

Seminar 4


Week 4- Lecture 4

Right-wing populism and Trump

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Is populism a necessary corrective of liberal democracy, or does it threaten the existence of democracy?

What's wrong with populism? – List some populist policies/opinions



See: <https://hac.bard.edu/amor-mundi/the-peoples-populism-2018-08-20>

How do right-wing and left-wing populism differ in their idea of who constitutes the 'people'.

Is there any value to nativism?

“Political agents from the right of the political spectrum have constructed a powerful **security imaginary** around the loss of past national greatness that creates affinities with the experiences of those who feel disempowered and ties existential anxieties to concerns with immigration, globalization, and integration.” (Loffman and Homolar)

.... And The role of humailation?

Carl Schmitt:

The distinction between friend and enemy, Schmitt elaborates, is essentially public and not private. Individuals may have personal enemies, but personal enmity is not a political phenomenon. Politics involves groups that face off as mutual enemies (Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (CP) 28–9). Two groups will find themselves in a situation of mutual enmity if and only if there is a possibility of war and mutual killing between them. The distinction between friend and enemy thus refers to the “utmost degree of intensity ... of an association or dissociation.” (CP 26, 38) The utmost degree of association is the willingness to fight and die for and together with other members of one’s group, and the ultimate degree of dissociation is the willingness to kill others for the simple reason that they are members of a hostile group (CP 32–3).

Liberal states, in Schmitt’s view, have a tendency to fail to distinguish properly between friends and enemies, and thus to extend rights of membership to those who do not truly belong to the political nation. In a liberal state, Schmitt fears, the political nation will slowly wither and die as a result of spreading de-politicization, it will succumb to internal strife, or it will be overwhelmed by external enemies who are more politically united (CP 69–79). To avert these dangers, Schmitt suggests, it is necessary to make sure that the boundaries of the political nation and the boundaries of citizenship coincide.

(<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/>)

“In *The Concept of the Political* (1932), he claimed that fundamental to ‘the political’ is the distinction between friend and enemy – who is in the political community, and who is out – and that what matters in politics is *only* whether some ideological proposal stands a chance to be successful, given the historical context.

In the Weimar period, during which a rickety republic governed interwar Germany from 1918 to 1933, Schmitt took it as a basic fact that democracy was the sole principle of legitimacy capable of garnering mass support. So, for this supreme anti-liberal, the challenge of the times was to reinterpret democracy into authoritarian terms. Any ideology based on an idea of the ‘substantive homogeneity’ of the nation would do – a secular substitute for the religious basis on which political legitimacy had been founded in the past. Schmitt yoked that idea to his [claim](#) that the sovereign is ‘**he who decides on the state of exception**’.

Sovereignty is revealed in a situation of crisis, when the identity of the political community is at stake. In the circumstances of post-First World War constitutionalism, Schmitt [located](#) the bearer of sovereignty in the figure at the apex of the executive branch of government (in Weimar, the president of the Reich) because only he could rise above the fray of partisan politics and represent the political community.”

(<https://aeon.co/essays/carl-schmitts-legal-theory-legitimises-the-rule-of-the-strongman>)

