speak at times as though primitive accumulation refers to the accumulation (expropriation) of material resources. Primarily and fundamentally, however, the concept refers to institutional change (Millar, 1978, p. 392).

A further recent account of Preobrazhensky's system of thought by
Filtzer condemns past attempts to reduce him to a 'super-industrialiser' and nothing more:

these interpretations share one thing in common: they all divorce Preobrazhensky's economic theories both from his general methodology and from the goals to which he applied them . . . This economic approach fails to see that his economic theories and his statements about inner-party democracy, class consciousness and culture are all aspects of a unified theory of transition in the USSR (Filtzer, 1978, pp. 64-65).

Realistic assessment of Preobrazhensky has suffered, then, firstly because of an inaccurate perception of his views. But it has also suffered because of a second factor - a too-easy identification of his prescription for financing socialist industrialisation out of the rural surplus product with the actual course of Soviet economic development. Preobrazhensky's place in history may have been considerably exaggerated by the view that what he advocated in the 1920s was simply carried out by Stalin in the 1930s. While Stalin undoubtedly intended the collectivisation of peasant farming to secure a rural 'tribute' to finance industrial plans, Preobrazhensky had not envisaged collectivisation - certainly not in its Stalinist form. Moreover, collectivisation did not permit increased extraction of the rural surplus product to finance increased industrial investment via unequal exchange (Barsov, 1969, 1974; Ellman, 1975, 1978). According to Barsov,

the chief burden lay on the shoulders of the working class (Barsov, 1969, p. 82).

According to Vyas,
to say that accumulation was carried out at the expense of the peasantry is, at best, misleading. Urban real wages fell drastically during the First Plan period, and even if a longer period is taken, to include the Second Five Year Plan, real wages fell between 1929 and 1937 by 43% (Vyas, 1979, p. 11).

However if one thinks of primary accumulation as a restructuring of production relations, not just as a physical transfer of resources, then clearly collectivisation itself was the most important single act of primary accumulation in Soviet history. It changed fundamentally the relationship of millions and millions of small producers to farming, to the factory and to the state. In correlation with the industrial upsurge of the first Five Year Plan it created,

in the well-known words of Marx's analysis of original [primary] accumulation, one of those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence and hurled as free and "unattached" proletarians on the labour market' (Ellman, 1975, p. 857).

Rescuing the idea of primary socialist accumulation from Preobrazhensky, reinterpreting it independently of the precise forms and policies envisaged by its first theorist, is really much more important than reinterpreting Preobrazhensky. This means that we must learn to speak of primary socialist accumulation, no longer in the senses dominated by Preobrazhensky, but rather in its proper sense which is one dominated by history. Primary socialist accumulation, when it is referred to below, comprises the construction of new relations at work and new planning relations, the restructuring of agriculture and its integration into the national economy, organising the transfer both of labour-power and of its products from old to new locations and
uses, incorporating them into a new system of production and of reproduction. This broad notion binds together a series of current issues which help us to see more clearly both Soviet history and Preobrazhensky's place in it.

Below, surveying discussion on primary capitalist accumulation, we shall discover that this process unfolded along different routes under different conditions. The choice between one route and another involved political conflict between social forces. The choice conditioned subsequent development of the capitalist social formation, especially its ability to evolve organically 'from below' and to develop non-coercive methods of rule. In Russia the process of primary capitalist accumulation was not completed, and the political struggles around the route to be taken were not resolved but were cut short by the October 1917 revolution. Consequently in the USSR there developed a dialectic between different routes of primary socialist accumulation. One route, based in development of the New Economic Policy of 1921-1929, was eventually blocked off by the formation of the Stalinist economic and political system and thus another route was actually followed. Below we shall consider both the realism of the option blocked off in 1929, and the consequences of the route actually undertaken, particularly the integration into the socialist social formation of methods of production, allocation and rule inherited from previous historical epochs.

What is primary capitalist accumulation?

The Bolsheviks' understanding of their own revolution was largely formed by a particular view of the genesis of capitalism and of bourgeois revolution. By taking the same point of departure we, too,
can enlarge our understanding.

One of the main conclusions of post-war debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism is that there was not one but at least two routes of primary capitalist accumulation. Dobb (1963, p. 123) initiated this theme in the debate, by referring to a passage from the third volume of Capital:

The transition from the feudal mode of production is two-fold. The producer becomes merchant and capitalist, in contrast to the natural agricultural economy and the guild-bound handicrafts of the medieval urban industries. This is the really revolutionising path. Or else, the merchant establishes direct sway over production. However much this serves historically as a stepping-stone . . . it cannot by itself contribute to the overthrow of the old mode of production, but tends rather to preserve and retain it as its precondition (Marx, 1971, p. 334).

Marx's distinction was seen by the Japanese historian Takahashi as a definition of alternative, mutually antagonistic routes of national development:

in Western Europe, Way No. I (producer → merchant),

Emphasising the contradiction between the two routes, Procacci argued that predominance of the elements of one route over the other, determining the basic outline of each country's development, would be resolved through politics:

the two ways are not . . . two separate solutions
to a single problem; they do not answer to the same interests, but correspond to different problems, different interests and different social strata . . .

From this point of view, the opposition between the two ways and the two opposed modes of production with which they are linked is reflected in political struggle and in parties: independents vs royalists in the English Revolution, Jacobins vs Girondins in the French Revolution (Procacci, 1976, p. 140).

In principle, then, it was possible to generalise two different, antagonistic roads of primary capitalist accumulation. In the first, the small producer broke free of servile and mercantile restrictions, developing free-trading institutions in opposition to the old regime, expanding production on the basis of technical progressiveness and competitive advantage. The second route involved the subordination of the small producer to pre-existing large-scale concentrations of merchant capital formed under and within the old regime; the advantages of large-scale production, when it arose along this route, did not flow organically from its ability to raise the productiveness of labour-power, but from inherited capacities of repression and market power.

Consequently, the capitalist Way No. I disrupted feudal relations and the ordering of estates. The alternatives to capitalism - peasant farming, domestic manufacture, guild and cooperative production - were uprooted and destroyed. As a result, a new bourgeois outlook and order were developed, capable of winning the consent of the uprooted and the disposessed to the power of capital. The capitalist Way No. II, however, had different results. Dependent from birth upon absolutism and enforced obedience 'from above', the second kind of primary capitalist accumulation restructured society by predominantly forcible means, which
were made acceptable to those who were suddenly torn from their means of subsistence by reference to traditional authoritarian and patriarchal values. Consequently, Way No. II carried over many characteristic features of the old society, including the extra-economic coercion characteristic of feudal production.

Historically we do not find these routes in pure form. In England, the principal country of the first way, the peasant smallholder was rooted out 'from above' and the aristocracy survived civil wars and beheadings. In every country a permanent dialectic existed between the forces for capitalist development 'from above' and 'from below'. One bloc of forces might subordinate, but not destroy the other:

Though in each case one configuration emerges as the dominant one, it is possible to discern subordinate ones that become the dominant features in another country. Thus in England, during the latter part of the French Revolution and until after the end of the Napoleonic wars, there existed some of the elements of a reactionary configuration recognizable as a dominant feature in Germany: a coalition between the older landed elites and the rising commercial and industrial ones, directed against the lower classes in town and countryside ... Indeed this reactionary combination of elements turns up in some form in each society studied, including the United States (Moore, 1966, p. xiv).

Just as elements of Way No. II were strongly felt in Western European primary accumulation processes, in the countries of Eastern Europe elements of Way No. I - of small capitalist development 'from below' - were also registered. There springs to mind Lenin's famous distinction between the two paths of agrarian capitalist development in Russia, the 'American' and the 'Prussian' paths, both in evidence, both locked in mutual struggle since the partial Emancipation of the
serfs in 1861:

The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord latifundia, i.e. either by reform or by revolution ... 

In the first case feudal landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy, which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of Grossbauern ('big peasants') arises. In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it is broken up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer (Lenin, 1962, p. 239).

This latter circumstance, the revolutionary victory of the small capitalist producer, Lenin further defined as:

the establishment of the most favourable conditions for the further accomplishment by the working class of its real and fundamental task of socialist reorganisation (Lenin, 1964A, p. 33).

In fact, as history showed, in Russia the capitalist Way No. II failed, and the October 1917 revolution opened up new perspectives and possibilities not previously encountered.

From primary capitalist to primary socialist accumulation

Below I shall argue that primary socialist accumulation also has a Way No. I and a Way No. II; these two routes are antagonistic, resolving the problems of transition to socialism in ways which correspond to different interests, different economic mechanisms and different
methods of rule. The route of primary accumulation presented by Preobrazhensky was not the only possible route, but can be characterised as the route based predominantly in the compulsory accumulation of resources in the hands of the centralised political state, the rapid forced development of large-scale production formed 'from above', and the subordination to these tasks of the elements of socialist development 'from below'.

I should like to stress that this characterisation of Preobrazhensky's 'Way No. II', and the implied existence of another 'Way No. I' based predominantly in consent and in development 'from below' are not arguments by analogy ('Primary capitalist accumulation happens in two ways, therefore so does primary socialist accumulation'). I shall argue that the route of primary socialist accumulation along 'Way No. I' was a real, historical possibility even in a backward agrarian economy such as the USSR in the 1920s. It was real precisely because primary capitalist accumulation along Way No. II had been attempted in Russia, and had failed in its historical project to remould the Russian economy on capitalist lines. As a result, side by side with the Russia of authority, order and patriarchy, there still existed living elements of a democratic, communal Russia of the small producers, the 'American' path of development based in the peasant smallholders and in domestic manufacture, which Lenin had described as presenting 'the most favourable conditions' in which the working class might attempt its task of socialist construction. Therefore one of our tasks will be to estimate the degrees of freedom present in those most favourable conditions, and the extent to which they were explored and realised.

When we consider how Preobrazhensky reasoned from primary
capitalist to primary socialist accumulation, we find that he relied upon a model of primary capitalist accumulation which was narrowly deterministic and devoid of historical choices between different routes. In *The New Economics* he reflected at length on the origins of capitalism and socialism. Focusing on the gradual small-scale, spontaneous beginnings of capitalist production within feudal society, he wrote that:

> primitive capitalist accumulation could take place on the basis of feudalism, whereas socialist accumulation cannot take place on the basis of capitalism. The nationalisation of large-scale industry is also the first act of socialist accumulation . . . (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p.80)

Focusing on the harsh conditions of socialism's sudden genesis, its lack of the 'prehistory' and the 'agelong cultural accumulation' which capitalism had enjoyed, he pointed to the key advantage of the capitalist system, namely, that the human material it needed was already shaped in the preceding epoch - that type of agent of production and distribution who was educated in response to capitalist stimuli to labour and adapted to capitalist discipline. Conversely, the type of 'worker in the state economy' . . . is still only a formula, which means that the new economic system has to rely on 'old' people, so that huge losses are incurred by unbusinesslike methods, mishandling and so on (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 133).

For Preobrazhensky, therefore, socialist construction was a task which had presented itself to the Soviet people for the first time in 1917, but for which it was unprepared (this dissatisfaction with the human material of the October Revolution is not, of course, peculiar to
Preobrazhensky, but was a continuous strand in Bolshevism, based primarily in a sense of how capitalism creates people by deforming them and depriving them of their independent self-activity). There followed from this the tendency to write off the actually existing 'agelong cultural accumulation' of Soviet workers and peasants as providing elements for the foundation of a real Soviet culture. Instead, Preobrazhensky held that socialist production could not establish itself 'from below' as an economically effective system with a grass-roots basis:

whereas capitalist state enterprises were from the start technically superior to, and economically stronger than, the separate enterprises of the mode of production which they were to oust or subordinate to themselves, that is, petty production, socialist production has to pass through a fairly long period ... during which the individual enterprise of the state economy will inevitably be not superior but inferior to, economically not stronger but weaker than, a contemporary capitalist enterprise in an advanced bourgeois country (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 120).

This concentration upon the weakness of socialist enterprise led Preobrazhensky to the conclusion that it could only be established by a combination of political force and market power:

Capitalism conquers in open form, in conditions of free competition with pre-capitalist economic forms. Socialism conquers in the close order of state economy, which goes forward as a unified whole, fused with the political power, in conditions under which free competition is systematically restricted and nearly liquidated (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p.131).
The focus on the centralised monopoly of economic power in the hands of the political state was, again, not peculiar to Preobrazhensky. What he had done was to theorise a metaphor which had worked its way deeply into the Bolshevism of the 1920s: the metaphor of the 'commanding heights' (kommandnye vysoty) of the economy. This metaphor can stand in relation to the 'valleys' (the lower depths, the grass-roots) of society in several different ways. Preobrazhensky gave it its full military-feudal significance of a fortified peak, surrounded by hostile civilised valleys from which the garrison could command tribute, waylay merchants and exact tolls, and deter invasion by more prosperous neighbours.

This provided the theoretical foundation for Preobrazhensky's 'law of primary socialist accumulation', 'or at least that part of it which relates to the redistribution of the material resources of production', which he put as follows:

The more backward economically, petty bourgeois, peasant, a particular country is which has gone over to the socialist organisation of production, and the smaller the inheritance received by the socialist accumulation fund of the proletariat of this country when the socialist revolution takes place, by so much the more, in proportion, will socialist accumulation be obliged to rely on alienating part of the surplus product of pre-socialist forms of economy and the smaller will be the relative weight of accumulation on its own production basis, that is, the less will it be nourished by the surplus product of the workers in socialist industry (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 124 : emphasis removed).

It is argued here that this 'law of primary socialist accumulation' was based upon a Way No. II type of transition involving forced
development predominantly 'from above'. Its implementation was characterised by the use of inherited pre-capitalist mechanisms of production and appropriation of surplus, underpinning the military-feudal metaphor of the 'commanding heights'. Is it realistic to contrast this with a model of voluntary socialist development 'from below', a Way No. I of primary socialist accumulation, relevant to the USSR in the 1920s? Bukharin and his followers clearly held a series of positions in common with Preobrazhensky. For them, too, possession of the 'commanding heights', both in economics and in politics, was an indispensable condition of successful socialist development. However this was combined with elements of another outlook, which portrayed a different kind of primary socialist accumulation. It was not, as Millar (1978, p. 390) reminds us, a 'well worked out alternative theoretical solution', and it failed to establish itself either practically or philosophically (Bukharin defensively rejected the very idea of 'primary socialist accumulation'). This alternative was rejected in 1929, and ended as only a 'subordinate configuration' in subsequent Soviet development.

There is insufficient space here to do more than note that in the post-war period this 'subordinate configuration' re-emerged, both in the East European democratic reform movements, and in the West as Eurocommunism, in strategies which reject the 'close order' of forced development from above, and which see the grass-roots restructuring of capitalist production relations along socialist lines as having a decisive phase before the socialist revolution.
Soviet primary accumulation: Way No. I

To discern the outlines of the alternative route of primary socialist accumulation in the USSR, we have to examine both programmes and theories, and material realities and practices. We must consider particularly closely the issue of the New Economic Policy of 1921-1929 which writers such as Lewin (1975) and Cohen (1973) have argued provided an alternative route.

NEP can be defined as a set of relationships: socialised large-scale industry combined with peasant agriculture and domestic manufacture; elements of planning (control of large-scale investment, prices, taxes and monetary conditions, the state monopoly of foreign trade) combined with very broad areas of individual and enterprise discretion mediated through market forces; elements of petty capitalist production combined with cooperative and state regulation of them; the Bolshevik political monopoly combined with elements of pluralism. The extent to which these relationships were seen to be dominated by mutuality and cooperation on the one hand, or antagonism and competition on the other, formed the principal division between opposing assessments of NEP.

Thus Preobrazhensky emphasised the element of antagonism between plan and market, embodied respectively in socialised large-scale industry and peasant farming, and saw NEP as providing for a period of struggle between these two principles. From this point of view NEP was a tactical accommodation to hostile forces, to be used to prepare for the 'close order' frontal attack of 'primary socialist accumulation'. Thus it would be technically incorrect to portray Preobrazhensky as an opponent
of NEP; he saw it as a necessary stage in the unfolding of the contradictions of Soviet evolution. If the NEP stage was not employed to prepare for and undertake the frontal attack of socialist construction, the contradictions would unfold in the direction of a capitalist restoration, dictated by the competitive market forces; alternatively, developing the struggle for planned socialist industrialisation would unravel the NEP relations in the opposite direction.

Others came to reject the focus on petty commodity production as a main source of danger, the threat of capitalist degeneration. Emphasising instead the elements of mutuality and cooperation in the NEP economy, they focused upon the possibility of developing new kinds of social relations within NEP itself. 'Is it possible,' asked Lenin shortly before his death,

> to 'attach' all the urban groups to all the village groups, so that every working class group may take advantage regularly of every opportunity, of every occasion to serve the cultural needs of the village group it is 'attached' to? (Lenin, 1964B, p. 28).

Developing some of these ideas, Bukharin came to see the voluntary organisation of mutual links between town and country as capable of revolutionising both production and Soviet civil society. He defined this process as:

> the development of a Soviet civil community (obshchestvennost') in the countryside . . .

we must channel the developing energy of the peasantry, especially of the poor peasantry and its youth, into the formation of all types of voluntary circles, societies etc., etc., 'Society of the Friends of Convertible Husbandry',
'Down with Illiteracy Club', societies and groups for agricultural propaganda, for fighting alcoholism, against smoking, societies for rural amenities, for cooperative assistance and so forth — this is what we envisage (Bukharin, 1924A, p. 23).

This revolutionary process would have to overcome real enemies: the bearers both of the entrenched 'cruder types of pre-bourgeois culture, i.e. bureaucratic culture or serf culture' (Lenin, 1964B, p. 47), as well as of the 'kulak culture' of literacy and technical progressiveness which was dominant in the village community, and even in the shakily founded rural Soviet institutions (Bukharin, 1924A, pp. 22-23). Against this it was necessary to bring to bear the elements of a new Soviet democratic culture, capable of solving the production problems of millions of small producers in a cooperative way, winning the consent of the petty capitalist to socialist development. 'Only along this road', it seemed to Bukharin,

... can we solve the task of control from below, of struggle against bureaucracy . . . (Bukharin, 1924A, p. 23 : emphasis added).

From this standpoint Bukharin and his followers came to see NEP not as a tactic of accommodation but as a strategy of advance, a framework for hegemonic struggle. They did not accept the stark alternatives of rapid socialist industrialisation versus kulak capitalism. Bukharin was not opposed to industrialisation as such; peasant farming needed manufactures and technology, as much as the working class with its industries and armed forces needed foodstuffs and raw materials. But the question of industrialisation was secondary, and depended upon the primary issue, how best to achieve the socialist transformation of
social relations. This element of the debate has a modern ring. What is the point of industrialising a backward agrarian country with a primitive state structure, if the resulting state-industrial forms are themselves primitive and backward? Bukharin saw the revolutionising of rural culture and production as the most important task. NEP was the best framework for this struggle, because it provided the greatest degree of mutuality between agriculture and industry, and the best access to the village and farm where the cultural revolution would be organised.

However, in the course of 1929, the framework was shattered and the perspectives which it had generated were closed off. The reasons for this were bound up with the problem of industrialisation.

Why did NEP fail?

Why then did NEP fail, to be replaced by Stalin's strategy of forced industrialisation 'from above'? I should like to distinguish three ways in which this question has been answered, indicating why the third appears to me to be the most satisfactory. In the first view, NEP was abandoned because it was inconsistent with any industrial development of a socialist kind, and its abandonment was therefore a rational decision. In the second view, strongly reacting against the first, NEP is seen as consistent with a wide variety of development patterns, including the industrial development actually achieved in the inter-war Five Year Plans. Therefore the abandonment of NEP had no strictly economic rationale, but was an outcome of brute political struggles and the formation of the Stalinist political system. In the third view, NEP is seen as inconsistent with the degree and rate of industrialisation
actually undertaken from 1928 onwards, but contained the possibility of alternative development patterns involving a lesser commitment to industrial growth. In this case, the abandonment of NEP was neither simply rational (according to the first view) nor irrational (according to the second), but was the outcome of a political conflict over the course of Soviet economic development.

The main source of authority for the first view, that NEP had become inconsistent with any kind of socialist industrial development, was Stalin who identified the small-scale, petty commodity character of agriculture under NEP as a principal constraint on economic growth:

in our country the principal holders of grain available for the market are the small and, primarily, the middle peasants. This means that not only in respect to gross output of grain, but also in respect to the production of grain for the market, the USSR has become, as a result of the October Revolution, a land of small peasant farming, and the middle peasant has become the 'central figure' in agriculture.

... the abolition of landlord (large-scale) farming, the reduction of kulak (large-scale) farming to less than one-third, and the change to small peasant farming with only 11 per cent of its output available for the market, under conditions of the absence in the sphere of grain growing of any more or less developed large-scale farming in common (collective farms and state farms), was bound to lead, and in fact has led, to a sharp reduction in the output of grain for the market as compared with pre-war times. It is a fact that the amount of marketed grain in our country is now half of what it was before the war, notwithstanding the fact that gross output of grain has reached the pre-war level (Stalin, 1940, pp. 208-209).

This view, formulated in 1928 on the basis on 1926/27 statistics, was
the foundation for the view that industrial development could only proceed by replacing small-scale agricultural commodity production with large-scale production and the direct appropriation of surplus product by the state. In itself, of course, this view did not dictate the pace and methods of the transition, which were set in the unfolding of the economic and political crisis of 1928 and 1929.

Since 1928, Stalin's view has been subject to three main revisions. The first is that it embodied an underestimate of the productive potential of the small-scale peasant agriculture produced by the October Revolution. The second is that the grain crises of 1928 and 1929 were, at least in part, provoked by the planners themselves; policy adjustments would have permitted rapid industrial growth to be reconciled with NEP. The third is that actual Soviet growth in the first Five Year Plan period involved significant avoidable costs; a continuation of NEP would have avoided these costs while still producing the results. Taken together, these revisions back up the view that the abandonment of NEP was irrational, serving only Stalin's lust for power. In my view the first revision is well founded, but the second and third are overstated.

Did Stalin underestimate the productive potential of peasant farming in a socialist economy? Undoubtedly the levels of grain marketing in the 1920s really were much lower than before the war; a Soviet challenge mounted against the statistics used by Stalin, arguing that they understate grain marketings during NEP (Moshkov, 1966, pp. 20-24), was probably misplaced (Carr and Davies, 1974, p. 971). Grain marketings may have deteriorated by as much as half. But this is very one-dimensional.
For a start, grain yields and harvests were now growing relatively rapidly. In addition, there was historically unprecedented growth of non-grain products and marketings (Moshkov, 1966, pp. 19-20). In summary:

Before the revolution, agriculture was dominated by extensive grain production: grain accounted for 90 per cent of the sown area and accounted for over 40 per cent of gross agricultural production. By 1928, only 82 per cent of the sown area was sown to grain and grain production accounted for only 35 per cent of gross agricultural production. Gross agricultural production as a whole, according to official figures, was 25 per cent higher than in 1913. Grain was being fed to animals rather than being exported, and partly because of this the number of livestock expanded rapidly until 1928; and they were apparently better fed, healthier and more productive than before the war (Cooper, Davies and Wheatcroft, 1977, p. 4).

In other words, as a result of the October revolution Soviet agriculture had gone through a transition from a combination of large-scale and small-scale producers, to overwhelmingly small-scale farming. But the disappearance of the large-scale high-yielding producer had not meant the rise of the small-scale low-yielding subsistence farmer. The small-scale farmers themselves were developing intensive, high-yielding branches of diversified commodity production. This gives us a new interpretation and vindication of Lenin's view that the most rapid development of agriculture's productive forces would come on the basis of the petty producer, with increased yields and large-scale productive forms arising through an organic process of development - not implanted or enforced from above. At the same time, of course, this does not solve the problem of finding socialist forms for such an organic process.

The second revision to the view that NEP was doomed by the end
of the 1920s concerns the extent to which the grain crises of 1928 and
1929 were provoked by the mismanagement of the economic planners. Both
in 1927/28 and in 1928/29 the procurement price for grain was reduced
relative to those for livestock products and technical crops. This can
only have intensified the shift of agriculture away from grain speciali-
sation towards other branches - from the viewpoint of the grain procurers,
a clearly irrational course (Malafeev, 1964, p. 115). The difficulties
of the grain procurers were further aggravated by the management of
aggregate demand in the economy. By the latter 1920s 'goods famine'
(tovarnyi golod), i.e. chronic excess demand for manufactures, was
endemic in the Soviet economy. Peasant commodity producers, unable to
use money balances accumulated from the sale of foodstuffs in order to
purchase manufactures, withdrew from both markets. Attempts to remedy
the situation by increasing grain procurement prices in 1929 only
increased the excess of rural monetary demand. An inflationary gap had
developed, which could only be closed by a reduction in rural or urban
living standards (or both), or by postponing current investment plans.
By 1926/27 gross investment in Soviet large-scale industry had considerably
exceeded the standard set by pre-war growth; the industrial capital stock
was growing at rates exceeding 10 per cent per annum. Industrial growth
was contributing to the economic tensions, partly through the investment
demand for plant and machinery. But a significant part of the industrial
growth rate, ranging between 17 and 22 per cent per annum between 1925/26
and 1928/29, was still being accounted for by the reemployment of unused
fixed capacity. The resulting demand for working capital, of which in
physical terms agriculture was the most important source, was also
contributing to the strained situation.
It has been argued that policy adjustments would have reduced the strain, relaxed the constraints and allowed rapid industrial growth to continue within the NEP framework (Millar, 1978, p. 393). For example, Preobrazhensky's policies were based in the view that the contradictions of the transition could be resolved (or at least advanced) by combining rapid industrialisation with NEP. He criticised what he saw as the domination of the NEP economy by competitive market forces, as a result of which the surplus product of peasant farming was being retained within the petty commodity sector. His solution was to challenge the competitive market forces with a combination of political force and market power. The state should use its possession of the 'commanding heights' of economics and politics to redistribute the surplus product of the petty commodity sector towards socialised industry. The method which he advocated was a combination of direct and indirect taxation which would compel the peasants to sell their products at unfavourable terms of trade (Preobrazhensky, 1965, pp. 91-112).

Would Preobrazhensky's solution have saved NEP? The main objections raised against it then seem just as valid with hindsight. The element of direct taxation, to be effective, required new tax-enforcing institutions (otherwise tax liabilities would be concealed and obligations evaded) (Vyas, 1978, pp. 44-45). After all, the highly successful surplus-appropriation policies of the Tsars had required a battery of special rural institutions from the manorial system and medieval commune to a standing rural militia. Preobrazhensky did not envisage a return to such measures, and Nove (1972, p. 220) suggests that this was the very point of his self-criticism before the 17th CPSU Congress in 1934 ('Collectivisation, that was the point! Did I anticipate collectivisation?
I did not.') But without new forcible institutions of direct taxation, the effects of indirect taxation would be contradictory. Use of the market power of the state industrial sector to shift the terms of trade against peasant farming would mean higher price-cost margins per unit of industrial production, and up to a certain point an increase in the total surplus-product realised within the state industrial sector. Excess aggregate demand would be reduced or eliminated. But it would be on a basis of lower rural living standards and consumer demand, lower industrial turnover and employment, and therefore more inequality of urban incomes, access to jobs and access to the means of consumption. The negative consequences for urban state industry would be intensified, in so far as peasant consumers could evade indirect taxation of manufactures by turning to petty rural industries outside the scope of nationalisation. Additional new forcible institutions would be needed to enforce the state monopoly in the supply of manufactures.

A way out of the dilemma has been argued by Millar (1970), on the basis of Chayanov's theory of the peasant economy. If the elasticity of supply of agricultural marketings to the urban economy in response to changes in the ratio of agricultural to industrial prices were negative, then the outlook would be very different. Had Soviet planners resolutely turned the terms of trade against the peasant farmer, agricultural sales to the state industrial sector would have increased, the net transfer of resources from agriculture to industry would have increased, and the inflationary gap in the economy would have been closed. Rapid industrialisation could have proceeded on the basis of peasant commodity production in agriculture. Empirical investigation, however, is inconclusive; the hypothesis of a negative peasant response to changes in
the given terms of trade implies either a relatively inelastic demand for manufactures, or a relatively inelastic demand for income, and neither seems particularly likely (Harrison, 1978; Vyas, 1978, p. 45).

The third revision to the view that NEP was doomed by the end of the 1920s can be put as follows. Actual Soviet industrialisation was unprecedentedly rapid. However the Stalinist policies of forced collectivisation and over-ambitious planning resulted in grave economic losses along the way. Had these losses been avoided, the same economic transformation could have been achieved with a much smaller burden upon the peasantry and working class. This smaller burden would have been consistent with the NEP framework.

In what sense did Stalinist policies result in avoidable losses? It is widely accepted that Stalin's agricultural policies were responsible for the loss of half the country's livestock herd between 1928 and 1932; it is less clear whether the slaughter of livestock which brought this about was occasioned by peasant hostility to forced collectivisation, or by the reallocation of grain flows from animal consumption to state procurement for human consumption. In either case the result was the same. Supplies of meat and milk dried up but bigger quantities of inferior foodstuffs were made available for urban consumption. At the same time increased quantities of manufactures, particularly tractors using precious steel and engineering resources, had to be supplied to agriculture to make good the deficit of animal draught power. As a result of these factors, combined with petty commodity transfers on the free 'kolkhoz market' which proved impossible to suppress and were legalised at an early stage, collectivisation did not achieve any
significant increase either in the net transfer of resources from agriculture to industry, or in the net financial contribution of agriculture to investment in the economy as a whole (Barsov, 1969, 1974; Millar, 1974; Ellman, 1975). Since Soviet industrialisation did not require these magnitudes to rise much, if at all, above their 1928 levels,

a continuation of the New Economic Policy of the 1920s would have permitted at least as rapid a rate of industrialisation with less cost to the urban as well as to the rural population of the Soviet Union (Millar, 1974, p. 766).

It has also been argued that avoidable losses resulted from the Stalinist industrial strategy. Some years ago Holland Hunter suggested that the Soviet economy between 1928 and 1941 was a case study in excessive 'tautness'. 'Taut' planning, involving the setting of highly ambitious, probably unattainable growth targets, may be necessary to achieve high industrial growth rates in a developing economy. By this means resources are mobilised, reserves are uncovered and slack is eliminated. As a result the production frontier is pushed out more rapidly than would result from a process of planning for what is already known to be 'realistic'. However, if taken too far, the approach of taut planning results in cumulating imbalances and sharply reduced growth achievement; in this case,

further relaxation of aggregate targets would yield still higher rates of achieved improvement (Hunter, 1961, p. 568).

This diagnosis, at any rate with respect to the first Five Year Plan,
is shared by Barsov:

the level of accumulation in 1931 and 1932, above all considering the reduced level of agricultural production, was in all probability excessively high and scarcely yielded optimal conditions for solving the problems of the most rapid industrialisation of the country. It seems to me that approximately the same effect in increasing industrial production and heavy industrial growth could have been achieved by allocating a somewhat smaller share of the national income to investment, increasing resources for consumption and creating optimal conditions for material incentives and growth in the productivity of social labour (Barsov, 1969, p. 96).

The view that the first Five Year Plan was excessively taut has been substantially confirmed by Hunter's more recent work on the 'optimal' variant of that plan (which itself was overtaken by more ambitious directives in 1930). Using a six-sector linear programming model and starting in 1928, Hunter found that:

No allocation of resources among the six sectors and over the several plan years would enable the [planned] terminal-year levels of capital and output to be reached, along with the intended levels of household consumption and other final uses. Even with the plan period extended to six, seven or eight years, the full set of official targets is unachievable.

If we ask instead how much could be delivered to households over the plan period, on the assumption that terminal-year capital stock requirements are met, we find that there is a feasible and optimal solution in five years ... The five-year solution here incorporates a mild requirement that year-to-year increases in household consumption, after the first plan year, at least match the rate at which total population was expected to grow - namely, 2.26 per cent per year. The trouble with this solution, of course, is that it would have reduced household consumption from its 1928 level of 21.2 billion rubles to about 15.7 billion rubles in 1929 ... One thinks of the surgical operation that was technically successful although the patient died (Hunter, 1973, pp. 251-252).
Hunter's work contains elements of understatement (Hunter, 1973, p. 253) and of overstatement (Davies and Wheatcroft, 1974, pp. 790-792; Vyas, 1978, pp. 152-153) of the infeasibility of the first Five Year Plan. In spite of Hunter's disclaimer to have said anything material about 'what really happened', most commentaries assume that he has demonstrated the inefficient costliness of Stalinist policies. A slower planned rate of growth with more feasible targets would have allowed an equivalent or higher growth rate than that actually achieved, at a lower cost in terms of the human and material resources of 1928.

Thus consideration of Stalinist policies with regard to both agriculture and industrial planning lends significant support to the view that heavy avoidable wastage was involved. However there is also a significant leap from this view, to the view that different policies retaining the NEP framework could have matched the actual growth performance of the Soviet economy starting from 1928. There are several reasons why this leap cannot be sustained.

Firstly, the strained situation of the Soviet economy of 1928 was primarily the result of carrying out existing, as yet relatively modest, industrial development plans. Increasing disequilibria were being introduced into the NEP economy by attempts to industrialise without prior institutional change. To carry through the still more advanced plans of the 'optimal' variant of the first Five Year Plan necessitated radical changes in the allocation of resources. In Hunter's experiment, it was found that:

If we set a consumption floor that requires constant
per capita household consumption, there is no feasible solution, even over an eight-year plan period. The Soviet economy was tightly constrained at the end of the 1920s, and there was no easy way to build an altered structure. Experiment indicates that roughly a 9 per cent cut in household consumption would have freed enough resources to set the growth model in motion ... (Hunter, 1973, p. 252).

Vyas's similar conclusion is that the building of an altered structure could not have been achieved without an initial decline in the industrial wage. Reconstruction requires an increased share of investment going to heavy industry. With growing industrial employment, static or falling labour productivity, and an unchanged allocation system in agriculture, the real wage must decline in terms either of foodstuffs or of consumer manufactures or both:

substantial declines in real wages were inevitable, given the objectives of the Soviet regime ... hence it is misleading to suggest that the sharp declines that took place during the course of the actual [first Five Year Plan] were merely the result of breakneck speeds of industrialisation and rapid collectivisation (Vyas, 1978, p. 147).

Ultimately there seems no way of reconciling the existing commitment of resources to consumption (including to peasant agriculture) in 1928 with the fixed and working capital requirements of subsequent industrial growth. Therefore in Ellman's view collectivisation was not just irrational:

Comparing 1932 with 1928, collectivisation did not increase the net agricultural surplus ... It did, however, increase procurements of grain, potatoes and vegetables, thus facilitating an increase in urban employment and exports, swing the terms of trade between agriculture and the state in favour
of the state, and facilitate the rapid increase in the urban labour force...

In this period collectivisation appears as a process which enabled the state to increase its inflow of grain, potatoes and vegetables and its stock of urban labour, at the expense of livestock and the rural and urban human population (Ellman, 1975, p. 859).

Cooper, Davies and Wheatcroft (1977, pp. 10-11) also emphasise the importance of the physical form of the gross transfer of inferior wage-goods out of agriculture (as opposed to the net flow of investment finance) as a condition of industrial growth, secured by collectivisation. They point out that, had the 1928 livestock herd been maintained through the 1930s, it would have demanded an additional diversion of grains from human to animal consumption reaching a maximum of 19 per cent of the actual harvest in 1933/34. In the same spirit Vyas (1978, p. 144) calculates that, had the actual trend of declining agricultural marketings between 1926/27 and 1928/29 been projected to the end of the first Five Year Plan, on the basis of the 'minimal' and 'optimal' employment targets, the industrial wage in terms of food would have declined by 22 or 25 per cent. In the event industrial employment grew far in excess of the 'optimal' variant, while there were drastic unforeseen declines in meat and milk marketings. Nonetheless, because collectivisation ensured supplies of basic foodstuffs, the actual decline in the industrial wage in terms of food up to 1932 was held to 26 per cent. This is because by means of collectivisation, in Ellman's words (1975, p. 859), agriculture 'was transformed into a residual sector which absorbed shocks (e.g. bad harvests)'.

In summary therefore it is not possible to agree with Millar
that the NEP economy was consistent with industrialisation on the scale of the 1930s, and that therefore the decision to abandon NEP was irrational. The crisis and abandonment of NEP followed directly from decisions to give priority to rapid industrialisation. The evidence supports the view that:

the New Economic Policy led to an expanding economy, but... the rate of industrial expansion feasible within NEP was far lower than that actually achieved during the first two five-year plans (Cooper, Davies and Wheatcroft, 1977, p. 1).

The NEP economy could have yielded further economic expansion and restructuring of production relations, with rather less industrial growth, more rural community development and more agricultural revolution. These tasks could not be reconciled, however, with the task of rapid, large-scale industrialisation.

In this view, the abandonment of NEP involved the rejection of one route of primary socialist accumulation in favour of another. This was a political, not just logical choice. Therefore it is also not possible to agree with Vyas who concludes, in direct opposition to Millar, that:

the decision of mass collectivisation was made in response to the logic of objective circumstances (Vyas, 1978, p. 171).

The latter view owes a great deal to the author's identification of extremely rapid industrialisation as the only alternative to economic stagnation, and refusal to consider the options in between ('it all
depends on what one means’) (Vyas, 1978, p. 165). Much is owed also to the author's identification of economic stagnation with peasant farming ('the fragmentation and backwardness of agriculture were the fundamental reasons for the difficulties on the grain front’) (1978, p. 95), and to the unspoken, unrealistic assumption that all means of production are produced in industry, none in agriculture. Vyas argues that the objective of rapid industrialisation justified the introduction of new forcible institutions in order to shift resources from agriculture and consumption to industrial investment in the 1930s (1978, pp. 53, 173). As a result, between 1928 and 1932 both the industrial real wage and real urban consumption per head declined unambiguously, but over the whole period 1928-1937 the fall in the industrial real wage was moderated and real urban consumption per head increased (1978, pp. 120-121). He comments:

The phenomenon of rising per capita consumption and falling real wages has an interesting welfare implication: the reduction in urban unemployment and the fact that large numbers of poor peasants were moving from the countryside to the towns meant that there was a redistribution of consumption within the 'working class' - i.e. consumption of the unemployed and underemployed sections of society was increasing but for those who were formerly employed it was falling, so that the urban population as a whole was better off than before.

... inclusion of communal services would make the picture look even more favourable than shown by our results on per capita consumption (Vyas, 1978, pp. 122-123).

This argument over the welfare implications of Stalin's industrial revolution has a direct parallel to English history. The parallel is found in the debate over the standard of living in the English industrial revolution. Should we limit attention to the family budget of wage goods? Or rather, are we also concerned by the morbidity and mortality
of urbanisation, the small producer's loss of control over the working
day and the process of work, the integration of women and even small
children into factory work? The Soviet parallel is direct, though
qualified by much more rapid development of urban amenities and services,
and by greater protection of labour including limitation of the working
day and education, not exploitation of children (although within the
sphere of the NKVD labour was expended without protection or restraint).
The movements in the Soviet standard of living just reflected a process
of raising the production of both absolute and relative surplus value
by predominantly forcible means.

The resort to these methods had implications far beyond the
size of the urban family budget, or the scale of accumulation of means
of production. What was involved was a particular historic change in
social and production relations. This transition was neither purely
logical (according to Vyas) nor just irrational (according to Millar),
but marked the outcome of a choice between two routes of primary socialist
accumulation, corresponding to different interests, different problems
and different futures.

Soviet primary accumulation: Way No. II

In an article first published in 1922, Bukharin referred to
the well-known history of the barbarian conquerors who,

settling upon more highly cultured tribes, were them-
selves eventually overwhelmed; they adopted the
life-style, customs, values, even the language of
the 'conquered' race. The higher culture, adroit-
ness, practicality, technical edge, training,
adaptability and so on, through numberless channels and tiny molecular flows disrupted, remodeled, deformed and refashioned the fabric of social life and relations customary to the conquering race, which in this manner capitulated historically.

The proletariat finds itself in a similar position to this barbarian people. So what if its culture is higher 'in principle'!

... One can illustrate it crudely as follows. Consider that any technical or economic task ... can be solved by the old method and the new method. In theory the new method is clearly feasible. But there is no living experience, there are no practitioners, no exponents, no 'technicians'. The 'technicians' are used to the old way, not the new. And the problem is solved in the old way, since otherwise nothing gets done (Bukharin, 1924B, pp. 237-238).

For the Bolsheviks of 1922, including Bukharin, the main fear was the restoration of the capitalist 'old way'. But historically Russian capitalist production had never achieved full separation from feudal-bureaucratic methods, and to a considerable extent had grown upon them.

As it turned out, the real danger of the 1920s was not a revival of capitalist elements and methods, but a reversion to older, pre-capitalist types of 'bureaucratic culture or serf culture'. This danger was realised in the course of the forced industrialisation 'from above'.

In remoulding Soviet society, the existing, practical model which was drawn upon was the agrarian feudal model of a moneynessless economy subject to extra-economic coercion. At the same time this model was not borrowed without undergoing a series of transformations. Firstly it was infused with new industrial tasks organised through new, socialised productive forms. Secondly, where it came into contact with the forces of organic, spontaneous development 'from below', it was unable to suppress
them completely and was modified by the contact (Davies, 1977).

There are many examples of this experience which deserve elaboration, for example the integration of the 'new' Soviet working class into factory production, the experience of forced labour, the origins and development of Stakhanovism. A most obvious case of the integration of feudal-bureaucratic and socialist forms was the collective farm, itself the product of the greatest single act of primary socialist accumulation. The collective farm combined new technical forms and new forms of collective labour with new institutions of cooperative democracy. But these were subordinated to the needs of state policy and to the state's coercive organs, finding only primitive expression. They were dominated by the restoration of features of the Russian manorial system - the mutual guarantee (krugovaya poruka) and the restricted right to an internal passport. As under the Tsars, the coercive apparatus was intended to secure from agriculture the 'tribute' which Stalin sought to finance industrialisation plans, and which Bukharin called 'military-feudal exploitation'. At the same time this new system of property and production was a very partial success. The collective farm itself was held together by extra-economic coercion, as is strikingly illustrated by the decree of 1932 which rendered petty pilfering of collective farm property (including food produce) punishable by shooting. At the same time the collective farm had to be combined with the family-based petty commodity small-holding as an integral part of the kolkhoz, tiny in terms of acreage but enormously important in terms of foodstuffs produced.

Thus the historical significance of the Way No. II was to develop modernised, socialised industrial productive forms by integrating
them with a number of forms and methods derived from pre-capitalist Russian formations, the feudal economy, the military-bureaucratic culture and so on.

I do not wish at this point to counterpose the historical, contradictory Soviet productive forms against 'pure' or abstract theoretical socialism. Marx himself recognised socialism as a combination of social relations (communist property in the means of production, 'bourgeois right' to the means of subsistence distributed in commodity form). He assumed that socialist society would necessarily develop on the basis left by the past - by advanced capitalist society:

a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges (Marx and Engels, 1968, p. 319).

Of course there is no method of building a socialist society without building upon the past, employing 'old' traditions, practices and productive apparatus. However, social revolution is also, partly, a process of defeating and rejecting elements of the old society. The direction which such a revolution takes is determined, ultimately, by the elements of the past which it rejects, the elements which it takes on, and the balance which is formed between old and new.

In this sense, the Soviet revolution had available to it a uniquely broad array of choices between the various foundations for the future, constructed out of its uneven zigzag of past development. It was
further shaped by those elements which had not been created, or which had failed. For example, Soviet industrialisation has constantly evoked many 'capitalist' themes; by this, I do not mean the task of economic development itself, but the ways in which this task was undertaken. From the first days of Soviet industry, the benchmark of its development was taken from Western capitalist industry. Well before Stalin formulated the goal 'to catch up and overtake', Soviet planners and managers had been engaged in borrowing Western technology, management techniques ('Taylorism') and efficiency concepts. In the Western capitalist economies they had found precisely a practical model (with which they were already partly familiar from the previous import of Western capital) embodying a 'higher culture' to be copied, a standard of culture which should be wholeheartedly adopted ('For a start, we should be satisfied with real bourgeois culture') (Lenin, 1964B, p. 47).

For many writers critical of the Soviet experience, these themes are seen as forming the main contradiction, or even the dominant direction in Soviet society:

central to Bolshevik strategies from Lenin to Brezhnev and inclusive of Oppositions both Left and Right has been a conception of what the productive forces are, and what it means to develop them, which has occasioned a systematic replication of certain essential relations of capitalist production (Corrigan, Ramsey and Sayer, 1978, p.45).

This seems to me a misinterpretation. The themes of Taylorism, labour discipline and incentives to labour are prominent in Soviet history, because Soviet management has not been able to achieve the control of labour-power characteristic of Western capitalist production. The
resort to external forms of control and of coercion over the labour-process is a direct consequence of this failure.

This failure to achieve an organic system of labour discipline seems to me to be rooted in the adoption of the Way No. II of primary socialist accumulation. At the same time, subordinate configurations continue to develop within the USSR, indicating alternative paths of socialist development today, as well as more anarchic, explosive possibilities. Although discussion of this is beyond the present paper, it indicates the contemporary significance of the historical problem discussed. This was also pointed out by Takahashi in another connection:

what the author of Capital wrote about his fatherland in 1867, in the preface to the first edition, still holds true, despite the different stage of world history: 'Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production, with their inevitable train of social and political anachronisms'. Thus the question of 'two ways', so far as we are concerned, is not merely of historical interest, but is connected with actual practical themes (Takahashi, 1976, pp. 96-97).
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