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Democracy, Foreign Forces, and War: The United States and the Cold War in the Third World

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During the Cold War, the United States carried out a number of covert actions against elected governments in the Third World.¹ Critics of the “democratic peace” suggest these covert operations are potential invalidations of, or at least exceptions to, the proposition that liberal democracies rarely or never wage war on one another.² Democratic peace theorists, however, argue that the targets of these covert actions were not long-term, stable democracies, that covert action falls short of interstate war by Correlates of War (CoW) criteria, and that the covert nature of these operations meant that liberal norms and institutions in the United States did not have an opportunity to function. Even so, by forcing the executive to use covert means, democratic institutions may have prevented the higher level of international violence known as war, although they were not robust enough to prevent covert action. Liberal interventionist and anti-communist ideology provided policymakers with a justificatory frame for intervention which, however, did not amount to war between democracies.³

One feature of these covert operations noted by Bruce Russett is that U.S. troops did not participate “openly.”⁴ With the exception of specialists on secondment to the CIA, U.S. regular, national forces were not part of the armed force used in militarized covert actions such as those in Guatemala in 1954. It is precisely the fact that regular units of the U.S. armed forces were not involved on a large scale that enabled policymakers to evade the domestic democratic processes that would have come into play otherwise. CoW makes a firm connection between international war and the use of the national armed forces of a state as well. A state’s own troops must be involved and suffer casualties for armed conflict to amount to interstate war, although CoW counts thinly disguised volunteers, such as China claimed to use in Korea, as part of a state’s military. Even coding a civil war as internationalized requires the presence of a foreign state’s official forces, regardless of the degree of foreign material aid or clandestine involvement.⁵

While CoW and the democratic peace proposition identify interstate war as a violent conflict between the armed forces of sovereign states, war can also be understood following Clausewitz, as the use of force to achieve political purposes.⁶ In this view, war is made with the armed force at the disposal of policy, regardless of the national origins of that force. If a state identifies an objective that requires force to achieve, constitutes an armed force out of foreign nationals by providing arms, training, advice, and support, and then uses this force in an attempt to achieve its policy aims, it is war even though the state did not make use of its official, national armed forces. Other than their place of recruitment and the disparity in their fighting power, the distinction between the foreign and national elements of a state’s coercive apparatus is largely a legal one, whether in terms of a state’s constitution or the status of its soldiers in international law. Needless to say, states make war with armed force, not legal distinctions. From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, these foreign forces were less reliable and efficient instruments of policy than national armed forces, but were the only forces available under certain conditions. When domestic democratic constraints, international norms and institutions, and competition with the Soviet Union, as well as finite resources, limited the use of national armed forces for purposes of intervention in the Third World during the Cold War, the creation of foreign forces, of an “international coercive apparatus” to supplement the national one, was the only recourse for policies that required the use of force. These foreign forces are defined as those which would not otherwise have existed without U.S. advice and support or which

acquired the bulk of their fighting power from U.S. advice and support, and which were intended for some U.S. policy purpose.

With respect to the use of force by First World powers in the Third World, the category of interstate war as defined by CoW and used to establish the democratic peace correlation is problematic beyond its failure to account for the use of foreign forces in war. The use of this category to refute exceptions to the democratic peace raises the question of whether or not the understandings of “state” and “war” in interstate war are theoretically and empirically appropriate for analysis of the use of force by First World powers in the Third World. One need not agree with those scholars who argue that the era of conventional interstate war is largely over to observe that interstate war, as defined by CoW, has *never* been the predominant form of reciprocal organized violence between the First and Third Worlds.⁷ Prior to decolonization, wars of imperial conquest and control predominated, while after 1945 various forms of intervention in internal conflicts predominated. The absence of interstate war between First and Third World states, democratic or otherwise, may not be significant. More fundamentally, the use of interstate war as the only indicator of “war” in the democratic peace proposition *removes from analysis* other forms of reciprocal organized violence and *their* relation to questions of democracy.⁸ The use of foreign and national forces to rule an informal empire of quasi-states is not considered. Such quasi-states, reliant upon external support for their internal security apparatuses, can repress popular demands and forestall democratic developments. While both the United States and the USSR ruled informal empires of this sort, this essay focuses on the U.S. “imperial democracy” for purposes of engaging the democratic peace literature.⁹

The use of the category of interstate war in the democratic peace literature presumes the existence of states, of sovereign entities as recognized in international law and operationalized by CoW. But many states in the Third World, especially those susceptible to great-power intervention, are not sovereign entities as imagined in international law and theories of international politics developed for the analysis of relations between and among great powers. Recently, Robert Jackson has termed them “quasi-states” in that their internationally recognized sovereign status is not matched by empirical statehood.¹⁰ Not only are these states unable or unwilling to provide for the social welfare of their citizens, creating socioeconomic conditions which provide the basis for popular insurrection and internal armed challenge, but with respect to their juridical territory they do not exercise the primary function of states as understood by Max Weber: they do not rule over their claimed, internationally recognized territory by virtue of a monopoly on armed force. Within this juridical territory, the quasi-state coercive apparatus competes with internal competitors, some of which, such as well-developed guerrilla groups, approximate the state form, being capable of ruling territory through coercive power even if they lack sovereign recognition. In addition to internal competitors, the quasi-state may “share” its coercive apparatus with an imperial power.¹¹ As Raymond Aron argues, great powers necessarily pursue imperial policies, those intended to shape and control the domestic and foreign relations of secondary states.¹² When great powers intervene to secure or establish friendly regimes within quasi-states, the latter become the client states of informal empires. Their coercive apparatus acquires the bulk of its capability from relations of advice and support with an imperial power, becoming an extension of that power’s coercive apparatus, an extension used to rule foreign populations. With respect to its informal empire of quasi-states, the empirical statehood of the U.S. “imperial democracy” “exceeded” its juridical statehood in terms of the core Weberian dimension of the state, rule ultimately through recourse to coercive power. In addition to the international exercise of other forms of authority, such as cultural hegemony or economic dominance,¹³ the United States used armed force for purposes of rule, to shape and control the internal nature of secondary states. As the United States was constrained in the use of its national forces for a variety of reasons, including the domestic democratic processes identified in the democratic peace

literature as well as international sovereign norms of overt nonintervention, it made extensive use of foreign forces for such imperial purposes.

One form of intervention was the covert use of foreign forces, such as those used in Guatemala or the Bay of Pigs. However, once foreign forces are seen as part of the United States' coercive apparatus, their role in U.S. foreign policy and the question of when the United States is involved in international war must be reconsidered, as well as the relation of such wars to questions of democracy. The only use of foreign forces considered relevant to questions of democracy and war in the democratic peace literature are specific operations against elected governments in the Third World. Only in these cases, efforts by one sovereign entity to forcibly change the sovereign power of another, can covert operations plausibly be argued to amount to interstate war, although they clearly are not by CoW operational definitions. However, most U.S. use of force in the Third World during the Cold War took the form of intervention in state-society conflicts, in which the United States was involved predominantly on the side of narrowly based client states facing popular insurrection and in which the fighting was done predominantly by client state armies, paramilitaries, and police; that is, by foreign forces advised and supported by the United States.¹⁴ It was in these internationalized internal conflicts that war decided questions of democracy, of whether and how the people would rule. Most client state armies, such as those of South Vietnam and El Salvador, would not otherwise have existed with anything approaching the fighting power they in fact attained without U.S. training, support, advice, and often the combat leadership of U.S. military "advisors." Client armies and other foreign forces used in these conflicts, such as guerrilla forces, like the Meo (Hmong) in Laos or the Contras, and the multinational staff of the CIA's paramilitary operations, were understood by U.S. policymakers as part of the United States' coercive apparatus to be used on Third World battlefields in a global struggle with communism. In that struggle, popular forces seeking more democratic conditions of just distribution of material values and political power were perceived as externally inspired communist subversion requiring a military response.

Extending consideration of the relation between democracy and international war to U.S. involvement in internal conflicts in the Third World raises additional issues neglected in the democratic peace debate. A focus on internal war draws attention to the fact that degrees of democratization, whether understood as the extension of civil and political liberties or the redistribution of material values, are nearly always the product of intense social struggles in which the state, and any foreign backers, are participants. Analysis of war and democracy, then, requires attention to the role of international factors in state-society relations and conflicts. The client states of informal empire can rely on foreign advice and support of their internal security forces for their survival, rather than seeking domestic legitimacy through democratic reform.¹⁵ In contrast to the democratic peace debate, which is one largely over the relative importance of "second image," internal variables versus "third image," systemic variables for the external policies of states, state-society approaches in International Relations and historical sociology focus on the interaction between international and domestic processes and, in turn, their mutual constitution.¹⁶ U.S. advice and support of the armies of client states, in the context of a global struggle against communism, was one way in which international factors influenced the outcomes of internal state-society conflicts in the Third World. In turn, these conflicts were constitutive features of the Cold War itself, attaining central importance in the foreign policies of the superpowers and in domestic U.S. politics. This mutual constitution of the internal and external does not stop even at the borders of great powers such as the United States. Constrained by the threat of mutual nuclear destruction, a systemic condition, the superpowers found other forms of conducting their contest by proxy in the Third World. In turn, the "secret wars" of the U.S. executive and the extensive apparatus developed for their conduct had severe corrosive effects on U.S. democracy, in particular on the war powers of Congress, and culminated in the domestic use of intelligence services established

to conduct such “secret wars.”¹⁷ A coding rule which simply identifies the United States as a democracy throughout this period obscures such processes.

The debate over the democratic peace needs to be broadened beyond its exclusive focus on a single law-like hypothesis, and should be seen as part of a larger domain of inquiry, the international relations of democracy and war. This essay is an effort toward broadening the democratic peace debate. As such, it does not seek to directly refute or support the democratic peace proposition but rather to interrogate the category of interstate war upon which it is based and to question the analytic usefulness of this category for relations of war and democracy between the United States and the Third World during the Cold War. The theoretical and empirical considerations outlined above, that foreign force be considered part of a state’s coercive apparatus for purposes of war-making, that the predominant form of reciprocal organized violence between the United States and the Third World during the Cold War was not interstate war but intervention in internal conflicts, and that such internationalized internal wars are relevant to consideration of questions of war and democracy, suggest that the use of the category of interstate war to refute Third World exceptions to the democratic peace proposition is inappropriate. The focus in the literature on interstate wars and stable democratic states removes from analysis the ways in which the United States waged war in the Third World and the relation of such wars to democracy. If the real relations of international organized violence between the First and Third Worlds during the Cold War diverged from the legal institutions of interstate war, sovereign states, and their official armed forces, then those institutions provide a misleading basis for social scientific categories and hence for correlations, laws, and theories derived from them. While the “zone of peace” *within* the First World is certainly not invalidated by these arguments, U.S. use of force against elected governments and popular forces seeking democratic change is at odds with the central premise of the democratic peace, that democracies are constrained in waging war against other democratic peoples. As the absence of interstate war among stable democratic states in the First World, a “zone of peace” which largely overlaps with “the West,”¹⁸ correlates with variables other than democracy,¹⁹ the failure on conceptual and empirical grounds to extend the democratic peace beyond this context has consequences for judgments about the scientific value of the democratic peace proposition.

I proceed by first considering U.S. covert operations in the Third World and the manner in which proponents of the democratic peace proposition demonstrate they are not exceptions. Here I argue that foreign forces, such as those used in militarized covert operations, be considered part of the United States’ coercive apparatus. I argue also that the covert nature of these operations was less a consequence of domestic democratic constraints, as Russett has claimed, than of the nature of the communist threat as perceived by U.S. policymakers. Conceptualizing foreign forces as part of the United States’ coercive apparatus, and covert operations as one, relatively minor, form of U.S. intervention for purposes of rearranging relations of power within Third World states, leads to consideration of the much more extensive use of foreign forces in internal war; and to the relation of such use to processes of democratization. After discussing U.S. use of foreign forces in internal war, I turn to the theoretical issues raised by the use of the category of interstate war for analyzing forms of reciprocal organized violence between the First and the Third World. I argue these forms of warfare are best understood as occurring between imperial and quasi-states in the context of informal empire, rather than between sovereign states. Here I show how the use of foreign forces to rule informal empire during the Cold War falls outside the CoW categories of interstate and internationalized civil war. Lastly, I consider some of the consequences of the inapplicability of the category of interstate war to analysis of U.S. use of force in the Third World for the democratic peace debate. I argue that a state-society approach illuminates rather than obscures forms of warfare in informal empire as well as draws attention to issues ignored in the “second vs.

third image” debate, namely the corrosive consequences for *U.S.* democracy of the executive branch’s “secret wars.”

The Democratic Peace and Covert Operations

In the period since 1947, the United States developed an apparatus for the conduct of a variety of covert operations in which the United States could “plausibly deny” its involvement at least in the short term. These operations became a prominent and regular feature of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. They are considered only in limited fashion in the democratic peace debate, namely whether specific operations against elected governments are exceptions to the proposition that democracies rarely or never wage war on one another.²⁰ Only in such cases can it be argued that these operations fit within the categories of democratic state and war as understood in the literature. Potential exceptions to the democratic peace proposition, considered to date in the literature, include the operations in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957–58), Brazil (1960s), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua after the elections in 1984. Laos, which had an elected government and conducted competitive elections with universal franchise during the early period of U.S. covert involvement in the late 1950s, has been overlooked.²¹ For the cases discussed in the literature, four features are emphasized: first, that they do not amount to “interstate war” by CoW criteria in that national armed forces did not participate “openly” or that 1,000 battle deaths did not immediately result; second, with the exception of Chile, the targets of these covert actions were not “long-term, stable democracies”; third, that anti-communism provided a justificatory frame for intervention; and fourth, that the covert nature of these operations prevented democratic processes in the United States from functioning. Of these four features of covert operations, the first two are the most significant in terms of establishing that these operations are not exceptions to the democratic peace proposition. That is, these two features demonstrate that the covert actions in question are not “interstate war” between “democracies.”²²

In the democratic peace literature, then, the question of whether or not covert operations against elected governments in the Third World are exceptions to the proposition depends on whether or not they amount to interstate war by CoW criteria, an armed clash between the armies of two sovereign states which are long-term, stable democracies. By employing an alternate, Clausewitzian understanding of war, I argue that U.S. policymakers made war by using foreign forces to achieve political objectives. Therefore, I consider only militarized covert actions which involved the use of a foreign armed force. These forces were used for purposes of rule over foreign populations; the United States sought to rearrange social and political relations on territory beyond its juridical borders through resort to coercive power. The objectives U.S. policymakers sought with these foreign forces arose from their perception of the nature of the communist threat in the Third World. The elected nature of the governments targeted for covert action was secondary to their perceived susceptibility to communist takeover.

I briefly consider three covert operations, those in Iran, Indonesia, and Guatemala. I show in each case that the United States sought a political objective through the use of a foreign force. I discuss the varying degree of control the United States exercised over the foreign forces and the degree of dependence of those forces on U.S. advice and support. I then place the use of these forces in the context of “strategies of containment.” The democratic peace theorists have overemphasized internal democratic constraints, as opposed to U.S. perception of external threat, in determining the use of covert means.

In 1953, the CIA conducted an operation to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, which had nationalized the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.²³ The events surrounding the coup are exceedingly complex as it is likely that it

coincided with a previously planned coup by pro-Shah army officers. The communist Tudeh party offered to defend Mossadegh against the coup if he would declare a “united front” and provide them with arms. He refused, and Iranian Army units loyal to him were overcome by their pro-Shah counterparts in fighting that left about 300 dead.²⁴ Of the operations considered here, the role of foreign forces in U.S. policy is the most limited in the case of Iran. The CIA shepherded the Shah about and played a large role in sponsoring street demonstrations during the coup, though these obviously do not amount to the use of armed force. However, the U.S. military mission in Iran played a role in encouraging the pro-Shah faction in the army to support the coup. The Director of the Defense Department’s Office of Military Assistance at the time, Major General George C. Stewart, later testified before Congress:

Now when this crisis came on and the thing [the coup] was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis, blankets, boots, uniforms, electric generators, and medical supplies that permitted and created the atmosphere in which they could support the Shah . . . The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program.²⁵

In terms of the criteria for a foreign force used here, that it would not otherwise have existed or acquired the bulk of its fighting power from the United States and was intended for a U.S. policy purpose, the Iranian case is the most problematic. The U.S. role in the coup was only one factor in an already serious internal crisis. To the degree the United States did influence the outcome of the coup, it did so largely through the agency of the Iranian Army, advised and supported by the U.S. military mission. The U.S. military mission was providing much of the Iranian Army’s equipment and training with the intention of defending Iran and its oil from Soviet invasion. When U.S. policy shifted toward shaping the nature of Iran’s regime, the very presence of the U.S. military mission allowed it to play a role in supporting the pro-Shah faction, although those units which remained loyal to Mossadegh were probably armed also with U.S. weaponry. As Aron notes in regard to Latin America, “[b]y concluding more and more agreements for reciprocal military assistance . . . the United States is liable, voluntarily or involuntarily, to exert a conservative or counterrevolutionary influence on the domestic politics of every state concerned.”²⁶ Later, under the Shah, U.S. advice and support to the army and internal security services continued to significantly influence internal power relations in Iran.

The operation in Indonesia more clearly involved a foreign force intended for a specific policy purpose and which acquired much of its fighting power through covert U.S. advice and support. In late 1956, some regional army commanders on the “outer islands” of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (Celebes) peacefully revolted from the central government, carrying with them a portion of the forces they commanded and having the support of much of the civilian population in these areas, which resented the dominance of Java in the central government. In the wake of these revolts, Sukarno declared a “guided democracy” and negotiations with the rebel colonels commenced.²⁷ The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which had won over 16 percent of the vote in the 1955 elections, was included in the new cabinet.²⁸ The Eisenhower administration became concerned about the possibility of a communist takeover, even though it did not consider Sukarno himself to be a communist. It decided to back the rebel colonels against such an eventuality. As Allen Dulles later described to the Kennedy administration, in November of 1957 the Eisenhower administration approved “a special political action program in Indonesia calling for the maintenance as a force in being of anti-Communist, pro-West dissident movement

established by anti-Sukarno military commanders in Sumatra and the Celebes” and that this “later authorized the provision of arms and other military aid to the dissidents including air support.”²⁹ The CIA provided substantial amounts of money and arms to the rebels. U.S. Navy submarines and commercial freighters delivered substantial quantities of modern arms and ammunition. The submarines took out small numbers of rebel soldiers to be trained at American facilities in Guam, Okinawa, and Saipan. Nationalist Chinese training teams were deployed to Sumatra and Sulawesi. Sophisticated radio equipment was provided and daily telegraphic contact maintained with the CIA station in Singapore. U.S. military and CIA planes flying from the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and British fields in Singapore airdropped weapons and supplies to the rebels. Air support was promised to the rebels if they should need it.³⁰

In February of 1958, the rebels declared a countergovernment and fighting commenced. The United States and its allies continued providing logistical support and also flew reconnaissance missions and bombing raids from Singapore and British Borneo. Additionally, at least eight or nine planes, P-51s and B-26s, were provided to the rebels on Sulawesi along with American and Nationalist Chinese pilots, providing the rebels with a substantial advantage in the air.³¹ One of these planes was shot down after bombing the city of Ambon and the American pilot was captured carrying his U.S. military identification papers.³² While the fighting continued for several years, U.S. support for the rebels began to unravel by June 1958 after the pilot was captured and the success of Jakarta’s forces deprived the rebels of their main bases. The United States also developed a more realistic understanding of the anti-communist potential of the Indonesian Army, which it had previously believed to be communist infiltrated, and began to provide it with arms, training, and support.³³ Casualties on the government side totaled more than 10,000, of which half were civilian, while rebel casualties were 22,174 by best estimate, a figure which probably includes a substantial number of civilians.³⁴

In the Indonesian case, while U.S. policy sought to support an already existing rebellion, the role of U.S. advice and support was more pronounced than in Iran. Jakarta had been interested in achieving a compromise with the rebels. There was doubt as to whether Javanese soldiers would fight the rebels, spurred by the refusal of two commanders to participate in an expedition against rebel forces.³⁵ It was widely believed that it would be possible to meet the rebels’ demands for regional autonomy and the formation of a senate representing the regions as long as the situation remained short of an actual break between Jakarta and the dissidents. But the rebels decided on an ultimatum and the formation of a countergovernment. This willingness to directly confront Jakarta was premised on the military power they had acquired with American support: “[T]he rebels apparently felt foreign backing would ensure their success. These calculations help to explain the Sumatran dissidents’ reluctance to pursue possibilities for a compromise settlement and their insistence on taking a series of rapid steps towards confrontation with the central government” that many who sympathized with their cause “regarded as unnecessarily precipitate and provocative.”³⁶

U.S. support of the rebels was premised on fears that the Indonesian government was susceptible to communist takeover and that the Indonesian Army was infiltrated by communists. This was a misreading of the situation: “while Washington was acting upon information to the effect that a pro-Communist Djakarta government with a heavily Communist infiltrated army was fighting the anti-Communist forces of [the rebels]—it was clear that an anti-Communist Indonesian army led by one of the country’s top anti-Communists was locked in combat with the other principal anti-Communist force of the nation.”³⁷ The fact that it was based on mistaken premises does not change the character of the policy, which was to use force to shape internal relations in Indonesia. Indeed, the Eisenhower administration contemplated a breakup of Indonesia, as PKI strength was located mostly on Java while much of the oil was on rebel-dominated Sumatra.³⁸ Dulles

also expressed the desire to “see things get to a point where we could plausibly withdraw our recognition of the Sukarno government and give it to the dissident elements on Sumatra.”³⁹ None of these policies could have been contemplated, nor most likely would the rebels have pursued a course of military confrontation with Jakarta, had not the United States provided for the “maintenance of a force in being”; that is, a foreign force intended and used as an instrument of U.S. policy.

In both Iran and Indonesia, the United States supported forces that were not under direct U.S. control and which were pursuing their own objectives in addition to any U.S. policy purposes they also served. In Guatemala, however, the United States constituted a foreign force that would not otherwise have existed and which was under the direction of U.S. policy.⁴⁰ The United States sought to overthrow the government of President Jacobo Arbenz. When U.S. efforts to convince the Guatemalan Army to overthrow Arbenz failed, a small force of about 170 was raised and trained in Nicaragua and the Panama canal zone by the CIA. It was composed of Guatemalan exiles and other Latin and North American soldiers of fortune and was supplemented with a dozen or more aircraft, P-47 and P-51 fighter-bombers and B-26 medium bombers, flown by CIA operatives including nationalist Chinese from the CIA’s Civil Air Transport (CAT).⁴¹ This small air force proved decisive when the invasion force stalled short of Guatemala City and failed to provoke the Guatemalan Army to overthrow Arbenz. Bombing sorties from Honduran and Nicaraguan fields, during which some of the planes were shot down and a British freighter sunk,⁴² and the army’s refusal to crush the invasion force, led Arbenz to try to form a popular militia. This did provoke the military to overthrow Arbenz and the United States convinced it to install Colonel Castillo Armas, the leader of the invasion force, as head of state. While there was no “open” use of U.S. forces, the operation involved the use of armed force to achieve a policy aim. The force used was constituted by the United States and would not have existed otherwise. While members of the U.S. national armed forces played important roles, in training, supplying, and advising the invasion force, the force itself was made up of non-nationals and mercenaries. It operated under the direction of the U.S. government. Even though the force was not part of U.S. national armed forces in international legal or U.S. constitutional terms, it was, for policy purposes, part of the coercive apparatus of the U.S. state.

Interestingly, however, the operation against Arbenz, while a case of the use of force for political purposes, may not amount to war in so far as that term refers to *reciprocal* organized violence, as Arbenz for the most part was unable to fight back. This demonstrates one of the differences with the conception of war used herein, as a policy which pursues its objectives with *use* of force, and CoW’s, which uses the criterion of 1,000 battle deaths, a measure of severity, for organized violence to amount to war.⁴³ In the Clausewitzian view, the fact that Arbenz could be toppled so easily is an indicator of his regime’s weakness, not of the nature of the policy used to topple him. The unwillingness of the army to back Arbenz, a consequence of its close ties to landlords affected by his land reform policies, was decisive. On the CoW view, reciprocal organized violence has to achieve a certain scale before it amounts to war. This criterion of 1,000 battle deaths poses a problem particular to the Third World as well as earlier imperial campaigns, and is another instance in which categories appropriate for great-power war may not be suitable for analysis of the forms of organized violence between great powers and non-European opponents. The weakness of non-European opponents often meant that, as with Arbenz, large-scale violence was not necessary to defeat them. Alternatively, their resistance took the form of the raid and ambush and might last for decades, as on the Northwest Frontier of British India. For CoW, these imperial “low intensity conflicts” do not amount to war precisely because they do not involve organized violence on a large scale.⁴⁴ As is often remarked about the use of the term “low intensity conflict,” these conflicts can be rather intense for those involved in them.⁴⁵ On the Clausewitzian view, war is the use of violence

as a means to achieve ends, a definition as applicable to the Northwest Frontier as it is to World War II.

In each of these three cases, the United States used armed forces to shape and control the internal nature of secondary states. That is, it sought to exert rule over foreign populations. The instrument of this rule was a foreign force wholly or partially constituted through U.S. advice and support. In Iran and Indonesia, U.S. policy supported indigenous elements pursuing their own objectives through the use of force. In Guatemala, the United States directly controlled a foreign force, although U.S. objectives were consonant with those of sectors of the indigenous elite. The fact that U.S. policy collaborated with indigenous elements in all three cases does not mean these covert operations were not instances of rule over foreign populations. Collaboration with indigenous elements, often of dubious reliability from the point of view of the imperial power, is a feature of imperial rule both before and after 1945. European informal and formal empires always depended, to varying degrees, upon the collaboration and mediation of indigenous groups.⁴⁶ The Europeans exerted rule through indigenous elites who were simultaneously pursuing their own objectives. The Europeans depended also upon foreign forces, principally in the form of regular colonial armies and police, and worried constantly about the reliability of such forces. Indeed, the greatest armed challenge to British rule in India was a rebellion sparked by the mutiny of a foreign force, that of the East India Company's Bengal Army in 1857, a rebellion suppressed only with extensive use of other foreign forces, such as Gurkha and Sikh regiments. But European use of foreign recruited forces extended beyond such "official" forces. Prior to the spread of formal colonies over much of the non-European world by the late nineteenth century, European powers exercised their influence informally by backing one side or another with troops, arms, supplies, and advice in local conflicts. While the East India Company became a territorial power after 1757, when it acquired Bengal, it continued to exercise informal rule, through subversion, shifting alliances, and indigenous clients, over a much vaster area, even as it raised formidable regular colonial forces. Even these forces were partially recruited from principalities beyond the direct rule of the company.⁴⁷

The formal independence of Third World client states faced with internal armed challenges, such as South Vietnam or El Salvador, increased the difficulties of the exercise of rule through foreign forces and indigenous collaborators for an imperial power. Client armies and other internal security forces, officered largely by indigenous elites, were always less effective instruments of rule than colonial army and police forces officered by Europeans. Covert operations were conducted through even less reliable means than client armies, those of a complex, multinational network of soldiers of fortune and anti-communists, secret agents and their contract workers, and alliances with indigenous elements such as the Indonesian colonels and their civilian backers. But covert operations, in the context of the Cold War, were a relatively minor instrument for purposes of shaping and controlling the internal nature of secondary states compared with the advice and support of client internal security services, including regular military and police forces. This becomes clear when covert operations are placed in the context of strategies of containment rather than that of domestic democratic constraint.

Russett argues that the covert nature of these operations and the fact that U.S. national forces did not participate in open fashion is evidence that democratic norms and institutions were functioning in the United States to "limit intervention" and "forestall open military action," although they were not strong enough to prevent these operations entirely.⁴⁸ However, from the perspective of U.S. policymakers, covert operations were one instrument in their global struggle against communism. The Eisenhower administration, which carried out all three operations discussed above, saw covert action as a means of making containment affordable.⁴⁹ More significantly, covert action was a means of responding to what often was termed Soviet or communist "internal aggression," as opposed to the threat of conventional external invasion. As George Kennan put it in a 1947

letter endorsing a proposal to supplement the covert action mission of the new civilian intelligence agencies with a Department of Defense-run “guerrilla warfare corps”:

I think we have to face the fact that Russian successes have been gained in many areas by irregular and underground methods. I do not think the American people would ever approve of policies which rely fundamentally on similar methods for their effectiveness. I do feel, however, that there are cases where it might be essential to fight fire with fire.⁵⁰

While Kennan points to a public legitimation problem, the nature of the perceived Soviet threat is the reason for “fighting fire with fire.”

Covert action, then, not only provided a means to avoid domestic, and other international,⁵¹ constraints on the overt use of national forces, but was seen as a way of meeting the peculiar nature of the communist threat. Prior to the Guatemala operation, Dulles pushed for a resolution by the Organization of American States condemning communism in the hemisphere. Although he was forced to accept an amendment specifying “dangers originating outside the hemisphere,”⁵² Dulles interpreted the resolution as “an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to include the concept of outlawing foreign ideologies in the American Republics.”⁵³ That is, for Dulles, the external communist threat was manifested internally, and so covert action as well as other forms of involvement in the internal affairs of Third World states were the necessary response. It was not primarily a “second choice” of policymakers who would have preferred overt intervention but were domestically constrained in the use of national forces, as Russett implies. Quite aside from domestic or international political repercussions, the United States lacked sufficient national forces for large-scale deployments in every case of internal aggression. Foreign forces advised and supported by the United States were generally sufficient, with U.S. regular forces being used only in the case of their imminent failure, if at all. In this way, the United States adapted as far as possible the European colonial practice of “stiffening” native troops with European regulars to conditions of the formal independence of Third World states.

Allen Dulles described the operations in Iran and Guatemala in these terms:

In Iran, a Mossadegh, and in Guatemala, an Arbenz had come to power through the usual processes of government and not by any Communist coup as in Czechoslovakia. Neither man at the time disclosed the intention of creating a Communist state. When this purpose became clear, support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements in the respective countries—in the one case to the Shah’s supporters; in the other, to a group of Guatemalan patriots. In each case the danger was successfully met.⁵⁴

The perception that the communist threat was always a form of externally inspired aggression, even when it took internal forms, is crucial to Dulles’ curious logic. The democratically elected and highly popular Arbenz government, seeking more just distribution of land, is equated with a government which came to power through a foreign-supported coup overthrowing an elected government. As communism is by definition an external imposition, U.S. intervention via a foreign force is required to respond to the external threat represented by Arbenz. A mercenary force, as with the Contras in the 1980s, is seen as the true “patriots” by virtue of its use in an anti-communist campaign. As communism is always externally inspired, someone perceived as a communist cannot be a patriot by definition.⁵⁵

Intervention against elected, non-communist governments to prevent the communists from taking over was seen as legitimate because communism was understood as externally imposed rather than arising from political, social, and economic forces in the countries concerned. As an assistant secretary of state in the Truman administration calling for action to oust Arbenz argued, “No one is more opposed than I to interfere in the internal affairs of

other nations. But . . . we may be compelled to intervene. . . . I should like to underscore that because Communism is so blatantly an international and not an internal affair, its suppression, even by force, in an American country, by one or more of the other republics, would not constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the former . . .”⁵⁶ The fact that people might have voted the communists, or those perceived by the United States as communists, into office was secondary. Fearing the electoral victory of Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity movement in the 1970 elections, Henry Kissinger said, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”⁵⁷ A clearer statement of the relative importance in U.S. foreign policy of anti-communism over the externalization of democratic norms, as stressed by the democratic peace theorists, could hardly be imagined. During the Indonesian intervention, Dulles cabled his ambassador, “They [the Indonesians] cannot turn over their country to communism without something being done about it by the free world.”⁵⁸

As discussed extensively elsewhere, communist and socialist parties were popular in much of the Third World after 1945 because they sought more equitable social, economic, and political conditions and often successfully mobilized anti-colonial and nationalist sentiment.⁵⁹ These parties often, but by no means always, formed the core of popular movements. The strength of these movements, whether they took the form of peaceful organizing, labor or electoral politics, or revolutionary warfare, can only be understood in the context of the social, economic, and political conditions from which they arose. Yet, as also discussed extensively elsewhere, they were consistently perceived by U.S. policymakers as closely coordinated efforts by the USSR to bring countries into the “communist orbit.”⁶⁰ In 1957, after reviewing events in Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Iran, Trieste, and Guatemala, Eisenhower claimed these were all instances “of Soviet pressure designed to accelerate Communist conquest of every country where the Soviet government could make its influence felt.”⁶¹ As Gabriel Kolko has noted, the consequence of this expansive vision of the communist threat was to place U.S. foreign policy in opposition to change in the Third World, and to cast it as the backer of status-quo regimes in an era of great social upheaval.⁶²

In this context of global containment, the use of foreign forces in covert action to rearrange relations of power inside Third World countries was only one relatively minor means of countering the “internal aggression” of the communists. A much more prominent form of the use of foreign forces was the advice and support of the armies and other internal security forces of narrowly based client regimes. If the people in these states turned to guerrilla warfare, covert action to switch regimes would not suffice to ensure U.S. objectives. The consequent involvement of the United States in internal war, whether by foreign or national forces, was the predominant form of reciprocal organized violence between it and the Third World during the Cold War. These wars are not considered in the democratic peace literature because they fall outside the category of “interstate war.” Covert operations are considered not in their historical context of containment but rather only when they were conducted against elected governments, as potential exceptions to a proposed law of international relations that traverses historical contexts. The proponents of the democratic peace demonstrate that such operations are not interstate wars between democracies by tightening the definition of democracy⁶³ and, as argued here, by reference to an unwarranted, primarily juridical distinction between the national and foreign elements of the United States’ coercive apparatus. Once these foreign forces are seen as part of a U.S. international coercive apparatus, their use in internal war, and the relation of such use to questions of democracy, must be considered.

Consideration of foreign forces, internal war, and democracy requires moving beyond the terms of the democratic peace debate in at least two ways: its pluralist and liberal conception of democracy as competitive elections and its focus on the question of whether systemic variables, as understood by neo-realism, or internal variables, such as democratic institutions, determine the external policies of states. By equating democracy with competitive elections and focusing on “long-term, stable democracies,” democratic peace theorists elide consideration of processes of democratization; of how, for instance, the franchise is extended or redistribution of wealth and political power is achieved in democratic states. Analysis of these processes requires use of the older, non-liberal meaning of democracy, as direct popular action.⁶⁴ It is through popular struggles often directed at the state and its relations with economic and political elites that degrees of democratization are achieved, in First World as well as Third World states. State-society approaches in International Relations and historical sociology study the interaction between domestic and international processes and, in turn, their mutual constitution, in contrast with the focus of the democratic peace debate on whether and when the second or third image determines foreign policy. The focus here, then, is on the role of international factors in the course and outcome of state-society conflicts.

In this section, I consider the role of U.S.-advised and -supported foreign forces in Third World state-society conflicts during the Cold War and their relation to democracy. I begin by comparing the liberal and pluralist conception of democracy, used in the democratic peace debate, to the older meaning of the term as direct popular action and/or rule. During the Cold War, popular forces often engaged in insurgent or revolutionary warfare in pursuit of more democratic conditions of just distribution of wealth and political power. I show how the United States perceived these insurgencies as an internal manifestation of the communist threat and sought to respond through the mobilization of foreign forces in the form of client armies, paramilitaries, and police. These foreign forces were employed against popular forces which often had extensive sources of foreign support of their own. While the fighting power of both sides in such conflicts depended to varying extent on external sources of material support, the “moral” component of the fighting power of popular forces, their “fighting spirit,” depended to a large degree on the motivation of their members to achieve substantive democratic change. They were the “armed people” seeking more democratic conditions. By contrast, the fighting spirit of client and internal security forces depended upon their nature as regular, sometimes professional, armed forces. That is, these state-society conflicts are instances of the use of a regular army to suppress popular forces, but in which the regular army is dependent upon, and constituted by, a foreign imperial power. Even when victorious, the objectives of popular forces were frequently subject to subversion by the communist parties at their core, which upon seizing power could abandon the national front strategies that secured the support of and inspired many in their rank and file.

The democratic peace literature relies on coding rules to establish which states are “democratic.” These rules are derived from two sources: the pluralist tradition of empirical democratic theory and liberal democratic political thought. The coding rules identify as democratic those states which have competitive elections and consequent peaceful transfers of power. More explicitly liberal proponents of the democratic peace add private property requirements and/or guarantees of civil and political rights.⁶⁵ The extent of the franchise and of guarantees of rights necessary for a state to be coded democratic is problematic, as some scholars extend the democratic peace to the early nineteenth century.⁶⁶ Ray has specified that 50 percent of a state’s population must have the franchise for it to be coded democratic.⁶⁷

The view that competitive elections constitute democracy is derived from pluralism, which holds that through elections and political competition among parties, groups, and individuals, citizens can exert a high degree of control over their leaders.⁶⁸ The coding rules used in the democratic peace, based on this conception of democracy, refer to

democratic *process* rather than to democratic outcomes. As Ray puts it, “To define democracy as synonymous with ‘responsiveness to the people’ or ‘maximization of the power of the nonelite,’ or, say, economic equity is to confuse political process with political, social or economic outcomes . . . such definitions serve as the bases for endless, unresolvable arguments about which political systems (and when) are ‘really’ democratic.”⁶⁹ The difficulty with defining democracy by reference to democratic process, while it allows for apparently “value-free” coding rules,⁷⁰ is that if the cause of the “zone of peace” is “democracy,” then the states involved must be *substantively*, not merely procedurally, democratic. This is reflected in the causal mechanisms hypothesized for the democratic peace, which focus on institutional constraints or the role of liberal ideology in *actually* forestalling war against other liberal states.⁷¹ It must be the substantive outcomes of democratic mechanisms which produce peace, not the mere existence of formal democratic procedures. Coding rules identify as democratic those states which have elections, such as El Salvador from 1950 to 1961,⁷² but which are not democratic, liberal, or participatory in any substantive sense. Their inclusion is a statistical artifact of the coding rules, not of their substantive democratic nature. As Raymond Cohen asks, “Is it meaningful to include Bolivia, Peru, Nigeria and Sri Lanka—‘liberal regimes’ at various times according to Michael Doyle—in a list together with Switzerland and the Netherlands?”⁷³

A second difficulty with the use of coding rules which equate democratic process with democracy, especially those which employ a variable franchise, is that they fail to capture the historical processes by which democratization occurs, namely intense, often violent, political and social struggle. These struggles extended rights won by elites from the king to the masses, extended the franchise from propertied men to all adults, and secured the Keynesian compromise which granted a degree of redistribution of wealth alongside political rights. A crucial component of these struggles were efforts by groups in society to seize, influence, or democratize the state. The expansion of democracy, then, resulted from the organization of, and struggle by, sectors of society, sectors we can appropriately designate popular forces for democratic change.⁷⁴ In the European context, for example, the extension of democracy was crucially dependent upon workers’ unions and women’s movements, both of which waged intense struggles to secure the vote and minimal social welfare protections. In the American context, in addition to these groups, the struggles of the civil rights movement are an example.

Those who participated in these struggles were motivated by the prospect of substantive democracy, of democratic outcomes. That is, these struggles refer to the older, non-liberal understanding of democracy as popular power or direct participation by “the people,” rather than their representation via formal electoral processes. “No ‘competitive party process’ or ‘competition for leadership’ would have achieved women’s suffrage in Britain, or the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, or the upsurge in union organization after its passage.”⁷⁵ These struggles are often decidedly non-liberal, as Raymond Williams’ invocation of Plato reminds us: “Democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power.”⁷⁶ However, they are a primary historical motive force for democratization. Their primary focus is on social and political equality rather than on the establishment of democratic procedures or formal electoral processes. These demands characterize democratic struggles in the West. The extension of the franchise and political rights in the West occurred in tandem with the partial redistribution of material values through the creation of the welfare state and the Keynesian compromise. The demand for substantive political, social, and economic equality motivated many who struggled against U.S.-backed client regimes in the Third World during the Cold War. These struggles pose the following questions for the democratic peace theorists: How is it that the causal mechanisms of the “zone of peace” prevent interstate wars between

democracies but allow wars against popular forces seeking democratic change, whether these forces possess state power or not; or allow wars, and the use of means short of war, to forestall democratic developments generally? How is it that democratic norms of respect and peaceful resolution of conflict are externalized toward other “self-governing peoples” but do not apply toward peoples struggling for democratic change?

The struggles of popular forces to seek more democratic conditions of just distribution of wealth and political power occur in both First and Third World states. They are never “over,” as the category of “long-term, stable democracies” implies; substantive demands for political, social, and economic equality are never fully met. Degrees of democratization are achieved in the often intense and sometimes violent struggles in which the state is a participant. The involvement of the U.S. “imperial democracy” in violent state-society conflicts in which popular forces sought more democratic conditions suggests an alternate relationship between international war and democracy than that of the democratic peace proposition: international democratic and anti-democratic wars are those fought to forestall or advance processes of democratization in foreign states. During the Cold War these struggles generally involved the armed forces of a narrowly based authoritarian state versus those of the popular forces, or the “armed people.” In such wars, foreign support can be provided for either side. The United States, for purposes of combating communism, provided advice and support to client armies and other internal security forces. The USSR and other East bloc states provided weapons, advisors, and training in sanctuaries to the popular forces, the socialist and communist elements of such forces, or to their front organizations. These foreign imperial powers sought their own objectives in such conflicts, rather than those of the popular forces. These forces, with their aspirations for substantive democratic change, and their willingness to risk life and limb for such change, represent a specifically indigenous democratic element in these internal wars. The U.S. “imperial democracy” constituted foreign regular military, police, and other internal security forces for purposes of waging war against them.

A consistent concern of U.S. policymakers during the Cold War was to develop means of utilizing “local” or “indigenous” manpower to counter “internal” communist aggression in the Third World. As Eisenhower put it, “the United States could not maintain old-fashioned forces all around the world,” so it sought “to develop within the various areas and regions of the free world indigenous forces for the maintenance of order, the safeguarding of frontiers, and the provision of the bulk of the ground capability.”⁷⁷ The “maintenance of order” refers to the “internal security” mission of such forces. As part of its strategy of flexible response, the Kennedy administration sought to meet the threat posed by “wars of liberation.” Insurgencies in Third World countries were seen as a new type of Soviet aggression. The administration developed a high-level coordinating committee called the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) which approved in 1962 an “Overseas Internal Defense Policy.”⁷⁸ The policy sought to limit the role of the United States to support of the indigenous effort through training, advice, and materiel. Training of Third World officers in counterinsurgency was expanded as were the U.S. Special Forces. The Special Forces developed a doctrine and force structure for training foreign troops overseas and for the mobilization of “tribal groups.”⁷⁹ The twelve-man “A’ teams” were designed to mobilize, advise, and lead up to 1,000 foreign guerrillas each. In Indochina, the Special Forces would muster and operate with large numbers of Hmong and Montagnards. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams were dispatched to train Third World militaries in counterinsurgency skills.⁸⁰ Training in the United States of Third World officers was extensive as well; between 1955 and 1981, nearly 400,000 passed through various programs.⁸¹

The Nixon Doctrine was specifically concerned with limiting the role of U.S. national forces in “other types of aggression,” stating that the United States would provide military and economic assistance but “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”⁸² “Vietnamization” was

intended to shift the burden of the war in South Vietnam back to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The Reagan administration continued U.S. advice and support to the client army in El Salvador and training programs for Third World militaries in “foreign internal defense.” According to Secretary Weinberger, these programs were designed “to reduce the probability that United States armed forces could be committed in foreign battles.”⁸³ In the wake of the Grenada operation, training in the Caribbean was stepped up. The Puerto Rican National Guard had been training the paramilitary security services of Barbados, Dominica, and Jamaica since 1980, and after 1984, the Special Forces trained Caribbean “Special Services Units” on Grenada and a number of neighboring islands. These units were designed to “provide their governments, most of which do not have armies, with extra muscle for dealing with insurgencies and external attack.”⁸⁴ Exercises were conducted in which these forces operated jointly with U.S. forces to combat insurgencies on neighboring islands. The Reagan administration sought also to develop a mirror image of the perceived Soviet strategy of internal aggression through “pro-insurgency.” Support was given to Angolan and Afghan insurgents and a light infantry raiding force was raised to conduct operations in Nicaragua.

The United States, then, saw foreign forces as an integral part of its Cold War strategy. These forces were primarily intended as internal security forces to prevent “communist” insurgents from coming to power. As is extensively discussed in the literature on counterinsurgency, U.S. officials tended to see insurgencies as primarily military threats which relied on external sources of support.⁸⁵ A member of the Special Group (CI) in the Kennedy administration later criticized the policy on internal defense: “It treated each revolutionary movement in a foreign society as if it were a clearly articulated military force instead of the apex of a pyramid deeply embedded in society.”⁸⁶ By contrast, many counterinsurgency theorists saw insurgencies as primarily a political struggle between two leaderships competing for the support of the population, in which the military component was subordinate.⁸⁷ Communist parties created front organizations to attract support from all sectors of society and articulated their struggles with nationalist and anti-colonial themes. In order to defeat insurgencies, governments were supposed to address many of the concerns raised by the revolutionaries, principally the redistribution of material values.⁸⁸ However, the governments faced with insurgencies were usually backed by economic elites unwilling to redistribute wealth or political power, and thus relied on their armies and other security forces. The use of these forces against their populations, whether as instruments of state terror or in conventional military operations with artillery and air support, tended to increase support for the insurgents. Given the formal independence of countries threatened with insurgency, the United States was generally unable to convince such governments to reform even when it sought to and relied in practice on militarized responses to insurgency.

The perception of insurgency as primarily a military threat was intensified by linking it to Soviet aggression. “What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings,” Secretary McNamara said, “I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression.”⁸⁹ The United States developed the notion of “overseas internal defense” to defend client states from this threat. This is the political purpose behind the constitution of foreign forces, primarily client armies and security forces, in the Third World. Insurgencies struck at “the weak point in *our* defenses,” according to Secretary Weinberger.⁹⁰ Since the United States was constrained in using its national armed forces, partly because of limited resources and, especially following the war in Indochina, because of popular disenchantment, it sought to raise, train, and advise foreign forces for purposes of countering “communist” internal aggression. Given the nature of client regimes in states such as Somoza’s Nicaragua, South Vietnam, and El Salvador, and the general perception of the “external” origins of insurgency, the response to insurgencies was primarily military. These client governments relied on their militaries to keep them in power, and on the

United States to advise, train, and supply their militaries, while the United States saw these governments and their militaries as part of its strategy of countering the Soviet threat. The “domino theory” held that these insurgencies had the cumulative capacity to threaten U.S. national security, even if particular countries were in and of themselves not of vital interest to the United States.

Above I argued that a specifically democratic element in state-society conflicts during the Cold War in the Third World was popular forces and their aspiration for substantive democratic change. Such popular forces, as with the armed forces of client states, received external material support. This raises the question of how to judge between the internal and external elements of internal war. From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, the insurgents represent an external force while the client army represents an internal force. From the perspective of the insurgents, the picture is reversed and client armies are seen as foreign forces. Viet Cong propaganda referred to the “U.S.–Diem regime.” In an overlooked article, Karl Deutsch sought to specify how to deal with this issue. He wrote:

In most internal wars, elements of domestic strife and of external intervention are intermingled in varying proportions. If, on both sides of such a conflict, there is a clear quantitative preponderance of domestic motivations, recruitment, and resources, we may speak of an authentic internal war or revolution. If outside manpower, motives, money and other resources appear to constitute the main capabilities committed to the struggle on both sides, then we are inclined to speak of a “war by proxy”— an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some or all of that country’s manpower, resources, and territory as means for achieve preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies.⁹¹

While both sides may acquire varying degrees of external material support, Deutsch raises the possibility of internal versus external motivation. In war, including insurgencies, a significant aspect of the overall fighting power of an armed force is its “will to combat” or fighting spirit. In Deutsch’s terms, I ask what the relation is between domestic as opposed to external motivations for the will to combat. Deutsch allows the possibility of foreign forces in internal war, that is, of locally recruited soldiers who serve foreign goals, when he identifies the use of a country’s manpower as one way in which foreign goals can be achieved. But this raises the question of from whence such forces acquire their “will to combat,” to the degree they have it. I suggest they derived their “fighting spirit” from their training, largely by a foreign power, as regular forces. The employment of these forces against the “armed people” is an instance of the use of a regular army to put down popular revolt. As the United States, a democracy, wholly or partially constituted such foreign regular forces, it is an instances of the use of force by a democratic state against peoples struggling for democratic change.

The “armed people” can be conceptualized as those armed forces which have a close relationship with “the people,” however constituted: they are “the people under arms.” Such forces serve out of a bond of political legitimation with those from whom they are recruited. The phalanx of Athens in the classical period was composed of a militia of citizens which depended for its fighting power on bonds of solidarity developed in civil life, including kin and tribal ties. Hoplites served in the phalanx for only a few short weeks as needed and then returned to civil life.⁹² The Swiss pikemen, who eventually became international mercenaries, were originally a militia seeking to defend their cantons from foreign invasion. In contemporary democratic states, a certain relationship is assumed to exist between the military, the nation, and the state. The national people constitute a political association, with elected representative leadership and an organizational apparatus ruling a piece of territory, the state, which in turn, as part of this rule, recruits a certain number of the people to serve in the military. The military, whether a conscript or volunteer

“national-professional” force, is seen as serving out of a bond of political legitimation which unites it with the people and therefore the state. This bond is one of democratic citizenship and is captured nicely by John Keegan: “A free man . . . has mortgaged his life to his liberty, and must be ready to risk his life on the battlefield if the mortgage is to be redeemed.”⁹³

By contrast, the antithesis of an “armed people” is a regular professional military which serves at the behest of the state, not the people. European sovereigns depended on mercenary professional forces to put down popular uprisings. Regular colonial armies and police forces were used to put down revolts against foreign rule.⁹⁴ Liberal thought, concerned to constrain the power of the state, sought to limit and control the state’s coercive means.⁹⁵ Legislative control of “purse strings” and the power to declare war were seen as a way of effecting this control. For the writers of the U.S. Constitution, the maintenance of state militias was a way of balancing executive control of national armed forces.⁹⁶

In insurgencies, the “armed people” were the insurgents. Insurgencies arose out of economic, social, and political contexts conducive to rebellion and revolution. While the communist parties at the core of many of these struggles intended to establish state socialist regimes, most of the rank and file of the insurgent forces and their supporters were motivated by the prospect of a more equitable distribution of political power and material values. This is why communist parties formed front organizations to appeal to sectors of society beyond the poorest peasants and industrial workers and why land reform, nationalism, and anti-colonialism were such prominent aspects of their party lines. By contrast, the motivation and fighting spirit of the rank and file of client armies was a product of their training, largely by a foreign power, as regular, professional soldiers. As Bernard Fall puts it:

It is . . . important to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage to a far vaster political contest and that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale. A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously replaced by his own social environment. A dead revolutionary usually is.⁹⁷

A dead client soldier, with his expensive foreign training and equipment, is not spontaneously replaced by internal social conditions. The rank and file of client armies were often recruited from the very same classes that were rising in revolt. Sources of political legitimation bonding them to the state were notably absent. Most such armies, and their associated internal security forces, never faced full-scale insurgencies, and engaged only in various forms of state terror against largely unarmed opponents. However, when client armies did combat insurgencies, as in Vietnam and El Salvador, what fighting spirit they had was largely the product of their training and motivation as regular soldiers; and this training, as well as their equipment and frequently even combat leadership, was provided by a foreign power. In addition to any material support, the primary external source of motivation or fighting spirit in internal war was the U.S. advice and support of regular client forces. The distance between the use of regular colonial armies as instruments of European expansion and domination of the non-European world and U.S. rule of its informal empire via foreign forces is not so great. The comment of Sir Thomas Monroe regarding the East India Company’s colonial forces applies in no small measure: “We are trying an experiment never yet tried in the world, maintaining a foreign domination by means of a native army.”⁹⁸

Quasi-States, Imperial States, and Informal Empire

International Relations has long made use of the abstraction “state” as a sovereign entity or “social-territorial totality.”⁹⁹ This analytic shorthand tends to conflate the state, as a centrally directed bundle of administrative and coercive organizations, with sovereignty, the practices by which states mutually recognize each other’s right to rule their claimed territory free from external intervention. The core of the state form, in the Weberian sociological tradition, is the ability to rule territory and the population on it through recourse to coercive power. Sovereign practices produce an always contested, but more or less mutually understood, juridical division of the globe: state boundaries as recognized in international law. However, the rule of states, the shaping and controlling of social relations ultimately through recourse to coercive power, can extend beyond this juridical territory. States may rule populations other than those in their internationally recognized territory. The democratic peace theorists and the CoW category of “interstate war” conflate state and sovereignty by operationalizing states as sovereign entities.¹⁰⁰ Many states in the Third World, most of which date only from decolonization in the wake of World War II, are incapable of exercising rule over their juridical territory. Indeed, entities capable of waging war, such as guerrilla forces and their associated organizational apparatuses, or “counter-states,”¹⁰¹ are often based within the juridical territory of these quasi-states. Such entities, while not internationally recognized sovereign states, approximated the state form.¹⁰² When the United States, principally via the advice and support of client state security forces, waged war against these entities, or otherwise intervened with armed force on the territory of quasi-states, as in militarized covert operations, it was exercising rule beyond its borders. International wars of this sort fall outside the CoW category of interstate war and, unless the United States deployed its own national armed forces, outside the category of internationalized civil war as well. Involvement in internal war was the predominant form of reciprocal organized violence between the United States and Third World during the Cold War. These wars should be analyzed in the context of relations of informal empire between and among imperial and quasi-states, not between and among states as sovereign entities. The refutation of alleged exceptions to the “zone of peace” in the Third World on the basis of the absence of interstate war between democracies is theoretically and empirically inappropriate. The democratic peace proposition is not supported or invalidated but simply inapplicable in that its categories are not appropriate for the real entities involved, imperial and quasi-states, nor to the relations of organized violence between them. I first provide an alternate “sociological” understanding of the state in order to develop the distinction between imperial and quasi-states and place U.S. involvement in Third World internal wars in this context. Second, I show how some of the forms of reciprocal organized violence between imperial and quasi-states fall outside of, or “appear” in different form, in CoW categories.

In contrast to the state as a sovereign entity or “social-territorial totality,” a “sociological” understanding of the state, derived from the work of Otto Hintze and Max Weber, emphasizes its character as a territorially based bundle of administrative, military, and policing organizations, more or less coordinated by a political leadership, situated in complex relations with the society over which it rules.¹⁰³ Rule is defined here as the ability, dependent ultimately on recourse to coercive power, of a political leadership and its organizational apparatus to shape and control social relations on a piece of territory in accordance with its objectives. As such, rule is *always* a matter of degree. When rule requires the actual use of coercive power, whether internally or abroad, whether with the use of forces constituted nationally or beyond juridical borders, it becomes war in the Clausewitzian-derived view used herein. A state conducts war, a policy requiring the use of armed force, whether internally or abroad, with its coercive apparatus, which may be staffed with persons recruited from within as well as from beyond the territory over which the state rules.

The sociological view of the state, as with the abstraction of a sovereign entity, makes a firm connection between the state and rule over a territorially demarcated area. The “sociological state,” as an ensemble of centrally directed administrative and coercive organizations, exercises rule backed up by coercive force over its territory. It is precisely the combination of coercive power and territorial rule that gives the state its relative autonomy from, and power over, the society in which it is situated, providing the basis for its ability to shape and control that society. Disputes between state managers and elements of civil society, as well as conflicts between and among elements of civil society, are regulated through the organizational apparatus of the state, which “tends to focus the relations and the struggles of civil society on to the territorial plane of the state, consolidating social interaction over that terrain, creating territorialized mechanisms for repressing or compromising the struggle, and breaking both smaller local and also wider transnational social relationships.”¹⁰⁴

A focus on this core function of states, rule over territory backed up by coercive power, enables a distinction between states, imperial states, and quasi-states in international relations in the post-1945 era. The territory over which a state rules is equivalent to its juridical territory as recognized in international law. Its “juridical statehood” is equivalent to its “empirical statehood,” the extent of its *actual exercise of rule*. The territory over which imperial and quasi-states actually exercise rule, however, diverges from their internationally recognized juridical territory. “Empirical statehood” can both fall short of juridical territory, as with quasi-states, and exceed juridical territory, as with imperial states. The international juridical status of quasi-states is not matched by “empirical statehood.” They are unable to exert rule within their entire juridical territory. This inability may stem from a variety of internal factors, including corruption, lack of resources, and insurrection, it may be the result of external intervention as foreign powers seek to shape and control their internal relations, and quasi-states may “share” their coercive apparatus with an imperial power.¹⁰⁵ A foreign power which exercises a degree of rule through recourse to coercion within the juridical territory of a quasi-state is an imperial state. This rule can be exercised through a variety of means, such as cultural hegemony and relations of economic subordination and dependency, and it may pursue ideological and economic goals of diverse type. The Weberian tradition, however, identifies the state by the means specific to it,¹⁰⁶ rule over territory ultimately through recourse to coercive power, regardless of whatever goals such rule seeks to achieve. Given this understanding of the state, an imperial state is one which rules territory beyond its juridical territory through national or foreign forces and through the *threat* of violence or its *use* against unarmed or armed challengers. As with rule internal to juridical borders, the mere presence of coercive force is a primary source of state power. This threat of violence contrasts with its actual employment in battle against armed challengers, or the use of the military and other internal security services to violently disorganize unarmed political opposition, that is, state terror.¹⁰⁷ The divergence between empirical and juridical statehood, with respect to quasi- and imperial states in relations of informal empire, can be summarized as follows: the rule of quasi-states falls short of their juridical borders, as coercive power in their territory is shared between their own security apparatus, any internal armed challengers, and an imperial power, while the rule of imperial states seeking to shape the internal nature of quasi-states exceeds their juridical borders, as they use force to rule territory aboard, the core function of Weberian states.

An empire is a political unit which subjects foreign populations to its rule.¹⁰⁸ However, a state need not rule a formal empire to be an imperial state. Raymond Aron argues that imperialism did not disappear with the advent of juridical statehood in the Third World: “imperialism in the form of behavior calculated to construct an empire in the classic and political sense has receded from the foreground, while imperialism in the form of a nonegalitarian relationship between states and a great power’s will to influence the domestic life and foreign conduct of a small power has, like Descartes’ common sense, never been so widespread as it is in our own time.”¹⁰⁹ In Aron’s view, every great power tends

toward an imperial policy because it seeks to influence the internal policies of weaker states: “every ruling power is obliged to exercise an influence on the internal affairs of secondary states, at least to the degree necessary to prevent the victory of the party linked to the rival camp.”¹¹⁰ An imperial power may exert its rule formally or informally, conditionally or unconditionally, and distinctions can be made between the degree of “interference, influence, and domination.”¹¹¹ But the degree of rule does not change the imperial character of efforts to shape and control the internal affairs of lesser powers. These efforts become a policy or war when the actual employment of armed force is required. The use of foreign forces, whether in the era of colonialism or of the Cold War, always raises the question of the degree to which the imperial power controls such forces for its own purposes. The formal independence of Third World client states faced with internal armed challenges, such as South Vietnam or El Salvador, increased the difficulties of the exercise of rule through foreign forces for an imperial power. While colonial powers often ruled through the mediation of, and accommodation with, indigenous elites, the power of these elites and their ability to influence policy for their own ends rather than those of the imperial power was increased with the advent of formal independence.

Great powers become increasingly imperial as the disparity in power between them and other states grows.¹¹² During the Cold War, both superpowers pursued imperial policies, in that they sought to shape and control the internal nature of quasi-states and, moreover, they did so in accordance with an “imperial idea”: “An imperial state (or a state which fulfills an imperial function) is characterized by a *worldwide* purpose” and seeks to establish “an international environment consonant with the imperial state’s idea or purpose.”¹¹³ For the United States, this purpose was a global effort to contain Soviet power and to prevent the spread of communism in the “free world.” In Europe and parts of Asia, containment took the form of defense of juridical borders from the perceived threat of external invasion. But in much of the Third World, where the external threat manifested itself in internal insurrection, the United States pursued imperial policies to shape and control the internal nature of quasi-states in accordance with its imperial idea, to prevent communists and those perceived as communists from seizing state power. It was in this imperial context that most U.S. use of force, whether with national or foreign forces, in the Third World occurred. This suggests that analytic abstractions based on juridical statehood, or the state as sovereign entity, may be seriously misleading for analysis of U.S. use of force in the Third World. Yet it is precisely on such abstractions that the democratic peace proposition, and in particular the CoW category of interstate war, depend.

The CoW category of interstate war, which provides the basis for the correlation between democratic state dyads and peace, presumes the existence of states as “social-territorial totalities.” As such, it is not suitable for the analysis of relations of organized violence between quasi-states and imperial states, nor was it intended to be so. CoW operationalizes states on the basis of population criteria, membership in the League of Nations or the UN, or formal diplomatic recognition by great powers.¹¹⁴ Prior to 1920, CoW identifies a central and a peripheral state system, which is a distinction between those states that were active in European power politics and those not.¹¹⁵ After 1920, a single interdependent states system is considered to exist. CoW draws a distinction between intra-systemic wars, those between states or interstate wars, and extra-systemic wars, those between a state and some other non-state entity capable of waging war.¹¹⁶ Intervention in internal state-society conflicts, the predominant form of the use of violence in the Third World by the superpowers during the Cold War, falls outside the category of interstate war, into that of internationalized civil wars. But a civil war, on CoW terms, only becomes internationalized by the direct military participation, with soldiers or “volunteers,” of a foreign power in an internal conflict.¹¹⁷

The CoW category of extra-systemic wars identifies those between imperial powers and non-state entities. An internationalized civil war identifies those in which a foreign power

directly intervenes in an internal conflict. However, some of the forms of organized violence between imperial states and quasi-states fall outside of these categories. The reason for this is the emphasis on juridical statehood, over empirical or “actually existing” statehood, in two senses. The first is that measures of population, membership in international organizations, and diplomatic recognition identify quasi-states as sovereign entities. The second is that CoW criteria only count the national, and not the foreign, elements of a state’s coercive apparatus. For social scientific purposes of analyzing war, juridically derived measures of state and war involvement are meant to identify real entities and the relations of organized violence between them. When the legal institutions of interstate war, war conducted by national armed forces between internationally recognized sovereign states, diverge from the actual forms of organized violence, these institutions are a misleading basis for such social scientific categories. The point is not that legal institutions are unreal; they are as real as any other social relations. Rather, the reciprocal organized violence that characterizes war involves the clash of persons under arms, or armed forces. Should armed forces of some type diverge from the legal institutions, whether national or international, erected for their regulation, then those forces “escape” social scientific measures, or categories, based on those institutions. In other words, operational categories for data collection based on legal institutions do not identify or produce facts on some of the armed forces which wage war, or these forces “appear” as the armies of independent sovereign states or as engaged in civil war. In this manner, such categories potentially obscure, or remove from analysis, some forms of reciprocal organized violence, namely, those involving the use of foreign forces to rule informal empire in the post-1945 period.

The assumption that after 1920 there is a single interdependent states system ignores the historical fact that for most of the “new states,” juridical statehood did not necessarily entail empirical statehood. While the category of extra-systemic wars identifies those fought between European colonial powers and entities that resisted their expansion in the non-European world, the possibility of relations of informal empire in a juridically constituted states system, and use of foreign forces to rule that empire, is not acknowledged. The only way in which such relations of organized violence “appear” in CoW data is if the imperial power intervenes directly with its own troops, or thinly disguised “volunteers,” in a state-society conflict or civil war. Yet the use of foreign forces, those recruited from beyond juridical borders with the advice and support of an imperial state, qualifies neither for internationalized civil war, nor for interstate war. To the extent that the U.S. imperial democracy exercised rule by armed force in quasi-states, it did so principally with foreign forces of diverse type. These forces were intentionally constituted for political purposes by U.S. policymakers and were understood as part of the U.S. coercive apparatus, as part of the armed force at the disposal of policy. The juridically derived measures of the state and its coercive apparatus, which make no allowance for relations of informal empire or foreign forces, have diverged from the actual policy practices of international organized violence in the post-1945 period.

In Clausewitzian terms, war is the use of force to achieve political purposes. From the perspective of a political leadership pursuing an objective which requires the use of its coercive apparatus, a policy of war, the nationality of the armed force at its disposal does not change the nature of the policy. War is still war regardless of the nationality, uniforms or lack thereof, or the international legal status of those staffing a state’s coercive apparatus. That apparatus need not, and historically has not, been staffed only with persons recruited from within the territory over which the state rules. Some foreign-recruited forces, such as the French Foreign Legion or the Gurkha regiments of the British Army, are part of national armed forces as recognized in international law and CoW definitions of national forces.¹¹⁸ However, the coercive apparatus available to the political leadership of a state can exceed its national armed forces, and foreign elements of a state’s coercive apparatus should be included in understandings of when a state is waging war. The history

of foreign forces, those recruited from beyond the borders of a political unit, extends back to antiquity. In early modern Europe, an international class of mercenaries staffed the armies of sovereigns.¹¹⁹ The Europeans made extensive use of troops from non-European populations for purposes of colonial conquest and control, including advice and support for the armies of client princes, the formation of irregular units of all types, and the raising of regular colonial armies and police forces.¹²⁰ The United States adapted these practices to conditions of the formal, juridical independence of Third World states in the post-war period. Covert action was one form of this adaptation, the advice and support of client armies another.

While the category of extra-systemic wars captures European use of regular foreign forces in the non-European world, no equivalent category captures U.S. or Soviet use of foreign forces to rule informal empire after 1920. Both before and after 1920, the Europeans made extensive use of regular colonial armies, for purposes of colonial conquest and external defense, use in European wars, and for internal security. While colonial forces saw extensive service in the two world wars, they were primarily used in the non-European world. Large numbers of Indochinese, Africans, and Algerians served in the French wars of decolonization. Regular colonial armies were part of the national armed forces of European powers and their use, other than anomalies such as the Gurkhas, ended with decolonization. But European use of foreign recruited forces extended beyond such “official” forces. Prior to the spread of formal colonies over much of the non-European world by the late nineteenth century, European powers exercised their influence informally by backing one side or another with troops, arms, supplies, and advice in local conflicts. The extensive and widespread use of foreign recruited forces in the non-European world, including but not limited to the raising of regular forces, lends support to the notion that their use in the Third World continued after the global spread of juridical statehood. The ARVN, in name the army of a sovereign state, was formed out of French colonial forces. It was only one of several Third World client armies which battled insurgencies with extensive U.S. advice and support.

The International Relations of Democracy and War

Historical sociology and state-society approaches in International Relations focus on the mutual constitution of domestic and international processes.¹²¹ Of course, it need hardly be remarked that the internal processes of quasi-states are uniquely susceptible to and shaped by the influence of international factors of all kinds, including foreign involvement in their internal wars. As Naeem Inayatullah asks, “[h]ow can the inside of any Third World state be seen as disconnected from the outside of the world system?”¹²² Much less appreciated is how the interaction between internal and external processes shapes the nature of even great powers. One well-known example is the extensions of the franchise in European countries which followed the raising of mass armies for purposes of interstate competition. For William McNeill, global processes of industrialization led to the “totalization” of modern warfare between great powers, which in turn transformed liberal and other states into “national firms for the waging of war,” further intensifying the total character of modern conventional warfare.¹²³

The mutual constitution of the internal and external can be observed in the case of U.S. unconventional warfare in the Third World during the Cold War. The threat U.S. policymakers perceived was not limited to East bloc nuclear and conventional forces, but included also communist “internal aggression” in the Third World. Not only did the military come to play a much larger role in U.S. political life, largely as a consequence of the conventional and nuclear threats, than had previously been the case, but the United States also developed an extensive organizational and military apparatus for the conduct of

“overseas internal defense.” Aspects of this apparatus have been discussed in the preceding pages. They range from the covert operations functions of the intelligence agencies to the development of an internal warfare capability for U.S. national armed forces. They include also the provisions made for the constitution of foreign military and police forces. Overall, these developments led to a dramatic increase in the power of the executive branch of the U.S. government; that is, they had obvious consequences for U.S. democracy. Discussion of these issues is not part of the debate over the democratic peace, which focuses, as mentioned above, on the question of internal and systemic variables in determining foreign policy. These issues, however, relate directly to consideration of the relation between democracy and war. They fall under the broader rubric of the “international relations of democracy and war.” I conclude by briefly considering some of the consequences for democracy in the United States of the use of foreign forces in internal war, including both covert operations and client armies.

Covert operations are a means of carrying out foreign policy without normal democratic constraints. Crucially, these operations are generally only “covert” or “secret” from the perspective of the American public. Citizens and elites in the target country are often well aware of American involvement. U.S. domestic secrecy enables policymakers to evade many of the causal mechanisms suggested as explanations for the democratic peace. The fact that the only Americans involved in such operations are a small number of intelligence and military professionals means that the electorate is spared the cost in blood, if not treasure, of conducting them. “Black budgets” and ineffective or nonexistent congressional oversight enable the executive to evade the legislature. Congressional oversight is further hampered by the fact that many operations, as well as the state terror of client security forces, are carried out by foreign nationals, not officials of the U.S. government subject to U.S. law. Secrecy also prevents electoral incentives from deterring the executive. Not only is the operation of the free press hampered by secrecy, but the press itself is often tacitly complicit, out of “patriotic” motives and shared ideology, or actively complicit by spreading disinformation, as was the case with the Guatemala operation.¹²⁴ The fear of failures becoming public, especially after the Bay of Pigs, was incentive for further secrecy. While covert operations were developed originally in response to a perceived external threat as one weapon among many in the Cold War arsenal, they simultaneously enabled the executive to conduct foreign policies that might not have met with public approval. Moreover, public discussion of foreign policy was hampered by lack of knowledge of just what policies were being pursued.

Additionally, the intelligence and covert operations apparatuses developed in response to a foreign threat were employed domestically, directly undermining the civil and political rights of U.S. citizens. With the announced intent of uncovering foreign influence on domestic political dissent, the CIA instituted a number of programs to collect intelligence on dissident organizations and their activities. Beginning in 1952, there was an extensive mail-opening program for mail from foreign countries to Americans on a “watch list,” which included the American Friends Service Committee, several congresspersons and senators, and even John Steinbeck. Files were maintained and surveillance conducted on thousands of anti-war groups and activists. Reports about domestic dissent based on these various programs were submitted to the White House during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Several other agencies, most notably the FBI but including also the NSA and the IRS, conducted domestic surveillance justified by fears of foreign influence on what was legitimate political activity.¹²⁵

The central argument of this essay is that foreign forces be considered part of the coercive apparatus of the United States. When these forces are used in war, they raise direct questions about the democratic control of war-making powers. The constitutional apparatus for the regulation of war powers is designed to control the use of national forces. Foreign forces are considered only in terms of the budget for foreign military assistance, not in terms of their war-making capacity as instruments of U.S. policy. They provide the

executive with a war-making capacity, with “untraceable troops,”¹²⁶ partially outside the control of the legislature. Perhaps the most extreme instance of the sort during the Cold War, involving the constitution and direct U.S. control of such troops, was the war waged in Laos in which American officials commanded tens of thousands of foreign troops, ranging from Hmong tribesmen to Thai mercenaries.¹²⁷ As with the Contras in the 1980s, since the troops fighting for U.S. objectives are not Americans, the incentives for legislators are different. The question of continued financial and other support for foreign forces is much different than the specter of U.S. national casualties in foreign war.

None of the arguments in this essay invalidate the notion of a “zone of peace” between long-term, stable democracies. This essay argues that the scope of the “zone of peace” is restricted, however, not because there are exceptions in the Third World to the democratic peace proposition as currently formulated, but because the category of “interstate war” is not applicable to analysis of most First World use of force in the non-European world.¹²⁸ That category removes from analysis the primary way in which a democratic great power, the United States, conducts wars in the Third World. Restricting the zone of peace to the First World, moreover, has consequences for the democratic peace debate. The number of long-term, stable democracies is relatively small. With the exception of a few Asian states, there is a high degree of overlap between those states coded democratic and “the West.” This overlap increases considerably the set of variables correlated with the absence of overt militarized conflict between these states.¹²⁹ Moreover, more stringent definitions of liberal democracy, which remove unstable, elected Third World governments from inclusion, reduce not only the geographic but the temporal scope of the zone of peace. The period from 1947 to 1989, during which most of the Western democracies were in a military alliance against a perceived aggressor, is a considerable portion of the democratic peace. If peace between these states was overdetermined during this period, then evaluation of the democratic peace proposition hinges on whether its claims hold outside this context. The use of armed force by the United States against elected governments in the Third World has greater significance than is appreciated in the literature. While recourse to the category of long-term, stable democracies and to CoW operational definitions of interstate war certainly preserves the democratic peace proposition in its law-like form, the role of anti-communist ideology in relations with the Third World suggests that democratic norms may not always take precedence in questions of the use of force against elected governments. Moreover, the development of institutions to conduct war with foreign forces means that democratic institutions do not constrain the war-making powers of states even when they reliably control national armed forces.

Notes

¹ William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995); John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf* (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996).

² Raymond Cohen, “Pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that ‘democracies do not go to war with each other,’” in *Review of International Studies* 20 (1994); David P. Forsythe, “Democracy, War, and Covert Action” in *Journal of Peace Research* 29,4 (1992); Patrick James and Glenn E. Mitchell II, “Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace,” in *International Interactions* 21,1 (1995).

³ Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs” in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 35–44; James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International*

Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 36–7; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 13, 120–124.

⁴ Russett, *Grasping*, p. 123.

⁵ See discussion this paper pp. 22–25.

⁶ Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 34. See also Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), “Preface” and chap. 1.

⁷ Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 11; Michael Mann, “Authoritarian and liberal militarism: a contribution from comparative and historical sociology,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Martin van Crevald, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

⁸ As Cohen points out in “Pacific unions” (p. 217), the use of measures short of war, such as the CoW Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,” in *American Political Science Review* 87,3 [1993]) or of overt military intervention (see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Margaret G. Hermann, “Military Intervention and the Democratic Peace,” in *International Interactions* 21,1 [1995]), fail to include clandestine, proxy, and surrogate forms of violence, much less foreign forces as understood herein.

⁹ Another case of post-1945 informal empire ruled by a democratic state is that of France in Africa.

¹⁰ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Jackson’s analysis of quasi-states differs from that here. I focus exclusively on the “Weberian” dimension, the inability of such states to rule their entire juridical territory through recourse to coercive power. See discussion this paper pp. 19–21.

¹¹ Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, “Hierarchy under anarchy: informal empire and the East German state,” in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 246. Wendt and Friedheim, discussing East Germany, argue it “shared” its coercive *monopoly* with an imperial power, the USSR. In quasi-states faced with internal armed challenge, there is no monopoly to share.

¹² See Aron’s discussion in *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.), pp. 259–278, and *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945–1973* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 252–260.

¹³ See for example Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, *America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988); G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and hegemonic power,” in *International Organization* 44,3 (1990); John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

¹⁴ Examples include Cambodia, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and South Vietnam.

¹⁵ Wendt and Friedheim, “Hierarchy under anarchy,” p. 253.

¹⁶ Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994); Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power: Volume 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Martin Shaw and Michael Banks, eds., *State and Society in International Relations* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991); Martin Shaw, *Dialectics of War: an essay in the social theory of total war and peace* (London: Pluto, 1988); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

¹⁷ Morton H. Halperin, Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Borosage, and Christine M. Marwick, *The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (Penguin Books, 1976); Sidney Lens, *Permanent War: The Militarization of America* (New York: Shocken Books, 1987); Athan Theoharis, *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government: The CIA and U.S. Intelligence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

¹⁸ Cohen, “Pacific unions,” pp. 214–216.

¹⁹ For instance, these states share common forms of social and economic organization (see Halliday, “International Society as Homogeneity” and “‘The Sixth Great Power’: Revolutions and the International System,” in *Rethinking*). See also Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

²⁰ The CIA also conducted operations to influence elections in Western Europe and Australia (See Blum, *Killing Hope*, chaps. 2, 15, 18, 40). These operations to subvert electoral processes in democracies have been considered only in passing in the literature and certainly do not represent armed intervention. Forsythe, without explanation, interprets them as covert action in “support” of democracy (“Democracy, War and Covert Action,” pp. 386, 392).

²¹ Blum, *Killing Hope*, chap. 21; Bernard B. Fall, *Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960–1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969), chaps V–VI; Prados, *Secret Wars*, chap. XIV; Charles A. Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), chaps. 1–3.

²² Doyle, “Liberal Legacies,” pp. 35–44; Forsythe, “Democracy, War and Covert Action”; Russett, *Grasping*, pp. 120–24.

²³ See Blum, *Killing Hope*, chap. 9; Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945–1980* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 72–77; Prados, *Secret Wars*, chap. VI.

²⁴ Blum, *Killing Hope*, p. 68.

²⁵ Quoted in Blum, *Killing Hope*, p. 69.

²⁶ Aron, *Imperial Republic*, p. 234. See also Edward N. Muller, “Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World,” in *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (1985); Edward Thomas Rowe, “Aid and Coups d’Etat: Aspects of the Impact of American Military Assistance Programs in the Less Developed Countries,” in *International Studies Quarterly* 18,2 (1974); Miles D. Wolpin, “External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Military Behavior in the Third World,” in K. Fidel, ed., *Militarism in Developing Countries* (New Brunswick,

NJ: Transaction Books, 1975); Miles D. Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1972).

²⁷ See Blum, *Killing Hope*, chap. 14; Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962); Audrey R. & George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York: The New Press, 1995); Prados, *Secret Wars*, chap. VIII; Ulf Sundhaussen, "Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 430–438. I rely principally on Kahin and Kahin for the details of the covert operation. They have assembled, in the face of continuing government secrecy, the most complete account of the facts and chronology of the operation through a variety of sources, including government documents from several states, handwritten summaries of still secret documents kept by U.S. officials, and extensive interviews (see pp. 238–240).

²⁸ Sundhaussen, "Indonesia," p. 433.

²⁹ Quoted in Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 181.

³⁰ Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, pp. 91, 120–1, 128.

³¹ Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, pp. 172–173.

³² Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, pp. 179–182; Prados, *Secret Wars*, pp. 142–143.

³³ Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 377; Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, pp. 160, 193; Kolko, *Confronting*, pp. 173–185.

³⁴ Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 305. These are estimates of those killed (not missing or wounded) by the commander in chief of the Indonesian Army.

³⁵ Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 135.

³⁶ Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 136.

³⁷ Howard P. Jones, U.S. ambassador to Indonesia at the time, quoted in Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 160.

³⁸ Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, pp. 87–91.

³⁹ Quoted in Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 132.

⁴⁰ See Blum, *Killing Hope*, chap. 10; Kolko, *Confronting*, pp. 102–105; LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: the United States and Central America* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984), pp. 111–126; Prados, *Secret Wars*, chap. VI.

⁴¹ Prados, *Secret Wars*, pp. 63–4, 101. CAT, a commercial airline that served Nationalist Chinese forces from 1946, became a CIA operation after it ran into financial trouble in the wake of the Nationalist defeat and began flying CIA missions.

⁴² Prados, *Secret Wars*, pp. 105–106. Lloyd's of London, insurer of the ship, was later reimbursed by the CIA after British complaints.

⁴³ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 50. See also Raymond Duvall, "An Appraisal of the Methodological and Statistical Procedures of the Correlates of War Project," in Francis W. Hoole and Dina A. Zinnes, eds., *Quantitative International Politics: An Appraisal* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).

⁴⁴ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 56–7. The length of these conflicts also poses a problem for CoW, which seeks to measure the frequency of discrete instances of 'war.'

⁴⁵ See for example Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989 [1898]).

⁴⁶ See Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) and Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972).

⁴⁷ In fact, the absorption on dubious legal premises of one such principality, the Kingdom of Oudh, from which a large number of Bengal Army sepoys were recruited, was one of the precipitants of the 1857 revolt.

⁴⁸ Russett, *Grasping*, pp. 123–124.

⁴⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 157–158.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter-terrorism, 1940–1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 28.

⁵¹ In addition to the Soviet threat, another systemic-level reason for covert action was the constraints international norms and institutions, such as those of sovereignty, placed on overt U.S. use of national forces for purposes of intervention.

⁵² LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, p. 121.

⁵³ Quoted in Kolko, *Confronting*, p. 104.

⁵⁴ Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: New American Library, 1965), pp. 207–208.

⁵⁵ See H.W. Brands, *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For Charles Wolf the Soviet Union had “proxies” or “surrogates” in the Third World, while the West had “cooperative forces.” See Charles Wolf, Jr., and Katherine Watkins Webb, eds., *Developing Cooperative Forces in the Third World* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987).

⁵⁶ Quoted in McClintock, *Instruments*, p. 138.

⁵⁷ Quoted in Prados, *Secret Wars*, p. 317.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 168.

⁵⁹ William J. Duiker, *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995) and *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981); Kolko, *Confronting*; LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*; Jeffery Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1972); William E. Odom, *On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1992); Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

⁶⁰ Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986); Kolko, *Confronting*; LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*; Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A*

History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

⁶¹ Quoted in Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 140.

⁶² See “Preface,” “Introduction,” and “Conclusion” to *Confronting*. See also Morris J. Blachman, William M. LeoGrande, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, *Confronting Revolution: Security through Diplomacy in Central America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

⁶³ Cohen, “Pacific unions,” pp. 210–214.

⁶⁴ See David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), chaps. 1, 4; and selections by Philip Green and Raymond Williams in Philip Green, ed., *Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993).

⁶⁵ Doyle, “Liberal Legacies,” pp. 4–9; Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, pp. 96–102; Russett, *Grasping*, pp. 14–16.

⁶⁶ Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976,” in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33,1 (1989).

⁶⁷ Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, pp. 98–99.

⁶⁸ Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Held, *Models*, chap. 6. As an empirical theory of “actually existing democracies,” pluralism is subject to severe criticism wholly ignored by proponents of the democratic peace. See Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); Held, *Models*; Charles Lindbloom, *Politics and Markets* (Basic Books, 1977); Steven Lukes, *Power: a Radical View* (Macmillan, 1974); Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

⁶⁹ Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, p. 97.

⁷⁰ See Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” in Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans. and eds., *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1949) for the argument that all social scientific inquiry, including the collecting of facts within categories defined by coding rules, takes place within value-oriented conceptual schemes.

⁷¹ See John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, *Debating*.

⁷² Doyle, “Liberal Legacies,” p. 9.

⁷³ Cohen, “Pacific unions,” p. 213.

⁷⁴ For one account of such struggles in nineteenth century French labor politics see Ronald Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For an account of this process in revolutionary guerrilla warfare, see Race, *Long An*.

⁷⁵ Philip Green, “‘Democracy’ as a Contested Idea” in Green, ed., *Democracy*, p. 15.

⁷⁶ Plato, quoted in Raymond Williams, “Keywords” in Green, ed., *Democracy*, p. 19.

⁷⁷ Quoted in Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 153.

⁷⁸ See McClintock, pp. 161–178.

⁷⁹ McClintock, p. 253.

- 80 McClintock, pp. 185–188.
- 81 Stephanie G. Neuman, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), pp. 28–29.
- 82 From a clarification of the Nixon Doctrine provided by the White House, quoted in Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 298.
- 83 Quoted in McClintock, p. 351.
- 84 McClintock, pp. 401–403.
- 85 Cable, *Conflict of Myths*; D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Race, *Long An*.
- 86 Charles Maechling quoted in McClintock, p. 171.
- 87 John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966); Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*.
- 88 See for example Odom, *Internal War*, p. 7.
- 89 Quoted in McClintock, p. 174.
- 90 Quoted in McClintock, p. 334. Italics added.
- 91 Karl W. Deutsch, “External Involvement in Internal War,” in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 102.
- 92 Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- 93 John Keegan, “Introduction,” in Hanson, *Western Way*, p. xiii.
- 94 See Ranajit Guha, “Dominance Without Hegemony and its Historiography,” in R. Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies 6: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), on the overestimation of the role of cultural hegemony, as opposed to armed force, in securing the obedience of colonized populations.
- 95 See Lois G. Schworer, “No Standing Armies!” *the Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth Century England* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
- 96 See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 164–170.
- 97 Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Co., 1967), p. 357.
- 98 Quoted in Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men* (London: Cape, 1974), p. 192.
- 99 Halliday, *Rethinking*, pp. 78–9.
- 100 Doyle, “Liberal Legacies,” pp. 5–6; Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, pp. 102–103; Russett, *Grasping*, pp. 13–14.
- 101 Michael Radu, *The New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerrillas in the Third World* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 29.
- 102 The administrative apparatus of many guerrilla groups during the Cold War collected taxes and policed and administered justice to areas under their control. They even engaged in policies to shape the societies they ruled, such as land reform, and had organized

violence at their disposal to coerce recalcitrant landlords and rich peasants. Examples include the FMLN, which ruled parts of El Salvador, and the NLF in Vietnam.

¹⁰³ See Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. I, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 53–56; Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), chap. 1; Theda Skocpol, “Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,” *Politics and Society* 10,2 (1980); Tilly, *Coercion*.

¹⁰⁴ Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, p. 26.

¹⁰⁵ Wendt and Friedheim, “Hierarchy,” p. 246. See note 11.

¹⁰⁶ See Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, *Max Weber: The Lawyer as Social Thinker* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 103–104.

¹⁰⁷ See Alexander George, ed., *Western State Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

¹⁰⁸ Aron, *Peace and War*, p. 259.

¹⁰⁹ Aron, *Imperial Republic*, p. 259.

¹¹⁰ Aron, *Peace and War*, p. 260.

¹¹¹ Aron, *Imperial Republic*, p. 255; *Peace and War*, p. 260.

¹¹² Aron, *Imperial Republic*, p. 256.

¹¹³ Aron, *Imperial Republic*, p. 303.

¹¹⁴ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 39–41.

¹¹⁵ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, p. 44.

¹¹⁶ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 51–54.

¹¹⁷ Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 218–219.

¹¹⁸ Additionally, a large number of non-nationals serve in the “official” forces of the United States and many other countries. After the Cold War, the idea of forming a U.S. Foreign Legion was mooted in response to concerns that public fears over U.S. casualties would limit the usability of U.S. national forces in situations where clear threats to national security were not apparent.

¹¹⁹ Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), chap. 2.

¹²⁰ Anthony Clayton, *France, Soldiers and Africa* (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988); Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Monographs, 1989); Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Mason, *A Matter of Honour*; William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), pp. 147–153; Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism.”

¹²¹ See note 16.

¹²² Naeem Inayatullah, “Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: quasi-states as social construct,” in Biersteker and Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty*, p. 71.

¹²³ McNeill, *Pursuit*, p. 317.

124 See Kahin & Kahin, *Subversion*, p. 158; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit* (New York: Anchor Books, 1982); Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 315.

125 Halperin et al., *Lawless State*, chaps. 3–9; Lens, *Permanent War*, pp. 133, 141–146; Theoharis, *Spying on Americans*.

126 Lens, *Permanent War*, p. 105.

127 See Blum, *Killing Hope*, chap. 21; Fall, *Anatomy of a Crisis*; Prados, *Secret Wars*, chap. XIV; Stevenson, *End of Nowhere*.

128 See Robert Latham, “Democracy and War-Making,” in *Millennium* 24,3 (1993) and Mann, “Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism.”

129 See note 19.