

Office Contact Information

Department of Economics,
University of Warwick,
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Education:

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, University of Warwick, 2013 to present

Thesis Title: “*Essays in Economics of Information and Organization*”

Expected Completion Date: January 2020

PhD Committee/ Supervisors:

Professor Motty Perry, Professor Ilan Kremer and Professor Jacob Glazer

MA Economics, Australian National University, 2006-2007

MSc Economics, London School of Economics, 2011-2012

BSc Economics, *Summa Cum Laude*, Shahid Beheshti University, 2006

Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory.

Secondary fields: Industrial Organization, Information Economics

Job Market Papers:

“Feedback on Ideas” (with Ayush Pant)

Employees are often assigned tasks comprising two distinct phases: in the first phase, ideas are generated; in the second phase, the best idea is implemented. Furthermore, it is common for supervisors to give feedback to their employees in this process. We study the supervisor’s problem. Supervisors face the following tradeoff: while honest feedback encourages employees to discard bad ideas, it can also be demotivating. We obtain three main results. First, the supervisor only gives honest feedback to high self-opinion agents. Second, receiving honest feedback leads high self-opinion agents to exert more effort. Third, overconfidence is potentially welfare improving.

“The Diversity Paradox” (Second Paper)

Diversity related reputation is becoming increasingly important for managers in organizations. We study a principal manager career concern relationship where manager and principal may not have an identical bias toward diversity. In such a setting, the misaligned manager faces the following trade-off; while hiring minorities reduces his utility, not hiring them may cost him his career. We show that when the success of employees depends on their ability and manager’s effort, with low reputation, a positive bias of the principal induces sabotage of minority groups. If the principal has no bias toward diversity, diversity marginally improves. However, if the principal has a positive bias

toward diversity, the misaligned manager improves reputation by hiring more from minority groups but sabotages them. We define this, diversity paradox: if there is no positive bias toward diversity, diversity does not improve much. However, if there is, diversity improves at the cost of increased sabotage. We show that minorities in low productivity jobs are more likely to be sabotaged.

Research Papers in Progress

“Optimal intermediary test-design” (with Ayush Pant)

We consider how a profit-maximizing intermediary designs, prices, and discloses tests to facilitate signaling between a sender and a receiver. Designing more difficult tests increases the willingness-to-pay of the more able senders but reduces that of the less able senders. We show that the intermediary is not indifferent between different tests with the same informativeness. Notably, the intermediary designs the easiest test possible to convince the receiver of the sender's ability. Splitting a single test into many helps the intermediary extract a higher surplus from better senders by inducing more participation of bad senders. The reason is two-fold. First, making the test easier induces senders of all types to take the test more often to prove their ability. Second, the decline in prices (due to more tests) is less than the increase in the number of tests.

“Effort-inducing Promotions” (with Daniel Habermacher)

Promotions are signals of worker ability. We study a framework in which a firm designs the disclosure of information from promotions to increase a worker's effort.

When high-productivity firms can screen workers better, promotion improves a worker's prospects by making him more attractive to these firms.

While distorting promotion signals increases the effort of a low-ability worker, it decreases a high ability worker's information rent and effort. We show that low-productivity firms prefer to distort the promotion signal away from the full revelation of a worker's type. Doing so increases the effort from low-ability workers and decreases that of high-ability ones relative to the fully separating contract.

Conditions on the convexity of effort costs guarantee such signaling contracts are optimal.

Our result qualifies the traditional notion of “no distortions at the top” in Contract Theory -- the firm substitutes informational rents from the high-type for similar rents from the low-type worker. We also show that a worker's career prospects are path-dependent.

Teaching Experience:

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| Autumn, 2018 | Microeconomics for MSc Economics and Finance, Warwick Business School, Teaching fellow for Dr. Luciana Niccollier |
| Autumn, 2017 | Microeconomics for MSc Economics and Finance, Warwick Business School, Teaching fellow for Dr. James Choy |
| Spring, 2016 | Microeconomics for MSc Economics and Finance, Warwick Business School, Teaching fellow for Dr. James Choy |
| Spring, 2016 | Industrial Economics 2: Strategy & Planning, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Teaching fellow for Professor Jacob Glazer |
| Spring, 2015 | Economics II, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Teaching fellow for Ms. Elizabeth Jones |
| Autumn, 2014 | Economics II, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Teaching fellow for Professor Natalie Chen |

Research Experience and Other Employment:

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| 2008-2011 | Iran's Center for Strategic Research, Researcher in “Macroeconomics Indexing, Forecasting and Future Studies” and “Economic Infrastructure” research groups, head of “Oil & Gas sector” research subgroup |
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2009-2010 Municipality of Tehran's Investment Organization, Member of Council of the Municipality of Tehran's Investment Organization's Economic Advisers

Professional Activities:

Autumn, 2019 Visiting Research Student, Host: Professor Debraj Ray, New York University, Department of Economics

December, 2017 European Winter Meeting of Econometric society
• "Feedback on Ideas" Presented in Economic Theory session

August, 2017 6th Lindau Meeting on Economic Science

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2015-2018 UK Economics and Social Science Council (ESRC) Scholarship

Languages:

Persian (native)
English (fluent)
French (fluent)
Italian (intermediate)

References:

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