

# Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years

DR18: Is there evidence that national, and other, identities change as the ethnic composition of the UK changes? If so, how? Are there differences between people from different ethnic groups? And of different ages/ social classes

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# **Summary**

This Driver Review addresses the question of the linkages between the growing ethnic diversity of the UK and changes in national identity over time. It looks at how the population has changed and is likely to change over the medium term future and reviews changes in national identification, drawing upon a range of survey data sources and published research. Overall, identification with Britain has been declining in recent decades as identification with individual UK countries has become stronger. However, people from minority ethnic groups tend to be more likely than White people to identify themselves as British. People from higher status social groups are more likely to identify themselves as British, while those from lower status social groups are more likely to identify with the country they live in. Younger adults demonstrate weaker national identity than older people. It is likely that migration and rates of population increase for minority ethnic groups will remain high and current trends in identity will continue over the next ten years. The research evidence demonstrates that ethnic diversity on its own does not result in a lack of social cohesion but that ethnic diversity, population mobility and economic deprivation combine together to have a negative effect. Thus, the impact of increased ethnic diversity upon social and neighbourhood cohesion will be strongly influenced by economic conditions and the relative prosperity of individual ethnic groups.

## 1. Introduction

This Driver Review aims to explore how international migration and the changing ethnic composition of the nation influences the extent to which the population as a whole identifies with the British nation. Within this, the review is required to investigate which national identities are affected and in which ways. In particular, differences by ethnic group, age and social class are to be examined. Underlying these questions are the concerns for the impact of increased ethnic diversity upon social cohesion (at both the national and neighbourhood scales).

In recent decades, the ethnic diversity of the nation has increased, while international migration has accelerated rapidly. At the same time, "British" identity appears to have weakened as national identities within the UK have strengthened and the UK state has been challenged by both membership of the European Union and devolution of political power to nations within the UK. Within these trends, the growing ethnic diversity of the population can influence national identity through two mechanisms: by changing the way in which people from majority ethnic groups perceive the nation and identify with it; and through differences in the perception of the nation and identification with it by migrants and people from minority ethnic groups. These forces also operate at the local and neighbourhood scales and are reflected in concerns over "community cohesion".

This paper is mainly based upon the analysis of quantitative information on the changing ethnic composition of the population and attitudes towards national identity. This analysis is informed by a brief review of recent literature concerned with trends in national identification and in social cohesion.

The paper commences by establishing the demographic background to attitudinal change and social cohesion. The first section presents trends in population change by ethnic group and international migration, demonstrating the role of migration in changing the ethnic and national composition of the UK over the last two decades.

The focus of the paper then changes to the conceptual background for the questions explored. It briefly discusses the concept of national identity and the concerns that have been voiced about the possible impact of increasing ethnic diversity upon national cohesion. Having raised the question of the attitudes of British people towards migration and its possible effect upon the cultural diversity of the nation, the paper goes on to present evidence of British attitudes towards migrants over the recent past.

The second part of the paper attempts to answer the questions posed for this Driver Review by presenting the findings of other research studies and evidence from a range of survey data sources. It begins by presenting evidence on change over time in national identification for the population as a whole and then contrasts the experience of sub-sets of the population. An extended section considers trends in the national identity of people from minority ethnic groups. This section concludes by presenting a regression model which estimates the influence of a range of variables including age, social class and ethnicity upon different forms of national identification.

The final section of the paper is concerned with a review of published quantitative research on the link between ethnic diversity and social and community cohesion. The paper concludes by

briefly summarising the evidence presented and using this to reflect on the questions posed in the Driver Review.

# 2. The growing ethnic diversity of the United Kingdom

The recent past has seen a particularly rapid transformation in the ethnic composition of the UK population. Rapid population growth occurred during the "baby boom" and "baby boom echo" from the end of World War 2 to the mid-1960s, but the number of births fell sharply by the early 1970s. The population continued to increase slowly, but this was now mainly through net international migration from the New Commonwealth and the higher fertility and lower mortality of these new migrant populations. The British-born minority ethnic group population steadily increased and the 1991 Census of Population showed that of the 55 million people in Great Britain (with another 1.5 million in Northern Ireland), just over 3 million were from minority ethnic groups, representing 5.5 per cent of the population. Ten years later, the ethnic minority population had grown by a million, to account for nearly 7 per cent of the population. It grew twice as rapidly after 2001, reaching 6.3 million or 10.2 per cent of the population in 2011.

In recent decades, therefore, the growth of the UK population as a whole was largely accounted for by the rapid growth of the minority ethnic group population, but the White population continued to increase slowly. The major influence upon population change during this period has been the increasing trend of net international migration. Until the early 1980s. more people left the UK than entered in most years, but net international migration has been positive in most years ever since (Figure 3). Total annual net in-migration has increased steadily since 1991, remaining at more than 200,000 from 2003 onwards. Net in-migration fluctuates from year to year, being the difference between two large flows of people. Inmigration reached more than 500,000 per annum from 2003 onwards. In 1991, people with British citizenship formed nearly half of in-migrants to the UK, but less than a fifth by 2010. Figure 4 shows that the numbers of migrants from all parts of the world increased over this period, with the established flow from the "Old Commonwealth" being maintained, while migration from the EU15 increased slowly. The bulk of the increase in migration is made up of migrants from the New Commonwealth, "Other" parts of the world and the rapid increase in migration from the EU Accession countries after 2003. While migration from the latter fell as the economy entered the current recession, migration from the New Commonwealth and "Other" countries continued to grow.

The effect of these migration trends upon the ethnic composition of the UK has been to revive the growth of the "established" minority ethnic groups whose origins are in South Asia, the Caribbean and Africa, to increase the range of ethnic groups resident in the UK as new migration flows from outside Europe emerged, and also to bolster the White population (as new migration flows from countries with White European populations became established).

The changing ethnic composition of the population over the period can be identified using the Labour Force Survey (LFS). This is the largest regular household survey in the UK, yielding representative data on the demographic and economic characteristics of the population, and estimates of sub-groups of the population. It has included questions on the self-defined ethnicity, country of birth and nationality of the population since it was established. Figure 5 summarises the growth of six broad ethnic groupings of the population over the period from 1994 to 2011. The White population of the UK has remained fairly static over this period. The South Asian and Black ethnic groups have approximately doubled in size over this period,

while the number of people of mixed parentage was nearly three times larger in 2011 than in 1994. The most rapid growth has been in the "Other" ethnic group, which encompasses people with origins outside the "Old" and "New" Commonwealth, Europe and North America. This category grew particularly rapidly in the early years of the 21st century, reflecting the international migration trend displayed in Figures 3 and 4.

The growing diversity of the population is not completely captured by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) ethnic group classification (used by the Census of Population and Labour Force Survey) because it is slow to recognise the emergence of new minority groups within the population (and many smaller national minorities are grouped together in the "other" categories). Thus, to summarise the trend over time in the diversity of the population, a diversity measure was devised which used data on the number of UK residents born in each country of the world (Figure 6). This is based on the Herfindahl index, standardised for the number of countries represented in the classification of country of birth used by the Labour Force Survey, and subtracted from 1. The resulting measure increases as the number of people born outside the UK and the range of national origins in the population increases. It clearly shows that the increase in net migration has been associated with growing population diversity as well as an increasing minority ethnic group population. The proportion of the population born in the UK has steadily declined over this period, from 94.1 per cent in 1994 to 87.9 per cent in 2011.

#### 2.1 Future population change

Projecting the UK population as a whole involves projecting the separate components of population change (births, deaths and migration, all of which involve considerable uncertainty) into the future. Recent projections by the Government Actuary Department and the Office for National Statistics have seen the projected population of the UK continually revised upwards. Substantial increases in birth rates and increases in life expectancy in the first decade of the 21st century have added to the uncertainty of population projections. The 2010-based ONS population for the UK as a whole project the total population increasing from an estimated 62.3 million in 2010 to 67.2 million by 2020, 70 million by 2027 and 73.2 million by mid-2035. These projections assume that the excess of births over deaths (natural change) will be responsible for 56 per cent of this increase (resulting from increased birth rates and life expectancy), with the remainder the consequence of net international migration. The assumption is that net long-term migration to the UK will remain at more than 200,000 per annum.

The implication of such projected changes is for continued growth in minority ethnic group populations and greater diversity in the ethnic background of the population. Because of the much greater data demands involved and the need to make assumptions about changing ethnic identification over time (because ethnicity is a social construct and hence subject to change, unlike age), few attempts have been made to project the ethnic composition of the UK population forward. The most significant of these are the models created by the Greater London Authority, Oxford University and University of Leeds.

Of these, the Leeds model (Wohland *et al.*, 2010) is the most comprehensive and sophisticated. It is based on the approach of estimating population transitions from year to year, including geographical mobility and mobility between ethnic groups. A range of variant projections were developed, based on alternative assumptions about the demographic forces underlying population change and changes in ethnic identification. Alternative projections

based on assuming fixed migration flows or relating migration to the population at risk were developed. Their 'benchmark' projections using the same assumptions as ONS yield a much lower rate of population growth than the official 2008-based projections between 2011 and 2021, regardless of whether migration is estimated as a flow or a rate. However, their model with revised assumptions about demographic rates yields a similar rate of increase for the period 2011-21 (growth of about 5 million in the UK population). Their benchmark projections yield a substantial fall in the White British population and slow growth in most minority populations. Their projections based on their own assumptions project the population of all ethnic groups to increase over the period 2011-31, with a number of minority ethnic groups more than doubling in population. The share of the population from White groups is projected to fall to under 80 per cent of the population and minority ethnic groups are projected to increase most rapidly in areas which currently have small minority ethnic group populations. The population is therefore projected to be much more ethnically diverse across a much larger area of the UK and the major cities are projected to also have much larger minority populations.

Having established that the ethnic diversity of the population has increased substantially and will continue to do so in the medium-term future, the attention of the paper will now change to national identity, change in identity and social cohesion.

# 3. The concept of national identity and the impact of changing ethnic composition

The model of the nation state implies that its population constitutes a nation, united by a common descent, a common language and many forms of shared culture. Where the implied unity was absent, the nation state often tried to create it, promoting a uniform national language. The creation of national systems of compulsory primary education and a relatively uniform curriculum in secondary schools proved the most effective instrument in the spread of the national languages. Schools also taught the national history, often in a propagandistic and mythologised version. However, McNeill (1986) suggests that only in Europe between 1750 and 1920 did this model of national unity based on ethnic homogeneity hold sway. He further suggests that that the experience of the Nazi regime in Germany discredited the idea of ethnic unity within an existing state, while leading ethnic minorities to abandon the ideal of assimilation to locally prevailing national groups. He further argued that the undermining of the ideal of national uniformity also led to the reassertion of identity by national minorities, since striving for uniformity had necessitated the erasure of distinguishing cultural differences.

British identity is an extremely nebulous concept. A research study for the Commission for Racial Equality (found that the concept of 'Britishness' "is very much a fluid concept, which can be associated with a range of different, and indeed contradictory, meanings" (Ethnos, 2005, 11). Stuart Hall (1997) has pointed out that discussions of English and British identity during the era of Empire were good at defining the deficiencies of other national and cultures relative to the British, who were presented as an ideal but with little reflection on what being British actually meant. Bhabha (1990) highlights the conceptual indeterminancy of the nation-state and its 'two--faced' nature: presenting something different to those within and outside it. Condor et al. (2006) comment that the construct of "Britishness" (whether in its imperial or domestic guise) has been used by contemporary politicians in celebratory accounts of British 'unity in diversity'. Within this, cultural diversity is presented both as a post-Imperial phenomenon, and also an enduring aspect of 'our' way of life, enabling devolution and multiculturalism to be encompassed simultaneously as both progressive historical developments and the political instantiations of an enduring moral order. However, they point out that the construct of British identity is disputed and that there are competing interpretations of identity varying from "kith and kin" to an externally imposed category of empire, autonomous ethnic preference or citizenship duty. In a study of integration and immigration for the Migration Advisory Committee, Saggar et al. (2012) concluded that there had been a "move from an ancestral understanding of Britishness to one based more on civic values. There is little evidence that immigration played a role in this, but those of immigrant heritage are likely to feel this more strongly, suggesting this trend may have been accelerated by immigration" (Saggar et al. 2012, 64-5). While this points to an explanation for the relatively high levels of identification of people from minority ethnic groups as being British, Fukuyama (2007) warns that "the rise of relativism has made it harder for postmodern people to assert positive values and therefore the kinds of shared beliefs that they demand of migrants as a condition for citizenship".

However, Vasta (2009) has pointed out that the absence of a "strong, purposive and inspiring" national identity makes the benefits of integration to a national culture less obvious for migrants and people from minority ethnic groups. She argues that the Canadian model of integration, in which importance is placed on the accommodation of diverse ethnic/cultural/religious identities

and their symbolic importance for the national identity as the most promising approach. Modood (2007) also contends that it makes no sense to encourage strong multicultural or minority identities and weak common or national identities. In his view, the maintenance of community traditions must fall within a strong framework of national ceremonies and traditions which demonstrate how minority communities contribute to the overall national identity.

Goodhart (2004) expressed his unease that much of the organisation of British society and economy (e.g. the welfare state) is predicated on the idea that the population of the country represents a community with interests in common and that recent population trends had undermined this. He noted that three centuries of a process of homogenization had been followed by the diversification of values and ethnic diversification, with a conflict developing between diversity and shared values and solidarity. Goodhart suggested that if the share of the population born outside the UK grew large enough, that British society would become more like the United States, with low levels of social solidarity and political participation, sharp ethnic divisions and a weak welfare state. Increased immigration also threatened the acceptance of a welfare state among the majority population if recent migrants were beneficiaries without being contributors in his view. Indeed, Goodwin (2012) argued (using data from the 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey) that people in Britain are more likely than those in continental Europe to view migration as a threat to the national culture and concluded that this perceived threat to the cultural unity of the nation is the strongest driver of prejudice.

#### 3.1 Devolution and national identity

In a period in which the diversity of ethnic and geographical origins of the population has increased at an unprecedented rate, there has also been rapid change in the political organisation of the British state, with the devolution of some central government powers to elected governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and an attempt to introduce regional elected government in England (which was only implemented in London). Curtice and Heath (2000) noted that following the establishment of devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the late 1990s, English respondents to questions on national identity in attitudinal surveys became more likely to identify themselves as English rather than British. However, Condor et al (2006) note that responses to the British identity question are very sensitive to the way in which the question is asked. They also conclude that White English people are increasingly likely to describe themselves as English rather than British. In contrast to Scottish people, English people have been more likely to equate nation and state, but this has not resulted in the creation of a strong English nationalist movement. Hopkins (2008) noted that in Scotland, people from minority ethnic groups felt more able to identify with Scotland than their counterparts living in England could identify with England. This was consistent with the findings of the CRE survey on national identity, which found that some aspects of British national identity associated with 'English' attributes were very unattractive to people from minority ethnic groups and other parts of the UK (Ethnos, 2005).

# 4. Attitudes of the British people towards diversity and international migration

As was established in section 2, the increasing ethnic diversity of the UK population is largely a consequence of international immigration (particularly from beyond Europe) and the natural increase of the migrant population once settled. Attitudes towards migrants may therefore be an important influence upon social cohesion. The popular press in the UK regularly contains stories about the problems caused by mass immigration or individual immigrants. There have been regular media 'frenzies' about particular aspects of immigration, most notably the prolonged controversy over asylum migration in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the continuing concern over the impact of migration from Eastern Europe, following EU expansion in 2004. Continuing themes running through these stories have been those of migrants cheating the immigration system or the benefit system or 'taking British jobs'. Underlying these has been a perception that the 'political elite' has imposed without democratic consultation a liberal migration regime which serves their own class interests and is in opposition to the interests and perceptions of the 'British people'.

It might therefore be expected that British public opinion would be generally hostile to international migration. Indeed the Transatlantic Trends survey found that "British views about immigration are much more negative than those typically found in other TTI countries" (Ford, 2012, 11). This was confirmed by the 2008 European Values Survey, in which 69.4 per cent of UK respondents "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that there were too many immigrants living in the country (compared with the average for all 47 countries in the survey of 44 per cent). Ipsos-MORI opinion research suggests that around two-thirds of the British population feel there are "too many immigrants in Britain", and that this has remained more or less constant over the last two decades (http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/53/Attitudes-Towards-Immigration.aspx). The British Election Studies of the 1960s and early 1970s found that over 80 per cent of White respondents felt there were 'too many migrants' in Britain (though Blinder [2012] suggests that changes in question wording means that a reduction in hostility over time cannot be identified with certainty).

The percentage of the population for whom immigration was one of the most important issues facing the UK was high during the late 1970s, and after a period of low concern, increased steadily during the 1990s (Figure 7). From 2002 onwards, at least a quarter of respondents viewed this as the most important issue. It was viewed as being of equal or greater importance than other issues (e.g. the NHS, crime and the economy) during the long period of relatively rapid economic growth in the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century, only being replaced by the state of the economy during the current recession. Nearly two-thirds (64.6 per cent) of respondents to the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "Immigration is a threat to our national identity" and only a fifth disagreed.

Hostility to immigration appears to have increased between the mid-1990s and the early years of the 21 century. The British Social Attitudes Survey found the percentage of people who thought that the number of immigrants to the UK should be reduced by 'a lot' increased in all social classes (measured on the Goldthorpe-Heath scale) between 1995 and 2003 (Figure 8). Hostility to migration was greatest for routine non-manual workers in 2003 and for manual workers in 1995. The increase between 1995 and 2003 in the percentage favouring a large cut

in immigration was greatest for routine non-manual workers and the working class and least for the "salariat", who were least likely to favour a large cut in immigration in both years. This is broadly consistent with the findings of the Transatlantic Trends Surveys conducted between 2008 and 2011 (Ford, 2012). Ford concluded that the views of the British people towards immigration are sharply polarized between people characterised as the "cosmopolitan young" (highly educated and ethnically diverse), who are relatively comfortable with immigration and "parochial pensioners" (older and homogenously White), who are deeply alarmed by migration. However, this survey also found that there was relative ignorance of the composition of international migration. Views towards migrants were found to vary according to the type of migrant, with greater acceptance of economic migrants and those coming to fill skilled jobs, but relative hostility to asylum seekers and refugees and unskilled migrants. On the other hand, Blinder (2012) noted that the hostility towards 'immigrants' identified by surveys tended to be generalised, since the surveys usually did not provide a precise definition of an immigrant. Moreover, surveys tended to reveal lower levels of hostility to immigrants living in the neighbourhood of the respondent. This finding tends to support the argument of the proponents of contact theory that greater contact with minorities reduces majority prejudice. This will be revisited in section 8, which is concerned with social cohesion studies.

# 5. Trends in national identity

This section presents survey evidence on trends over time in identification with Britain and contrasts between sections of the population in national identity. Most of the surveys considered here are attitudinal surveys with relatively small samples. However, their findings are supplemented by the Labour Force Survey, which is large enough for analysis to be undertaken for sub-groups of the population.

The primary source of information on the changing views of the British population is the British Social Attitudes Survey, which been conducted annually since the early 1980s. It asks a random sample of around 4,000 people a series of questions about the political and social attitudes and also collects data on their demographic characteristics. Since 1996, it has included questions about national identity. Figure 9 presents the percentage of respondents who report that they "feel British". This percentage has remained fairly constant over this period, at around two-thirds of respondents. This is a higher percentage than that obtained in questions which permit a range of British identities to be chosen from, but lower than the sum of all types of British identities identified by such questions. A range of other questions about national identity occur in particular years of the survey. In 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2007, respondents in England (only) were asked how proud they were to be British. The percentage 'proud' was very high, at just under 90 per cent. However, this fell between 1999 and 2007 and the percentage who said they were 'very proud' to be British declined much more markedly.

This result is consistent with the European Values Survey for 2008-10, in which 92 per cent of respondents from the UK felt either 'very proud' (53 per cent) or 'proud' to be a citizen of the UK. The average across all 46 countries covered by the survey was 87.5 per cent (with 47.5 per cent being 'very proud'). This percentage rose from 88 per cent in the first wave of the survey (conducted during 1981-4) to 92.9 per cent in the fourth wave (conducted in 2008-10), though the percentage 'very proud' fell from 55.2 to 52.7 over this period. These values are fairly typical of the countries in the survey, in which higher values tend to be recorded by recently independent countries like Kosovo, while low values are recorded for Germany and a number of countries which were formerly part of the Soviet Union.

In the UK, the measurement of British identity in surveys is complicated by identification with the constituent countries of the UK. The Final Report of the ESRC Programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change in the UK (http://www.devolution.ac.uk/final\_report.htm) noted that the percentage of people choosing to identify as "British" rather than identifying with the country in which they lived has declined relative to the 1970s. This trend is less apparent in Wales where the percentage identifying as Welsh was higher than the percentage identifying as British in the 1970s, with little shift in these percentages. Scotland was similar to Wales in the 1970s, but there has been a very sharp shift since the early 1990s, with three-quarters identifying as Scotlish and less than a fifth British. In England, in the early 1990s, nearly two-thirds identified themselves as British and a third English. By 2003, the percentage identifying with England or Britain was about equal, at 43-44 per cent. The percentage identifying with their own country and "not British" was highest in Scotland, and slightly higher in Wales than in England.

The Labour Force Survey has also included a question on national identity since 2001. This is asked in each country of the UK, asking about identification with Britain and each of the UK

nations, in a different order in each country. The country in which the respondent is resident is usually the first option on the question. Respondents can select as many countries as they like; so they can identify with both Britain and another UK country or another country altogether. However, the survey provides no information on the degree of identification the respondent has with each choice.

Figure 11 presents the trend over the period 2001 to 2011 in the percentage of people choosing each national identity option for the whole population, and Figure 12 presents the same information for people from White ethnic groups (White-British and White-Other). Only about 30 per cent of the population as a whole identified themselves as British with no other national affiliation. This percentage has remained fairly stable with fluctuations from year to year over this decade (there are some inconsistencies in the data and questionnaire from year to year - data for 2001 and 2008 is based on 3 quarters because of missing data and in 2008 an unusually high percentage of non-responses were recorded for the national identity questions). However, 56.1 per cent selected one of the nations of the UK as their national identity in 2001. This corresponds with the results of other surveys. However, the percentage choosing a nation within the UK as their sole national identity declined over this period. reaching 51.2 per cent in 2011. The percentage of people choosing to describe themselves as both British and English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish doubled between 2001 and 2011, from 5.9 to 10.3 per cent. The percentage who identified with another country increased over this period, reflecting the increasing number of overseas-born people in the population. About 1 in 40 people did not state their national identity. These trends for the entire population are largely shared by the White population. However, White people are less likely to describe themselves as British and more likely to identify with one of the UK nations. There is also more of a decline in the percentage who identify as British only. The percentage with a nationality from outside the UK is much smaller than for the population as a whole, and increased much more slowly over this period.

National identity varies by socio-economic class. The trends in national identity presented above are explored using the ONS Socio-Economic Classification in Figures 13 and 14 for identification as "British only" and with a UK nation only respectively. The trend over time in the percentage identifying as British is shared by all levels of this classification, but there are consistent differences between socio-economic categories. People in higher and lower managerial occupations are the most likely to have a "British-only" identity, and also least likely to only identify with one of the UK nations. People from routine occupations were least likely to identify as British, and this percentage declined more during 2001 to 2011 than for most other categories of the classification. People working in lower supervisory and technical and routine occupations are most likely to identify with a UK nation. People in semi-routine occupations and those who are unemployed or who have never worked are also amongst the most likely to identify with a UK nation.

#### 5.1 People from minority ethnic groups

People from minority ethnic groups who are of migrant origin may well identify with the nation state in which they live. This section presents evidence from selected published studies of ethnicity and nationality and analysis of data from the Labour Force Survey, Communities Survey and 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study, which all include questions on ethnic and national identity.

Starting from a cross-national perspective, analysis of the World Values Survey by Masella (2011) revealed no evidence of a lower intensity of national sentiment in more ethnically fragmented countries or among minority groups. In the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, Modood *et al* (1997) asked respondents whether they thought of themselves as being British. In most minority ethnic groups, between three-fifths and two-thirds stated that they felt British, but they were much more likely to identify with their ethnic group. However, most could identify both with Britain and their ethnic origin. The British-born were more likely to think of themselves as British and only slightly less likely to identify with their ultimate country of origin than the overseas-born. However, many Caribbean people were alienated from British identity because they felt that British society did not accept them as British, with the weakest identification being found in those parts of the country in which they were most numerous.

Nandi and Platt (2012) examined ethnic and national identification using data from the first wave of the ESRC Understanding Society longitudinal survey. They found that (after adjusting for sex, age and education) people from minority ethnic groups (both the UK-born and those born outside the UK) tended to express a stronger British identity than the White British majority. They also found that 29 per cent of the UK population had a connection with a country outside the UK, while 17 per cent of those born outside the UK identified themselves as White British. On the other hand, nearly half of respondents in England had no connection outside England, and they therefore cautioned that the relatively high percentage of migrants in the population should not be used uncritically as an indicator of ethnic and cultural diversity. It is likely that the experience of such diversity is far from uniform within the UK.

The trend in identification with Britain or UK nations (from LFS data) between 2001 and 2011 is presented in Figure 15 for minority ethnic groups as a whole and Figure 16 for South Asian people. The percentage of people from minority ethnic groups who identified themselves as British only was much higher than for White people and was the largest identity category throughout the period. However, it was slightly lower at the end than at the beginning of the period. The percentage identifying with a UK nation only declined faster. The percentage who identify with another country is the second largest category and slightly increased over this period. For South Asians, the percentage who describe their national identity as British only initially rose, but then fell, and the percentage whose national identification was with a non-UK country increased. In both cases, the percentage who identified only with a UK nation declined between 2001 and 2011. A small percentage chose both "British" and a non-UK country as their national identity, which has hardly changed over this period.

There were notable differences between people of mixed parentage (Figure 17), the individual South Asian ethnic groups (Figures 18 to 20), Chinese people (Figure 21) and people from Black ethnic groups (Figure 22). People of mixed parentage mainly had a British identity and were more likely to have a "British and UK" identity than other ethnic groups. Identification as "British only" tended to increase over time, while identification as "British and other UK" declined over time. While identification as "British only" declined slightly for Indian people, this was maintained or increased slightly for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people. The percentage identifying themselves as "British only" also increased for Black people but declined slightly for Chinese people. For the latter, the percentage who identified with another country increased over time.

The high degree of attachment of people from minority ethnic groups to a British national identity, is confirmed by a number of other household questionnaire surveys which include questions about ethnicity and national identity. The 2009-10 Citizenship Survey (Figure 23)

found that 87.3 per cent of people felt "very" or "fairly" strong belonging to Britain. This percentage was slightly higher for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, and only slightly lower for Black-Caribbean and Black-African people. The lowest percentages were reported for the Chinese and 'Other' ethnic groups (who were also most likely to report weak or no attachment to Britain). This relatively high degree of attachment to a British identity is probably because people from minority ethnic groups are able to maintain their own ethnic identity as well as a British identity. The 2009/10 Citizenship Survey revealed that people from minority ethnic groups were much more likely than White people to strongly agree that it is "possible to fully belong to Britain while maintaining a separate cultural or religious identity (Figure 24).

However, nationality was by no means the most important aspect of identity for any ethnic group (Figure 25). White, Asian and Black people all place 'family' as the most important aspect of identity (rather more so for White than other ethnic groups). For Asian and Black people, religion is second most important, and national identity has similar importance as for White people, comparable with occupation or education. Ethnic or racial background is a more important component of identity than national identity for Black people. Locality, age and life stage and interests are more important components of identity for White than for Black or Asian people. This survey found a higher percentage of people from minority ethnic groups than White people reporting their national identity as "British only", but a lower percentage identifying with a UK nation and a higher percentage of Black-African, Chinese and Other people than people from South Asian ethnic groups identifying with another nation (Figure 26).

The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study was a booster survey to the British Election Survey which followed the 2010 General Election. In addition to guestions about political attitudes and electoral behaviour, the survey asked a number of questions concerned with national identity and attitudes towards British society, focussing on the three main South Asian ethnic groups and Black people of Caribbean and African origin. The findings on national identity broadly confirm those of other sources. In all five minority ethnic groups, more than half identified themselves as British, with Bangladeshi people the most likely to report their national identity as British, followed by Pakistani and Caribbean people, with African people being least likely (Figure 27). For most ethnic groups, the second most important identity was their ultimate geographical region of origin. A relatively small percentage of people from South Asian or African ethnic groups identified with one of the UK countries rather than Britain or their ultimate origin. However, for Black-Caribbean people, the second most important identity (24.2 per cent) was one of the UK nations. Muslim people were much more likely (over 70 per cent) than those from other religions to identify with Britain (Figure 28). Hindu and Sikh people were more likely to identify with an Asian country and Christian people were most likely to have multiple national identities.

When asked what was the most important part of their identity (Figure 29), around half of respondents reported that they felt equally British and of their ethnic identity (this percentage being smallest for African people). Between a sixth and a fifth of Asian people identified more with Britain than with their ethnic group, much higher than for Caribbean and African people, amongst whom the percentage identifying primarily with their ethnic group was correspondingly higher.

# 6. Regression modelling of national identity

The results presented above have presented the relationship between national identity and a number of dimensions of individual experience separately. In this section, a multinomial logistic regression model was estimated using Labour Force Survey data in order to identify the relationship between choice of national identity and a number of individual characteristics in order to identify which factors were stronger in determining the choice of national identity (Table 1). These models include variables representing gender, age, ethnic group, migration status, country of residence and socio-economic category. The trend in identification between 2001 and 2010 (in order that the full detail of the 2001 Census ethnic group classification could be represented) is also represented by a variable indicating the year and quarter of the LFS data. A final dummy variable controlled for data anomalies in 2001 and 2008.

The multinomial logistic regression model simultaneously estimated the relationship between the independent variables and identification as British only, British and with a UK nation, identification with a UK nation only, British and another foreign country and identification with a foreign country. The comparison category was people with no national identification. The model was estimated using a data set with over 5 million observations which was also weighted to replicate the UK population structure, and thus all the odds ratios estimated are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate a greater chance of identifying and those below 1 a lesser chance of choosing a particular type of national identity. They represent the influence of each independent variable, having taken the effect of all other independent variables in the model into account. All the odds ratios are relative to a 'base case' which is a woman of "other" ethnicity with foreign nationality living in England who was unemployed or who had never worked, living outside Scotland. The models for each type of identity are also estimated relative to the probability of a person reporting no national identity.

The likelihood ratio tests reported in Table 2 indicate that all the independent variables in the model are statistically significant (which would be expected with such a large data set). The largest chi-square values are for country of birth and nationality and ethnic group, indicating that these are the most important influences upon choice of national identity. The statistical fit of the model (identified using three "pseudo R squared" measures) is quite good (Table 3), with nearly a third of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the model.

In each model, the odds ratio for the time trend is very close to 1, indicating only a weak trend over the period 2001 to 2010, once the other independent variables are taken into account. The probability of identifying as only British, or identifying with a UK country only, declined slightly over time, while the probability of choosing other forms of identity increased slightly. Men were less likely to choose Britain or any combination of Britain and other countries as their national identity than an individual UK nation, but these effects were very small. In terms of social class (represented by the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification), there is a clear tendency for those of higher social status to identify with Britain. The odds ratios for each type of national identity were largest for people from the higher managerial and professional category and tended to decline with socio-economic status. The higher managerial and professional group was most likely to identify with Britain and another (non-British) country or with Britain only. People from this socio-economic group were least likely to identify with a UK nation only. The pattern for lower managerial and professional occupations was similar. People from the lower supervisory and technical, semi-routine occupations and routine occupations

socio-economic groups were most likely to identify with a UK country only. Odds ratios were smallest for small employers and own account workers. People aged in their twenties and thirties were least likely to identify with any of the five combinations of national identity and were least attached to a UK country only. People aged less than 40 were more strongly attached (with odds ratios greater than 1) to a non-UK national identity. Attachment to any national identity increased with age for people over 40, but odds ratios were below 1.

Turning to ethnicity, White people were relatively unlikely to identify as British only (or identify with non-British identity), but were much more likely to identify with a single UK nation or as British and another UK nation. People of mixed parentage were more likely to identify as British only and with other UK nations. Identification with Britain only and with Britain and another country (in the UK or elsewhere) was strongest for South Asian and Black-Caribbean people. South Asian ethnic groups are much more likely than White people to identify as British, and also much less likely to identify with a UK nation alone. These effects are strongest for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people. However, people from the Black-Caribbean and Black-Other ethnic groups also strongly identified with other UK countries. South Asian people also displayed higher odds ratios for identification with Britain and another country than with an individual UK country. A major reason underlying this pattern is suggested by the odds ratios for migrant status. Migrants with UK nationality are very likely to identify as British only, and very unlikely to identify with an overseas country. This suggests that achieving citizenship probably makes migrants identify with the British state. The odds ratios for people living in Scotland are much higher than for all the other independent variables. The likelihood of Scottish residents choosing a UK country only identity is extremely high, and they are also much more likely to choose UK and Scottish as their identity than to choose British only.

# 7. Community Cohesion and ethnic diversity

Increasing ethnic diversity may have a negative effect on social cohesion and identification with community at the neighbourhood level (which has come to be termed "community cohesion"). The violent disturbances of summer 2001 in 'Northern Towns' (Bradford, Burnley and Oldham) led to considerable concern in government that these were the consequence of a breakdown of community cohesion, linked to the growth of minority ethnic communities suffering social, economic and geographical exclusion (Cantle, 2001). The field of research related to community cohesion is too large to be addressed in this study, which will present evidence from a number of studies of the factors underlying social cohesion. Demireva (2012) notes that there is no universally accepted definition of social cohesion, and that "most researchers have assumed that high levels of cohesion and social capital in a community will be reflected in high levels of trust between individuals and the observance of common social norms" (Demireva, 2012, 3).

Therefore, quantitative studies of social cohesion have tended to focus on measures of "trust" – either generalised (whether most people can be trusted) or trust at the neighbourhood level (most of the neighbours in this community can be trusted). In the United States, many research studies have found that as the ethnic diversity of a community increases, the less likely are individuals living in it to be trusting. For example, Putnam concluded from his analysis of the Social Capital Community Benchmark survey that ethnic diversity causes people "to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin" (Putnam, 2007) (though he also suggests this may be a short-term effect). However, Putnam paid little attention to the effect of the socio-economic situation of a neighbourhood upon the level of community cohesion.

Studies undertaken in Europe (e.g. Gesthuizen *et al.* 2009) tend to suggest that factors such as economic inequality and patterns of democratic participation have a greater influence on social cohesion than ethnic diversity. Indeed, Letki (2008) found no association between ethnic diversity and social interaction within British neighbourhoods, once economic deprivation was taken into account. Also in Great Britain, Sturgis *et al.* (2010) found (from analysis of the Taking Part survey) that while 'trust in neighbours' declined as ethnic diversity increased, this effect almost disappeared once compositional and structural differences between neighbourhoods were taken into account. The effect was also related to the amount of interpersonal contact a person has with their neighbours. They suggest that the effect of inter-ethnic competition in reducing trust was less strong in economically deprived areas than in slightly more affluent areas. Moreover, Hewstone (2009) has argued that even for people who have little direct contact with other minority groups, observing positive contact between other people from different ethnic groups can reduce anxiety about contact with other groups.

This tends to support the argument of contact theory (Allport, 1954) that social contacts between natives and ethnic minorities help weaken group loyalties and group prejudices and hence lead to a more culturally homogeneous society. However, an alternative view is that in maintaining their own distinctive cultural heritage, ethnic minorities enhance their psychological self-esteem and can defend themselves from the racism of the majority society. Bisin *et al.* (2010) found (from analysis of the 1994 Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities) that in

areas of mixed ethnicity, people from minority ethnic groups (particularly Muslims) tended to be more likely to maintain their community traditions and be less likely to integrate. In a qualitative study of residential segregation in Bradford and Leeds, Phillips *et al.* (2007) found that Pakistani people had recreated village communities in the areas in which they were dominant, and while this was an attraction and source of comfort for recent immigrants, some British-born Asians (particularly women) aspired to move away in order to achieve independence from their ethnic community. More affluent Pakistani people actively sought to move to affluent (but preferably with a mix of ethnic communities rather than exclusively White) areas in order to escape 'undesirables' and take advantage of the better opportunities (e.g. educational) available in these neighbourhoods. Phillips *et al.* (2007) challenge the interpretation that the residential segregation of minority communities is a result of a minority preference for pursuing 'separate lives', instead emphasising the economic and institutional constraints on residential mobility. Asian families found that moving to the suburbs was easier for those for whom their cultural differences were kept private.

Twigg, et al. (2010) analysed data from the British Crime Survey using multilevel modelling, to investigate the relative importance of individual factors and the characteristics of localities in explaining variations in two indicators for small geographical areas: social cohesion and trust; and informal social control. They found statistically significant associations between both ethnic diversity and economic disadvantage and a reduction in the level of both social cohesion and trust, and informal social control. However, the negative relationship between diversity and social control and trust diminished as deprivation increased, leading them to conclude that neighbourhood disadvantage was the more influential factor. However, the relatively large geographical areas they studied and the fact that the census data they used to measure ethnic diversity was very outdated weakened the chance of identifying significant associations.

Saggar et al. (2012) attempted to identify the separate influence of ethnic diversity and recent immigration upon local authority-level change in social cohesion. They concluded that deprivation is the most important influence upon perceptions of social cohesion, but that the pre-existing ethnic character of the area also influenced cohesion. They make the pertinent criticism of these types of analysis that "most of the available indicators of [social] cohesion are individual-level subjective assessments of the cohesion of the area in which they live. Not only is the individual's perception of the area's cohesiveness subjective, but so is the size and location of area itself as it is also left to the individual to delineate subjectively" (Saggar, et al. 2012, 27). Laurence and Heath (2008) undertook one of the more comprehensive analyses of the individual and community factors influencing community cohesion, applying multi-level modelling to data from the 2005 Citizenship Survey. They found that overall, ethnic diversity was positively associated with community cohesion, having controlled for the other characteristics of the neighbourhood. However, the influence of ethnic diversity and economic deprivation was complex. Predominantly White deprived areas experienced lower levels of cohesion than deprived ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. The key influence on cohesion was found to be contact and social mixing with people from other ethnic groups, but individual deprivation also acted to reduce social cohesion, as did fear of racial discrimination. However, income was not a significant influence for White people, but strongly associated with increased cohesion for Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black-African people. They found that the effect of some attitudinal predictors of cohesion varied between ethnic groups. People of mixed parentage were more likely to experience cohesion the stronger their attachment to Great Britain, while for Black-Caribbean people, attachment to the local authority they lived in was a stronger influence. Living in an area with a large Indian population was a strong positive influence on community cohesion, but where the White and Pakistani/Bangladeshi

communities were relatively large, the effect was negative. Only where there was a high percentage of non-White migrants in the population did migration lead to reduced community cohesion.

The identification of trends in community cohesion from survey data is quite difficult. The concept itself is nebulous and it is difficult to accurately measure how people understand a local community and interact with it from standard survey questions. Furthermore, few surveys include questions concerned with the neighbourhood, social cohesion and diversity. This section presents information from three surveys. The Home Office Citizenship Survey (now cancelled) was the main regular source of information on issues concerned with communities (including community cohesion and interaction and volunteering) and discrimination faced by ethnic minorities. The ESRC Understanding Society longitudinal survey includes questions on attitudes towards the neighbourhood amongst other issues. The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study included a number of questions about national identity and attitudes towards communities.

Analysis of data from the first wave of the ESRC's Understanding Society survey reveals that around two-thirds of people say they have feelings of belonging to their neighbourhood, and this does not vary greatly according to their sense of national identity, for those who report having some kind of British identity. However, those whose national identity is other than British are slightly less likely (57.1 per cent) to report a feeling of belonging to the neighbourhood.

The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study found the majority of people (over 70 per cent for four of the largest minority ethnic groups) from minority ethnic groups felt that people from minority ethnic groups should mix with White people (Figure 30). However, Bangladeshi people (just under two-thirds) were much less likely to agree that they should mix with White people than those from other minority ethnic groups, and were also much more likely to give a neutral or negative response.

The 2009/10 Citizenship Survey asked people whether they felt that people from different backgrounds get on well together in their local area (Figure 31). Over 80 per cent of people from all ethnic groups answered positively, indicating that the great majority of people did not experience ethnic conflict in their neighbourhoods. However, the survey also asked about whether people actually came into contact with people from other ethnic groups in the course of their work, daily business or social lives, and whether they had mixed with other people at least once a month. This question found that just over a fifth of all people regularly came into contact with other ethnic groups. This percentage was much smaller for people from minority ethnic groups than for White people (but slightly higher for South Asian than Black people). The difference between ethnic groups suggests continued separation of life activities between ethnic groups, reflecting geographical segregation of ethnic groups. As the majority population and geographically ubiquitous, White people are more likely to come into contact with other ethnic groups.

#### 8. Conclusion

This paper has presented a body of evidence concerning the changing ethnic composition of the UK and changes in the pattern of national identity over the last two decades. This has been a period of rapid change in the population, largely driven by sustained high rates of

international migration. The ethnic minority population has doubled and the composition of the country has become much more diverse, in terms of ethnic and national origins. The percentage of the population born overseas has increased greatly and the UK-born population with links to other countries has also increased substantially in numbers and share of the population during this period.

It might therefore be expected that identification with Britain / the UK would diminish. The evidence reveals that national identity in the UK is more complex than identification with a single nation state. Around two-thirds of people "feel British", and this percentage has remained fairly constant over time. However, there has been a slow decline in the percentage of people who declare their nationality to be "British". When given the choice of nationalities, White people in Britain are more likely to identify with one of the four UK nations than to say they are "British". This tendency became established in the 1970s and 1980s, but has not greatly increased during a period of much more rapid transition in the population. The effect of devolution has been to make White people more likely to identify either with the country they live in or that country and Britain than with Britain alone.

Men display a slightly weaker identification with a British national identity than women. Older people are much more likely to identify either with Britain or with a British nation than younger adults. People aged under 20 display a slightly stronger British identity than young adults. There are marked differences by socio-economic status. People from the highest status social categories are most likely to identify with "Britain" and less likely to identify with one of the UK nations. People in routine manual and non-manual occupations are more likely to identify with the UK nation in which they live than with the British nation. This might reflect the greater geographical mobility of people in higher-status jobs and hence a weaker attachment to country of residence.

People from ethnic minorities clearly retain identification which their ultimate country of origin, but are more likely than White people to identify with "Britain", and are much less likely to identify solely with one of the four nations within the UK. People from the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups and Muslim people are much more likely than the average for minority ethnic groups to report "their national identity to be "British", despite their relative social exclusion. However, questions on social mixing between ethnic groups appear to reveal a lower degree of contact with White British people. Migrants who have obtained citizenship are more likely than average to report their national identity as "British". Hence the higher percentage of minority ethnic groups identifying with Britain probably reflects the naturalisation process and a 'legal' attachment to the state, rather than identification with the British people. One reason for the increased percentage of English people identifying with England rather than Britain is that devolution has produced a clearer distinction n between English identity and British identity. The characteristics of "Englishness" which induce English people to prefer identification with England (e.g. characteristics established during the period of Empire also tend to be unattractive to people from minority ethnic groups, who therefore are highly unlikely to identify with England.

Net international migration to the UK is likely to remain at a similar level over the next ten years. Given the youthful nature of minority ethnic groups and White minority migrant groups, birth rates will remain high. Thus the minority share of the population will continue to grow and ethnic diversity will continue to increase. The outcome for national identity is not easy to predict. The likelihood is that the percentage of people identifying with Britain will decline as older people with the strongest identification with Britain and UK countries die. However,

minority ethnic groups have a stronger identification with Britain than the White population. It is likely that this identification will decline for those ethnic groups which are most economically successful and most strongly integrated with White people of a similar age and class background.

The implications of growing ethnic diversity for community cohesion over the medium term are probably dependent upon economic conditions. The evidence presented above has suggested that the effect of ethnic diversity upon community cohesion is mediated through economic prosperity. If there is an economic recovery, there will be more potential for people of minority ethnic and migrant background to achieve economic success. They may then have greater ability to integrate and have the choice of moving to more prosperous areas and locations where they are not in direct competition for resources with ethic neighbours. If the majority population also has the opportunity to find work and improve its material circumstances, then the opportunity for conflict with other communities will be reduced. However, continued recession conditions and the association of migration with cheap labour would be likely to increase conflict between communities.

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## **Tables**

Table 1: Odds ratios from a multinomial logistic regression estimating the relationship between choosing an identity and a set of socio-economic characteristics

Independent Variable	Dependent variable				
	(Base category= no national identity).				
	British only	British and other UK country	UK country only	British and other country	Other country
Time trend	0.998	1.048	0.989	1.022	1.002
Gender (base-female)					
Male	0.915	0.927	1.013	0.841	0.932
NS-SEC (base=unemployed or never worked)					
Higher managerial and professional	3.049	2.633	1.906	3.927	2.858
Lower managerial and professional	2.166	1.895	1.639	2.582	1.803
Intermediate occupations	1.950	1.791	1.717	1.952	1.554
Small employers and own account workers	1.295	1.219	1.242	1.425	1.306
Lower supervisory and technical	1.595	1.593	1.758	1.480	1.411
Semi-routine occupations	1.394	1.447	1.531	1.205	1.257
Routine occupations	1.199	1.313	1.447	1.029	1.298
Age group (base=aged 85 or more)					
Aged under 20	0.591	0.462	0.461	0.908	1.312
Aged 20-29	0.451	0.415	0.356	0.640	1.568
Aged 30-39	0.489	0.435	0.354	0.590	1.270

Independent Variable	Dependent variable				
	(Base category= no national identity).				
	British only	British and other UK country	UK country only	British and other country	Other country
Aged 40-49	0.537	0.443	0.388	0.529	0.960
Aged 50-59	0.600	0.502	0.459	0.561	0.802
Aged 60-69	0.631	0.593	0.584	0.552	0.656
Aged 70-84	0.819	0.855	0.833	0.662	0.774

Table 1: Odds ratios from a multinomial logistic regression estimating the relationship between choosing an identity and a set of socio-economic characteristics (continued)

Independent Variable	Dependent variable				
	(Base category= no national identity).				tity).
	British only	British and other UK country	UK country only	British and other country	Other country
Ethnic group (base=Other ethnic group)					
White	0.217	1.875	1.467	0.060	0.081
White and Black Caribbean	3.090	11.561	9.442	2.388	2.060
White and Black African	1.318	5.455	3.031	0.956	1.103
White and Asian	1.245	2.843	3.110	1.061	0.893
White and other	1.344	4.312	2.841	1.327	0.994
Indian	2.072	1.538	1.178	1.945	1.079
Pakistani	3.559	2.833	1.951	3.830	1.238
Bangladeshi	4.333	1.349	1.476	3.882	1.286
Other Asian	0.910	0.882	0.695	0.649	0.474
Black-Caribbean	4.186	5.496	4.232	4.655	2.052
Black-African	1.665	1.097	1.136	1.609	0.789
Black-Other	4.122	16.550	4.268	1.955	1.756
Chinese	0.497	0.714	0.528	0.373	0.333
Country of birth and nationality (base=non-UK nationality)					
UK-born	3.157	9.068	2.878	0.145	0.011

Independent Variable	Dependent variable (Base category= no national identity).				
	British only	British and other UK country	UK country only	British and other country	Other country
Migrant with UK nationality	10.120	7.534	2.229	2.700	0.239
Dummy variables					
2001 or 2008	0.944	0.924	0.916	0.820	0.877
Living in Scotland	12.119	20.009	29.561	12.764	14.217

Source: Labour Force Survey.

Table 2: Explanatory power of the independent variables

Independent variable	-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model	Chi- Square statistic	Degrees of freedom	Significance level
Intercept	42660375	0	0	·
Time trend	43502752	842377	5	0
Gender	42880397	220023	5	0
NS-SEC	46278356	3617982	35	0
Age group	46126776	3466401	35	0
Ethnic group	61106011	18445636	65	0
Country of birth and nationality	129666269	87005894	10	0
Year (2001 or 2008)	42690277	29903	5	0
Living in Scotland	49192478	6532103	5	0

**Table 3: Goodness-of-fit statistics** 

Pseudo R-Square measure	Value
Cox and Snell	0.331
Nagelkerke	0.365
McFadden	0.17

## **Figures**




Figure 1: Growth of the White and minority ethnic group population of the UK 1994-2011. Source: Labour Force Survey. NB: Data for 1994-6 is for Great Britain.




Figure 2: Growth of the minority ethnic group share of the UK population, 1994-2011. *Source*: Labour Force Survey. NB: Data for 1994-6 is for Great Britain.




Figure 3: Net immigration to the UK by citizenship, 1991-2010. *Source*: Office for National Statistics Total International Migration estimates.




Figure 4: In-migration to the UK by citizenship, 1991-2010. *Source*: Office for National Statistics Total International Migration estimates.




Figure 5: Growth of larger ethnic groups, 1994-2011 (1994=100). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 6: Diversity index. Source: Labour Force Survey




Figure 7: Percentage of the population citing immigration as the most important issue facing the UK. Source: Migrationwatch UK

(http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/ppt/noto70million\_November2011.ppt)




Figure 8: Percentage who feel that the amount of immigration to the UK should be reduced by 'a lot', 1995 and 2003. *Source*: British Social Attitudes Survey




Figure 9: Percentage of people who feel British. Source: British Social Attitudes Survey




Figure 10: Pride in being British (percentage of respondents). *Source*: British Social Attitudes Survey




Figure 11: Trend in national identity for all people, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 12: Trend in national identity for White people, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 13: Percentage identifying as British only by NS-SEC, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 14: Percentage identifying with a UK nation by NS-SEC, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 15: Trend in national identity for people from minority ethnic groups, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 16: Trend in national identity for South Asian people, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 17: Trend in national identity for people of mixed parentage (percentage of respondents), 2001-2011. *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 18: Trend in national identity for Indian people, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 19: Trend in national identity for Pakistani people from minority ethnic groups, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 20: Trend in national identity for Bangladeshi people, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 21: Trend in national identity for Chinese people from minority ethnic groups, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 22: Trend in national identity for Black people, 2001-2011 (percentage of respondents). *Source*: Labour Force Survey




Figure 23: Strength of belonging to Britain (percentage of respondents). *Source*: 2009-10 Citizenship Survey




Figure 24: Is it possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural or religious identity? (percentage of respondents). Source: 2009-10 Citizenship Survey




Figure 25: The most important aspect of identity, by ethnic group. *Source*: 2009-10 Citizenship Survey




Figure 26: Summary of national identity, by ethnic group (percentage of respondents). *Source*: 2009-10 Citizenship Survey




Figure 27: Main national identity by ethnic group (percentage of respondents). *Source*: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study




Figure 28: Main national identity by religion. *Source*: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study




Figure 29: British or minority ethnic identity by ethnic group (percentage of respondents). *Source*: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study




Figure 30: Should people of respondent's ethnicity mix with White people? (percentage of respondents). *Source*: 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study




Figure 31: Measures of community cohesion. Source: 2009-10 Citizenship Survey