Japan's subregional security and defence linkages with ASEANs, South Korea and China in the 1990s

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Abstract  In the post-cold war period, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region and in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia is undergoing a transformation with the emergence for the first time of multilateral security dialogue. One of the most striking features of this transformation is Japan’s new role as a sponsor of multilateral security dialogue in the early 1990s. Japanese policymakers are also working to create security and defence linkages with Asian nations at the subregional level. Evidence gathered from diverse sources reveals that the Japanese Defence Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are experiencing varied success in extending these types of linkages to the ASEAN nations, South Korea and China. Linkages with the ASEAN nations have been slow to emerge but look set to progress further as suspicion lessens of Japan’s role in Southeast Asian security, and as Japan’s role in peacekeeping expands. Remarkable progress has been made between Japan and South Korea in establishing security and defence linkages, and the strategic uncertainties of the instability of North Korea and the commitment of the US to Northeast Asia look likely to push Japan and South Korea towards closer co-operation on security matters. By contrast, Japan’s repeated efforts to involve China in a closer dialogue on security have met with limited success, and immediate progress is hampered by the issues of missile and nuclear testing, Chinese attempts to intimidate Taiwan with military exercises in late 1995 and early 1996, and, more generally, the problem of ‘transparency’ in security relations. Indeed, the evidence from Japan’s attempts to create subregional security and defence linkages suggests that the most crucial factor in the success of this policy is the existence of a degree of ‘transparency’ in relations between Japan and the ASEAN nations, South Korea and China.

Keywords  Japan; ASEAN; South Korea; China; security; subregionalism.
Japan's new role in regional security

From the end of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s until the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and particularly in Northeast and Southeast Asia, was dominated by domestic, intra-regional and extra-regional security problems.¹ In Southeast Asia, the policymakers of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) were preoccupied with the triple domestic security concerns of communist insurgency, separatism, and civil–military relations; intra-regional territorial disputes between ASEAN members; and extra-regional security threats posed by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, China's claim to the Spratlys, and superpower competition for influence in the region. Likewise, their counterparts in Northeast Asia were concerned with domestic security issues, such as civil unrest in South Korea, intra-regional territorial disputes involving the Senkaku Islands, and extra-regional security relations with the superpowers. Moreover, continued tension on the Korean peninsula, forming as it did the point of interaction for the strategic interests of the major East Asian powers, represented both an intra-regional and extra-regional security problem.

The subjection of Northeast and Southeast Asian affairs to superpower rivalry during the cold war meant not only that these security issues were difficult to resolve, but also that attempts to construct a true multilateral security framework that would serve the region's interests were frustrated. The US failed over the long-term in its attempt to develop in Southeast Asia through SEATO (Southeast Asian Security Treaty Organisation) a multilateral security system equivalent to that of NATO in Europe, and proposals for multilateral security which originated inside the region, such as Malaysia's ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality) in 1971, have never really progressed beyond the conceptual stage.² The result of the failure to produce any kind of alternative multilateral arrangement was that security relations in Northeast and Southeast Asia were based in the main upon the build-up of independent national military forces and bilateral security relations. Thus, countries in these regions came to be tied to the Soviet Union and the US through a network of bilateral security agreements which were thought to serve best their security needs.³

Within this picture of instability and superpower military dominance the role of Japan in security dialogue and in the promotion of security institutions was limited and uncertain. Japan's direct contribution to security in Northeast and Southeast Asia was necessarily limited by the historical legacy of the Second World War and its own constitutional and other prohibitions.⁴ The Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 succeeded to some extent in moving Japan away from its previous seikei bunri (separation of politics and economics) oriented approach to Southeast Asia, and throughout the 1970s and 1980s allowed it to expand co-operation with
the ASEAN countries by providing economic leadership and diplomatic support for its efforts in dealing with Vietnam and the Cambodian crisis. However, one of the main tenets of the Fukuda Doctrine was that Japan would not play a military role in the region and this barred Japan from co-operating too closely with ASEAN on defence and security matters.5

Until the mid-1980s, Japan maintained no official security links with Northeast Asia, and took no direct part in and, in fact, shied away from proposals for regional dialogue. Instead its main contribution to regional stability was an indirect one through the US-Japan alliance. During the early and mid-1980s, and in response to real or perceived US pressure for Japan to increase its support for the US security system, the Zenkō Suzuki and Yasuhiro Nakasone administrations expanded Japan's security role in the region by accepting responsibility for the protection of 1,000 nautical miles of sea lanes around Japan in 1981, and by embarking on a quantitative and qualitative build-up of the Japanese SDF (Self Defence Forces). But even though these greater defence efforts, and particularly the question of sea-lane protection, infringed upon and had implications for the security of other nations in Northeast and Southeast Asia, they were conducted entirely within the US-Japan bilateral framework and largely ignored multilateral concerns.6 Furthermore, the promised expansion of Japan's military strength only succeeded in further fuelling the suspicion of certain Asian nations and outside commentators that Japan was seeking to abandon its traditional constitutional restraints and to convert itself into a major regional, if not global, military power. At best, Japan was to be seen following a well-intentioned but misguided policy to enhance its contribution to security during a period of increased Soviet military presence in the region. At worst, it was seen as a 'loose cannon on a rolling deck', and acting to destabilize the regional military balance (Gordon 1979).7

However, in the post-cold war era academics and policymakers have observed, and, indeed, have engaged actively in transforming the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Increased economic development and interdependence, and the retreat of superpower influence in the region have been accompanied by moves to settle some of the previously insuperable security problems of Southeast and Northeast Asia, most notably the Cambodian crisis, and the hope of improved security prospects for the region as a whole. These positive signs have been added to by the emergence of a multilateral and regional-wide security dialogue. Following a rash of proposals in the early 1990s from prominent Asia-Pacific policymakers for some kind of multilateral dialogue in the region, in January 1992 the ASEAN-PMC (ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference), attended by ministers from the ASEAN nations, the US, Canada, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan, agreed to discuss for the first time political and security matters.8 In 1993, ASEAN went further and established the ASEAN-ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) with the express purpose of
discussing security issues (Kerr 1994: 397). There have also been proposals (so far resisted) to develop APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation) as a vehicle for the discussion of political integration, and the proliferation of a whole range of non-governmental bodies for dialogue on regional political and security co-operation, such as ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies) and the CSCAP (Council for Security Co-operation in Asia-Pacific).\(^9\) With the end of the cold war, the pursuit of multilateral security dialogue has been taken up enthusiastically by many Asia-Pacific academics and policymakers, and even by those in South Korea who were previously staunch US bilateralists.\(^10\)

A striking feature of this change in the outlook for Asia-Pacific security has been the beginnings of a perceived transformation in Japan’s regional security role, and its lead in promoting multilateral security dialogue. The decision to institutionalize the use of the ASEAN-PMC as a body for the discussion of regional security issues was partly prompted by the unexpected suggestion of then Japanese foreign minister, Taro Nakayama, at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC that in the future the meeting should become a ‘forum for political dialogue’, and ‘a process of political dialogue designed to improve the sense of security’, among Asian nations (Asahi Shimbun 23 July 1991: 2 [Author’s translation]). At the time, Nakayama’s proposal was ‘coolly’ received by some ASEAN nations which did not wish to see the ASEAN-PMC identified exclusively as a security body, but it does seem to have given added impetus to the moves to attach a security dialogue function to it. Following on from Nakayama’s 1991 proposal, the prime minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, made a speech in the US in October 1992, calling on the US to co-operate with Japan in the establishment of an encompassing security framework in the Asia-Pacific, and then in Bangkok in January 1993, he announced the so-called ‘Miyazawa Doctrine’ which talked of the need for Japan–ASEAN dialogue to promote regional stability. The Miyazawa Doctrine has been criticized for its lack of adventure, but it did demonstrate that Japanese policymakers had finally and publicly abandoned the seikei-bunri approach to Southeast Asia and were beginning to think in terms of multilateral security (Brown 1994: 441–4). Moreover, Miyazawa could speak with some authority, given that by September 1992 units of the Japanese SDF had been dispatched to Cambodia under the PKO Bill (Peace Keeping Operations) passed in June of the same year, and were involved in attempts to resolve Southeast Asia’s most protracted security problem. That Japan with its sudden burst of diplomatic activity had taken a leading role in establishing a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific was demonstrated by its having preempted US foreign policy for perhaps the first time since the Second World War. Nakayama’s 1991 proposal seems to have caught the Bush administration off guard, and it clung to its traditional line in arguing that bilateral security relations were the only suitable security arrangements for Asia.\(^11\) It was left to the Clinton administration to try to catch up on Japan’s diplomatic lead
by stating in May 1993, that it was in favour of a multilateral CSCE (Council on Security Co-operation in Europe) type of security system for the region (Kerr 1994: 402). In February 1996, the US Defence Secretary William Perry proposed a multilateral defence ministerial gathering for the Asia-Pacific region (Japan Times 15 February 1996: 1).

Quite clearly the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast and Northeast Asia is still far from stable, and many of those problems pointed out above which were active in the cold war have continued to operate and in some cases have become of even more immediate concern. In Southeast Asia, the Cambodian problem is still not fully resolved; internal security problems continue in the Philippines and Indonesia; intra-ASEAN relations, especially between Malaysia and Singapore, are not as smooth as they sometimes appear to outsiders; and there are worries about China's policy in Burma and its ambitions in the South China Sea. Northeast Asia is still threatened by tension on the Korean peninsula, and uncertainty exists about Chinese irredentism and expansionism in the region. Added to these problems are the emergence of the new ones of piracy, and the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology; all set against the background of the continuing build-up of conventional weapon stockpiles by most of the nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

But new security developments such as the admittance of Vietnam into ASEAN in July 1995, the emergence of a multilateral security dialogue, and an expanded and responsible security role for Japan offer some hope that these security problems can be overcome. As Paul M. Evans comments, 'Effective multilateralism in security matters is coming to East Asia and the Pacific born of new realities and a distinctive regional process rather than by the imposition of an external power or by imitation of instruments more maturely developed elsewhere' (Evans 1994: 125). In regard to Japan's role in this new multilateralism, Eugene Brown notes that although the 1993 ASEAN-PMC 'did not deal formally with the creation of a region-wide institutional framework for collective security, the fact of its being held was indicative of a growing momentum towards a region-wide approach to security issues' (Brown 1994: 444).

Japan and subregional security

The problem that policymakers in the Asia-Pacific more generally and in Japan now face is how to keep this momentum identified by Brown moving. Japan clearly will continue to work at the broader regional level, as shown by its holding of the first Asia-Pacific Security Seminar in Tokyo in December 1994. The seminar participants were uniformed officers of lieutenant-colonel rank and below, and were drawn from thirteen countries, including China, South Korea, Russia and the US. Discussions centred upon problems of regional security and CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures), and the eventual hope of the Japanese...
Defence Agency is that the seminar will develop into an institution similar to the European CSCE (Bōeichō 1995: 196; Asahi Shimbun 8 March 1994: 1). Attempts to push forward with multilateral dialogue are also likely to continue through the work of INGOs (International Non-Government Organizations) and ‘Track Two’ policy communities, many of which are based in Japan, and which may involve members of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence Agency acting on an unofficial basis.14

But perhaps the most effective means available to policymakers for the creation of security institutions in the Asia-Pacific is to move beyond multilateral dialogue at the highest level, and, as Evans points out, create at the lower ‘sub-regional’ level, smaller and more mature ‘foci’ of co-operative activity (Evans 1994: 131). William T. Tow categorizes these types of ‘foci’ as subregional security regimes, which exist because of shared strategic and security interests amongst their members, such as the establishment of regional equilibrium. In addition, subregional security regimes are characterized by a ‘transparency of relations’, that allow for closer collaboration in security matters amongst members than would usually be seen in international relations (Tow 1993: 13-14). Thus, to achieve real progress in security dialogue the focus of activity is likely to move towards the building of security links and institutions at the sub-regional level.

Japanese policymakers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Agency now seem to be actively advocating both the greater regional and subregional approaches to security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region.15 The Defence Agency’s attraction to the functionalist subregional approach is shown by the announcement in March 1995 of its ‘Basic Policy’ (Kihon Hoshin) on security dialogue and defence exchange. The ‘Basic Policy’ argues for the maintenance of existing security relations with the US, but also for the need to diversify security dialogue in the post-cold war period by increased contacts with the ASEAN countries, South Korea, China and Russia. Interestingly, it stresses the importance of tōmeisei or transparency in defence matters, and proposes that Japan should promote security dialogue with other countries by the exchange of defence ministry officials, military personnel, education and training, and warship visits, and by the observation of military exercises, and co-operation in UN peacekeeping operations (Asahi Shimbun 13 March 1995: 1).

Given the existence of these types of initiatives for subregional security dialogue, the purpose of this article is to investigate in what ways Japan has been seeking to promote its security role and defence linkages in the Asia-Pacific region, and especially in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In particular, the aim is to glean from newspaper reports and other diverse sources, evidence of formal contacts at different levels between the Japanese defence community and the defence communities of ASEAN,
South Korea and China, as outlined in the March 1995 ‘Basic Policy’. By doing so it is hoped to further our understanding of the subregional security regimes identified by Tow, and Japan’s security and defence policy in the post-cold war era.

**Japan and the ASEAN nations**

The development of subregional security dialogue and even possibly defence linkages between Japan and the ASEAN nations is the product of the recognition on both sides of mutual economic and security interests. A large proportion of the trade of many ASEAN nations is with Japan. They continue to receive around 20 per cent of their total FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) from Japan, and are also allocated around 30 to 35 per cent of Japan’s total ODA (Official Development Assistance) (Morrison 1988: 436–8; Wong 1991: 310). In 1990–1, 13 per cent of Japan’s total trade was with the ASEAN countries, and the region’s strategic significance for Japan is increased by the fact that! up to 80 per cent of its imported oil passes through the Straits of Malacca (MacGregor 1993: 273). As Japan’s 1980 defence white paper acknowledged for the first time: ‘The ASEAN countries occupy important geographical positions along the routes for the supply of raw materials to Japan and have strong economic ties with Japan. Therefore, the security of the ASEAN countries is essential to the security of Japan’ (Defense Agency 1980: 78).

Increased economic interdependence has served, then, as the basic rationale for the growth of diplomatic and political co-operation between Japan and ASEAN. This process has been given added importance by the perception on both sides of the US’s lessening commitment to Asian security – marked first by Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine in 1969; and then reconfirmed by the US’s withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973; Jimmy Carter’s proposals to withdraw ground troops from South Korea in 1978; and actual withdrawal from bases in the Philippines in 1992. To compensate for the reduced US presence, Japan and ASEAN have drawn closer together diplomatically, establishing the Japan–ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference in 1978 as the vehicle for their ‘special relationship’ and political co-operation.

Co-operation between ASEAN and Japan on specific security issues, and especially on defence matters, though, has been slower to develop. Most ASEAN nations still regard the US as the best guarantor of security in the region and have been reluctant to ascribe too great a security role for Japan. For its part, Japan also sees the US as the essential balancing power in the region and has been careful to act in security matters within the constraints of the US–Japan Security Treaty, the Japanese constitution, and the Fukuda Doctrine. Hence, in the past it has eschewed a military role and has concentrated instead upon providing ASEAN with diplomatic assistance in dealing with security problems. Japan’s
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involvement in the Vietnam–Cambodia problem was purely on a diplomatic basis, and Noboru Takeshita's $2 billion initiative in 1987, 'Japan and ASEAN: A New Partnership Towards Peace and Prosperity', concentrated upon political, economic and aid issues, whilst avoiding questions of direct security co-operation. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese prime ministers have continued to visit the ASEAN countries, but in general the only time that they have held consultations on security matters with ASEAN leaders is to defend Japan against accusations of remilitarization, as was the case with Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit in 1983 (Fung Wai 1984: 63).18

But despite these restraints and difficulties, the strategic imperatives of the post-cold war period have meant that in the late 1980s and early 1990s there have been signs of the emergence of some type of subregional security and defence dialogue between Japan and certain ASEAN countries. The ASEAN countries which in general have been most supportive towards an enhanced security role for Japan have been Singapore and Thailand, and these were the first to agree in 1981 to the limited exchange and training of their military personnel at the Japanese National Defence Academy (Simon 1983: 308). The 1980s also saw the first visit by Japanese defence officials to Southeast Asia. In July 1988, the director general of the Defence Agency, Tsutomu Kawara, visited Indonesia and Singapore in order to reassure ASEAN over Japan's military policy. The reaction of the ASEAN countries to the visit was varied, with Singapore and Indonesia more positive towards an expanded defence role for Japan under US guidance, whereas Malaysia and the Philippines retained their suspicions of Japanese militarism (Sudo 1989: 59, 63). In May 1990, Yōzō Ishikawa became the second director general of the Defence Agency to visit Southeast Asia, holding discussions with officials in Malaysia and Thailand. Malaysian officials continued to express concern over Japan's military build-up, but the Thai prime minister surprised the director general with proposals for joint Thai–Japanese military exercises in the event of the US's withdrawal from the Philippines. Ishikawa's comment at the time that the proposal should be 'studied by experts' was intended as a refusal in deliberately vague Japanese language, but his comment was picked up by the Southeast Asian press and interpreted as signs of renewed Japanese militarism (Yomiuri Shimbun 4 May 1990: 3; Japan Times 5 May 1990: 5). To some extent, the Thai prime minister's proposal may have been an attempt to pressure the US into ending its withdrawal from the Philippines by arousing fears of a resurgence of Japanese military power in the region, but it also demonstrated the willingness of some ASEAN countries to contemplate a greater defence role for Japan, and, as Sueo Sudō comments, had the potential to serve as a 'taboo-breaking event in Japan–Southeast Asian relations' (Sudō 1991: 339).

These visits by Defence Agency officials do represent considerable progress in preparing the conditions for security co-operation between
Japan and ASEAN, but as yet it is still hard to pinpoint specific instances of co-operation and defence linkages. Reports did emerge from Indonesia in 1991 that Japan had assisted with the financing of the construction of a $2.7 billion air defence complex in Southern Sumatra (Far Eastern Economic Review 20 June 1991: 28–9). These reports were unsubstantiated and flatly denied by the Japanese government. More definite opportunities for military exchange were probably afforded by the port calls made by Japanese minesweepers to the Philippines and Malaysia en route to the Gulf in 1991, and it seems that it is through UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations that Japan and the ASEAN countries are most likely to build their initial defence linkages (Simon 1992: 122). The involvement of the Japanese SDF in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1993 was in a non-combat capacity, but it seems unlikely that the planning and logistics involved in the dispatch of the SDF would not have lead to the interaction to some degree of SDF personnel with the Thai, Indonesian, and Malaysian army units also deployed in Cambodia. The evidence from other regions of the world, such as the BALTBAT in the Baltic, suggests that it is these type of exchanges which take place during peacekeeping operations that may prove to be the most effective confidence-building measure that Japan can engage in.

The ultimate outcome of Japan’s attempts to build subregional security and defence links with the ASEAN nations is unclear, and depends upon changes in the strategic environment and US commitment to the region, and how far domestic opinion within the ASEAN nations allows their policymakers to respond to Japan’s initiatives. Sheldon W. Simon has argued in the past that Japan could form limited defence linkages with ASEAN by providing its member states with economic assistance and dual-use technology in order to develop their defence capabilities, but he has also pointed out that the degree of technological assistance that Japan can provide is severely circumscribed by its constitution (Simon 1989: 600, 1995: 17). A limited role for Japan in Southeast Asian security is also seen by Sueo Sudō. He believes that Japan should avoid a direct military role in the region, and proposes instead that Japan should extend its defence links to Southeast Asia by agreements on the exchange and training of ASEAN military personnel; that visits by top officials from the Japanese defence community should be institutionalized; and that Japan should play an indirect military role by the extension of the bilateral PACEX89 exercises held under the guidance of the US (Sudo 1991: 342).

What is certain, is that Japan is likely to continue to push for greater military exchanges in accordance with the 1995 ‘Basic Policy’, and to seek greater ‘transparency’ in military relations, as shown by the proposal of the then foreign minister, Yôhei Kôno, at the July 1994 ASEAN-PMC that the ASEAN countries should publish defence white papers as a CSBM (Nikkei Weekly 23 May 1994: 24). Japanese leaders are also likely to be more forthcoming in their attempts to discuss security matters with their
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ASEAN counterparts. The influential power broker and former LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) secretary general, and since December 1995 leader of the main opposition New Frontier Party, Ichirō Ozawa, is reported to have held discussions with defence officials on an unofficial visit to Indonesia in May 1992, and the then prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, when visiting Vietnam in August 1994 tried unsuccessfully to discuss security issues, and in particular the problem of the Spratly Isles (Asahi Shimbun 1 May 1992: 4; Nikkei Weekly 5 September 1994: 24).

Japan and South Korea

Perhaps rather surprisingly, the country with which Japan has made the most rapid progress in establishing subregional and defence linkages is South Korea. Historically, Japanese policymakers have been aware that any domination of the southern part of the Korean peninsula by a hostile power represents a threat to Japan, and since the Satō-Nixon communique of 1969, Japan has repeatedly acknowledged that the security of South Korea is essential to its own. During the cold war period, direct security links between Japan and South Korea were minimal and channelled through the agency of the US. Both powers relied on their respective alliances with the US to ensure stability on the peninsula, and South Korea, mindful of its past colonial domination by Japan, was highly suspicious of any Japanese moves to assume a larger military role in Northeast Asia. Even as recently as 1991, the South Korean foreign minister described Japan’s plans for the dispatch of SDF troops overseas as the ‘starting point for its remilitarisation’, and the 1991 South Korean Defense White Paper contended that the SDF was undergoing a transformation which would turn it from a self defence force into an offensive force designed for forward defence (Bridges 1993: 55-7; Asahi Shimbun 28 October 1991: 2).

However, in the post-cold war period, and in much the same way as in the case of ASEAN, the changed strategic situation has forced South Korea and Japan to seek closer co-operation on security and defence. The perceived retreat of US power in and around the Korean peninsula, and the potential instability of North Korea, coupled with its ballistic missile programme and possible development of nuclear weapons, poses a common security threat to South Korea and Japan and provides a common basis for co-operation. South Korea has long been preparing for the ‘Koreanisation’ of its own defence as the US gradually reduces its troop presence, and since 1992 has embarked on what it terms as a policy of the ‘Diversification of Military Diplomacy’ (Ministry of Defense 1992: 30). South Korea has already begun to build security and defence linkages with Russia and China, and now appears to be pursuing similar types of linkages with Japan.22 The South Korean 1993–4 Defense White Paper makes this policy clear: ‘We will try to expand mutual understanding and confidence between our armed forces and the Japanese Self Defence
Forces based on existing military exchanges, while seeking ways to play a positive role to maintain political stability and achieve peaceful reunification on the Korean peninsula' (Ministry of Defense 1993: 126). The Japanese Defence Agency’s 1995 white paper also makes clear the desire for increased co-operation, stating that: ‘The deepening of mutual understanding, and the exchange of opinions between Japan and South Korea about security matters of common concern, is of great benefit to the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the whole of the Asia-Pacific region’ (Bôeichô 1995: 197 [Author’s translation]).

The result of this readiness on both sides to advance security relations has been that security dialogue and defence linkages between Japan and South Korea have begun to emerge at all levels. At the highest level, and in response to the North Korean nuclear crisis, the frequency of summits between Japanese and South Korean political leaders has increased, and the agenda for talks has come to include the question of co-operation on security issues. The exchange of visits by officials from the Japanese Defence Agency and the South Korean Ministry of National Defence also have increased in frequency. The first visit by a director general of the Defence Agency to South Korea was made by Ganri Yamashita in 1979, but this was then followed by an eleven-year gap until the visit of Yôzô Ishikawa in 1990 (Bridges 1993: 55). After 1990 the pace of exchange appears to have quickened, with visits by the deputy director general, Akira Hiroyoshi and the director general, Seishiro Êto, to South Korea in October 1992 and September 1995 respectively (Asahi Shimbun 8 December 1990: 2; Nikkei Shimbun 24 September 1995). The first official visit by a South Korean minister of defence to Japan was made by Rhee Byoung-tae in April 1994, and there were plans to invite the Minister of Defence to Japan again in the spring of 1996 (Korea Newsreview 30 April 1994: 7; Asahi Shimbun 4 January 1996: 2).

These visits by top civilian officials involved substantive discussions and have paved the way for discussions between Japanese and South Korean military officers and the beginnings of practical military co-operation. In 1984 and 1990, the presidents, Chun and Roh, were accompanied to Japan by the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in October 1992 and March 1994 they again paid visits to Japan for talks at the Defence Agency (Bridges 1993: 55; Asahi Shimbun 20 October 1992: 3, 25 March 1994: 3). The chairman of the Japanese Joint Chiefs of Staff made a return visit to South Korea in February 1995. The practical military co-operation that has emerged from these talks has been in three main areas. First, since 1991 South Korean Navy and Air Force officers have been able to train at the Japanese National Defence Academy, and in 1992 there were reported to be twenty-one South Korean students at this institution (Asahi Shimbun 22 October 1992: 3). Second, talks have commenced on an Air Intercept Zone between Japan and South Korea. The Air Intercept Zone is intended as a safety measure to avoid the accidental shooting down by either side of
Japanese and South Korean fighter planes when scrambling to intercept an intruder from a third country into their airspace. Talks on the initiation of the zone began in 1990, and by 1994 had progressed to include for the first time uniformed officers of the rank of major general and below (Asahi Shim bun 8 December 1990: 2, 10 November 1994: 3). Third, talks have lead to the first exchange visits by warships from the two countries. In December 1994, three South Korean warships made a port call in Tokyo, and Japanese warships are scheduled to visit South Korea in 1996 (Nikkei Weekly 26 December 1994–2 January 1995: 4). These warship visits represent remarkable progress in the establishment of defence linkages between Japan and South Korea, given that only a few years previously South Korea had been critical of Japan’s defence build-up and the potential forward deployment of the SDF.

The future course of Japan–South Korea security and defence co-operation is hard to predict, but there is clearly much scope for the growth of defence linkages. During the October 1992 meeting of the director general of the Defence Agency and the South Korean defence minister, the South Korean side expressed an interest in the transfer of defence technology from Japan to South Korea (Asahi Shim bun 21 October 1992: 3). At the time these requests were turned down because they contravened Japan’s guidelines on defence technology transfer, but co-operation in this field between Japan and South Korea may be one future area of defence linkage. There is also evidence that joint naval exercises might be another area of future co-operation. South Korea participated in the US-directed RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercises for the first time in July 1992. The scale of South Korea’s involvement was small, and the US was careful to separate South Korea from Japanese forces during the exercises (Korea Newsreview 30 May 1992: 7). But future participation by both Japan and South Korea in RIMPAC and other US-sponsored exercises might serve as an important confidence-building measure, and possibly even persuade the two powers of the need to conduct their own limited joint exercises.

Therefore, Japan has experienced considerable success in creating security and nascent defence linkages with South Korea. The post-cold war period has marked nothing less than a transformation in security relations, and they have been marked by a relatively high degree of ‘transparency’. The aims of the 1995 ‘Basic Policy’ seem to have been achieved with regard to South Korea, and the existing defence linkages may become stronger as the North Korean security situation continues to develop.

Japan and China

The threatened expansion of China’s military power is arguably the most important long-term security problem faced by Japan’s policymakers. But whilst officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence Agency are clearly aware of the potential security problems and the need to involve
China in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, it is also clear that it is proving extremely difficult for them to forge lasting and reliable security and defence linkages with China. The transparency in military relations that Japan has sought with mixed success from the ASEAN countries and South Korea has so far eluded its policymakers when dealing with China.

Security dialogue with China began in the mid-1980s, and the director general of the Defence Agency visited China for the first time in 1987 (Asahi Shimbun, 20 February 1995: 3). Talks were then suspended following Tiananmen Square in June 1989, but the Japanese government has shown itself to be eager for their resumption since 1992. In April 1992, the Japanese prime minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, held talks with the Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, which involved discussions on the future security structure in the Asia-Pacific. Further talks on security were held between the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers in May 1992 and January 1994 (Akaha 1995: 59).

Out of these talks has come the agreement to resume security dialogue. Japan began by trying to persuade China to join a bilateral ‘Security Co-operation Council’ which would have included military officers, and the purpose of which was to serve as a confidence-building measure and to clarify China’s military posture (Asahi Shimbun 3 August 1992: 1). The Chinese military, however, refused to participate in this body and it was left for the foreign ministries of both countries to discuss security matters at a meeting in Beijing in December 1993. At this meeting, Japanese officials suggested that China for the purposes of ‘transparency’ in defence policy should publish an annual white paper on defence (Nikkei Weekly 26 December 1994–2 January 1995: 4). At the time, China refused this suggestion, but agreement did seem to be reached on continuing security consultations and to involve defence ministry officials and military officers in these discussions.

In March 1994, talks between the Japanese Defence Agency and the Chinese Defence Ministry were held in Beijing, and in January 1995, talks including officials from the foreign and defence ministries of both countries, and military officers of colonel rank and below, were held at the Defence Agency in Tokyo (Asahi Shimbun 2 March 1994: 3, 11 January 1995: 2). These talks were followed by the first visit of the chairman of the Japanese Joint Chiefs of Staff to China in February 1995, and by discussions between the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministries on arms reduction in July of the same year (Asahi Shimbun 20 February 1995: 3, 26 July 1995: 2). The director of the Defence Agency’s Bureau for Defence Policy was also scheduled to visit China in mid-January 1996 (Asahi Shimbun 4 January 1996: 2).

Thus, dialogue between Japan and China on security is underway, but from the Japanese point of view progress in talks has been hindered by China’s reluctance to co-operate over the problems of the export of missile technology, nuclear testing, and the wider issue of ‘transparency’. During the various meetings between officials of the two countries, the constant request from the Japanese side has been for restraint in missile technology exports.
and nuclear testing. Up until now, China has largely ignored these Japanese requests and continued with its plans for nuclear tests, content to allow France to be the subject of criticism for tests in the Asia-Pacific.

The problem that China's refusal to compromise on defence issues has posed for the Japanese government is shown by its reaction to China's test firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile in May 1995. The chief cabinet secretary stated that Japan might have to reconsider whether its aid to China is within the bounds of its ODA charter, which among other things is intended to prohibit the granting of aid to countries which possess and export weapons of mass destruction (Japan Times Weekly International Edition 12–18 June 1995: 2). This was followed by a rare instance of Japanese government action against China, with the limited suspension of bilateral grant aid in protest at China's nuclear tests. That Japan was pushed as far as to take these kind of steps demonstrates that the missile and nuclear issues are the main obstacle to improved Sino–Japanese security relations.

There are indications that this Japanese pressure, combined with the US policy of engaging China in security dialogue, may have had some effect upon China's attitude to regional security. China has made some progress on the nuclear and missile proliferation regime issues, has participated in the ASEAN-ARF since 1994, and in a timely move before the APEC summit held in Osaka, Japan, in November 1995, China published what approximates to its first defence white paper. But despite these Chinese moves, concerns still remain about its military stance, and these have been exacerbated recently by China's conducting of missile tests and large-scale amphibious exercises in the East China Sea designed to influence the outcome of elections in Taiwan in late 1995 and early 1996. Japan's reaction to the exercises has been muted, with further calls for Chinese self-restraint. But the holding of the exercises so close to Japanese territorial waters, and the possible involvement of US naval forces stationed in Japan in the China-Taiwan dispute is a matter of great concern. Therefore, China still needs to make more progress on specific military issues and the problem of 'transparency' before Japan can establish true security and defence linkages with its most powerful neighbour.

Conclusion

This article has examined the attempts by Japan to construct subregional security and defence linkages with the ASEAN countries, South Korea and China, and has demonstrated that Japan's efforts in these areas have met with varying success. Linkages with the ASEAN countries have been relatively slow to develop, but now that the mistrust of Japanese militarism within ASEAN policymaking circles has been dispelled to some degree, and now that Japan can play an active part in peacekeeping, there seem to be ready opportunities for Japan to expand its role in the region, and perhaps move beyond the security dialogue stage to practical defence co-operation.
Security and defence linkages with South Korea have already moved beyond the security dialogue stage and seem to be approaching the stage of practical co-operation in defence matters. This progress has been achieved despite the continuing controversy over Japan's atonement for its war record and colonial rule on the Korean peninsula. In late 1995, South Korean government protests forced the then prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi, to retract remarks on the legal status of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, and later on forced the resignation of the minister of state, Takami Etô, for remarks made in connection with the alleged benefits of Japan's colonial rule on the peninsula. Japan–South Korea relations were also affected by the renewal of a dispute in early 1996 over the ownership of Takeshima or Tokto Island, producing anti-Japan demonstrations in South Korea. However, the process of building subregional linkages between Japan and South Korea has been largely unaffected by the rhetoric at the political and diplomatic levels, and demonstrates the recognition on both sides of common underlying security interests in the post-cold war era that can transcend historical animosities.

Evidence from Japan's linkages with the ASEAN countries and South Korea suggests, then, that there is a strong demand for new security institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, and that Japan, in stressing the subregional approach, may have found an effective means with which to promote multilateralism. Subregional linkages based on security dialogue, CSBMs, technology transfer and limited military co-operation may be the starting point and the essential building blocks for the multilateral security institutions that Asian nations are now beginning to seek to create. Japan looks to have established a leading position in the growth of multilateralism through its sponsorship of multilateral, regional and subregional dialogue, and this role is likely to expand as Japan increases its participation in peacekeeping activities. Japan's support for UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda, the planned dispatch of its peacekeepers to the Golan Heights in early 1996, and the emphasis upon strengthening peacekeeping capabilities in a new National Defence Programme Outline (Shinbōei Keikaku Taikō) likely to be implemented in 1996, all serve to add a new multilateral dimension to the role of the Japanese Self Defence Forces. This role goes beyond the SDF's traditional one of acting exclusively in support of the bilateral military relationship with the US, and demonstrates that within certain limits Japan can engage actively in multilateral security operations. Thus Japan's peacekeeping activities, in conjunction with its other initiatives at the subregional level, offer some genuine prospects for the creation of multilateral security institutions and now provide an opportunity to integrate Japan into a future Asia-Pacific security structure without intimidating its Asian neighbours.

Japan's subregional approach, though, is not without difficulties. In addition to its own constitutional restraints, another potential check upon
Japan’s activities in this field is the US–Japan alliance. It is clear that the bilateral relationship will continue to be the basis for Japan’s security policy and for the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the Pentagon’s February 1995 report, United States Security for the East-Asia Pacific Region, envisages that the growth of multilateral institutions in the region should be founded upon the US’s bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea (Department of Defense 1995: 13). For the foreseeable future, and in the absence of any other viable alternative, multilateral security institutions will have to be created in and around the US’s network of bilateral alliances. But how far the US–Japan alliance can redefine itself to meet the demands of multilateralism in Asia over the long term is uncertain. Recent controversy over the issue of US bases in Okinawa does not threaten fundamentally the future of the US–Japan alliance, but it does illustrate the difficulties that the bilateral relationship is experiencing in trying to adapt to the new security environment of the post-cold war period. The alliance’s flexibility and role as a launch-pad for multilateralism may ultimately be limited, and as long as the bilateral security relationship with the US continues to receive priority, Japan will be constrained in the extent to which it can devote itself to multilateral initiatives.

The other major problem that Japanese policymakers face is the security relationship with China. Building security and defence linkages with China is proving difficult for Japanese policymakers, and it is hard to see further progress unless China is prepared to take a more open stance on defence planning. The issue of openness and ‘transparency’ forms the key to Japan’s efforts to push forward with security and defence linkages. In the case of its relations with ASEAN and South Korea the element of ‘transparency’ exists and brings about the potential to strengthen links. In the case of China this element of ‘transparency’ is weak and so far has frustrated attempts to promote dialogue.

Consequently, it would seem that at present only in its dealings with the ASEAN countries and South Korea does Japan have the ability to create the type of subregional security regimes envisaged by Tow. Japan, ASEAN and South Korea do appear to share sufficient security and strategic interests to work for the stability of the region, and, most essentially, recognize the need for a certain ‘transparency’ in relations. As yet China does not seem willing to fully commit itself to talking the same security language as Japan, and shows a reluctance to pursue an open defence policy. Hence, Tow’s definition of a subregional security regime cannot be used to describe adequately the current state of security relations between Japan and China. It is possible that Sino–Japanese relations will grow to fulfill these criteria in the future, but the failure to achieve now even the level of co-operation that would approximate to the conditions for the establishment of some kind of subregional co-operative body casts doubt upon the future progress of multilateralism, and is a worrying problem for the security of Japan, China, and the entire Asia-Pacific region.
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Notes

1 For the analysis of types of security problems in the Asia-Pacific, I have relied on the categories proposed by Sheldon W. Simon (1992: 113) in regard to ASEAN. In fact, the bi-polar system which overlay Northeast and Southeast Asia during the cold war was responsible for the origin and prolongation of many of the security problems identified above, and makes it difficult to rigidly classify any of them as domestic, intra-regional, or extra-regional. For example, the Vietnam–Cambodia problem began as an inter-Khmer domestic and Khmer–Vietnamese issue, but eventually came to involve Sino–Vietnamese, Sino–Soviet, and US–Soviet superpower rivalries. For an explanation of the development of the Cambodian problem, see Alagappa 1992: 450.

2 SEATO was first proposed in September 1954, and finally dissolved in 1977. For a full description of the history of the ZOPFAN concept, see Simon 1987: 18–25.

3 The USSR bilateral treaties in the region included the Mutual Defence Treaty with North Korea (1961) and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Vietnam (1978). The bilateral treaties concluded between the non-communist nations of the Asia-Pacific were: US–Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty (1952); ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty) (1952); US–Japan Security Treaty (1952; revised 1960); US–Republic of Korea Defence Treaty (1954); US–Thailand Alliance (1954); Singapore–Malaysia–Australia–New Zealand–and Britain Five Nation Defence Agreement (1971). This last bilateral treaty is evaluated in detail in, Wah 1991. These bilateral alliances have proved to be remarkably resilient even in the face of cold war pressures, and, arguably, their longevity is proof of their success.

4 The chief constitutional prohibitions and anti-militaristic principles which have restricted Japan's security role in the Asia-Pacific since the Second World War are: 1) Article IX, or the so-called ‘peace clause’ of the 1947 constitution, which has been interpreted by successive Japanese governments as prohibiting the right to maintain forces to wage offensive war, but allowing the maintenance of forces for self defence. The result of this interpretation has been that Japan has avoided the acquisition of the types of offensive weaponry that would provide it with an obvious power projection capacity in the region, such as aircraft carriers and in-flight refuelling capabilities. However, the flexibility of interpretation that the constitution has allowed for in the past, means that its role as an obstacle to the expansion by Japan of its security responsibilities in the future is dependent upon the prevailing political will and how far political parties are willing to stretch the limits of interpretation; 2) Overseas dispatch. LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) governments have maintained that the sending of the Japanese SDF (Self Defence Forces) is not unconstitutional. A 1980 cabinet decision interpreted article IX of the constitution as prohibiting the dispatch of the SDF overseas on operations that would require the use of
force. Thus, a major issue for the government in attempting to frame the peacekeeping bill in 1991 was whether or not the SDF's use of arms in repelling an attack during a peacekeeping mission would represent genuine self defence or would involve a use of force which exceeded the limits of the constitution. The PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) passed in June 1992 tended towards the latter interpretation and made SDF despatch on peacekeeping operations dependent upon the opposing sides' agreement to a ceasefire, the presence of the SDF and the neutrality of that force. In addition, the SDF was prohibited from engaging in logistical operations that would require the transport of weapons, and SDF units were to 'stay far from the sound of gunfire'. The issue of the SDF's possible participation in combat operations was left unresolved, and was expected to be dealt with by a future law; 3) The three non-nuclear principles - not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan - were established in 1967. The first two principles have been maintained, and strengthened additionally by Japan's ratification of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 1976. But, according to some interpretations, the third principle has been breached by the introduction into or transit through Japanese ports of nuclear weapons on US naval vessels; 4) Bans on the export of arms and defence technology were introduced by the administrations of Eisaku Satô in 1967 and Takeo Miki in 1976. The 1967 measures prohibited the export of arms to communist countries, and the 1976 measures ordered restraint in the case of other countries and prohibited the export of all weapons related technology. In 1983, though, the administration of Yasuhiro Nakasone made an exception to these prohibitions by signing The Exchange of Technology Agreement Between Japan and the United States, which allows for the export of defence related technology from Japan to the US; 5) The 1 per cent of GNP limit on defence spending established by the Miki administration in 1976. In effect, this prohibition was scrapped by the Nakasone administration which pushed defence expenditure above the 1 per cent limit for the first time in 1987.

For further details of these constitutional constraints, anti-militaristic principles, and developments on peacekeeping, see Chapman, Drifte, Gow 1983: 1–10; Hook 1988: 386–90; Katzenstein and Okawara 1994: 60–2.

5 The three main elements of the Fukuda doctrine were: 1) Japan rejected a military role in Southeast Asia, and on that basis was resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the region; 2) Japan would work for 'heart to heart' understanding with the ASEAN nations on political, economic, social and cultural matters; 3) Japan would co-operate equally with ASEAN and the nations of Indo-China to contribute to the region's peace and prosperity (Sudô 1992: 178).

6 Japan's acceptance of responsibility for 1,000 nautical miles of sea-lanes meant that it could potentially be involved in intervention in the Straits of Malacca and the territorial waters of the Philippines and Indonesia (Fung Wai 1984: 60).

7 For an account of Japan's changing conceptions and stance on security policy under the Suzuki and Nakasone administrations, see Hook 1988; Muroyama 1992: 473–85.

8 A list of the proposals for multilateral dialogue which preceded the 1991 ASEAN initiative includes the following: Consultative Conference for Peace in Northeast Asia (South Korea, 1988); Asian Security Co-operation (Australia, 1990); North Pacific Security Co-operation Dialogue (Canada, 1990); All-Asia Forum (USSR, 1990).

9 Australia has been especially keen on proposals to add a security role to APEC. For example, during an official visit to Japan in May 1995, the then Australian prime minister, Paul Keating, called for Japan to support a strong security role for APEC, and at the APEC summit in Japan in November 1995 canvassed the idea of the creation of a multilateral research group to study security in a nuclear-
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free world (Japan Times Weekly International Edition May 22–8 1995: 2; Japan Times 19 November 1995: 4). Australia's proposals may not have been entirely rejected as the then Japanese prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, at the APEC summit did not rule out the possibility of APEC taking up regional security issues at future meetings. However, he was also careful to stress that such APEC discussions could not become the basis for the creation of an institutionalized framework for regional security similar to NATO (Japan Times 20 November 1995: 1). For a full account of the creation of the CSCAP and an inventory of non-government dialogue channels in the Asia-Pacific region, see Evans 1994.

10 Until the early 1990s, South Korean policymakers were even more die-hard supporters of bilateralism than the Japanese. The extent to which these conceptions of security pervaded the thinking of its policymakers was shown by the remarks of the South Korean foreign minister, Lee Sang-ock, when he stated as late as 1991 that a multilateral security system like the CSCE (Council of Co-operation and Security in Europe) was inappropriate for the diverse security needs of Asia and that bilateralism was the only effective security arrangement that could be envisaged for the region (Korea Newsreview 17 July 1991: 6).

11 Following Nakayama's proposal concerning the discussion of security matters in the ASEAN-PMC, the US under-secretary of state, Robert Zoellick, stated in opposition that, 'What has made Asia relatively stable and has underpinned its economic dynamism, is a loose network of bilateral alliances' (Korean Newsreview 27 July 1991: 6). For a further description of the US's reaction to Australian and Japanese proposals for multilateral security dialogue, see Maswood 1993: 93-4.

12 A description of these problems and ASEAN's attempts to deal with them is provided by Acharya 1993: 17–40.

13 For the re-emergence of the problem of piracy in the South China Sea, see Nikkei Weekly 14 March 1994: 20. A less than optimistic account of the arms build-up in the region and its consequences for security can be found in Buzan and Segal 1994: 3–21.

14 The role of INGOs is described in Woods 1991. ‘Track Two’ is the term used by Kerr 1994: 399.

15 For an example of this type of thinking from a member of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Satō 1995: 270.

16 Security and defence linkages are defined here in accordance with the Defence Agency's March 1995 'Basic Policy' and are, therefore, based on evidence of formal and open links promoted by the Japanese government within constitutional limits and prohibitions. However, it is also arguable that Japan has long had informal and indirect defence linkages with other nations in Asia promoted through its export of dual-use technology products that can be employed for either civilian or military purposes. Reinhard Drifte (1986: 74–6) points out that Kawasaki V-107 helicopters and river patrol craft have been sold to the Burmese military, and that YS-11 and T-34 aircraft have been exported to the Philippine Air Force. In addition, the Chinese navy have been equipped with Japanese navigational radar.

17 For the concern of the ASEAN countries about the withdrawal of US power from the region, see Acharya 1991: 171–72.

18 The following Japanese prime ministers paid visits to the ASEAN countries in the following years: Nobusuke Kishi (1957); Hayato Ikeda (1961 and 1963); Kakuei Tanaka (1974); Takeo Fukuda (1977); Zenkō Suzuki (1981); Yasuhiro Nakasone (1983); Noboru Takeshita (1987); Toshiki Kaifu (1991); Kiichi Miyazawa (1993); Tomiichi Murayama (1994).

19 Interviews given by offers after returning from Cambodia provide some evidence that SDF units may have engaged in operations that involved
activities other than their mandated task of construction work. The reality of operations in the field and an unclear command structure meant that perhaps the strict definitional and practical barriers between construction (kôhei) and infantry (hohei) responsibilities broke down. As a result, SDF units may have found themselves involved in operations which, whilst they were termed 'information gathering' (jôhô shûshô) by the Japanese government, may have taken on more the appearance of patrolling (junkai). It is these types of operations that could have given the SDF opportunities for interaction with military units from Southeast Asian countries. Firsthand accounts by Japanese officers about the problems of adhering to the SDF's peacekeeping mandate can be found in Maeda 1994: 112–18. For further details about the deployment of the SDF in Cambodia, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994: 11–13.

20 BALTBAT, the joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion was formed in February 1995 by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, with co-operation from the UK, the US, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and France. The aim of BALTBAT is to encourage co-operation between the Baltic and Nordic states by joint efforts in training for peacekeeping. Haekkerup 1995: 14–18.

21 For a detailed description of the PACEX89 exercises, see Nishizawa 1990.

22 South Korea's links with Russia include the exchange of military personnel, the observation of military exercises and talks on the purchase of military equipment (Korea Newsreview 16 January 1993: 9, 18 September 1993: 12, 25 September 1993: 10). South Korea has sent to China a military delegation with officers of lieutenant colonel rank and below (Korea Newsreview 4 March 1995: 10).

23 John Welfield points out that the South Korean defence minister, General Song Hyo Chan, made a visit to Tokyo in June 1961 for secret talks with the chief of the Japanese Ground Self Defence Forces, General Ichiji Sugita (Welfield 1988: 204).

24 For details on Japanese restrictions on defence related technology transfer, see note 4.

25 Two scenarios for improved naval security co-operation between Japan and South Korea under US guidance and building on the start made in RIMPAC are provided by Nacht 1995: 42.

26 Reacting to accusations that it had assisted Pakistan and Iraq in the acquisition of these key technologies, China became a signatory to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in March 1992, indicated some support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, and gave a tacit agreement in 1991 to abide by the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). However, although China no longer openly opposes these non-proliferation regimes it does not yet seem to have taken effective steps to prevent the export of missile and nuclear technology, and reports have continued of the transfer of nuclear-capable M-9 and M-11 missile technology to Pakistan. For full details of China's efforts in non-proliferation, see David 1995: 592–97.

27 Examined from the Chinese point of view, one of the main impediments to progress in talks has been Japan's persistence in co-operation with the US over the TMD (Theatre Missile Defence Initiative), which China sees as a threat to the military balance in the region (Asahi Shimbun 14 January 1995: 1). In addition, China was angered by what it saw as the spying activities of Japanese and US defence attaches at military installations in Guangdong in January 1996, and this resulted in the effective expulsion of the officials from China in the same month (Asahi Shimbun 18 January 1996: 2).

28 The new National Defence Programme Outline was adopted by the Japanese coalition government in November 1995 and is intended to replace the existing Outline which has been in place since 1976. The new Outline aims to strengthen
the US bilateral alliance through enhanced co-operation and technology exchange, and to diversify the SDF's role through its activities in peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and disaster relief. The most controversial issue in the reworking of the Outline was the issue of whether to include within it provisions designed to preserve Japan's ban on the export of military technology to countries other than the USA. The eventual compromise saw explicit provisions on the export of technology excluded from the Outline, but confirmation of the provisions in a statement on the Outline by the chief cabinet secretary. For full details, see Asahi Shimbun 29 November 1995: 1, 3.

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