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Editor’s foreword

Expanding and multiple crises in the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’ have marked international affairs during this quarter. Terrorist atrocities in Russia, jihadist kidnappings and beheadings pressuring an increasingly beleaguered ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq, turmoil in Saudi Arabia and another Jemaah Islamiyah engineered explosion in Indonesia—this time directed against the Australian Embassy—all underscore the increasingly perilous times in which we live.

The long-term ramifications of these developments for global security are subject to debate but it is certain that the legitimacy and credibility of those great powers, regional and international institutions and regimes that previously were accorded the authority to manage world politics are being severely challenged by religious, ethnic and class challenges that were hardly expected to emerge with the end of the Cold War. This issue of the AJIA captures both the fervency and flavour of our increasingly uncertain world with its Commentaries. Yet it simultaneously provides insights into more gradual processes of ‘normalisation’ in Japan, state-building in the South Pacific and doctrinal revisions required for Western military strategy in a more fluid and uncertain international environment. It concludes in a more hopeful vein with a cautiously optimistic review of recent works on prospects for global governance.

It is always gratifying for a journal editor when people who have worked so hard to make such an enterprise work are able to gain some recognition in return. Matt Sussex has relinquished his Associate Editor position and Anna Searle takes over his responsibilities as well as continuing her heavy workload in the same capacity. Both have contributed to this issue of the AJIA with assessments reflecting their respective research interests. Our former Assistant Editor, Dr Donna Weeks, has enriched our compendium on Japan with a reflective but provocative article on Japanese identity. Finally, our Review Editor, Dr Mark Beeson, signs off for a well-deserved research leave with a major review article assessing recent works on global governance. All of these individuals have made indispensable contributions to this journal’s operations and I wish them Godspeed.

WILLIAM T. TOW
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and oil: risk factors

AMIN SAIKAL

As two oil-rich states and significant members of OPEC, Iraq is in the grip of a devastating conflict and Saudi Arabia is confronted with a serious legitimacy crisis. They both face much uncertainty over the next few years, although from different sources and in different degrees. The world has been able to cope with Iraq being an erratic oil producer since 1991, with its production at times falling to negligible amounts. Saudi Arabia, however, has been towards the other end of the spectrum during the same period. It has been OPEC’s largest and most stable pro-Western producer with a capacity to increase production whenever necessitated either to meet demand for more oil or to moderate oil prices to the extent required to maintain stability in the world market and economy. This can no longer be taken for granted. While international demand and oil prices have risen amid uncertainties about Iraq, sustained threat from international terrorism, technical problems such as the limited availability of shipping and accidental supply disruptions, soaring demand for energy in East Asia, and the incapacity of Russia to increase production, the Saudi political and security environment has correspondingly become a major source of growing concern. If this concern is not alleviated, the Iraqi situation is not stabilised and alternative sources are not found, the international oil market is likely to remain volatile. Oil prices at around $40-45 per barrel over the next three years are a possibility.

Of course the risk factor is at present much higher with Iraq than with Saudi Arabia. The 28 June 2004 hand-over of power to the Iraqis is unlikely to signify a landmark step, as promoted by President Bush and his allies, in the Iraqis’ arduous and bloody journey to achieving democracy, prosperity and viability. The Iraqi Interim Government is essentially an outgrowth of the US-installed Iraqi Governing Council. It suffers from the same lack of legitimacy, credibility and enforceability that had rendered its predecessor ineffective. The only way that this government can survive, and possibly hold a Constitutional Convention by January 2005 and a general election a year later for a popularly mandated government as a prelude to Iraq’s transformation into some kind of stable democratic state, is for the United States and its allies to remain in Iraq for a long term.
There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, given the experience of Afghanistan, the timeline for the interim government to establish the foundations and procedures for a stable political order within a secure national environment is very short. There is little possibility that it would be able to hold a fair and free election within at least three years. Second, the Iraqi law and order enforcement and security maintenance institutions will not be ready to replace the US forces and those of their allies for at least 5 to 10 years. In Afghanistan, in the three years since the overthrow of the Taliban, the US and its NATO allies have not been able to train more than 10,000 troops, whose loyalty has not been tested yet. Iraq has a stronger civic culture than Afghanistan, but the inculcation of strong national values and discipline upon which a professional military force must be based will remain a major challenge for any US-sponsored Iraqi leadership. Third, the Iraqi resistance is most likely to persist for as long as the foreign forces are in Iraq and an Iraqi government which could enjoy widespread popular support as well as rule enforcement apparatus of its own has not been established. The resistance is not only composed of die-hard Saddam Hussein supporters, but also includes many Iraqi nationalists and Islamists as well as foreign Jihadis linked to Al Qaeda and associated groups. Iraq has become as much of a battleground for their future and that of the region as it is a litmus test for the US-led war on terrorism and for US efforts to reshape the Middle East and counter radical political Islam.

Three scenarios could eventuate in Iraq in the next two years. The first is that the present situation of violence, insecurity and uncertainty will continue. No amount of tough measures, including imposition of martial law, by the Interim Government and US-led enforcement of those measures may work to stem the tide of violent opposition to enable the interim authority to improve, within a reasonable time, much-needed services and security, and draw up a legal-rational framework for a workable system of governance. Under these circumstances, Iraq’s oil production will be disrupted either severely or moderately from time to time. Without adequate security for the oil fields and infrastructure, and for the technical experts needed to oversee the massive investment required for oil infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion, Iraqi oil exports may not exceed 3 million barrels per day. One of the outcomes would be continued nervousness in the international market and no major contribution from Iraq to ease the shortage in global oil supply.

The second is that Iraq descends into a civil war. Although the threshold for such a conflict has not been approached yet, this is a possibility that no serious analyst can exclude. A civil war can eventuate under a number of conditions. First, if the Interim Government either fails to deliver on the objectives for which it was created or disintegrates. Second, if Iraq’s non-Arab Kurdish minority, which is closely allied with the US and Israel, but highly suspected by the country’s Arab Sunni minority and Shia majority, as well as Iraq’s three important neighbours—Turkey, Iran and Syria—decides actively to seek (even
if it does not declare independence. Kurdish leaders would be under pressure to do so if they were to become convinced that the situation was moving in a direction which would deprive them of the autonomy that they have built for themselves, under US protection, since the 1991 Gulf War. Other groups and neighbours will be opposed to a Kurdish control of the Kirkuk oil fields.

Third, if the measures implemented by the Interim Government result in either empowerment of the Shia majority to lead an Islamic government or deprive the Shia from securing political dominance, the fallout would be difficult to contain. In any case of civil war, among many devastating consequences, one would be serious disruption in Iraq’s oil production, with the possibility of the country’s oil infrastructure lying in ruins and oil fields set ablaze, unless the US and allied forces take over the fields and facilities to defend them.

The third scenario is that President Bush is defeated in the forthcoming election and his Democratic successor decides to abandon Iraq for fear of greater American casualties and material losses. Although this scenario is a remote possibility, not least because of its implications for the war on terror and US interests in the region and beyond, it is nonetheless one that cannot be discounted entirely. In this situation, Iraq would be left at the mercy of its various micro-societies and neighbours to play it out, as was the case with Afghanistan in the early 1990s following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country.

The US is now involved in a very damaging war. The consequences of leaving Iraq sooner rather than later could prove to be as damaging as those of staying in for the long haul. If it opts for an accelerated pullout, this could easily spell the end of American political dominance in the Middle East and reflect very badly on the efforts of the US and its allies in Afghanistan and the war on terror. If it stays on course ‘for as long as necessary’, neither President Bush nor his successors can be sure the American public will be prepared to wear the costs, being mindful of sinking America into an Iraq syndrome similar to that of Vietnam. The futility of the Iraq conflict is now set not only to haunt the United States and its allies for a long time to come, but also to serve as an important factor in the stability of the international oil market.

The prognosis for Saudi Arabia is not as bad as that for Iraq, but the Kingdom is nonetheless in a situation that could keep the world oil market jittery and oil prices high for the foreseeable future.

The spate of recent kidnapping and killing of foreigners, including the beheading of US engineer Paul Marshal, and massive bomb blasts, have shattered the image of Saudi Arabia as a safe, secure and stable oil-rich state. The opposition is not in a position to break all the security barriers to inflict such damage on the Saudi oil fields and facilities as to cripple the country’s oil industry. It is well defended, and has a range of outlets for exports that will ensure the oil can be kept flowing under virtually any circumstances short of wholesale war. Also, despite the departure of the non-essential staff of some Western diplomatic missions and companies due to an upsurge in violent
opposition activities in recent months, the Saudi oil industry still remains lucrative and secure enough to enable the regime to keep the West engaged in the kingdom. While urging reform, President Bush, whose family has reportedly had close business ties with the Saudi royal family, has been very careful not to say or do anything that could undermine the Saudi regime and make the kingdom vulnerable to regional and international isolation. But the oil market is driven by perceptions as well as practicalities. And on that score, Saudi Arabia at present is faring badly.

The problem is rooted not in Al Qaeda and its associated violent activities but rather in a stubborn reluctance by the ruling Ibn Saud family—a close regional ally of the US for 60 years—to create a viable, institutionalised system of governance, and to manage Saudi Arabia’s immense oil wealth in such a way as to promote the common good and democratic values. Its intensified campaign against terrorism will yield little unless it is accompanied by structural reforms to enable many Saudis not to feel alienated and threatened with a loss of their Islamic identity through the association of their rulers with the United States.

The regime has rested on spent political capital for too long. Its traditional formula based on an interactive manipulation of politics, Islam (and a very narrowly interpreted version of it at that) and oil wealth to generate a foundation of political legitimacy is coming unstuck. While seeking to project a benevolent and reformist image, in reality it has failed to build a polity where political inclusiveness, the rule of law, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary and observance of human rights underpin the operation of state and society. It has done little, even by the standards of the Arab and Muslim worlds, to generate legitimate avenues for public participation in policy-making arenas.

Power rests entirely with a small oligarchy of elderly brothers, which presides over a royal family of some 7000 members. The oligarchy, which has a determining share in every aspect of Saudi society, has treated Saudi oil wealth as its private property and spent it as it has seen fit. The veteran Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bander Bin Sultan, has claimed that of the $400 billion spent on modernisation of Saudi Arabia since the early 1970s, only $50 billion of it may have gone astray!

The cumulative effect has been catastrophic: a growing alienation of many (especially young) Saudis, who do not trust their government in either Islamic or democratic terms, and a growing sense of disappointment and frustration that the Saudi economy has not been managed in such a way as to provide the employment opportunities for younger Saudis that they believe they deserve.

Two kinds of underground opposition forces seem to have benefited most from this: Islamic radicals and democratic reformists. The former have criticised the regime for being too pro-American, un-Islamic, deceptive, manipulative and wasteful. With no legitimate avenues of participation open to them, some of these have become receptive to Al Qaeda, with increasing
admiration for Bin Laden as a source of political salvation. It is estimated that there are some 7,000 of such elements, penetrating the Saudi structures at all levels. On the other hand, the regime’s democratic opponents, many of whom are also devout Muslims but who have shunned Al Qaeda and its violent methods, have been subjected to the same repression as their radical Islamic counterparts, with some operating in exile.

Dangerously for the regime, when it comes to their demands for inclusiveness and representativeness, the Islamist and democratic opposition share a common platform. Their position is reinforced by the criticism levelled against the regime by some neoconservative elements within the Bush Administration, since the 11 September events. The regime has been accused in the United States of having nurtured a kind of Islam and supported a kind of Islamic education at home and abroad which have helped to spawn radical Islamism.

A combination of potential domestic instability and exogenous pressure has left the Ibn Saud rule in a state of limbo and in a weaker position than at any time in the post-World War II period. This does not mean that the regime is in serious danger of collapsing or Saudi Arabia of sinking into a revolution in the near future. As a matter of fact, despite all the regime’s shortcomings and an upsurge in violent activities against it, neither a majority of Saudis will be willing to see it overthrown, nor, as noted earlier, is the oil industry at serious risk. But given its links and influence with other, smaller oil-rich Arab states in Gulf, and its position as the largest and most determining producer within OPEC, any degree of eruption or uncertainty associated with the kingdom could easily have wider impact. It could reflect to cause instability in other GCC members. Without ringing the alarm bells, the effect of a perception of Saudi instability on the international oil market and economy itself may be enough to keep the prices of oil high close to $45 rather $35 per barrel. The only way that the situation could be remedied is for the regime not only to become more resolute in its prosecution of domestic violent opposition activities, but also to reform and to reform fast to prevent many of its young people from being attracted to extremism.

The bottom line is that if (and it is a big if) the Iraqi situation improves, with the country’s oil production reaching beyond 4 million barrels per day on a sustained basis, and if the Saudi regime engages in structural reforms to diminish the gap between state and society in its policy existence and behaviour, the oil market stands to stabilise and prices remain around $40 per barrel within the next few years. However, if this does not eventuate, the oil price and oil market stability is anybody’s guess.
Beslan’s lessons: is pre-emption better than cure?

MATTHEW SUSSEX

The brutal ending to the school siege in the North Ossetian town of Beslan serves as a tragic reminder that seemingly irrational violence remains a central feature of contemporary international politics. In an attempt to understand how Beslan could have occurred, questions about the nature of the Chechen war and the specific response of the Russian security services have been posed to a Putin administration elected—and subsequently returned to power—on a platform that prioritised order ahead of Russia’s ailing democratisation project. Some of these questions, such as Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot’s insinuation that Russian commandos were to blame for the bloodbath, were misguided. Russian forces, mindful of past criticism of heavy-handedness during the October 2002 siege of a Moscow theatre in which over 100 hostages died, adopted a more patient approach at Beslan. Once a mine detonated inside the school, and terrorists began gunning down those who took the opportunity to flee amid the confusion, on-site commanders had little option but to order a full-scale assault. More thoughtful questions pertain to Russia’s conduct in the war against Chechnya, and whether Putin has deliberately sidestepped political solutions in his quest to preserve Russia’s territorial integrity. Ultimately, in order to better identify avenues for conflict resolution we also need to determine to what extent the crisis should be interpreted as part of a global war on terror (GWOT) and what the implications are for Russian security policy-making.

One clear lesson already learnt by the Putin administration stems directly from US renovations to its strategic policy after the attacks of 11 September, 2001. Russia’s decision to move to an overtly pre-emptive framework for prosecuting the war represents an extension of Putin’s strategy to legitimate the Chechen conflict by tying it to the GWOT. It achieved its greatest progress on this issue soon after 11 September, when it went from being perceived by Western nations (especially among EU members) as a perpetrator of gross human rights violations, to a key coalition partner in global antiterrorism efforts. Since then Russia has had a relatively free hand in its prosecution of the conflict. Yet immediately after Beslan, Russia’s top-ranking general Yuri
Baluevski announced that Russian forces would seek to prevent terrorist attacks originating outside that nation, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov cautioned the West not to ‘get in the way’. Their comments were echoed by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov in an interview with Izvestiya on September 8 2004. Ivanov called a pre-emptive doctrine ‘fully justified’ and added that Russia would give no warnings before taking action. Putin, meanwhile, accused Western governments of double standards in refusing to negotiate with Osama bin Laden while simultaneously calling for Russia to hold talks with those whom he called the ‘bastards’ of the Chechen resistance movement. The Kremlin also explicitly equated leaders in the resistance movement’s political wing with terrorists, making no distinction between a US$10 million bounty for the capture of former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and a similar reward for apprehending Shamil Basaev, field commander and leader of the Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSMB), whom Moscow suspects of having ordered the Beslan attack.

Yet although al Qaeda and Chechen resistance groups are increasingly interlinked, sharing assets, training and tactics, the Chechen conflict differs from the broader war against terrorism in two major respects. Both conflicts are asymmetrical. But so are most wars, since absolute strategic parity between main actors has been rare in the history of international politics. Here it is useful to understand the GWOT in relation to the power status of the US. The deepening cracks in the transatlantic alliance following the invasion of Iraq as well as the new Pentagon doctrine of floating coalitions demonstrates that the GWOT, although a convenient tag, primarily represents a war against threats to US interests. However, the US is a global actor with broad interests and reach; and as a result, the GWOT is a war truly global in scope. Conversely, the Chechen conflict remains fundamentally a more localised struggle, with a transparent territorial focal point of conflict. While pre-emption from the Kremlin is not new—indeed, Russian FSB agents have been active in attempting to capture, assassinate, and disrupt the planning of Chechen resistance fighters abroad—the Putin administration has concentrated the main war effort within the breakaway province itself.

It has done so because of the second main difference between the Chechen war and the GWOT, which relates to the main motivations for each conflict. In the case of the GWOT it is clear that many uncertainties remain. There is uncertainty over the composition of the main actors in the conflict, prompting us to keep asking who the terrorists are, whether they are united, and who their sponsors might be. There is also uncertainty over al Qaeda’s main grievances, its aims, and its centre of operations. As US President George W. Bush has noted while arguing not uncontroversially in favour of a pre-emptive doctrine, deterrence, containment or diplomacy are ineffective under such circumstances.

The motivations for the wars in Chechnya, on the other hand, are more transparent. They are linked to power and interests, and represent a
traditional struggle over territory and resources with clear goals and objectives on both sides. Even conservative estimates put the number of resistance fighters who are secular nationalists at around 75% to 80%, with most of the remainder comprising warlord militias and organised criminal gangs. It is well recognised that Moscow has exaggerated the impact of external Wahhabi fighters in the conflict, and even Putin’s press secretary has put the number of jihadists in Chechnya at not more than two hundred. Certainly figures such as the Saudi-born Ibn-al Khattab, with direct links to al Qaeda, have played a role. But even Basaev, who trained in Afghanistan, participated in Chechnya’s 1997 elections and promised initially to support Maskhadov after his victory. Since then Basaev has found cultural and religious appeals particularly effective in mobilising support for his cause, both within the region and in the Arab world. This means that a radicalised politics of identity has operated as a powerful unifying force for the conflict, even though it does not represent its primary determinant.

Identity politics are also important for Russians still struggling to adapt to a post-Cold War era in which Moscow’s influence has waned. Losses in prestige and territory after the collapse of the USSR were exacerbated by the economic and social policy failings of the Yeltsin administration. For this reason, any policies that threaten to weaken Russia further are perceived negatively. The need to retain the trappings of great power status as a symbol of Russia’s post-Soviet identity has been instrumental in Russia’s refusal to negotiate on the Kurile Islands/Northern Territories, and in its criticism of NATO expansion and the 1999 war in Kosovo. Putin used popular frustration at Russia’s diminishing power as a potent vehicle during his initial election campaign, turning a highly unpopular first Chechen war (1994-1996) into a highly popular second conflict (1999-onwards). And although Putin has come under fire for failing to do more to combat terrorism, his position as a strong leader with broad-based support seems likely to sustain him through the present crisis. If anything, Beslan provides him with a more potent domestic rationale for escalating the Chechen conflict.

Russia’s main objectives in its war comprise a combination of geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, as well as prestige and the desire to prevent spillover that could result in the further withering of national power. Putin, like Yeltsin, has no wish to risk granting independence to Chechnya only to see Dagestan and Ingushetia follow suit. This would not only have disastrous domestic consequences, but would severely hamper Russian access to strategic points of its southern rim, especially around the Caspian Sea. Russia’s limited economic recovery has been built on a willingness to tap new petroleum reserves across the region, and has been facilitated by high global oil prices. Some analysts have expressed the opinion that Chechnya itself offers little in terms of long-term economic value to Moscow, since its oil stocks will shortly be depleted. Although this is a pertinent observation, it ignores fears that Chechen autonomy might create a domino effect that would be impossible to
contain. Moreover, any new Chechnyan state would be economically dependent on others for aid and support. Without a steadfast commitment from either Russia itself or the international community in general to state-build in Chechnya, the problem could simply shift levels of analysis from intra-state to inter-state violence. The dangers of a militant such as Basaev coming to power in an independent Chechnya teetering on the brink of state failure are all too real.

Basaev, for his part, hopes to ignite a wider war in the Transcaucasus, bringing Ossetians into conflict with the Ingush, whom many in Beslan regard either as active participants or at least complicit in the siege. His incursions into Dagestan during the first Chechen war, which won him fame among *jihadists* in the first place, reflected a similar strategy. Basaev and his colleagues are no strangers to asymmetrical warfare and unconventional methods. Over a ten year period he has been implicated in the seizure of a hospital, the kidnapping and execution of Russian soldiers and businessmen, an incident of radiological terrorism in which Chechen fighters claimed to have hidden canisters of caesium in a Moscow park, bombings of apartment buildings and public places in large cities, the Moscow theatre siege, and plans to attack nuclear power plants.

Although Chechens and al Qaeda terrorists share similar operational tactics, making no distinction between civilian and military targets, it does not necessarily follow that a pre-emptive Russian strategy will prove more effective. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the case of US responses to the GWOT. While the 11 September Commission Report and the 2002 US National Security concept both refer to transnational threats as facts of life in contemporary international politics, the prescriptions of both documents are by necessity heavily state-centric, relying on a ‘capabilities-based’ approach that combines diplomacy, coalition-building, propaganda (or ‘selling the message’) and the application of overwhelming force against specific targets of opportunity. In practice, however, the vast military machine of the United States has thus far struggled to adapt to *mujahidin* tactics in Afghanistan and resistance fighters in Iraq. Russia’s severely weakened armed forces, themselves unable to secure Chechnya despite two wars in the past ten years, make Putin’s claims that he can effectively prosecute a pre-emptive campaign seem dubious at best. Nor has George Bush Jnr’s approach won him many friends among the international community. While the need for stable alliances is not pressing for a powerful US with the option of unilateral action, Moscow lacks Washington’s ability to manoeuvre without significant international support.

The Putin administration has therefore learned the wrong lessons from the tragedy of Beslan. Scholars from within the international relations community were quick to recognise that a US policy pre-empting terrorism threatened to simply create more terrorists, and set a dangerous precedent with the potential for others to act unilaterally using the same rationale. We have already seen this policy adopted to some extent by Israel; we are now seeing it in Russia.
But are there any other real alternatives? Few analysts seriously entertain the possibility that inter-civilisational dialogue (what some derisively call the ‘disco night’ approach) can ameliorate terrorism in relation to the GWOT or war in Chechnya. Nor is it apparent that economic aid would be effective in resolving either conflict. The fact that most of the 11 September hijackers were well-educated and well-off members of Saudi society demonstrates that economic reasons alone are insufficient to explain the root causes of—and hence potential solutions to—the GWOT. In Chechnya a vast aid package that the Russian government cannot afford would be required to rebuild significant war damage and to reconstruct what remains of the region’s infrastructure. Even before the disintegration of the USSR, Chechnya was one of the poorest Soviet republics. It had the lowest number of doctors per capita in the USSR, and poor education levels. Over 58% of the population had not completed secondary schooling and only 4% went on to higher education. In addition, Chechnya had the highest proportion of the population among Soviet republics classified as rural (73%), coupled to high birth rates (16.1 per 100,000 people as compared to the national average of 2.2 per 100,000). Given that aid packages to Russia resulted in the overnight creation of a new economic elite, and corruption remains a crippling problem, one cannot be confident that such resources could be distributed properly even if they were available in the first place.

However, one can argue that in contrast to the GWOT, the Chechen conflict offers the possibility of a political solution. Putin’s blunt rejection of this option will in all probability alter as the strategic difficulties in maintaining a costly war against Chechnya become increasingly evident. Serious concessions will also be required from the Chechens, who may have to accept some degree of federal oversight in return for enhanced autonomy. Even so, there are obstacles to overcome. Avenues for negotiation are limited, particularly since Maskhadov lost control of Chechnya during his brief tenure as President. After the assassination of the Moscow loyalist president Akhmad Kadyrov in May 2004, it is also apparent that any future leader will need strong security and a stronger stomach. Uniting the Chechen people, ending infighting among rival warlords and ethnic groups, and cracking down on organised crime will be difficult. Some have posited the formation of a Loya Jurga comprising secular and religious Chechen leaders in a similar manner to those convened in post-Taliban Afghanistan, to operate as a negotiating council with the Russian centre. This should be pursued. So too should international cooperation between Moscow and Western governments on the issue of counterterrorism. Already Russia has sent Sergei Ivanov to meet with Donald Rumsfeld to discuss this question, and the NATO-Russia Council is slated to hold several meetings on the subject. Ultimately a political solution will be a bitter pill for both sides to swallow, but unlike the GWOT at least each protagonist has clear, identifiable goals that can serve as a basis for negotiation. It is to be hoped that such avenues are explored, since it is doubtful that—in the Chechen war at least—pre-emption is better than cure.
Declare the cost of war: Southeast Asia, Australia, and interpretative spin

WILLIAM F. CASE

Across Southeast Asia, the ways in which governments have interpreted terrorist threats have varied. And as is now widely recognised, these variations have been conditioned by electoral cycles. Thus, in Malaysia, the government asserted early on that it faced a grave terrorist menace. It thereby won licence to extend its punitive reach beyond true terrorist cohorts, arresting members of a popular Islamic opposition party during the run-up to general elections. By contrast, Indonesia’s government, though conceding that it too faces a terrorist problem, long understated the level of threat for fear of alienating voters. For many Indonesians, terrorists are less worrisome than abusive security forces, responding to loathsome Western demands.

In Thailand, the government has reacted in both ways. Seeking at first to reassure electorates, as well as the foreign tourists and investors that buoy its economy, the government flatly denied that terrorists were plotting in its midst. But after the capture of Hambali in the old royal capital of Ayudhya and the revival of fierce Muslim insurgency across provinces in the south, the government reversed its position. But then, after retaliating so aggressively against insurgents that Muslim grievances were deepened, the government drew back from its hard-edged assessments and military strategies. After all, general elections are approaching in Thailand. And the south is the traditional redoubt of the opposition Democrats.

The Philippines government has shown similar ambivalence. But with the political class divided, the state apparatus corroded, and the disciplining effects of elections rapidly receding, the government has been unable to replicate quite the oscillations that Thailand has displayed. Put simply, the Philippines government cannot muster even the purposiveness that flip-flopping requires, characterised by sharp breaks in sequencing and concerted swings. The country’s president thus welcomed US troops in Basilan, while senators furiously denounced their presence. The government later withdrew its small contingent from Iraq, whether in bold defiance or from utter craveness remains unclear.
In Australia too, we find the government varying its interpretations of terrorist threats, seeking to retain voter loyalties. And in some measure, these variations have formed a composite of different Southeast Asian approaches. Australia’s government, like Malaysia’s, has consistently asserted the threat of Islamic terrorism. Indeed, it exceeded Malaysia’s position, amplifying American claims about the availability in Iraq of nefarious leaders and potent weaponry through which to succour al Qaeda and its fellow travellers. But in thereby charting the global dimensions of terrorism, Australia’s government, like Indonesia’s, has understated any correlative threat at home—or at least denied that any of its actions have worsened what small internal threat there might be.

Thus, in its initial interpretations given to voters, Australia’s government proclaimed the urgency of joining the war on terrorism. But this could be done, it calculated, at fairly low cost, with only modest detachments sent to Iraq. What is more, the country’s broader security needs might be cheaply underwritten in this way, firming American willingness to provide vital intelligence and sundry guarantees—a pay-off whose prioritised standing was revealed by the sketchiness of the intelligence about Iraq upon which the government acted, the alacrity with which it did so, and the token contribution to the military campaign that it finally made.

Australia’s government also contended that its war against terrorism could be waged with little risk. Specifically, it could safely answer the call to Iraq because terrorism was global, rather than internal, and there was no correspondence between the two. And those in its ranks who dared imply otherwise—whether one-time prime ministerial aspirants or federal police commissioners—were ostracised or browbeaten into silence.

However, as new acts of terrorism occurred, local militants sprang up, and revisions were commensurately made by experts, the government’s interpretative spin began to shift, shadowing the flip-flopping seen in Thailand or perhaps the ambivalence of the Philippines. In brief, the government came slowly to concede that the terrorist threat to Australia was greater than it had initially allowed. Nonetheless, it continued to deny that this could be ascribed to its actions in Iraq. Rather, the government argued, it was the very life-style of its citizens, evidently so geared to this world and pleasurably led, that enraged Muslim terrorists.

But as John Bruni of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute wrote recently, ‘a popular myth being propagated by governments worldwide—not least our own—is that terrorists target us primarily because of our culture and what we represent, rather than the conduct of our foreign and domestic polices… The truth is that it’s because of both’. The bombing of Australia’s embassy in Jakarta, of course, has done much to confirm this view, with Jemaah Islamiyah promptly recording on its website: ‘We ... advise the Australian Government to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and if our demands are not met, we will direct many painful strikes against them, God willing. The hands that attacked it in the island of Bali are the ones that attacked in Jakarta’.
To be sure, the government resisted any further interpretative flips of the kind seen in Thailand. And when, after the embassy bombing, the deputy prime minister volunteered more accurate assessments, the government quietened him, seeking to avoid the imagery of Philippines ambivalence. Thus, in campaigning for elections, the government persisted in under-declaring the costs and risks of its war on terrorism, striving to leave voters comfortably under-mobilised. Indeed, it is striking that in a national setting even so precarious as the government now allows, it has demanded so little sacrifice. The business community is left undisturbed in its collusive pursuits, private schools wax fat on unprogressive subsidies, mum-and-dad investors gear negatively still, consumers acquire sleek, but petrol-guzzling 4-by-4s, and bonding footballers, partying adolescents, and screeching hoons articulate lesser social strata. But there can be no mystery about why this is so. In Australia, just as in Southeast Asia, the government’s interpretations of terrorist threats must be tempered by electoral considerations. But in so under-declaring the costs and risks, the war may be seriously misdirected.

Freed of electoral pressures and the need for interpretative spin, what would a more ingenuous set of threat perceptions and strategies look like? First, the government would acknowledge that its small thrust in faraway Iraq has done little to contain global terrorism. If anything, Australia’s role in Iraq has but sharpened the threat against its citizens. Further, this role may not even have secured so much American good will as had been hoped, evidently necessary for rendering Australia’s broader security more affordable. Rather, the US government is reportedly far more impressed with Australia’s achievements in East Timor and the Solomons.

Thus, in better directing its war on terrorism, the government might make one last interpretative spin, shifting its attentions to that part of the world in which it can make a difference—Southeast Asia. Indeed, while unlikely, of course, to quit Iraq, the government has lately begun at least to diversify its efforts, announcing in September the formation of six new Federal Police ‘flying squads’ through which to bolster its participation in the region. Of course, notions of pre-emption must be discreetly conveyed. But this is at last a step in the right direction. It just remains for the government fully to declare the new costs and risks to the voters.
Japan’s security policy, the US-Japan alliance, and the ‘war on terror’: incrementalism confirmed or radical leap?

CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES

Japan’s response to the ‘war on terror’, in the form of the despatch of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, has given policy-makers and academic analysts grounds for believing that Japan is becoming a more assertive military power in support of its US ally. This article argues that JSDF despatch does not necessarily mark a divergence from Japan’s previous security path over the short term. This is because its policy-makers have continued to hedge around commitments to the US through careful constitutional framing of JSDF missions and capabilities, allowing it opt-out clauses in future conflicts, and because it has also sought to pursue economic and alternative diplomatic policies in responding to terrorism and WMD proliferation in the Middle East. However, at the same time this article argues that Japan has established important precedents for expanded JSDF missions in the ‘war on terror’, and that over the medium to longer terms these are likely to be applied to the bilateral context of the US-Japan security treaty in East Asia, and to push Japan towards becoming a more active military power through participation in US-led multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’ in East Asia and globally.

Introduction: the speed, substance and significance of Japan’s response to 11 September

Is Japan becoming a more active military player, a more reliable US alliance partner, and, as some would dare say, a more ‘normal’ big power in regional and global security affairs? Japan’s response to 11 September and the ‘war on terror’ has further fuelled the ongoing debate on its security policy, and has given certain policy-makers and academic analysts grounds for believing that Japan is indeed becoming a more assertive military power (Miller 2002; Atlantic Council of the United States et al 2002; Okamoto 2002).1

The Government of Japan (GOJ) swiftly passed an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSM) by 29 October 2001 (subsequently revised four times between 2002 and 2004), enabling the despatch from November that year onwards of Japan Self-defence Forces (JSDF) units to support the campaign in
Afghanistan. Maritime Self-defence Force (MSDF) flotillas (consisting of fuel supply and transport ships and two destroyers), in combination with Air Self-defence Force (ASDF) transport aircraft have been charged with providing refuelling and logistical transport, medical and maintenance support to US and other forces in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. As of May 2004, the MSDF has supplied fuel to ships from the navies of the US, UK, Germany, New Zealand, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Greece; and transported Thai army equipment for reconstruction activities to Afghanistan. The JSDF’s range of action has been defined as including not just the sea and airspace of the Indian Ocean itself, but in addition the land territory of the states located along the coast of the Indian Ocean and the supply lines stretching back to Japan, Australia and the US.

Japan’s Diet then passed on 26 July 2003 a Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction (LCSMHRA), which has enabled Ground Self-defence Force (GSDF) and ASDF despatch since December of the same year to provide logistical support for US and coalition forces in Iraq and in the surrounding Persian Gulf states. The 600-strong GSDF unit has conducted reconstruction activities in Samawah, southwest of Basra, while the ASDF has flown supplies from Kuwait to the GSDF and transported US troops from Kuwait to Iraq.

Japan has certainly exhibited in the past a pattern of international and regional crises precipitating important changes in its security policy. The GOJ, as a result of its perceived failure to respond to US and international demands for a ‘human contribution’ during the Gulf War of 1990-91, eventually despatched minesweepers to the Gulf after the cessation of hostilities and then passed an International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992 to allow for SDF despatch on limited UN PKO missions (Hook 1996: 86-90; Yamaguchi 1992; Inoguchi 1991; George 1999; Woolley 2000). Similarly, the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 indicated the US-Japan alliance’s fundamental lack of political and military operability to respond to regional contingencies (Hughes 1996; Christensen 1999; Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). This created momentum for the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation from September 1997 onwards, and then the passage through the National Diet in May 1999 of legislation (known in Japan as the Sh hen Jitaib) to enable the SDF to provide logistical support to US forces in order to defend Japan in the event of regional contingencies around its periphery, or Sh hen.

Nevertheless, even given this track record of external crises and incremental expansions in Japanese security policy, many Japan watchers—not only foreign, but also domestic—have been taken aback at the unprecedented speed and the substance of the Japanese reaction to events, all indicating a possible major shift in its military posture. JSDF activities under the GOJ’s separate Basic Plans for despatch devised in line with the ATSML and LCSMHRA indicate the expansion of Japan’s military security role beyond previous legal frameworks. JSDF missions in the Indian Ocean and Iraq represent the first
time in the post-war period that Japan’s military has officially been despatched overseas during an ongoing conflict; and Japan has taken the decision in Iraq to put GSDF ‘boots on the ground’ for the first time in a conflict situation. The ATSML and LCSMHRA, although designating limits upon the geographical range of JSDF logistical operations in support of the US and other states, at the same time provide two forms of legal framework which expand the JSDF’s geographical scope of action far beyond that of the Sh_hen Jitaih_; enable new GSDF missions on the land territory of states included within the geographical range of the ATSML and LCSMHRA; and indicate that in the future, under new laws, the despatch of the JSDF in support of US forces could become almost limitless geographically. In addition, the ATSML and LCSMHRA have expanded the functional scope of JSDF despatch— differing from the IPCL and Sh_hen Jitaih_ in that they allow the JSDF use of weapons to protect not only the lives and bodies of individual JSDF personnel and their units, but also those who ‘have come under their control’, which has been read as meaning wounded personnel from US and other forces, and refugees from the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts.

Japan in responding to 11 September has certainly revealed its potential as a decisive and proactive military power. However, there is still no consensus among policy-makers and commentators with regard to exactly what type of precedent the ATSML and LCSMHRA set for the overall future trajectory of Japan’s security policy. It might be possible to interpret the new laws and JSDF operations as a series of one-off actions, produced by the extraordinary circumstances of the post-11 September security environment, Japan’s need to demonstrate support for the US for fear of losing its ally’s assistance against a resurgent North Korea nuclear crisis, and Prime Minister Koizumi’s bold but unusual leadership in committing Japanese support (Midford 2003; Sato 2003: 4). Hence, the ATSML and LCSMHRA may not lead to any fundamental deviation from the traditional pattern of the incremental expansion of Japan’s security role both independently and in conjunction with the US, which still leaves in place the constitutional and other prohibitions on the use of Japanese military power. Japan’s attempts to limit the type of capabilities and missions prescribed for the JSDF, including, as investigated below, Aegis despatch and JSDF non-combat zone operations, can be seen as one indication of its continued ultra-caution about committing military forces to overseas operations.

For others, as mentioned above, Japan’s recent actions represent a major incremental leap in its security policy that could take it to the point-of-no-return, or ‘crossing the Rubicon’, in terms of breaking with its past traditions. This is due to the fact that, even though the ATSML and LCSMHRA have not challenged openly many of the constitutional prohibitions on Japan’s exercise of military force and the role of the JSDF, they have established de facto precedents of cooperation with the US and other states in the case of the global ‘war on terror’ which mean that Japan will be obliged eventually to
apply the same levels of cooperation to bilateral security cooperation with the US in other regional and global crises (McCormack 2001; Sakamoto 2002). In particular, Japan’s support for the forces of the US and other states, which themselves were operating under the invocation of the principles of individual and collective self-defence respectively, has been interpreted as necessarily a *de facto* act of collective self-defence and breach of constitutional prohibitions.

Given the surprise at the substance of Japan’s response to the war on terrorism, and the divided debate over the exact significance of Japanese actions, the objective of this article is to investigate in depth the question as to whether it represents a confirmation of traditional patterns of security policy or a turning point and abandonment of incrementalism.

On the one hand, this article argues that in the short term the ATSML and LCSMHRA should not be overestimated in their significance. This is because the continued adherence of GOJ policy-makers to anti-militaristic principles or norms, their inherent fear of entrapment in US military conflicts, and the fact that they do not fully share the US vision of ‘the axis of evil’, mean that they have employed the same degree of ingenuity in framing the ATSML and LCSMHRA as in the *Sh hen Jitaih* so as to provide them with opt-out clauses in future conflict scenarios. GOJ policy-makers have ensured that most of the *de jure* restrictions on the despatch of the JSDF remain in place and could, with the necessary political determination, be reasserted as *de facto* restrictions—all indicating that US cannot expect automatic support from its ally in other conflict situations beyond the limited military assistance already supplied in the Afghan campaign and in Iraqi reconstruction. Furthermore, Japan’s actions in other non-military areas of security indicate that sections of the GOJ are still attempting to follow conceptions of comprehensive security and to act as an alternative form of ‘global civilian power’ (Funabashi 1991-1992).

On the other hand, this article argues that, despite the caution of Japan’s policy-makers, the ATSML and LCSMHRA do set potentially radical precedents for Japanese security policy over the medium to long terms, and strengthen the hand of the ‘normalisers’ in the policy system. Japan in participating in the ‘war on terror’ is becoming inured to the habits of multilateral cooperation, thereby providing the GOJ with the political confidence and the JSDF with operational experience to take part in future US-led multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’ and overseas expeditions, and marking a decline in Japan’s traditional post-war reluctance to become involved in overseas contingencies. The expansion of the geographical and functional scope of the JSDF could come to be applied to the bilateral domain of the US-Japan security treaty, as the GOJ finds it hard to maintain the deliberate political and constitutional ‘firewalls’ that it has erected to demarcate the support that it can provide to the US in the Afghan conflict under the ATSML and LCSMHRA from the support that it can provide to the US in a regional contingency under *Sh hen Jitaih* and the bilateral security treaty.
Japan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ thus points to a further incremental jump in the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance as the key determinant in the inter-state regional security order in East Asia.

In order to put forward this argument, this article is divided into four major sections. The first two sections respectively examine in more depth the policy-making motivations and legal frameworks that lie behind Japan’s response to the ‘war on terror’ and its despatch of the JSDF to support the Afghan campaign and Iraqi reconstruction. The third section then draws out the combined significance of these two examples of JSDF despatch by assessing how far they represent a divergence from or confirmation of past patterns of security behaviour in terms of Japan’s degree of willingness to commit itself to the military support of its US ally and the international community. This section then further pursues the question of incrementalism or radicalism in Japan’s security policy by juxtaposing its military role in the ‘war on terror’ against its non-military role and other diplomatic activity to determine how far it may be moving away from past traditions of security. The fourth section then completes the discussion by examining and speculating in what ways Japan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ has come to open up potential new multilateral frameworks for its utilisation of military power; how the ‘war on terror’ is likely to affect new developments in Japan-US military cooperation within the context of the bilateral security treaty in East Asia; and how these bilateral and multilateral frameworks are likely to influence each other and Japan’s future security path.

**Japanese policy-making and JSDF despatch to the Indian Ocean**

Japan’s key security policy-makers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and services of the JSDF were concerned to contribute to the US and international community’s campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan for a variety of motivations. Japanese policy-makers were certainly concerned that they would face gaiatsu (external pressure), similar to the time of the Gulf War, from its US ally to provide a human and military contribution to the international coalition, and that failure to respond could again jeopardise the political basis of the Japan-US alliance (September 2001, incidentally, marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the original bilateral security treaty). However, it also the case that gaiatsu only proved effective because it worked in combination with and amplified preexisting Japanese sentiment which reviled the terrorist attacks on the US and had increasingly advocated a greater role for Japan to contribute to the stability of international society. The events of 11 September confirmed for many Japanese the enhanced dangers to international society of transnational terrorism that had first been demonstrated by Japan’s own experience of the ‘hyper-terrorism’ of the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995 (Hughes 1998). The
opinion polls taken in reaction to the debates on 11 September indicated generally widespread public support for the despatch of the JSDF to provide logistical support for the US and other states.  

Therefore, much of Japan’s policy-making community and its citizenry were predisposed to the overseas despatch of the JSDF and support for the US and international community ‘war on terror’, so marking a major contrast from the time of the Gulf War. Nevertheless, Japanese policy-makers’ own anti-militaristic norms and general wariness of entanglement in US and international military contingencies meant that they also prepared careful political and legal fallback positions to allow Japan to circumscribe current and future military cooperation. This potential radicalism, but also inherent caution, among Japan’s policy-makers in responding to 11 September was demonstrated by their design of the provisions of the ATSML.

**Japan’s design of the ATSML**

MOFA, the JDA, and the LDP were all in accord from the start that Japan’s principal contribution, in line with US and international expectations, should be in the form of JSDF despatch and at least match that of the *Sh_hen Jitaih* in its functional scope, and thus include activities such as refuelling and logistical supply for US forces. Sections of the JDA and the LDP initially proposed that the GOJ should utilise the revised Japan-US Defence Guidelines and *Sh_hen Jitaih* as readily available and extendable framework to provide support for the US (Tamura 2001: 4; *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 September 2001: 4).

MOFA, and other elements of the LDP and JDA, though, moved to block these moves, preferring instead that the GOJ should enact a new legal framework for JSDF despatch. MOFA’s opposition to the application of the *Sh_hen Jitaih* was derived from a number of reasons. Firstly, the revised Defence Guidelines were regarded as overly restrictive of JSDF activities in the sense that the rationale for their activation was a military contingency that if left unaddressed would directly affect Japan’s security, a difficult case to argue in the case of Afghanistan. Moreover, Japan’s government had stated since 1999 that the Indian Ocean was not envisaged as within the scope of the Guidelines. Furthermore, the GOJ’s application of the Guidelines, which limit JSDF support for the US to sea and airspace, would have effectively ruled out MOFA’s hopes for possible GSDF despatch to Pakistan to provide medical assistance to US forces and refugees; viewed by the ministry as the most visible way for Japan to ‘fly the flag’ in support of its US ally (Yachi 2002: 12). Secondly, the revised Defence Guidelines were viewed as under-restrictive, in that, if used for the Afghan campaign, this would set a precedent for JSDF despatch that would undermine previous GOJ attempts to retain control over the geographical and functional scope of its military and so heighten the risks of entrapment in US regional and global military contingencies (*Asahi Shimbun*, 16 September 2001: 4).
Legal justifications and the UN: shifting from Article 9 to the Preamble

GOJ policy-makers also exercised considerable ingenuity in their interpretation of constitutional prohibitions in order to justify JSDF activities under the ATSML, while at the same time building into these interpretations limits to the precedents that could trigger a Japanese commitment to other military contingencies in support of the US. Japan’s search for a legal framework to allow JSDF despatch was complicated by its need to avoid any direct breach of its self-imposed constitutional prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. The US and NATO allies justified respectively their involvement in the Afghan campaign on the rights of individual and collective self-defence, rather than extant UN resolutions (Greenwood 2002: 311-312). Japan could have chosen to invoke the right of individual self-defence as a basis for JSDF despatch due to the number of fatalities of Japanese citizens on 11 September, but this would have then mandated a combat role for its military. Japan’s exercise of the right of collective self-defence was not an option constitutionally. Japan’s preference instead has been for a non-combat role that relies on the right neither of individual or collective self-defence, but is predicated on relevant UN resolutions.

Japan has stressed UN resolutions that identify the 11 September attacks as a threat to international peace in general and that call on all UN members, and by implication Japan as well, to take steps to counter terrorism. Japan has been able to link this UN legitimacy with its own constitution to legitimise JSDF despatch by switching emphasis from Article 9 (the so-called ‘peace clause’) to the Preamble. The Preamble states that Japan should work with international society for the preservation of peace, and thus the GOJ has been able to use the Preamble to argue that it should support the UN as international society’s highest representative and its relevant resolutions to counter terrorism. In turn, Japan has bridged UN resolutions, its constitution, and support provided for the US by emphasising that its support is not just for the US but for ‘other concerned states’ and the international community as a whole to expunge terrorism.

Japan and Iraq despatch

Japan’s policy-makers in the case of the ATSML and Afghan campaign, therefore, can be seen as preoccupied with the creation of frameworks to expand but also retain close control over JSDF missions for fear of becoming sucked against their will into US military strategy. Likewise, Japan’s despatch of the JSDF to Iraq displayed similar motivations and caution.
The ‘axis of evil’, the US-Japan alliance, and state-building

Japan, as in the case of other developed states and allies of the US, has displayed varying degrees of ambivalence about the war in Iraq and its aftermath. Its policy-makers are known to have questioned the legitimacy of the war in the absence of clear UN mandates; the necessity of military action and regime change, as compared to economic power and engagement, in countering Iraq’s alleged WMD programme; Iraq’s connections with 11 September and transnational terrorism, and the whole concept of the ‘axis of evil; the limitations of US capabilities and commitment for stabilising post-war Iraq; and the risks of Japanese military entrapment in US military adventurism in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. However, in the final calculation, Japan’s ambivalence has been overridden by concerns about the proliferation of WMD, and the alliance imperative of demonstrating support for the US in Iraq in order to counter the resurgent nuclear threat from North Korea (Kamiya 2004: 14-15). Moreover, Japan, despite its doubts about the US’s long term ability to commit itself to Iraq, and the failure of the US to involve the UN from an early enough stage, does take the task of state-building in Iraq very seriously, and believes that through JSDF despatch and economic assistance it can play an important security and reconstruction role.

Japan’s policy-makers ruled out from the start any direct support for the war in Iraq. Prime Minister Koizumi instead expressed ‘understanding’ for the US-led military action, and pledged the extension of the ATSML and JSDF deployments in the Indian Ocean in order to free up US forces for Iraqi operations. However, in the run-up to President George W. Bush’s declaration of the end of major combat hostilities in May 2003, Japanese policy-makers had already become engaged in efforts to contribute to post-war reconstruction. Japan sent fact-finding missions to Iraq and the region in the Spring of 2003. The GOJ next waited upon the passing of UN resolution 1483 calling upon member states to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq, and then succeeded in passing the LCSMHRA through the Diet by July in 2003 with less than five weeks of deliberation.

Japan’s final commitment to JSDF despatch was held up by Lower House Diet elections in November 2003, during which Prime Minister Koizumi watched for any adverse public reaction to the prospect of Iraq despatch, and by the general deterioration of the security situation in Iraq from mid-2003 onwards. Japan also spent a long time on determining the region within Iraq for GSDF despatch, rejecting US requests for deployments to Balad in support of US troops north of Baghdad as too risk-laden, and even considering the relatively stable Kurdish-controlled north. Japan decided upon Samawah in November, but bomb attacks upon Italian troops in Nasiriyah, around 100 kilometres north of Samawah, pushed back plans for despatch to early 2004.
Circumventing constitutional prohibitions in the LCSMHRA

Japan’s government in enacting the LCSMHRA and committing itself to JSDF despatch put forward a dual rationale. Prime Minister Koizumi stated upon the announcement of the Basic Plan for JSDF despatch under the LCSMHRA that the commitment of the JSDF was essential for maintaining confidence in the US-Japan alliance, and thus the essential mechanism for maintaining Japan’s own security. At the same time, the rationale of alliance preservation was presented in parallel with the need to assist the international community’s efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq. Koizumi in his statement deliberately conflated the US and UK with the international community, thereby conveying the impression of a broad based coalition on a par with the previous campaign in Afghanistan. Moreover, the LCSMHRA itself was predicated on the basis of UN resolutions 1458 and 1511, thus lending legitimacy to Japan’s participation in the US-led campaign, even though the degree of legitimacy conferred by these resolutions was actually relatively weak. Furthermore, Koizumi employed the same circumvention of constitutional prohibitions, as in the case of Afghanistan, in order to link Japan’s support essentially directed towards its bilateral ally with the domestically vaunted legitimacy of the UN and its own constitution. Koizumi in his statement stressed the constitutionality of JSDF despatch, but chose to read out, not Article 9, the previous arbiter of Japan’s security policy, but instead the Preamble. Hence, once again, Japan had succeeded in extending support for its US ally in the ‘war on terror’, without breaching the constitutional principle of the non-exercise of collective self-defence, and by wrapping up its actions in the legitimacy of UN multilateralism, however tenuous that may have been in the case of immediate post-war Iraq.

Implications of Afghan and Iraq despatch for Japan’s security policy

Japan attempting to hedge against entrapment

Japan’s design of JSDF despatch to the Afghan campaign and to Iraq demonstrates considerable subtlety, and, consequently, the implications of these activities for its overall security policy direction also need to be divined with some sophistication. Japan’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ does contain potentially radical implications for its security, but this should not be overstated. Japanese policy-makers in devising their response to Afghanistan and Iraq have remained highly wary of entrapment in US-inspired contingencies worldwide and within the East Asia region, and therefore continued to pursue hedging options to limit these risks. Japan has based the ATSML and LCSMHRA as the legal frameworks for JSDF despatch upon relevant UN resolutions. Moreover, the GOJ has ensured that each JSDF despatch to Afghanistan and Iraq is enabled by separate laws. The ATSML and LCSMHRA, although modelled on each other, and using the revised Defence
Guidelines as a form of legislative template, are in turn entirely separate from the legal framework of the US-Japan security treaty. Japan in using UN resolutions as the overt legal trigger for JSDF despatch has thus created opting-out clauses to escape involvement in US-led operations that it does not interpret as having a strong UN mandate, as in the case of the Iraq war. Japan’s use of separate laws for each JSDF despatch has erected a set of ‘firewalls’ between each mission, so enabling it to simultaneously push forward but also limit on a case-by-case basis the extent of support that it should provide to the US under the ATSML, the LCSMHRA, and the US-Japan security treaty. Japan’s intention to prevent any type of open-ended commitment to the Afghan and Iraq campaigns is shown also by the limited, although extendable, time frames on the expiry of both laws (set to run for a standard period of one year, and then subject to Diet review and revision), and the need for Diet ex post facto approval of despatch.

Japan’s continued caution in committing its military forces to overseas action is demonstrated further by the types of missions and capabilities chosen for the JSDF. The JSDF under the ATSML and LCSMHRA are deployed in non-combat zones (sent_ki ga okanawarete orazu) to limit the risks of embroilment in a conflict. Japan found the distinction between combat and non-combat zones easier to make in the case of the Afghan campaign, with the MSDF as its principal form of deployment, and the GSDF ultimately not sent to Pakistan. In the case of an Iraq ridden with insurgency, and despite its efforts to find the safest zone possible in Samawah, this distinction has been much harder for the GOJ to sell. The GSDF has thus had to endure greater risks in its Iraq mission, especially as the security deterioration around Samawah has further deteriorated in 2004. But it has limited these risks by essentially shutting itself up in its fortified camp since mid-2004.

JSDF capabilities in the Afghan campaign and Iraq have also remained limited, thereby limiting also the risks of becoming co-opted into combat duties. The GSDF in Iraq is far more heavily armed than on any previous mission. In addition to its usual equipment of pistols, rifles and machine guns, it has access to recoilless rifles, light anti-tank munitions, and wheeled armoured personnel carriers. But these are capabilities really only useful for self-defence, and in most cases the GSDF has looked for protection from Dutch troops stationed nearby. Japanese policy-makers have demonstrated similar caution in the Afghan campaign, refusing to despatch Kong_class Aegis war-fighting system-equipped (AWS) destroyers to the Indian Ocean area in its first deployments in November 2001, much to the frustration of the US and the MSDF. The GOJ only relented on this decision in December 2001, sending two AWS destroyers in rotation. Japanese policy-makers were deeply divided on the issue of Aegis despatch. They recognised that the AWS destroyers are the MSDF’s most capable assets and thus provide it with maximum flexibility and security in an uncertain theatre of operations. But policy-makers, and particularly the older guard of the LDP were concerned
that the high degree of inter-operability and data-linking systems between MSDF and US Navy warships equipped with the AWS might lead to US requests for Japan to deploy its naval assets as substitutes for those of the US. This would highlight problems of the exercise of collective self-defence and would risk that Japanese forces might become directly involved in combat operations.

The GOJ eventually took the decision for Aegis despatch only after persistent internal pressure from MOFA, the JDA, and the MSDF, all of whom sought to maximise the safety of Japanese forces and the degree of visible support for the US-led war effort. The despatch also came after the dampening down of hostilities in Afghanistan thereby minimising the risks that the JSDF would become involved in combat operations. Japanese caution was also seen in the decision not to despatch the GSDF to Pakistan under the ATSML. In part this decision was obviated by the relative lack of US casualties in the Afghan war and the ability of aid agencies to cope with refugee flows. But the government was also influenced by fears that the JSDF could become embroiled in land combat operations in the volatile environment of Pakistan.

**Japan’s non-military and diplomatic activity and the ‘axis of evil’: divergent policies to the US?**

In addition to the GOJ’s careful limiting of the degree of its military commitment under the ATSML and the LCSMHRA, it has also taken pains to balance this involvement in the ‘war on terror’ with other non-military and economic activity. Japan in responding to 11 September and the commencement of hostilities in Afghanistan launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign sending letters and special emissaries throughout September and October, including former prime ministers Hashimoto Ryōtarō and Mori Yoshirō, to Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Arab League of States (states with which Japan has traditionally cultivated close relations since the Oil Shocks of the 1970s), Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, urging these states to support the international effort against terrorism (Yachi 2002: 15). On the economic front, Japan, in line with UN Resolutions 1267 and 1333, also took measures on 22 September and 26 October to freeze the assets and restrict the money flows of a total of one hundred and eighty-eight individuals and groups related to the Taliban. On 22 September and then on 16 November, the GOJ decided to provide a total of US$300 million of bilateral assistance to Pakistan over the following two years for education, health and poverty reduction. The GOJ on 26 October also discontinued its limited sanctions on India and Pakistan imposed since May 1998 in response to their nuclear testing activities. Japan’s ‘assistance to countries surrounding Afghanistan’ also took the form of a total of US$18 million to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In addition to the emergency humanitarian assistance transported
by the ASDF and MSDF to Pakistan, as of February 2002 the GOJ has provided a total of US$102 million via the UN and other agencies to Afghan refugees and a pool of ¥580 million to Japanese non-governmental organisations (NGO) for refugee assistance. This Japanese activity then culminated in its recognition on 22 December of the Interim Authority as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and the hosting in Tokyo of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan on 21-22 January 2002. Japan at the conference pledged up to US$500 million for rebuilding the government and physical infrastructure of the country, and the conference itself raised a total of US$4.5 billion.

Japan’s extension of economic assistance clearly complemented the US’s overall strategy of seeking to stabilise friendly states around the region of Afghanistan, and in this sense was something of a repeat of Japanese assistance provided to Pakistan as a ‘country bordering on the area of conflict’ to support US Cold War strategy during the USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s (Hook et al., 2001: 210). At the same time, though, the GOJ was engaged in more than just another US-directed exercise in burden-sharing (or indeed burden-shifting, given initial Bush administration reluctance to engage in ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan), and its diplomacy and emphasis on the use of economic power reflected a degree of divergence in Japanese and US perceptions of the most appropriate means to respond to the challenge of al-Qaeda. The GOJ’s interest in dealing with immediate humanitarian problems and the reconstruction of the Afghan state was motivated by its past patterns of security policy which have viewed economic dislocation as root causes of intra- and inter-state security and the generation of terrorism (Hughes 1999: 12-25).

In the case of Iraq, Japan has also attempted to pursue a twin-track security contribution. JSDF despatch has been viewed as vital for a show of alliance unity with the US, but the GOJ also sees the GSDF as playing an important role in complementing its distribution of economic aid, and is genuinely committed to the task of state-building in Iraq. Japan at the International Donors’ Conference on Reconstruction of Iraq in October 2003 pledged US$5 billion (US$1.5 billion in grants; and US$3.5 billion in ODA loans) disbursed bilaterally and multilaterally, and in cooperation with NGOs. In this sense, Japan’s utilisation of economic power in Afghanistan and Iraq represents a reconfirmation of its conceptions of comprehensive security, Human Security, and its aspirations for the status of a ‘global civilian power’.

Moreover, Japan’s energetic diplomatic contribution in the Middle East has indicated that, far from totally falling into line with US intentions in the region, it has actually been preparing a diplomatic position that could allow it to stand aside from future US military actions. The fear has been that Japan’s support for the US in the campaign against terrorism and WMD will undermine its role as a relatively neutral interlocutor with the Arab and Gulf States; a position carefully built up since the oil shocks of the 1970s due to
Japan’s heavy reliance on imported oil, and provided to it by its status as the only non-Christian major developed power. Japan since 11 September has certainly portrayed itself as an intermediary between the West and the Middle East, but has possibly been more concerned to exploit this role in order to consolidate its position as a friend of Iran and the Arab states (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002). Japan has assiduously courted Iran, sending its Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to Iran in April 2002 and January 2004, and despite lining up with the US to express concerns about Iran’s possible evasion of IAEA safeguards it has, much to the discomfort of the US, sponsored the signing of new deal with Iran for the development of the Azegedan oil field. Japan, in addition, remains as one of the principal aid donors to the Palestinian Authority. Japan thus continues to count among its key priorities the maintenance of good relations and its oil supplies with Iran and the Arab world, all meaning that it may be hesitant to support the US in further military action in the region, and most especially against Iran, unless this was also supported by other regional powers, substantial evidence connecting these states to terrorism, and new UN resolutions.

New horizons for multilateral and US-Japan security cooperation?

Japan in the ‘war on terror’ thus can be seen to have pursued a highly cautious hedging strategy militarily and diplomatically to limit the risks of entrapment in US-inspired out of area contingencies. Japan is thus still some way from becoming the ‘Britain of the Far East’, lined up indefatigably, and perhaps dogmatically, in support of the US. However, despite Japan’s attempts to maintain incrementalism in the expansion of its security responsibilities, it is the case that its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has set crucial precedents for JSDF despatch which means that its security policy could be pulled in more radical directions in the near future.

As noted in the introduction to this article, the JSDF for the first time has been despatched during on-going conflicts, and it now has a mandate to use weapons not only for the defence of its own personnel but also for US personnel and refugees under its charge. The geographical scope of JSDF operations has expanded rapidly from being restricted to East Asia over the past fifty years, to now encompass in the past three years the sea, air and land space of an area stretching as far as the Middle East. Japan’s new found determination for JSDF despatch is also shown by the fact that its plans were not derailed by public resistance that might have arisen from the killing of two Japanese MOFA officials in Iraq in November 2003, the withdrawal of Spanish troops in 2004, or the widely publicised trauma of the kidnappings of Japanese citizens in April 2004 and killing of Japanese journalists in May of the same year.

Japan’s role in the ‘war on terror’ has also opened up new radical directions for JSDF activities in multilateral frameworks and the US-Japan alliance.
Japan might be able to fulfil an enhanced role in US-centred multilateral operations through an option known as collective security. Japan’s policy-makers in devising the ATSML and LCSMHRA, as explained in the section above, have been obliged to circumvent constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence by switching the emphasis of constitutional interpretation from Article 9 to the Preamble. Japan’s shift of constitutional interpretation has resulted in the creation, whether deliberately or inadvertently, of the same type of collective security option as proposed by policy-makers such as Ozawa Ichirō (briefly the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan) at the time of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Ozawa has long posited that greater attention should be paid to the Preamble and its emphasis on Japan’s need to contribute to the preservation of international peace. Collective security is seen to differ from collective self-defence, in that the latter is an inherent right under the UN Charter that can be exercised without UN approval, whereas the former is a right that can only be exercised if sanctioned by the UN and is for the purposes of collective retaliation by UN members against an aggressor (Mochizuki 1997). Japan’s use of the Preamble to justify the ATSML and LCSMHRA and JSDF despatch now meshes closely with this collective security concept. If Japan were to exercise this latent collective security option in the future then it would allow it to participate in all forms of UN-sanctioned security activities, including peace enforcement, both in conjunction with and separately from the US. Japan’s collective security option could make for expanded US-Japan cooperation in a range of UN mandated missions such as that of the Gulf War. But the collective security option could also allow Japan, based on UN resolutions, to remove its military capabilities from the context and control of the alliance and place these under the control of the UN Security Council, and thus actually hamper US-Japan alliance cooperation in instances where there is no sufficient UN mandate to act. Hence, even though the collective security option may open up a new range of possibilities for JSDF multilateral missions, it is for the very reason that these may conflict with bilateral alliance ties, that Japan is unlikely to exercise this as the overt basis for its security policy.

Instead, Japan is more likely to pursue a second set of radical options opened up for its security policy by the ‘war on terror’. Japan may realise in the future an expanded multilateral security role in line with precedents of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this is again likely to be within the context of US-centred ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’, with only a limited veneer of UN legitimisation, rather than more UN-centred frameworks that might create alternative multilateral channels for Japan’s military power. Japan is indeed learning the habits of multilateral interaction, but this is under US instruction and among existing US partners (whether refuelling the UK, transporting Thai army equipment, or relying on the Dutch for protection in Iraq), and to empower primarily US strategy and interests. The flip-side of this position is that Japan is unlikely to learn the substance of multilateralism
within its own East Asia region, or as a way to temper its dependence upon or bind its US ally.

In turn, Japan’s multilateral activity and role in the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq may serve to further strengthen radically the bilateral alliance with the US. Japan, having established the precedent of the expansion of the geographical and functional scope of military cooperation with the US in the Afghan context, may find it progressively tougher politically to turn down future requests from the US in the campaign against terrorism in other theatres. Japan may also find it politically hard to sustain the US-Japan alliance while simultaneously placing different, and possibly, seen from the US perspective, artificial restrictions on the support that it can provide to the US in the Afghan and Iraq conflicts under the ATSML and LCSMHRA and a regional contingency under the Shiben fitaib. If another regional crisis were to occur in East Asia, the reaction of US and GOJ policy-makers, the latter’s inherent caution not withstanding, might be to overtly transfer the principles and expertise acquired in drafting the anti-terrorism bill to the bilateral context of the US-Japan alliance and the Shiben fitaib. In this instance, the geographical range of the US-Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation could be greatly, or even limitlessly expanded if the situation demands; the JSDF might be able to operate in support of the US on the land territory of neighbouring states; and its use of weapons loosened for the protection of its own members and US servicemen ‘under its control’—all measures sure to generate intense controversy, if not apprehension, among certain East Asian regimes, such as North Korea and China.

**Conclusion: Japan’s leaning towards a more proactive security role in support of the US**

Japan’s support for the US and international community in the campaign against terrorism has indeed produced mixed signals about the future direction of its security policy. There is considerable evidence to suggest that JSDF despatch to the Indian Ocean may not be such a notable departure from past patterns of incrementalism. GOJ policy-makers continue to exercise extraordinary ingenuity in adhering to traditional constitutional and normative restrictions on the despatch of the JSDF, and they retain their usual wariness to avoid entrapment in US military strategy in other regional contingencies. Japan was ultra-cautious in designing the ATSML and LCSMHRA in such a way as to expand the range of possibilities of support for the US, but also to retain UN resolutions as the justification for JSDF despatch; to separate these missions from the context of the US-Japan security treaty; to limit the mission parameters and capabilities of the JSDF to non-combat roles and non-substitution roles for US forces; and to hedge round despatch with a variety of set time limits and measures for Diet approval. In these ways, GOJ actions in the ‘war on terror’ have been very much in line with the past precedent of the
Sh_hen Jitaib_, which also built in ambiguity with regard to Japanese cooperation for the US by emphasising that the scope of the Guidelines was functional and not geographical in nature, and thereby also refusing to rule in or out Japan’s military support in regional contingencies such as the Taiwan Straits (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/2002: 171-172; Smith 1999: 86-87). Japan has attempted once again to elude entrapment in US inspired contingencies regionally and globally.

However, while GOJ policy-makers may be able to hold to this traditional incrementalist line over the short term, this article has also sought to argue that this position may prove less tenable over the medium and longer terms. The evidence from the speed and substance of Japan’s reaction to 11 September suggests that potentially radical trends have been set in train in its military security policy. As noted above, over the medium term, the principal trend in Japanese security policy may be for greater US pressure for Japan to transfer the provisions of the ATSML to the Sh_hen Jitaib_, and for Japan to take an ever greater role in US-led multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’. Japanese discussions since mid-2003 for the creation of a permanent and single law for international peace cooperation and for a segment of the JSDF as a standing force dedicated to this purpose point in these types of directions. Such a law might provide Japan with a more flexible means for JSDF despatch rather than having to pass a law through the Diet for each mission. But the essential purpose of this multinational force in serving bilateral alliance aims may not change. For a JSDF force may be available under the law for UN-centred missions, but given US-Japan alliance ties and the prevailing international political situation it is more likely that its prime purpose would be for despatch on US-led multinational coalitions for international peace. Japan would then edge towards becoming the ideal ally: providing not just bases and logistical support for the sword of US power projection as at present under the security treaty, but also providing under an international security cooperation law fully interoperable air, sea, and, most importantly, ground forces for the support of US expeditionary warfare on a global scale.

Moreover, Japan is now increasingly equipped with a policy-making structure that may make it a more proactive security actor. It is clear that the ‘normalisers’ are increasingly in charge of Japan’s security policy. The Prime Minister’s Office after 11 September has enhanced its role in coordination among relevant security policy-making actors. MOFA has strengthened its bilateral ties with the US policy community; and the JDA has elevated its overall role in the policy process; while all the time the JSDF is strengthening its bilateral operational contacts with the US. Finally, in a complete turn-around from the Gulf War, the GOJ experienced almost no meaningful resistance in the Diet in passing the ATSML and LCSMHRA. All this may herald a much more rapid and substantial Japanese military response in support of the US in future conflict scenarios in East Asia as well as globally.
Japan may not yet have totally ‘crossed the Rubicon’ in its security policy as a consequence of the ‘war on terror’, but has incrementally put in place many of the components of an expanded and more proactive security policy that will enable it to make such a radical leap. The trigger for this leap in security policy over the short term is most likely to be North Korea. Prime Minister Koizumi’s government has offered political and military support to the US in Iraq, in the expectation that the US will remain engaged in trilateral efforts with Japan and South Korea, and the Six-Party Talks, in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Japan’s optimum policy for dealing with North Korea remains a mix of deterrence and active engagement in the hopes of avoiding an unwanted conflict, as shown by Koizumi’s diplomatic visits to North Korea in September 2002 and May 2004. Japan will hope to nudge the US back towards engagement. But if US patience with engagement fails, North Korea presses ahead with its program, and the US turns to other means to resolve the issue, Japan will be forced to prioritise its alliance with the US and move towards the full implementation of the 1997 revised Guidelines, but this time augmented by the precedents for alliance cooperation set in Afghanistan and Iraq. All this then argues that Japan’s future security direction is likely to be one towards assuming the status of a more ‘normal’ military power, but one operating firmly within the framework of a strengthened US-Japan bilateral alliance and US-led coalitions of the willing, which will only further increase US dominance over the security landscape of East Asia for the foreseeable future.

Notes
1. James Auer, the former Director of Japan Affairs at the Department of Defence, even claimed that Japan’s support for the US after 11 September would be an opportunity to make amends for Pearl Harbour. James E. Auer, ‘Japan’s chance to reverse Pearl Harbor’, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/pearlhauer.html.
3. For instance, an opinion survey taken in the Mainichi Shimbun, one of the leading Japanese dailies, reported that 63 per cent of respondents were in favour of some form of JSDF despatch. In terms of the actual contents of this support provided by the SDF, 56 per cent favoured non-military support in the form of medical and humanitarian aid for refugees, 26 per cent favoured food and transport logistical support for US forces, 6 per cent favoured the supply of weapons and ammunition, and 4 per cent Japan’s actual participation in combat. Mainichi Shimbun, 25 September 2001, http://www.mainichi.co.jp/news/selection/archive/200109/25/2001092600000m010069000c.html.
4. Interview with Director level official, National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, MOFA, Tokyo, 29 March 2002.
5. Takano Toshiyuki, then Director General of MOFA’s North American Affairs Bureau stated in the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on 13 May 1998 that the occurrence of a regional contingency in the Middle East or the Indian Ocean could not
realistically be imagined to be of a degree sufficient to impact on Japan’s own security and thus invoke the revised US-Japan Guidelines. Dai142kai Kokkai Sh_gin Gaimuinkai Kaigiroku Dai 11g , 13 May 1998, p. 9. Prime Minister Obuchi in the House of Councilors deliberations on the Sh _ben Jitaih _ on 28 April 1999 commented that while the definition of Japan’s periphery could not be strictly geographically defined it did have limits which meant that the Middle East and Indian Ocean were not envisaged to be within the scope of the bill for the Sh _ben Jitaih _ . Dai145kai Kokkai Sangiin Honkagai Kaigiroku Dai 17g , 28 April 1999, p. 12.

7. Interview with MSDF officer and member of MSDF Staff Office, JDA, Tokyo, 26 March 2002.

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Softly, softly to Iraq: removing the inverted commas from Japan’s security contributions

DONNA WEEKS

This article considers the Japanese Government’s decision to send self-defence force personnel to Iraq ‘for humanitarian assistance’ as a basis for examining the tensions between expectations and aspirations of Japan’s security identity. The deployment presents us with an opportunity to examine prevailing assumptions about international security and what it means for Japan’s international ‘contributions’. The article seeks to explore the theoretical constructs and practical constraints which foster the tension between those who expect Japan’s military capability to be equal to its economic status (that is, a ‘normal power’) and those who champion Japan’s ‘comprehensive security’ position as a long-standing alternative security interpretation. The article acknowledges that while the deployment may well represent the very limits of constitutional interpretations of the famous Article 9 (or peace clause), it also presents an option which ought to withstand ongoing international and domestic pressures to revise the 1947 Constitution.

In 1946, in the aftermath of World War II, a victorious, occupying United States coerced a compliant and defeated Japan into accepting a constitution drafted for the time. The new constitution embodied a range of rights and freedoms—a glimmer of the ability of the victorious power constructing another in its own image—it turned the Emperor from god to symbol, clarified a system of parliamentary democracy owing more to the Westminster system than to the presidential, and most significantly, endowed the defeated and occupied nation with a constitutional article which withdrew the right of Japan ever to act as a belligerent state again. That article, cited here, has remained a constituent construct of Japanese security identity in the decades since. Domestically, the Japanese polity can be divided according to its support for the preservation and protection of the article or agitation for a wholesale change to its meaning, even an elimination of its constraining nature.1 Internationally, and almost in defiance of this constitutional constraint, there have been more strident calls for Japan to match its economic strength with a concomitant military flex of muscle.
Article 9

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.²

What, if anything, might Article 9 mean in the era of the War on Terror given the Japanese Government’s despatch of self-defence forces to Iraq and assistance in Afghanistan? In the brief hiatus between the end of the Cold War and the onset of the new era in global polarisation, it was the perhaps naive hope that the end of the Cold War might usher in broader and more imaginative responses to constructions of ‘security’, with the Japanese model of ‘comprehensive security’ a leading candidate. Does the War on Terror—through a coalition of the (willingly) coerced—necessarily commit Japan to an era of ‘remilitarisation’ as seems anticipated or is there still room (and time) to engage with Japan’s international contributions in a less predictable way? To tackle this question, this article seeks to contextualise the despatch of the SDF to Iraq in terms of a Japanese security identity. In order to do so, this article sets aside the contentious Article 9 as centrepiece of the security debate—since its amendment is not immediately foreshadowed³—and instead, argues that the despatch ought to be viewed legitimately within the context of what has become known as ‘comprehensive security’. The starting point of the analysis, however, is not the oft-heralded 1980 policy document on comprehensive security instigated by the then Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi. Rather, this article will forge a deeper construction by beginning with the time when Japan was compelled to seek alternative security constructs through the stripping of its rights to belligerence: 1946. In tracing the precedents of ‘comprehensive security’, the article argues that a Japanese security identity lies outside the constraints of Article 9 and indeed supports the view that in making international contributions of the type witnessed in the War on Terror, Japan can perhaps finally remove the inverted commas which plague its contributions to international security.

The main documentary evidence informing this proposal is a report written in 1946 by a special committee under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Keizai Saiken no Kihon Mondai—‘The Basic Problems in Rebuilding the Japanese Economy’—(hereafter referred to as the ‘1946 Report’). This document underwrites a basic Japanese postwar security orientation guided by a security identity based on resource acquisition. Shigen busoku—lack or paucity of resources—is a recurring theme in postwar Japanese documents and commentary across a range of issues. The concept constitutes a key pillar of Japanese security culture/identity which, in turn, underscored the articulation of Japan’s security policy for the 1980s: ‘comprehensive security’ as promoted by Prime Minister Ohira.
The security discourse has been dominated almost exclusively by European and North American scholars and strongly influenced by their respective neorealist and liberal-institutionalist preconceptions. Japanese literature and documentation indicates that, through *shigen busoku*, Japan was forced to create and maintain a normative expectation of resources as security identity (in contrast to Thomas Berger’s identification of a ‘norm of anti-militarism’). Jutta Weldes’s explanation of national interests suggests that the traditional realist concepts have difficulty in explaining ‘the adoption by a state of particular policies over alternative means for achieving security’ (Weldes, 1996: 278). She reiterates the point made earlier by Wendt that to explain states’ interests and actions, we need a theory that accounts for the ‘intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests’ of states (Wendt cited in Weldes, 1996: 279). This section of this article articulates a position for Japan’s security identity where other elements, circumventing the constitutional article imposing non-belligerence, operate as referents for Japan’s national interests and a way for ‘explaining the adoption of a particular set of policies’ by Japan for achieving security since the end of World War II.

By way of facilitating a framework for bridging Japanese and European conceptions of post-Cold War security, two authors are of interest here for the similarity in their approaches in defining ‘security’ in the mid- to late 1990s. Both Bill McSweeney and Tanaka Akihiko introduced their respective examinations of the meaning of ‘security’ using a similar method of interrogating orthodox meanings of the term and using these observations as a basis for identifying how notions of its meaning have been subsequently constructed and revised. Their respective points of commonality and contrast offer a valuable starting point for bridging the linguistic nexus between Western and Japanese security thinking.

For Tanaka, the word ‘security’ begins with an orthodox definition of ‘preserving the safety of the state and citizenry from external invasion’ or ‘protecting the safety of the state from attacks by (sources) external to the country by means of military alliance, economic cooperation or neutrality’ (Tanaka, 1997: 1). Both of these ‘dictionary definitions’ he notes are overwhelmingly ‘military and state-centric’ in meaning and yet the meaning of security (*anzen bosho*) for Japanese people, he hypothesises, should probably envisage a far greater phenomenon than these narrow, military-oriented concepts suggest. He then contrasts the Japanese term *anzen bosho* with the English word ‘security’ which he says is not as narrowly defined. In English, the word ‘security’ is not limited to a meaning of protecting the state but also includes aspects of an individual’s safety or security. Rather, when the security of the state or citizenry is discussed, ‘in most cases the term “national security” is used’ (Tanaka, 1997: 2). Taking Tanaka’s approach one step further, however, a specialist Japanese dictionary of politics circumvents a definition of *anzen bosho* (‘security’) altogether, preferring to define the political sense of...
the word as ‘collective security’, that is *shudanteki anzen hosho*, when ‘several states collectively pursue security’ (Abe et al., 1978: 9, 131).

McSweeney likewise challenges us to rethink the etymology of the word ‘security’: as a noun it is a tangible object—a lock, alarm or weapon used to defend or protect; but in its adjectival form, ‘secure’ suggests enabling or making something possible (McSweeney, 1999: 13–14). He notes that the meaning of ‘security’ has evolved from a positive to a negative—from a psychological condition of the carefree to a material condition which ‘we worry about, tighten, fear’ (McSweeney, 1999: 16).

McSweeney also draws to our attention to a further critical differentiation in the use of the term which reflects a distinction that can be found in Japanese analyses (including Tanaka’s comprehensive discussion) but remains subliminal rather than explicit. A rather simple transfer of meaning occurred when in various countries the ‘War Department’ became the ‘Department of Defence’ when in fact the function of this state institution was ‘security’, not ‘defence’ (McSweeney, 1999: 19). McSweeney suggests that this shift to security was linked to the concept of ‘national interest’ and, as Tanaka noted above, the perception of its content in relation to the new idea and the doctrine of “national security”’ (McSweeney, 1999: 19). Thus we begin to derive a point of intersection between Tanaka’s and McSweeney’s linguistic analyses. The site of semantic contestation intensifies when we include the distinction in Japanese between *anzen hosho* (security) and *boei* (defence) which, though observable in Tanaka’s work, is far more pronounced in the work of other analysts, for example Tsuyoshi Kawasaki whose argument for a realist interpretation of Japanese security policy is in fact a revision of Japanese defence policy as articulated by policymakers in the 1970s (Kawasaki, 2001). Tanaka, on the other hand, quite explicitly states that his text on ‘security’ has less to do with being a book on Japan’s ‘postwar military, self-defence and alliance history’. It is more to do with exploring the perspective of how Japanese people were ‘secured’ during the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–52), a period during which ‘it could not be said there were no security problems but rather the security problems which did exist involved how Japanese people might be protected’ (Tanaka, 1997: 2–3). Indeed, Tanaka’s key concerns with regard to security recall both Finnemore and Weldes: for Tanaka in its simplest form, ‘what is protected is the object of security; from what (we) are protected is security’s threat and how (we) are protected is the means of security’ (Tanaka, 1997: 4).

**Insecurity and vulnerability in the Japan of 1946**

The context of such linguistic analysis underlines its relevance to the document subjected to this analysis: the ‘1946 Report’. Compiled in the months after Japan’s wartime surrender, it contains some fundamental notions of Japanese security policy—if we are prepared to view it in the terms defined by Tanaka
above. Indeed, McSweeney’s reappraisal of ‘security’ inferring ‘vulnerability’ becomes relevant here in the context of understanding Japan’s security concerns as a function of its self-perception of ‘vulnerability’ at a time when it sought to rebuild following wartime devastation (McSweeney, 1999: 13). Justification for using the 1946 Report as a primary referent can also be inferred by applying Ruggie where he argues that a core constructivist concern is where ‘world views’ are of great interest: civilisational constructs, cultural factors, state identities, together with how they shape states’ interests and patterns of outcomes. Further, he notes, that what differentiates a constructivist reading of principled beliefs is that [a constructivist] makes the case that principled beliefs are not simply theoretical fillers but that they ‘lead states to redefine their interests or even their sense of self’ (Ruggie, 1998: 19). Murakami Yasusuke noted that the basic policy orientation of postwar Japan was established in the first few decades after the war and it ‘included the national consensus of catching up with the advanced countries in economic policies’. He further argued the policy orientation thus constituted ‘the national goals that conditioned the postwar Japanese political economy’, and subsequently set in train ‘the locus of Japanese society in the following decades’ (Murakami, 1987: 37). This assertion reflects Ruggie’s point about norms driving the identification of national interests.

In more recent years as sociological interpretations (or intersubjective constructions) of international relations have gained greater scholarly influence, commentators have sought to contextualise Japan’s latter twentieth century development in its immediate postwar experiences. Soeya Yoshihide, in his discussion on economic security, notes that after the devastation of World War II, reconstruction of Japan’s national economy became a top priority. In his identification of Japan’s ‘dual identity’, he observed it ‘[affected] the most fundamental aspect of national security, the survival of the people [and the situation] allowed the Japanese policy makers to devote their attention to economic development while taking advantage of Pax Americana’ (Soeya, 1998: 207). The architects of the 1946 Report identified Japan’s immediate postwar strategic circumstances as demanding a ‘dual personality’ with regard to the national interest choices to be made.

Laura Hein’s study of Japan’s early postwar economic growth and the perception/image of ‘vulnerability’ is instructive in this regard. It led her to conclude that ‘…in the harsh environment of post surrender Japan, economic decisions necessarily also shaped political and social choices’ (Hein, 1993: 103). She further noted that ‘the postwar economy depended on powerful birthrights from both the prewar and wartime eras…[p]ostwar Japan shared significant intellectual continuities with the prewar Japanese economy, as well as drawing on a strong presurrender economic base’ (Hein, 1993: 103). The 1946 Report supports her contention.

The economic ‘shocks’ of the early 1970s saw the re-emergence of ‘vulnerability’ as a predominant feature in Japanese politics. Hein has recalled that
‘most Japanese felt increasingly insecure (emphasis in original) about their place in the global economy...the real consequences of [Nakayama’s] economic strategy—a fundamental interdependence with the international economy—became vividly clear. A clear sense of vulnerability [emphasis added] over vital imports of food and fuel swept the nation...wealth without economic security suddenly seemed pointless’ (Hein, 1993: 115).

In *Embracing Defeat*, John Dower discusses the 1946 Report even more explicitly. In the section entitled ‘planning a cutting-edge economy’ much of his attribution to the 1946 Report is revealed: ‘although never elevated to the level of official policy, this lengthy study [the 1946 Report] proved as close to a long-term blueprint for subsequent policy making as one can find’ (Dower, 1999: 538). Following Hein’s observations and supporting Ruggie’s and others’ assertions of the historical import of constructivist discourse, Dower noted that several of the members of the Report committee had been purged from university positions for their leftist sympathies, and all of them were aware of and sensitive to the ideological, technocratic and technological trends of the time. Given their backgrounds, their commitment to domestic welfare, national prosperity, and the creation of a nonmilitarised economy was strong while their interests in ‘capitalism’ as such seemed less identifiable.

**The 1946 Report and the construction of security/insecurity**

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Japan's key goal was rebuilding its economy. This required access to key natural resources from overseas sources and in a peaceful regional and international environment conducive to doing so. Akao Nobutoshi has since identified the resource challenge facing his country:

> [R]aw material problems ... have far-reaching implications for Japan’s security and foreign policy. In order to ensure stable supplies of important raw materials, it will be essential for Japan to maintain close friendly and interdependent relations with their producers. (Akao, 1983:9).

Akao’s view, although written in the early 1980s, was consistent with sentiments articulated by members of the 1946 Gaimusho committee charged with assessing how Japan could go about rebuilding the national economy in the immediate post-Pacific War period. The 1946 Report was the result of the committee’s deliberations. The committee was chaired by young Tokyo University engineering graduate Okita Saburo, who would eventually become a prominent figure in Japan’s postwar development. It sets out the requirements for rebuilding the Japanese economy and the objectives required to reach that goal. It should be considered an important cornerstone of Japan’s national interests in the years following World War II and, arguably, the ‘starting point’ of Japan’s postwar foreign policy for which security of the supply of resources became a primary focus.
In his memoirs written approximately 35 years later, Okita reflected at length on the circumstances surrounding the formation of the Special Committee and the discussion and writing of the Report. Indeed, in an interview with this author in 1991 when in his late seventies, his thoughts and comments on the importance of the document were as lucid and enthusiastic as if the Report had been published recently rather than almost half a century before. In that interview he remarked that he was ‘surprised that a student from Australia might be interested in the contents of this report’. Subsequently, in his foreword to the revised English translation of the Report in 1992, Okita noted,

Looking back at the policies which the economists and intellectuals of the day recommended to reconstruct an economy devastated by war gives us many new insights into Japan’s relations with the rest of the world today. (Okita, 1992: viii).

Okita’s observation is the key to the reorientation of this articulation of security interests. As the nature of the broader security debate has turned, the Report has become a distinctive path of enquiry for understanding the nature of the Japanese security construct. It is this sentiment expressed by Okita so many years after the Report was written, and his comments during the interview, that suggested the potential for this report as a key referent for Japanese security. Okita has written of this historic period in his memoirs at some length. In his reflections, Okita noted that the 1946 Report stands as ‘tribute’ to the study of economics in Japan (Okita, 1981: 59) and suggested that a ‘rationale’ for Japan’s economic approach could be found in the eleventh article of the Potsdam declaration in particular that ‘Japan’s participation in world trade should be permitted’ at which point he noted that ‘we needed to rationally and concretely calculate which industries would best support a peaceful economy’ (Okita, 1981: 67; emphasis added).

A ‘reconstructed’ reading of the Report, however, can define these economic concerns as predominant issues of security particularly given the inevitability of Article 9. It can also illuminate the efforts of Japanese government leaders to develop a more evenly balanced political and economic relationship. Can one use what appears to be an ostensibly economic policy document as a construct for Japan’s security identity? The answer to that perhaps lies partly in the Report itself. In addition to the interpretations of Hein, Dower and others previously cited, Omori Tokuko also noted in her introductory essay to the English translation that,

the [Special Survey Committee] held its meeting as planned but began activities with the express aim of accurately perceiving the current state of the Japanese economy, from a foreign policy point of view, under the new postwar situation. (Omori cited in Ohira, 1992: xv).
The Report clearly had long-term goals in mind, perhaps even a ‘grand strategy’. It sets out a number of basic issues which in retrospect offer inescapable parallels for contemporary Japanese security postures and behaviour. Of interest here is the fact that the Committee charged with writing the 1946 Report was not remiss in establishing the reconstruction of the Japanese economy firmly in the international context. The following section examines how the Committee, through its Report, saw Japan’s place in the postwar world order, (with a view to drawing out themes which resonate in Japan’s current debate).

*The International Environment: Japan as a Bridge Between ‘Two Blocs’*

From its opening paragraphs, the Report seeks to place Japan in its international environment, defining the new conditions under which the country must rebuild. Losing control over sectors of Asia where it had wartime authority made it difficult for a country which has a high degree of dependence on external resources. Indeed, the Report notes that ‘losing political sovereignty results in an increase in dependence on foreign countries in economics’ (p. 8). The legacy of this ‘renunciation’ is evident on p. 39 of the Report which lists the major resources procured by Japan from the countries and regions which it lost. This notion is reiterated further where it is observed that while the development of foreign trade is a ‘desirable direction’ for Japan to take,

over-dependence on foreign trade makes the economic foundation too unsteady and [can] harm stable development. Failing to secure a degree of independence and instead relying on a foreign economy can lead to economic and political colonisation (p. 75).

This important assessment of resisting the danger of becoming beholden to ‘one foreign economy’ is interesting, given Japan’s immediate past history. One cannot help but underscore the irony of a former imperialist power (Japan) now finding itself in the position of needing to ‘secure a degree of independence’ in order to avoid ‘economic and political colonisation’. Could Japan pursue economic and strategic independence on its own or was alliance with another country inevitable?

This brings us to one of the more intriguing aspects of the Report and perhaps the origins of the ‘dual identity’ of Japan’s international interaction as recently observed by Soeya. One of the major issues with which the Report deals is the influence on Japan’s economy given its position as the ‘contact zone’ between the Soviet and Western bloc countries. By 1946, there was already an implicit recognition of Japan as a member of the Western bloc nations (defined as the ‘US-UK bloc’) while at the same time remaining ambivalent about its status:
At present, although subsumed in a way in the western bloc, our position of receiving influence from both camps will mean much complexity in our international environment and the rise and fall of both blocs will have great influence on Japan’s politics and economics (p. 8).

The Committee in charge of the Report reviewed the relative significance of the East Asia policies of the UK and the US in the wake of the war and due recognition was given to the probable shift in the balance of power to the United States. There are three key points to be stipulated here. The first point is that the relative voice or influence in East Asia of both the UK and the US would invert, that is, ‘it would probably be the United States, rather than the United Kingdom, whose control in East Asia would strengthen’. The second point is that the relative significance of East Asia in US foreign policy would increase and the US would come to have a ‘growing attachment’ to East Asia, compared with the period before the war. The third point, highlighting Japan’s economic and industrial interests, was concerned with the relative importance of Japan and China to the US and the UK, given that power structures within the region, had also changed. The ‘centre of gravity’ in East Asia issues, as a result of the war, had shifted to China and the position of Japan became secondary. There was the question of whether or not America would combine its own economy with that of China or tie its economy to the East Asia region as a whole, with cooperation in the division of labour within the region. However, ‘whichever path America chose, it would have great influence on the future Japanese economy, in particular, Japanese industrialisation’. As for influence from the Soviet bloc, it might not only have direct impact on Japan, but also on the fortunes of either the Nationalist Party or the Communist Party in neighbouring China. The outcome of that contest could directly affect Japan’s own politics and economy.

In summing up this apparent position of ambivalence, the Report noted that while its political and economic position was subject to complex influences as a result of bordering on both blocs, at the same time

[J] could undertake a positive mission as that of a political and economic go-between, seeking to unite in harmony the social organisations which both blocs represent (p. 9).

Further evidence of this ambivalence was expressed on page ten of the Report where it was noted that before World War II, Japan had a ‘dual personality’: towards East Asia, Japan was an ‘advanced industrial country’ which imported raw materials from the region and exported textiles and manufactured goods whereas towards the West, specifically Europe and America, Japan was an ‘industrial manufactures importing country’, importing machinery and other similar goods (p. 10).

Another noteworthy aspect of the Report was Japan’s recognition of its place in the Pacific region, later to be manifested in policy pronouncements such as comprehensive security and various Pacific Rim community concepts.
Discussed in terms of the geographical characteristics of the Japanese economy, the Report noted Japan’s geographical position in the world observing that,

from now on the prosperity forecast between the Asian region, Oceania, North and South ‘America’ and Japan [lies in] the sea transportation combining them. It is on this point that we can see the possibility of Japan playing an important role in the world’s commercial trade (p. 15).

‘World prosperity’, ahead of but not excluding Japan’s own economic recovery, was another key theme throughout the Report. Despite Japan’s reluctance to put its industrial sector on hold, great emphasis was always put on encouraging prosperity and global stability. Even as a ‘weaker nation’, the Report insisted that Japan see as its ‘important mission’ that it should be among the smaller countries to ‘speak out bravely for world prosperity and peace’ in the face of the major powers which will ‘manage the postwar economy’ and, by virtue of their power, could bring about ‘arbitrary and self-complacent actions’ (p. 92). It is again a further irony that in the contemporary world, Japan, having gained ‘major power’ status in most people’s minds, should have once been so apparently reluctant to take a stand or ‘speak out bravely’ on international issues.

What makes the 1946 Report so significant is its timeliness. It was written post-surrender but sufficiently independently of any undue influence from the Allied Occupation (chiefly American) authorities. It indicates that the ‘foreign policy’ aspirations of Japan were to rebuild its economy and take its place in the world in an environment of peaceful cooperation and mutual understanding. It may be that in expecting Japan to behave in its security orientation the way that orthodox security discourse of the time would have defined it, that is, with a heavy emphasis on a military-industrial complex, that most analysts have been unable to recognise other dimensions of Japanese security policy as readily.

In the very last paragraph of the 1946 Report the Committee expresses its ‘earnest hope’ that readers consider the paper as a ‘stepping stone’ to further research. The Report was composed as a starting point, not as a final destination (p. 193). In the immediacy required of analysis of Japan’s security expectations and demands, such as contributions to international peacekeeping efforts or response to the United States administration’s drive to eliminate transnational terrorist organisations, it is easy to overlook the longer term interests and underlying philosophies which guide a nation’s international intercourse. The Report could be considered an example of long-term policy evaluation that fulfilled this requirement during the time it was written.

For his study on the feasibility of multilateral security institutions, like the CSCE for East Asia, Peter van Ness interviewed Okita in 1991. Okita’s response was that such a concept already exists but inasmuch as:
the structure of foreign trade, aid, investment and technology transfer between Japan and the rest of East Asia that has been carefully constructed in the post-World War II period by the Japanese...[suggesting a comparison with the prewar Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere] many of the objectives are the same: gaining access to vital natural resources and markets for Japan’s industrialisation. But the means are quite different. ...Japan’s relations (are) built on voluntary cooperation rather than enforced compliance and the result would have substantial benefits for all parties... (van Ness, 2001: 10–11).

In other words, while perhaps not explicit at the time, the parameters of Japan’s identification of its security interests were heralded in the shadow of surrender. As van Ness rather accurately perceived Japan’s security machinations in terms of relative and absolute gains, he argued that unlike the logic of realist thinking focused on relative gains for the different countries, the foundation for strategic stability for the region was to be found in the absolute gains for all parties derived from economic interdependence. Further, he noted that,

although the United States and Japan are obviously economic competitors in markets throughout the world, Japanese economic policy in East Asia, when understood in Okita Saburo’s sense as security policy, serves to sustain and support the US hegemonic role (van Ness, 2001: 11; emphasis added).

As confirmed by van Ness, in Okita Saburo, we have seen how one man’s vision for (resource) security has engendered clear normative implications for Japan’s policy objectives for several decades. Analysis of Japan’s security stance must therefore surely encompass elements of this norm of ‘resource security’.

Forging security identities and ‘comprehensive security’

Amid the fluidity in the international relations discourse prompted by the end of the Cold War, one might have expected Japan’s much-heralded ‘comprehensive security’ policy announced in 1980 to garner more interest than it did. Some commentators acknowledged its ‘difference’ such as the following quote from a textbook on International Relations which stands out as a typical example of linkage made between Japan’s economy and security:

...Japan has gradually created its own concept of international security...which links security with economic relations (trade and investment) and foreign aid. Japan is as dependent as ever on natural resources from foreign countries but Japanese leaders now believe that military capabilities are not useful for obtaining such resources (Goldstein, 1996: 88).
From the time when Prime Minister Miki Takeo issued the clarion call for the population to ‘think differently’ about security, Japanese analysts have gravitated towards embracing a broader, more enriched perspective of national security than that of mere strategic dependency on the United States. They have viewed the development of Japan’s security posture as a gradual but distinct process of coming to terms with a traditional legacy of identity shaped by apprehensiveness about the outside world. Comprehensive security emerged as the litmus test for operationalising the quest to the ensuing debate about the best means to adopt for overcoming this self-perceived vulnerability.

In 1980, one of several study groups set up by the then Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi (who died before the groups could present their final reports) outlined an explicit response to competing demands of an international community which (even then) beckoned a more concrete security role from Japan. There was visible domestic pressure for the prime minister and government which wanted to be seen to be responsive to external expectations with regard to Japan’s increasing economic power. The group charged with the key issues for Japan’s security responded with the following main themes:10

- closer cooperation with the United States
- the strengthening of the self-defence forces
- the improved management of relations with the [then] USSR and China
- maintaining energy security, and
- maintaining food security (Ohira Study Group, 1980: 44)

Reviewing the five areas it is apparent that the intent of ‘comprehensive security’ was to be more broadly defined than exclusive military security (although the ‘strengthening’ of the self-defence forces was clearly a priority). John Chapman, for example, noted Ohira’s motivation to embrace a flexible concept of comprehensive security by directly quoting his expressed policy motivation:

As far as comprehensive security policy in the broad sense is concerned, my policy is to establish a chain of tautly balanced national power, including various factors such as the economy, diplomacy and politics and to support the security of the nation with these (Chapman et al, 1983: xvi).

‘Comprehensive security’ has since evolved in response to changing international circumstances. Approximately five years after the release of the Ohira group’s study, a think tank working under the auspices of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, a well-known hawk on security matters, released an updated version of the comprehensive security policy in a treatise entitled ‘Comprehensive security policies for an international Japan’ (Heiwa Mondai Kenkyujo, 1985). This report merely reiterated and amplified the key issues outlined in the initial reports. In keeping with the changing international environment, however, the Nakasone version recognised that further changes
were needed in the posture given Japan’s growing political and economic roles.

In the post-Cold War era, too, respected Japanese strategists have demonstrated an awareness of Japan’s need to respond to the changing security environment. In his opening address at a 1993 symposium on Japan’s strategic priorities for the 1990s and noting that ‘global cooperation and adjustment had become inevitable’, career diplomat Matsunaga Nobuo called for,

a new more flexible meaning of the word ‘security’ ... one which encompassed issues as diverse as the competition between industrialised countries to issues such as the environment and human rights, drugs and the wholesale reduction of weapons (JIIA, 1993: iii).

The evolution of comprehensive security continues. At the end of the 1990s as external pressures were coming to bear on Japanese defence expectations, prominent Foreign Ministry bureaucrat and commentator on Japanese security issues Yukio Satoh declared that comprehensive security was not a policy as such but ‘a collection of approaches to security issues’. Thus the evolution of Japan’s ‘comprehensive security’ since its formalisation in 1980 presents the international relations observer with a mine of challenges in exploring broader definitions of security in the post-Cold War era.

In this context, it is important to again note the hand of Okita Saburo in this policy development. Okita, as was noted above, was Japan’s Foreign Minister during the term of the Ohira Prime Ministership (1978–1980; it is possible for Japanese Prime Ministers to ‘co-opt’ people from outside the elected parliament to hold Cabinet positions). Okita was Foreign Minister to Prime Minister Ohira in 1979 for 252 days including standing in for the ailing Ohira at the Venice G7 Summit but their association extended back several decades earlier to 1939 where both men found themselves posted to Beijing, Ohira as a bureaucrat in the Finance Ministry (Okita, 1983: 34). Okita was a major contributor to Ohira’s study groups, particularly one on the Pacific Rim Concept and another study group which produced the ‘comprehensive security’ report which bore remarkable resemblance to the concepts contained within the 1946 Report.

Okita’s reflections on security demonstrate his broader interpretations remained constant. In the early 1970s he held the view that while Japan’s expenditure on defence as a percentage of GNP remained at a comparatively low 0.9%, ‘it could be said that Japan’s aid contribution to developing countries is security in the broad meaning of the word’ (Okita, 1983: 145). Recalling themes which were developed in the 1946 Report, he believed that Japan’s aid, together with its trade, could be thought of as the two ‘conditions of the state’.

‘Comprehensive security’ then can be viewed as an element of the progression of Japan’s security concerns rather than an ad hoc policy statement. The ‘evolution’ of Japanese security policy since the end of World War II, as
articulated by Yukio Satoh in his monograph\(^{14}\), has its origins in the peace constitution (written during the early stages of the Allied Occupation and promulgated in 1947) and it is this strong public aversion to war which has been the bedrock of Japan’s approach to international security. Satoh’s review of the first two and a half decades of Japan’s emergence onto the international scene after World War II portrays Japan’s security interests as embodied within the Japan-US Security Treaty framework.

Satoh notes, however, that the early 1970s was the beginning of ‘the second stage’ and subsequently the beginning of change for Japan. Most significantly, this period included the ‘oil shocks’ and Nixon’s ‘secret’ rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which was considered as something of a snub by Japan. While these events triggered changes to Japan’s external security environment, Satoh identified changes emerging domestically which may have had even greater ramifications for Japan’s perception of its security. One of the major changes he identified during this period was the potential for the decline in the public’s aversion to war and militarism as the war became a distant memory (Satoh, 1982: 5). In addition, Satoh noted,

> the security implications of diplomacy began to be emphasised as the broad and complex nature of Japan’s security requirements (including those to minimize [its] economic vulnerability) were increasingly understood (Satoh, 1982: 5–6).

Much has been made of the importance of public opinion as a domestic constraint on Japan’s security identity. Berger uses public opinion surveys to effect yet he doesn’t ask why through his data ‘only 6 percent of respondents thought military power was a very effective means of defending the nation, while 32 percent thought it was somewhat effective and 14 percent thought it was totally ineffective’. This contrasts with some 32 percent of people who ‘thought that economic instruments (foreign aid, trade aid and so forth) were very effective ways of maintaining national security, and 43 percent thought they were somewhat effective’. Respondents rated diplomatic negotiations, maintaining a high standard of living and international exchanges all as more effective than military power as ways of ensuring national security. (Berger 1996: 340).

An advocate for comprehensive security as a preferred approach to Japanese security identity would recognise this survey (taken in 1972, eight years before comprehensive security was formally instituted) as rather ‘comprehensive’ in its fundamental assumptions. ‘Economic vulnerability’, as identified by Satoh, is one of the strongest elements which characterise Japan’s sense of security. Different from the mercantilist interpretation offered by Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) and the neo-classical realist reassessment of Brooks (1997), what is central to this study’s concerns is the notion of ‘vulnerability’ and how that can be understood in terms of the identity of a country recognised as having one of the strongest economies in recent times. ‘Vulnerability’ is a
concept which has attracted the attention of international relations scholars previously (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Lipschutz, 1989; Choucri, North and Yamakage, 1992; Milner, 1993). In his study on raw materials and ideology, Lipschutz attempted to define the ‘indefinable’ when it comes to assessing vulnerability:

Dependency on imports for critical minerals is widespread and immediately quantifiable; but to be vulnerable requires...a politically realistic possibility of being cut off, a lack of possibilities for alternative foreign or domestic supplies...the absence of options for substitution, and the expectation of significant impact from doing without (Lipschutz, 1989, xxiii).

Retrieving the antecedents of Japan’s comprehensive security from history, one can begin to piece together a picture of an identity crafted on lines of vulnerability felt at the end of a bitter war and in an environment of defeat and occupation.

Softly, softly to the UNSC via Iraq

As this article was going to press, the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. Japan is once again seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and Koizumi has used the deployment to Iraq and other ‘peacekeeping’ ventures in recent years to fortify Japan’s contribution to maintaining international security and, in particular, demonstrating Japan’s international credentials. Can the ‘comprehensive’ component of comprehensive security carry any weight in the international arena in such a way that extends our understanding of ‘security’, particularly in the present era when security is a multi-faceted construct?

This article has endeavoured to explore the development of a Japanese security identity in an historical context as a means to articulate an alternate understanding of the meaning of security. It has sought to understand ways in which Japan may justifiably lobby for a recognition of its international security contributions without recourse to a total abandonment of Article 9 or, ipso facto, a reversion to a militarist state. Comprehensive security has provided a platform for a responsive and engaged approach to security although the integrity of Article 9 has not been without some compromise. Nonetheless, the visionary position of those who drafted the 1946 Report did not stick entirely to an ‘economics only’ script as many of Japan’s detractors have sought to do over the years. In his statement to the General Assembly, Prime Minister Koizumi could well have been reading from the precepts of the 1946 Report as he spoke of ‘peace and security, economic and social issues...increasingly intertwined’ and of Japan’s ‘dramatic economic recovery, with the help of the international community’. The 1946 Report, as we have seen, articulated a role then for Japan as something of a ‘go-between’ in
international relations—a role it seems to be grooming for itself as it positions itself again for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

The Japanese Government and its people keenly felt the international retribution for its stance on Gulf War One—when its invocation of Article 9 as a core security norm prevented all but a consolation deployment of minesweepers post-hostilities and a very large cheque to underwrite the allied efforts. This sense of vulnerability to its international contributions triggered domestically a reinvigoration of what lies at the heart of Japanese security identity. The twenty-first century hostilities have wrought on all of us a very different security regime—one which will not be sustained by playing by the old rules. By positioning its contributions—its people deployments—this time as a humanitarian contribution, Japan is in some ways, privileging a decades-old security identity which was born of a confiscation of the right to be belligerent and given the chance, and contextual understanding, may once and for all relieve its security approaches from those annoying inverted commas.

Notes
1. An excellent analysis of the ongoing domestic debate over the constitution can be found in Hook and Mc Cormack (2001).
2. For a most comprehensive discussion in English on the drafting of the 1947 Constitution readers are directed to Dower, 1999, especially chapters 12 and 13.
3. Article 96 sets out the requirements for amendments including a concurring vote of two-thirds of both Houses of Parliament and subsequent referendum to the public requiring ‘the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes’. Given these requirements, amendment by referendum would be difficult to achieve.
5. It should be noted that the revised English translation noted here was published well after my ‘discovery’ of the original Report in the Japanese Parliamentary (Diet) Library in 1988–9. The translations of the Report used in this thesis are my own, undertaken during an earlier phase of this project, prior to the publication of the English version since I am satisfied their interpretation does not deviate from either Okita’s intent, discussed in our interview in 1991 or the 1992 translation.
6. The full text of the Potsdam article cited by Okita reads:(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
7. The significance of resources was never far from Okita’s thoughts. Returning from a flight to the Middle East around the time of the 1970s oil shock, Okita recalled looking out of the window of the plane and pondering the never-ending stretches of desert ‘under which lay enormous oil resources’ but which otherwise ‘bore nothing in an inhospitable climate’ whereas he thought that in comparison, ‘Japan has no resources but the land is blessed with “greenery” with a distinct four seasons and people competing together to improve technology form a dynamic society, which makes one think that human resources are the most important in economic development’ (Okita, 1981: 143).
9. It is this notion of ‘dual personality’ identified here that resonates quite strongly with Soeya’s concept of Japan’s ‘dual identity’ discussed earlier (Soeya, 1998).
10. There was a sixth issue concerning responses to severe earthquakes but this was considered part of the prime minister’s domestic portfolio, not so much an issue of international relations.
12. Similarly, Okita notes in his memoirs that as a young person he was able to engage in discussion on the postwar economy with another figure who was to become Prime Minister, Ishibashi Tanzan (Okita, 1983: 54).
13. The word Okita uses here is rikkoku literally, ‘establishment of the state’, interpreted as advocating key pillars of the state’s foreign policy.
14. It should be noted that Satoh has been a serving Japanese diplomat whose postings have included Japanese Ambassador to Australia (until 1998). In 2003, following a posting as Japan’s Ambassador to the United Nations, he took up the Chair of Japan PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council). At the time of writing this 1982 monograph, he was, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a research fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Although all his writings include the relevant disclaimer that the views expressed are his own, they tend not to depart too much from Foreign Ministry orthodoxy.

References


Anchoring trilateralism: can Australia-Japan-US security relations work?

ANNA SEARLE AND IPPEI KAMAE

Editor’s Note: Both Japan and Australia are evaluating how to manage their respective alliances with the United States at a time when no clear international order has yet emerged to replace Cold War bipolarity. As America’s two closest allies in the region, both of these countries have a growing interest in exploring how their own security relations should develop in conjunction with or independent of their US affiliation. Two major workshops were convened in Tokyo and Brisbane during July 2004 to consider this question, employing a rich array of approaches and perspectives to the task. The two authors served as the rapporteurs for the respective workshops and have collaborated here to summarise and assess the results.

Brisbane: 29-30 July 2004 (Searle)

In a smaller and more complex world, certain instruments of international security relations are proving to be surprisingly enduring and pliable instruments for regional and global security. The American network of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific (collectively known as the ‘San Francisco System’) is one such mechanism. Although terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have supplanted the ‘Soviet threat’ as predominant concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, the salience of long-standing US alliances with Japan and Australia, in particular, appears to be growing rather than diminishing. The rise of China, the geopolitical fate of the Korean Peninsula and the imperative to neutralise the forces of terrorism in areas of Southeast Asia all provide rationales for future Australian-American-Japanese alliance collaboration. But how best to collaborate?

This question drew over twenty policy experts from the three countries concerned, along with several noted Southeast Asian security experts, to Brisbane at the end of July 2004 to assess the ramifications of a closer trilateral alliance framework and how the Asia-Pacific region would respond to such a development. The workshop was hosted by Griffith University’s Asia-Pacific Research Institute (GAPRI) and was largely funded by the Japan Foundation, Asia Centre. The meeting was timely for several reasons: (1) US global strategy
has recently been undergoing a historic ‘defence transformation’ with potentially far-reaching implications for the future defence postures of Japan and Australia; (2) both Australia and US national elections occur within a few months after the workshop; such elections could, if new policy-making elites were elected to power, affect the context and durability of bilateral security relations; and (3) Japan has been moving rapidly to ‘normalise’ its national security and defence ‘identity’ by dispatching small but symbolic Self Defence Force (SDF) elements abroad in support of American-led military actions against Afghanistan and Iraq. As importantly, a ‘Trilateral Security Dialogue’ process started between the three countries in 2003, largely motivated by a growing North Korean threat and its ramifications for overall regional stability. Convening robust discussions on the implications of such developments for alliance policies and regional stability was therefore a timely and highly relevant enterprise.

Bilateral alliance collaboration: characteristics and rationales

A major feature of the contemporary Asia-Pacific is the resilience of bilateralism as the predominant mode of security organisation. As will be discussed below, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the one viable multilateral security network to be found in the region and its relative effectiveness is debatable, if somewhat promising. The ‘alliances that really count’ in strategic terms, however, are bilateral ones: the China-North Korea security pact, the recently modified security treaty between Russia and Pyongyang and the five US alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. Although not a formal alliance, recent American strategic collaboration with Singapore should also be noted.

From an American and allied perspective, alliances still matter in a more globalised, post-Cold War world, notwithstanding the immense structural changes that are now unfolding in Asia and elsewhere. As GAPRI Director Professor Michael Wesley observed, there are three reasons why such is the case. First, they are important as ‘value added’ support of American power in the region, and thus to ensure that strategic equilibrium (as distinct from US strategic ‘hegemony’) is maintained. Second, they together preserve and expand an interlocking network of ‘functional’ collective goods such as greater surveillance or patrolling capabilities and strategic reassurance in the region. Third, they provide a potentially critical resource of mutual supportive action during times of crisis escalation.

There is clearly no assurance that these alliances will be effective in every instance. However, a bilateral alliance framework that allows Washington to coordinate its regional policies with its separate allies in ways that allow it to adjust to their particular sensitivities constitutes a solid foundation for alliance management. Accordingly, the traditional ‘hub and spokes’ system of US alliance management in this region was judged to still have utility if it could
remain flexible enough to reconcile American global strategy and the mainly region-centric concerns of its Asia-Pacific security partners.

Inevitable differences within this alliance network will occur. Workshop participants were nearly unanimous that the ‘China factor’ represented the most serious challenge to Australian-American-Japanese security policy coordination. But other, less self-evident, issues emerged as well. These included the idea of an ‘American threat’ predicated on the ‘revolutionary policies’ of democratisation spearheaded by neo-conservative factions in the United States, and an increasing concern shared by Washington’s Asia-Pacific allies that ‘alliance loyalty’ has become the price which must be paid for alliance rewards. Professor Amitav Acharya of Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) advanced the latter concern, observing that the US appears to have increasing difficulty in understanding that a ‘good ally’ is not necessarily an invariably ‘compliant ally’—that enlightened alliance management must reflect a willingness by the most powerful ally to consult, listen and, when justified, concur with the advice of its smaller partners.

In this context, the Trilateral Security Dialogue has materialised as an important antidote for what American insensitivity may exist towards the need to reconcile global and regional security priorities. To understand the benefits and challenges relating to this process the workshop’s deliberations will now be summarised by presenting a synthesised perspective of each Dialogue partner’s interests and priorities.

The Japanese view

Japan is a nation wrestling with its security identity as domestic political debate intensifies over how best to pursue international influence without precipitating traditional post-war apprehensions about a resurgence of Japanese ‘militarism’. Several conference participants noted that there is a view among a rising number of Japanese (especially younger citizens) that officially sanctioned pacifism is an outdated policy, and that Japan should become a ‘normal’ state again. In his presentation to the workshop, Professor Takashi Inoguchi, from Tokyo University, observed that recent Japanese peacekeeping ventures in such countries as Cambodia, East Timor and Iraq were an incremental but significant steps toward such normalisation.

Inoguchi surmised that strategic triangularity is part of a more complex Asia-Pacific security structure than that which existed during the Cold War, and one that tends to produce more countervailing security trends. The US remains the region’s overwhelmingly predominant military and economic power. Yet it still cannot realise the eradication or even substantial modification of atavistic forces and trends that tend to undercut its regional agendas of democratisation, crisis stability, arms control and market development. North Korea, for example, remains a ‘failed state’ that could threaten the South Korean and Japanese populations with massive destruction. He
noted that the benefits of globalisation are hardly felt by vast segments of the Asian populace, resulting in protracted credibility crises for various ASEAN governments and enduring threats of terrorism and separatism throughout much of Southeast Asia.

Given these anomalies, more systematic security dialogue between Canberra, Tokyo and Washington appears to be warranted. Commonalities between Japan and Australia, America’s two ‘alliance anchors’ in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia respectively, reinforce this conclusion. Both are long-standing US security partners who are technologically proficient developed states that regularly collaborate with US defence components. Both are maritime powers with a predominant interest in working with American force assets in the region to guard major littorals against disruption of access. Both share Western political values, and thus both risk by virtue of their identity and geography marginalisation from the ‘Asian core’. Both nurture strong records in projecting ‘good international citizenship’ within those institutions and regimes that collectively shape the ‘international community’.

Flowing from the above considerations, a key question raised by Inoguchi, and reiterated by other workshop analysts, was how Japan’s regional image and influence would be affected if Japan was viewed by China, North Korea and other regional powers as moving compliantly toward a new Western ‘containment’ architecture with the United States and Australia. In this context, Japanese participation in recent peacekeeping operations could be interpreted as nothing more than Japan endeavouring to meet an American test for ‘alliance loyalty’, and conceding any real hope for its own strategic independence as a ‘normal nation’ in the process. As Dr Marianne Hanson of the University of Queensland noted, Japan seems to yearn for acceptance both internally and globally but questions how its ‘soft power’ approach to security, as reflected by its development assistance and human security agendas, fits with current American hardline policies such as GWOT and coalition-building against WMD threats. Purnendra Jain of the University of Adelaide characterised the need to answer such questions as a central requirement for justifying triangularity: a clear rationale for such cooperation between the three allies must be articulated if Japan were to participate without undercutting its own regional legitimacy in the process.

The Australian perspective

There is a certain irony attached to the Australian ‘pillar’ in the trilateral relationship under review here. Since the Coalition Government led by John Howard came to power in 1996, it has pursued an unqualified agenda of closer ties with Australia’s ‘great and powerful [American] friend’. Yet eight years later, the US is preoccupied with the Middle East and Central Asia, transforming its global defence strategy to one that relies less on forward positioning and relies more on allied burden-sharing in Europe and Asia. It has,
concurrently, earmarked Australia as a spearhead for most of the South Pacific and much of peninsular Southeast Asia in containing anti-Western forces.

The price Australia has paid for unmitigated alliance loyalty has been high: many of its regional neighbours perceive its current role as being an obsequious American ‘deputy sheriff’ incapable of independently pursuing its earlier and more favourably viewed policies of middle power diplomacy and multilateral politics. A middle power needs to be seen as sufficiently independent within any alliance framework with which it is affiliated to remain comfortable with its regional identity. The challenge for Australia, whether under a Coalition or Labor government following the federal election in 2004, is to strike a more effective balance between its regional and global security postures and to be seen by its neighbours as moving effectively toward such equilibrium.

This policy imperative relates directly to the question of Australia’s position in any emerging Australia-Japan-US trilateral security group. Would Australia and Japan be just ‘followers’ in the revised American ‘grand strategy’ that is now emerging or would they have real input into US strategic perceptions and planning directed toward the Asia-Pacific? According to Dr Russell Trood and Professor William T. Tow, any trilateral collaboration would inherently need to be low-key, task-directed, and directed toward strategic reassurance rather than toward traditional alliance strategies such as containment or deterrence. Earlier proposals coming from conservative Japanese and American circles that envisioned a ‘JANZUS’ as an Asian version of NATO were advanced during the Cold War and would only be detrimental to Australian regional interests in the current Asia-Pacific security environment.

The American dimension

As one workshop observer noted, the Bush administration’s pressure for global democratisation has combined with its insistence on alliance loyalty to cause a ‘rearrangement the heavy furniture’ of international relations. Yet there appears to be a conspicuous lack of debate within the United States on how its bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific fit into evolving, broad US strategic objectives. How does the ‘hub and spokes’ strategy, with Washington at the centre, correlate with an increasingly decentralised Global War on Terror, American strategies of ‘pre-emption’ and the non-proliferation of WMDs? Initiatives engaging selected coalitions of American allies and friends such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are clearly gaining policy momentum. Their underlying rationales as they relate to existing alliance mechanisms and to evolving US grand strategy have yet to be openly defined. Even more fundamentally, if either Japan or Australia, two of America’s oldest and most trusted post-war allies, were to unexpectedly dissent or break from future US policy, does Washington have contingency plans for salvaging
alliance relations, avoiding a repeat of New Zealand’s exit from ANZUS in the mid-1980s?

Weighing these issues led to workshop participants asking an even broader question: does the US believe that traditional alliance mechanisms are still relevant in an increasingly globalised world? Or will American strategy oscillate between what many have characterised as ‘unilateralism’ and seeking specific ‘coalitions of the willing’ when UN or other institutional initiatives are at odds with US objectives? Although unilateralism appears to be a less likely American posture in the aftermath of the Iraq War imbroglio, one could easily point to a future defence of Taiwan as another instance where the US could find itself to be a very lonely superpower, its expectations of alliance loyalty dashed and allied expediency prevailing in the face of Chinese pressure to stay out of any such conflict.

Australia and Japan are ideal candidates to support an American superpower’s efforts to define its future priorities in the Asia-Pacific. According to Professor Satu Limaye, Australia-Japan-US trilateral cooperation can be justified and envisioned between the US, Japan and Australia in this context. Unlike the US, both Canberra and Tokyo can contribute to future UN peacekeeping missions without automatically raising apprehensions that expanding American power is the real agenda of such exercises. Given their long histories of alliance collaboration and technological proficiencies, both Australia and Japan can participate in research and development of missile defence but avoid being perceived as core initiators of such a project. Low-key alliance collaboration and consistent consultation are perhaps the best assets of ‘alliance loyalty’ in today’s more complex international security environment.

The China factor

Any future alliance burden-sharing burden in a ‘triangular’ sense, the workshop concluded, would need to be shaped in ways that avoided the intensification of China’s apprehensions that such geometry would be nothing more than a ‘containment revisited’ initiative. This may be best achieved by encouraging China’s positive diplomatic engagement with the region, especially in multilateral settings. According to Professor Robert Scalapino, China’s growing emphasis on transposing its traditional adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to an updated ‘New Security Concept’ is interest-driven, and more competitive than cooperative, in its design. But this ‘softer image’ could be supplanted by a harder policy line, underwritten by intensified Chinese nationalism, if an American-led strategic triangle is viewed by China as opposing its own interests and ambitions.

In this sense, a ‘virtual alliance’ model emphasising greater consultative mechanisms within and beyond the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Security Dialogue (established in August 2002 to discuss regional security issues) could
be systematically followed by regular consultations between a nominated dialogue partner and China. The dialogue could address security cooperation on such ‘non-traditional’ issues as terrorism, drug trade, the environment and energy so as to mitigate Chinese suspicions about containment. According to Professor Douglas T. Stuart from Dickinson College, the current American preoccupation with the Global War on Terror has led to a lack of American focus on Asia, giving China an opportunity to make significant headway as a regional leader. While the US is focused on the Middle East and the war on terror, China is busy implementing a long-term agenda with its neighbours in Asia. Given success in the implementation of that agenda, a China containment posture could re-emerge as a knee-jerk reaction unless the US and its allies acted to ensure sustained dialogue, consultations and negotiations with the PRC. The Six Power Talks on Korean denuclearisation (involving China, the US and Japan) are a positive illustration of how such dialogue and consultation about regional security issues can work.

Conclusion

Since 11 September and, more recently, the Australian Embassy bombings in Jakarta, the regional and international security outlooks of all three allies have been transformed and challenged. For Australia, such developments serve as obvious reminders of its vulnerability in a dynamically changing world, geographically positioned as it is in Asia while still relating most closely in a strategic and cultural sense to a distant and powerful American ally. For Japan, they signify the need to adjust its national security identity in ways that will allow it to play a greater role in its defence and in global security politics but along non-provocative lines. For the United States, they signal the ultimate futility of unilateralism at a time when its resources and strategic will are being seriously tested in the Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere.

A security triangle between Australia-Japan-US would have to be managed gradually and sensitively. More positively, the overall mood of the Asia-Pacific region is better than at any time than during the past thirty years and is likely not to be disrupted unless lingering regional flashpoints in Korea and Taiwan are allowed to cinder to unacceptable levels. With so much at stake for the future stability of the region, the formation of a security triangle between Australia, Japan and US needs to be cautiously structured if it is to be viewed, and is to function as, a positive strategic attribute.

Tokyo: 17-19 July 2004 (Kamae)

Nearly three decades after Cold War scholars first speculated about prospects of a ‘JANZUS’ alliance, and fifteen years after the end of Soviet-American competition, America’s bilateral security alliances with Japan and Australia appear to be stronger than ever. Other US security partners in the region (with
South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines) appear less committed to US global strategy. South Korea is adopting an increasingly independent posture toward the North. It is diverging in its approach to conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula from the American insistence that prospects of nuclear non-proliferation must be eradicated from the Korean peninsula before its reunification is seriously pursued. Both Thailand and the Philippines suffer from local insurgency movements, but their preoccupation with such movements pales in comparison to US concerns with the al-Qaeda and Iraqi terrorist factions that now preoccupy Washington’s strategic planners. Why do the Australian-US and Japan-US dyads still seem so relevant? What factors are compelling them to consider collaborating more directly with the US—and, indirectly with each other—in such areas as peacekeeping, missile defence and counter-terrorism?

To answer these questions, selected policy experts from Australia, Japan, and the United States convened an international conference in Tokyo during 17-19 July 2004 and launched a joint study on trilateral security cooperation. The event was supported by a grant from the Japan Foundation Centre for Global Partnership (CGP) and was co-hosted by Griffith University and the University of Melbourne of Australia, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) of Japan and the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS) of the United States. The intent of this joint study was to investigate the ways that Australia, Japan and the United States could cooperate on maintaining regional stability in the post-11 September Asia-Pacific and to formulate a set of policy recommendations to be submitted to government officials in all three countries.

International structural change and the Asia-Pacific

Conference participants began their deliberations by weighing recent structural changes in international relations. Although the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 remain the benchmark for this transformation, the loss of bipolarity after the Cold War was a fundamental element. The US has emerged as the dominant state-centric actor, but it still lacks a grand design for exercising truly credible international leadership commensurate with George Kennan’s containment strategy formulated at the dawn of the Cold War. Most discussants agreed that Washington was prone to seeking fulfilment of its own national interests under the heading of the Global War on Terrorism GWOT). In reality, GWOT is hardly a collective enterprise; it is the United States that decides what missions will be pursued to counter what it perceives as destabilising elements in its preferred vision of a world order. The Iraq War may well change any calculus that the GWOT is collective, as members of the American-led ‘coalition of the willing’ have visibly soured on this enterprise as their nationals are targeted by Iraqi ‘militants’ or by other hostile forces beyond the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
This situation sets a rather bleak scene for contemplating how trilateral security relations among Australia, Japan, and the United States will ‘make a difference’. It raises questions as to where Asia-Pacific regionalism is heading. If, alternatively, a momentum for regionalism is present, is it attuned to ‘exclusive’ Asian regionalism that would bar countries like the US and Australia from participating? Or would it be a broader, more inclusive Asia-Pacific group? As importantly, what are the expectations among Australia, Japan, and the United States, respectively as to how triangularity in a security context might assist the establishment of a more inclusive model of regionalism? Such questions constituted a reasonable basis for reassessing the US-Japan alliance, the US-Australia alliance, and the implications of any more systematic trilateral relations.

US-Japan alliance

Following its creation in 1951, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST) was intended to function primarily as a deterrent against an invasion of Japan by the Soviet Union. Over the ensuing decades, alliance tensions sharpened over perpetual demands by Washington for Japan to assume greater defence burden-sharing responsibilities, notwithstanding constitutional and domestic political constraints limiting successive Japanese governments’ flexibility to do so. In the post-Cold War era, however, two intensifying regional crises worked to shift Japanese public opinion toward support of a more defence-oriented Japanese outlook: the Taiwan cross-Strait conflict and North Korea’s conduct of ballistic missile tests and possible development of nuclear weapons. These developments led Japan to strengthen its security ties with the United States and to commit itself more tangibly to alliance operations. The Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, a subsequent revision on US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines and a Japanese decision to participate in the development of missile defence in 1999 are illustrative of this trend. It is also worth noting that strong sentiments of dishonour and frustration were generated in Japan following its government’s reluctance to provide forces in support of the 1991 Gulf War when most other developed nations risked shedding blood to overturn Iraq’s invasion of another sovereign state and to preserve access to critical energy supplies. Despite its financial support of over US$13 billion for this operation, Japan was sharply criticised for not projecting political and strategic leadership commensurate to its economic power as the world’s second largest economy.

Following major terrorist strikes against US icons (the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon) on 11 September 2001, Japan deployed Self Defence Force (SDF) fuelling ships to the Indian Ocean in support of US and British operations in Afghanistan and, in early 2004, dispatched around 550 SDF troops to Iraq. Tokyo’s decision to join so-called ‘coalitions of the willing’ does not fit into the framework of the MST. Yet Japan swiftly and firmly
Anchoring trilateralism

supported the United States under the logic that the GWOT allows Japan to ignore traditional restraints on defence cooperation.

Conference participants concurred that deterrence shapes the MST’s strategic rationales in Northeast Asia, as facing up to North Korea and balancing a rising China are required. The rapidly changing and increasingly challenging post-11 September world confronts Japan with the imperative to review and adopt new forms of alliance collaboration to cope with the emerging threats of global terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the unravelling of basic human security needs across a wide spectrum of the international environment. It was made clear in Conference discussion that Japan faces a historic task of reconciling its traditional regional focus with an increasingly global set of missions predicated by its affiliation with US power and its own vulnerability to a diverse array of transregional dangers. It will need to systematically and consistently interact with US policy-planners to complete this task.

US-Australia alliance

1996 was a year of significant change in Australian-American defence relations. A Coalition government was formed under Prime Minister Howard in March, and it immediately moved to solidify the US alliance to unprecedented levels. It publicly supported American naval intervention in the showdown between China and Taiwan during the latter’s presidential election; it offered to pre-position American military weapons and supplies on Australian soil (an offer declined by the Clinton administration). In December, it negotiated the Sydney Statement with US officials: a strong reaffirmation of the US-Australia bilateralship which was formalised in 1951 and which Howard and his advisors believed had been allowed to languish under his predecessor, Paul Keating.

With hindsight, conference participants noted, Australia’s move to ‘reinvigorate’ its American alliance reaped visible dividends. In 2001 President Bush, who was particularly supportive of Australia, came into power. The new administration considered loyalty to be the most important element for alliance cooperation and this criterion dovetailed perfectly with Howard’s own strategic philosophy. He was visiting Washington during 11 September, witnessed the partial destruction of the Pentagon, and activated the ANZUS alliance almost immediately after returning home. Along with Britain, Australia became a spearhead for allied support of US military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, earning increasingly warm platitudes from Bush and his advisers, Capitol Hill and the American federal bureaucracy, and greater recognition and appreciation from the American public. To many Americans, Australia, for the first time, came to mean something more than a long holiday flight across the Pacific and ‘throwing a shrimp on the barbie’.

Such generous praise, however, was accompanied by a commensurate risk. Rising American expectations concerning Australian loyalty made it increas-
ingly difficult for Australia to strike a balance in its relations between China and the United States. Moreover, a lack of substantial debate about Australia by the US policy-planners and independent American analysts could be interpreted as a looming asymmetry. A number of conference participants ventured that the United States simply places Australia as one of the many allies in a wider context of its own global strategy. This asymmetry, in return, could possibly turn into American perceptions of disillusionment if a future Australian government were to opt for more ‘region-centric’ diplomatic and security strategies and a return to something resembling the Labor government’s ‘concentric circle’ posture pursued during the 1980s and early 1990s which focused on self-reliant and neighbourhood defence. Participants in the conference concluded that reconciliation of a global strategy of supporting the United States and a regional strategy emphasising homeland defence and closer ties with possible rivals of America’s power base in the Asia-Pacific, would emerge as a critical policy challenge for maintaining alliance durability.

Regional implications and trilateral relations

Dealing with China effectively is indispensable for any Australia-Japan-US ‘strategic triangle’ to function credibly. At present, China is keeping a low profile with the United States due to its decision to prioritise its own domestic economic growth. This has been especially true on the Taiwan issue, with China restraining itself from aggressively challenging the still viable US commitment to that island’s security in favour of tapping the US marketplace as a key component of its economic growth strategy. In this context, the Global War on Terrorism works to China’s advantage, giving Beijing a basis for forging common strategic ground with an American administration initially predisposed to view the Chinese as inevitable strategic rivals. Yet Taiwan remains the critical element in longer-term US-China relations. China has made it clear that it reserves the right to use force against Taiwan if it deems such a step to be necessary. Taiwanese nationalism under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian, moreover, is on the rise.

This type of scenario—military action by China to regain Taiwan—presupposes that ‘worst case’ assumptions about Chinese strategic thinking are warranted. Conference discussants argued that rather than being trapped in such a scenario-dependent dilemma, it is far more productive for those advocating trilateral security cooperation between Australia, Japan and the US to consider what signals and incentives those three countries could send to China that can effectively reinforce the value of a peaceful resolution to the cross-Strait crisis. Most fundamentally, US-China relations must remain benign if trilateral security cooperation is to be a factor for strategic reassurance rather than a stimulus of regional destabilisation.

In Southeast Asia, the United States understandably views Indonesia, the southern Philippines and (to a lesser extent) southern Thailand as major
Anchoring trilateralism

concerns, because of their susceptibility to terrorism. Being close to this sub-region, Australia is both knowledgeable and properly concerned about its strategic relevance. Japan has substantial investment in, and aid programs earmarked for, ASEAN states, and worries about the future security of critical Southeast Asian straits and littorals as transit points for accessing its energy supplies. All three allies, however, are hampered by their negative images entertained by Southeast Asian elites and by various ethnic and religious groups. Memories of Japan’s wartime occupation of the region are still strong. The US and Australia are both viewed as less concerned about Southeast Asia’s actual economic development and well-being than they are about targeting and eliminating ‘anti-Western’ elements there. The Asian financial crisis was especially helpful to Southeast Asian critics in this regard, as feelings of hostility toward American hardline policies on loan repayments and transparency practices intensified. The ASEAN states are now negotiating with China, Japan and South Korea for the creation of ‘strictly Asian’ financial architectures (such as the ‘ASEAN + 3’) as a hedge against any future such vulnerabilities.

Concerning the Pacific Islands region, the situation is somewhat similar to that of Southeast Asia but much less significant on a global scale of reference. Despite the existence of overlapping interests between Australia, Japan, and the United States in this sub-region, there is no specific trilateral security cooperation directed toward this area. Conference participants noted that there is a strong US expectation that Australia will assume the leading role in dealing with any South Pacific crisis, by virtue of the Howard government’s recently announced ‘Pacific Doctrine’ and its recent successful intervention in the Solomon Islands. In this regard, both the United States and Japan support Canberra’s self-proclaimed status as a spearhead for South Pacific stability.

As required by the complexity of regional security relations in the post-Cold War strategic environment, any trilateral Australia-Japan-US security collaboration will be initially ad hoc and low-key. However, participants noted that a strategic dialogue between Australia and Japan has recently begun and that a number of ‘functional’ or task-specific security related networks are in place, especially in the arena of military discussions and contingency planning. The key to such activities’ future growth is the gradual replacement of the hierarchical or ‘hubs and spokes’ modus operandi for alliance management directed out of Washington with a firmer sense of alliance complementarity and regional community.

Even if the general purpose of triliteralism is understood in this context, barriers to realising it still remain. One is that the United States still prefers to manage bilateral relations, so that it can maximise its power with less need to bargain with allies rather than diluting such leverage in more ‘minilateral’ or multilateral settings. Secondly, any trilateral security cooperation will need to be very transparent, including constant updates extended to China, the ASEAN states and South Korea. Such transparency has not been synonymous
with the classical management of alliance relations due to their ‘threat-based’ rationales for existence. Conference participants were encouraged, however, to note that the East Timor peacekeeping episode during late 1999 might foreshadow a new style of regional security management. In that instance, layers of bilateral and multilateral negotiations were integrated successfully, leading to a UN-sanctioned military intervention. The intervention ultimately entailed mostly regional actors contributing to that operation, but only low levels of American resources. East Timor has been one of the successful cases of regional stabilisation in which Australia was integrally involved, and in which Japan was a major financial and acceptably limited military contributor.

Conclusion: three frameworks

The conference closed with several broad conclusions and with new questions to be considered for a follow-up session to be convened in February 2005. Three ‘framework’ issues guided the concluding discussions.

First, it was accepted that the traditional alliances were gradually being supplemented—and in some cases supplanted—by greater American emphasis on structuring ‘coalitions of the willing’ to support its US global strategic objectives. The narrowly focused bilateral alliances of the Cold War are giving way to more fluid and more adaptable architectures of strategic collaboration. This evolution is significant since it not only bears on the two most developed links of the San Francisco System—the US-Japan and the US-Australia alliances—but also has implications for how Australia and Japan might perceive the purpose and value of their increasingly distinct security relationship.

Two specific questions, moreover, arise regarding an intensified Australia-Japan security dyad. The first is precisely why this change has occurred, and what has specifically prompted the movement to the broadening and thickening of Australia-Japan security relations. Since 11 September, one reason seems obvious: Japan and Australia have bought into US global strategy, and especially its counter-terrorism element, to guarantee their individual access to US defence technologies and networks. But this trend was well under way even before 11 September. A more convincing explanation might be that the momentum of both the US-Japan MST and US-Australia alliances since 1996 has inevitably ‘spilled over’ to stimulate more Australian-Japanese explorations of how their own relationship might fit within US global strategy to their mutual advantage. The second question is the extent of the influence of a somewhat countervailing factor to the trend towards employing coalitions of the willing. There is a sense of anxiety in Japan and Australia that strategic change is evolving so rapidly that the one clear benefit of affiliation with US power—the extended deterrence afforded by traditional alliance politics—may be eroding. This is obviously a greater concern for Japan at present,
confronted with North Korean WMD capabilities and Nodong missiles, but a destabilised Southeast Asia ten or fifteen years from now could certainly generate similar apprehension in Australia. Participants noted that the future policy challenge here is to reconcile future rationales for bilateral US-Japan and US-Australia defence relations with the advantages of trilateral security cooperation.

The second framework of the closing discussion focused on the United States’ global strategy relative to its Asia-Pacific focus or lack thereof. Critical to this exchange was the enduring impact of ‘11 September’ on US strategic objectives and doctrine. Participants concluded that there is no American ‘grand strategy’ to replace ‘the containment’ doctrine that guided Washington through the Cold War, and that the ‘pre-emption’ strategy outlined in President Bush’s September 2002 National Security Statement was proving to be difficult to apply on a credible and enduring basis. The United States, moreover, has been singularly narrow and largely inconsistent in implementing what strategy it has evolved over the past few years, in large part because the neo-conservative ideology has been allowed to control that policy agenda to an inordinate degree. Parochial and oscillating modes of American strategic expression have confused rather than clarified US strategy. The Quadrennial Defence Review, for example, was published days after the 11 September terrorist strikes and obviously failed to anticipate any such event. It instead presented a classical geopolitical premise, implying that Sino-American competition would preoccupy US national security planners for years to come. Clearly, this projection has not materialised in the way that the Review expected. If the United States considers its own global strategic primacy to be a desirable path for realising a preferred world order, it is America’s responsibility to form and enforce a new international consensus through enlightened leadership designed to win a broad consensus from other states and actors. An Australia-Japan-US strategic triangle might be a useful politico-security conduit to initiate such consensus-building in the Asia-Pacific.

A final framing issue leads from the second: the inter-relationship between alliances or coalitions and evolving multilateral architectures and regimes. Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific has taken a turn towards greater inclusiveness following the 1997 Asian financial crisis—ironically at the same time that American bilateral alliances experienced some resuscitation in purpose as components of selective integration into ‘coalitions of the willing’. In the early 1990s, the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was essentially applying multilateralism to keep the United States engaged in Asia as a way of balancing the rise of China; this was congruent with the San Francisco system’s geopolitical purpose. Today, several different kinds of multilateralism have emerged. One is a putative trend of contesting the vision of an exclusive ‘East Asia’ with a more inclusive ‘Asia-Pacific’. Another is the rise of ‘competitive multilateralism’ in the regional and economic arenas, with China, the United States, Europe, ASEAN and Japan all following disparate agendas.
under the guise of global trading politics. A third relates to questions of the future identity, relevance and credibility of the United Nations.

All of these frameworks need to be addressed and reconciled. Conference participants converged on the point that a blueprint needs to be derived as to how US-Japan, US-Australia, and Japan-Australia relationships can be integrated to accommodate both multilateral initiatives and trilateral relationships. How alliance politics can be harmonised with other forms of regional and international security collaboration to achieve this end constitutes a major research challenge for this project as a more uncertain world continues to unfold.
State functioning and state failure in the South Pacific

BENJAMIN REILLY

The South Pacific region features enormous variation in state performance. While Polynesian nations such as Samoa have proved to be relatively successful post-colonial states, Melanesian countries like the Solomon Islands are increasingly categorised as ‘weak’, ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states. Drawing on a range of comparative studies by economists and political scientists in recent years, this article argues that cross-country variation in ethnic diversity between much of Polynesia and Melanesia is a key factor in explaining differences in state performance across the South Pacific. It shows how different kinds of ethnic structure are associated with specific political and economic outcomes, including variation in political stability, economic development, and internal conflict from country to country. In so doing, it helps explain why some parts of the South Pacific appear to be failing while others are relative success stories – and why this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Introduction

The South Pacific region is marked by enormous contrasts in state performance. On the one hand, Polynesian countries such as Samoa have proved to be relatively successful post-colonial states, providing stable government, policy continuity and steady if unspectacular economic growth, notwithstanding an ongoing dependence on foreign aid. By contrast, much of Melanesia is plagued by poor state performance, with negative economic growth, ethnic conflict, weak governance and military coups all signalling the failure of states to provide basic security and public services to their citizens. Each of the four independent Melanesian states (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) have suffered army mutinies in recent years; Fiji has experienced three coups; and Papua New Guinea has faced armed conflict in Bougainville and, more recently, the Southern Highlands. The most dramatic case of state failure in the region is Solomon Islands, the subject of an Australian-led intervention, operation Helpem Fren, in June 2003. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has categorised the Solomons as a ‘failing state’, a term also used by the Australian government and academic commentators (ASPI 2002, Wainwright 2003).
In parallel with this stark variation in state performance across the region, different sub-regions of the South Pacific are characterised by enormous contrasts in their internal social structure. On the one hand, the independent Polynesian states of Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu are among the most ethnically homogeneous societies in the world today, being composed of one dominant cultural group and usually speaking one language. By contrast, Melanesia is one of the world’s most fragmented regions, containing roughly a quarter of all the world’s known languages. Papua New Guinea alone has over 800 languages and several thousand ethno-linguistic groups, making it on some indicators the most heterogeneous state anywhere in the world. Other parts of the region, such as Fiji or New Caledonia, exhibit more polarised social structures as a result of colonial labour migration. How do these different patterns of societal diversity affect state performance?

**Ethnicity and development**

Political scientists and economists have been interested in the effects of ethnic structure on state performance for decades. In one prominent case, a World Bank study of Africa found that ethnic diversity was negatively related to economic growth, schooling attainment, availability of infrastructure and sound government policies, prompting the authors to identify ethnic fragmentation as the key to Africa’s ‘growth tragedy’ (Easterly and Levine 1997). Similarly, Rodrik (1999) found ethnic fragmentation to be associated with a range of negative outcomes, including poor economic growth and income inequality. Mauro (1995) concluded that fragmented societies had a strong tendency towards corruption, because of the tendency of members of ethnic groups to favour their own kin.

In a recent study of this phenomenon in the Pacific region, Reilly and Phillpot (2002) found that the most important reason for disparities in provincial development in Papua New Guinea was differences in ethnic diversity from province to province. Testing and rejecting a range of alternative explanations, they found that higher diversity levels in different regions of Papua New Guinea created collective action problems and undermined the development of social capital, undermining development in more heterogeneous areas. Even when alternative explanations such as size, government performance and land resources were factored in, more diverse provinces had significantly lower development levels than more homogeneous ones.

Testing this same proposition in the rest of the Pacific should be relatively easy once a common measurement of ethnic diversity is agreed upon. Unfortunately, the measurement of ethnicity is notoriously difficult. At a minimum, most scholars agree that ethnicity is manifested as a mixture of ‘primordial’ and ‘constructed’ factors, being based on ascriptive notions such as clan, tribe, and language as well as more malleable social identities formed by colonialism or post-colonial developments.1 This means that ethnic identities are never
static: indeed, they can be created to serve particular goals and ends. Recent landholding disputes in Papua New Guinea, for example, have seen claimants invent clan identities from scratch in order to facilitate collective demands for compensation (Filer 2000).

This dynamic aspect of group construction makes any reliable measurement of ‘ethnicity’ extremely difficult. There is no generally accepted measure of ethnic diversity. In Papua New Guinea, for example, estimates of the number of ethnic groups range from ‘more than 1,000‘ (Levine 1997, 479) to ‘more than 10,000’ (Griffin 1974, 143). By contrast, more reliable data are available on a related measure—the extent of linguistic diversity for each country. This information can be captured in a ‘diversity index’ ranging from 0 (a completely homogeneous country where every individual speaks the same language) to 1 (a completely heterogeneous country where every individual speaks a different language). While crude, this is easy to quantify, and serves to captures the relative degree of societal homogeneity or heterogeneity from country to country.

Figure One compares the relationship between linguistic fragmentation and per capita income across the seven independent states of Melanesia and Polynesia. Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—all Melanesian states—all have a diversity ranking of .97 or higher, while the Polynesian cases of Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu are at the other extreme, with diversity levels around .01. Overall, there is a strong and statistically significant negative correlation between fragmentation and prosperity. The higher a country’s diversity levels, the lower its per capita income. Indeed, according to the regression co-efficient measuring this relationship, almost half the variation in per capita GDP from country to country is explained by linguistic fragmentation. Alternative measures of prosperity yield similar patterns: among this
same group of countries, linguistic diversity is also negatively correlated with long-run (1970-2000) economic growth rates and with 2002 ‘human development’ rankings.4

Of course, there are alternative explanations that could be advanced to explain the performance of the two regions, such as the relative size of states in both population and geographic terms, the much larger natural resource endowments of Melanesia, proximity to potential markets, and so on. However, on most of these measures the larger, better-resourced states of Melanesia should be at an advantage compared to their smaller and more isolated Polynesian counterparts. Yet despite these inherent advantages, they have performed more poorly across the board (with the exception of Fiji, with its large Indo-Fijian population). By contrast, Tuvalu—one of the world’s smallest, most isolated and resource-poor countries—has been one of the best performers in the entire region (Finin 2002). This flies in the face of conventional wisdom. How do we account for such a pattern?

One explanation is that the highly-fragmented societies of Melanesia have difficulty in delivering public services and infrastructure in the face of competing ethno-linguistic demands. As Easterly (2001, 271) notes, even the delivery of an innocuous public good like a road can have an important ethnic dimension. This is a major problem in countries like Papua New Guinea, where roads represent an essential lifeline for rural communities. For example, the Highlands Highway—the main artery linking highlands towns with coastal ports and with each other—has deteriorated markedly over the past decade as investment has increasingly been diverted towards local projects. In November 2002, it was revealed that a former Finance Minister, Andrew Kumbakor, had as Minister granted approval to seven financially-questionable new road projects, six of which were in his own electorate—a move which benefited his own support base, but did little to promote development in the country as a whole.5

In the absence of a strong national identity in post-colonial creations like Papua New Guinea or Solomon Islands, most people’s primary loyalty is to their clan, tribe and wantok (‘one talk’) groups. In competing with each other for resources, these ethno-political units increasingly act like interest groups in developed societies, attempting to divert potential public goods towards the private enrichment of their members alone. Such ‘rent seeking’ is a pervasive aspect of contemporary political and economic life in Melanesia, precisely because of the way societal fragmentation enables small ethnic collectives to be mobilised, monitored and enforced to acquire and then monopolise control of actual and potential public goods. Micro-ethnic identities thus become the key social structure for facilitating the formation of distributive coalitions, which are then used to divert potentially productive public goods towards the benefit of their group alone (for more on this, see Reilly 2004).

Buttressing this is the pervasive problem of representative government and democracy in highly diverse societies. Politics in many parts of Melanesia
continues to be more about wealth distribution than wealth creation. If politicians see their role not as part of a national government but rather as delegates whose role is to channel resources back to their own group of tribal supporters (as is the case in many parts of western Melanesia), their focus will be on delivering these goods to their clan voters (which are often a much smaller group than even their electorate) in order to ensure their re-election. In so doing, they will not invest as much in public infrastructure—which can assist with wealth creation—as they would in a more homogeneous society. The result is lower provision of many types of public resources than would otherwise be the case, and hence much lower development levels for society at large.

Understanding the underlying impact of ethnic fragmentation thus helps explain the poor performance of Melanesia as compared to other parts of the Pacific. As Judith Bennett (2002:1) recently observed,

For many outsiders, the accelerating failure of governments in western Melanesia in the last decade has been difficult to understand. At independence, although their resources ranged from the rich diversity in Papua New Guinea to the less abundant, but still substantial in Solomon Islands, it seemed that with some temporary assistance from developed nations in the region their future would be assured. Yet since independence, overall Melanesian living standards and personal security have declined; and more and more aid is being requested from donors.

Focusing on the developmental challenges created by diversity makes this failure of government more understandable. The western Melanesian countries are some of the most ethno-linguistically diverse societies not just in the Pacific, but in the world. It should therefore be no surprise, if one accepts the arguments made in this article, that it is these same societies that have struggled the most since independence to deliver national development in the face of a multitude of competing ethno-political demands.

The political consequences of ethnic fragmentation

While the consequences of ethno-linguistic fragmentation are seen as being almost entirely detrimental to good economic performance, there are other dimensions of governance. What about the political impacts of heterogeneity? Here, the comparative literature is more nuanced. According to recent research, the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and democracy is essentially bell-shaped: both highly homogeneous and highly fragmented social structures bolster the likelihood of democracy, while bi-polar structures are inimical to democratic prospects. Thus a highly fragmented society (as in Papua New Guinea) should be better placed to maintain democracy than one split between two similarly-sized groups, as in Fiji. Such a situation, in which
society is polarised and in which one group can potentially control power alone, is empirically one of the most important predictors of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).

As with the literature on the economic consequences of ethnic fragmentation, these comparative findings have considerable relevance for understanding patterns of politics and conflict in the Pacific. For one thing, they help explain why Fiji, the wealthiest and most developed sovereign state in the South Pacific, has nonetheless suffered several coups while Papua New Guinea, with a much poorer economic record, is nevertheless one of the very few post-colonial states to have maintained an unbroken record of democratic rule. As is well known, in Fiji the dominant ethnic cleavage is a bi-polar one between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, and in both 1987 and 2000 this cleavage was used to mobilise support for an economically disastrous coup. By contrast, there has been no coup in Papua New Guinea, despite a much larger and poorer population, failing infrastructure, declining investment, falling living standards, and weak economic growth.

Comparative statistical models which rely on these very factors to predict coups and other kinds of democratic breakdown have found the continuity of democracy in Papua New Guinea to be a deviant case which defies explanation (Londregan and Poole 1990, Vanhanen 1997). Why, they ask, has democracy in Papua New Guinea not broken down in the face of such unfavourable facilitating conditions? Ethnic structure provides one explanation. Even though there may be widespread dissatisfaction with the way the political system works in Papua New Guinea, it is nevertheless extremely difficult for any one group to amass sufficient collective support to overthrow the government in power. The result is that, even though it has not delivered much in the way of development, the existing political system persists in part through its own inertia. Thus Reilly (2000) argues that Papua New Guinea’s extremely high levels of ethno-linguistic fragmentation actually make democracy possible in the face of unfavourable social and economic conditions.

So, while ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is a negative factor for economic development, it can be a positive factor for safeguarding formal democracy. However, this is not to argue that a fragmented ethnic structure is a good thing for other dimensions of governance. One clear effect of ethnic fragmentation is the way that it impacts upon the stability of executive government. Here the contrast between the more homogeneous Polynesian states and the more fragmented Melanesian ones becomes particularly acute. In Tonga and Samoa, governments tend to be long-lasting, and participation in executive government is restricted to members of the country’s traditional aristocracy: in Tonga, to the monarchy alone, in Samoa, to the matai. This stifles open competition, but it does create a degree of political stability, and policy predictability. Indeed, comparisons of government tenure across the Pacific show these to be among the most stable of all countries in terms of continuity of office (Larmour 2000).
The stability of executive government in these Polynesian cases stands in stark contrast to the increasing use of no-confidence votes to bring down governments in other parts of the Pacific, such as western Melanesia. Indeed, the raucous competition for elected office that is a feature of politics in places like Papua New Guinea has been accompanied by enormous executive instability. To date, every government elected in Papua New Guinea has fallen before the expiration of the parliamentary term; in recent years the governments of both Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have also been overturned on the floor of parliament (under considerable duress, in the Solomons case).

However, the most unstable executive government in the Pacific today is undoubtedly that of Nauru, which is in Micronesia. Dobell (2003) categorises Nauru as the Pacific’s second failed state, along with Solomon Islands. Like the Solomons, Nauru is now essentially bankrupt, dependent on external aid from Australia in return for temporarily accepting refugee claimants. Nauru’s social structure is generally considered to be based around 12 traditional clans (Crocombe and Giese 1988), and the combination of clan, familial and personal rivalries now dominates political competition. Indeed, in recent years Nauruan politics has become increasingly ‘Melanesian’, with fifteen changes of government in the last five years, including five in 2003 alone. However, Nauru’s trajectory towards a failed state is quite different to Solomon Islands, as it has squandered almost all the earnings from its near-exhausted phosphate resources. As Dobell (2003, 8) notes, ‘One state has failed because of its poverty, the other because of its inability to handle riches’.

Again, these patterns of behaviour have well-established impacts on developmental variables such as economic growth. Successive comparative studies have confirmed that the worst possible form of governance for economic growth is to have unstable executives, an unrepresentative legislature, and a fragmented and personalised political party system which lacks roots in the community (see Powell 1982, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001). This is a recipe for unstable politics, unsteady policy, and a serious weakness of governance. Unfortunately it is also an increasingly accurate description of governance in much of Melanesia and also of Nauru. It is less applicable to most of Micronesia (where US-inspired presidential forms of government are the norm, with consequent benefits for executive stability) or Polynesia (where politics continues to be based around traditional chiefly social structures rather than micro-ethnic loyalties).

**Ethnic fragmentation and internal conflict**

Another issue that has great relevance to the Pacific is the interplay of ethnic identity and natural resource endowments. There is a growing and influential scholarly literature on the so-called ‘resource curse’: the tendency of resource-rich countries to under-perform economically and fall victim to large-scale internal violence (Ross 2004). As both ethnic groups and natural resources
such as mines, gas fields and forests tend to be geographically concentrated, there is often a clear overlay between ethnic identity and claims of group ownership to a resource, and thus an interplay between ethnic diversity, natural resources, and internal conflict.

Testing a range of ‘greed versus grievance’ explanations for the outbreak of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) found that primary commodity dependence sharply increases a country’s risk of conflict; indeed, a sizeable resource endowment was actually the most important single explanation of civil wars. Again, however, the ethnic dimension was also important: societies in which one ethnic group could dominate others were particularly at risk of civil war. Ethnic fragmentation, by contrast, decreased the risk of large-scale conflict, for the same reason that it decreased the risk of coups: the problems of organisation posed by the presence of many different ethnic groups. Collier used the example of West Papua/Irian Jaya as an illustration:

This province is dependent upon primary commodity exports and over the past 30 years many small groups have attempted to mount armed opposition to rule from Indonesia. However, none of these groups succeeded in building a viable rebel organisation of any scale. The likely reason for this is that Irian Jaya is so astonishingly ethnically fragmented, with some 450 distinct language groups: the groups simply cannot cohere into a military organisation (Collier 2001, 150).

In sum, coups and rebellions should thus be rare in ethnically fragmented societies because of the considerable difficulties posed in maintaining cross-ethnic unity for any political objective, either positive or negative.

But if this is the case, how do we explain the various armed rebellions that have occurred in all four independent Melanesian states over the past decade—the Fijian coups, the Bougainville war in Papua New Guinea, the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu, and (most recently) the overthrow of elected government in the Solomon Islands? On the face of it, these events undermine the claim that ethnic fragmentation somehow makes societies safer. However, I argue that upon closer examination, each of these conflicts can also been seen as an example of the broader theory in action. In each case, the diverse impacts of colonial rule, migration and post-colonial state-building led to the growth of new cleavages which served to restructure politics along a more confrontational axis. In all of these cases, the fragmentation of traditional society was overlaid and sometimes replaced by a bi-polar, us-versus-them form of identity construction which served to move ethnic structure away from a dispersed (and thus safer) formation and towards one of polarisation.

Colonialism has been a crucial factor in this process. In New Caledonia, for example, as part of the campaign for independence from France ‘the indigenous liberation movement seeks to polarise the population into Kanak/non-Kanak segments, and to establish an independent nation? The French in turn attempt to undermine Kanak unity by appealing to the “true diversity of
races’ in New Caledonia’ (Linnekin 1990, 171). The 1988 hostage drama in New Caledonia, in which 28 people died, is a tragic example of the consequences of this kind of polarised identity creation. Elsewhere, the emergence of identities based around colonial constructs such as ‘Papua’ (in Papua New Guinea) or ‘Malaita’ (in the Solomon Islands) are examples of how simple administrative units of colonialism can nonetheless assume prominence as important post-colonial ethnic identities. In such cases, ‘what in pre-colonial times were politically fragmented and culturally and linguistically diverse communities? become units locked in the struggle for power and resources in post-colonial states’ (Keesing 1989:26). Contemporary conflicts in Fiji, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu provide good examples of the way in which this process can occur.

Fiji

Fiji provides perhaps the most obvious example of the dangers of a polarised ethnic formation. The ‘bi-communal’ division between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, each comprising around half of the population (50 percent indigenous Fijian, 44 percent Indo-Fijian), is the most dangerous of all ethnic structures (Milne 1988). At times of elevated ethnic politics—such as the elections of governments perceived as being controlled by Indo-Fijians in 1987 and 1999—this one dimension of cleavage tends to takes precedence over all others. Indeed the superficial Fijian-Indian division has served at various times to maintain a degree of unity within the indigenous Fijian population, which is itself divided along tribal, regional and cultural lines—especially the distinction between the dominance of Polynesian chiefly systems in the east versus the more egalitarian structures in the western regions (Thomas 1990). The Indo-Fijian community is also divided along various internal lines, and contains a significant Muslim minority.

These various intra-community divisions, however, quickly become overlaid at times of crisis with the much blunter one of ‘Indian’ versus ‘Fijian’. Both the 1987 and 2000 coups used the threat of Indo-Fijian domination as a means of unifying the Fijian community along ‘us-versus-them’ lines. There have been varying academic interpretations of the 1987 coups, with some seeing them as racially motivated, and others as more complex events encouraged by class interests, competition between chiefly and commoner indigenous Fijians, regional tensions and personal ambition (Scar 1988; Lal 1988; Lawson 1991). Similarly, some analyses of the 2000 coups argue that the illusion of ethnic unity was actually critical in maintaining a crude power-grab that was more about the economic interests of George Speight and his backers than about ethnicity per se (Lal and Pretes 2001). In each case, however, there is little argument that pan-ethnic appeals to a unified Fijian or Indo-Fijian identity were a primary means of mobilising support on both sides. In both 1987 and
2000, multiple and often competing identities were replaced, temporarily at least, by a crude dichotomy of indigenous versus immigrant.

**Bougainville**

The Bougainville rebellion in Papua New Guinea, the most serious internal conflict in the Pacific region during the 1990s, featured a different process of identity construction. The island of Bougainville is no more internally homogeneous than most other parts of Papua New Guinea: it features 19 different language groups and associated clan and tribal rivalries (Larmour 1992). Following the outbreak of full-blown conflict between secessionist forces on Bougainville and the Papua New Guinea government in 1987, the pro-independence forces also split into several competing camps (Regan 1998). However, the independence movement needed to downplay these differences and emphasise a distinctively pan-Bougainvillean identity. Emphasis was consistently placed on the supposedly more peaceful temperament and relative cultural advancement of Bougainvilleans compared to the more aggressive nature of other Papua New Guineans, a process that became crucial to the creation of a Bougainville ethnic identity (Nash and Ogan 1990).

Another way of doing this was by focusing on Bougainville’s putative closeness to Solomon Islands and distinctiveness from the rest of Papua New Guinea by emphasising not language or tribe as an ethnic marker, but skin colour. Thus one rebel, Leo Hannett, claimed that ‘Ethnically, Bougainvilleans are obviously different from Papuans and New Guineans. We are generally jet black people having common ancestry with more people down West Solomons rather than with any groups in PNG’ (quoted in Premdas 1977, 71). As part of the process of identity construction, then, some traditional forms of identity such as linguistic and tribal allegiance were eclipsed by others which more usefully served the purpose of projecting a unified Bougainvillean nation. Since the peace deal signed in 2001, intra-Bougainvillean divisions based around traditional clan ties have become more salient once again.

**Solomon Islands**

The process of identity construction between the islands of Guadalcanal and Malaita, which precipitated the recent conflict in Solomon Islands, has deeper historical roots. A country with 450,000 people, 87 different indigenous languages, and little in the way of national consciousness, tensions between island groups have been a feature of life in Solomon Islands for much of the post-war period. This process was intricately intertwined with the introduction of new administrative units by the colonial state, which precipitated divisions between various parts of the Solomons. Following independence, governments attempted to build some kind of national consciousness through the education system and the development of Pigin as a common language of
communication, but they made little progress in replacing traditional ethnic identities with non-ethnic ‘civil’ ones (Jourdan 1995).

The 1990s saw increasing ‘ethnic tensions’ between Malaita, one of the most ethnically diverse parts of the Solomons, and the neighbouring island of Guadalcanal, to which many Malaitans had migrated. This led to the development of new kind of identity, as ‘the ethnically diverse islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal forged large island-wide ethno-nationalist identities [in order] to dominate Solomon Islands national politics as if they were the only two ethnic groups in the country’ (Fry 2000:303). This attempt at identity construction was not an easy process: Kabutaulaka (2001) notes that the maintenance of a single ethnic identity in Malaita proved so difficult that some enterprising leaders claimed that Malaitans were actually descendants of the lost tribes of Israel. Similar problems afflicted the attempt to create a unified Guadalcanal identity.

Despite these difficulties, by 1999 these renewed island-based cleavages had resulted in the formation of two armed groups: the Malaitan Eagle Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement (‘Isatabu’ being the claimed traditional name for Guadalcanal). Rising conflict between these groups resulted in the expulsion of some 20,000 Malaitan settlers from Guadalcanal in 1999, the overthrow of the Solomon Islands government in May 2000, and a violent and chaotic internal war, with hundreds of casualties on both sides. The conflict served to reinforce the salience of what was effectively a bi-polar cleavage overlaid on the fragmented cultural basis of the country. Significantly, since the signing of the Townsville Peace Accord, and particularly since the Helpem Fren intervention, this veneer of island-wide unity has begun to splinter, as local clan identities have reasserted themselves (Kabutaulaka 2002).

**Vanuatu**

Vanuatu, an Anglo-French condominium before independence in 1980, has recently seen the mobilisation of ethnic identities work in the other direction—towards conflict de-escalation. The de-politicisation of Vanuatu’s Anglophone-Francophone cleavage, and the reassertion of traditional Melanesian politics, are good illustrations of the dynamism and fluidity of ethnic identities. Like Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu has a highly fragmented form of traditional society featuring typically Melanesian patterns of clan organisation, and some 109 indigenous languages. But until recently, Vanuatu politics was dominated by an over-arching colonial cleavage between the country’s Anglophone majority and the Francophone minority. This bi-polar linguistic identity has had a marked impact on Vanuatu’s political development. For example, the Santo rebellion in 1980— which featured a hodge-podge of different actors and interests including disaffected French settlers and French-educated locals, the local chief Jimmy Stevens, and the
libertarian US-based Phoenix Corporation—was mobilised primarily around the issue of Francophone disaffection.

Similarly, Vanuatu’s post-colonial party system featured two dominant parties, one Anglophone, one Francophone—a system quite unlike the fractionalised multiparty patterns of other Melanesian countries. However, in recent years, this cleavage has gradually lost its salience and more traditionally Melanesian patterns of political identity seem to be reasserting themselves. For example, the vote share for the major Anglophone party, the Vanua’aku Pati, has declined steadily since independence, from 67 percent in the 1979 elections that brought it to power to 47 percent in 1987, whereupon the party split in two. By the 1990s, the two-party system of the past had been largely replaced by more familiar Melanesian patterns of fragmentation, while traditional clan and tribal politics had reasserted themselves.

It is unlikely today that any secessionist movement based around the Anglophone-Francophone cleavage would be able to succeed in mobilising significant support in Vanuatu. Rather, as traditional forms of ethnic fragmentation have reasserted themselves, the danger of a bi-polar conflict has receded, and more familiar governance problems associated with Melanesian politics—such as clan voting, ethnic nepotism and unstable executive government—have become more prominent. As one indication of this, there were six changes of government between 1995 and 2001 alone (Stöver 2001, 835).

**Conclusion**

The combined evidence presented in this article has important implications for discussions of state performance and state failure in the South Pacific. Despite their small size, lack of natural resources, and distance from world markets, the better performers in the South Pacific have, on most indicators of development, come from Polynesia. By contrast, in the larger and better-endowed states of Melanesia, the combination of ethnic diversity and natural resource endowment appears to have generated particular pathologies of governance, with a focus on rent-seeking by ethnic interest groups leading to collective action problems, the under-provision of public goods, and below-par economic performance. Thus it is these cases, rather than their resource-poor Polynesian counterparts, that are increasingly raised in discussions of state failure in the South Pacific.

This trend also has implications for Australia’s policy towards the South Pacific region. Due to a combination of geographical proximity and historical circumstance, as well as current policies on asylum seekers, the ‘war on terror’ and state-building, the Australian government’s foremost preoccupations in the region are Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Vanuatu, in roughly that order of importance. With the exception of Nauru, these are the most ethnically diverse states in the South Pacific. They are also, without exception, the worst performed states of the region on most indicators of
development. If, as the evidence presented in this article suggests, these problems are rooted in the very social structure of the countries themselves, this record of under-performance is unlikely to change any time soon, regardless of external efforts. Deep-rooted patterns of identity and culture are likely to be considerably more resilient than anything Australian policymakers can come up with.

However, there are some positive effects of diversity too. Despite its deleterious economic impacts, ethno-linguistic diversity can promote democratic longevity by making it difficult to overthrow existing regimes. Thus, we are unlikely to see a coup in Papua New Guinea, for example, despite its ongoing difficulties. In addition, ethnic identities are not static. Existing patterns of ethno-linguistic fragmentation are influential but not inviolable. Indeed, new identities and cleavages can establish themselves surprisingly quickly. Examples include contemporary conflicts in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, both of which depended on the fashioning of ‘us-or-them’ post-colonial identities from what were highly fragmented traditional societies. Patterns of ethno-linguistic identification, influential though they are, should thus be seen as fluid, contextual and dynamic. History is not destiny.

By unifying explanations of both economic and political outcomes via the common causal factor of ethno-linguistic structure, this article helps to explain variations in state development and performance across the Pacific islands region. Of course, there are many other reasons for these variations as well; social phenomena are never monocausal. Nonetheless, the evidence does suggest that the disparate affects of ethnic structure on governance, economic growth, political stability, democratic continuity, and internal conflict are a key part of the explanation of state success and state failure across the South Pacific.

Notes
1. The term primordialism is usually associated with Geertz 1963. For a discussion of this typology in the scholarly literature, see Esman 1994, 9-16.
2. The most widely-used measure, the index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation (ELF), suffers from numerous errors of omission and commission, and ignores the Pacific islands region completely. See Reilly 2000.
3. The regression coefficient is $R^2 = 0.48$, statistically significant at the .05 level.
4. For the first measure, see Hughes 2003; for the second, see United Nations Development Program 2002. However, both measures are affected by missing data, hence my use of per capita GDP figures.
6. For example, violence between ‘Papuans’ and ‘New Guineans’ following a rugby league match in Papua New Guinea in June 1968, which was later reported as ‘one of the worst outbreaks of inter-tribal fighting to occur’ in Port Moresby, was structured along these introduced colonial administrative divisions (Nelson 1974, 26).
References


Cadence, war and security

LESLEY SEEBECK

An increased incidence of attack has been identified as a major characteristic of the new threat posed by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. This article considers what such a change means for Western national security systems by examining how different parts of the system change over time. It becomes evident that Western national security systems are structured on an assumption of comparatively slow state-based threats. In contrast, terrorist franchises operate at a faster pace, are more ‘lightweight’ and can adapt within the operational and capability cycles of Western governments. Neither network-centric warfare nor an improved assessment of the threat, called for by some, offers a panacea in this regard. Rather, it is clear that not only do Western governments need to adjust their operational and capability cycles, but that they also need a greater diversity of responses to increase overall national security resilience and offer more tools for policy-makers.

Introduction

In a recent issue of The National Interest, Philip Zelikow (2003) discusses the role of time in transforming the national security agenda. These days, he says, the cadence—the rhythm and speed—of threats has increased. But the national security apparatus and doctrine of the United States—and by extension the West—remains in step with a much slower cadence, the cadence of state-based warfare, in which the greatest threats arose from large states with much to lose. Moreover, he points out, the fault-lines of conflict have shifted from national borders to within societies; geography is no longer the delimiter it once was.

Zelikow’s argument leads us to think more carefully about the importance of time in national security. National security, after all, comprises more than threats, though threats along with ambitions and our assessment of the world are motivating forces in the shaping of our national security strategy. National security comprises many different activities and structures, from ongoing diplomatic contacts to military operations, through to geography and deep cultural mores. Each of these has a differing dynamic, and so will behave differently over time; it is a mistake to believe that the whole system acts as one over time, or to any particular, universal beat.
This article extends Zelikow’s observation concerning a different cadence of threat to the effects of differing cadences across the national security system as a whole. As I will illustrate, complex systems may be layered temporally—that is, according to the pace at which different components change—allowing assessments to be made concerning responsiveness and stability. The utility of such an approach is that it helps us to better understand the consequential changes to our system of national security from a changing cadence of threat.

Understanding time in systems

A national security system is comprised of many components. The military, the most obvious manifestation of the national security effort, forms only a part of the system. We less often consider those aspects that direct the soldier to battle; that determine which battle, where and why; that ensure that the soldier has appropriate equipment; and that allow the soldier to fight alongside others. We often neglect the nature of the technological, economic and cultural underpinnings of war. Our oversight is due in part to the apparent individuality of the component parts. For example, the intelligence apparatus is often seen as detached from policy-makers and the military, let alone investment concerns, global communication networks and individual citizens. Meanwhile, the military go to considerable lengths to separate themselves from the civilian world, wearing distinguishing uniforms, working to internal hierarchies, and possessing distinctive behaviours.

But when these fragments work well and work well together, they are synergistic, manifesting what are known as emergent properties. Emergent properties are those which are observable at the system level, but cannot be reduced to individuals. The ability to exert power is the key emergent property of a successful national security system. What affects that emergent property is as much the nature of the linkages between components as it is the individual capability of the components themselves. An intelligence agency with the best analysts money can buy but aloof and unresponsive to policy needs is of little value in the context of serving the national interest. A highly capable tank force is of little value to either power projection or deterrence if it is unable to move quickly where needed, or if the political will for its use is lacking.

Therefore, how each of those components changes and interacts with the others over time is an important determinant of the system’s shape and adaptability, and ultimately, emergent outcomes.

Each of the component parts reacts to time differently because of differences in resource requirements; the effects of competition and selection; and problems of internal coordination. Simply put, each component needs sufficient resources to maintain itself and renew itself periodically; generally, the bigger the component, the more resources it needs, and the longer it takes to rejuvenate. Because resources, whether finance, skills or goodwill, are limited,
competition ensues. That means each component must expend time and effort
to adjust itself and its strategies for survival to ensure it has enough resources
to sustain itself. In doing so, it must constantly exercise selection, making
choices about priorities and interactions, and assessments of likely resources
and where they are to be found. While these processes are well known in
capitals, particularly in the intense period leading to budget formulation, they
are also apparent in the lobbying by defence contractors and researchers, in
the urgency of reporting from posts, and in targeted leaks to media. Even in
parts of the system which we think of as free of such concerns, such as military
units, we find such behaviour: soldiers using civilian equipment because of
deficiencies in their own, for example.

A further difficulty is responding to external change, due to the effort and
time needed for internal coordination—a major problem for any system
beyond the very simple. Because we can never know our external environment
completely, we make decisions based on what we can understand with our
limited processing capabilities (Simon 1955)—as new information becomes
available we need to adjust. Large systems spend a lot of time and energy
adjusting to their own internal changes; it takes time for local change to be
understood and the necessary readjustment propagated throughout the internal
environment. Accordingly, systems can never know fully either their
internal or external environments, even with the benefits of modern technol-
ogy (Luhmann 1997). Social systems try to overcome this fundamental limi-
tation by exercising best guesses as to what circumstances will be at some
future point, and acting accordingly (Luhmann 1995); they seek to operate in
leaps through time.

Operating through time in such a fashion is exactly the purpose of strategy,
exercised at a national level. But at a sub-national, or sub-system, level,
component parts operate on a more localised set of information. The result is
that different aspects of the system behave differently in time, and often
differently to other, adjacent parts. A system with the complexities of a
national security system will not change homogeneously. Rather, it will be
restless, exhibiting sudden jumps, sometimes in an unexpected direction as one
particular component drives the agenda. Numerous explanations may be
proposed for such behaviour, from particular power dynamics between indi-
viduals or groups, to tension between public and private interest, to various
conspiracy theories. But there may be a deeper, underlying system dynamic at
play, one which lies beyond the reach of particular individuals or conspiracies
and relies more on the fundamental behaviours of the system as sketched out
above. We can understand such dynamics better by using the notion of
temporal layering.

The idea underlying temporal layering is a simple one. System elements that
are slow to change—or possess a slow cadence, to use Zelikow’s terms—will
lie deep in the system’s temporal structure, while those that change frenetically
lie close to the top.
Cadence, war and security

Figure 1: Temporal Layering in Buildings

By way of illustration, consider a building. A building can be layered (Brand 1994), as set out in Figure 1. The ‘stuff’ is that which changes most frequently, daily to monthly, the furniture, whitegoods, telephones and so on that we use in our daily lives. Space, the building’s floor plan, changes less frequently. Services—electricity, water, air-conditioning and communications—change less often again. Skin, the external façade, may change every couple of decades or so, for reasons of need or fashion. The structure comprises what we normally consider as a building, from the foundations, external walls and support structures and the roof. But even structures come and go while the site, the slowest layer, is close to eternal.

Layering national security

We can similarly ‘layer’ national security. In doing so, we consider elements that have clearly different cadences and that have meaning in the context of national security. Further, faster elements depend on the existence of slower layers, just as the ‘stuff’ of our everyday life in buildings needs all the lower layers to give it meaning and to meet human needs—a telephone unconnected in a field, for example, may have a site, but is otherwise meaningless in the context of a building.

The things that resemble a building’s ‘stuff’ in that they change most frequently are the daily diplomatic interchanges, reporting and collection activities undertaken by diplomatic staff, including military officers, and intelligence agencies. Those exchanges and reporting add to the bit streams of information which, combined, and added to by the media, comprise what Nye calls the ‘fire hose’ of information directed at policy-makers (Nye 1994).

The torrent of information helps shape the world-views of desk officers and analysts, who, in turn, provide briefings to senior officials and ministers, perhaps weekly, monthly, or even annually. Policy proposals may be raised with a similar frequency, but if we assume white papers to signal major reviews, then policy is re-evaluated and redirected every two to three years. The pace of major Australian Defence Force (ADF) deployments has picked up recently, with operations in Afghanistan (2001-), Iraq (2003-) and the
Solomons (2003-) since 11 September, supplementing ongoing operations in East Timor (1999-) and the Persian Gulf (periodic since 1991-), plus ongoing surveillance tasks and lesser contributions to other peacekeeping efforts. We can posit an average cadence for major military deployments of 18 to 36 months, with the pace quickening in recent years.

Although collection priorities may be changed according to the policy development cycle, establishing collection capabilities can take considerably longer. Terrorist groups in particular are hard targets; their cliques are tight, and trust is based on not merely community, religious or ideological ties, but also on familial or ‘school’ ties (Jones 2003), and so take considerable time and often luck to penetrate.

Similarly, though the military may be deployable at comparatively short notice, its actual capabilities change much more slowly, over 10 to 50 years. Even the small arms used change slowly—the technology underpinning semi-automatic rifles, for example, has settled, leaving room only for periodic refinements. The expense of large platforms has ensured their longevity—Australia’s F11-11s will be retired in 2005, after a service of 35 years, while US B52 bombers still are being used after 50 years.

Of more concern to policy-makers is not merely the life-span of individual capabilities, but the time taken to decide on and implement new capabilities—an issue identified by Zelikow. Capability lead-times in Australia remain in the region of five to ten years. Capability lead times are driven by a combination of strategic need (a measure of the threat) and a variety of factors including politics, regional development, ability to pay and access to technology. Still, such times can outstrip military doctrine (which tends to be linked to, and lags, major operations or even wars), military outlook (based on the formative ideas of commanders, and thus a generational issue) and military culture (multigenerational).

The geopolitical layer possesses a yet slower cadence. This layer comprises geography, alliances, and the ‘international system’. Geography is often understood as the basis of national security; that concept underpins the 1987 Defence of Australia and its successors. But through the lens of time, and of national interest, geography is not immutable. Geographical national interest may stretch from the continent, to the continental shelf, to air-sea gaps, to exclusive maritime zones, to sea-lanes, to occupied territory and forward deployments. War can distend or contract such boundaries. Technology can minimise distance, making once impassable geographical barriers irrelevant, and generate wealth from unwanted wasteland or unclaimed waters. Recent US rethinking on forward deployments reflects this mutability of geography: the 2003 suggestion by General Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) that US overseas bases be used as ‘lily pads’ harnesses geographical pre-positioning as a means of compressing time. Other factors can alter the shape of geographical national interest, such as the location of our major trading partners, our power projection capability, or the location of
Figure 2. The temporal layering of national security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buildings (Brand, 1994)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stuff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Space</td>
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<td>Services</td>
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<td>Skin</td>
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<td>Structure</td>
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diplomats and travellers. It even changes with our interpretation of history—consider the place in the Australian psyche of Gallipoli, geographically almost as distant from Australia as is possible.

In terms of the building analogy, then, geography is less like ‘site’, the slowest and lowest layer, and more like structure, the second slowest layer. Structure alters as a result of the building’s purpose, an idea akin to national interest, and in response to activity at upper layers, such as a demand to accommodate more services or to create extra space. In the same way, teaching practices in universities reside at a deeper level than the physical location and site of universities; there are factors that shape social systems and which transcend geography.

Relationships between nations also possess a slow cadence. Relations with other countries are based on trust (Axelrod 1984), a slow and careful negotiation of understandings, a gathering of similarities or a well of differences. Bilateral arrangements at their least contentious may take years to propose, negotiate and formalise. Multilateral arrangements are constrained to slowness by their multiple interconnections. Deep alliances are found only rarely, precisely because to be deep, they need to be deeply rooted within two nations, not merely one, and be able to withstand the test of time.

If change in geography and international systems run slowly, then culture runs more slowly yet. In the West, the basic precepts of our culture have had over 2000 years to form. Victor Davis Hanson (2001) argues that such principles, which themselves evolve slowly, underpin what he calls the Western way of war.

Figure 2 sets out the temporal layering of national security as described above. The model allows a revised perspective of national interest: just as a building’s purpose is to meet human needs, so a national security system needs to meet the national interest. National security may be defined by the content and interaction of all the layers described above. National security motivates the components, but is also defined by them and their interaction.
Time as strategy

The temporal layering approach brings to the fore time as a strategic quality. From this perspective, national security strategy concerns the design and management of the temporal behaviour of the system. Key conditions follow.

First, a good national security system must be temporally diverse. That is, it must have a range of different periods, phases, cycles and layers. Such diversity in a system’s time-based behaviour allows it to manage shocks better: a system that comprises many different temporal patterns has many different ways of absorbing the shock, as some parts absorb it while others respond quickly to counter it. An analogy may be drawn with spatial modularity; that is, the division of a system into largely independent but interacting sub-systems. Such modularity enables damaged components to be replaced without requiring the whole system to be broken apart; it’s a technique common in highly complex engineered systems. A resilient system, then, needs to have temporal modularity to match its spatial modularity.

Second, tight coupling between layers needs to be avoided. There exists already dependence between the layers, for the purpose of the whole. For example, in a building, arranged space assists the placement and use of stuff, while in national security, targeting defines the ball-park of analysis and focuses interactions. But it makes little sense, and rapidly accrues costs, to rearrange the space layout every time a desk is shifted, or revisit targeting priorities for each interaction between diplomats. Yet systems may be designed with exactly such binding inbuilt, particularly when technology is involved. Where fast-moving behaviours are deeply embedded, the result is system frustration and failure.

Third, the nature of the constraints between layers needs to be understood. Because lower layers serve as a necessary basis for the existence of upper layers within the system, providing stability in doing so, they restrict change within those upper layers (Brand 1994). Change in the lower layers may disrupt upper layers; sudden, unexpected change in those layers may shear the system. But the integrity of lower layers also depends on their ability to accommodate the demands of the upper layers. If they are unable to meet the demands of the upper layers, again the system may warp, disturbing other components and failing user needs. In much the same way, too many users accessing a web site may crash the wider organisational information system; that is how internet denial-of-service attacks bring down their targets. Similarly, forcing policymakers to rely solely on the flood of raw, unassessed data can easily lead to confusion, mistakes and a disjunction between immediate action and policy instruments and broader concerns. Decision-makers need context and analysis, a filtering and deeper understanding of fast-moving, piecemeal raw data. Ignoring that need, or structuring the system poorly, increases the likelihood that small glitches or poorly presented information can have unexpected, catastrophic outcomes.
Last, the purpose of the system must be borne in mind: the system must meet user need. A building that has the wrong structure, cannot adapt to new services, cannot accommodate stuff or is in an unsuitable site, may be vacated, sold or knocked down. The consequences of a national security system that cannot adapt to, pre-empt, or counter a changing threat, so failing user need—defined as the national interest—are considerably more serious.

An increased cadence of threat

When we consider Western national security systems from a temporal perspective, we find they are based—currently—on an assumption that threats are principally state-based. State-based threats are reasonably slow to emerge—building, equipping and training a national military force takes time—and possess a large signature or set of indicators, such as large, capable militaries, force-projection capabilities, a military-industrial complex, clandestine weapons programs or acquisitions, and diplomatic posture and political rhetoric. The exact point of crisis may be unpredictable, but states have time to develop deterrent capabilities and alliances in preparation. Moreover, though democracies have difficulty in appreciating and acting on ‘slow threats’ (Senge 1994), policy review cycles of a few years in duration allowed for course correction. And in the past, they did indeed allow for sufficient correction, when conditions of a fair degree of continuity and a reasonably stable paradigm of state-based warfare held.

But 11 September represented a major discontinuity in national security. From a temporal-layering perspective the resulting tension in the system becomes apparent. As Zelikow argues, the nature of the threat has changed and the cadence of threat has increased: al Qaeda and its ilk are using time in shaping the pattern of their activities. Now a system designed for comparatively slow state-based threats has to cope with much more rapid non-state-based threats. The cadence of these new threats has more resonance with our daily lives than it does with the slow grind of government bureaucracies and Western military capability development. It is clear that terrorist groups such as al Qaeda operate well within the operational cycles of Western governments. Figure 3 illustrates the difference: the temporal cycle of threat from conventional state-based actors corresponds roughly with existing capability and doctrinal cycles; the temporal cycle of threat from al Qaeda and its fellows lies well within the existing capability and doctrinal cycle.

As a potential threat to nation-states, terrorism has not been ignored; famously, the US Congress received a report on the terrorist threat only months before the 11 September attack. A number of analysts identified various non-state actors as posing not merely a threat to Western interests, but also as the instigators of a changed paradigm in war fighting (van Crefeld 1991). However, globalisation and technological advances—classic examples of the slow changes that analysts and policy-makers find hard to grasp—have
allowed a non-linear transformation in the potential capabilities available to terrorists.

First, the tools of state warfare are more accessible to non-state groups. That is a major concern because of the destructive power of those weapons, especially with respect to WMD. But there is more reason to worry, because non-state groups are comparatively light-weight—they lack the normal apparatus and inertia of nation-states—they lack the same constraints, such as conditions on the use of force and of high logistics demands, experienced by nation-states. Martin van Crefeld (1991) notes the supply needed by a division has multiplied some 30 times that of the Franco-Prussian War, when a division required some 50 tons of supply, to 650 tons per day used by the Allies in 1944-1945, to two to three times that last figure today. Supply includes food, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, even technological know-how; it buys freedom of movement and from reliance on local resources, but imposes huge logistical costs and sophistication. Getting the 101st Airborne simply to Kuwait meant transporting 5,000 vehicles, 1,500 shipping containers, 17,000 soldiers and over 200 helicopters; 1,900 railcars over a two week period were needed for the first stage of the journey alone, from the 101st’s US base in Kentucky to Florida (Atkinson 2004).

In contrast, al Qaeda operatives draw what little they need largely from Western society and local sympathetic communities. The March 2004 bombing in Madrid required explosives; local transport, mobile phones and SIM cards acquired from sympathisers; easily purchased backpacks; and a meticulous coordination typical of al Qaeda operations. Non-state groups can move, act and adapt much more quickly than Western national security capability can respond. Thus the signals—the indicators Western agencies and policy-makers usually use to assess threats—such groups emit are much weaker and more changeable than those from inimical nation-states.
Second, Western society is more accessible to those groups. Ease of movement between states and region is much more than it was even 15 years ago, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. But also sympathisers to these various non-state groups have been dispersed and are now embedded within Western communities. And even where there are no active sympathisers, there are those who will assist members of non-state groups simply because they share a nationality, religion or culture. Typical of such people is Agus Budiman. Tried but not convicted of involvement in the 11 September attack, the Indonesian national helped Muhommed Atta move into a new house and later falsely certified that another of the terrorists lived at his address in Virginia, so that the latter could obtain an identification card. He did so, he said, because they were members of the same Muslim community in Hamburg, and ‘helped each other out’ (Djuhari 2002). A social network analysis of the 11 September terrorists and their associates, as reported by the press, finds Budiman near the centre of the network (Krebs 2002). Non-nation-state ties, such as familial ties or attendance at the same training camp, assume increased importance, a point also made by Sidney Jones (2003) in her report on Jemaah Islamiyah.

Third, Western society in particular is sufficiently interconnected that a disruption in one part may cascade rapidly and beyond human control throughout the whole system (Homer-Dixon 2000). In complex systems, structure matters. The structure of communications, financial and transportation systems are such that information, and disinformation and malevolence, disseminates rapidly, often without check. Societal hubs, whether of finance (such as the World Trade Centre, representative of the centre of the Western capitalist system), military power (the Pentagon), association (the Sari Club in Bali represents a localised example), and transport (Madrid’s train network, particularly the Atocha station), are particularly attractive as targets. If attacks on such hubs are successful, the system—the social, economic, technological and political system—can be damaged. If such attacks are sustained, the system, or at least some aspects of it, may be severely degraded.

Threats from networked terrorists possess a lighter footprint than the nation-state, allowing them a faster cadence of attack. Access into Western society is provided through non-nation-state means, and instead relies on familial, religious or cultural affiliation, eased through globalised travel and dispersal of sympathisers or at least passive assisters. That allows for the swift movement of and access to resources. And targets generally are ‘soft’, even idiosyncratic, rather than command and control or the conquest of land, both traditional military targets. Indeed, RAND’s Bruce Hoffman (2003) argues that the strength of al Qaeda’s capability resides in deception; the ability to locate vulnerabilities in Western society; and the willingness to ensure success through suicide, a typically non-Western behaviour. But for none of these ‘capabilities’, or the ‘rudimentary methods’ used in Madrid, does al Qaeda require state-like apparatus or even support.

Speed is not the only characteristic of the new threat that challenges our existing security paradigms; there is also sustainability. Western militaries look
for quick, decisive victories on the battlefield (Hanson 2001). Post-Vietnam, and in accordance with the Powell Doctrine, they look for exit strategies and limited casualties, and there is an inherent conservatism in military professionals that makes them wary of entanglement in messy, non-state affairs. Western publics and governments, too, have become used to technological superiority and swift success. Fielding high-tech, well-trained militaries is an expensive and politically laden activity, and thus it is used sparingly and when need demands short-term results. In contrast, while the cadence of actual attack has increased, al Qaeda also talks not merely of years but of generation of jihad (Hoffman 2003). That such a threat is sustainable lies in the agility and parsimony of the actual capability for attack, and the anchoring of al Qaeda’s intent in Islamic culture, the deepest and slowest layer.

The national security system we have now is highly specialised, the product of 50 years of state-based warfare and the precepts of the Cold War. The only real means of immediate response to 11 September it offered was state-based military attack. Accordingly, the response was the US-led military overthrow of regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq—the outcomes of which the military alone is unable to resolve. A state-based military response is by no means invalid—recall Clausewitz’s dictum that war is but an extension of politics—but, as Dana Priest (2003) has noted, over time, the military have been burdened with providing an increasing proportion of the tools that should be available to policy-makers. Systems theorists such as Beer (1974) and Ashby (1957) argue that decision-makers need as many levers of control as there are aspects to be controlled. A reliance only on a military itself focused on slow state-based threats fails to provide decision-makers with the finesse, speed and scope necessary to respond to a faster cadence of a changeable, and likely long-term threat.

Countering the transformed threat

Given that the threat has transformed—and the fact that we cannot afford to discount the ongoing possibility of state-based threats—we need to consider the implications for existing Cold-War based national security systems.

The most obvious concern is ensuring a diversity of capability—the systems theorists’ levers of control—and increasing capability development turnaround. The Cold War paradigm presupposed that threats were state-based, and multi-layered primarily so as to hold or seize territory. Such capability and capability development demands a substantial footprint, in terms of infrastructure, resources, skills and political apparatus, as well as considerable time to develop. The strategic threat posed by state-based warfare possessed a period of between five years for smaller weapons systems, economic adjustment, and lesser challenging technologies, and perhaps 20 years or longer for platforms, economic recovery, and large technological leaps.
Contrast such development cycles with the cycles of attack in Iraq (daily, weekly or monthly) and al Qaeda’s past efforts (roughly biannually). With the further dispersal of al Qaeda-sponsored capability to regional groups (Bonner and van Natta 2004), threat cycles may vary according to region, group, capability and opportunity, but will still lie well within traditional Western military capability cycles. The result is that the new threat not only operates, but with each testing and probing of Western response is evolving within existing Western capability cycles.

In his study of buildings, Stewart Brand observed that it was the building’s ability to adapt to change in the middle layers—in the case of buildings, services—that determined whether a building continued to be used relatively intact or whether it was demolished. While it is the building’s use that shapes the specifics of the layers, it is the middle layers that mediate change between faster and slower layers. Once change at the lower and middle layers is underway, the rule of constraint says that change will follow at the upper layers. Thus change only at the interaction or analytical level, such as adjusting analysis or changing the content of diplomatic exchange, will not suffice to change the system as needed. What’s needed is change at the middle level of capability and doctrine. Enacting change in such layers is not easy; slow layers possess their own inertia. But change is necessary if we are to possess the tools to counter the new threat.

The temporal perspective also sheds a new light on the most recent panacea offered by the military to meet their obligations: network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW has its roots in the Cold War and the post-Vietnam Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and so represents a capability shift of 30 years—though some like Luttwak (2002) and Hammes (1994) argue that RMA and NCW are little other than high technology welded to old platforms yielding no commensurate shift in paradigm. NCW’s over-riding goal is speed and interconnectedness—getting the right information to the right soldier at the right time (Alberts et al. 2000): ‘The right information in real-time is a warfighter’s most powerful weapon’, according to a Lockheed-Martin internet advertisement. Even still under-developed, we saw its effects in Iraq, combined with the overwhelming conventional capability the US military can bring to bear on a modern battlefield. Surely such speed and knowledge, the thinking goes, is what is needed to counter the terrorist threat (Hill 2003).

While the transformation of the US (and allied) military may well transform state-level strategic dynamics, it is not apparent that it solves the underlying policy problem identified above: the reduction of levers of control. With NCW, the sledgehammer remains a sledgehammer, albeit faster, more coordinated and precision-guided. Again, the problem is no better illustrated than in Iraq.

National security does not reside only on the battlefield; indeed the victory in Iraq demonstrated the comparatively light footprint such a swift victory left. The difficulty now is to effect deeper change, and make that change stick.
To do that, the lower, slower layers—economy, infrastructure, governance, and culture (Brand 1999)—must be addressed (see Figure 4). Arguably, deeper change could be eased—remembering that there are no worthwhile quick fixes—had the military effort been if not slower, then heavier and broader in terms of its footprint. The new order necessarily must be supported adequately by the lower layers of the societal system—at the level of culture—and that inherently will take a long time. In Iraq, the military capability and battlefield outcomes have run ahead of the rest of the system.

There resides a dilemma here: Western militaries operate increasingly quickly, but respond to changing threats increasingly slowly, and find it hard and expensive to operate against a sustained threat. They have become very good at one way of warfare, and clearly will be reluctant to change. As we found while watching the Iraqi campaign live, ‘real-time’ is addictive: NCW as a concept is good at selling itself. But it is not wise to force all system behaviour in a national security system to operate at a preternaturally faster rate, as is suggested in the conception of ‘speed is good’ metaphor, for two reasons.

First, strategists are interested in long-term trends, behaviours and outcomes, and policy-makers must consider matters and consequences beyond the battlefield. Intelligence targeting and collection is by its nature a slow process, especially the human collection effort needed to penetrate small, light and tightly-knit terrorist organisations. Using only real-time information can lead policy-makers to focus too much on the immediate, the battlefield, at the cost of considering the long-term—consider the much slower processes of democratisation, for example. Yielding to the temptation to mould to the specific makes the whole brittle.

Second, slower layers are needed to constrain errant behaviour in faster layers. A case in point here is the need in a democracy to retain civilian control over the military. Typically, policy decisions by civilian policy-makers are paced more slowly than military operations and tactics. That is the nature of decision-making in a democracy. That civilian decision-makers can react quickly, too, when there has been a major shock to the system, when the nature and instance of the threat has changed, as with 11 September, also reflects good system design. In a democracy, statecraft is timing (Gulick 1987).
Unfortunately for policy-makers seeking to enact change, NCW poses a further challenge: NCW isolates the military task, hopefully over quickly and painlessly, from political decision and concerns, both slower and longer term (Kagan 2003). Such a separation, of course, is both fatuous and dangerous: not only is war but the extension of politics, but in a democracy use of the military entails not merely military but political risk.

Last, the temporal perspective shows why relying on intelligence as the key, if not the only, response to the new threat, as some have implied (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2002) is insufficient. New collection capabilities are indeed needed, but their institution will be comparatively slow, a problem when the behaviour and composition of the terrorist groups are themselves changeable at a much faster rate. Developing a seasoned assessment capability also will be slow; time is needed for analysts become acquainted with the behaviour, mindset and capabilities of the threat and the environment in which they operate, and learn from their colleagues and their own mistakes. So we can expect the uncertainty characteristic of intelligence to increase, as agencies and the wider system redirect existing or deploy new resources towards a new set of little understood and hard-to-penetrate targets. As those parts of the system readjust, they place stresses on other parts of the system, including policy, so increasing internal uncertainties. And that then means that the variety of possible events, outcomes and policies increases, requiring in turn a greater range of tools for policy-makers. Isolating other parts of the system, such as existing military capability and structures, with their assumptions of state-based warfare, from change and adaptation makes little sense and indeed frustrates necessary change in the overall system. Like military capability, intelligence is a necessary but of itself an insufficient response to the changing nature of the threat; intelligence is but one part of the national security system.

Once new or redirected intelligence capabilities are in place and delivering product (a fast layer), then we face a different problem: the commonly held assumption that more information increases certainty. Understanding how the international security system and terrorist organisations work is without doubt necessary; it informs policy and more resources are needed to account for the new threat. However, from information theory, more information means increased uncertainty. The task of policy-makers becomes more, not less, complex, and more contentious. We have already established above that acquiring absolute knowledge is impossible. Thus trying to reduce uncertainties and associated risks by seeking surety from intelligence as a necessary constraint on action, whether military assault, constabulary activity, or redirecting capability, at a time when the uncertainty inherent in intelligence is increasing, is unreasonable. It would unnaturally slow and constrain action, reducing the variety of tools available to policy-makers, and leading to system distortion and, potentially, failure.
Policy Implications

So while a wholesale and immediate overhaul of ADF—or any Western military—capabilities in one fell swoop is out of the question, deep change is needed nonetheless. Sharpening analysis, increasing intelligence data flow and implementing NCW do not by themselves provide a sufficient response—these activities are too fast and in the case of NCW too rigid to allow the diversity of response necessary to meet the new threat or to ensure a resilient system capable of countering a sustained, low-level, high-impact threat. Military action is a necessary but by itself insufficient response to cases such as Iraq and the Solomons, and more generally to the ‘War on Terror’. Widening the scope of responses provides greater leverage for policy-makers and helps to address problems on a greater temporal range.

We can achieve greater diversity by integrating, for example, a constabulary effort, aid programs, and covert action into the overall effort. That’s done, in part, already: for example, intelligence targets are chosen within a framework of specific national interests; and the Australian operation in the Solomon Islands included both police and military. But there needs to be more of the same, with improved integration and feedback: efforts to generate synergistic ‘jointness’ should extend beyond the military services. Neither the military nor NCW should drive those efforts, not least because of the need to restructure capability and doctrine and lend greater temporal depth, but chiefly because of the need to retain civilian control. Only with civilian control can the national interest be supported and the necessary strategic depth be obtained.

Along with greater diversity of the available tools for policy-makers, we need improved responsiveness at the middle layers of capability and doctrine and operations and reviews. We need improved turn-around times on development and a lightened capability footprint. Doctrine needs to reflect both conventional and new threats, and account for the ability to work within a network of a diverse range of other policy-tools and programs, such as the constabulary mentioned above. And operations need a lighter logistical footprint. That in turn has implications for capability. For example, sea and air ‘lift’ capability is needed to shorten response time, to compress time and space. As well, units need to be able to integrate quickly with other elements, whether non-military or allied military, on site.

Reviews need increased granularity: the bimodal nature of the threat, comprising both the ongoing need to account for state-based warfare and the faster-paced, non-linear non-state-based threat, suggests a split cycle of big picture assessment. The nature of ‘conventional’ may continued to be assessed on a bi- or tri-annual basis, bearing in mind that even these threats assume shorter lead times and greater non-linearity with the proliferation of WMD materials and expertise. Non-state threats and ongoing progress in countering them need to be assessed and tuned more frequently. And there is a further reason for more frequent reviews: the increased interconnectedness of military
and non-military effort increases the complexity of the whole system and the likelihood that mistakes, and the various ‘unknowns’, will escalate into catastrophe.

Last, while adapting our own, sustainable response to the threat, we need to continue to work to attenuate the new threat as best possible. In temporal terms, that means slowing the cadence of attacks. There are some immediate measures, many of which are under way. For example, Western governments are seeking to protect high value targets and to limit the ability of inimical non-state agents to draw on Western resources and move unhampered within Western society. The use of Western technology itself opens opportunities for infiltration (Faia 2000) and tracking, as was the case with Western security agencies tracking the use of particular mobile phone SIM cards (van Natta and Butler 2004). However, if al Qaeda and its franchises are drawing motive and strength from the slow layer of culture, then the threat they pose will be with us for a long time.

Conclusion

Considering time through the lens of temporal layering offers a different perspective on national security, and one that allows us to tease apart the implications of a faster cadence of threat. First, it shows that the temporality of existing Western national security systems is dominated by an assumption of slow, generally visible state-based threats. Second, temporal layering throws into sharp relief the challenges posed by a light, adaptable and fast non-state groups such as al Qaeda, and the difficulties current national security systems have in meeting terrorist threats. The lightness, speed, adaptability and social embeddedness of the terrorist threat allow al Qaeda terrorists to operate well within the response and capability cycles of Western systems geared to a slower, heavier, state-based threat. Third, it identifies key areas of change urgently needed to meet the new non-state threat, as well as any ongoing conventional threat.

Among the changes are the need to increase temporal and system diversity, and thus the range of response available to policy-makers. Merely sharpening analysis or relying on NCW is insufficient; expanded ‘jointness’ with a constabulary capability, among others, and greater temporal depth are needed. As importantly, the ‘middle layers’ of operations and reviews, and capability and doctrine need to allow for increased responsiveness. Changing such embedded layers will be hard, but given the mediating role of the middle layers, it is necessary to allow an improved adaptability within the faster layers.

Adjusting the temporality of the national security system is fundamental to meeting both the new threat of al Qaeda-style terrorism and the ongoing possibility of state-based warfare. The consequences of a national security system that fails to adapt to new threats are grave.
References


Goverance goes global: power, authority and order in the twenty-first century

MARK BEESON


Although there is still a good deal of debate about the origins, extent and ultimate impact of ‘globalisation’, most observers agree that the intensity, complexity and variety of contemporary transnational flows, processes and interactions mean that there is something novel and distinctive about the present era (see Held et al. 1999). More than a quarter of a century ago Keohane and Nye (1977) produced a path-breaking book which described a form of ‘complex interdependence’ that emerged from processes we now associate with globalisation. Importantly, Power and Interdependence highlighted the blurring of the domestic-foreign policy divide, and the array of new non-state actors that was becoming a prominent part of ‘transnational’ relations. At the beginning of the twenty-first century many of the trends they
identified have consolidated and spawned a burgeoning literature subsumed under the rubric of ‘global governance’.

All the books reviewed here are concerned with global governance in some form or other, although there are some significant differences in emphasis. What is common and revealing, however, is that every volume is an edited collection. This is not to say that there haven’t been some important single-authored contributions to the field of governance studies (see, for example, Reinicke 1998; Rosenau 1997; Young 1999), but the very diversity and complexity of the potential component parts of global governance seem to lend themselves to this sort of multi-author analysis. The books are generally distinguished by the celebrity or otherwise of their respective contributors and by the range of case studies they employ. All of them can be recommended as useful introductions to a complex topic although, as we shall see, some are more coherently organised and theoretically innovative than others. However, the sheer number of volumes addressing broadly similar themes suggests that global governance is a concept whose time has come.

Theorising global governance

Governance has long been staple of the political science literature, and has been employed to describe of the ‘self-organising, interorganisational networks’ which, in addition to governments, help to authoritatively allocate resources, exercise control and coordinate social activities (Rhodes, 1997) At a time when some observers believe that the extent and complexity of cross-border economic interactions make some sort of transnational coordination and cooperation between individual governments a functional necessity if the processes associated with globalisation are to operate successfully (Cerny, 1995), then it is perhaps unsurprising that the concept of governance would take on a global dimension.

In the introduction to Global Governance, Rorden Wilkinson details the array of new actors that have assumed prominent positions in the international system, and argues that it is the way these actors ‘combine to manage...a growing range of political, economic and social affairs’ that is one of the distinctive qualities of global governance, even if it is a process that is as yet not ‘complete and fully coherent’ (p.2). A degree of caution in the claims made about the extent or significance of global governance is a noteworthy quality of most of the contributions to these volumes. The very subtitle of the collection edited by Cooper et al.—Towards a New Diplomacy?—is indicative of the mixture of circumspection and qualified optimism that pervades many of the essays. Readers—and the contributors to Enhancing Global Governance, for that matter—might have been better able to make a judgment about the possible extent, novelty and usefulness of ‘new diplomacy’ as a concept had it been more unambiguously spelled out at the outset. Given that most of the essays in this collection are connected in some way to the United Nations
it was never clear—to this reader, at least—whether the ‘new diplomacy’ was in some way limited to, or driven by, UN-sponsored initiatives, or whether it was emblematic of a more generalised transformation in global processes.

One of the ‘key arguments’ of *Enhancing Global Governance* is that the sources of ‘innovation and initiative’ in the international system are ‘being transformed’ (p.5). This claim is substantiated through a number of case studies that detail how new actors and issues are influencing policy outcomes. There is a degree of repetition here (no less than three chapters cover issues revolving around the movement to ban land-mines) which may be illustrative of the limited number of success stories available. Indeed, as Cameron concedes in his analysis of the process that culminated in the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting the use and production of such weapons, ‘the uniqueness of the issue, the fortuitous circumstances surrounding the ban movement, and the willingness of key players to go way out on a diplomatic limb’ (p.83), mean that it is a case study with limited wider implications. Likewise, Nossal’s excellent analysis of the use of sanctions against Angola and its lucrative diamond trade comes to the sobering conclusion that ‘it seems unlikely [that] had countries of greater consequence been the targets [of sanctions] we would have seen such unanimity in the efforts to create smarter, sharper, and stronger UN sanctions’ (p. 264).

Other chapters in *Enhancing Global Governance* that consider the relationship between the United States and the UN remind us why the influence of the latter organisation has frequently been constrained by the actions of powerful states—which is why most analysts of global governance focus on other actors and employ different conceptual frameworks to make sense of the new realities. Although the contributors to *Taming Globalization* are also concerned with creating ‘adequate structures of global governance’ that will allow globalisation to be ‘reconciled with democratic principles and social justice’ (p. 9), they operate on a larger canvas than Cooper et al. In some ways this is unsurprising, as this rather slim volume contains some of the biggest names in contemporary social science. Robert Wade spells out why market-centred globalisation has done little to alleviate chronic patterns of inequality and poverty, Joseph Stiglitz tells us how it might all be different if some of the most prominent agencies of transnational governance like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were less influential, Robert Goodin reminds us why we ought to care about it, and David Held suggests how ‘cosmopolitan multilateralism’ might provide the basis for a new international order. Whether readers find Held’s ideas inspirational, Utopian or just unlikely, his claim that the continuing absence of more inclusive, accountable and effective strategies for dealing with globalisation’s all too tangible inequities could lead to its ultimate failure is one that needs to be taken seriously if interdependence is to be sustained. The period between the two World Wars serves as a powerful reminder that there is nothing inevitable or irreversible about continuing globalisation (see James 2003).
Accountability and governance

The other two substantive chapters in *Taming Globalization* are by John Ruggie and Robert Keohane, and provide an important theoretical dimension to the overall volume. Ruggie revisits the concept of ‘embedded liberalism’, first articulated in a highly influential and much-cited essay more than twenty years ago (Ruggie, 1982). The essence of the earlier version of embedded liberalism was the claim that a trade-off existed between economic openness and national autonomy: states agreed to greater international economic integration as long as they retained a capacity to manage the domestic social impacts of liberalising initiatives. As Ruggie points out in the new essay, such an implicit agreement was predicated on the idea of discrete national economies managed by relatively autonomous states. However, the transnational restructuring of corporate activity and the growing influence of international financial markets ‘threatens to leave behind merely national social bargains’ (p. 94). Ruggie’s surprising and optimistic conclusion is that corporations will play a key ‘bridging role’ between an increasingly global economy and national communities. Whether business has the capacity or, more pointedly, the desire to take on this sort of role is a moot point, but Ruggie rightly highlights the gaps in transnational governance structures that traditional, nationally based-political actors seem incapable of addressing (see Strange 1996).

Keohane’s chapter is concerned with the implications that more globalised patterns of governance may have for accountability. The disjuncture between nationally-based polities and unelected, generally non-transparent, but highly influential transnational institutions, and the latter’s concomitant capacity to corrode democratic principles, is one that has long been recognised (Held, 1995). Keohane’s particular concern reflects both his interest in international institutionalisation and his underlying assumption that ‘the vision of global society is a mirage’ (p.136). For Keohane, at least in the sphere of ‘complex interdependence’, or the dense networks of economic and political connections that characterise much of the industrialised world, future governance structures will continue to be dominated by states, but they will share power with non-state actors. Elsewhere, ‘coercion and bargaining’ rather than ‘persuasion and emulation’ will be the norm, and fundamentalist rather than democratic values are likely to predominate. At the very least, Keohane’s chapter serves as a salutary reminder that the preoccupations of these volumes are predominantly those of the ‘developed’, industrialised, rich world. Much of the developing world participates in global governance either at the margins or under a regulatory regime laid down by the United States and a handful of other countries (Woods, 2002). Nevertheless, Keohane concludes that ‘the world needs more multilateral governance not less’ if powerful state and non-state actors are to be held accountable.
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are, in fact answerable to both governments and a wider array of civil society actors, he is forced to concede that ‘in the last analysis they are in fact accountable, through internal processes, only to a few powerful states and the European Union’ (p.145). Indeed, as Keohane notes, this lack of broadly-based accountability is even greater in the case of non-state actors like multinational corporations and transgovernmental or private sector networks. This lack of accountability and the question of precisely which organisations or actors are able to make authoritative decisions about the allocation of resources is consequently at the centre of contemporary theoretical and policy debates. To their credit, both of the other volumes under review here take seriously the questions of power and authority that the growing prominence of non-state actors and inter-governmental organisations raise. Both provide sophisticated—and in the case of *Political Space* quite innovative—conceptual frameworks with which to try and make sense of the new developments.

**Geography and governance**

The editors of *Political Space* borrow a number of concepts developed primarily by geographers in an effort to avoid the ‘territorial trap’. The primacy attached to the nation-state in the practice and conceptualisation of international relations has led to a preoccupation with nationally demarcated spheres of economic and political activity. The possible theoretical limitations of such an approach have been especially apparent to political-economists, who have drawn attention to the way global forces have effectively undermined the idea of discrete national economies. The most forceful and persuasive statement of this possibility in these volumes actually appears in *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance* (hereafter *EPAGG*), where Stephen Korbin outlines the impact of economic globalisation on nation states, the rise of the networked economy, and their combined impact on geographic space which, he argues, is ‘losing meaning as the basis for the organisation of markets’ (*EPAGG*, p.46). While both *Political Space* and *EPAGG* are concerned with the implications of these developments, *Political Space* contains some of the most ambitious theoretical attempts to get to grips with it.

The editors’ introductory essay in *Political Space* provides the most complete attempt to delineate a conceptual framework for, and description of, the terrain upon which nascent practices of global governance unfold. In this context, global governance becomes

not so much a reference to the control exercised by effective authorities on a truly global scale, than a concept that invites investigators of political
space in today’s world to map the patterns and consider the source(s) of whatever order and compliance they may observe (p.8).

Central to this endeavour is the recognition that the line between the public and private sectors is blurring and that governance ‘emanates sometimes from discrete and identifiable actors, but as often as not, from their complicated relationships on various levels’ (p.9). These themes and the open-ended nature of the research project provide the basis for a number of exploratory essays by some very prominent international relations theorists: K. J. Holsti examines the problem of change; Richard Little provides a comparative historical context with which to make sense of contemporary realities; the editors, Robert Latham, and Stewart Corbridge both provide separate considerations of some of the theoretical implications that flow from reconfigured political space. Other, more mundane, space considerations prohibit a detailed consideration of all of these chapters. A couple of the contributions to this volume are, however, worth briefly highlighting.

One of the most interesting chapters in this collection is by John Agnew, a prominent geographer, who has been responsible for some of the most innovative attempts to link the generally separate concerns of space and power (see, for example, Agnew and Corbridge 1995). He continues this endeavour here and concludes that power is always historically realised and contingent. In short,

...power is not a fixed in given territorial units but changes both its character and spatial structure as different geographical scales (local, regional, national-state, world-regional, international and global) change their relationships to one another as the political practices of the global geopolitical order change’ (p.115).

This approach, which self-consciously eschews the idea that power is synonymous with or can be ‘reduced to state territoriality’, provides a way of thinking about the complex, multilevel, and spatially distributed nature of power. It also highlights the way power relations have evolved over time. The key point that emerges from this sort of analysis, and which is implicit in many of the contributions to these volumes, is that the nation-state is but one form and location of power, and a fairly recent, historically contingent one at that. Indeed, if the global governance debate does nothing else, it should alert us to the fact that there is something distinctive and different about contemporary patterns of transnational interaction and we need to develop ways of thinking about them that reflect this underlying reality.

Revealingly, some of the most important contributors to contemporary debates about governance and globalisation come from outside of the discipline of International Relations. Saskia Sassen, for example (a sociologist), has become one of the foremost analysts of global processes and their spatial and political implications. (So prominent is she, in fact, that she also appears in EPAGG ). Her major concern in this essay is the way in which formerly
national governance functions are being ‘denationalised’ as regulatory responsibility shifts from the national to the transnational, and from the public to the private sector. One of the most important consequences of the new patterns of interaction between states and private sector market actors is, Sassen argues, the creation of a ‘new normativity that attaches to the logic of global capital’ (p.178). The idea that particular values associated with ‘Western capitalism’ might come to dominate economic and even social activity is hardly new (Strange 1990). What is becoming clearer, however, is that the regulatory role that business has increasingly assumed is establishing enduring standards and patterns of behaviour through formal instruments like patents and intellectual property law, and by modelling business practices, which in turn become pervasive norms that exert an influence over economic and ultimately political practices (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Importantly, states are playing a crucial role in adjusting their own internal administrative architectures and practices in line with the functional requirements of globally-oriented business—and frequently handing greater power and authority to business as a consequence.

Authority and governance

These processes are often subtle and difficult to recognise or make sense of as they become part of everyday reality at multiple levels. One area in which we might expect to see opposition to the pervasive influence of business is in ‘global civil society’. Given the attention this idea has received in the scholarly literature and the potential role some see global civil society playing in new structures of global governance (Keane 2003; Lipschutz 1992), the concept is given surprisingly little attention in these volumes (although see Lipschutz and Fogel in EPAGG). While it is important to remember that not all the actors in civil society are associated with ‘progressive’ causes or necessarily agents of political liberalisation (Morris-Suzuki 2000), it is clear that NGOs in particular have assumed a prominence and ubiquity that makes them potentially important parts of new governance structures.

James Rosenau (1992;1997) has played a major role in popularising and explicating the idea of global governance and his analysis of the role of NGOs in international system makes it clear why ‘it seems inconceivable that the interstate system is still the sole arbiter of the course of events’ (p.266). This volume generally and this chapter in particular should be compulsory reading for the (depressingly large) number of international relations scholars who persist in producing relentlessly state-centric analyses of contemporary events that pay perfunctory, if any, attention to the new patterns of international interactions in which non-state actors play such a major part. One of Rosenau’s most important contributions in this collection and elsewhere has been to show how authority—be it associated with state or non-state actors—can be decisive in determining political, economic and social outcomes, and
how the power to act authoritatively is not simply a function of the formal position of an actor or agency. Rosenau details the various types of authority—moral, knowledge-based, reputational, issue-specific, and ‘affiliative’—which underpin the habitual patterns of compliance that distinguish authority relations, and which help to account for the distinctive patterns of governance that characterise the contemporary international system. The significance of authority relations is given an even more prominent place in EPAGG.

For the editors of EPAGG, authority refers to the ‘institutionalised forms or expressions of power’ (p.4). The problems of accountability identified by Keohane and others are brilliantly dissected by A. Claire Cutler who has produced some of the most original analyses of the private-public interface and its implications for governance regime (Cutler, 1999). Here she points out that

efforts to hold private institutions accountable are bound to flounder, for that which goes unrecognised is difficult to regulate...The legally formalistic associations of authority with the state function ideologically by depicting the world not as it is, but as it ought to be [p. 24, emphasis in original].

Cutler details the way in which corporations have effectively created legal and regulatory regimes to create commercial law, or the sort of regimes that have been created under the auspices of intergovernmental organisations like WTO. In effect, she argues, ‘firms are basically functioning like governments’ (p.32). This process is not made any easier to understand because governments are frequently willing partners in this shift of regulatory responsibility. As Louis Pauly points out in his examination of the regulation of global finance, ‘blurring the boundary lines between public and private is part of an intentional effort to render opaque political responsibility for the wrenching adjustments entailed in late capitalist development’ (p.77). Put differently, governments are able to claim that their systematic abnegation of responsibility for the basic welfare and compensatory functions that were once considered central components of the postwar settlement are inevitable, inescapable responses to the ineluctable logic of ‘the markets’. There are two obvious problems with such a claim: first, if governments are no longer autonomous or capable of regulating key elements of the international political economy then their legitimacy is fundamentally undermined. Second, the financial sector demonstrates just how dangerous it can be to rely on ‘self-regulation’ and ‘the market’ to determine economic outcomes in a sector that is dominated by a handful of vested interests (see Beeson, 2003a).

Global governance: Déjà vu all over again?

Most of the contributions in the volumes under consideration here focus on either the political aspects of governance or on the underlying processes of
economic restructuring and integration that are influencing the way governance occurs. As a consequence, there is an understandable preoccupation with new actors and modes of interaction. There is also a noteworthy—and welcome—recognition that the state is neither the only nor even always the most important agent in processes of governance that are increasingly dependent on other actors. This is not to say that states are becoming redundant or powerless, as some of the more breathless accounts of globalisation would have us believe (Ohmae 1996). On the contrary, there have been a number of persuasive, recent analyses of contemporary governance and state-market relations that have suggested that state power might actually be enhanced by processes associated with globalisation (see Kahler and Lake 2003; Weiss, 2003). Of course, such analyses are—like most of those considered above—almost exclusively concerned with those governments that possess a high degree of ‘state capacity’, or the ability to formulate and implement policy in response to economic restructuring and competition. Many states in the developing world have neither the internal state capacity to respond to such pressures, nor the ability to influence the wider international system that effectively shapes the rules of the governance game. As with so many other aspects of globalisation, governance is a highly uneven, spatially differentiated, and power-laden process that reflects enduring political, economic and even strategic asymmetries.

It is noteworthy that the continuing importance of strategic issues is a striking lacuna in these collections. Only Enhancing Global Governance takes this potentially decisive element of global governance seriously. Even then, only one author, Ramesh Thakur, explores security issues in a systematic way. Significantly, Thakur points out that the United States’ increasingly unilateral foreign policy poses major problems for multilateral diplomacy and intergovernmental organisations like the UN, which seek to manage transnational relations and problems. While this tendency may have been most dramatically highlighted in the recently strained relations between the US and the UN, it is also important to recognise that this growing predilection for unilateralism and the direct application of state power is also happening in economic relations. The US’s pursuit of bilateral trade agreements, for example, is not only at odds with the idea that economic agreements and regulation will inevitably become more multilateral and multi-actor, but it is a reminder that the most powerful states retain critical sources of leverage that they are not averse to using (Ravenhill 2003). This is especially the case when strategic imperatives—the ‘war on terror’ notwithstanding—have released the US from the need to indulge former Cold War allies (see Beeson 2003b).

There are, therefore, some important continuities as well as a number of novel features subsumed under the rubric of global governance. True, there is an array of new actors that have become integral components of the international political economy and the regulatory superstructure that attempts to govern transnational commerce. At the same time, however, the international
system is characterised by continuing disparities of power, influence and capacities to take part in, never mind actually influence processes of global governance. While the emergence of NGOs and other actors from civil society may be welcome, potentially emancipatory, and something scholars need to factor into their depictions of contemporary international relations, this should not blind us to fact that some states remain pivotal actors in the international system and that global governance is—at this stage, at least—a shorthand for a number of processes and relationships that are likely to become more important, but which continue to be powerfully mediated by states. Indeed, if some of the gloomier prognostications about a world regressing to a struggle over diminishing resources prove correct (Hirst 2001), then discussions about global governance may prove somewhat redundant. Yet in the foreseeable future, Rosenau may be right that the emerging world order will ultimately become so decentralised and multicentric that it will ‘not lend itself to hierarchy or coordination under hegemonic leadership’ (p.263). If he is correct, we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of unipolarity and the attempt by one state and its subordinates to impose itself on the international system. Getting from here to something that actually looks like global governance could prove the tricky part, though.

Acknowledgement: thanks to Alex Bellamy for commenting on an earlier version of this article. The usual caveats apply.

References


SELECTING MEMORIES

The organisers of a recent ethnic affairs conference in Melbourne told me that for the first time in many years they had not invited politicians, who would only talk about themselves or make partisan speeches.

One of the few politicians who has been feeding his ideas to the hungry public is Malcolm Fraser. He has made himself unpopular with the government by, for example, deploring their immigration and refugee policies, challenging their subservience to the United States, calling for a bill of rights to protect Aborigines, and advocating a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities. The former prime minister reminds us that there were times his Liberals supported human rights, multiculturalism, Indigenous development, SBS, and standing up to the Americans. Whether or not we can swallow them all, his ideas on these and other issues are like a relief package of high protein policy alternatives.

To this paperback reprint of his original 2002 book, Fraser adds a postscript on Iraq, in which he describes the current contest between a hegemonic United States and a battered United Nations. He concludes that Australian governments owe it to us to support and reform the UN, not undermine it, and to address the underlying causes of terrorism, not just those picked out for us by the US.

Built from speeches and articles over several decades, and mortared together with commentaries, Common Ground is a sturdy monument to a life’s work, impressive and designed to last. Still the politician in retirement, Fraser means it to justify himself and his policies. He doesn’t comment on the process by which he became prime minister, perhaps having defined that as outside the book’s scope. Similarly, he chooses to say little about the Hilton bombing or about the murders at Balibo, although he was in power when one occurred and both were investigated. He avoids discussing our role in East Timor, though to compare it with the illegality of invading Iraq would support his argument. He mentions Guantanamo Bay prisoner David Hicks but overlooks...
Mamdouh Habib. Even more puzzlingly, he leaves out the women’s movement, which was a national and international issue throughout his prime ministership. Nor does he discuss Australia’s failure to sign the CEDAW protocol, even while stressing the importance of the other UN instruments that we adhere to. What’s more, although he cites US support of terrorist activities in Ireland several times as an example of double standards, Fraser stops short of criticising America’s contributions to Israel’s terrorising of the Palestinians. Nor does he compare Iraq’s sins with America’s support for Israel’s repeated defiance of the Security Council.

When he turns to the ANZUS alliance, Fraser, whose distaste for the present Prime Minister is palpable, widens the distance between himself and the government. He makes plain (a favourite Fraser expression) that Howard’s failure to seek more independence and self-reliance is contrary to Australia’s national interest. Fraser doubts the reliability of the United States as a long-term strategic partner. In the post-Cold War climate, he argues, the US is unlikely to be interested in countering threats to Australia; and all our talk about keeping the Americans involved in the region is empty, since ‘they are and they will be’ for as long as it suits them. Instead, he warns, the Treaty is being distorted in ways that could involve Australia in conflicts of America’s choosing, including in our region. But here again, Fraser the conservative avoids the consequence of his own logic: the ANZUS treaty should be maintained, he says, while we work towards not needing it. He doesn’t say what we should do about proposals to station US troops in Australia. Instead, he warns, the United States mustn’t introduce its own ideology into our region. Australia and Japan must together ‘make sure that American policies support the general aspirations of most of the people and most of the countries of the region’. Now that would be an achievement.

Predating Fraser’s book by a year, another of Monash Asia Institute’s valuable publications reminds us not to overlook the potential for interaction with Japan. Just as Australian business people seek out niche opportunities in the Japanese market, Australian historical scholars of Japan as almost all the contributors are are always hunting for niche research topics. In Changing Histories, providing a welcome antidote to themes of conflict and misunderstanding, their investigations include the early operations of Japanese trading companies in Australia, a major report on Australia by one of them (Kanematsu G.sh.), and changing prewar Australian views of Japan. A comparison of Hal Porter and Harold Stewart, and a review of the work of David Sissons, challenge some common suppositions about these long-standing observers of Japan. (Another, film-maker Solrun Hoaas, is not overlooked, though her name is misspelt).

Perhaps the Monash team could follow up this useful collection with another that investigates more recent events and includes more Japanese perspectives. It might include the Nara treaty negotiations for instance, Japanese-Aboriginal interactions, the Iwasaki project at Yeppoon, Japanese
views of Australian multiculturalism, and the 1992 ‘Melbourne incident’ for which Japanese tourists are claimed to have been unjustly imprisoned.

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The discussion linking politics with business has a long history, and given the influence it occupies in determining economic outcomes it remains a major strand of argument despite the often contentious and anecdotal evidence available to undertake scientific analysis. This book seeks to extend this discussion by examining the political relationships that extend into business using the major economies of East and Southeast Asia as the laboratory. Understandably it departs from the prevailing dominant political economy expositions of strong states as inadvertently essential to enjoy the autonomy necessary to push developmental strategies (e.g. Johnson, 1982; 1987). Gomez has done a wonderful job of bringing together an interesting list of chapters from such diverse economies as China and Singapore. In addition to the introduction by Gomez, the conceptual underpinnings to the book is offered by Wedeman in chapter one. Johannes Schmidt’s provides an overview of the nexus between external relations, political business and domestic growth dynamics in East and Southeast Asian economies in chapter two. The remaining eight chapters discuss country experiences.

Wedeman provides a useful examination of development and corruption. There is an illuminating attempt to distinguish auto-corruption from transactive corruption in this chapter. Since he attempts to address the issue exhaustively it would have been useful to add the contribution of Khan (1989) and Chang (1994) who discuss the input-output framework of rents given that these approaches attempt to evaluate innovation as well as other efficiency promoting aspects of rents. He should also qualify before using the corruption index data since the growth data used against it is much more reliable. Attempts to locate the analysis against the financial crisis should take cognisance of financial volatilities unrelated to domestic politico-business alliances. The second chapter by Schmidt attempts to examine this issue, albeit without a careful scrutiny of the issues involved against growth and corruption. A
deeper discussion using these premises may help extend the debate to produce a more sharply defined assessment of the nature and impact of politico-business relationships on economic performance.

Johannes Schmidt discusses East and Southeast Asian economies experiences in chapter two—pinning political business strategies in varying degrees against the Asian financial crisis. The chapter lucidly traces the fundamentals of export-led growth to List, though 15th century England and later a string of latecomers in Europe and the United States (Alexander Hamilton in the late 18th century) made this strategy a sufficiently proven one. The chapter detaches itself from the Washington consensus explications, but in doing so glues itself to the structures typically fast growing economies have built with global financing and trading nations as the basis of the crisis. The chapter raises several promising points on the type of state constructs that can stimulate productive business alliances, though he could have discussed more the differences between the “foreign capital dependent” Southeast Asian economies and the Northeast Asian economies.

The remaining country level chapters offer useful discussion of critical aspects of the nature of rentier relationships—varying between the gross cases involving Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea and Taiwan (though, Field’s account seems to be a rare disclosure since most works paint a much cleaner image of the country), and the low levels reported on Singapore. Gomez, Karl Fields, Wedeman, Peter Wad, Stefan Eklof, Tom Wingfield, Stephan Haggard and Linda low, and James Babb offer interesting accounts of politico-business relationships in Malaysia, Taiwan, China, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Japan respectively.

The book brings out the politicisation of business in several cases. It will be useful if the authors were able to establish greater rigour by establishing stronger link with business conduct and economic performance as set out in the first chapter. Also, it would be useful to state examples whenever there is mention of corruption—e.g. in the case of Singapore. The country chapters identify only Singapore as a case of low levels of corruption, though, no explicit examples are given. If corruption is endemic to most of the regimes discussed—from Indonesia to Japan irrespective to their levels and trajectories of development, how does this basic premise help the formulation of an economic development model to do justice to Wedeman’s ambitious effort to construct one in chapter one.

Overall, this is an interesting book, which is rich in cases and relationships.

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‘Preventive action, as early as possible, is the least complex, the most humane and the most cost-effective path for the international community to take in resolving disputes’ (Gareth Evans, 1993). Signalling his agreement (‘We must not wait passively for crises to erupt, but tackle the root causes of violent’) Secretary-General Kofi Annan has sought to upgrade the UN’s capacity to undertake preventive initiatives. *From Promise to Practice*, a project of the International Peace Academy (New York), takes stock of the now considerable experience of the UN and other agencies in the endeavour to anticipate and prevent ‘deadly conflicts’. To this reviewer its main contribution is not its rather modest findings but its demonstration of the diversity and complexity of the issues that are raised, and the ensuing policy dilemmas. The complexity is conceptual as well as practical. For example, how is successful prevention to be evaluated, or even identified—especially if, as one of the authors suggests, it is inherently reversible and incremental? The book offers no clear-cut examples of success.

Nine case studies are presented: three relate to newly independent states (Georgia, Tajikistan and East Timor); one to a state entering into a union (Zanzibar after the formation of Tanzania); the other five (Kenya, Fiji, Colombia, Liberia and Burundi) are essentially internal conflicts. This breakdown is not really surprising, but reflects the refocusing of the UN’s security concerns since the Cold War. What is surprising is that the cases relate not only to prevention as usually understood—diplomatic intervention in the earlier phases of a conflict, before the onset of large-scale violence—but also to the escalation and resurgence of conflict, that is to say, the UN’s involvement in internal warfare of long standing. The editors defend this by arguing that, while the division of conflicts into phases has heuristics value, in practice there is often overlap or a phase may be omitted altogether; and, more importantly, the diplomatic measures regarded as characteristic of any given phase are also frequently, and quite appropriately, employed in other phases. Although these points have some validity, the inclusion of all phases of conflict precludes a sharper focusing on the problems peculiar to preventing the outbreak of major violence, which is widely seen as an important threshold. Some of these, such as the difficulty of mobilising international attention at that stage, are familiar and are noted in various chapters, but crucial questions such as just how intractable are the obstacles to preventative diplomacy, especially to ‘early prevention’, are not examined in depth. Nor, for that matter, are the normative issues raised by the intrusive forms of intervention that are often envisaged. The editors’ normative stance is indicated in the comment that: ‘pressure can certainly be applied by the international community to overcome the sovereignty obstacle when it so chooses’ (p. 366).
The volume’s main strength lies in the case studies, each by a highly qualified specialist fully in command of the intricacies of the case at hand. This brings out the extraordinary diversity of the situations confronting international decision-makers and mediators. Overall coherence is achieved, nonetheless, through the systematic use of a common analytical framework drawn from an earlier International Peace Academy study—a model of successive phases of conflict—potential conflict, gestation, trigger escalation and post-conflict—and the policy instruments characteristic of each. This is supplemented by Donald Rothchild’s chapter in the present volume on the incentives and forms of leverage available to external actors in each phase. The editors draw some conclusions relating to UN practices, in particular on the need to overcome the separation between the bureaucracies concerned with the longer term, and thus the ‘root causes’ of conflict—development—and those concerned with its immediate manifestations—security. But their main contribution is the achieving of sufficient uniformity in the presentation of the case studies that the work comes across as a coherent whole. This renders it valuable not just to specialist but to any readers interested in updating their knowledge of the remarkable scope of UN diplomacy, supplemented by other agencies, directed to the prevention and restraint of violence.

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