

# Xueying Zhao

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Department of Economics  
University of Warwick  
CV4 7AL, Coventry, UK

Phone: +44 (0)74 225 05098  
Website: [xueyingzhao8.github.io](https://xueyingzhao8.github.io)  
Email: [xueying.zhao@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:xueying.zhao@warwick.ac.uk)

## EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, <i>University of Warwick</i> , UK	2025 (expected)
M.Res. in Economics, <i>University of Warwick</i> , UK	2020
M.A. in Economics, <i>Shanghai University of Finance and Economics</i> , China	2017
B.A. in Economics, <i>Shandong University</i> , China	2015

## RESEARCH FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Mechanism Design

## JOB MARKET PAPER

### "Tailoring Data for Profit"

*This paper develops a framework to analyze the optimal sale of information. A data buyer, facing a decision problem under uncertainty, initially has access to an information structure that is private to him and determines his willingness to pay for any additional information. A monopolistic data seller, capable of designing tailored information structures, seeks to maximize revenue. Compared to Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2018), the novelty of this paper lies in two key features: (i) the type space consists of various information structures, and (ii) correlations are allowed between the data buyer's initial information structure and the additional information structure offered by the data seller. My main result demonstrates that, in a large class of cases, the data seller can design and price information within a mechanism to fully extract the first-best surplus. Specifically, full surplus extraction is achievable when each lower-type buyer's willingness to pay for information that fully supplements their initial information is weakly higher than that of all higher types.*

## WORKING PAPERS

### "Contracting with Heterogeneous Beliefs"

*We analyze the optimal design of incentive contracts in the context of belief heterogeneity between a principal and an agent.*

### "When to Go Negative in Political Campaigns?" (with Sinem Hidir)

*We explore whether and when it is optimal for a privately informed incumbent politician to engage in negative campaigning by disclosing a scandal about the challenger's corruption in order to persuade voters.*

## WORK IN PROGRESS

### "Think Different but Not Too Different"

### "Signaling in Information Design"

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

### University of Warwick

Statistical Techniques B (UG)

Spring 2021, Spring 2022

Mathematical Techniques B (UG)

Fall 2020, Fall 2021

### Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Advanced Microeconomics I (MA)

Fall 2017

Advanced Microeconomics II (MA)

Spring 2017

### Shandong University

Intermediate Microeconomics: Game Theory (UG)

Fall 2014

## PRESENTATIONS

**2024:** 35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

**2023:** 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, 12th Annual Conference of the Israeli Chapter of the Game Theory Society (Tel Aviv), RES and SES Annual Conference 2023 (Glasgow), Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, 9th Annual Conference "Contests: Theory and Evidence" (Reading)

## WORKSHOPS AND SUMMER SCHOOLS

33rd Advanced School in Economic Theory: Imperfect Cognition and Economic Behaviour (IIAs, 2023), Workshop on Learning and Bounded Rationality (Stony Brook, 2023), 5th Reading Experimental and Behavioural Economics Workshop (2023), Warwick Economics Theory Workshop (2022, 2023), CAGE Summer School (Warwick, 2022), Warwick-SUFE Workshop (2021)

## AWARDS AND GRANTS

Micro Theory Group Research Grant £1,000, *University of Warwick* 2024

Departmental Discretionary Research Grant £4,000, *University of Warwick* 2023

Department of Economics Scholarship, *University of Warwick* 2018-2024

Kwang-Hua Scholarship, *Shanghai University of Finance and Economics* 2016

Academic Excellence Scholarship, *Shanghai University of Finance and Economics* 2015-2017

Meritorious Winners of the Mathematical Contest in Modeling (MCM), *COMAP* 2014

Academic Excellence Scholarship, *Shandong University* 2011-2014

## SERVICE

Referee for Warwick Economics PhD Conference (2022, 2023), M.Sc. Dissertation Helpdesk (2022)

## REFERENCES

### **Daniel Sgroi**

Professor,  
Department of Economics,  
University of Warwick  
[Daniel.Sgroi@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:Daniel.Sgroi@warwick.ac.uk)

### **Sinem Hidir**

Associate Professor,  
Department of Economics,  
University of Warwick  
[S.Hidir@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:S.Hidir@warwick.ac.uk)

### **Herakles Polemarchakis**

Professor,  
Department of Economics,  
University of Warwick  
[H.Polemarchakis@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:H.Polemarchakis@warwick.ac.uk)