
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter analyzes changes in Japan's security strategy, the modernization of JSDF capabilities, and the upgrading of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War and post-September 11 periods.

MAIN ARGUMENT:

Japan is moving along a long-term trajectory to assume a "normal" security role, as evidenced by (1) the JSDF's acquisition of enhanced power projection capabilities and (2) the gradual strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance to play a more effective part in both regional and global security.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:

- Japan is becoming a more reliable ally that will seek to support U.S. regional and global strategies in the post-September 11 period.
- Like all "normal" allies, Japan is, however, continuing to hedge against over-dependence on its alliance with the U.S. Not only will Japan continue to impose limits on the degree of its military cooperation with the U.S. over such issues as Taiwan and Iran, but it will also explore UN-centered security options.
- As a more "normal" ally seeking reciprocity in alliance ties, Japan will also be more demanding over base issues in Okinawa, seek more equal treatment in decisionmaking within the alliance, and expect support for its UN Security Council bid.
- This "normal" ally behavior notwithstanding, Japan's increasing military integration with and dependence upon the U.S.—especially when combined with rising concerns regarding China and North Korea—indicate that, ultimately, Japan will see little alternative but to continue to strengthen the bilateral alliance relationship.

Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a “Normal” Security Role

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Japan's grand strategy, security policy, and military doctrine and capabilities have undergone a significant round of change over the last ten years, and have recently begun yet another round of major transformation. The first cycle of military modernization began in the mid-1990s when Japan moved to revise both its National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and the Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. These efforts upgraded both Japan's national military capabilities and the functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance to respond more effectively to regional security contingencies. In the aftermath of September 11, Japan has already dispatched the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in support of many U.S. global security initiatives.

In late 2004, moreover, Japan took initial steps toward a second cycle of military modernization and upgrading of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As part of this effort, Japan undertook a second revision of the NDPO (now renamed the National Defense Program Guidelines [NDPG]), released a new Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) in December 2004, and is now committed to a Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) with the United States over the future course of alliance cooperation. This new cycle will set the overall trajectory for Japan's security policy over the next decade and will potentially encompass changes far beyond those of the first cycle. Increasing emphasis on military modernization will provide a route for Japan to achieve its long-debated, more proactive and “normal” role in regional and global security, and one closely identified with expanded U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation.

This process of military modernization and adjustments to both security policy and the alliance relationship will not, however, always progress smoothly. First, Japan is seeking more reciprocity within the alliance by seeking to assert greater leverage over the strategic orientation of the United States. Second, while venturing to push outwards the potential envelope of alliance cooperation beyond traditional geographical and functional confines, Japan's policymakers will remain cautious and selective about the actual level of commitment to overseas military operations. The military support proffered to the United States will still be based upon careful calculation of Japan's perceived national interests. Japanese policymakers—as is the case with other “normal” key allies—will remain mindful of entrapment, and will thus seek to maintain their “double hedge” against both exclusive reliance on military power and the U.S.-Japan alliance as a security guarantee.

Nevertheless, even as Japan attempts to exploit these hedging options, Japanese policymakers will find it progressively harder both to exercise such options and to resist the logic of tighter and expanded U.S.-led alliance cooperation. Japan's very enactment of hedging strategies has created legal, political, and military-operational precedents that engender momentum and expectations on both sides for the continued expansion of alliance cooperation. At the same time, Japan's declining defense production capabilities along with its participation in ballistic missile defense (BMD) will further tighten U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. Moreover, Japan's room to hedge against reliance on the United States will be continually eroded by the structural pressures manifested in the perceived threats from North Korea and China. Japan's next decade of security planning, initiated in 2005–06 is, therefore, likely to be characterized by Japan's re-emergence as a more “normal” power, but one that will continue to fulfill this security role chiefly through the mechanism of the bilateral alliance.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first overviews the past trajectory of Japan's comprehensive security policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and investigates the regional and global drivers modifying each. The second section overviews Japan's two cycles of security policy and alliance change. The third examines how Japan has sought to modernize its military in order to support Japan's emergent global security role via the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance. A final section considers the implications of Japan's shifting security policy for regional stability and the global strategy of the United States.

Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: Origins and Pressure to Change

Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy

The grand strategy that Japan adopted at the end of World War II was one that involved the pursuit of a comprehensive security policy. Resulting from Japan's wartime defeat, anti-militaristic norms, and constitutional prohibitions, this strategy has consisted of both military and non-military (i.e., economic and diplomatic) components. Japan's policymakers—in the guise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan Defense Agency (JDA), and governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—have in large part entrusted the military component of the nation's security to the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This treaty is based in part on the strategic bargain of accepting U.S. military protection in return for Japan's provision of bases to facilitate U.S. power projection in East Asia. Japan's reliance on the U.S. military guarantee has always been tempered, however, by Japanese hedging against the dual alliance dilemmas of abandonment and, most especially, entrapment in U.S. regional and global military strategy.¹ Japan's security role in East Asia and beyond in the postwar period has thus been based on a U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation that is complementary but asymmetrical.²

Japan's postwar security policy has traditionally been predicated upon both individual national self-defense and the non-exercise of the right to collective self-defense; Japan has, for instance, prohibited itself from defending its U.S. security treaty partner outside Japanese territory. Throughout the Cold War period, Japan also chose to emphasize military cooperation with the United States under the security treaty in line with Article 5 (the immediate defense of Japan) rather than Article 6 (the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East). Moreover, fear of entrapment has been the motivation behind Japan's avoidance of integrating JSDF capabilities and missions with those of the U.S. military. This was true even in the latter stages of the Cold War when Tokyo, hoping to counter the USSR's ability to threaten the airspace and sea lanes around Japan, embarked on a qualitative and quantitative build-up of JSDF capabilities that served to

¹ For the alliance dilemma, see Glen H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95; for specific application to the case of Japan, see Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49–80.

² Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, "Managing the New U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanism to Address Post-Cold War Requirements," in *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 98.

support overall U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia.³ Consequently, Japan's military security role during the Cold War was geographically restricted to the area immediately surrounding Japan, and limited functionally to providing a defensive "shield" to support the U.S. offensive "sword" in Northeast Asia. Any Japanese contribution to wider regional security was effected indirectly through the mechanism of the bilateral alliance and general support for the U.S. presence in East Asia.

Under Japan's comprehensive security policy, both economic power and diplomacy have been the primary means not only to compensate for military deficiencies but also to further hedge against overreliance on military power and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japanese policymakers in the postwar period have viewed economic power and diplomatic engagement (often taking the form of official development assistance [ODA] and the promotion of economic interdependency) as key tools for countering the rise of potential military security threats such as those related to China and North Korea.⁴ In addition, Japan views economic insecurity and non-traditional security concerns as important issues in their own right within a comprehensive security agenda. Hence, Japan has played an important role in articulating conceptions of "human security" and in providing financial assistance for the East Asian states to deal with social, health, and food security problems resulting from the financial crises of 1997–98.⁵ This active commitment to comprehensive security was demonstrated most recently by Japan's response to the Asian tsunami of 2004, when Tokyo disbursed \$500 million in emergency grant aid and dispatched Japan Disaster Relief Teams (JDRT) and the JSDF to Sumatra for humanitarian relief operations.

Drivers of Security Policy Change

Since the end of the Cold War, however, Japan's grand strategy and comprehensive security policy have undergone important changes in response to a shifting international environment. The most immediate security threat that has confronted Japan is that of North Korea. Japanese security anxieties have focused on the North's potential development of nuclear weapons, anxieties compounded by the "Taepodong-1 shock" of August 1998 when the North test-fired a missile over Japanese airspace. Japanese policymak-

³ Christopher W. Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, "U.S.-Japan Security Relations—Toward Bilateralism Plus?" in *Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific*, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 61–63.

⁴ Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?* (London: Routledge, 2003), 133–39.

⁵ Bert Edström, "Japan's Foreign Policy and Human Security," *Japan Forum* 15, no. 2 (2003): 209–25; and Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda*, 208–18.

ers have been similarly concerned about incursions into Japanese waters by North Korean spy ships, as well as the risks of North Korean guerrilla attacks upon key facilities such as nuclear power installations on the Sea of Japan coast.

If North Korea represents the most immediate threat to Japan's security, then China poses the greatest challenge for Japan's security over the medium to long terms. Japan has been concerned about the modernization of China's conventional and nuclear forces since the early 1990s. These concerns focus not on China's military modernization *per se*, but upon signs that China is now willing to project military power beyond its borders. Beijing could use its small blue-water surface, submarine, and amphibious naval capacities to assert China's territorial claims to the South China Sea and thereby disrupt Japan's sea lines of communication (SLOC).⁶ China's constant dispatch of both "research ships" and warships into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the disputed Senkaku Islands are viewed by many in Japan as evidence of aggressive intent.⁷ Japan's concerns about China were heightened when a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine passed through Japanese territorial waters on November 10, 2004. Bilateral frictions have continued over China's natural gas exploration activities (begun in early 2005) in an East China Sea oil field abutting Japan's EEZ claim. Sino-Japanese ties have continued to deteriorate thus far in 2005, with renewed tensions over the correct representation of Japan's colonial past in Japanese history textbooks.⁸

Meanwhile, Japan-China security relations have been further complicated since the mid-1990s by both the Taiwan issue and Sino-U.S. strategic competition. Japan viewed the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises—including China's intimidation of Taiwan through the test-firing of ballistic missiles—as additional indicators of Chinese aggression. Specifically, Japan is worried about China's willingness to project military power in pursuit of its national interests, to possibly challenge the United States militarily in the region over the longer term, and to even use ballistic missiles to strike against U.S. bases in Japan and against rear area support facilities provided by Japan in the event of a full-blown conflict resulting from any Taiwanese move to declare independence. Japanese security planners also fear that in a Taiwan Strait

⁶ Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," *International Security* 8, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 161–96.

⁷ Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy," November 28, 2002, <http://www.kan-tei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2002/1128tf.html#2-2>.

⁸ Denny Roy, "The Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions," *Survival* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 196–205.

crisis China might attempt to seize offshore islands, such as parts of Okinawa Prefecture, in order to disrupt U.S.-Japan military cooperation.⁹

Beyond the region, Japan has similarly been presented with a new series of security challenges that demand a new set of responses. Japan's reaction to the 1990–91 Gulf War eventually took the form of underwriting the war financially to the tune of \$13 billion; this dollar diplomacy was the subject of U.S. and international criticism and first made Japanese policymakers aware of the need to dispatch the JSDF in support of international responses to major post-Cold War security crises.¹⁰ In the wake of September 11, Japan has been made aware of the threat of transnational terrorism and the need to support the efforts of its U.S. ally—and the international community in general—to expunge this threat. Japanese policymakers have also been in accord with their U.S. counterparts both on the need to halt the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and on the possible threat of the vertical proliferation of WMD to terrorist groups.

Japan's preferred role in responding to this post-Cold War and post-September 11 security agenda is clearly a non-military one. Japan has continued to rely on diplomatic efforts as the main means to deal with North Korea. The summits that Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro initiated with the North in September 2002 and May 2004 were designed both to clear away domestic obstacles to the resumption of normalization negotiations and to demonstrate to the United States the need to persist with diplomacy in order to avoid an unwanted conflict on the Korean Peninsula.¹¹ Japan has also been working with South Korea to nudge Washington back toward negotiations with Pyongyang, and has been supportive of the Six Party Talks process. Similarly, Japanese policymakers are continuing their efforts to engage China economically and diplomatically, with both sides moving to ensure that bilateral tensions over historical and territorial issues do not spiral out of control. For instance, on April 24, 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi and President Hu Jintao agreed to meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Africa Summit in an attempt to patch up ties.

Nevertheless, Japanese policymakers are increasingly aware of the limits of economic and diplomatic engagement in dealing with these regional challenges. Japan's ability to engage the North has been severely hampered by domestic anti-North Korean feeling over the fate of Japanese abductees, the

⁹ "Defense Paper Assumes China Invasion of Japan," *Japan Times Online*, May 15, 2004, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040515b6.htm>.

¹⁰ Kitaoka Shinichi, Yamazaki Masakazu, and Watanabe Taizo, "Wangan Senso to wa Nani Datta Ka: Nihon Tenkanten o Furikaeru" [What Was the Gulf War: Reflecting on Japan's Turning Point], *Gaiko Foramu*, no. 158 (September 2001): 28–37.

¹¹ Yakushiji Katsuyuki, *Gaimusho: Gaikoryoku Kyoka e no Michi* [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Path to Strengthening Diplomatic Power] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2003), 14–22.

increasingly hard-line stance that Washington is taking toward the North, and the North's own nuclear brinkmanship. Despite attempts to keep open the door to engagement, Japan now acknowledges the need to line up more closely with U.S. efforts to apply military pressure upon North Korea over the nuclear issue.

Japanese policymakers have in recent years also shown signs of declining confidence in their ability to use economic and diplomatic means to manage China's rise.¹² Indeed, Japanese aid and economic engagement have played a large part in bringing China into the regional community in a relatively peaceful manner, and Japan's economic recovery has increasingly piggy-backed on China's economic expansion. Both Japan's perceived economic decline relative to China and the possible resulting asymmetric economic interdependency in favor of China over the longer term have, however, engendered concerns amongst Japanese policymakers that China may be emboldened to challenge Japanese economic and diplomatic interests in East Asia. Japanese policymakers are already concerned that China, through its free trade area (FTA) proposals, has begun to overtake Japan in the economic leadership of Southeast Asia. Japanese policymakers also feel they have fewer economic tools available either to engage China bilaterally or to balance Beijing's influence in the region. Japan has been forced to cut its overall ODA budget by around 30 percent from 1997 to 2004 (although some increases may be planned for fiscal year 2006), and Tokyo may cease loans (totaling around 3 trillion yen between 1980 and 2003) to China by 2008.¹³ Recognizing that ODA may now not be the most effective means available with which to countervail the rise of China, Japan is increasingly obliged to look instead to military power and U.S.-Japan alliance ties.

Japan has taken similar lessons from both the "war on terrorism" and the Iraq war. True, Japan has sought a role in the Afghan conflict and in Iraq that emphasizes the use of economic power, post-conflict reconstruction, and state-building. Moreover, Japanese policymakers have strong reservations concerning such issues as the utility of military power in bringing about a resolution to the multi-causal phenomenon of terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the linkages between Al Qaeda and Iraq, and the ability of the United States to reconstruct and stabilize postwar Iraq.¹⁴ Nonetheless, Japan has perceived that September 11, the war on terrorism, and the Iraq war have presented demands for an enhanced military response in support of the United States and the international com-

¹² Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 77–109.

¹³ "Nihon no ODA Gaku" [Japan's ODA Total], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 18, 2004, 8.

¹⁴ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence*, 46–47.

munity. Tokyo needs to provide such support in part because these issues are tests of the political and military strength of U.S.-Japan alliance ties, but also because transnational terrorism and WMD in other contexts represent genuine threats to Japan's own security.¹⁵

Two Cycles of Security Policy Change: Strengthening Regional and Global Roles

As examined above, Japan in the post-Cold War period has been forced into the realization that its current comprehensive security approach is inadequate to respond to extant regional and global security challenges. Japanese policymakers have thus sought to change national security policy to allow for an expanded military role in the region and beyond.

Cycle One

The first wave of security policy change began in the mid-1990s and was primarily focused on the U.S.-Japan alliance's regional security functions, which have also been the essential basis of Japan's postwar security policy. Tokyo's recognition of the inadequacy of the alliance, including Japan's role within it, as a mechanism to respond to regional security challenges was initially triggered by the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994–95. During the crisis, Japan faced U.S. requests for active support in the event of an actual conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Japanese policymakers were unable to respond effectively, however, due to their previous reluctance to consider Article 6-type cooperation for regional contingencies under the bilateral security treaty. The alliance's lack of military operability induced a crisis of confidence in the bilateral relationship and raised fears that the United States might abandon Japan as an unreliable ally.¹⁶

Looking to shore up the postwar strategic bargain with the United States, Japanese policymakers undertook initiatives to revise Japan's military doctrine and to redefine the alliance. In November 1995 Japan issued a revised NDPO, the document that sets out Japan's military doctrine alongside the necessary force structure. Significantly, the document stressed the need for stronger U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation and inserted a new clause to state that if a situation impacting national peace and security should arise in

¹⁵ Argument as presented in Kamiya Matake, "Naze Jieitai o Iraq ni Hakken Suru no Ka?" [Why are the JSDF going to Iraq?], *Gaiko Foramu*, no. 188 (March 2004): 24–28.

¹⁶ Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council On Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 280–95; and Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London: Routledge, 1999), 93–97.

areas surrounding Japan (*shuhen*), then Japan should seek to deal with the situation in cooperation with the UN and via U.S.-Japan security arrangements. In April 1996 Japan and the United States issued a “Joint Declaration on Security” that opened the way for a revision (which took place between 1996 and 1997) of the original 1978 Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The revised guidelines specified for the first time the extent of Japanese logistical support for the United States in the event of a regional contingency (*shuhen jitai*), and thereby switched the agreed emphasis of alliance cooperation from Article 5 to Article 6 of the security treaty.

Japan’s focus on an expanded security role during this first cycle has not, however, been based exclusively on the U.S.-Japan alliance, nor has it been limited entirely to regional issues. Japan’s failure to respond to U.S. and international expectations for JSDF dispatch during the Gulf War of 1990–91 led Japan to pass the June 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL), which in turn allowed JSDF dispatch on any non-combat reconstruction UN peacekeeping operation (PKO). Japan to date has taken part in UN PKOs in Cambodia (1992–93), Mozambique (1993–95), Rwanda (1994), the Golan Heights (1996–), and East Timor (2002–04). In 2002 Japan also “unfroze” provisions in the IPCL in order to allow JSDF participation in “core” UN PKO, including the monitoring of ceasefires, collection of weapons, and exchange of prisoners. In the meantime, Japan has indicated further possibilities for cooperation with UN military activities through the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) and Iraqi reconstruction law. Even though these laws are clearly intended to boost U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation on a global scale, the predication of JSDF dispatch on UN resolutions opens up future avenues for Japan to dispatch the JSDF in line with the principle of collective security rather than collective self-defense.¹⁷

Another portent of its expanding military role was Japan’s response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004. The JSDF used its dispatch on this non-combat humanitarian mission under the International Disaster Relief Law (which, involving 1,500 personnel, was its largest overseas mission ever) to test its joint and combined operation capabilities. Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) ships en route to return to Japan after service as part of the U.S.-led coalition in the Indian Ocean under the ATSML were first diverted to the vicinity of Thailand for relief assistance immediately following the tsunami. Then in January 2005 an MSDF flotilla, including an *Osumi*-class

¹⁷ Collective security is seen to differ from collective self-defence in that the latter is an inherent right under the UN Charter that can be exercised without UN approval, whereas the former right must be sanctioned by the UN. Japanese policymakers have argued that the preamble of the Constitution, which states Japan’s duty to cooperate with international society (equated with the UN), should provide Japan with the constitutional right to take part in collective security. For a fuller explanation, see Hughes and Fukushima, “U.S.-Japan Security Relations,” 69–70.

transport, was dispatched to Sumatra. This flotilla carried five GSDF helicopters and twenty GSDF trucks, and acted as a “floating camp” for joint MSDF and GSDF operations.¹⁸

One must note, however, that though this first cycle of modernization has included important shifts in Japanese security policy, Japan has continued to hedge on its military commitments. For instance, in the revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, Japan stressed that the activation of the guidelines is predicated upon the concept of “situational need” rather than strict geographical demarcations, which introduces an element of strategic ambiguity as to whether the scope of the revised guidelines covers Taiwan. The constitutional and legal firewalls that Tokyo has enacted predicating JSDF dispatch to support U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq on UN resolutions possibly limit the range of support that Tokyo is prepared to offer Washington. Moreover, Japan has restricted the expansion of JSDF activities regionally and globally to non-combat missions, and left intact its constitutional prohibition on the exercise of collective self-defense.¹⁹

Cycle Two

Japan’s second cycle of policy change was spurred in response to changing overall U.S. global strategy needs. The Bush administration has, especially since September 11, been seeking to activate its regional alliances to function for global security. The United States emphasized this shift in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* of September 2001, the *National Security Strategy* of September 2002, and the *National Defense Strategy* of March 2005. The White House now supports a move from “threat-based” regional alliances to “capabilities-based” global alliances that are capable of constructing flexible coalitions with interoperable military assets for missions in the “arc of instability” stretching from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.²⁰ In addition, the Global Posture Review (GPR) of 2004 made clear that bases provided by regional alliances should be integrated into the U.S. strategy for the “surging” and global deployment of its forward forces.

Japanese policymakers have faced pressure to respond to these changes in U.S. strategy and the international security environment. This need has,

¹⁸ “Kaijikan, Rikuji Shukueiji ni” [MSDF, a Base for the GSDF], *Asahi Shimbun*, February 2, 2005, 29.

¹⁹ Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence*, 131–33.

²⁰ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 25–27; The White House, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington, D.C., 2002), 22–24; Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington, D.C., 2005), 12, 15, 17; and Yoko Iwama, “The New Shape of the U.S. Alliance System,” *Gaiko Forum: Japanese Perspectives of Foreign Affairs* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 28–29.

moreover, been intertwined with the ongoing and wider debate in Japan regarding the next steps in Japanese security policy. This reinvigorated domestic policy debate on security in the postwar period is still subject to a variety of divisions, but there has been an increasing convergence of mainstream opinion in favor of a more proactive, or “normal,” military role for Japan.

There exists no objective standard in Japan, or indeed in any other state, for measuring the alleged status of a “normal” state.²¹ At one extreme are the Japanese rightists and Gaullists who argue that Japan can only be “normal” by acting both more autonomously in relation to the United States and more assertive militarily against China and North Korea. At the other end of the continuum, the leftists and pacifists argue that real “normality” lies in renouncing military-centered approaches to security and the bilateral alliance. Most MOFA, JDA, and LDP policymakers, however, hold that the pathway toward the “normalization” of Japanese security policy is the incremental and cautious expanding of national military capabilities and responsibilities within the framework of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance. The Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, similarly supports the U.S.-Japan alliance, but emphasizes the maintenance of restrictions on the exercise of Japanese military power and enhanced multilateral cooperation. The principal opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), is in favor of maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance, although it proposes that far greater weight should be given to a UN-centered security policy and the promotion of regional multilateral frameworks for security dialogue and cooperation. Moreover, all elements of the policymaking community recognize that there are opportunities for Japan to play an expanded role in UN PKOs.

Japan’s debate concerning a more proactive military security role has also been reflected in proposals for constitutional revision. Following five years of deliberation, the National Diet’s House of Representatives and House of Councilors released separate reports on constitutional revision in April 2005. The House of Representatives reported a consensus that Article 9 of the constitution should be revised in such a way that the first clause, the renunciation of the right to belligerency, should be kept in place, but that in the second clause Japan’s right to self-defense and the constitutionality of the JSDF should be explicitly acknowledged.²² The House of Councilors failed to agree on revisions to Article 9, and neither of the houses was able to reach a consensus on revisions relating to the exercise of the right of collective self-

²¹ For a detailed summary of these debates see Mike M. Mochizuki, “American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis,” in *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations*, ed. Mike M. Mochizuki (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 59–62; and Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence*, 49–59.

²² “Shugiin Kempo Chosa Saishu Hokoku” [House of Representatives Final Report on the Constitution], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 16, 2005, 13.

defense—although they both agreed that Japan should engage more actively in international security cooperation. In this sense, many of the changes debated in the Diet reports were proposals only for *de jure* confirmation of the *de facto* realities of Japan's security policy. Nonetheless, these reports are important in initiating forthcoming Diet debates on constitutional revision. Moreover, there may be more radical proposals to come. For instance, in an intra-party report on constitutional revision, the LDP in the same month avoided proposals for the recognition of the right of collective self-defense within the Constitution itself, but did advocate that this right and the specific conditions for its exercise should be acknowledged in a Basic Security Law to be passed at the same time as any revisions.²³

Despite the above debate, Japanese policymakers have still managed to draw a number of clear and long-term policy lessons from shifts in U.S. military strategy. In order both to remain indispensable as an ally and to maintain political and strategic influence over the United States, Japan needs to move beyond the changes made in alliance cooperation in the mid-1990s and the immediate post-September 11 period, and further strengthen the alliance to respond to both regional and global security contingencies.

As one step, Japan has begun participating in U.S.-led multinational coalitions, including the dispatch of the JSDF to support the Afghan campaign and Iraqi reconstruction. Moreover, Tokyo has become cognizant of Washington's expectations that U.S. regional alliances should function to support global security operations, as evidenced by specific GPR proposals relating to Japan since 2004. In the GPR the United States initially proposed to Japan that the 5th U.S. Air Force (USAF) Command at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo should be integrated with the command operations of the 13th USAF headquartered in Guam, a key base for long-range bombers and tanker aircraft often deployed in the Middle East. A second proposal was for the command functions of the U.S. Army I Corps, a rapid deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific, to be relocated from the U.S. state of Washington to Army Camp Zama in the Japanese prefecture of Kanagawa. The clear ramification of these base realignments was that Japan would serve essentially as a frontline U.S. command post for the Asia-Pacific and beyond, and that the increased concentration of command functions in Japan would also tighten military cooperation between U.S. forces and the JSDF.²⁴

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSMML) passed through the National Diet in October has enabled the dispatch of JSDF units to the

²³ "Jimin Shinkempoho Kisoi Yoko" [LDP New Constitution Proposals Committee Outline], *Asahi Shimbun*, April 5, 2005, 1.

²⁴ "Rikuji to no Kankei Kyoka" [Strengthening Relations with the GSDF], *Asahi Shimbun*, December 8, 2004, 2.

Indian Ocean area to provide logistical support to U.S. and multinational coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan.²⁵ In July 2003 Japan then passed a Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA, or Iraq reconstruction law) that has enabled the dispatch of JSDF on non-combat reconstruction activities in the southern city of Samawah. Japan has predicated these laws and JSDF “out-of-area” dispatches upon linkages to relevant UN resolutions, and thus these security activities are strictly outside the geographical and functional scope of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Nevertheless, the principal impetus behind the ATSMR and Iraqi reconstruction law has centered on Japanese attempts to strengthen the range of U.S.-Japan alliance activities outside East Asia.

Meeting Changing Security Policy Needs via Military Modernization

In order to implement the strengthened alliance cooperation allowed for by this new shift in policy described above, Japan is now seeking to acquire both new doctrine and more interoperable JSDF capabilities. These changes are being undertaken with an eye toward expanding military activities alongside the United States and in U.S.-led multinational coalitions on a global scale. The goal is also to find a means within the U.S.-Japan security treaty to provide the United States with bases for regional and global deployments.²⁶

NDPG and MTDP Revision: Pursuing Power Projection

Japan began this round of military modernization, which was timed to match its cycle of security policy change, with the issuance in October of the final report of the Prime Minister’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, known as the “Araki Report” (after its chairman Araki Hiroshi). This panel—consisting of a range of business figures, academics, and former bureaucrats and JSDF officers—was notable in calling for an “Integrated Security Strategy” for Japan that would mandate a two-pronged approach for the JSDF: (1) the traditional function of preventing direct threats from hav-

²⁵ Paul Midford, “Japan’s Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea,” *Asian Survey* 43, no. 2 (April 2003): 331–33.

²⁶ Morimoto Satoshi, “Nichibei Domei no Shorai to Nihon no Sentaku” [The Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Japan’s Choices], *Gaiko Forum* 5, no. 1 (January 2005): 46.

ing an impact on Japan and (2) a new emphasis on international cooperation outside Japan's own territory to prevent the rise of security threats.²⁷

The Araki Report was followed in December 2004 with the release of the revised NDPG and the simultaneous release of a new MTDP for 2005–09. The NDPG followed the 1995 NDPO in stressing Japan's regional security concerns and the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in responding to these issues. The NDPG guidelines moved beyond its predecessor, however, by outlining a range of new threats to Japan, including ballistic missile attacks, guerrilla and special operations attacks, incursions into its territorial waters, and chemical and biological warfare. These concerns are a clear reflection of recent perceived regional threats from North Korea and China. The NDPG actually went further than the 1995 NDPO by not only identifying North Korea specifically as a destabilizing factor in East Asia, but also by identifying for the first time concerns about China's impact on regional security, although the latter was couched in the oblique language of needing to "remain attentive" to China's future military modernization.²⁸ The NDPG also went beyond the 1995 NDPO in its new emphasis upon global—as opposed to regional—security interests. The report stated that "the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan," thereby mapping Japan's own security interests onto those of the United States along the "arc of instability." The report also focused upon the need for Japan to engage actively in "international peace cooperation" activities through the dispatch of the JSDF to support UN and U.S.-led multinational operations.²⁹

In order for Japan to fulfill these regional and global responsibilities, the NDPG and MTDP advocated that the JSDF should seek to establish "multi-functional, flexible, and effective" forces. These forces should be characterized by mobility and rapid-reaction; enhanced joint command and control, including the capability to undertake joint operations amongst the three services of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF; increased interoperability with UN and U.S. forces; and the utilization of state-of-the-art intelligence and military technologies. In terms of specific JSDF organization and hardware, the MTDP has stressed a quantitative build-down from Japan's Cold War-style forces. These forces have been characterized by large tank (Type-74 main battle tanks), interceptor (E-2C early warning aircraft and F-15 fighters), and anti-submarine warfare forces (destroyers, minesweepers, and P-3C

²⁷ The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, "The Council on Security and Defence Capabilities Report: Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities," October 2004, 4–5, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/dai13/13siryou.pdf>.

²⁸ *National Defense Program Guideline FY 2005*, 2–3, <http://www.jda.go.jp>.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

Table 1. Comparison between the Organization and Primary Equipment Scales of 1976 and 1996 NDPOs and 2004 NDPG

		1976 NDPO	1996 NDPO	2004 NDPG
GSDF	GSDF personnel	180,000	160,000	155,000
	Regular personnel		145,000	148,000
	Reserve personnel		15,000	7,000
	Major units			
	Regionally deployed	12 divisions	8 divisions	8 divisions
	Mobile operations	2 combined brigades	6 brigades	6 brigades
		1 armored division	1 armored division	1 armored division
		1 airborne brigade	1 airborne brigade	central readiness group
		1 helicopter brigade	1 helicopter brigade	group
	Ground-to-air missile units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Main equipment			
Battle tanks	approx. 1,200	approx. 900	approx. 600	
Artillery	approx. 1,000	approx. 900	approx. 600	
MSDF	Major units			
	Destroyers (mobile operations)	4 flotillas	4 flotillas	4 flotillas
	Destroyers (regional district)	10 divisions	7 divisions	5 divisions
	Submarines	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions
	Minesweepers	2 flotillas	1 flotilla	1 flotilla
	Land-based patrol aircraft	16 squadrons	13 squadrons	9 squadrons
	Main equipment			
	Destroyers	approx. 60	approx. 50	47
Submarines	16	16	16	
Combat aircraft	approx. 220	approx. 170	approx. 150	
ASDF	Major units			
	Aircraft control and warning units	28 groups 1 squadron	8 groups 21 squadrons (1 early-warning)	8 groups 20 squadrons
	Interceptors	10 squadrons	9 squadrons	12 squadrons
	Support fighters	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	
	Air reconnaissance	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
	Air transport	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
	Ground-to-air missile units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups
	Main equipment			
Combat aircraft of which fighters	approx. 400 approx. 350	approx. 400 approx. 300	approx. 350 approx. 260	

Source: Böeichōhen, *Bōei Hakusho* (Tokyo, Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1995), 312, 321; and *National Defense Program Guideline FY 2005*, <http://www.jda.go.jp>.

patrol aircraft). Their mission has traditionally been to repel a Soviet land invasion, to protect U.S. air and naval forces in the immediate vicinity of Japan, and to help protect Japan's own SLOCs up to a range of 1,000 nautical miles. Now, the MTDP is seeking to switch to a lighter and qualitatively strengthened JSDF, which would be capable of greater power projection and expeditionary capabilities.

In line with the NDPG and MTDP, the GSDF is seeking to convert itself into a mobile force for overseas operations. This change entails the loss of approximately one-third of its main battle tanks and artillery (see Table 1), although the army will continue to introduce the highly sophisticated M-90 tank, the AH-64D *Longbow Apache* anti-tank and ground-attack helicopter, the UH-60JA *Apache* helicopter, the CH-47JA transport helicopter, and upgraded *Hawk* surface-to-air-missiles. The GSDF will also establish such new entities as a Central Readiness Group to coordinate nationwide mobile operations and special tasks, a rapid reaction force with access to its own helicopter transports, and a special unit to train personnel for dispatch overseas. Japan's ground forces will seek to acquire an expanded role in dealing with domestic terrorism, guerrilla incursions, and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.

Though set to lose another seven of its Cold War destroyer force, the MSDF power projection capabilities will, however, be boosted by the continued procurement of three *Osumi*-class transport ships, with flat decks for the landing of transport helicopters and an integral rear dock for the operation of hovercraft capable of landing tanks. The MSDF justifies these ships as necessary for GSDF UN PKOs and other international operations in support of peace, and two of the class have already been deployed to East Timor, Iraq, and Sumatra. The MSDF also has plans to construct four new DDH (Destroyer-Helicopter) ships, each mounting four helicopters. The displacement of the DDH, combined with their end-to-end flat tops and below-deck hangars, has raised suspicions that these ships could be suitable for use as mini-aircraft carriers. The MSDF is also seeking the indigenous development of a P-X replacement for its P-3C patrol and surveillance aircraft (although Japan might opt for purchasing the U.S. Multimission Maritime Aircraft). The MSDF's procurement from the United States of an off-the-shelf ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, mounted on a total of six Aegis war fighting system (AWS)-equipped *Kongo*-class destroyers, will further add to Japan's defensive power projection capabilities by providing a sea-mobile asset potentially capable of projecting an interoperable missile shield in support of its U.S. ally in contingencies in East Asia and beyond.

The ASDF's defensive (and potentially offensive) power projection capabilities are to be strengthened through the continued procurement of the

F-2 interceptor (although in smaller numbers than originally hoped for), and a C-X replacement for its C-1 transports, which will serve as the principal means of air transport for a GSDF rapid reaction force to regional contingencies and beyond. The ASDF will also procure four Boeing-KC767 tanker aircraft and, for the first time, an in-flight refueling capability; such power projection capabilities would potentially allow sorties overseas. In addition, the ASDF is believed to be looking to the next MTDP to replace its aging F-4 fighter-bomber with a version of the F-35 JSF, again increasing potential interoperability with the United States and the likely ability to operate across East Asia and even out-of-area. For BMD, the ASDF will deploy three batteries of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-III), and upgrade its Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) command and control system as the principal coordinator of Japanese air defense in the event of a missile attack.

Japan's defense planners have further plans for the JSDF to embark on its own revolution in military affairs (RMA) and U.S.-style "force transformation." Japan is eyeing additional capabilities not yet in the MTDP, with the GSDF interested in the indigenous development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for coastal battlefield surveillance, the MSDF in *Tomahawk* cruise missiles to strike against enemy missile bases, and the ASDF in joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) and airborne electronic jamming equipment, again making for the potential capability to strike enemy missile bases in combination with the new in-flight refueling assets.³⁰ In an attempt to integrate previously disparate JSDF intelligence gathering assets, Japan upgraded its intelligence capabilities through the establishment of the Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters (JDIH) in 1997. From 1998 onwards, Tokyo has sought to deploy four indigenously produced intelligence satellites—two optical and two with synthetic aperture radar (SAR). These satellites have already proved of some use in monitoring North Korea's missile bases.³¹ Japan is seeking to leverage these potential and existing assets through the promotion for the first time of joint JSDF operations. Japan has created a Common Operating Environment (COE) and a Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) designed to enable information sharing among the JSDF's three separate command and control systems. A new Central Command and Control System (CCS) has also been put in place to ensure a more

³⁰ *Midterm Defense Program (FY 2005–2009)*, 5, <http://www.jda.go.jp>; "UAVs Mulled," *Japan Times Online*, May 3, 2005, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/makeprfy.pl5?nn20050503a3.htm>; and "Senshu Boei ga Henshitsu" [The Changing Nature of Exclusively Defense Oriented Defense], *Asahi Shimbun*, December 4, 2004, 3.

³¹ They lack the resolution capabilities of those of the United States, however, and Japan still remains dependent on crucial infra-red satellite surveillance from the United States for the detection of actual missile launches and the early-warning necessary to operate any BMD system.

comprehensive overview of military operations. Japan is also set to replace the current Joint Staff Council (JSC) with a new Joint Staff Organization (JSO) in early 2006. In the past, the three service chiefs of staff have reported individually to the Director General of the JDA. Now, however, the Chief of the JSO, drawn from one of the three JSDF services, will become the principal military advisor to the Director General, thereby centralizing decision-making and promoting the capability for joint tri-service operations.³²

Continuing Domestic Obstacles to Modernization

Japan can thus be seen to have embarked on a major program of military modernization, marked in particular by an emphasis on power projection, amphibious capabilities, force transformation, and improved command and control. This new expansion should enable Japan to perform an expanded role in regional and global security. Nevertheless, important limitations have also been imposed on this NDPG revision and military modernization. Firstly, the Japanese defense establishment has been afflicted by organizational inertia. For instance, the GSDF has insisted on holding on to its core system of divisions and brigades responsible for the defense of designated regions in Japan and possessing their own independent tactical military capabilities; greater sharing of capabilities across units, for instance, might have made for more flexible forces.³³

Secondly, the JDA faced considerable budgetary restrictions in the run-up to the release of the NDPG. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) refused JDA requests for a 1 percent increase in defense expenditure to pay for the costs of BMD, and proposed instead GSDF cuts of up to 40,000 personnel and 50 percent of its tank force, around 50 percent of the MSDF's destroyer force, and a third of the ASDF's fighter force.³⁴ The JDA has been forced to accept a 1 percent decrease in defense spending for 2005–06; the agency still managed, however, to secure a compromise with MOF for smaller cuts in GSDF personnel and cuts in tank and destroyer forces, and remains confident that it can fund BMD through financial mechanisms to roll over costs. Hence, even though Japan is attempting to limit its overall defense costs, the shift to qualitatively improved and lighter forces (including even big ticket

³² Boeichohen, *Boei Hakusho* [Defense of Japan White Paper] (Tokyo: Zaimusho Insatsukyoku, 2004), 331–33.

³³ “Arata na Kyoie Sokuo Jushi” [An Emphasis on Rapid Reaction to New Threats], *Asahi Shimbun*, December 11, 2004, 4.

³⁴ “Boeihigen Nerai Dokujian: Shinboeitako e Zaimusho” [An Independent Plan for Reductions in Defence Spending; MOF on the New NDPG], *Asahi Shimbun*, November 11, 2004, 3; and David Fouse, “Japan’s FY 2005 National Defense Program Outline: New Concepts, Old Compromises,” *Asia-Pacific Security Studies* 4, no. 3 (March 2005): 3.

items like BMD) should make an enhanced military role more affordable and practicable.

Thirdly, Japan's defense plans have been constrained by political pressures. The GSDF has reportedly requested that the MTDP should include the acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles as a means to defend Japan's offshore islands, possibly envisaging a Chinese threat to parts of Okinawa Prefecture. The Komeito vetoed this plan, however, suspecting that the 300-kilometer range of these missiles signaled an intent to move toward acquiring a missile capability to strike directly against North Korean missile bases.³⁵ Similarly, Komeito opposition was instrumental in blocking possible plans for Japan to lift its ban on the export of arms. The LDP's Defense Policy Subcommittee had advocated many changes: the lifting of Japan's blanket ban on exports that had been in place since 1976, the imposition instead of an arms licensing export system that would enable joint development and production with other developed states, and the sale of civilian-converted surplus equipment and military items to states not involved in conflicts or not under a UN arms embargo.³⁶ The lifting of the ban had been seen by many—including defense planners, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), and defense contractors—as an essential means of preserving Japan's indigenous military production capacity in an era of shrinking defense budgets, spiraling production costs, and increasing dependency on U.S. imports of key technologies such as BMD.³⁷ The Komeito, though, was prepared to accept only the export of arms technology to the United States for the purposes of joint BMD research and development, for fear that otherwise Japanese weapons would be exported to conflict zones.

Strengthening the Alliance: GPR, Base Realignment, and DPRI

Having revised its military doctrines and capabilities, Japan has now embarked on the next step in “normalizing” its security policy to deal with regional and global challenges: the further upgrading of U.S.-Japan alliance functions. Japan initially attempted to evade U.S. GPR proposals in 2004. MOFA officials stated that these would be “difficult to accept” (*ukeire wa*

³⁵ “Kenkyu Chakushu Miokuri: Choshatei Yudodan” [Research Plan Shelved: Long Range Guided Missile], *Asahi Shimbun*, December 8, 2004, 3.

³⁶ Defense Policy Subcommittee, National Defense Division Policy Research Council, Liberal Democratic Party, “Recommendations on Japan's New Defense Policy—Toward a Safer and More Secure Japan and the World,” March 30, 2003, 15, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/main/seisaku.html>.

³⁷ “Kensho Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku Kanwa: Kokubozoku, Zaikai ga Kenin” [Investigation of Loosening the Restrictions on Arms Exports: The Defence Tribe and Business World Are Hauled Back], *Asahi Shimbun*, December 11, 2004, 4.

konnan).³⁸ They were cognizant that the relocation and integration of command functions of the U.S. Army and USAF would make overly explicit the functioning of U.S. bases in Japan for contingencies in the Middle East and beyond, and thus be seen to exceed the existing interpretations of the geographical and functional limits of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in East Asia. Japanese policymakers have long acknowledged that the United States has utilized its bases in Japan for the deployment of forces outside the scope of the Far East, as the Iraq war and the deployment of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa clearly demonstrate. Japan has, however, officially maintained that these forces are first deployed out of Japan to an area in the Far East and then redeployed to the Middle East, thus meaning that they are not direct deployments under Article 6 of the security treaty.

Tokyo has been persuaded of the need to address in a more direct and comprehensive fashion the issue of U.S. force realignments, and to do so in a matter that strengthens the deterrent functions of the alliance whilst reducing the burden on the citizens of Okinawa.³⁹ This has come about for two main reasons: (1) recognition of the United States' clear intent to make these regional bases function for Washington's global security strategy and (2) concern about the domestic political damage inflicted by the renewed controversy over U.S. bases in Okinawa from late 2004 onwards. Meanwhile, the United States has come to some recognitions of its own. First, Washington may not have sufficiently consulted with Tokyo in the run-up to the GPR. Second, the United States has emphasized the exigencies of military operability over the political value of its force presence for the solidity of the alliance. Finally, the activation of the DPRI since late 2004 calls for a broader dialogue on the overall future functions of the alliance.

As of June 2005, Japan and the United States appear to have made significant progress on the principles of force realignments and the GPR. Japanese policymakers, while opposed to any security treaty revision for domestic political reasons, have shown a propensity to once again stretch the definitions of the security treaty in order to reconcile it with GPR expectations. By November 2004 Japan had formulated the basic position of being prepared to accept U.S. force dispositions with expanded "out-of-area" command functions as long as these could be demonstrated to in some way contribute to Japan's own security and the security of the Far East in line

³⁸ "Kyokuto Joko no Seiyaku Kanwa" [Loosening of Restrictions on the Far East Clause], *Asahi Shimbun*, November 12, 2004, 1.

³⁹ "Beigun Saihen: Yokushiryoku Iji shi Futankeigen" [U.S. Force Realignments: Maintaining Deterrence Power and Reducing Burdens], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, January 11, 2005, 2.

with Article 6 of the security treaty.⁴⁰ More specifically, Japanese policymakers pointed out that this basic position means that U.S. command centers and base usage cannot be countenanced in cases where they are judged, firstly, to have no relationship whatsoever to the Far East, and, secondly, where their activities outside of the Far East would deplete their ability to contribute to the security of this area.⁴¹ By adopting this stance Japan has adhered to the letter of Article 6 and has retained a hedging option to place restrictions on U.S. activities; Japan has, however, also clearly moved the interpretational goalposts to enable the potential expansion of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. Consequently, in the final base realignments Japan will likely accept the relocation of U.S. Army I Corps function to Camp Zama. On the other hand, though, Japan has put forward a counterproposal regarding USAF command functions. Tokyo has requested that Washington essentially leave intact the 5th USAF Command at Yokota. Instead, Japan will move its ASDF command functions from Fuchu City to Yokota in order to establish a joint-use facility for the two countries. This request represents a success for Japan in that Tokyo has managed to limit U.S. redeployment of expanded command functions to Japan while maintaining the U.S. presence (with the USAF establishing an additional new War Fighting Headquarters in Hawaii). The joint use facility at Yokota is also an indication of strengthened bilateral cooperation in other ways, since Japan's intention is to promote the integration of ASDF and U.S. functions at Yokota for the purposes of BMD command and control.

Japan and the United States have found more contentious the issue of base realignments on Okinawa, and in particular the Futenma issue. Japan's official plan has been to relocate Futenma's functions to a new facility built on reclaimed land in the Henoko district, and the prefectural government and Nago City voted in 1999 to accept this plan. Japan's government has embarked on an environmental survey of the proposed site since September 2004, but progress on relocation has been halted by the prefectural government's insistence on limiting the usage of the air strip to fifteen years, a measure unacceptable to U.S. forces. In the meantime, a number of force realignment proposals have been passed back and forth between both sides since 2004. For example, in March 2005 a proposal was considered to redistribute Futenma's various functions. This would include moving both its tanker aircraft to the USMC Iwankuni base in Yamaguchi Prefecture on Honshu and its helicopter units to the USAF base at Kadena either to USMC

⁴⁰ Author's interview with Deputy Director-General, North American Affairs Bureau, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, April 6, 2005.

⁴¹ "Kyokuto Joko no Seiyaku Kanwa" [Loosening of Restrictions on the Far East Clause], *Asahi Shimbun*, November 12, 2004, 1.

Camps Hansen and Schwab or to ASDF facilities. MOFA has mainly persisted with its official line of relocation to Henoko, given that this proposal has city and prefectural approval, and given the potential opposition from other parts of Okinawa and the mainland to accepting the relocation of U.S. forces. As of June 2005, however, MOFA has been under pressure from the Prime Minister's Office to reconsider the Kadena option as a means to break the impasse over Futenma.⁴² Given the misperceptions on both sides, Tokyo and Washington are likely to encounter continued difficulties over base realignments: the United States tends to stress military operability issues, whereas for Japan such issues are somewhat secondary to the issue of tackling domestic sentiment over basing burdens.

Japan's ability to reach an agreement over the Okinawa bases will be crucial for cementing the foundations of bilateral military cooperation, and for enabling Japan and the United States to push ahead with their future plans for security cooperation. This is evident from the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or "2-Plus-2" meeting, on February 19, 2005.⁴³ The SCC statement drew considerable media attention due to its perceived focus upon China and identification of Taiwan as a "common strategic objective" for the alliance. The SCC statement is certainly significant in stressing the strengthened functions of the alliance for regional security, and represents a slightly more forthcoming statement than the revised guidelines concerning Taiwan's position as an object of alliance cooperation. The SCC statement has arguably been more significant, however, in indicating the intentions of U.S. and Japanese policymakers to use the latest cycle of alliance planning in order to upgrade cooperation for regional and global security objectives. The SCC statement gave equal prominence to "global common strategic objectives," including dealing with terrorism, limiting WMD, and bilateral cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The statement also praised the revised NDPG and Japan's moves to respond to new threats, and stressed the need for greater U.S.-Japan military interoperability to deal with a variety of contingencies. The SCC statement's stress on countering threats, such as terrorism, that do not respect regional demarcations is a clear sign that Japan and the United States are creating greater leeway for the stretching of security treaty interpretations and for allowing the U.S.-Japan alliance to function in an increasingly global manner.

Japan and the United States are expected to follow the February SCC statement with another statement in mid to late 2005 that will move beyond

⁴² "Kadena-osa e no Togo Kento" [Investigation of Integration Inside Kadena], *Sankei Shimbun*, April 13, 2005, 1.

⁴³ "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," Washington D.C., February 19, 2005, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>.

stressing the broadened principles of alliance cooperation to actually outlining specific military divisions of labor both regionally and globally. In particular, Washington is prodding Tokyo to specify not only the types of logistical support that Japan will provide in contingencies, but also to name the actual airstrips, harbors, and civilian facilities and to draw up detailed plans for their usage. This may then be followed by a new Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security that will supersede that of 1996 by emphasizing a shift toward strengthened regional and global alliance functions. In order to facilitate greater military cooperation for global contingencies, Japan and the United States may move in late 2005 and early 2006 to once more revise the Defense Guidelines. Due, however, to the domestic political difficulties involved in revision and a desire to avoid any repeat of the protracted Diet debates of the first revision, Japanese policymakers may seek only partial revision—instead of a wholesale overhaul—on key areas such as logistical support and BMD.⁴⁴

Ballistic Missile Defense

Japan's engagement with BMD is potentially the most significant step in forcing the pace of Tokyo's military modernization plans and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan decided in December 2003 to purchase an off-the-shelf PAC-III and the Navy Theatre Wide Defense (NTWD) (in current U.S. terminology the Sea-Base Midcourse System [SMD] and Terminal Defense Segment [TDS], respectively). This, along with continued joint research with the United States into NTWD interceptor missile technologies, makes Japan the first U.S. security treaty partner to actively sign on to missile defense programs. Japan plans to deploy its first BMD capabilities on an MSDF AWS-equipped destroyer by 2007, and on all six of its destroyers by 2011. The upgraded interceptor missiles for a PAC-III system are slated for acquisition by 2007. The JDA estimates the total cost of deployment at \$4.6 billion, and in June 2005 the United States was reported to have requested that Japan invest \$545 million in joint research on interceptor missile technologies.⁴⁵

In order to operate the BMD system, Japan has already begun to implement a range of adjustments to its military doctrines and capabilities. In February 2005 the government submitted to the Diet a bill for revisions

⁴⁴ Author's interview with Deputy Director-General, North American Affairs Bureau, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, April 6, 2005.

⁴⁵ "U.S. Asks Japan for \$545 Million for Missile Defense Report," *DefenseNews.com*, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=925972&C=asiapac>; International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Japan's Push for Missile Defence: Benefits, Costs and Prospects," *IISS Strategic Comments* 9, no. 8 (October 2003): 1.

to the SDF Law that enables the Director General of the JDA to mobilize the JSDF to launch BMD interceptors against incoming missiles only with the approval of the Prime Minister (rather than in consultation with the Cabinet's National Security Council as mandated under the present law). In other situations, when there is no time to consult even with the Prime Minister, the Director General is entitled to mobilize JSDF interceptor launches in accordance with pre-planned scenarios.⁴⁶ The revised SDF Law is a necessary recognition that BMD systems can work only on the basis of short reaction times and by devolving control to military planners and commanders. For Japan this law constitutes a radical step toward reducing the strength of Cabinet-level civilian control over the JSDF in the postwar period.

Japan's BMD system may also necessitate the greater integration of Japanese and U.S. military forces and strategy. To operate BMD effectively, Japan will need to rely on U.S. infrared early warning satellite information, and to link for the first time JSDF command and control systems with those of the United States. Tokyo may be hoping to slightly lessen this dependency by developing—in cooperation with the United States—Infrared Search and Tracking (IRST) early warning sensors mounted on P-3Cs, a system that could undergo testing in September 2005.⁴⁷ Japanese dependency will be further reinforced by the fact that it is reliant on U.S. black-boxed technology for its first off-the-shelf systems. In seeking to deploy BMD in a time-frame similar to the United States, Tokyo made the decision to purchase its first BMD systems from the United States under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program without first negotiating a licensed production agreement. Japan now faces a uphill battle to secure any production rights for Japanese defense contractors—although in July 2005 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries may at least have achieved licensed production from Lockheed-Martin for the PAC-III.⁴⁸

In acquiring a weapons system dependent on active U.S. cooperation to function properly, Japan will thus have to gear its entire strategic orientation even further to accommodate the United States.⁴⁹ Japan's declared intention

⁴⁶ Boeicho [JDA], *Boeicho Secchiho nado no Ichibu o Kaisei Suru Horitsuan Kankei Shiryo* [Documentation Relating to the Bill for the Partial Revision of the Defence Agency Establishment Law] (Tokyo: Boeicho, 2005), 11–13.

⁴⁷ Kawakami Takashi and Jimbo Ken, "Dando Misairu Boei to Nichibeiki Domei" [BMD and the U.S. Japan Alliance], in *Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu*, ed. Morimoto Satoshi (Tokyo: JIA, 2002), 278–79.

⁴⁸ "MD no Shogeki: Yunyu ni Konwaku Boei Sangyo" [Missile Defense Shock: Defense Contractors at a Loss over Imports], *Asahi Shimbun*, November 15, 2004, 1; and "Raisensu Seisan" [Licensed Production], *Asahi Shimbun*, July 20, 2005, 4.

⁴⁹ Matusmura Masahiro, *Nichibeiki Domei to Gunji Gijutsu* (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1999), 135–48.

is to operate a BMD system on the basis of “independent judgment.”⁵⁰ The U.S. expectation is, however, that Japan will deploy the system to defend U.S. bases in Japan in the event of a regional contingency (such as Taiwan). This plan will necessitate closer tactical planning between the JSDF and U.S. forces. In addition, Japan may in the future face pressure from the United States to deploy Japan’s highly mobile and interoperable BMD assets in support of U.S. forces; whether this assistance was required in East Asia or in other regions, such requests would be in line with the new purport of alliance planning for global contingencies. Finally, BMD may also challenge Japan’s non-exercise of collective self-defense given that these systems demand the freer, and possibly two-way, flow of military information between U.S. and Japanese command and control systems. Such communication is largely prohibited by current Japanese interpretations of collective self-defense.⁵¹ If BMD obliges Japan to breach its prohibition on collective self-defense, more radical bilateral military cooperation may then occur in other alliance contexts—including combat support for the United States in a range of theaters falling outside the scope of the existing security treaty (such as the Middle East).

Implications for Regional and Global Security

Japan’s military modernization has taken the form of enhanced JSDF interoperability and power projection capabilities, and has been planned in tandem with the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to deal with regional and global security issues. This modernization is allowing Tokyo to assume a more proactive and “normal” security role in the post-Cold War, and especially post-September 11, world.

Japan’s growing capabilities to undertake an expanded military role, and to do so alongside the United States (as showcased in the Asian tsunami), have important ramifications for security in East Asia, including the U.S. presence in the region. It is now possible to envisage the emergence of a more interoperable U.S.-Japan alliance, encompassing even stronger mutually reinforcing “sword” and “shield” functions, one that works to perpetuate U.S. military dominance across East Asia. Japan’s continued strengths in anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping are represented by MSDF destroyer, minesweeping, and P-3C/P-X forces, all of which give Tokyo the ca-

⁵⁰ “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary: Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures,” December 19, 2003, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html.

⁵¹ Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence*, 112–14; and Morimoto Satoshi, “BMD to Nihon no Boeiei Seisaku” [BMD and Japan’s Security Policy], in *Misairu Boei*, 308–9.

pability to dominate—through the ASDF's F-2 and in-flight refueling—the airspace around Japan and beyond. These capabilities should enable Tokyo to provide an effective defensive shield against any potential adversary, while at the same time enabling the United States to concentrate on projecting offensive power should a regional contingency arise.

Japan's improved military capabilities and the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance will certainly assist U.S. efforts in the short term to deter China in a conflict involving Taiwan. At the very least, Japan possesses the legal frameworks and operational experience necessary to provide logistical support for the United States, the capabilities to prevent Chinese air and amphibious forces from assaulting Japanese territory, and, in the not-too-distant future, the capability to defend U.S. bases in Japan from Chinese missile attacks. Expanding U.S.-Japan alliance ties may, however, exacerbate Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese tensions and increase Japan's fear of entrapment in U.S. strategy toward China.

A strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance will also deter North Korea and reassure Japan about U.S. security guarantees in the event that the North demonstrates nuclear weapons capability. Most importantly, if the United States remains intent on containing or rolling back Pyongyang's nuclear program, Tokyo will have no need to discuss independent acquisition of a nuclear deterrent. Japan will, however, remain apprehensive concerning the possibility that the United States might harness the strengthened alliance as a means to exert pressure on North Korea without the prospect of dialogue—and thereby drag Japan into a possible confrontation with North Korea.

Meanwhile, Japan's strengthened power projection capabilities and alliance with the United States should also provide Tokyo with the confidence to engage other security partners in the region. Japan will probably continue to expand cooperation with South Korea in areas such as maritime safety and diplomatic cooperation toward North Korea. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by tensions between Japan and South Korea over the disputed Takeshima Islands, there remain clear limits to the extent of military cooperation between these two U.S. allies. Japan may instead show more military activism in Southeast Asia in combating piracy. Tokyo has attempted to launch a number of important anti-piracy initiatives via the ASEAN+3 process, and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has, since 2001, embarked on bilateral exercises and patrols with Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. In a move that would seem to hint at an MSDF role in anti-piracy, former JDA Director General Ishiba Shigeru floated the idea in 2005 of Ocean Peacekeeping Operations. Indeed, many ASEAN states are

receptive to enhanced Japanese naval cooperation as a means to counterbalance China's growing presence.⁵²

Most intriguing of all, though, are the implications of Japan's changing military capabilities and the objectives of alliance cooperation for global security. Japan has already shown a degree of willingness to stretch alliance cooperation in humanitarian and non-combat logistical and reconstruction missions as far as the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Japan's growing capabilities in amphibious and air-lift operations, deployment of rapid-reaction style forces, and mobile BMD systems (represented by its *Osumi*-class transports, DDH-class, AWS-equipped destroyers, and C-1/C-X transports) make Japan a potentially ideal partner to provide logistical and defensive support for U.S. war-fighting operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. The JSDF has in fact already gained some valuable experience in operating with the United States and other states in a multinational environment through the establishment of a coordinating liaison headquarters alongside that of the United States at the Thai military base of U-Tapao.

Exactly how far Japan is willing to go in projecting power to the Middle East in support of the United States has yet to be tested. The revised NDPG's emphasis on security interests that correspond with those of the United States in the "arc of instability" is, however, one indication that Japan is contemplating an expanded security role covering the Middle East. Furthermore, Japan is not only showing a preparedness to stretch the geographical and functional scope of its military role in support of the United States, but is also beginning to work more closely within U.S.-led multinational coalitions for global contingencies. In supporting the Afghan campaign, Japan has worked to refuel coalition ships from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Australia, and has used amphibious capabilities to transport Thai army equipment to the Indian Ocean. JSDF officers have been stationed at U.S. Central Command at Tampa, Florida since 2001, and the JSDF in Iraq has accepted military protection from Dutch forces, and (as of mid-2005) from UK and Australian forces.⁵³ In October 2004, the JCG—with support from MSDF aircraft—also hosted a Proliferation Security Initiative interdiction exercise in Sagami Bay, south of Tokyo.⁵⁴ Thus Japan now appears to be an ally with greater interoperable capabilities and experience

⁵² Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba, speech, IISS Asia Security Conference Singapore, June 5, 2004, <http://www.iiss.org/newsite/shangri-la-speeches.php?itemID=36>.

⁵³ "Kiro no Saizensen Jieitai 50nen: Yushi Rengo Mura" [The Crossroads Frontline, The JSDF's Fiftieth Year: Coalitions of the Willing Village], *Asahi Shimbun*, March 24, 2004, 1; and Purnendra Jain and John Bruni, "Japan, Australia and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 4, no. 2 (2004): 278–81.

⁵⁴ "PSI Godo Kunren, Nihon Tate ni" [PSI Combined Drill, Two Pillared], *Asahi Shimbun*, October 11, 2004, 2.

intent on supporting U.S. “coalitions of the willing.” Such observations reinforce the impression that the U.S.-Japan alliance is indeed moving toward becoming a global alliance that provides not only bases but also boots on the ground.

There are, however, some major limitations and obstacles confronting Japan’s military normalization and the continued strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan is not pursuing unconditional expanded alliance cooperation with the United States, and Tokyo clearly maintains concerns about abandonment and entrapment. In order to hedge against dependency on the alliance, Japan will continue to foster a certain degree of defense autonomy. Japanese policymakers will, for instance, continue to maintain indigenous defense production capabilities in order to avoid the risks of being left defenseless in the event of a breakdown of the alliance.⁵⁵ Japan will, however, find the maintenance of such indigenous capacities to be difficult, particularly in light of Tokyo’s decision to buy off-the-shelf BMD technologies from the United States. Japan will also be reluctant to break the ban on collective self-defense. The LDP may be increasingly in favor of such a move, though MOFA—as can be seen from the cases of the ATSMML and Iraq Reconstruction Law—is fighting a stubborn rearguard action to sustain constitutional divisions between different contexts of alliance cooperation so as to prevent entrapment and preserve anti-militaristic principles. Japanese policymakers might even be able to find a way to circumvent the problems that BMD poses for collective self-defense. Their argument is that because BMD is a purely defensive system the use of BMD is akin to raising a shield to deflect a blow, and that the use of such systems does not actually constitute a use of force in violation of constitutional interpretations.

Despite the ingenuity of Japanese policymakers, pressure is clearly growing from the United States and from within domestic political circles to breach the ban. For example, Richard Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State, attempted in July 2004 to link Japan’s interest in a UN Security Council seat with Tokyo’s exercise of the right to collective self-defense.⁵⁶ Moreover, the degree to which the United States and Japan can resolve GPR, Okinawa, and other base-related issues will be crucial for the future of alliance cooperation. Futenma’s relocation is a nagging and debilitating political thorn in the side of the alliance, and the resolution of this sensitive issue is crucial. Japan’s list of the particular bases and facilities that it would be willing to

⁵⁵ Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Transformation of Japan* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1994), 31.

⁵⁶ Although under political pressure he was later forced to retract these remarks. See “Armitage Now Has No Problem With Article 9: Okada,” *Japan Times Online*, July 31, 2004, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040731a7.htm>.

provide to the United States in any revision of the Defense Guidelines is also likely to be a lengthy process that will frustrate U.S. policymakers looking for quicker responses.⁵⁷ Finally, as part of base burden reduction, Japan is looking for further decreases in the Host Nation Support (HNS) budget that currently covers close to 100 percent of the costs of U.S. facilities in Japan.⁵⁸ The bilateral Special Measures Agreement will expire in 2006, and in any new agreement Japan will seek to continue annual cuts of around 1 percent in utility costs.⁵⁹

U.S.-Japan alliance ties will also face tests over major regional and global strategic questions. Tokyo prefers that Washington work with Beijing to maintain the status quo over Taiwan, and U.S. policymakers should not take for granted that Japan—despite the 2-Plus-2 statement of February 2005—will support the United States militarily over Taiwan in anything other than the most extreme instances of Chinese aggression. Japan will continue to support the United States in Iraq, though Tokyo is now looking to withdraw the JSDF non-combat mission by December 2005. U.S.-Japan relations will, however, remain discordant over Iran. Tokyo continues to urge Tehran to halt its nuclear program, but Japan's oil interests in the Azadegan oil field mean that Tokyo is unlikely to support Washington in any attempt to militarily coerce Iran.⁶⁰

Finally, U.S.-Japan alliance relations may experience difficulties over Japan's new and assertive push since late 2004 for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC). Tokyo expects reciprocal and active U.S. support for its bid. The United States has indicated officially that it supports a permanent UNSC seat for Japan, and as of mid-2005 Japan even seems willing to drop its initial demands for veto rights in order to accord with the United States' preferred plans for UNSC reform. If the United States does not appear to actively campaign on Japan's part in UNSC negotiations and

⁵⁷ The February 2+2 statement indicating that a plan for realigning specific facilities could be produced within a matter of months, and the United States had hoped to conclude the plan by June 2005. Japan is now indicating, however, that it would only be ready for a mid-term general review report by July 2005 at the earliest due to its need to consult with local authorities about base realignments. For more, see "Beigun Saihen: Seifu, Jimoto e Itsu Dachin" [U.S. Military Realignments: Government and Local Authorities, When to Break the Deadlock], *Asahi Shimbun*, July 20, 2005, 4.

⁵⁸ This figure does not include the salaries of U.S. personnel. See Maeda Tetsuo, *Zainichi Beigun Kichi no Shushi Kessan* [The Balance Sheet for U.S. Bases in Japan] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2000), 162–65.

⁵⁹ MOF is, however, eager both for further cuts and to reduce the standard five-year time period of the agreement in order to review costs more frequently. "Japan Aims to Shorten Pact for Sharing U.S. Military Costs," *Japan Times Online*, May 3, 2005, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/makeprfy.pl5?20050512f3.htm>.

⁶⁰ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan," in *Strategic Asia 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 118–19.

passively allows China to veto Japan's entry, then this will raise perceptions of U.S. perfidiousness in Japanese eyes. If, on the other hand, Japan were to secure a seat on the UN Security Council, then Japan might be inclined to place its JSDF assets increasingly at the disposal of UN-led PKOs in areas such as Darfur in the Sudan, rather than the current trend of JSDF cooperation with U.S.-led coalitions (and subsequently weaker UN legitimization). In this instance, the extent of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation outside the range of the security treaty in East Asia, and the rationale for the future solidity of the alliance in general, might be more questionable.

Based on deep-rooted current trends, however, Japan is likely to continue on the path of tighter and expanded alliance cooperation with the United States. Japan's UNSC-centered security option at present seems unlikely to succeed, and looming regional concerns about North Korea and China, in tandem with the recognition of terrorism and WMD as global concerns, will continue to push Japan and the United States closer together. Japan's policymakers will largely be committed to this trend, even as they attempt, like all "normal" U.S. allies, to control the pace of these trends and to avoid unnecessary scenarios of entrapment. Japan's modernization of its security policy, military doctrines, and JSDF capabilities will only serve to reinforce the range of possibilities for bilateral alliance cooperation. In all likelihood, though, the international strategic environment and military-technological demands of the alliance mean that the odds are stacked against Japan retaining sufficient room to hedge against or significantly influence U.S. security behavior. Japanese policymakers will thus be obliged not only to create more potential avenues for cooperation with the United States, but also to increasingly exercise such options by responding to regional and global contingencies. In turn, Japan's re-emergence as a more normal military power will also raise questions for the overall balance of its comprehensive security policy. The shift toward an emphasis on military alliance cooperation with the United States may impose important opportunity costs on Japan's ability to pursue non-military approaches to a security—including human security—agenda.