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U.S.-Japan Security Relations

TOWARD BILATERALISM PLUS?

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Japan's Strategic Choice for Alliance

More than half a century after the signing of the original Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan in September 1951, and despite the passing of the Cold War strategic environment and the adversaries and functions for which it was ostensibly designed, the U.S.-Japan security relationship remains firmly intact. Indeed, bilateral security cooperation has not only been maintained in the post-Cold War period, but by all accounts has also been strengthened, and the incremental rate of the expansion of its geographical and functional scope has been accelerated.

The revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines between 1997 and 1999 that outlined for the first time Japan's military assistance for the United States in an East Asian regional contingency under the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and Japan's dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the Indian Ocean area to provide logistical support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan since November 2001 under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), are two clear indications that U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation has evolved to take on strengthened regional and global security responsibilities.

Japanese policymakers continue to stress that the range of support Japan provides for the United States under the bilateral security treaty is designed for Japan's individual self-defense. However, they have also become more willing than in the past to acknowledge overtly the long-understood fact that the treaty simultaneously undergirds both the United States' regional and global military strategies. This fact is then used to ar-

gue that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is indispensable to the maintenance of the U.S. military presence in East Asia, and hence serves as a public good and as the foundation for the region's security architecture and stability. Japan therefore continues to place the U.S.-Japan security relationship at the core of its individual national security policy in the post-Cold War period. Concomitantly, Japan's commitment to the bilateral security treaty and its alliance relationship with the United States remains the principal basis of its declared contribution to regional and global security at the start of the twenty-first century.

Japan's seemingly unswerving commitment to bilateralism in security affairs stands in stark contrast to the changing nature of the other dimensions of its international relations vis-à-vis the United States and the rest of the global political economy in the post-Cold War period. As observed in the other chapters of this volume, in the political and economic dimensions, Japan has developed increasingly viable multilateral frameworks and options at the regional and global levels for the conduct of its international relations, which in many instances have the potential to serve as partial or near total alternatives to the U.S.-Japan bilateral framework. By contrast, in its security relations, Japan has yet to develop such similarly viable multilateral frameworks to defuse, dilute, or deflect U.S. power.

As discussed in later sections of this chapter, Japan has certainly been involved in important multilateral security dialogue initiatives in East Asia, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Track II security dialogues, and it has been a staunch supporter of many United Nations (UN)-centered security activities at the global level. Nevertheless, as most commentators and even Japanese policymakers themselves would acknowledge, these multilateral frameworks have rarely been seen as viable or sufficient options for Japan's own security and for Japan to carve out a role in regional and global security separate from the alliance. More usually, they have been accorded, at best, and especially in military security affairs and at the East Asian regional level, a role that is secondary, supplementary, or subordinate to the primacy of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and that can be called part of a "bilateralism plus" security policy.

Japan's reluctance or inability to move beyond bilateralism in military security affairs gives rise to the central research problems of this chapter, which seeks to answer the question of why Japan's security policy has been and continues to be so strongly rooted in U.S.-Japan alliance bilateralism, in spite of the fact that the post-Cold War strategic environment and the evidence from the other dimensions of Japan's international relations suggest that Japan may increasingly have need and recourse to develop alternative multilateral security options. Following this discussion,

the chapter examines whether the factors that account for Japan's past predilection for what has been called *entrenched bilateralism* are likely to continue to propel it toward not only maintaining the alliance in the future but also further strengthening its functional and geographical scope.[1]

At the same time, this chapter considers the flipside to the question about the continuing strength of U.S.-Japan bilateralism and why multilateralism has been so relatively weakly rooted in Japan's security policy to date. It further asks whether the types of changes in the international environment identified earlier and Japan's development of multilateral frameworks in other dimensions are yet likely to strengthen the role of multilateralism alongside bilateralism in shaping Japan's future security policy.

In turn, the chapter addresses the question that arises from the first two sets of questions about the interrelationship between bilateralism and multilateralism in Japan's security policy, and to what degree they are capable of reinforcing or undermining each other. Specifically, the chapter investigates whether the relative strength of bilateralism in Japanese security policy is accounted for not simply by some inherent weakness in multilateralism that has compelled reliance on the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also by a more complex dynamic whereby the strength of alliance bilateralism itself has restricted multilateral options for security.

In the post-Cold War period, a body of academic and policymaking opinion has arisen in Japan and the United States arguing that alliance bilateralism and certain varieties of multilateralism are largely compatible approaches for augmenting Japan's own security, and that they offer pathways for Japan to enhance its contribution to regional and global security. This type of argument employs the logic that the two approaches can either perform separate but mutually reinforcing security functions, or that the U.S.-Japan alliance, even if it stops short of integration with multilateral approaches, is capable of providing a stable platform on which "incipient" multilateral security frameworks can now be constructed in line with the more propitious post-Cold War strategic environment.[2]

In opposition to this view is a body of opinion, often derived from the experience of the Cold War but also given force by the noticeable lack of substantial progress in East Asian multilateral security frameworks since the mid-1990s, that argues that bilateralism and multilateralism are essentially incompatible. The argument runs that the two approaches are at loggerheads because they are based on different assumptions about with whom and against whom and by what means security is provided. In many cases they are seen to conflict outright, with bilateral alliance ties constraining Japan from full participation in any meaningful multilateral framework that could come to form a substitute for and threaten the continuation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. In other cases, they are

seen to work in tandem only if multilateralism is subordinated in practice to alliance bilateralism.

The intention of this chapter is to engage with these contending arguments about the compatibility and relative strengths of bilateralism and multilateralism because they offer further explanation for Japan's enduring attachment to the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period. For if it can be discovered that in the past Japan's alliance bilateralism has played a large part in weakening confidence in multilateral approaches to security, then it will also be important to look to this quarter to understand Japan's contemporary attachment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, and to understand Japan's capacity and likelihood to move away from near-exclusive reliance on bilateralism and search for multilateral security options in the future.

Understanding Japan's Predilection for Bilateralism

This chapter argues that the best method for analyzing and uncovering the reasons that lie behind Japan's persistent attachment to bilateralism is to examine the strategic perceptions of Japanese policymaking elites, their corresponding evaluation of the relative security benefits and costs of alliance with the United States, and how their continuous calculus of the last fifty years that overall the alliance best serves Japan's national interests has made for its longevity and a disinclination to explore multilateral security options in depth. Japan's policymaking elite is taken to be composed of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials, as well as other elements of the central bureaucracy; politicians from the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other main parties; and other actors from big business, the mass media, and the academic communities.

The chapter starts with and backtracks to the Cold War period, because this enables detailing of the component factors that made for Japan's original strategic choice in favor of alliance with the United States. The chapter then moves on to the post-Cold War period and uses these factors as a basis for comparing and thereby explaining the continuities of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship across the supposed divide of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. It argues that by understanding the factors that underlie Japan's alliance choice in the Cold War, and by understanding that many factors similar to these are still at work in the post-Cold War period, we can see why Japanese policymakers continue to adhere to the strategic calculus that a strong or even strengthened U.S.-Japan security relationship is necessary despite the changing international security environment. Moreover, this chapter argues in its concluding sec-

tion that all current indications are that these factors are likely to continue to determine Japan's strong attachment to the alliance in the near to medium future.

Three factors, discussed in detail later, transcend the divide between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, continue to shape Japan's strategic calculation in favor of the alliance in the present day, and are likely to drive it forward in the future. The first of these factors has been *Japan's assessment of the strategic environment that has surrounded it in these periods and the resulting debates among its policymakers about the challenges posed to Japan and the opportunities for guaranteeing national interests and security through the mechanism of alliance with the United States*. Japan's perception of its national interest is here taken to be conditioned by more than straight material defense and economic interests.[3] In addition, and particularly as the security relationship increasingly acquired the trappings of an alliance during the later stages of the Cold War, the role of bilateral security institutions and the function of bilateralism itself as an emerging norm must be seen as significant influences in buttressing perceptions of the indispensability of the alliance.

The second factor is *the assessment by Japanese policymakers of the costs alongside the likely benefits of bilateral alliance with the United States*. In particular, these costs for Japan are calculated in terms of the alliance security dilemmas of *entrapment* and *abandonment*—the former arising if Japan becomes too dependent on the United States for its security, thus leading to its overintegration into U.S. military strategy and the related risks of becoming embroiled in a conflict; and the latter arising if Japan attempts to push for too much security independence from the United States, thus leading to its abandonment by the United States as an ally that it is reliable and worth defending.[4]

Also included in the calculations of this second factor are the expectations of Japanese policymakers that they have at their disposal alternative security options and associated hedging tactics to alleviate security dilemmas. In the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, even while sustaining an ever-deepening bilateral alliance relationship, Japan has safeguarded key constitutional prohibitions and independent military capabilities that have allowed it to retain a measure, even if gradually diminishing in scope, of security autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. This has meant that Japan has been able to obfuscate or even refuse support for the United States in certain areas of bilateral alliance cooperation, and to keep in reserve the extreme option of striking out on a more independent security policy. Japan's subsequent ability to intimate the limits of its support for U.S. global and regional strategy has made for U.S. wariness in pushing too hard to enlist support from or abdicate support for Japan in

a military conflict, thus reducing the probability of Japanese entrapment or abandonment resulting from unwanted conflict scenarios.

Added to these potential security options and hedges against the costs of alliance, and given special attention in this chapter as the third factor underlying strategic choice in favor of the bilateral alliance, is *the perception by Japanese policy actors of the utility or nonutility of multilateral security frameworks*. Multilateralism has clearly been one option that is capable of countering exclusive security dependence on the United States. As will be seen, however, Japan's eventual consideration that multilateral frameworks have not been sufficiently viable options has proved to be another component of the calculation that has governed its strategic preference for the bilateral alliance. Hence, taken together, Japan's careful assaying of the benefits but also the costs of alliance with the United States as well as its belief that it has the means to manage these costs through hedging options and that multilateralism has not been a viable alternative option are factors that can be used to explain its constant calculation from the Cold War through to the post-Cold War period that on balance the optimum choice available for its security is to adhere to alliance with the United States.

Japan's Cold War Strategic Calculus and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Japanese Assessments of the Cold War Strategic Environment

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's decision to seek and sign the original security treaty with the United States in 1951 was a demonstration of his conviction that alignment, if not alliance, with the United States was the best vehicle available for Japan to achieve its interrelated postwar objectives of regaining national independence from the U.S.-dominated occupation, countering the potential threat of Soviet Communism, gradually reintegrating itself into the East Asia region, and assuring economic recovery. The signing of the security treaty confirmed the grand "strategic bargain" between Japan and the United States alluded to in Ikenberry's chapter in this volume. Japan was able to pursue what was later to be called the Yoshida Doctrine of minimal rearmament and the concentration on economic restructuring, provided as it was by the United States with an effective guarantee of military security and access to special economic dispensations. Japan in return provided the United States with bases for projecting military power in support of its regional Cold War military strategy.

Japanese and U.S. policymakers and commentators at the time and since have been struck by the various unequal and lopsided provisions of the original security treaty. Most prominent was the absence of an explicit commitment on the part of the United States to defend Japan (although Yoshida had always been confident that the basing of U.S. forces in Japan would be a sufficient tripwire deterrent against the Soviet Union), and of any obligation for Japan to defend the United States in a collective self-defense arrangement despite the treaty acknowledging Japan's possession of this defensive right under the UN Charter. The 1951 U.S.-Japan security treaty thus lacked the mutuality of the other bilateral treaties signed by the United States with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and South Korea in the early stages of the Cold War.

Prime Ministers Ichirō Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi sought over time to persuade the United States to accept the removal of the unequal provisions relating to Japan by offering to inject a greater degree of mutuality into the treaty. Kishi's negotiations for the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 set out more clearly Japan and U.S. security responsibilities toward each other. Article 5 of the treaty provided an explicit U.S. guarantee by stating that any attack on the territory of Japan was recognized as an attack on both treaty partners. Article 6 of the treaty pledged that Japan, in order to contribute to its own security, would supply bases to the United States for the maintenance of security in the Far East. However, Japan here again stopped short of full mutuality in the treaty by stressing that its support for the United States was predicated on the right of individual rather than collective self-defense.

Japan's Cold War Risk Calculation and Management

Japan was thus able to forge, through the device of the original and revised treaties, a security relationship with the United States, the asymmetrical nature of which was seen to function much to Japan's overall benefit. Japan's choice for the security relationship in this period, however, was not made without extensive calculation about the accompanying costs and the methods available to minimize these costs. Strategic alignment with the United States carried the logic that Japan could become a proxy target in conventional or nuclear conflict with the USSR. In addition, Japan's policymakers were aware that beyond acting as part of the U.S.-inspired defensive perimeter for the containment of communism, there was the constant risk that the United States might push for Japan to become a more direct actor in the Cold War struggle outside its own territory, in areas such as the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan.

In the negotiations running up to the conclusion of both the original

and revised treaties, sections of the U.S. policy community demonstrated a persistent interest in encouraging Japan to participate in and develop the necessary military capabilities to support a genuine collective self-defense arrangement. Japan was first envisaged as a key member of a collective self-defense mechanism on a multilateral and regional basis, modeled along the lines of NATO and designed to complement the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), that would oblige it to assist militarily both the United States and other U.S.-aligned states. Second, Japan was envisaged as, at the very least, exercising the right of collective self-defense to come to the sole and direct assistance of the United States as its treaty partner through the overseas dispatch of the SDF to defend U.S. territory.[5]

Japan's policymakers were aware during the original and revised treaty negotiations that varying U.S. ambitions for a Japanese role in collective self-defense arrangement on a regional multilateral or bilateral basis, and above all for overseas dispatch of SDF, carried major risks of entrapment. Japan would face increased U.S. pressure for a rapid buildup of its military forces, and in particular of large ground forces designed for expeditionary purposes to complement U.S. naval and air forces deployed in the region.

Japanese policymakers instead sought, while continuing to accrue certain benefits of the security treaty, to minimize the associated risks by working to preserve a degree of autonomy in security cooperation with the United States. In Article 4 of the revised treaty and in the exchange of notes that took place afterward, Japan succeeded in negotiating a U.S. pledge to consult on combat operations from bases in Japan apart from those operations conducted under Article 5. Japanese policymakers have argued that this pledge has provided them with a final veto over U.S. military operations from Japan. In fact, they have never dared to exercise this veto due to fear of alienating the United States. Nevertheless, for Japan, the right to refuse cooperation under the security treaty has served as one latent means by which to rein in U.S. military operations from its territory if they are seen to impose too great a security cost.

In the revised treaty, Japan also succeeded in limiting the functional and geographic scope of bilateral cooperation, and the consequent risks of entrapment. Since 1954 the Japanese government had asserted that although Japan as a sovereign nation under Article 7 of the UN Charter possessed the right of collective self-defense, it could not exercise that right because it would exceed interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan that limited the use of force to the minimum necessary for self-defense. During the negotiations for the revised treaty, Japan's policymakers held to this position and the United States was forced to accept

that enhanced mutuality would mean neither a Japanese collective self-defense obligation nor the overseas dispatch of the SDF.

Japanese policymakers were further able to gain U.S. assent to drop plans for the geographic scope of Article 6 of the treaty to be designated as the Asia-Pacific and to accept the less extensive designation of the Far East, as in the original treaty. Prime Minister Kishi, in Diet interpellations in February 1960, limited the scope of U.S.-Japan security cooperation by stating that while the Far East was not necessarily a clearly designated geographical region to which the treaty could be restricted, it broadly included the areas north of the Philippines and surrounding Japan (*Nihon no shūhen*), and the areas under the control of South Korea and Taiwan.

Finally, Japan's determination to retain a degree of security autonomy was demonstrated in this period by its development of key independent military capabilities. Japanese policymakers were intent to retain control of the incremental buildup of their national military capabilities, not only to assist economic recovery and to satisfy U.S. demands for expanded cooperation, but also to ensure that this was done in a balanced manner that would ultimately make for cooperation rather than dependence in security affairs. Japan accepted Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) military aid from the United States from 1953 onward, but steadfastly refused to use this aid to develop the type of large-scale ground forces that could then identify it as a candidate possessing the requisite fighting capabilities to be press-ganged into U.S.-led conflicts in East Asia.[6] Although constricted by constitutional prohibitions and the need to consider U.S. expectations for assistance in the Cold War struggle, Japan sought to create more balanced naval, air, and ground forces and indigenous defense production capabilities that befitted the aspirations of an independent state.

Japan and the Nonviability of Multilateralism

During the periods of the treaty negotiations, Japan therefore sensed considerable risks of "satellization" and entrapment in U.S. military strategy. It also felt, however, that it could exert sufficient autonomy to minimize these risks, meaning that the aggregate cost-benefit analysis was still weighted toward partial strategic accommodation with the United States. Japan's strategic choice for the security treaty in this period was reinforced by its lack of perception of any viable multilateral alternative. The bipolar divisions of the early Cold War period offered few prospects for the development of cooperative multilateral security cooperation. Japan's principal and most realizable multilateral option was thought in-

stead to be a collective self-defense framework, centered on the United Nations or the United States.

Throughout the Cold War, Japan emphasized the importance of the United Nations to the maintenance of global and regional security and in part attempted to locate its own security policy within UN multilateralism. The original and revised security treaties stress that the U.S.-Japan security arrangements are in conformity with UN principles and that they should remain in place only until such time as the United Nations can satisfactorily provide for Japan's defense. Japan, however, was in this period clearly reluctant to exploit the United Nations more fully as an alternative security framework. Japanese policymakers were concerned that the United Nations was rendered ineffective by superpower competition and that it was unlikely ever to function as a sufficient or supplementary guarantee of security. Moreover, an active Japanese attachment to the United Nations was thought to conflict with the U.S. bilateral security guarantee because it would subject Japan to the Cold War tensions within the organization and detract from its freedom of action to cooperate with the United States under the security treaty.

Any potential Japanese commitment to a UN option was then subordinated to the exigencies of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and the principal role of the UN multilateralism in this period was to provide domestic and international legitimacy for the bilateralism of the security treaty. Japan's diffidence toward UN multilateralism at this time was also an indication of the fundamental contradictions that were to continue to hamper its role in the United Nations and other multilateral security frameworks for the rest of the Cold War, and arguably into the post-Cold War period. The avowed aspiration of Japanese policymakers in the security treaties was for the growth of the United Nations as a reliable and eventually alternative multilateral security framework, but in practice they looked first to the United States for security, and without acknowledging that the U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty may have actually undercut Japan's ability to support the development of the United Nations as a viable security institution.

Japan's other multilateral option, of a U.S.-centered collective self-defense framework in the East Asia region, was also in effect a nonoption in this period. Japan's policymakers were fully aware that this type of framework was unlikely to function effectively given that many of the partners that the United States projected for it had no shared security identity with Japan and were in fact former adversaries, such as Australia and South Korea, that were strongly disinclined to accept Japan's membership in any type of regional security community. Similarly, the increasingly apparent failure of the United States to mold a nascent collec-

tive self-defense organization in the form of SEATO, which lacked both genuine multilateral character and political and military coherence, did not inspire confidence.[7] Even more important, as noted earlier, Japanese policymakers were aware that U.S. plans for a collective self-defense framework in this period involved obligations for the overseas dispatch of the SDF, and thus entrapment in U.S. regional military strategy and the very antithesis of Japan's carefully calibrated strategic posture.

Japan's Strategic Calculus in the Mid- and Latter Stages of the Cold War

Japanese perceptions that the grand strategic bargain with the United States was the best available security option continued to hold, with some fluctuations, into the mid- and later stages of the Cold War. During the Vietnam War, Japan's immediate concern was to avoid entrapment in U.S. military strategy in Southeast Asia. Japan was prepared to provide diplomatic and economic assistance to South Vietnam, but avoided any position that suggested it could follow the United States' allies, Australia and South Korea, in dispatching military forces to assist the United States. Similarly, as the price of U.S. agreement on the eventual reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972, Japan was obliged in the Satō-Nixon joint communiqué of November 1969 to acknowledge that South Korea and Taiwan were respectively essential and important factors for the security of Japan. Nevertheless, Japan was also cautious to ensure that in the communiqué and thereafter it never provided the United States with any explicit pledge to participate directly in a regional security arrangement to support other U.S.-aligned states.[8]

During the early 1970s, the United States' pursuit of détente with the USSR and its rapprochement with China clearly reduced the risks for Japan of becoming embroiled in a regional conflict, and created space for it to pursue diplomatic and economic engagement toward China. Japan's only fear in this period was possible abandonment by the United States as a security partner as the result of bilateral economic frictions and the apparent limits of the maintenance of U.S. military hegemony in the region. Japan moved to hedge against abandonment through the device of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976. The NDPO was the first attempt by Japan to set out the principles of its defense policy alongside the military force structure necessary to achieve them. It was notable in emphasizing not only a qualitative buildup of Japan's national military capabilities as an implicit demonstration of efforts to relieve the defensive burdens of the United States, but also its explicit stress that Japan would maintain forces sufficient to defend itself in the first instance from direct aggression but that if this proved impossible it would seek U.S. support.

Japan was thus beginning to develop a military doctrine premised on the closer coordination of Japanese and U.S. forces.

Japanese and U.S. strategic interests began to coincide more closely during the late 1970s and 1980s due to the enhanced and common threat of the USSR. Japan found itself threatened to a more direct and greater degree than it had been threatened before by the Soviet military buildup in East Asia. In this situation, Japanese and U.S. Cold War strategic interests overlapped more clearly than they had previously, and Japanese policymakers' fears of needless entrapment in a military conflict were lessened.

Under the security treaty, Japan and the United States discovered for the first time a robust division of labor for security cooperation. Japan expanded its national military capabilities in order to assist the United States in fulfilling its obligations to defend Japan under Article 5 of the security treaty. Japan's military buildup, although predicated only on the basis of its own individual self-defense, was encouraged by the United States because it was seen to provide a more solid defensive platform from which the United States could project power under Article 6 of the treaty. Japan and the United States also embarked on the first steps toward the direct coordination of their respective military roles through the formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. These guidelines outlined areas for bilateral cooperation relating to Japan's immediate defense under Article 5 of the security treaty (including tactical planning, joint exercises, and logistical support) and for cooperation in regional contingencies in the Far East under Article 6 (including sea lane patrol). The fact that Japan's defense efforts were mainly focused on Japan itself, and that U.S. military activities, even if outside Japanese territory, were seen to contribute clearly to Japan's own security by countering the common Soviet threat meant that the issue of collective self-defense as a basis for bilateral cooperation was not seriously raised.

In turn, enhanced bilateral cooperation at the policy elite level among Japanese and U.S. politicians and bureaucrats, and at the operational level among the SDF and their U.S. military counterparts, led to the gradual inculcation of a norm of bilateralism into the security arrangements. This norm came to reinforce Japanese perceptions of the overall utility of the security treaty and of the importance of bilateral cooperation, to the point that in 1981 Prime Minister Zenkō Suzuki was for the first time able to refer to this relationship publicly as an alliance.

The conversion of the bilateral security treaty into an alliance did not, however, eliminate Japan's residual concerns about entrapment in U.S. military strategy, or its attempts to hedge against it. Japan retained its latent veto on the U.S. use of bases, the limitations of the geographic scope of the security treaty, and most of its key constitutional prohibitions, in-

cluding the ban on collective self-defense. The SDF's emphasis on the procurement of interceptor aircraft and antisubmarine warfare ships designed to complement and defend U.S. offensive military assets operating from Japan meant that the structure of its defense force became highly skewed, to the point that it lacked the balanced range of capabilities necessary to defend Japan independently of the United States. In this sense, Japan had begun to move away from one of the key hedging strategies of its policymakers in the early Cold War period. Yet Japanese policymakers ensured that even though the SDF and the United States increasingly developed complementary capabilities, they were still fundamentally separate. Japan avoided the integration of the SDF's command structures with those of the United States. It also studiously avoided in-depth research into Article 6-type cooperation under the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation for fear that this could lead to operations outside Japan's territory. Moreover, Japan continued to seek an indigenous defense production capacity, thereby keeping a degree of security autonomy from the United States.[9]

Japan's Post-Cold War Strategic Calculations

Japan's Post-Cold War Security Environment and Strategic Debates

Japan's strategic bargain and calculus of alliance with the United States began to come into question with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR removed the prime rationale for the security treaty and the dynamic that had influenced the evolution of the alliance in the 1980s. U.S.-Japan bilateral security arrangements also appeared poorly suited to deal with the vagaries of the new post-Cold War strategic environment.

During the Gulf War of 1990–91, Japan failed to respond to the U.S. expectation that as an ally Japan would provide a "human contribution" to the war effort of the U.S.-led and UN-sanctioned international coalition against Iraq. The Japanese government was unable to navigate the UN Peace Cooperation Corps bill through the Diet in October 1990, which would have enabled the dispatch of SDF to the Gulf region for noncombat logistical operations. It was obliged instead to financially underwrite the war with a total contribution of US$13 billion that was derided by much of international opinion as "checkbook diplomacy."[10] The final outcome of the international and domestic crisis generated by the Gulf War was to provide political momentum for the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) in June 1992, which has enabled the subsequent dispatch of the SDF on UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) missions.

Japan's failure to support its U.S. ally in the Gulf War and to meet U.S. requests to participate more actively in security affairs at the global level suffered a repeat performance at the regional level in the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994. In spite of its shared concerns about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program, Japan found itself politically hesitant and militarily incapable of supporting U.S. attempts to apply military pressure on North Korea during the crisis. The nuclear crisis exposed the fundamental lack of military operability of the U.S.-Japan alliance that resulted from Japan's reluctance since 1978 to study in depth Article 6-type bilateral cooperation for regional contingencies under the original Defense Guidelines, as pointed out in the previous section.[11]

U.S.-Japan alliance jitters in the mid-1990s were compounded by domestic questioning on both sides of the alliance's utility. Japanese domestic criticism of the alliance focused on renewed opposition to U.S. bases in Okinawa. Since reversion to Japanese administration in 1972, around 60 percent of the 37,000 U.S. troops in Japan have continued to be stationed in Okinawa, with U.S. bases accounting for close to 10 percent of the total land area of the prefecture. The necessity of this high concentration of U.S. forces in Okinawa came into question with the end of the Cold War. The protests of Okinawa's prefectural government and of sizeable sections of its civil society against this disproportionately heavy U.S. military presence obliged the Japanese and U.S. governments to create the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995. SACO's reports in 1996 recommended a general reduction of 20 percent in the land area of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the return of the Futenma Marine Corp air station at Ginowan. The SACO report assuaged Okinawan opposition to the bases, but as of early 2003 the issue has not been resolved because Futenma is yet to be relocated to an alternative site. Meanwhile, from the U.S. side, the utility of the alliance was brought into question due to trade frictions and accusations that Japan was a free rider in defense.

Since the mid-1990s, in addition to the global and regional security tests of the Gulf War and North Korea, as well as the domestic criticisms emanating from frictions over Okinawa and trade, the alliance has also been faced with a variety of new post-Cold War challenges to its continued functioning and viability. Japan is increasingly conscious of the looming military challenge of China. The preferred option of its policymakers has been and continues to be the political and economic engagement of China. Nevertheless, China's intimidation of Taiwan through military exercises and missile tests in 1995 and 1996 in the run up to presidential elections, and intensified bilateral tensions over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands since 1996, have been seen by Japanese policymakers as

increasing evidence of China's willingness to project military power in pursuit of its national interests.

China represents for Japan and the United States a potential interstate regional security challenge to set alongside that of North Korea. It is also clear that in the future the alliance will have to adjust to deal with nonstate security challenges at the regional and global levels. Japan's policymakers have argued strongly that the events of September 11 (which claimed the lives of twenty-four Japanese citizens) are a demonstration of the threat posed to international stability by terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda. Japan has been made doubly aware of the threat of terrorism by the Aum Shinrikyō's sarin gas attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995 and by the bombing in Bali in October 2002.[12] Japan has consequently been faced with the expectation that it should find ways to respond to the threats of transnational terrorism in conjunction with its U.S. ally and as a member of international society.

The contemporary and emerging challenges posed for Japan's security by the changing post-Cold War international strategic environment, and related questions about the recent ability of the U.S.-Japan alliance to respond to these challenges, have created the conditions for an ongoing debate among Japanese policymakers about the future viability of the alliance, and about the necessity and means to upgrade its functions. Japanese policy continues to be strongly influenced by antimilitaristic norms and prohibitions. However, mainstream opinion has firmly shifted toward acceptance of Japan's need to play a more active or "normal" role in regional and global security. Japan's security debate was first framed in terms of its assuming a so-called normal role following its failure to respond to requests from the United States and the international community for military participation in the Gulf War. In particular, former LDP power-broker and later leader of the Liberal Party Ichirō Ozawa gave life to this debate with his argument from the time of the Gulf War onward that Japan should become a "normal state" (*futsū no kuni*).[13] Ozawa posited that Japan, in determining its reaction to the Gulf War, should have taken greater note of the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, which obliges Japan to cooperate with the international community for the purposes of international stability. Utilizing this constitutional interpretation, Japan should thus have been free to exercise the right of *collective security* to support the United States and its other coalition partners in the UN-sanctioned war effort.

Collective security is seen to differ from collective self-defense in that the latter is an inherent right under the UN Charter that can be exercised without UN approval, whereas the former is a right that can be exercised only if sanctioned by the United Nations. Ozawa has argued ever since

that the Preamble—preferably combined with a revision of Article 9 to acknowledge Japan's right to maintain military forces for the support of international stability—provides Japan with the ability to participate in any form of UN-sanctioned and centered multilateral military operation, from PKO to full combat peace enforcement.

Ozawa's concept of a normal Japanese security role and his radical UN-centered collective security option was rejected at the time of the Gulf War. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s the idea of the normal state has been explicitly and implicitly appropriated by other sections of the policymaking community in Japan and then taken in different directions with different implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japanese Gaullist opinion has argued that Japan should assume a more normal security role by removing constitutional prohibitions, increasing its national military capacity, and eventually abrogating the security treaty with the United States, because this is the only way for Japan to break its security dependence on an external power and function as a truly independent sovereign state.[14]

The dominant strains of opinion about seeking a normal role for Japan, however, are those in favor of strengthening Japan's individual military capabilities in tandem with strengthening the alliance. Japan's most influential LDP, MOFA, and JDA policymakers have largely held to the position that the pathway to the normalization of Japanese security policy is the incremental expansion of national military capabilities and responsibilities within the framework of existing constitutional prohibitions and the U.S.-Japan alliance.[15] However, Japanese and U.S. policymakers both within and outside government have also increasingly debated whether there is need for a more radical expansion of Japan's military capabilities and simultaneous reinforcement of the alliance functions. Some commentators argue that Japan should take on enhanced capabilities and responsibilities to assist the United States, and that the United States should provide Japan with greater consultation on regional and global security affairs. In large part, this more equal partnership would involve Japan in reexamining its constitutional prohibitions and ending its ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense—thereby bringing to an end the asymmetries of the alliance in place since the Cold War.[16]

Japan's Readjusted Strategic Bargain with the United States

Japanese questioning of the future direction of national security policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance fed into official policy with the publication in August 1994 of the report of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense, known as the Higuchi Report. Designed to serve as a prepara-

tory document for the revision of the 1976 NDPO, the report recommended that Japan should adapt its policy to the post-Cold War strategic environment not only by strengthening its military cooperation with the United States, but also by taking initiatives to increase SDF involvement in UN PKO activities, and by promoting multilateral security dialogue in East Asia.[17] The report, if fully implemented, would have produced a significant shift in Japanese security policy toward greater multilateralism.

Japan's wavering with regard to its commitment to the bilateral alliance (called "alliance drift" by *Asahi Shinbun* journalist Yōichi Funabashi) was arrested, however, by the intervention of U.S. and Japanese policymakers.[18] The first moves to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance came from the United States and the production of the East Asian Strategic Review (EASR) in February 1995. The Review stated that the United States would retain 100,000 troops in East Asia; it also focused on the rehabilitation of the U.S.-Japan alliance as one of the keystones of U.S. security strategy in the region. In turn, Japan's attempts to restructure its security policy were conducted in relative coordination with U.S. security initiatives. The revised NDPO of October 1995 mirrored the Higuchi Report in stressing the need for an enhanced SDF contribution to UN PKO and the promotion of multilateral security dialogue; but it was also formulated with the draft EASR in hand and with a view to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. The revised NDPO differed from the original version in stating that Japan would now seek from the outset to repeal any form of direct aggression with U.S. assistance. It also stressed that Japan would seek to cooperate with the United States to deal with situations in areas surrounding Japan (*shūhen*) that affected Japan's security, thereby carrying over the purport of the unfinished research on U.S.-Japan cooperation under the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the conviction on the need for bilateral cooperation to respond to regional contingencies.

Japan and the United States next moved to strengthen the alliance through the issuance on April 17, 1996, of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the Twenty-First Century. This declaration stressed the importance of the bilateral alliance for the security not only of Japan but also, for the first time, of the entire Asia-Pacific. It outlined areas for future security cooperation, including technology exchange and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) research, and most important, for the revision of the 1978 guidelines and research into military cooperation to deal with situations in areas surrounding Japan (*shūhen*).

U.S.-Japan bilateral research produced the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in September 1997. As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, the revised guidelines outlined for the first

time Japan's military support for the United States in regional contingencies, including the provision of rear-end logistics, the enforcement of economic sanctions, and the use of SDF and civilian base facilities. Japan again stopped short of any form of support for the United States that involved combat or the breach of the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense, but the revised guidelines still represented a significant upgrading of the military operability of the alliance.

The NDPO, the Joint Declaration, and the revised guidelines are important adjustments to the U.S.-Japan strategic bargain. Japanese and U.S. policymakers are correct to point out that these developments constitute simply a reaffirmation of the alliance in the sense that the letter of the security treaty remains strictly intact and the revised guidelines fill in the gaps in the operability of the alliance left open since the Cold War period. Nevertheless, in other ways these policymakers are disingenuous in claiming that there has been no redefinition of the security treaty and alliance in terms of its practical emphasis and function. The revised guidelines are an indication that the division of labor between Japan and the United States that developed in the latter stages of the Cold War can no longer be strictly demarcated. Japan can no longer satisfy U.S. expectations of fulfilling an alliance defense burden by acting as a de facto frontline state against the USSR and by purely defending its own territory in line with Article 5 of the security treaty. U.S. strategic priorities and expectations for Japanese alliance cooperation have shifted to Article 6 of the treaty in order to meet regional contingencies, such as North Korea and Taiwan. The emphasis of the revised guidelines on military cooperation in areas surrounding Japan reflects this regionalization of alliance functions and adjusted strategic bargain; Japan retains U.S. security guarantees but it must reciprocate by supporting U.S. power projection capabilities more actively, both regionally and beyond.

Japan's awareness of the need to expand the range of support for the United States beyond the traditional functional and geographic confines of Cold War interpretations of the security treaty and the alliance has been demonstrated also by its reaction to the U.S. war on terrorism. As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, Japan's response has taken the form of the enactment of the ATSML and the dispatch of units of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) to support U.S. and other concerned states' efforts to combat transnational terrorism and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. To take these steps, Japan was forced to circumvent the Constitution's prohibition of collective self-defense. The U.S. and NATO allies engaged in the Afghan campaign have primarily justified their involvement on the basis of the rights of individual and collective self-defense. Japanese policymakers

might arguably have had the option to invoke the right of individual self-defense due to the number of Japanese fatalities in the events of September 11. Instead, their preference has been for a noncombat and logistical role in support of the Afghan campaign that neither invokes individual self-defense nor challenges the ban on collective self-defensive but is predicated on relevant UN resolutions. Japan has stressed UN resolutions that identify the September 11 attacks on the United States as a threat to international peace and call on all member states, and by implication Japan, to combat terrorism. Japan has been able to link these resolutions to its own Constitution in order to legitimize SDF dispatch. It has done this by switching emphasis from Article 9 of the Constitution to the Preamble, which states, as explained earlier, that Japan should work with international society for the preservation of peace. Japan has been able to use the Preamble to argue that it should support the United Nations as international society's highest representative and its relevant resolutions to combat terrorism by dispatching the SDF to the Indian Ocean area.[19]

Japan included provisions in the ATSML that enabled the MSDF and ASDF to provide logistical and refueling support for U.S. and other international forces across an area stretching from the Indian Ocean to Australia, Japan, and the United States, and that allowed the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) to operate in Pakistan and India to provide medical care and protection for refugees from the Afghan conflict and wounded U.S. personnel. In devising its response to the war on terrorism, Japan has stretched its constitutional interpretations to the utmost, and as many policymakers admit, it is now to all intents and purposes involved in an active war campaign with the United States. Yet even this role is indirect and distanced from the actual battlefield.

Japan's Post-Cold War Strategic Calculus

The turnaround in the propensity and level of Japan's commitment to provide active support for the United States to deal with regional and global security crises during the ten-year period from the Gulf War to the war on terrorism appears remarkable. Japan's overall strategic calculus, despite the doubts of the early post-Cold War period, clearly remains weighted toward the strategic benefits of continued alliance with the United States and can be accounted for by a number of factors. Japanese policymakers, faced in the short to medium term with the potential threat from North Korea and in the long term with the latent threat of China and in general with an uncertain strategic environment in East Asia, have concluded that the bilateral relationship with the United States remains the most reliable quantity in their overall security calculations. The al-

liance with the United States is perceived as continuing to provide a framework that enables Japan to gradually assume an enhanced regional and global security role, and it works to suppress, if not always resolve, many potential regional security threats. Moreover, Japanese policymakers are aware that if the alliance relationship were to fail, then one option Japan might be forced to pursue for its defense is a rapid qualitative and quantitative expansion of its independent national military capabilities. The outcome of this expansion could be to produce enhanced fears of Japan's remilitarization and militarism in East Asia, an action-reaction arms race dynamic in the region, and a costly downward spiral of insecurity.

Japanese perceptions of the utility of the alliance are also buttressed by increasingly deeply rooted norms of bilateralism among key sections of the policymaking community and by the growth of the alliance as a quasi-institution. Japan and U.S. interaction at the policy elite and military operation levels that began during the Cold War has gathered further momentum since the 1990s, leading to a greater coincidence of normative worldviews and Japanese acceptance of the central importance of bilateral cooperation as a means to safeguard regional and global political, economic, and security orders.[20] In short, Japan continues to view the alliance as its safest security bet, and its policymakers have acquired deeply ingrained normative habits of bilateral behavior.

Japan's acceptance of a strengthened bilateral alliance as the outcome of its post-Cold War strategic calculus is further confirmed by its policymakers' knowledge that a strengthened alliance carries strategic risks as well as benefits, but that they still have at their disposal the means to manage both the entrapment and abandonment alliance dilemmas. As they were during the Cold War, Japanese policymakers are aware that the United States can be a capricious superpower ally with a regional and global security agenda that may supersede its interests vis-à-vis Japan. Japanese concerns about abandonment by the U.S. surfaced momentarily during the period of so-called alliance drift in the early stages of the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s, and then again toward the later stages of the administration in the late 1990s as the United States appeared disaffected with Japan's economic malaise and instead to be prioritizing relations with a rising China. Japan's reaction to this potential abandonment by the United States has been to strengthen the alliance, but also to explore, as seen later, other bilateral and multilateral options for its security.

Given U.S.-Japan recognition, however, of the importance of the alliance and of the moves to strengthen it, the most probable alliance dilemma scenario for Japan is entrapment in U.S. regional and global military strategy. U.S. expectations that U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation

should shift from Article 5 to Article 6 and include contingencies such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, combined with the adverse reaction of China to the strengthening of the alliance's regional contingency functions and the advent of the George W. Bush administration, which has fixed even more firmly on the U.S.-Japan alliance as the foundation of U.S. regional strategy, have intensified the entrapment dilemma. In particular, if the definition of *shūhen* in the revised guidelines were ever operationalized, Japan would be forced to choose between its engagement strategy toward China and its alliance with the United States, thereby upsetting its careful balancing act between its regional and global interests throughout the postwar period.

Nevertheless, Japan's policymakers have continued to deploy a number of traditional hedging tactics to minimize and manage the risks of entrapment. During the process of the revision of the defense guidelines, Japan took pains to stress that it still retained the option of saying no to the United States if it felt that Article 6-type cooperation did not function on behalf of the immediate security of Japan. The political costs of sustaining the alliance by using the final veto noted earlier are still too great to make it anything but a last-ditch option to check U.S. security behavior. Japan has instead fallen back on the option of continuing to manipulate the geographic scope of the security treaty to obfuscate and build in limitations to its security commitments. Japanese government policymakers maintain that the revised guidelines were not designed to counter the threat from any specific country, and that the term *shūhen* used in the guidelines as well as in the NDPO is situational rather than geographic. They argue that Prime Minister Kishi's 1960 definition of the Far East remains intact and that the revised guidelines contain a geographic element in that the range of action of the security treaty is most likely to be close to Japan. They also stress, however, Kishi's additional statements at the time that definitions of *shūhen* are not necessarily geographically rigid or restrictive of the security treaty's range of action, and they posit that it is not possible to draw a firm geographic line to demarcate Japan's security interests.

This concept of situational need introduces a valuable element of strategic ambiguity into the coverage of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and enables Japan to hedge against a regional contingency involving China and the United States. Utilizing the strengthened regional contingency functions of the revised guidelines, and in line with the 1960 definition of the Far East, Japan retains the option to support the United States in order to deter Chinese military action against Taiwan. At the same time, Japan's simultaneous utilization of the concept of situational need under the revised guidelines enables it to choose to deemphasize the clear-cut geographic specification of Taiwan as part of *shūhen* and as a concern of

the U.S.-Japan security treaty and guidelines, and thereby deemphasize the designation of China as a threat and the risks of antagonizing it that could overturn its preferred strategy of engagement.

Japan has also minimized the risks of involuntary participation in U.S. regional military strategy by adhering to its own constitutional prohibitions. Throughout the revision of the guidelines, Japan's policymakers doggedly held the line that the legitimization for enhanced bilateral cooperation remained Japan's self-defense. The refusal to breach the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, despite the heightened domestic debate on this issue, has meant that Japanese policy elites have remained the final arbiters of which regional contingencies pose a sufficient security risk to warrant Japanese support for U.S. military action. Finally, Japan has again sought to hedge against entrapment by the careful structuring of its military forces and by the retention of key independent military capabilities. Japan and the United States have sought to coordinate their command and control systems more closely through a comprehensive mechanism in order to implement the revised guidelines. Japan has taken care, however, to ensure that these systems remain distinct and nonintegrated. It has also eschewed the development of power projection capabilities. This is in line with constitutional prohibitions and with the principle of "exclusively defense-oriented defense." At the same time, however, Japan's relative lack of long-range defensive expeditionary force capabilities that can complement U.S.-led coalitions (with the exception of its minesweeping functions) has also enabled it to evade U.S. demands for the dispatch of the SDF outside Japan's immediate area.

Japan has found it increasingly difficult to maintain indigenous production capabilities for key military technologies and has been obliged to explore with the United States greater joint research and development of key weapons such as the F-2 fighter aircraft and BMD systems. Even so, Japan has still attempted to maintain independent production capabilities, not only for reasons of military-civilian technology "spin-on" and "techno-nationalism," but also to ensure a degree of continued autonomy in military affairs that lessens dependence on the United States and the risks of entrapment.[21] Japan's decision since 1999, in reaction to North Korea's test-firing of a Taepondong-1 missile over Japan in September 1998, to acquire its own intelligence satellites, as inferior as these might be to U.S. off-the-shelf products, is a demonstration of this drive for a degree of security autonomy from the United States.

Japanese hedging tactics are also evident in its response to the war on terrorism. Contrary to speculation in both Japan and the United States, Japan has not yet "crossed the Rubicon" in dispatching the SDF to the Indian Ocean area and in terms of providing unequivocal military support

for its U.S. ally in future operations in the war on terrorism or other conflicts. Japan's policymakers have again held the line on the nonexercise of collective self-defense and on limited SDF dispatch to noncombat functions, and they have made it clear that dispatch is outside the framework of the bilateral security treaty and the revised defense guidelines and is predicated instead on specific UN resolutions relating to September 11 and the Afghan conflict. In this way, even though it has in practice provided substantial military support for the United States in the Afghan campaign, Japan has retained the legal safeguard to avoid providing similar cooperation for the United States in other military operations relating to the war on terrorism that are not sanctioned by the UN, and to avoid providing similar support in the context of the bilateral security treaty in East Asia.

Aware that the possession and deployment of certain military capabilities in the military theater could lead to expanded requests for military cooperation from the United States, Japanese policymakers have also been cautious in deciding the actual composition of the SDF forces dispatched to the Indian Ocean area. Japan initially decided not to dispatch the MSDF's destroyers equipped with Kongō-class *Aegis* war-fighting systems (AWS) to the Indian Ocean area in its first deployments in November 2001, and then relented on this decision only in December 2002. Japanese policymakers were deeply divided on the issue of Aegis dispatch because, on the one hand, they recognized that the AWS destroyers are the MSDF's most capable asset and thus provide it with maximum flexibility and security in an uncertain theater of operations, while on the other hand they were concerned that the high degree of interoperability between MSDF and U.S. Navy warships equipped with the AWS might lead to U.S. requests for Japan to deploy its naval assets as substitutes for those of the United States, thus raising questions of the potential for the exercise of collective self-defense, and the risk of Japanese forces becoming directly involved in combat operations.

Japan's government eventually made the decision for *Aegis* dispatch only after persistent internal pressure from MOFA, JDA, and MSDF, which sought to maximize the safety of Japanese forces and the degree of visible support for the U.S.-led war effort, and after the damping down of hostilities in Afghanistan, which minimized the risks of the SDF becoming involved in combat operations. Japanese caution was also seen in the decision not to dispatch the GSDF to Pakistan under the ATSML. In part this decision was obviated by the relative lack of U.S. casualties in the Afghan war and by the ability of aid agencies to cope with refugee flows. In part, however, the government was also influenced by fears that the GSDF could become embroiled in land-combat operations in the volatile environment of Pakistan.

Japan's Multilateral Options and Nonoptions in the Post-Cold War Period

In addition to their analysis of the relative benefits and costs of alliance and available hedging options, Japanese policymakers' strategic choice in favor of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War has been strongly influenced by their perceptions of the availability and viability of multilateral frameworks as alternative security options. Japan has undoubtedly sought to explore multilateralism as a security option far more deeply in the post-Cold War period than it did during the Cold War. Japan was especially encouraged in the early 1990s as the relaxation of regional tensions and the Clinton administration's own "multilateral moment" in regard to APEC and other regional organizations offered an environment conducive to multilateral frameworks. Japan's revised NDPO stresses that the bilateral U.S.-Japan security arrangements facilitate the promotion of multilateral security dialogue and cooperation, as well as support for UN activities. The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security asserts that the two states will cooperate with each other and with other states to further promote multilateral security dialogue bodies such as the ARF.

Japan is now known, as outlined in Chapter 11, to have played a major part in initiating ASEAN's moves to create the ARF and has been one of its most consistent supporters. Japan has matched its support for the ARF's Track I security dialogue with active participation in a variety of Track II dialogue bodies such as the Council on Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security, and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). The Japanese government further dabbled with multilateral security concepts in the region by suggesting since 1997 the possibility of a four-way dialogue on security among Japan, the United States, Russia, and China, and that Japan and Russia could be added to the four-way peace talks over the Korean Peninsula to create a six-way peace framework. The director general of the JDA in March 2002 also suggested (in what has become known as the Shangri-La initiative, after its Singapore hotel conference venue) that the ARF, which mainly involves foreign ministry officials in the region, could be complemented by a defense ministers' forum.

APEC has served for Japan as a type of security forum for the multilateral discussion of the Korean Peninsula and East Timor. Japan has also utilized the margins of APEC and the ASEAN+3 (APT) as a space for more informal, minilateral and multiple bilateral security dialogues with China, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and individual ASEAN states. In addition, Japan has been an active member of the U.S.-inspired Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), which has func-

tioned to promote trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea diplomatic cooperation to respond to the North Korean security problem.

Japan's support for multilateral security cooperation at the regional level via the United Nations has grown significantly in the post-Cold War period with Japan's participation in UN PKO operations. Japan's human contribution to the United National Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC) and PKO activities took the form of providing 600 GSDF engineers for supply and reconstruction projects from 1992 to 1993. In 2002, Japan also dispatched 680 GSDF personnel for reconstruction activities in East Timor, and unfroze provisions in the IPCL that now enable the SDF to participate in core UN PKO activities, including the monitoring of ceasefires; the inspection, transport, and disposal of weapons; and the exchange of prisoners.

Japan's participation in multilateral security frameworks thus represents a total reversal of its position during the Cold War with regard to the acceptance of regional security dialogue, and a major expansion with regard to UN-centered multilateral activities. Japan's support of the formation and maintenance of these frameworks, and the importance of their contribution to confidence building and stability in East Asia, should not be belittled. It is clear, however, that few Japanese policymakers really view multilateral frameworks as viable security options in terms of their assuming a major and effective role in guaranteeing Japan's security over the medium to long terms. Moreover, in relation to the existing U.S.-Japan security arrangements, few policymakers see multilateral frameworks as capable of significantly bolstering the functions of the alliance, let alone developing as practical alternatives. Indeed, it is arguable that, as is explained in this section, the factor of multilateralism is actually perceived in certain cases not to be such an effective hedge against and to ameliorate the costs of the alliance with the United States, but to potentially accentuate these costs by complicating the dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment—entrapment in the sense that multilateral frameworks may actually work to reinforce Japan's dependence on a U.S.-determined security agenda; and abandonment in the sense that multilateral frameworks may work for a divergence of U.S.-Japan security interests that undermines the alliance.

Therefore, contrary to the arguments of Japanese and U.S. policymakers and academics, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Japan's participation in multilateral security frameworks does not necessarily involve a straightforward development upward and outward from the base of U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation, nor does it imply that both types of approaches to security are capable of developing equally or are sustainable in conjunction. Instead, the recent record of Japan's support

for multilateral security frameworks suggests that bilateralism and multilateralism are in tension with each other, and that Japanese policymakers have been reluctant to experiment too far with the latter for fear of undoing the strategic bargain of the former and enhancing its associated risks.

That bilateralism and multilateralism make uncomfortable and even irreconcilable bedfellows is illustrated by examining the limitations of Japan's participation in extant and putative regional cooperative security, in U.S.- and UN-centered collective self-defense, and in UN-centered collective multilateral security frameworks. Japan's commitment to the ARF as a multilateral cooperative and regional security dialogue body has been active, but this participation clearly remains a highly limited option for Japan's security policy. This is because Japan's participation in this form of multilateral cooperative security framework has been tailored to conform to the overarching constraints of U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance objectives, and because this framework is seen to have only moderate potential to develop into a practical framework for augmenting Japan's security.

Japan has been motivated to participate in the ARF to reassure regional states about its security intentions in the fluid post-Cold War international environment, and in large part, as noted in Chapter 11, to ensure its U.S. ally's continued security engagement in the region. Japan is able to participate in the ARF because as a cooperative security dialogue body it involves no obligations for the exercise of military force, and thus is in line with the principle of individual self-defense. Just as important, the absence of any military commitment means that the multilateralism of the ARF can in no way challenge Japan's present or future bilateral military commitments to the United States. Hence, for Japan the ARF serves as a multilateral framework that ensures the essential continuity and reinforcement of the primacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance and limits the risks of abandonment. Not unsurprisingly, Japan has ascribed to the ARF the role of supplemental rather than alternative security framework to the alliance.

In turn, it can be argued that Japan's continued subordination of ARF multilateralism to the demands of U.S.-Japan alliance bilateralism has ensured that the ARF is not just at best a supplement to the alliance, but it also has had even these supplemental functions undercut by the alliance relationship, thus demonstrating the essential incompatibility of multilateral and bilateral approaches in the case of cooperative security. Japanese policymakers and commentators have asserted that they have no choice but to prioritize the bilateral alliance because the ARF's security function remains highly limited in both conception and practice for all involved states. Most notable among the ARF's limitations has been its lack of a mandate and of organizational capacity to tackle interstate tensions in Northeast Asia with regard to North Korea and Taiwan and intrastate

conflict in Southeast Asia, and to move from its current state of confidence building and security measures to preventive diplomacy. It would not be reasonable to criticize Japanese policymakers for failing to rely on the ARF to deal with these issues, because few member states have envisaged the ARF as a body that can deal practically with these issues alone or substitute for existing individual national and alliance deterrence capabilities. Nevertheless, it is important for Japanese policymakers to acknowledge that the continued prioritization of the U.S.-Japan alliance has been not only the consequence but also the cause of the relative inability to date of the ARF to develop in order to fulfill even its more limited mandate of cooperative security.

Japan's strong attachment to bilateralism does not sit comfortably with multilateral security dialogue principles and in fact undermines the prospects for its development. Multilateral cooperative security relies on the principle that no attempt should be made to designate, explicitly or implicitly, certain states within a region as adversaries, and it stresses the need for all regional states, even those of potential concern, to cooperate with one another to eliminate sources of military conflict. Japanese and U.S. efforts to strengthen their alliance, and the well-understood fact in all states of the region, despite Japanese obfuscation and hedging tactics, that China is to all intents and purposes one of the most likely adversaries for alliance military cooperation, contravene these principles. China has often been seen as responsible for obstructing the progress of the ARF toward preventive diplomacy. It has most certainly been interested in restricting ARF functions to confidence-building measures since it joined the body in 1994, and even before the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the mid-1990s. However, since the mid-1990s, the enhanced regional security functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance have clearly contributed to China's reluctance to push forward the ARF process with partners that see China as a potential adversary. In this sense, it can be said that in spite of the metaphorical talk of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a platform for the growth of ARF cooperative security, the bilateral alliance has actually proved to be a ceiling on the further development of these forms of regionwide multilateral frameworks.

Japan's potential participation in any type of collective self-defense and multilateral security arrangement can also be seen as conditioned by and meant to serve the purposes of alliance bilateralism, far more than serving as any type of viable alternative to the alliance. Japan would be able to consider participation in such a multilateral framework only if it were to lift its constitutional prohibition on the exercise of collective self-defense. As noted earlier, since the early 1990s Japan has faced increased domestic and international demands to exercise this right in order to

move toward achieving a normal role in security. It is important to note, however, that the majority of those pushing for Japan to revise its constitutional prohibitions, especially the most influential figures in policymaking circles in Japan and the United States, advocate this course of action primarily because it is a means by which Japan can further expand its support for the bilateral alliance rather than a way of equalizing its security role in multilateral frameworks. Japanese and U.S. policymakers in favor of the exercise of collective self-defense do not deny the utility of Japan's participation in UN-centered or other multilateral frameworks, but this is clearly a secondary consideration to the prime one of upgrading the ease of bilateral alliance cooperation. Japan is seen as exercising the collective self-defense multilateral option in order to participate primarily in U.S.-led multilateral coalitions of the willing along the lines of the Gulf War and the war on terrorism that may or may not be under the sanction of the United Nations.

In practice, therefore, Japan's exercise of collective self-defense may simply serve to strengthen U.S.-Japan bilateral security linkages further, with participation in multilateral frameworks enhanced but still functioning as a secondary appendage to the alliance. Japan could then be faced with scenarios similar to the Cold War period of debate on collective self-defense—aware that the exercise of this right in the name of multilateralism will in actuality lead only to greater dependence on U.S. bilateralism and entrapment.

Japan's other conceivable multilateral security option is to explore enhanced UN-centered frameworks. Japan has shown an inclination to expand UN cooperation in a number of ways. It has been able to expand cooperation with the UN incrementally by keeping in place current constitutional prohibitions and utilizing the principle of individual self-defense. As already observed, this has enabled it to take on important UN PKOs and to exploit UN resolutions to expand the range of Japan's cooperation in the war on terrorism since 2001. Japan also has available the option of exercising collective self-defense in line with and to serve the principles of the UN Charter, and to enable full participation in UN activities.

Just as radical is the potential option of collective security. Japan rejected this Ozawa-inspired proposal for a normal role in security at the time of the Gulf War. Nevertheless, Japan's participation in the Afghan campaign, with its stress on the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution and on UN resolutions as the de jure basis for SDF dispatch, has edged Japan toward a latent, if not yet acknowledged, collective security option. If it were to take this option in the future, Japan could participate in all forms of UN-sanctioned security activities, both in conjunction with and independent of the United States. Japan's collective security option could

thus make for greater U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation in a new range of coalition missions and in scenarios like that of the first Gulf War. It could also, however, allow Japan, on the basis of UN resolutions, to remove its military capabilities from the context and control of the bilateral alliance, to place them under the control of the UN Security Council (UNSC), and actually to prevent U.S.-Japan cooperation in certain instances. Japan's careful use of UN resolutions to both expand and limit its role in the Afghan campaign in support of the United States is an example of how a multilateral collective security option under the auspices of the United Nations could check bilateral cooperation and undermine political confidence in the alliance.

Japan's strong interest in a UNSC permanent seat means that it will continue to deepen cooperation with UN-centered multilateral security activities. It is likely, however, to be ultracautious in expanding cooperation with the United Nations through the utilization of collective self-defense or collective security options. Japanese exercise of collective self-defense, given the realities of U.S. leadership in international coalitions, is likely, even under the sanction of the United Nations, to compound the risks of entrapment. Japanese exercise of collective security could accentuate the risks of entrapment, and more likely abandonment, especially if Japan is more beholden to the demands of the United Nations than to its U.S. ally. Instead, the most likely path of Japan's UN-centered multilateral activities is to continue to explore the current incremental path of expanding cooperation in PKO and in the types of measures contained in the ATSML and in similar legal frameworks in the future. This offers Japan the ability to make an active multilateral contribution to international security via the United Nations that is at times distinct from the function of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also to maintain the bilateral alliance as the principal foundation of its security policy.

Indeed, it is apparent that in the post-Cold War period, as in the Cold War period, for Japanese policymakers one of the principal functions of the United Nations is to provide multilateral legitimization for the incremental expansion of U.S.-Japan bilateral security activities that are seen not to impose unmanageable risks of entrapment. The role of the United Nations as a "stalking horse" for recent developments in the expansion of alliance cooperation can be seen in a number of ways. The revised NDPO and the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, although designed to facilitate bilateral cooperation, again both draw on the United Nations for their legitimacy. Japan's participation in PKO has been seen by some as a means to enable SDF dispatch to accomplish the goal that was not possible at the time of the first Gulf War of removing restrictions on the overseas dispatch of the SDF on an individual self-de-

fense basis and then of preparing the domestic and international conditions for SDF dispatch on other missions that are non-UN-centered, including support for U.S. forces in East Asia. Japan's role in the war on terrorism has been a partial realization of this goal, and the clearest demonstration that UN multilateralism can be manipulated as the justification for bilateral objectives.

Japan's Security Policy Toward Bilateralism Plus

From the above discussion, Japan can be seen to have consistently prioritized alliance bilateralism over cooperative, collective self-defense, and collective security forms of multilateralism. Japanese policymakers have tried to graft cooperative security onto the bilateral alliance, but its viability has been sapped by the alliance itself. Collective self-defense engenders too many uncertainties and potential alliance costs. Collective security is a too-radical option that spells entrapment or abandonment. Hence, the alliance may have strengthened and regionalized its functions in the post-Cold War period, but this is yet to be accompanied by any serious multilateralization. Multilateralism is a "bolt on" and supplemental accessory that primarily serves the needs of bilateralism. The U.S.-Japan alliance embraces multilateralism only in the sense of "bilateralism plus."

Japan's continued preference for strengthened bilateralism and the underdevelopment of multilateral security options can be explained by its overall strategic calculation in the post-Cold War period. Japanese policymakers have concluded that in an uncertain strategic environment the U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most reliable form of security insurance, and that even though the strengthening of the bilateral security arrangements also carries potentially heavy risks, Japan can employ a variety of tactics to hedge against these. Multilateralism is one option that Japan's policymakers are prepared to experiment with in order to hedge against total security dependence on the United States, but at present multilateral frameworks are not seen as viable options because they lack efficacy or only exacerbate alliance risks. Therefore, Japan's highly complex strategic calculus has arrived at the simple outcome that, given its international and domestic circumstances, the bilateral alliance is still the best security option available.

In determining the future trajectory of its security policy, Japan is also unlikely to demonstrate much prospect of moving beyond bilateralism or into bilateralism plus. Its security policy will continue to be influenced by a strategic calculus and by component factors similar to the Yoshida doctrine that have driven it toward bilateralism in the past. Japanese percep-

tions of its immediate regional security environment continue to be dominated by North Korea and the rise of Chinese power. Japan will persist in moving toward engagement with China. However, the relative decline of its economic capacity to pursue engagement policies may force Japan to rely increasingly on its own national military capabilities in tandem with those of the bilateral alliance to hedge against a potential Chinese security threat. At the same time, Japan will face ever-increasing U.S. expectations for enhanced bilateral alliance cooperation to deal with regional contingencies involving North Korea and China, and for support in contingencies beyond East Asia.

Still lacking suitable alternatives, Japan is likely to see continued value in the further strengthening of the alliance. The ongoing growth of the norm of bilateral interaction among policy elites will also harden Japan's resolve in this task, even if Japanese policymakers persist with examining alternative options and hedging tactics to manage the potential costs of the alliance. Japan will continue to obfuscate the true extent of its military support for the alliance in East Asia; to separate its support for the United States in the context of the bilateral alliance from support in other contexts, such as the war on terrorism; to maintain many key constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of military force; to eschew certain types of power projection capacity that could be used to defend the United States; and to safeguard key indigenous military production capabilities. Nevertheless, Japan's room for maneuver to exercise these options is likely to shrink in the near future. Japan may find it politically hard to sustain the U.S.-Japan alliance while simultaneously placing different and, as possibly seen from the U.S. perspective, artificial restrictions on the support it can provide to the United States in the Afghan conflict under the ATSML and on a regional contingency under the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. If it were to move from the stage of cooperative research to actual production and deployment of BMD systems, Japan would also find it difficult to continue to obfuscate its commitments to the United States and maintain its constitutional prohibitions. To construct an effective BMD, Japan will be forced to rely on U.S. sensor technology to track incoming ballistic missiles and to integrate increasingly its command and control systems with those of its ally.[22] In this instance, Japan will have to commit itself to more definite military contingency planning and joint military action with the United States, and will most probably have to end its ban on collective self-defense.

In plumping for a sea-based BMD option on its current class or on a new class of Aegis destroyers, Japan will also acquire a significant form of overseas expeditionary defensive capacity that could be used to sup-

port U.S.-led coalitions in Gulf War-type scenarios. Hence, the need for technology and the possession of military capabilities may push Japan toward ever tighter military integration with the United States—again drawing Japan into the very scenario feared by Yoshida at the start of the postwar period of involvement in U.S. expeditions and land wars.

Finally, Japan may find that multilateralism remains a security option that has too many unquantifiable risks to make it worth exercising. Japan is unlikely to seek the multilateral option unless the costs of alliance with the United States become so great that they outweigh the Japanese ability to manage them and associated alliance benefits. If Japan were to become potentially entrapped in a Sino-U.S. conflict it might need to reconsider the benefits of the alliance and opt for a UN-centered framework or even the independent Gaullist option. However, given Japanese policymakers' greater concerns about the unknown risks of the rise of China, and given the vagaries of multilateralism and complete security autonomy in a hostile region compared to the relatively known risks of alliance with the United States and the fear that if Japan does not support its ally the security treaty will in effect be nullified, Japan on balance might still acquiesce to the calculation that it is better to be entrapped than abandoned by alliance bilateralism.