8 Japan's National Security Discourse: Post–Cold War Paradigmatic Shift?

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Introduction: From Unique to Convergent Discourses of National Security?

Japan in the post–World War 2 period has long been thought of, and indeed openly thought of itself, as an outlier amongst the developed powers in its national security problématique, discourses, and practices. Japan's being bound by Article 9 of its so-called 1946 peace constitution has meant that its outlook on national security has been distinguished by a strong questioning of the efficacy of and reluctance to utilize military power.[1] In fact, to this day the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF). established in 1954, have yet to directly inflict a single lethal casualty on any adversary (despite attaining the status of one of the most capable militaries in East Asia. if not globally).

Japan's outlier status has been explained by a variety of viewpoints in academic and policy discourse. For some analysts and policy-makers, Japan has stood as a "structural anomaly," which has been able to preserve its relatively demilitarized posture in the use of force simply because it has been able to rely on U.S. security guarantees under the bilateral security treaty, and thus in effect buck pass to its ally on the real heavy-lifting for military security issues.[2] For others, Japan's stance is explained by attachment to deeply ingrained pacifist or antimilitaristic norms, generating a nearly unique national security culture highly resistant to the use of military force.[3]

In turn, Japan's debate on national security, both inside and outside Japan itself, has only intensified in recent years, with signs of the beginnings of a

significant shift in its demilitarized stance. As Japan's external—and to some extent internal—security challenges have mounted in the post–Cold War period, this has led to a questioning of the traditional postwar path of Japanese security policy in terms of the functioning of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the JSDF's own missions and capabilities. The JSDF in East Asia has found itself increasingly upgrading its qualitative capabilities in response to North Korean nuclear and missile provocations, and the far greater looming challenge of China's military modernization. Moreover, globally, the JSDF post–9/11 until 2009 found itself dispatched for the first time in the postwar period to support the United States and international community in on-going conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq; and since 2008 it has been dispatched as far away as the Gulf of Aden on international antipiracy operations, accompanied by Japan's building of its first overseas military base since the wartime period.[4]

Japan's comparatively recent military proactivity has been driven by and further fuelled transforming discourses on national security, and initiated questions over whether its security trajectory is now starting to finally converge with those of other developed states and becoming what is often termed in the Japanese discourse a "normal" military power.[5] For those traditionally viewing Japan as set to shift in this direction in line with structural pressures, Japan's recent military ambitions reflect the start of inevitable, and often welcome, convergence with other developed industrial and military powers. However, for those traditionally ascribing to the view that antimilitarism and caution about external military activities is ingrained in Japanese society and consequently policy-making, Japan's recent scaling back since the Iraq deployment of out-of-area military commitments is evidence of continued caution and adherence to past trajectories.[6]

The objective of this chapter is to explore these Japanese past and newly emergent discourses and policies in more depth, along with interpretations of the recent changes in its military doctrine and alliance cooperation with the United States, and to consider how these inform us of the degree to which Japan may or may not be converging on a more "normal" security trajectory. Japan's security debate matters because the decisions taken on how to utilize its not inconsiderable military power arguably hold the key to the United States' ability to maintain military hegemony and the overall power balance in the Asia-Pacific, and not least in reacting to the rise of China's military power. In particular, Japan's willingness to cooperate with and facilitate U.S. power in the region will be crucial for President Obama's plans to "pivot" or "rebalance" toward Asia.

Japan's View of Its Fundamental Security Predicament: From Edo to Shōwa

Japan has experienced historically the same set of perceived national vulnerabilities and concomitant national interests and security objectives from the period of the Edo Bakufu (or Tokugawa Shogunate [1603–1868]) through to the Meiji (1868–1912), Taishō (1912–1926), and early Shōwa (1926–1989) periods. Japan's elites have traditionally perceived their polity to be one that is inherently vulnerable due to limited natural and energy resources, land space and population, and to be positioned at the juncture of a uniquely difficult set of regional and global environments. Japan's rulers at the start of the Edo period, fearful of external regional instability on the East Asian continent and of the encroachment of Western imperialism, chose the path of autarky and imposed a policy of near total self-isolation (*sakoku*) from the outside world. Japan's closure endured for close to two hundred years, until the country was opened forcibly in the mid-19th century by the arrival of the Western powers.

Japan's political elites, after a degree of internal struggle, rapidly concluded that autarky was no longer a viable option, as it left Japan backward in economic and military development and as a disadvantaged late-starter power in a rapidly deteriorating regional environment. Japan's leaders feared that their country might follow the path of China and become gradually dismembered by and dependent upon the Western imperial powers. Japan in response to these challenges forged a new grand strategy, seeking to convert itself into a modern nation-state and imperial power capable of resisting external incursions. Japanese leaders were determined to catch-up with the early-starter Western powers and subsequently achieved rapid industrialization and the building up of naval and land forces powerful enough to gain victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905; to secure for itself colonies in Taiwan, Korea, and China; and from 1902 onwards to forge an alliance relationship with Great Britain as the hegemonic power of the day.[7]

Japan's grand strategy, however, came unstuck in the early 20th century as the international system was perceived to turn once again to its disadvantage. Despite Japan's participation on the victorious Allied side in World War 1, it received unfavorable treatment at the Paris Peace Conferences (1919), within the League of Nations, and at the Washington Naval Treaty (1922). Japan's attempts at further colonial expansion in Manchuria—a perceived necessity

from the Japanese perspective to halt instability in China and Soviet aggression—were censured by the Western imperial powers. Japan's leaders, viewing the international institutions as biased against their attempts to protect their national autonomy through "defensive" imperial expansion regionally, and perceiving a shift in the global balance of power to the revisionist Axis Powers, concluded a Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy in 1940. Japan subsequently sought to dislodge the Western imperial powers from the East Asia region in order to secure an exclusive economic and resource space for its national security—a new form of autarky. Japan's strategic choice was, of course, to prove disastrous. Stunning initial Japanese victories and the establishment of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1941–1942 were to be followed by conventional military defeat and the atomic bombings of Japan at the hands of Allied Powers by 1945.[8]

Japan's total defeat, subsequent economic devastation, loss of independence under the U.S.-dominated Allied Occupation (1945–1951), the process of demilitarization embodied in the acceptance of Article 9 of the Constitution, alienation of its Asian neighbors, and the oncoming Cold War reestablished all of its old vulnerabilities and forced its leaders to search for a new grand strategy in the postwar period. Japan's policy-makers rehearsed a number of new and past strategic discourses. On the left of the political spectrum, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) charged that the domestic failings of prewar democracy and resultant ultra-nationalism had been responsible for leading Japan into the calamity of war, and that Japan could only restore its independence by following a new path of the completion of the process of demilitarization and democratization, the pursuit of unarmed neutrality, and restoring ties with former colonies in East Asia. At the other extreme, conservative nationalists, or so-called Revisionists, argued that Japan should restore its autonomy through reprising a prewar strategy of building up national military capabilities, creating shifting and multiple alliances, revising Article 9 and its constraining influence on the exercise of military power, and rejecting foreign troops based on Japanese soil.[9]

In the final eventuality, these contending discourses were reconciled, or at the very least marginalized, by the forging of a compromise position led by Japan's conservative Pragmatists under the direction of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946–1947, 1948–1952). Yoshida was committed to restoring Japan's position amongst the ranks of the great powers, but his strategy rejected increasing military spending and large-scale rearmament as unfeasible

given the perilous state of the Japanese economy and the anticipated domestic political opposition from the JSP, JCP, the wider public, and East Asian states. Yoshida and the Pragmatists perceived, instead, that the reconstruction of the civilian economy and technological prowess were to be the future prerequisites for ensuring national autonomy. Japan was to reemerge as a merchant state, not a samurai one; and national wealth was to be rebuilt through maritime trade and the gradual regaining of markets in the United States, Europe, and East Asia. The Pragmatists were highly realistic and nationalist in outlook and did not reject altogether the role of military power in ensuring national autonomy, and they were prepared to contemplate more significant rearmament and Japan's reemergence as an autonomous military power in the future.

In order implement this new grand strategy, later termed Yoshida Doctrine, Prime Minister Yoshida chose to reprise another former Japanese strategy from the early 20th century of moving closer to the established hegemonic power of the day. Japan was thus committed under Yoshida to alignment—although not necessarily alliance—with its former adversary, the United States, seeking and signing the 1951 Security Treaty. The bilateral security treaty initiated an implicit grand strategic bargain. Japan was obliged to provide the United States with bases to enable the projection of U.S. power onto the East Asian continent to pursue Cold War containment.[10] In separate agreements, Japan committed itself to assume a degree of responsibility for national self-defense through light rearmament and the formation of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and the National Safety Force in 1952—the forerunners of the JSDF. In return, Japan gained effective (if not explicit, until the revised security treaty of 1960) guarantees of superpower military protection, including forward-deployed forces in Japan and the extended U.S. nuclear "umbrella" deterrent.

In accepting these security arrangements, Japan further gained U.S. assent for the ending of the occupation and thus restoration of its independence (although the United States retained administrative control of Okinawa until 1972). Japan's postwar alignment also brought it (as originally calculated by Yoshida, based on his view that the United States needed Japan as a Cold War bastion of capitalism in East Asia) economic security guarantees in the form of special economic dispensations, including access to the U.S. market, economic aid and international economic institutions, and technology transfers. Hence, through U.S. sponsorship, Japan was able regain its place in the international community and, furnished as it was with U.S. military protection,

was free to pursue its goal of economic reconstruction. In addition to meeting the challenges of its postwar international vulnerabilities, Yoshida's decision to entrust, in large part, U.S. military security enabled the management of domestic controversies over Japan's future military stance: the JSP and JCP objecting to the U.S.–Japan security treaty as abetting U.S. imperialism but robbed of political leverage by the avoidance of large-scale rearmament; and the Pragmatists and Revisionists eventually joining forces through the formation in 1955 of the long-governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (holding power for a near uninterrupted period of more than fifty years until 2009) in order to beat off the challenge from their common left-wing adversaries, and then reaching a consensus on the necessity of maintaining the U.S.–Japan security treaty.

Japan's LDP was subsequently to sit relatively comfortably under the economic and security benefits of U.S. hegemony for most of the Cold War period. Japanese policy-makers were aware of potential costs associated with this alliance and that Japan's commitment should not be unconditional. Yoshida in particular hoped U.S. alignment would be a temporary expedient, stating famously that "the day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious (*zurui*), but let the Americans handle [our security] until then."[11] The principal costs for Japan of alignment were the alliance dilemmas of abandonment and most especially entrapment by the United States in its regional and global security strategy. During the Cold War, Japanese policy-makers feared abandonment the least, because they perceived that the United States valued Japan too highly as a central component of its containment strategy in East Asia. However, for successive Japanese administrations, U.S. military dependence, and the knowledge that the U.S. interests as a global power could supersede those regional interests related to Japan, has engendered residual fears that the United States' commitment to defend Japan might eventually wane, exposing its vulnerabilities. The major concern for Japanese policy-makers, though, has been that of entrapment, either through requests for Japan to provide reciprocal defense for U.S. territory or to engage in U.S.-led bilateral or collective security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

Consequently, Japanese policy-makers ever since the signing of the security treaty have tempered the risks of entrapment through hedging tactics vis-à-vis growing U.S. demands for security burden-sharing. Japanese policy-makers have stressed to their U.S. counterparts that Article 9 has been

interpreted to enable Japan solely to exercise the right of individual national self-defense, and not the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and thus that Japan cannot exercise armed force outside its own territory to defend its U.S. security treaty partner or assist other U.S. allies or other states. Japan also chose to emphasize U.S. military cooperation under the security treaty in line with Article 5 (the immediate defense of Japan) rather than Article 6 (the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East). Japan refused to develop the type of military capabilities that might mean it could be called upon to participate in U.S.-led expeditions. Japan in this way avoided pressure to join other U.S. allies, such as South Korea, in participating in the Vietnam War.

Moreover, Japan, even in the latter stages of the Cold War, as it embarked on a qualitative and quantitative build-up of JSDF capabilities—the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) shifting its heavy forces and tank deployments to Hokkaidō; the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) acquiring E-2C early-warning aircraft and F-15 advanced interceptors; and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF) large numbers of destroyers and P-3Cs for antisubmarine warfare—that all served to counter the USSR's ability to threaten the airspace and sea lanes around Japan and thus supported overall U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia, carefully avoided the integration of JSDF capabilities and missions with those of the U.S. military for fear of entrapment.[12] Japan and the United States did embark on the first steps toward the direct coordination of their respective military roles through the formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, including under Article 5 of the security treaty tactical planning, joint exercises, and logistical support, and under Article 6 cooperation in regional contingencies and Japan's patrolling of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). However, in practice, Japan concentrated only on research into Article 5–type contingencies for its own immediate defense.

Japan's reserved alliance stance was reinforced by a range of antimilitaristic principles or taboos, nonbinding in legislation but normatively ingrained in society at large. These included the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of 1967 (not to possess, produce, or introduce nuclear weapons); the total bans on the export of military technology introduced in 1967 and 1976; the insistence on peaceful use of space in 1969; and the 1 percent of GNP limit on defense expenditure introduced in 1976. In turn, these constraints on the exercise of Japanese military power were reinforced by the fact that the LDP, despite

holding power continually and being able to nudge forward Japan's military role alongside the United States, had to contend with stiff opposition from the JSP as the principal opposition party.

Hence, even though Japan's then Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō was able by 1981 to refer for the first time publicly to U.S. security arrangements as an "alliance," Japan's actual military security role was one that had been geographically limited to the area immediately surrounding Japan and functionally limited to providing a defensive "shield" to support the U.S. offensive "spear" in Northeast Asia; and if Japan made any contribution to wider regional security it was an indirect one through the mechanism of the bilateral alliance and support for the U.S. presence in East Asia.

Japan's "Grand Strategy" under Stress in the Heisei Era: International Systemic Challenges and Renewed Security Discourses

The pursuit of the Yoshida Doctrine and the maintenance of a highly asymmetrical U.S. alliance worked largely to Japan's benefit during the Cold War. However, in the post–Cold War period, or Heisei era (1989–), there have been indications that Japan's grand strategy is once again becoming untenable in the face of regional and global challenges.

Japan's East Asian security environment has significantly deteriorated with the ending of the certainties of bipolarity during the Cold War and the more fluid environment introduced by fleeting U.S. unipolarity, and then the transition to a possibly more multipolar international system. The most immediate challenge Japan has faced is the miscreant state of North Korea. Japanese anxieties had focused on North Korea's development of nuclear weapons alongside the strengthening of its ballistic missile capabilities to produce a credible *force de frappe*. Japan has seen North Korea progressively push forward its nuclear capabilities through a series of nuclear crises since the mid-1990s, culminating in its conduct of nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009. In turn, Japan's vulnerability to missile attack was demonstrated by the Taepdong-1 shock of August 1998, when North Korea test-fired a missile over Japanese airspace; by North Korea's conducting of a series of missile tests in the Sea of Japan in July 2006; and then again by North Korea launching a Taepdong-2 missile test over Japan in April 2009. North Korea then conducted further rocket launches in April and December 2012. Added to this, Japanese

defense officials have been concerned about the incursion of North Korean "spy ships" (*fushinsen*) on espionage missions and the risks of guerrilla attacks upon key facilities such as nuclear power installations on the Sea of Japan coastline.[13]

However, it is China that poses the greatest challenge for Japanese security over the medium to long terms. Japan has been concerned at China's modernization of its conventional and nuclear forces since the early 1990s. Japanese concerns focus, though, not just on China's military modernization per se but upon signs that it is now willing to project military power beyond its borders in support of its national interests. Japan is aware that China could disrupt its SLOCs with only a small blue-water surface, submarine, and amphibious naval capacity and through the assertion of its territorial claims to the South China Sea. China's constant dispatch of research ships and warships into Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea are taken as evidence of aggressive intent.[14] Japan's concerns about China have been compounded by the latter's natural gas exploration activities in the East China Sea, in fields abutting onto Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone, and the inability by both sides to forge a working pact on joint development of the fields. Japan–China maritime tensions escalated in 2010 with Japan highlighting the passage of a large People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) flotilla (or armada, as described in the Japan media) passing close to Japan's southernmost islands. Japan and China subsequently clashed over the Senkakus in late 2010. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) arrested the captain and crew of a Chinese trawler that attempted in September to ram its vessels in the disputed area, leading to China reacting by curtailing diplomatic ties with Japan and temporarily halting exports of strategic rare earths materials. Japan-China relations then further deteriorated over the Senkakus from 2012 onwards, with the Japanese government's nationalization of the islands through purchasing two of them from their private owner in order to prevent their potential falling into the hands of domestic right-wing political forces, but which then triggered a ramping up of Chinese military activity around the islands.

Japan–China security relations have been further complicated since the mid-1990s by the issue of Taiwan and Sino–U.S. strategic competition. Japan viewed the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits crisis and China's intimidation of Taiwan through the test firing of ballistic missiles with alarm, seeing it as another indication of China's willingness to project military power in pursuit

of its national interests; to possibly challenge the United States militarily in the region over the longer term; and even to use ballistic missiles to strike against U.S. bases in Japan and against rear area support facilities provided by Japan in the event of a full-blown conflict resulting from any Taiwanese move to declare independence. Japanese security planners apparently fear as well that in a Taiwan Straits crisis China might attempt to seize offshore islands such as parts of Okinawa Prefecture in order to disrupt U.S.–Japan military cooperation.

Japan in the post–Cold War period has now come to face for the first time involvement in a series of global security challenges and responsibilities, especially with the realization that U.S. hegemony and willingness to provide security dispensations are no longer boundless. Japan's response to the 1990–1991 Gulf War, which took the form of underwriting the war financially by providing US$13 billion, rather than a human contribution in the form of JSDF dispatch, was the subject of U.S. and international criticism, given the scale to which Japan also relied on stability in the Middle East for its economic welfare. It also made Japanese policy-makers aware of the need for a more proactive stance in supporting international efforts to respond to major post–Cold War security crises.[15] Similarly, Japan, in the wake of 9/11, was made aware of the threat of transnational terrorism and the demands from its U.S. ally to support the United States and the international community in efforts to expunge this threat. Japanese policy-makers have also been in accord with their U.S. counterparts on the need to halt the proliferation of WMD to other states or even possibly terrorist groups.

Japan's preferred role in responding to this post–Cold War and post-9/11 security agenda has clearly been a nonmilitary one, which relies on economic power and diplomacy. Japan has persevered with diplomacy toward North Korea and engagement toward China. Japan has taken similar lessons from the war on terrorism and the Iraq war. As will be seen in the next section, Japan sought roles in supporting the Afghan conflict and in Iraq that emphasized the use of economic power, postconflict reconstruction and state-building. Moreover, its policy-makers maintain strong reservations concerning the utility of military power in bringing about a resolution to the multicausal phenomenon of terrorism in Afghanistan, and the ability of the United States to reconstruct and stabilize postwar Iraq.[16] Nevertheless, Japanese policy-makers are increasingly aware of the limits of traditional low-profile diplomatic and economic responses to security issues and realize that in the final calculation,

Japan may now need to line up more closely with U.S. efforts to deter militarily North Korea and China and to deal with other challenges globally.

In turn, Japan's shifting external security environment has triggered a shifting set of domestic political conditions and security discourses that challenge the maintenance of the former status quo in security policy. The end of the Cold War has challenged the legitimacy of the existing political forces in Japan. The LDP since the early 1990s has overseen a decline in Japan's economic fortunes and further questioning of its legitimacy to govern as its anti-communist credentials have become less relevant. Similarly, the SDPJ's antimilitaristic stance has become less credible as Japan has been faced by a series of extant security crises. The consequence has been that the SDPJ has largely imploded as a political force over the last decade, while the LDP has searched for new sources of domestic legitimacy in its economic program and external security policy. The LDP was to eventually fall from power, largely due to economic issues, and gave way as the governing party in September 2009 to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had emerged as the main opposition party over the previous decade. The LDP was then to regain power in December 2013. This process of the fall then rise of the LDP in power has been accompanied by a consequent new fluidity in Japanese thinking about security policy.

The extremes of the Japanese security debate have partially reemerged on either side of the spectrum: Japanese right-wing nationalists call for significant remilitarization, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons, to guarantee Japan's future independence; whereas the remnants of the far left-wing continue to call for a neutral and demilitarized stance. However, the Japanese mainstream has tended to converge on three contending yet in many ways overlapping views of the appropriate security trajectory. The Pragmatists in the LDP continued to hold overall sway until 2009 and clung to a modified version of the Yoshida Doctrine of a Japanese military low-profile pushed incrementally forward in step with expanding U.S.–Japan regional alliance functions. The Revisionists increasingly reasserted themselves, however, under the likes of Prime Ministers Kozumi Junichirō (2001–2006), Abe Shinzō (2006–2007; 2012–), and Asō Tarō (2008–2009), arguing for a more assertive Japanese military role regionally and globally, although again through the mechanism of the U.S.–Japan security treaty and arguing for an alliance somewhat akin to the UK–U.S. security partnership. The DPJ for its brief period in power argued that Japan should certainly take a greater international

security role and strengthen the U.S. alliance. But the DPJ has also cautioned that Japan should exercise more of its military capabilities via multilateral institutions such as the UN, expand multilateral security cooperation with East Asian neighbors, and take care not to overly stretch U.S. military cooperation outside the East Asian region. Japan has thus not yet reached a post–Cold War consensus in its security discourse but is clearly edging toward a new acceptance of the need to play a greater military role, and that much of this role should be exercised through a revitalized U.S.–Japan alliance.

Japan's Shifting National Security Policy: Strengthened Alliance and JSDF Capabilities

Japan's first wave of security policy transformation began in the mid-1990s and was focused on the U.S.–Japan alliance's regional security functions. Japan's recognition of the inadequacy of the alliance and its role within it as a mechanism to respond to regional security challenges was initiated by the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994–1995. Japan at this time faced U.S. requests for active support in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, including rear area logistical support. Japanese policy-makers were unable to respond effectively, though, due to their previous reluctance to consider Article 6–type cooperation for regional contingencies under the bilateral security treaty. The result was to reveal the hollowness and lack of military operability of the so-called alliance; to induce a full-blown crisis of political confidence bilateral alliance relationships; and to raise the prospect of Japan's abandonment by the United States as an unreliable ally.[17] Japan–U.S. security tensions in this period were also compounded by tensions over U.S. bases in Okinawa prefecture, and most especially crimes perpetrated by U.S. servicemen and the environmental impact of the bases.

Japanese policy-makers' fear that the postwar strategic bargain with the United States risked becoming undone meant that they took initiatives to revise Japan's military doctrine and to redefine the alliance. Japan in November 1995 issued a revised National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)—the document that sets out Japan's military doctrine alongside the necessary force structure—which was significant in stressing the need for stronger U.S.–Japan alliance cooperation, and inserted a new clause to state that if a situation should arise in areas surrounding Japan (*shūhen*) that impacts upon national peace and security, then Japan should seek to deal with this in cooperation

with the UN and via U.S.–Japan security arrangements. Japan and the United States then issued a Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996 that opened the way for a revision between 1996 and 1997 of the original 1978 Japan–U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The revised guidelines specified for the first time the extent of Japanese logistical support for the United States in the event of a regional contingency (*shūhen jitai*), and thereby switched the agreed emphasis of the alliance cooperation from Article 5 to Article 6 of the security treaty.[18]

Japan post-9/11 then moved to a new global security agenda. Japan passed through the National Diet in October 2001 an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) that enabled the dispatch from November 2001 until January 2010 of JSDF units to the Indian Ocean area to provide logistical support to U.S. and multinational coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan, and in particular MSDF refueling of U.S. and coalition ships in the Indian Ocean.[19] Japan then passed in July 2003 an Iraq reconstruction law that enabled the dispatch of JSDF from 2004 to 2006 on noncombat reconstruction activities in the southern city of Samawah. The GSDF worked under the protection of UK, Dutch, and Australian forces. Japan predicated these laws and JSDF out-of-area dispatch upon linkages to relevant UN resolutions, and thus these security activities are strictly outside the geographical and functional scope of the U.S.–Japan security. Nevertheless, it is clear the principal impetus behind the ATSML and Iraqi reconstruction law was Japanese attempts to strengthen the range of U.S.–Japan alliance activities outside East Asia.

Japan's focus on an expanded regional and global security role since the early 1990s has not been exclusively on the U.S.–Japan alliance. Japan's failure to respond to U.S. and international expectations for JSDF dispatch during the Gulf War of 1990–1991 provided the opportunity for the passing in June 1992 of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) to allow JSDF dispatch on noncombat reconstruction UN PKO. Japan has taken part in UN PKO in Cambodia (1992–1993), Mozambique (1993–1995), Rwanda (1994), the Golan Heights (1996–2013), East Timor (2002–2004), Haiti (2010), and South Sudan (2011–) with other small deployments to support UN missions in Nepal and Sudan. Japan in 2002 also unfroze provisions in the ICLP that allow JSDF participation in core UN PKO, including the monitoring of ceasefires, collection of weapons, and exchange of prisoners. Nevertheless, Japan's main preoccupation has not been with UNPKO in recent years, with for instance less than 30 of its 240,000 personnel deployed on these missions in 2009.[20]

Japan in deploying the JSDF overseas has thus begun to shift away from the rigid tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, but it is notable that Japan has retained the Pragmatists' line by continuing to hedge carefully in its U.S. commitments. Japan in the revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation has stressed that their activation is predicated upon the concept of situational need rather than strict geographical demarcations, thus introducing an element of strategic ambiguity as to whether the scope of the revised guidelines necessarily covers Taiwan. Japan in responding to the war on terrorism enacted individual laws to enable JSDF dispatch to support U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq and predicated these laws on UN resolutions, thereby creating constitutional and legal firewalls between these operations and the range of support that it is prepared to offer the United States under the bilateral security treaty. Moreover, Japan has restricted the expansion of JSDF activities regionally and globally to noncombat missions and as yet has left intact its constitutional prohibition on the exercise of collective self-defense.[21] Furthermore, the DPJ after it took power was far more wary of committing the JSDF to new out-of-area operations, withdrawing the JMSDF from the Indian Ocean, although maintaining a deployment of MSDF destroyers and P-3Cs in the Gulf of Aden as part antipiracy missions and constructing in 2011 a permanent base for these in Djibouti.

Nevertheless, Japan's military planners still remain committed to steadily pushing forward long-term plans for a more activist global alliance with the United States. Japan and the United States in 2006 concluded a Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which then resulted in a series of Security Consultative Committee statements, the main mechanism for bilateral security planning, which were significant in stressing that the United States and Japan now shared not just common regional but also now *global* strategic objectives. The DPRI included plans for the relocation of the command functions of U.S. Army I Corps, a rapid-reaction force typically operating from the Asia-Pacific to the Middle East, from Washington State to Camp Zama near Tokyo. The ramification of this were that Japan would serve as a frontline command post for U.S. global power projection to as far away as the Middle East, thus marking an implicit breaching of the interpretations of the scope of the U.S.–Japan security treaty and U.S. bases as covering only Japan and the Far East. Japan has complemented this realignment by moving its own newly established JGSDF Central Readiness Force, with rapid-reaction capabilities, to Camp Zama. In addition, Japan agreed to the establishment of a Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Centre (BJOCC) at Yokota air base to collocate

the ASDF's command and control functions of Japan's emergent Ballistic Missile Defense system with those of the U.S. military in Japan, and for the United States to deploy additional and complementary BMD assets around Japan, including an X-band radar system at Kashiri in Aomori Prefecture and *Patriot* Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 systems. Hence, Japan has now largely abandoned its former Cold War fear of integration of the JSDF with the U.S. military.[22]

In the meantime, Japan has worked on upgrading its own national defense doctrines and JSDF capabilities. The MOD in December 2004 released its revised National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), to replace the 1996 NDPO, and it stressed the need for Japan to concentrate its security activities on the area spreading from the Middle East to East Asia. Japan's policy-makers have subsequently worked to change the nature of the JSDF as essentially a force designed to ward off the USSR during the Cold War and instead convert it into a lighter, more mobile force to respond to regional and global contingencies, and more interoperable with the U.S. and other militaries. Consequently, the 2004 NDPG reduced the number of GSDF tanks, ASDF interceptors, and JMSDF destroyers and emphasized the need for more qualitatively advanced weaponry.[23]

The latest iteration of the NDPG in 2010 then went further in reshaping the JSDF, finally abandoning the 1970s concept of the basic defense force in favor of a new dynamic defense force. The basic defense force concept was a hangover from the Cold War period whereby Japan maintained the minimum defense capabilities supposedly just sufficient to defend its territory. In contrast, the dynamic defense force concept is one where the JSDF will calibrate its capabilities more closely, in near balance of power fashion, to counter specific sources of threat and contingencies. In order to counter the emerging maritime threat from China, the MSDF plans to continue to procure DDH light helicopter carriers, to maintain a very substantial fleet of forty-eight destroyers, and an increased submarine fleet of twenty-two vessels. The MSDF will also complete the fitting out of six of its destroyers for a BMD capability. The JASDF will reduce its number of fighters but has compensated for this by a qualitative upgrade through acquiring the F-35 fifth-generation fighter. The JGSDF will continue to cut its number of tanks and artillery but further develop rapid reaction capabilities, with a new emphasis on garrisoning Japan's southernmost islands in the East China Sea—a move again designed to counter possible Chinese incursions.[24] All of these new Japanese capabilities should also assist the U.S.

emerging plans to hedge against China's military rise through the Air-Sea Battle Concept, with Japan providing key BMD, air defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets

Japan's defense establishment in this period has not only challenged postwar constraints by acquiring greater power projection capabilities for the JSDF, but also by increasingly eroding a number of key antimilitaristic principles that constrain military planning. Japan has effectively breached the 1969 prohibition on the use of space for military activities by launching since 2003 a series of spy satellites and now declaring that it would use space for defensive rather than nonmilitary purposes per se.[25] Japan's defense production sector has pushed hard in recent years and came close in 2010 to breaching the ban on arms exports in favor of an export license system, desirous as it is of enhanced opportunities for international co-development of new weapons systems with United States and other partners. Japanese policy-makers have turned a blind eye since the 1960s to breaches of the third of the non-nuclear principles by allowing the United States to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan in transit of its navy ships; and more recently a number of high-profile politicians have raised questions about the utility of Japan's acquiring its own nuclear deterrent as U.S. extended nuclear guarantees are feared to possibly slip in face of North Korea's nuclearization. Finally, Japanese policy-makers have come to question the value of constitutional limitations on the use of military force. The LDP in particular, but also elements of the DPJ, have sought to overturn the self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense because it impedes U.S.–Japan alliance cooperation. The Japanese National Diet has also begun to investigate for the first time the possible formal revision of Article 9 of the Constitution to acknowledge the existence of the JSDF as a military and to specify its responsibilities for national defense.[26]

Reflections: A Radical Turning Point in Japanese Security Policy?

Japan appears to be nearing, if incrementally, a potential paradigmatic shift in the context and trajectory of its postwar security trajectory—moving from a situation of a highly circumscribed defensive posture concerned purely with its own immediate national security to one of a more assertive defense stance, more closely allied with the United States, and extending beyond its own region to include global security functions. In short, the so-called Yoshida

Doctrine appears to be losing its grip on the making of national security policy. Japanese policy-makers and analysts are now considering how far Japan may continue to move along this trajectory.

It is certain that Japan's concerns about the changing international structure and the pressure this exerts on changes for its security policy look unlikely to abate in the short, medium, or long terms. Japan's concerns over North Korea may dissipate if international efforts contain the nuclear issue. However, Japan will still then be confronted more openly by China's seemly inexorable rise, which will continue to drive forward Japanese remilitarization to cope with related territorial and resource threats. At the same time, Japan's ability to shelter behind the United States in the international system will come increasingly into doubt. All of this suggests that Japan's domestic attachment to discourse and norms of antimilitarism will be progressively eroded in the future, reinforcing the cycle of remilitarization.

Japan's exact pathway toward a more remilitarized stance though is less certain. Japan in the past, as made clear in the historical sections of this chapter, has made radical jumps in strategic directions if the international system is perceived to turn against it. For Japan any leap from the current hegemonic power of the United States, however currently weakened, toward band-wagoning with China as the potentially rising dominant power seems unlikely. This is due to the fact that China clearly stands more as a threat at present; that the prospects for U.S. hegemony are really finished are far from clear; and that Japan's policy-makers are inherently risk averse, given past attempts to shift toward revisionist powers. In turn, any attempt by Japan to retreat into isolation appears unlikely, given the historical lessons of this strategy; Japanese strategic dependence on the outside world for economic welfare; and its own lack of national strength to adequately defend itself, short of adopting its own nuclear deterrent.

Hence, the most likely path for Japan to follow is to strengthen its own national capabilities in conjunction with a stronger U.S.–Japan alliance. This will allow Japan to avoid the full costs of an independent defense posture, to maintain a semblance of its post-war antimilitarism, to bolster the weakening U.S. presence in the region, and provide Japan with the assurance to gradually expand outwards its international security role. Japan's progress along this path is unlikely, though, to be smooth. Japan's acceptance of increased alliance responsibilities and security interdependence or dependence on the United States will engender renewed abandonment and entrapment

concerns. Japan's policy-makers may at times try to retreat back into essentially a low-profile stance, or defensive realism, to avoid the costs of alliance and simply concentrate on homeland security.[27] At other times, Japan may be obliged to assume more a form of reluctant realism, accepting the need to gradually follow the United States in facing up to regional and global security exigencies.[28] Finally, in other instances, Japan's ambitions as an independent and Great Power may be frustrated by rivalry from China and dependence on the United States generating unpredictability in its defense posture, characterized more by what might be termed resentful realism and a tendency to lash out against its adversaries.[29]

Notes

1. Article 9 of Japan's Constitution states:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

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