Research Interests

• Applied Microeconomic Theory
  • Economics of Information
  • Organizational Economics & Industrial Organisation

Supervisors

• Professor Motty Perry
• Professor Ilan Kremer
• Professor Jacob Glazer

Working Papers

• Job Market Paper
  • Feedback on Ideas (Joint with Ayush Pant)
    • Abstract: Employees are often assigned tasks comprising two distinct phases: In the first phase, ideas are generated; in the second phase, the best idea is implemented. Furthermore, it is common for supervisors to give feedback to their employees during this process. This paper studies the supervisor’s problem. Supervisors face the following tradeoff: while honest feedback encourages employees to discard bad ideas, it can also be demotivating. We obtain three main results. First, the supervisor only gives honest feedback to agents who believe in their ability to succeed. Second, receiving honest feedback leads such high self-opinion agents to exert more effort. Third, overconfidence is potentially welfare improving.
• The Diversity Paradox
  
  • Abstract: Diversity related reputation is becoming increasingly important for managers in organisations. We study a principal manager career concern relationship where manager and principal may not have an identical bias toward diversity. In such a setting, the misaligned manager faces the following trade-off; while hiring minorities reduces his utility, not hiring them may cost him his career. We show that when the success of employees depends on their ability and manager's effort, with low reputation, a positive bias of the principal induces sabotage of minority groups. If the principal has no bias toward diversity, diversity marginally improves. However, if the principal has a positive bias toward diversity, the misaligned manager improves reputation by hiring more from minority groups but sabotages them. We define this, diversity paradox; if there is no positive bias toward diversity, diversity does not improve much. However, if there is, diversity improves at the cost of increased sabotage. We show that minorities in low productivity jobs are more likely to be sabotaged.

Work In Progress

• Effort-Inducing Promotions (Joint With Daniel Habermacher)
• Optimal Intermediary Test and Disclosure Design (Joint With Ayush Pant)
• Short-Sighted Voters, Strength and Political Competition

Affiliations :

• Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications (CRETA) research fellow

Teaching

2018/19

• EC957: Microeconomics for MSc Economics & Finance

Previous Years

• EC957: Microeconomics for MSc Economics & Finance
• EC326: Industrial Economics 2: Strategy & Planning
• EC204: Economics 2